Hyperpolitik: Extreme Politisierung ohne politische Folgen
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| Jäger's argument is based on a two-axis four-field diagram. One axis points to the degree of politicization of a society; the other to its institutionalization (social networking in parties, families, trade unions, clubs, churches and associations). | Jäger's argument is based on a two-axis four-field diagram. One axis points to the degree of politicization of a society; the other to its institutionalization (social networking in parties, families, trade unions, clubs, churches and associations). | ||
| - | ''Mass politics'' from the late 19th century to around 1990 was an expression of a high degree of politicization and also institutionalization (ties to family, church, associations, parties, trade unions). Those who severed such ties excluded themselves. This was followed by a phase of [[post-politics|post-politics]] with low politicization and equally low institutionalization. During this period, churches, trade unions and parties lost members en masse. Politics became the preserve of professional politicians, technocrats and PR teams. After the [[global financial crisis 2007-2008|banking crisis 2008]], there was a partial repoliticization of the population, but without a corresponding re-institutionalization. This phase of ''anti-politics'' was expressed in protests against controversial measures by the political establishment and manifested itself as a protest against the existing political order in [[Occupy Wall Street]], the [[UK's exit from the EU|Brexit]], [[Bernie Sanders]]'s pre-election candidacy and [[Donald Trump]]'s presidential election. Here, Jäger recognizes a high degree of politicization compared to a low degree of institutionalization. As a reaction to such ''anti-politics'' and in response to the [[multiple crisis]] (banks, migration, climate), there was a repoliticization of society as a whole - but also without re-institutionalization. Jäger calls this form of politics ''hyperpolitics''. | + | ''Mass politics'' from the late 19th century to around 1990 was an expression of a high degree of politicization and also institutionalization (ties to family, church, associations, parties, trade unions). Those who severed such ties excluded themselves. This was followed by a phase of [[post-politics|post-politics]] with low politicization and equally low institutionalization. During this period, churches, trade unions and parties lost members en masse. Politics became the preserve of professional politicians, technocrats and PR teams. After the [[global financial crisis 2007-2008|banking crisis 2008]], there was a partial repoliticization of the population, but without a corresponding re-institutionalization. This phase of ''anti-politics'' was expressed in protests against controversial measures by the political establishment and manifested itself as a protest against the existing political order in [[Occupy Wall Street]], the [[Brexit]], [[Bernie Sanders]]'s pre-election candidacy and [[Donald Trump]]'s presidential election. Here, Jäger recognizes a high degree of politicization compared to a low degree of institutionalization. As a reaction to such ''anti-politics'' and in response to the [[multiple crisis]] (banks, migration, climate), there was a repoliticization of society as a whole - but also without re-institutionalization. Jäger calls this form of politics ''hyperpolitics''. |
| While [[populism]] with its clear “anti-logic” at least has a recognizable ideological vector, “hyperpolitics” remains an extremely “volatile and diffuse phenomenon in this respect.” The ''anti-politics'' in populist parties has already taken the first steps towards its institutionalization, whereas hyperpolitics is more of a general atmosphere without actors with the power to act. Seen in this light, ''hyperpolitics'' represents an intensification of ''anti-politics'', “a mode of viral panic that is typical of the accelerated internet age with its | While [[populism]] with its clear “anti-logic” at least has a recognizable ideological vector, “hyperpolitics” remains an extremely “volatile and diffuse phenomenon in this respect.” The ''anti-politics'' in populist parties has already taken the first steps towards its institutionalization, whereas hyperpolitics is more of a general atmosphere without actors with the power to act. Seen in this light, ''hyperpolitics'' represents an intensification of ''anti-politics'', “a mode of viral panic that is typical of the accelerated internet age with its | ||
Revision as of 20:17, 23 April 2024
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Hyperpolitiek: Extreme politisering zonder politieke gevolgen (2023) is a book by Anton Jäger.
Blurb:
Iedereen die wel eens aan verhitte discussies deelneemt, kan bevestigen dat de politiek terug is in het dagelijks leven en dat debatten over corona, ‘wokeness’ en identiteit al lang buiten de oevers van X (Twitter) zijn getreden. Na een tijdperk van postpolitiek, waarin technocratisch bestuur plaatsvond terwijl burgers hooguit vanaf de bank commentaar konden leverden, staat inmiddels bijna álles onder politieke hoogspanning.
Anton Jäger muntte hiervoor de term ‘hyperpolitiek’. Hij merkt op dat golven van opwinding zich zelden vertalen in collectieve daden: politisering resulteert niet in politieke actie. Volgens Jäger is dit het gevolg van digitale eenzaamheid, waardoor mensen niet langer via de klassieke instituties zoals partijen en vakbonden betrokken zijn bij het politieke proces.
Contents |
German lemma
Hyperpolitics (subtitle: Extreme politicization without political consequences) is a book by the Belgian historian Anton Jäger, which was originally published by edition suhrkamp in 2023. The manuscript was written by Jäger in English and translated by Daniela Janser, Thomas Zimmermann and Heinrich Geiselberger. With the term hyperpolitics, borrowed from Peter Sloterdijk, Jäger describes an increasing politicization of broad sections of the population, which is expressed in short-term avowals but remains politically inconsequential.
Content
Jäger's argument is based on a two-axis four-field diagram. One axis points to the degree of politicization of a society; the other to its institutionalization (social networking in parties, families, trade unions, clubs, churches and associations).
Mass politics from the late 19th century to around 1990 was an expression of a high degree of politicization and also institutionalization (ties to family, church, associations, parties, trade unions). Those who severed such ties excluded themselves. This was followed by a phase of post-politics with low politicization and equally low institutionalization. During this period, churches, trade unions and parties lost members en masse. Politics became the preserve of professional politicians, technocrats and PR teams. After the banking crisis 2008, there was a partial repoliticization of the population, but without a corresponding re-institutionalization. This phase of anti-politics was expressed in protests against controversial measures by the political establishment and manifested itself as a protest against the existing political order in Occupy Wall Street, the Brexit, Bernie Sanders's pre-election candidacy and Donald Trump's presidential election. Here, Jäger recognizes a high degree of politicization compared to a low degree of institutionalization. As a reaction to such anti-politics and in response to the multiple crisis (banks, migration, climate), there was a repoliticization of society as a whole - but also without re-institutionalization. Jäger calls this form of politics hyperpolitics.
While populism with its clear “anti-logic” at least has a recognizable ideological vector, “hyperpolitics” remains an extremely “volatile and diffuse phenomenon in this respect.” The anti-politics in populist parties has already taken the first steps towards its institutionalization, whereas hyperpolitics is more of a general atmosphere without actors with the power to act. Seen in this light, hyperpolitics represents an intensification of anti-politics, “a mode of viral panic that is typical of the accelerated internet age with its
While populism with its clear “anti-logic” at least has a recognizable ideological vector, “hyperpolitics” remains an extremely “volatile and diffuse phenomenon” in this respect. The anti-politics in populist parties has already taken the first steps towards its institutionalization, whereas hyperpolitics is more of a general atmosphere without actors with the power to act. Seen in this light, hyperpolitics represents an intensification of anti-politics, “a mode of viral panic typical of the accelerated internet age with its short cycles of hype and outrage.”
According to Jäger, hyperpolitics is first and foremost “an eminently market-compliant variant of politics, both in terms of its form and its content. Markets offer exit options and are by their very nature designed for the short term.”
Sustainable left-wing politics is only conceivable via re-institutionalization: The left will only compensate for the right's lead and successfully counter the polycrisis in a humane way if enough people get involved in “voluntary organizations” on a regular basis again. It is worth taking a look at the immersive quality of the former labor movement.
History of origin
The book's arguments are based on several previously published journal articles. Jäger concludes by citing, among others, the essay How the World Went from Post-Politics to Hyper-Politics, published on January 3, 2022 in the English socialist weekly Tribune which was translated and published in the German-language Jacobin edition on January 19, 2022. Jäger also cites the Jacobin article From Bowling Alone to Posting Alone from May 12, 2022, which was translated and published in the German-language Jacobin magazine on March 30, 2023. Jäger mentions Everything Is Hyperpolitical as the third of a total of eleven previous texts, which appeared in The Point Magazine on February 22, 2023 and was translated and published as Die neuen Aufstände jenseits von Nostalgie und Zukunftseuphorie in the Swiss weekly WOZ on May 11, 2023. According to Jäger, the essay versions were also incorporated into the book version as the basis for the German translation.
Reception
In her review for the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Nele Pollatschek describes Hyperpolitik as a very good book that is no fun. It is very good because it accurately captures the present, “with its weekly shitstorms, its open letters and rainbow captain's armbands, its greenwashing and queerbaiting.” It's no fun because the diagnosis is so devastating for anyone who is not explicitly right-wing conservative. Because if the factor that leads to sustained and therefore successful political action is actually social solidarity in institutions, the right has a clear advantage. While shooting clubs and fraternities could experience a renaissance, in times of digitalization and working from home, it is unlikely that the left will once again fraternize in factories. Jäger referred to studies according to which Donald Trump was particularly successful where people had stable ties (social capital). The same applies to the NSDAP.
Zeit' reviewer Matthias Warkus criticizes the book's lack of empirical social research. The text is garnished with quotations from Guy Debord and Jean Baudrillard, Annie Ernaux, Peter Sloterdijk and above all Michel Houellebecq. Jäger presents a brief passage through Houellebecq's entire body of work and nowhere mentions his most important themes: Sex, gender relations, frustrated masculinity. Nevertheless, Houellebecq is invoked again and again throughout the book as a key witness to the depoliticization and atomization of Western societies. Didier Eribon]], the “international pop star of the milieu explainers”, also has his say. Jäger himself warns twice in the text that there is no systematic processing of empirical findings in his book. Jäger bases his statements on social ties on surveys conducted at the height of the Covid pandemic, which are understandably unrepresentative, and on Robert Putnam's famous study Bowling Alone, which is controversial and also a quarter of a century old.
Warkus also criticizes the fact that economic aspects do not appear in the book, which is surprising for an avowed Marxist like the author. Hyperpolitik is clearly written for an audience that is so convinced of the correctness of a Marxist view of society and history that it is no longer necessary to argue for it in principle. This may have something to do with the genesis of the book, which began as a tweet and was further developed through a series of articles in popular Marxist magazines such as Jacobin. The expected readership there no longer needs to be told what “progressive neoliberalism” is or why it is bad, that individuals in Western industrialized countries today are “atomized” and why. For such an audience, Hyperpolitik is an almost ideal book. With its references to euphonious theorists and somehow rebellious-looking sources such as Houellebecq, it conveys a “left-wing coolness” that is both retro and contemporary at the same time. However, there is no explanation of controversial findings; no one need doubt anything they hold dear when reading the book. Jäger's world is a very clear one. It remains to be seen what value a book that takes such a selective view of its subject and describes it against the backdrop of such extensive theoretical assumptions has for a broad audience beyond this milieu.
For the reviewer of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oliver Weber, the title calls for the new phenomenon to be taken seriously. It is all the more sobering that the author did not take the opportunity to pursue the implications of his ideas in greater depth. Weber suggests that the book should only be seen as an introduction and that the laws of motion of hyper-political states should be studied more closely in future.
For Tobias Obermeier (Jungle World), Jäger's diagnosis is plausible despite some blind spots in the presentation: “We are living in a time of intense political heating, which goes hand in hand with a low level of institutional organization. The politicized masses emerge from highly unstable concatenations that form in the digital information streams within a very short space of time, occasionally finding their way onto the streets before disintegrating ineffectively into their individual parts.”
See also
See also
