Reductionism  

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-In [[philosophy]], '''reduction''' is the process by which one object, property, concept, theory, etc., is shown to be explicable in terms of another, lower level, concept, object, property, etc. For example, we say that [[Physics|physical]] properties such as the [[boiling point]] of a substance are reducible to that substance’s [[molecule|molecular]] properties, because [[statistical mechanics]] explain why a liquid boils at a certain temperature using only the properties of its constituent atoms. Thus we might also describe reduction as a process analogous to [[wiktionary:absorption|absorption]], by which one theory (or concept, or property, and so on) is wholly subsumed under another.+'''Reductionism''' is any of several related [[Philosophy|philosophical]] ideas regarding the associations between [[Phenomenon|phenomena]], which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts.
-In [[science]], such reduction is generally desirable, because it explains why and how the thing which is being reduced exists, and because it promotes conceptual and theoretical economy. Reducing chemical properties to properties of atoms thus explains these properties and integrates them into a single explanatory framework, that of atomic structure.+== Definitions ==
 +''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name=Ruse>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>
 +# '''Ontological reductionism''': a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.
 +# '''Methodological reductionism''': the scientific attempt to provide explanation in terms of ever smaller entities.
 +# '''Theory reductionism''': the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation and explanation.<ref name=Ney />
-[[Reductionism]] may therefore be divided into three general areas &ndash; methodological, theoretical, and [[ontology|ontological]] &ndash; and reduction (the process) into two &ndash; theoretical and ontological.+Reductionism can be applied to any [[phenomenon]], including [[object (philosophy)|objects]], problems, [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings.<ref name=Ney /><ref name=Polkinghorne>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism |author=John Polkinghorne |url=http://www.disf.org/en/Voci/104.asp |encyclopedia=Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science|date=2002 |publisher=Advanced School for Interdisciplinary Research; Pontifical University of the Holy Cross}}</ref><ref>For reductionism referred to [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings, see [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]'s ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''. Quine objected to the [[positivism|positivistic]], reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.</ref>
-==Types of reductionism==+For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. [[Thomas Nagel]] and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry).<ref name=Nagel /> In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />
-Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities. Methodological reductionism would thus hold that the atomic explanation of a substance’s boiling point is preferable to the chemical explanation, and that an explanation based on even smaller particles (quarks, perhaps) would be even better.+Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name=Polkinghorne /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name=Blackburn>{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 27 October 2005 |page=311 |isbn= 978-0-19-861013-7 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name=Kim>{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0-19-103747-4 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name=Jones />
-Theoretical reductionism is the position that all scientific theories either can or should be reduced to a single super-theory through the process of theoretical reduction. +The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."<ref name=Jones />
-Finally, ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances. This claim is usually [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and is most commonly a form of [[monism]], in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A [[dualism|dualist]] who is an ontological reductionist would presumably believe that everything is reducible to one of two substances.)+Reductionism should be distinguished from [[Eliminative materialism|eliminationism]]: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.
-==Types of reduction==+Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref>Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref>Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to [https://www.d-iep.org/diep DIEP]-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>
-The distinction between the processes of theoretical and ontological reduction is equally important. Theoretical reduction is the process by which one theory is absorbed into another; for example, both [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler's]] laws of the motion of the [[planets]] and [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]]’s theories of motion worked out for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics, because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered to be beneficial because [[Newtonian mechanics]] is a more general theory &mdash; that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Theoretical reduction, therefore, is the reduction of one explanation or theory to another &mdash; that is, it is the absorption of one of our ideas about a particular thing into another idea.+== Types ==
 +Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.<ref name="Ruse" />
-By contrast, ontological reduction is the process of reducing things themselves to one another. For example, it was once believed that [[vitalism|life was an irreducible property of objects]]. An ontology of such properties might therefore have read:+=== Ontological reductionism ===
-*extension in space+Ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances.<ref name=":0" /> This claim is usually [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and is most commonly a form of [[monism]], in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A [[mind-body dualism|dualist]] who is an ontological reductionist would believe that everything is reducible to two substances—as one possible example, a dualist might claim that reality is composed of "[[matter]]" and "[[spirit]]".)
-*location in space+
-*is alive+
-*has a soul+
-*and so on.+
-All the other properties of an object, such as its shape, color, or mobility are considered to be nothing more than the effects of these irreducible properties. Shape, for example, is a function of in what way the object is extended in space, as is color, since it is determined by how light bounces off a surface, which is in turn determined by how that object is extended in space.+Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.<ref>Richard H. Jones (2000), ''Reductionism: Analysis and the Fuullness of Reality'', pp. 24-26, 29-31. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.</ref>
-Science now considers that all life forms are alive by virtue of the fact that they are physically organized in such a way that they can reproduce themselves, not because they possess a special property distinct from and in addition to their physical organization. Biologists therefore say the property of life is reducible to the physical properties of an organism; being alive is simply nothing more than having certain physical properties.+[[Nancey Murphy]] has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.<ref>Nancey Murphy, "Reductionism and Emergence. A Critical Perspective." In ''Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion''. Edited by Nancey Murphy, and Christopher C. Knight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. P. 82.</ref>
-==Benefits of reduction==+Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological [[emergence]], and claims that emergence is an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref>[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-9213.00136 Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", ''The Philosophical Quarterly'', Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999)], ({{ISSN|0031-8094}}).</ref>
-An ontological reduction reduces the number of [[ontological primitive]]s that exist within our [[ontology]]. Philosophers welcome this, because every ontological primitive demands a special explanation for its existence. If we maintain that life is not a physical property, for example, then we must give a separate explanation of why some objects possess it and why others do not. This is more often than not a daunting task, and such explanations often have the flavor of ''[[ad hoc]]'' contrivances or ''[[deus ex machina]]''. Also, since every ontological primitive must be acknowledged as one of the fundamental principles of the natural world, we must also account for why this element in particular should be considered one of those underlying principles. (To return to an earlier example, it would be extremely difficult to explain why planets are so fundamental that special laws of motion should apply to them.) This is often extremely hard to do, especially in the face of our strong preference for simple explanations. Pursuing ontological reduction thus serves to unify and simplify our ontology, while guarding against needless [[Ockham's razor|multiplication of entities]] in the process.+Ontological reductionism takes two forms: '''token ontological reductionism''' and '''type ontological reductionism'''.{{Citation needed|date=July 2020}}
-At the same time, the requirements for satisfactorily showing that one thing is reducible to another are extremely steep. First and foremost, all features of the original property or object must be accounted for. For example, [[lightning]] would not be reducible to the electrical activity of air [[molecules]] if the reduction explained why lightning is deadly, but not why it always seeks the highest point to strike. Our preference for simple and unified explanations is a strong force for reductionism, but our demand that all relevant phenomena be accounted for is at least as strong a force against it.+Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.
-== Examples ==+Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_reductionism.html|title=Reductionism – By Branch / Doctrine – The Basics of Philosophy|work=philosophybasics.com}}</ref>
-In [[metaphysics]], the [[Bundle theory]] says that objects can be reduced to collections of properties;+[[Michael Ruse]] has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against [[vitalism]].<ref>[http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/1061.pdf] Michael Ruse, "Do Organisms Exist?", Am. Zool., 29: 1061–1066 (1989)</ref>
-so whenever we talk about objects, we can be understood to be talking about bundles of properties. Does this mean that the bundle theory says that objects do not exist? Perhaps not objects as we had thought of them, but the theory ''is'' trying to give an account of what objects ''are''; namely, they are bundles of properties. So, the bundle theorist is not denying that objects exist; he or she is affirming that objects are the same as bundles of properties. The only reason one would have for maintaining, then, that the bundle theory holds that objects do not exist is if you think that, according to our ordinary concepts, something simply ''cannot'' both be a bundle of properties ''and'' an object.+
-Philosophers mean about the same thing when they talk about what exists ''ultimately''. For example, the bundle theory says that ultimately, properties and bundles thereof exist, rather than objects. The things that exist "ultimately" are precisely the things to which other things are reduced.+=== Methodological reductionism ===
 +Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Montague|first=Gerard P.|title=Who Am I? Who Is She?: A Naturalistic, Holistic, Somatic Approach to Personal Identity|publisher=Transaction Books|year=2012|isbn=978-3-86838-144-3|location=Piscataway, NJ|pages=308}}</ref> In a biological context, this means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism in Biology |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-biology/ |last1=Brigandt |first1=Ingo |date=2017 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Love |first2=Alan |access-date=2019-04-28}}</ref> Claim of efficacy is demonstrated that the gene – unit of classical heredity – is the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a macro-molecule.<ref name=":1" />
 + 
 +=== Theory reductionism ===
 +Theory reduction is the process by which a more general theory absorbs a special theory.<ref name=":0" /> For example, both [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler's]] laws of the motion of the [[planet]]s and [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]]'s theories of motion formulated for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered beneficial because [[Newtonian mechanics]] is a more general theory—that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Besides scientific theories, theory reduction more generally can be the process by which one explanation subsumes another.
 + 
 +== In science ==
 +{{More citations needed section|date=August 2011}}
 +Reductionist thinking and methods form the basis for many of the well-developed topics of modern [[science]], including much of [[physics]], [[chemistry]] and [[molecular biology]]. [[Classical mechanics]] in particular is seen as a reductionist framework. For instance, we understand the solar system in terms of its components (the sun and the planets) and their interactions.<ref>{{Cite book|last=McCauley|first=Joseph L.|title=Dynamics of Markets: The New Financial Economics, Second Edition|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0-521-42962-7|location=Cambridge|pages=241}}</ref> [[Statistical mechanics]] can be considered as a reconciliation of [[macroscopic]] [[thermodynamic laws]] with the reductionist method of explaining macroscopic properties in terms of [[microscopic]] components.
 + 
 +In science, reductionism implies that certain topics of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of [[chemistry]] are based in [[physics]], and [[molecular biology]] is based on chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers less rigorously defined intellectual pursuits. For example, claims that [[sociology]] is based on [[psychology]], or that [[economics]] is based on [[sociology]] and [[psychology]] would be met with reservations. These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are obvious associations between these topics (for instance, most would agree that [[psychology]] can affect and inform [[economics]]). The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from [[Emergence#Emergent properties and processes|emergent properties]] of [[complex systems]], which are more common at certain levels of organization. For example, certain aspects of [[evolutionary psychology]] and [[sociobiology]] are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a [[holistic]] method is needed to understand them.
 + 
 +Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (see Richard Dawkins's concept of [[memes]]). In his book ''[[The Blind Watchmaker]]'', [[Richard Dawkins|Dawkins]] introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism"<ref>Interview with magazine ''[[Third Way (magazine)|Third Way]]'' in which [[Richard Dawkins]] discusses reductionism and religion, February 28, 1995</ref> to describe the opinion that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which is only described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy. He provides the example of a computer, which using hierarchical reductionism is explained in terms of the operation of [[hard drive]]s, processors, and memory, but not on the level of [[logic gates]], or on the even simpler level of electrons in a [[semiconductor]] medium.
 + 
 +Quantum Holonomy theory is a theory of the lowest possible reduction.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://youtube.com/watch?v=fSVbWwivu5g|website=youtube|title=Does reductionism End? Quantum Holonomy theory says YES|year=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite arXiv|eprint=2008.09356|last1=Aastrup|first1=Johannes|last2=Grimstrup|first2=Jesper M.|title=The Metric Nature of Matter|year=2020|class=hep-th}}</ref>
 + 
 +Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems. In particular, ecologist [[Robert Ulanowicz]] says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization. He advocates (and uses) [[information theory]] as a framework to study [[Propensity probability|propensities]] in natural systems.<ref>R.E. Ulanowicz, ''Ecology: The Ascendant Perspective'', Columbia University Press (1997) ({{ISBN|0-231-10828-1}})</ref> Ulanowicz attributes these criticisms of reductionism to the philosopher [[Karl Popper]] and biologist [[Robert Rosen (theoretical biologist)|Robert Rosen]].<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Ulanowicz | first1 = R.E. | year = 1996 | title = Ecosystem Development: Symmetry Arising? | url = http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/Symmetry.PDF | journal = Symmetry: Culture and Science | volume = 7 | issue = 3 | pages = 321–334 | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130530212418/http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/Symmetry.PDF | archive-date = 2013-05-30 }}</ref>
 + 
 +[[Stuart Kauffman]] has argued that [[complex systems]] theory and phenomena such as [[emergence]] pose limits to reductionism.<ref>[http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/kauffman06/kauffman06_index.html Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred] by Stuart Kauffman</ref> Emergence is especially relevant when systems exhibit historicity.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Longo|first1=Giuseppe|last2=Montévil|first2=Maël|last3=Kauffman|first3=Stuart|date=2012-01-01|title=No Entailing Laws, but Enablement in the Evolution of the Biosphere|url=https://www.academia.edu/11720588|journal=Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference Companion on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation|series=GECCO '12|location=New York, NY, USA|publisher=ACM|pages=1379–1392|doi=10.1145/2330784.2330946|isbn=978-1-4503-1178-6|arxiv=1201.2069|citeseerx=10.1.1.701.3838|s2cid=15609415}}</ref> Emergence is strongly related to [[nonlinearity]].<ref>[http://personal.riverusers.com/~rover/RedRev.pdf A. Scott, ''Reductionism Revisited'', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, No. 2, 2004 pp. 51–68]</ref> The limits of the application of reductionism are claimed to be especially evident at levels of organization with greater [[complexity]], including living [[Cell (biology)|cells]],<ref name=Huber2013>{{cite journal |last1=Huber |first1=F |last2=Schnauss |first2=J |last3=Roenicke |first3=S |last4=Rauch |first4=P |last5=Mueller |first5=K |last6=Fuetterer |first6=C |last7=Kaes |first7=J |title=Emergent complexity of the cytoskeleton: from single filaments to tissue |journal=Advances in Physics |volume=62 |issue=1 |pages=1–112 |year=2013 |doi=10.1080/00018732.2013.771509|bibcode = 2013AdPhy..62....1H |pmid=24748680 |pmc=3985726}} [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00018732.2013.771509 online]</ref> [[neural networks]], [[ecosystems]], [[society]], and other systems formed from assemblies of large numbers of diverse components linked by multiple [[feedback loop]]s.<ref name="Huber2013" /><ref name=Clayton2006>{{cite journal |editor1-last= Clayton |editor1-first= P |editor2-last= Davies |editor2-first= P |title=The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |year=2006}}</ref>
 + 
 +[[Nobel prize in physics|Nobel laureate]] [[Philip Warren Anderson]] used the idea that [[symmetry breaking]] is an example of an emergent phenomenon in his 1972 ''[[Science (journal)|Science]]'' paper "More is different" to make an argument about the limitations of reductionism.<ref>[http://www.sccs.swarthmore.edu/users/08/bblonder/phys120/docs/anderson.pdf Link] {{cite journal|last=Anderson|first=P.W.|title=More is Different|journal=Science|volume=177|issue=4047| pages=393–396|year=1972|doi=10.1126/science.177.4047.393|pmid=17796623|bibcode=1972Sci...177..393A|s2cid=34548824|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/8019560143abeb6145ed95aa04ad8ddf9898178d}}</ref> One observation he made was that the sciences can be arranged roughly in a linear hierarchy—[[particle physics]], [[solid state physics]], [[chemistry]], [[molecular biology]], [[cellular biology]], [[physiology]], [[psychology]], [[social sciences]]—in that the elementary entities of one science obeys the principles of the science that precedes it in the hierarchy; yet this does not imply that one science is just an applied version of the science that precedes it. He writes that "At each stage, entirely new laws, concepts and generalizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one. Psychology is not applied biology nor is biology applied chemistry."
 + 
 +Disciplines such as [[cybernetics]] and [[systems theory]] imply non-reductionism, sometimes to the extent of explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of reductionism.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/DOWNCAUS.html|title=Downward Causation|work=vub.ac.be}}</ref>
 + 
 +== In mathematics ==
 +In [[mathematics]], reductionism can be interpreted as the philosophy that all mathematics can (or ought to) be based on a common foundation, which for modern mathematics is usually [[axiomatic set theory]]. [[Ernst Zermelo]] was one of the major advocates of such an opinion; he also developed much of axiomatic set theory. It has been argued that the generally accepted method of justifying mathematical [[axioms]] by their usefulness in common practice can potentially weaken Zermelo's reductionist claim.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1305/ndjfl/1093633905 |first=R. Gregory |last=Taylor |title=Zermelo, Reductionism, and the Philosophy of Mathematics |journal=Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic |volume=34 |issue=4 |year=1993 |pages=539–563 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
 + 
 +Jouko Väänänen has argued for [[second-order logic]] as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,<ref>{{cite journal |first=J. |last=Väänänen |title=Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics |journal=Bulletin of Symbolic Logic |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=504–520 |year=2001 |doi=10.2307/2687796 |jstor=2687796 |s2cid=7465054 }}</ref> whereas others have argued for [[category theory]] as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.<ref>{{cite journal |first=S. |last=Awodey |title=Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective |journal=Philos. Math. |series=Series III |volume=4 |issue=3 |year=1996 |pages=209–237 |doi=10.1093/philmat/4.3.209 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |first=F. W. |last=Lawvere |chapter=The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics |title=Proceedings of the Conference on Categorical Algebra (La Jolla, Calif., 1965) |pages=1–20 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |location=New York |year=1966 }}</ref>
 + 
 +The [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems|incompleteness theorems]] of [[Kurt Gödel]], published in 1931, caused doubt about the attainability of an axiomatic foundation for all of mathematics. Any such foundation would have to include axioms powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (a subset of all mathematics). Yet Gödel proved that, for any ''consistent'' recursively enumerable axiomatic system powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers, there are (model-theoretically) ''true'' propositions about the natural numbers that cannot be proved from the axioms. Such propositions are known as formally [[Undecidable problem|undecidable propositions]]. For example, the [[continuum hypothesis]] is undecidable in the [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory]] as shown by [[Forcing (mathematics)|Cohen]].
 + 
 +=== In computer science ===
 + 
 +The role of reduction in [[computer science]] can be thought as a precise and unambiguous mathematical formalization of the philosophical idea of "[[#Types|theory reductionism]]". In a general sense, a problem (or set) is said to be reducible to another problem (or set), if there is a computable/feasible method to translate the questions of the former into the latter, so that, if one knows how to computably/feasibly solve the latter problem, then one can computably/feasibly solve the former. Thus, the latter can only be at least as "[[NP-hardness|hard]]" to solve as the former.
 + 
 +Reduction in [[theoretical computer science]] is pervasive in both: the mathematical abstract foundations of computation; and in real-world [[Analysis of algorithms|performance or capability analysis of algorithms]]. More specifically, reduction is a foundational and central concept, not only in the realm of mathematical logic and abstract computation in [[Computability theory|computability (or recursive) theory]], where it assumes the form of e.g. [[Turing reduction]], but also in the realm of real-world computation in time (or space) complexity analysis of algorithms, where it assumes the form of e.g. [[polynomial-time reduction]].
 + 
 +== In religion ==
 + 
 +Religious reductionism generally attempts to explain religion by explaining it in terms of nonreligious causes. A few examples of reductionistic explanations for the presence of religion are: that religion can be reduced to humanity's conceptions of right and wrong, that religion is fundamentally a primitive attempt at controlling our environments, that religion is a way to explain the existence of a physical world, and that religion confers an enhanced survivability for members of a group and so is reinforced by [[natural selection]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://evolution-of-religion.com/|title=Evolution-of-religion.com}}</ref> Anthropologists [[Edward Burnett Tylor]] and [[James George Frazer]] employed some [[Metatheories of religion in the social sciences#Edward Burnett Tylor and James George Frazer|religious reductionist arguments]].<ref>Strenski, Ivan. "Classic Twentieth-Century Theorist of the Study of Religion: Defending the Inner Sanctum of Religious Experience or Storming It." Pages 176–209 in ''Thinking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to Theories of Religion''. Malden: Blackwell, 2006.</ref>
 + 
 +== In linguistics ==
 +Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described or explained by a language with a limited number of concepts, and combinations of those concepts.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_reductionism.html|title=Reductionism – By Branch / Doctrine – The Basics of Philosophy|website=www.philosophybasics.com}}</ref> An example is the language [[Toki Pona]].
 + 
 +== In philosophy ==
 +The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref>P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, ''Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter'', Aarhus University Press ({{ISBN|87-7288-814-8}}) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |first1=A |last1=Juarrero |title=Causality as Constraint |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612013407/http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/Einmag_Abstr/AJuarrero.html |archive-date=June 12, 2011 }}</ref>
 + 
 +=== Free will ===
 +{{Main|Free will}}
 +Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref>Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/ ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'']</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref>Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref>
 + 
 +=== Causation ===
 +Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name=Carroll>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0-19-927973-9 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=Helen Beebee |editor2=Christopher Hitchcock |editor3=Peter Menzies }}</ref>
 + 
 +== Criticism ==
 + 
 +=== Antireductionism ===
 +{{Main|Antireductionism}}
 + 
 +A contrast to reductionism is [[holism]] or [[emergentism]]. Holism is the idea that, in the whole, items can have properties, known as ''emergent properties'', that are not explainable from the sum of their parts. The principle of holism was summarized concisely by [[Aristotle]] in the [[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts".
 + 
 +=== Fragmentalism ===
 +An alternative term for ontological reductionism is ''fragmentalism'',<ref>{{cite journal|author=Kukla A|title=Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=63|issue=1|pages=S298–S305|year=1996|doi=10.1086/289964|jstor=188539|s2cid=171074337}}</ref> often used in a [[pejorative]] sense.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Pope ML|title=Personal construction of formal knowledge|journal=Interchange|volume=13|issue=4|pages=3–14|year=1982|doi=10.1007/BF01191417|s2cid=198195182}}</ref> [[Anti-realism|Anti-realists]] use the term ''fragmentalism'' in arguments that the world does not exist of separable [[Non-physical entity|entities]], instead consisting of wholes. For example, advocates of this idea claim that:
 +<blockquote>
 +The linear deterministic approach to nature and technology promoted a fragmented perception of reality, and a loss of the ability to foresee, to adequately evaluate, in all their complexity, global crises in ecology, civilization and education.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|title=Global education as a trend reflecting the problems of today and meeting the requirements of tomorrow|website=Indiana University Bloomington|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/19991003182135/http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/global.htm|archive-date=3 October 1999|author=Anatoly P. Liferov}}</ref>
 +</blockquote>
 +The term ''fragmentalism'' is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term ''[[scientism]]''. This usage is popular among some ecological activists: <blockquote>There is a need now to move away from [[scientism]] and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical [[empiricism]], such as [[William James]] proposed, as an [[epistemology]] of science.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com/|title=Redirecting|website=bioregionalanimism.blogspot.com}}</ref></blockquote> These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, [[William James]] noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.<ref name=Lumpkin />
 + 
 +Such opinions also motivate many criticisms of the scientific method:
 +<blockquote
 +>The scientific method only acknowledges monophasic consciousness. The method is a specialized system that emphasizes studying small and distinctive parts in isolation, which results in fragmented knowledge.<ref name=Lumpkin>[http://www.bioregionalanimism.com/2006/12/is-polyphasic-consciousness-necessary.html Tara W. Lumpkin, ''Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival?'' December 28, 2006]</ref></blockquote>
 + 
 +== Alternatives ==
 + 
 +The development of [[systems thinking]] has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a [[holism|holistic]] rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a [[Holism in science|holistic paradigm]].<ref>[[Dossey, Larry]]. ''Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing.'' ({{ISBN|0-06-251622-1}}) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of [[scientific model|models]] or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered.
 + 
 +In many cases (such as the [[kinetic theory of gases]]), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties ([[morphogenesis]], [[autopoiesis]], and [[metabolism]]), [[emergent properties]] of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. [[Complex systems|Complexity theory]] studies systems and properties of the latter type.
 + 
 +[[Alfred North Whitehead]]'s metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.
 + 
 +[[Ecologist]] [[Sven Erik Jorgensen]] makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a [[holistic]] method in certain topics of science, especially [[ecology]]. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg [[uncertainty principle]] in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.<ref>S. E. Jørgensen, ''Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern'', 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, ({{ISBN|1-4020-0651-9}}) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.</ref>
 + 
 +In [[cognitive psychology]], [[George Kelly (psychologist)|George Kelly]] developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of [[personal construct psychology]] and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful [[mental model]]s of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth".<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Pope ML, Watts M |title=Constructivist Goggles: Implications for Process in Teaching and Learning Physics|journal=Eur. J. Phys.|volume=9|pages=101–109|year=1988|doi=10.1088/0143-0807/9/2/004|issue=2|bibcode = 1988EJPh....9..101P }}</ref>
== See also == == See also ==
-* [[Greedy reductionism]]+* [[Antireductionism]]
-* [[Reductionism]]+* [[Antiscience]]
-* [[Special sciences]]+* [[Aristotle]]
 +* [[Eliminativism]]
 +* [[Emergentism]]
 +* [[Fallacy of composition]]
 +* [[Further facts]]
 +* [[Holism]]
 +* [[Holistic science]]
 +* [[Materialism]]
 +* [[Multiple realizability]] was used as a source of arguments against reductionism.
 +* [[Philosophy of mind]]
 +* [[Physicalism]]
 +* [[Physical ontology]]
 +* [[Scientism]]
 +* [[Symmetry breaking]]
 +* [[Theology]]
 +* ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''
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"That there is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it ?"--Matter and Memory (1896) by Henri Bergson

"Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored." --"What Is it Like to Be a Bat?"

The Canard Digérateur, or Digesting Duck, was an automaton in the form of duck, created by Jacques de Vaucanson in 1739.
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Reductionism is any of several related philosophical ideas regarding the associations between phenomena, which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts.

Contents

Definitions

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:<ref name=Ruse>Template:Cite book</ref>

  1. Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.
  2. Methodological reductionism: the scientific attempt to provide explanation in terms of ever smaller entities.
  3. Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation and explanation.<ref name=Ney />

Reductionism can be applied to any phenomenon, including objects, problems, explanations, theories, and meanings.<ref name=Ney /><ref name=Polkinghorne>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref><ref>For reductionism referred to explanations, theories, and meanings, see Willard Van Orman Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Quine objected to the positivistic, reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.</ref>

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. Thomas Nagel and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry).<ref name=Nagel /> In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith /> However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of emergentism).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what John Polkinghorne terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name=Polkinghorne /> is the definition provided by Simon Blackburn<ref name=Blackburn>Template:Cite book</ref> and by Jaegwon Kim:<ref name=Kim>Template:Cite book</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name=Jones />

The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."<ref name=Jones />

Reductionism should be distinguished from eliminationism: reductionists do not deny the existence of phenomena, but explain them in terms of another reality; eliminationists deny the existence of the phenomena themselves. For example, eliminationists deny the existence of life by their explanation in terms of physical and chemical processes.

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed emergent phenomena, but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong emergentism, which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref>Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> Some physicists, however, claim that reductionism and emergentism are complementary: both are needed to explain natural processes.<ref>Piers Coleman, Center for Materials Theory, Rutgers, Hubbard Theory Consortium and Physics Department, Royal Holloway, University of London; contribution to DIEP-conference "Emergence at all lengthscales" 22-01-2019</ref>

Types

Most philosophers delineate three types of reductionism and anti-reductionism.<ref name="Ruse" />

Ontological reductionism

Ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances.<ref name=":0" /> This claim is usually metaphysical, and is most commonly a form of monism, in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A dualist who is an ontological reductionist would believe that everything is reducible to two substances—as one possible example, a dualist might claim that reality is composed of "matter" and "spirit".)

Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.<ref>Richard H. Jones (2000), Reductionism: Analysis and the Fuullness of Reality, pp. 24-26, 29-31. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.</ref>

Nancey Murphy has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.<ref>Nancey Murphy, "Reductionism and Emergence. A Critical Perspective." In Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion. Edited by Nancey Murphy, and Christopher C. Knight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. P. 82.</ref>

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological emergence, and claims that emergence is an epistemological phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref>Michael Silberstein, John McGeever, "The Search for Ontological Emergence", The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 195 (April 1999), (Template:ISSN).</ref>

Ontological reductionism takes two forms: token ontological reductionism and type ontological reductionism.Template:Citation needed

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.<ref>{{

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Michael Ruse has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against vitalism.<ref>[1] Michael Ruse, "Do Organisms Exist?", Am. Zool., 29: 1061–1066 (1989)</ref>

Methodological reductionism

Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities.<ref name=":1">Template:Cite book</ref> In a biological context, this means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.<ref>Template:Cite encyclopedia</ref> Claim of efficacy is demonstrated that the gene – unit of classical heredity – is the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a macro-molecule.<ref name=":1" />

Theory reductionism

Theory reduction is the process by which a more general theory absorbs a special theory.<ref name=":0" /> For example, both Kepler's laws of the motion of the planets and Galileo's theories of motion formulated for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered beneficial because Newtonian mechanics is a more general theory—that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Besides scientific theories, theory reduction more generally can be the process by which one explanation subsumes another.

In science

Template:More citations needed section Reductionist thinking and methods form the basis for many of the well-developed topics of modern science, including much of physics, chemistry and molecular biology. Classical mechanics in particular is seen as a reductionist framework. For instance, we understand the solar system in terms of its components (the sun and the planets) and their interactions.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Statistical mechanics can be considered as a reconciliation of macroscopic thermodynamic laws with the reductionist method of explaining macroscopic properties in terms of microscopic components.

In science, reductionism implies that certain topics of study are based on areas that study smaller spatial scales or organizational units. While it is commonly accepted that the foundations of chemistry are based in physics, and molecular biology is based on chemistry, similar statements become controversial when one considers less rigorously defined intellectual pursuits. For example, claims that sociology is based on psychology, or that economics is based on sociology and psychology would be met with reservations. These claims are difficult to substantiate even though there are obvious associations between these topics (for instance, most would agree that psychology can affect and inform economics). The limit of reductionism's usefulness stems from emergent properties of complex systems, which are more common at certain levels of organization. For example, certain aspects of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology are rejected by some who claim that complex systems are inherently irreducible and that a holistic method is needed to understand them.

Some strong reductionists believe that the behavioral sciences should become "genuine" scientific disciplines based on genetic biology, and on the systematic study of culture (see Richard Dawkins's concept of memes). In his book The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins introduced the term "hierarchical reductionism"<ref>Interview with magazine Third Way in which Richard Dawkins discusses reductionism and religion, February 28, 1995</ref> to describe the opinion that complex systems can be described with a hierarchy of organizations, each of which is only described in terms of objects one level down in the hierarchy. He provides the example of a computer, which using hierarchical reductionism is explained in terms of the operation of hard drives, processors, and memory, but not on the level of logic gates, or on the even simpler level of electrons in a semiconductor medium.

Quantum Holonomy theory is a theory of the lowest possible reduction.<ref>{{

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Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems. In particular, ecologist Robert Ulanowicz says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization. He advocates (and uses) information theory as a framework to study propensities in natural systems.<ref>R.E. Ulanowicz, Ecology: The Ascendant Perspective, Columbia University Press (1997) (Template:ISBN)</ref> Ulanowicz attributes these criticisms of reductionism to the philosopher Karl Popper and biologist Robert Rosen.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Stuart Kauffman has argued that complex systems theory and phenomena such as emergence pose limits to reductionism.<ref>Beyond Reductionism: Reinventing the Sacred by Stuart Kauffman</ref> Emergence is especially relevant when systems exhibit historicity.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> Emergence is strongly related to nonlinearity.<ref>A. Scott, Reductionism Revisited, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, No. 2, 2004 pp. 51–68</ref> The limits of the application of reductionism are claimed to be especially evident at levels of organization with greater complexity, including living cells,<ref name=Huber2013>Template:Cite journal online</ref> neural networks, ecosystems, society, and other systems formed from assemblies of large numbers of diverse components linked by multiple feedback loops.<ref name="Huber2013" /><ref name=Clayton2006>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Nobel laureate Philip Warren Anderson used the idea that symmetry breaking is an example of an emergent phenomenon in his 1972 Science paper "More is different" to make an argument about the limitations of reductionism.<ref>Link Template:Cite journal</ref> One observation he made was that the sciences can be arranged roughly in a linear hierarchy—particle physics, solid state physics, chemistry, molecular biology, cellular biology, physiology, psychology, social sciences—in that the elementary entities of one science obeys the principles of the science that precedes it in the hierarchy; yet this does not imply that one science is just an applied version of the science that precedes it. He writes that "At each stage, entirely new laws, concepts and generalizations are necessary, requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one. Psychology is not applied biology nor is biology applied chemistry."

Disciplines such as cybernetics and systems theory imply non-reductionism, sometimes to the extent of explaining phenomena at a given level of hierarchy in terms of phenomena at a higher level, in a sense, the opposite of reductionism.<ref>{{

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In mathematics

In mathematics, reductionism can be interpreted as the philosophy that all mathematics can (or ought to) be based on a common foundation, which for modern mathematics is usually axiomatic set theory. Ernst Zermelo was one of the major advocates of such an opinion; he also developed much of axiomatic set theory. It has been argued that the generally accepted method of justifying mathematical axioms by their usefulness in common practice can potentially weaken Zermelo's reductionist claim.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Jouko Väänänen has argued for second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> whereas others have argued for category theory as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref><ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

The incompleteness theorems of Kurt Gödel, published in 1931, caused doubt about the attainability of an axiomatic foundation for all of mathematics. Any such foundation would have to include axioms powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (a subset of all mathematics). Yet Gödel proved that, for any consistent recursively enumerable axiomatic system powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers, there are (model-theoretically) true propositions about the natural numbers that cannot be proved from the axioms. Such propositions are known as formally undecidable propositions. For example, the continuum hypothesis is undecidable in the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory as shown by Cohen.

In computer science

The role of reduction in computer science can be thought as a precise and unambiguous mathematical formalization of the philosophical idea of "theory reductionism". In a general sense, a problem (or set) is said to be reducible to another problem (or set), if there is a computable/feasible method to translate the questions of the former into the latter, so that, if one knows how to computably/feasibly solve the latter problem, then one can computably/feasibly solve the former. Thus, the latter can only be at least as "hard" to solve as the former.

Reduction in theoretical computer science is pervasive in both: the mathematical abstract foundations of computation; and in real-world performance or capability analysis of algorithms. More specifically, reduction is a foundational and central concept, not only in the realm of mathematical logic and abstract computation in computability (or recursive) theory, where it assumes the form of e.g. Turing reduction, but also in the realm of real-world computation in time (or space) complexity analysis of algorithms, where it assumes the form of e.g. polynomial-time reduction.

In religion

Religious reductionism generally attempts to explain religion by explaining it in terms of nonreligious causes. A few examples of reductionistic explanations for the presence of religion are: that religion can be reduced to humanity's conceptions of right and wrong, that religion is fundamentally a primitive attempt at controlling our environments, that religion is a way to explain the existence of a physical world, and that religion confers an enhanced survivability for members of a group and so is reinforced by natural selection.<ref>{{

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In linguistics

Linguistic reductionism is the idea that everything can be described or explained by a language with a limited number of concepts, and combinations of those concepts.<ref>{{

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}}</ref> An example is the language Toki Pona.

In philosophy

The concept of downward causation poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann, and Peder Voetmann Christiansen, among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate.<ref>P.B. Andersen, C. Emmeche, N.O. Finnemann, P.V. Christiansen, Downward Causation: Minds, Bodies and Matter, Aarhus University Press (Template:ISBN) (2001)</ref> The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as self-organization, natural selection, adaptation, and control.<ref>{{

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Free will

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Philosophers of the Enlightenment worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. Descartes separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "noumenal" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "phenomenal" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref>Paul Guyer, "18th Century German Aesthetics," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> The most influential formulation was by Immanuel Kant, who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl, used the Romantic method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref>Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (2006) p. 161</ref>

Causation

Most common philosophical understandings of causation involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name=Carroll>Template:Cite book</ref>

Criticism

Antireductionism

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A contrast to reductionism is holism or emergentism. Holism is the idea that, in the whole, items can have properties, known as emergent properties, that are not explainable from the sum of their parts. The principle of holism was summarized concisely by Aristotle in the Metaphysics: "The whole is more than the sum of its parts".

Fragmentalism

An alternative term for ontological reductionism is fragmentalism,<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> often used in a pejorative sense.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref> Anti-realists use the term fragmentalism in arguments that the world does not exist of separable entities, instead consisting of wholes. For example, advocates of this idea claim that:

The linear deterministic approach to nature and technology promoted a fragmented perception of reality, and a loss of the ability to foresee, to adequately evaluate, in all their complexity, global crises in ecology, civilization and education.<ref>{{
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The term fragmentalism is usually applied to reductionist modes of thought, often with the related pejorative term scientism. This usage is popular among some ecological activists:
There is a need now to move away from scientism and the ideology of cause-and-effect determinism toward a radical empiricism, such as William James proposed, as an epistemology of science.<ref>{{
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These perspectives are not new; during the early 20th century, William James noted that rationalist science emphasized what he called fragmentation and disconnection.<ref name=Lumpkin />

Such opinions also motivate many criticisms of the scientific method:

The scientific method only acknowledges monophasic consciousness. The method is a specialized system that emphasizes studying small and distinctive parts in isolation, which results in fragmented knowledge.<ref name=Lumpkin>Tara W. Lumpkin, Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival? December 28, 2006</ref>

Alternatives

The development of systems thinking has provided methods that seek to describe issues in a holistic rather than a reductionist way, and many scientists use a holistic paradigm.<ref>Dossey, Larry. Reinventing Medicine: Beyond Mind-Body to a New Era of Healing. (Template:ISBN) HarperSanFrancisco. (1999)</ref> When the terms are used in a scientific context, holism and reductionism refer primarily to what sorts of models or theories offer valid explanations of the natural world; the scientific method of falsifying hypotheses, checking empirical data against theory, is largely unchanged, but the method guides which theories are considered.

In many cases (such as the kinetic theory of gases), given a good understanding of the components of the system, one can predict all the important properties of the system as a whole. In other systems, especially concerned with life and life's emergent properties (morphogenesis, autopoiesis, and metabolism), emergent properties of the system are said to be almost impossible to predict from knowledge of the parts of the system. Complexity theory studies systems and properties of the latter type.

Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "fallacy of the misplaced concreteness". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

Ecologist Sven Erik Jorgensen makes both theoretical and practical arguments for a holistic method in certain topics of science, especially ecology. He argues that many systems are so complex that they can ever be described in complete detail. In analogy to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle in physics, he argues that many interesting ecological phenomena cannot be replicated in laboratory conditions, and so cannot be measured or observed without changing the system in some way. He also indicates the importance of inter-connectedness in biological systems. He believes that science can only progress by outlining questions that are unanswerable and by using models that do not try to explain everything in terms of smaller hierarchical levels of organization, but instead model them on the scale of the system itself, taking into account some (but not all) factors from levels higher and lower in the hierarchy.<ref>S. E. Jørgensen, Integration of Ecosystem Theories: A Pattern, 3rd ed. Kluwer Academic Publishers, (Template:ISBN) (2002) Chapters 1 & 2.</ref>

In cognitive psychology, George Kelly developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of personal construct psychology and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful mental models of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth".<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>

See also


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