Reductionism
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| - | In [[philosophy]], '''reduction''' is the process by which one object, property, concept, theory, etc., is shown to be explicable in terms of another, lower level, concept, object, property, etc. For example, we say that [[Physics|physical]] properties such as the [[boiling point]] of a substance are reducible to that substance’s [[molecule|molecular]] properties, because [[statistical mechanics]] explain why a liquid boils at a certain temperature using only the properties of its constituent atoms. Thus we might also describe reduction as a process analogous to [[wiktionary:absorption|absorption]], by which one theory (or concept, or property, and so on) is wholly subsumed under another. | + | '''Reductionism''' is any of several related [[Philosophy|philosophical]] ideas regarding the [[association]]s between [[Phenomenon|phenomena]], which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a [[complex system]] as the [[sum of its parts]]. |
| - | In [[science]], such reduction is generally desirable, because it explains why and how the thing which is being reduced exists, and because it promotes conceptual and theoretical economy. Reducing chemical properties to properties of atoms thus explains these properties and integrates them into a single explanatory framework, that of atomic structure. | + | == In philosophy == |
| + | The concept of [[downward causation]] poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by [[Peter Bøgh Andersen]], [[Claus Emmeche]], [[Niels Ole Finnemann]], and [[Peder Voetmann Christiansen]], among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate. The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as [[self-organization]], [[natural selection]], [[adaptation]], and control. | ||
| - | [[Reductionism]] may therefore be divided into three general areas – methodological, theoretical, and [[ontology|ontological]] – and reduction (the process) into two – theoretical and ontological. | ||
| - | ==Types of reductionism== | + | === Free will === |
| + | Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality. The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion. | ||
| - | Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities. Methodological reductionism would thus hold that the atomic explanation of a substance’s boiling point is preferable to the chemical explanation, and that an explanation based on even smaller particles (quarks, perhaps) would be even better. | + | === Causation === |
| - | + | Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts. | |
| - | Theoretical reductionism is the position that all scientific theories either can or should be reduced to a single super-theory through the process of theoretical reduction. | + | |
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| - | Finally, ontological reductionism is the belief that reality is composed of a minimum number of kinds of entities or substances. This claim is usually [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and is most commonly a form of [[monism]], in effect claiming that all objects, properties and events are reducible to a single substance. (A [[dualism|dualist]] who is an ontological reductionist would presumably believe that everything is reducible to one of two substances.) | + | |
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| - | ==Types of reduction== | + | |
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| - | The distinction between the processes of theoretical and ontological reduction is equally important. Theoretical reduction is the process by which one theory is absorbed into another; for example, both [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler's]] laws of the motion of the [[planets]] and [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]]’s theories of motion worked out for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics, because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered to be beneficial because [[Newtonian mechanics]] is a more general theory — that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Theoretical reduction, therefore, is the reduction of one explanation or theory to another — that is, it is the absorption of one of our ideas about a particular thing into another idea. | + | |
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| - | By contrast, ontological reduction is the process of reducing things themselves to one another. For example, it was once believed that [[vitalism|life was an irreducible property of objects]]. An ontology of such properties might therefore have read: | + | |
| - | *extension in space | + | |
| - | *location in space | + | |
| - | *is alive | + | |
| - | *has a soul | + | |
| - | *and so on. | + | |
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| - | All the other properties of an object, such as its shape, color, or mobility are considered to be nothing more than the effects of these irreducible properties. Shape, for example, is a function of in what way the object is extended in space, as is color, since it is determined by how light bounces off a surface, which is in turn determined by how that object is extended in space. | + | |
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| - | Science now considers that all life forms are alive by virtue of the fact that they are physically organized in such a way that they can reproduce themselves, not because they possess a special property distinct from and in addition to their physical organization. Biologists therefore say the property of life is reducible to the physical properties of an organism; being alive is simply nothing more than having certain physical properties. | + | |
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| - | ==Benefits of reduction== | + | |
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| - | An ontological reduction reduces the number of [[ontological primitive]]s that exist within our [[ontology]]. Philosophers welcome this, because every ontological primitive demands a special explanation for its existence. If we maintain that life is not a physical property, for example, then we must give a separate explanation of why some objects possess it and why others do not. This is more often than not a daunting task, and such explanations often have the flavor of ''[[ad hoc]]'' contrivances or ''[[deus ex machina]]''. Also, since every ontological primitive must be acknowledged as one of the fundamental principles of the natural world, we must also account for why this element in particular should be considered one of those underlying principles. (To return to an earlier example, it would be extremely difficult to explain why planets are so fundamental that special laws of motion should apply to them.) This is often extremely hard to do, especially in the face of our strong preference for simple explanations. Pursuing ontological reduction thus serves to unify and simplify our ontology, while guarding against needless [[Ockham's razor|multiplication of entities]] in the process. | + | |
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| - | At the same time, the requirements for satisfactorily showing that one thing is reducible to another are extremely steep. First and foremost, all features of the original property or object must be accounted for. For example, [[lightning]] would not be reducible to the electrical activity of air [[molecules]] if the reduction explained why lightning is deadly, but not why it always seeks the highest point to strike. Our preference for simple and unified explanations is a strong force for reductionism, but our demand that all relevant phenomena be accounted for is at least as strong a force against it. | + | |
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| - | == Examples == | + | |
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| - | In [[metaphysics]], the [[Bundle theory]] says that objects can be reduced to collections of properties; | + | |
| - | so whenever we talk about objects, we can be understood to be talking about bundles of properties. Does this mean that the bundle theory says that objects do not exist? Perhaps not objects as we had thought of them, but the theory ''is'' trying to give an account of what objects ''are''; namely, they are bundles of properties. So, the bundle theorist is not denying that objects exist; he or she is affirming that objects are the same as bundles of properties. The only reason one would have for maintaining, then, that the bundle theory holds that objects do not exist is if you think that, according to our ordinary concepts, something simply ''cannot'' both be a bundle of properties ''and'' an object. | + | |
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| - | Philosophers mean about the same thing when they talk about what exists ''ultimately''. For example, the bundle theory says that ultimately, properties and bundles thereof exist, rather than objects. The things that exist "ultimately" are precisely the things to which other things are reduced. | + | |
| == See also == | == See also == | ||
| - | * [[Greedy reductionism]] | + | * [[Antireductionism]] |
| - | * [[Reductionism]] | + | * [[Antiscience]] |
| - | * [[Special sciences]] | + | * [[Aristotle]] |
| + | * [[Eliminativism]] | ||
| + | * [[Emergentism]] | ||
| + | * [[Fallacy of composition]] | ||
| + | * [[Further facts]] | ||
| + | * [[Holism]] | ||
| + | * [[Holistic science]] | ||
| + | * [[Materialism]] | ||
| + | * [[Multiple realizability]] was used as a source of arguments against reductionism. | ||
| + | * [[Philosophy of mind]] | ||
| + | * [[Physicalism]] | ||
| + | * [[Physical ontology]] | ||
| + | * [[Scientism]] | ||
| + | * [[Symmetry breaking]] | ||
| + | * [[Theology]] | ||
| + | * ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]'' | ||
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"That there is a close connexion between a state of consciousness and the brain we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it ?"--Matter and Memory (1896) by Henri Bergson "Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored." --"What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" |
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Reductionism is any of several related philosophical ideas regarding the associations between phenomena, which can be described in terms of other simpler or more fundamental phenomena. It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a complex system as the sum of its parts.
Contents |
In philosophy
The concept of downward causation poses an alternative to reductionism within philosophy. This opinion is developed by Peter Bøgh Andersen, Claus Emmeche, Niels Ole Finnemann, and Peder Voetmann Christiansen, among others. These philosophers explore ways in which one can talk about phenomena at a larger-scale level of organization exerting causal influence on a smaller-scale level, and find that some, but not all proposed types of downward causation are compatible with science. In particular, they find that constraint is one way in which downward causation can operate. The notion of causality as constraint has also been explored as a way to shed light on scientific concepts such as self-organization, natural selection, adaptation, and control.
Free will
Philosophers of the Enlightenment worked to insulate human free will from reductionism. Descartes separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "noumenal" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "phenomenal" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality. The most influential formulation was by Immanuel Kant, who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albrecht Ritschl, used the Romantic method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.
Causation
Most common philosophical understandings of causation involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.
See also
- Antireductionism
- Antiscience
- Aristotle
- Eliminativism
- Emergentism
- Fallacy of composition
- Further facts
- Holism
- Holistic science
- Materialism
- Multiple realizability was used as a source of arguments against reductionism.
- Philosophy of mind
- Physicalism
- Physical ontology
- Scientism
- Symmetry breaking
- Theology
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism
