Logical atomism
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| - | Given that a [[natural language]] such as [[English language|English]] contains, at any given time, a finite number of words, any comprehensive list of definitions must either be circular or rely upon [[primitive notion]]s. If every term of every ''definiens'' must itself be defined, "where at last should we stop?" | + | '''Logical atomism''' is a philosophical belief that originated in the early 20th century with the development of [[analytic philosophy]]. Its principal exponents were the British philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]], the early work of his Austrian-born pupil and colleague [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], and his German counterpart [[Rudolf Carnap]]. |
| - | A dictionary, for instance, insofar as it is a comprehensive list of [[lexical definition]]s, must resort to [[Symbol grounding|circularity]]. | + | The theory holds that the world consists of ultimate logical "facts" (or "atoms") that cannot be broken down any further. Having originally propounded this stance in his ''[[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus]]'', Wittgenstein rejected it in his later ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]''. |
| - | Many philosophers have chosen instead to leave some terms undefined. The [[Scholasticism|scholastic philosophers]] claimed that the highest genera (the so-called ten ''generalissima'') cannot be defined, since we cannot assign any higher genus under which they may fall. Thus we cannot define [[being]], unity and similar concepts. [[John Locke|Locke]] supposes in ''[[An Essay Concerning Human Understanding]]'' that the names of simple concepts do not admit of any definition. More recently [[Bertrand Russell]] sought to develop a formal language based on [[Logical atomism|logical atoms]]. Other philosophers, notably [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Wittgenstein]], rejected the need for any undefined simples. Wittgenstein pointed out in his ''[[Philosophical Investigations]]'' that what counts as a "simple" in one circumstance might not do so in another. He rejected the very idea that every explanation of the meaning of a term needed itself to be explained: "As though an explanation hung in the air unless supported by another one", claiming instead that explanation of a term is only needed when we need to avoid misunderstanding. | + | The name for this kind of theory was coined in 1918 by Russell in response to what he called "[[logical holism]]"; i.e. the belief that the world operates in such a way that no part can be known without the whole being known first. This belief is commonly called [[monism]], and in particular, Russell (and [[G.E. Moore]]) were reacting to the [[absolute idealism]] dominant then in Britain. |
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| - | Locke and [[John Stuart Mill|Mill]] also argued that we cannot define [[Principle of individuation|individuals]]. We learn names by connecting an idea with a sound, so that speaker and hearer have the same idea when the same word is used. This is not possible when no one else is acquainted with the particular thing that has "fallen under our notice". Russell offered his [[theory of descriptions]] in part as a way of defining a proper name, the definition being given by a [[definite description]] that "picks out" exactly one individual. [[Saul Kripke]] pointed to difficulties with this approach, especially in relation to [[modal logic|modality]], in his book ''Naming and Necessity''. | + | |
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| - | There is a presumption in the classic example of a definition that the ''definiens'' can be stated. Wittgenstein argued that for some terms this is not the case. The examples he used include ''game'', ''number'' and ''family''. In such cases, he argued, there is no fixed boundary that can be used to provide a definition. Rather, the items are grouped together because of a [[family resemblance]]. For terms such as these it is not possible and indeed not necessary to state a definition; rather, one simply comes to understand the ''use'' of the term. | + | |
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| - | == See also == | + | |
| - | * [[Definitionism]] | + | |
| - | * [[Demonstration]] | + | |
| - | * [[Extensional definition]] | + | |
| - | * [[Fallacies of definition]] | + | |
| - | * [[Indefinable]] | + | |
| - | * [[Indeterminacy (Philosophy)|Indeterminacy]] | + | |
| - | * [[Intensional definition]] | + | |
| - | * [[Lexical definition]] | + | |
| - | * [[Redefinition]] | + | |
| - | * [[Semantic]] | + | |
| + | ==See also== | ||
| + | *[[G. E. Moore]] | ||
| + | *[[Logical positivism]] | ||
| + | *[[Philosophy of language]] | ||
| + | *[[Logic]] | ||
| + | *[[Ordinary language philosophy]] | ||
| + | *[[Theory of descriptions]] | ||
| + | *''[[On Denoting]]'' | ||
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Logical atomism is a philosophical belief that originated in the early 20th century with the development of analytic philosophy. Its principal exponents were the British philosopher Bertrand Russell, the early work of his Austrian-born pupil and colleague Ludwig Wittgenstein, and his German counterpart Rudolf Carnap.
The theory holds that the world consists of ultimate logical "facts" (or "atoms") that cannot be broken down any further. Having originally propounded this stance in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein rejected it in his later Philosophical Investigations.
The name for this kind of theory was coined in 1918 by Russell in response to what he called "logical holism"; i.e. the belief that the world operates in such a way that no part can be known without the whole being known first. This belief is commonly called monism, and in particular, Russell (and G.E. Moore) were reacting to the absolute idealism dominant then in Britain.
[edit]
See also
- G. E. Moore
- Logical positivism
- Philosophy of language
- Logic
- Ordinary language philosophy
- Theory of descriptions
- On Denoting
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