Philosophical realism
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| + | "[[George Henry Lewes]] has observed that the only medieval debate of any philosophical value is the debate between [[nominalism]] and [[Philosophical realism|realism]]. This opinion is rather [[temerarious]], but it emphasizes the importance of the persistent controversy provoked at the beginning of the ninth century by a sentence from [[Porphyry (philosopher)|Porphyry]], which [[Boethius]] translated and annotated: a controversy that [[Anselm of Canterbury |Anselm]] and [[Roscellinus]] continued at the end of the eleventh century and that [[William of Ockham|William of Occam]] reanimated in the fourteenth." --[[Jorge Luis Borges ]], "[[From Allegories to Novels]]" | ||
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| + | "If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of [[common sense]]; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call [[absurd]]." --Thomas Reid, ''[[Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind]]'' | ||
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| - | Contemporary '''philosophical realism''', also referred to as '''metaphysical realism''', is the belief in a [[reality]] that is completely [[ontological]]ly independent of our conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc. Philosophers who profess realism also typically believe that [[truth]] consists in a belief's [[correspondence theory of truth|correspondence]] to reality. We may speak of realism with respect to [[The problem of other minds|other minds]], the [[past]], the [[future]], [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], [[mathematics|mathematical entities]] (such as [[natural numbers]]), [[morality|moral categories]], the [[material world]], or even [[thought]]. | + | '''Realism''' (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in [[reality]] independently of our [[Concept|conceptual scheme]]. In philosophical terms, these objects are [[ontology|ontologically]] independent of someone's [[conceptual scheme]], [[Idealism|perceptions]], [[language|linguistic practices]], [[belief]]s, etc. |
| - | Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality and that every new observation brings us closer to understanding reality. In recent times, debates concerning realism have become quite contentious due mostly in part to the influence of [[postmodernism]]. | + | Realism can be applied to many philosophically interesting objects and phenomena: [[The problem of other minds|other minds]], the [[past]] or the [[future]], [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], [[mathematics|mathematical entities]] (such as [[natural numbers]]), [[morality|moral categories]], the [[physical world]], and [[thought]]. |
| - | ==Debates about realism== | + | Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to anti-realist views (like some forms of [[philosophical skepticism|skepticism]] and [[solipsism]], which deny the existence of a mind-independent world). Philosophers who profess realism often claim that [[truth]] consists in a [[correspondence theory of truth|correspondence]] between cognitive representations and reality. |
| - | Despite the seeming straightforwardness of the realist position, in the history of philosophy there has been continuous debate about what is real. In addition, there has been significant evolution in what is meant by the term "[[reality|real]]". | + | |
| - | The oldest use of the term comes from [[Medieval philosophy|medieval]] interpretations and adaptations of [[Greek philosophy]]. In this medieval [[Scholasticism|scholastic]] philosophy, however, "realism" meant something different—indeed, in some ways almost opposite—from what it means today. In medieval philosophy, realism is contrasted with "[[conceptualism]]" and "[[nominalism]]". The opposition of realism and nominalism developed out of debates over the [[problem of universals]]. [[Universal (metaphysics)|Universals]] are terms or properties that can be applied to many things, rather than denoting a single specific individual—for example, red, beauty, five, or dog, as opposed to "Socrates" or "Athens". Realism in this context holds that universals really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world; it is associated with [[Platonic realism|Plato]]. Conceptualism holds that they exist, but only in the mind, Moderate Realism holds that they exist, but only insofar as they are instantiated in specific things; they do not exist ''separately'' from the specific thing. Nominalism holds that universals do not "exist" at all; they are no more than words ([[flatus voci]]) we use to describe specific objects, they do not name anything. This particular dispute over realism is largely moot in contemporary philosophy, and has been for centuries. | + | Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved. In some contexts, realism is contrasted with [[idealism]]. Today it is more usually contrasted with [[anti-realism]], for example in the [[philosophy of science]]. |
| - | In its Kantian sense, ''realism'' is contrasted with ''[[idealism]]''. In a contemporary sense, ''realism'' is contrasted with ''[[anti-realism]]'', primarily in the [[philosophy of science]]. | + | ==History== |
| + | The oldest use of the term "realism" appears in [[Medieval philosophy|medieval]] [[Scholasticism|scholastic]] interpretations and adaptations of [[Greek philosophy]]. | ||
| - | ==In practice== | + | ===Platonic realism=== |
| - | Both these disputes are often carried out relative to some specific area: one might, for example, be a realist about physical matter but an anti-realist about ethics. The high necessity of specifying the area in which the claim is made has been increasingly acknowledged in recent years. | + | Platonic realism is a [[philosophy|philosophical]] term usually used to refer to the idea of realism regarding the existence of [[universals (metaphysics)|universals]] or [[abstract object]]s after the [[Greek philosophy|Greek]] [[philosopher]] Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BC), a student of [[Socrates]]. As universals were considered by Plato to be [[Theory of Forms|ideal forms]], this stance is confusingly also called [[Platonic idealism]]. This should not be confused with [[Philosophical idealism|Idealism]], as presented by philosophers such as [[George Berkeley]]: as Platonic [[abstraction]]s are not spatial, temporal, or mental, they are not compatible with the latter Idealism's emphasis on mental existence. Plato's Forms include numbers and geometrical figures, making them a theory of [[mathematical realism]]; they also include the [[Form of the Good]], making them in addition a theory of [[ethical realism]]. |
| - | Increasingly these last disputes, too, are rejected as misleading, and some philosophers prefer to call the kind of realism espoused there "metaphysical realism," and eschew the whole debate in favour of simple "[[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]]" or "natural realism", which is not so much a theory as the position that these debates are ill-conceived if not incoherent, and that there is no more to deciding what is ''really real'' than simply taking our words at face value. | + | ===Medieval realism<!--'Medieval realism' redirects here-->=== |
| + | '''Medieval realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> developed out of debates over the [[problem of universals]]. [[Universal (metaphysics)|Universals]] are terms or properties that can be applied to many things, such as "red", "beauty", "five", or "dog". Realism in this context, contrasted with [[conceptualism]] and [[nominalism]], holds that such universals really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world. Moderate Realism holds that they exist, but only insofar as they are instantiated in specific things; they do not exist ''separately'' from the specific thing. Conceptualism holds that they exist, but only in the mind, while nominalism holds that universals do not "exist" at all but are no more than words (''[[flatus vocis]]'') that describe specific objects. | ||
| - | Some realist philosophers prefer [[deflationary theory of truth|deflationary]] theories of truth to more traditional correspondence accounts. | + | ===The Scottish school of common sense realism=== |
| - | ==Realism in logic and mathematics== | + | [[Scottish common sense realism]] is a school of [[philosophy]] that sought to defend naive realism against philosophical paradox and [[scepticism]], arguing that matters of [[common sense]] are within the reach of common understanding and that common-sense beliefs even govern the lives and thoughts of those who hold non-commonsensical beliefs. It originated in the ideas of the most prominent members of the Scottish School of Common Sense, [[Thomas Reid]], [[Adam Ferguson]] and [[Dugald Stewart]], during the 18th century [[Scottish Enlightenment]] and flourished in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Scotland and America. |
| - | ''Mathematical realism'', like realism in general, holds that mathematical entities exist independently of the human [[mind]]. Thus humans do not invent mathematics, but rather discover it, and any other intelligent beings in the universe would presumably do the same. In this point of view, there is really one sort of mathematics that can be discovered: [[Triangle]]s, for example, are real entities, not the creations of the human mind. | + | Its roots can be found in responses to such philosophers as [[John Locke]], [[George Berkeley]] and [[David Hume]]. The approach was a response to the "ideal system" that began with Descartes' concept of the limitations of [[empirical evidence|sense experience]] and led Locke and Hume to a skepticism that called religion and the evidence of the senses equally into question. The common sense realists found skepticism to be absurd and so contrary to common experience that it had to be rejected. They taught that ordinary experiences provide intuitively certain assurance of the existence of the self, of real objects that could be seen and felt and of certain "first principles" upon which sound morality and religious beliefs could be established. Its basic principle was enunciated by its founder and greatest figure, Thomas Reid: |
| - | Many working mathematicians have been mathematical realists; they see themselves as discoverers of naturally occurring objects. Examples include [[Paul Erdős]] and [[Kurt Gödel]]. Gödel believed in an objective mathematical reality that could be perceived in a manner analogous to sense perception. Certain principles (e.g., for any two objects, there is a collection of objects consisting of precisely those two objects) could be directly seen to be true, but some conjectures, like the [[continuum hypothesis]], might prove undecidable just on the basis of such principles. Gödel suggested that quasi-empirical methodology could be used to provide sufficient evidence to be able to reasonably assume such a conjecture. | + | :If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd. |
| - | Within realism, there are distinctions depending on what sort of existence one takes mathematical entities to have, and how we know about them. | + | ==Realism in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy== |
| - | ==Realism in physics== | + | ===Naïve realism=== |
| - | Realism in physics refers to the fact that any physical system must have its property defined, whether or not it is measured (or observed or not). However, some interpretations of quantum mechanics hold that a system lacks an actualized property until it is measured. This implies that quantum systems exhibit a non-local behaviour. [[Bell's theorem]] proved that every [[Quantum mechanics|quantum theory]] must either violate [[Principle of locality|local realism]] or [[counterfactual definiteness]]. [[Physics]] up to the 19th century was always implicitly and sometimes explicitly taken to be based on philosophical realism. With the advent of [[quantum mechanics]] in the 20th century, it was noted that it is no longer possible to adhere to local realism — that is, to both the [[principle of locality]] (that distant objects cannot affect local objects), and counterfactual definiteness, a form of ontological realism implicit in classical physics. This has given rise to a contentious debate of the [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]]. Although locality and 'realism' in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, are jointly false, it is possible to retain one of them. The majority of working physicists discard counterfactual definiteness in favor of locality, since non-locality is held to be contrary to relativity. The implications of this stance are rarely discussed outside of the microscopic domain. See, however, [[Schrödinger's cat]] for an illustration of the difficulties presented. It can also be argued that the counterfactual definiteness 'realism' of physics is a much more specific notion than general philosophical realism. | + | |
| + | [[Naïve realism]], also known as direct realism, is a [[philosophy of mind]] rooted in a [[common sense]] [[theory]] of [[perception]] that claims that the [[senses]] provide us with direct [[awareness]] of the external world. In contrast, some forms of [[idealism]] assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms of [[skepticism]] say we cannot trust our senses. The naive realist view is that [[Object (philosophy)|object]]s have properties, such as texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually [[Perception|perceived]] absolutely correctly. We perceive them as they ''really'' are. | ||
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| + | ===Scientific realism=== | ||
| + | [[Scientific realism]] is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within [[philosophy of science]], it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of [[unobservable|unobservable entities]] apparently talked about by scientific [[theory|theories]]. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same [[Ontology|ontological]] status) as observables. [[Analytical philosopher]]s generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality. The main alternative to scientific realism is [[instrumentalism]]. | ||
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| + | ===Realism in physics=== | ||
| + | [[Realism in physics]] (especially [[quantum mechanics]]) is the claim that the world is in some sense mind-independent: that even if the results of a possible measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer (contrary to the "[[consciousness causes collapse]]" [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]]). That interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, states that the [[wave function]] is already the full description of reality. The different possible realities described by the wave function are equally true. The observer collapses the wave function into their own reality. One's reality can be mind-dependent under this interpretation of quantum mechanics. | ||
| + | |||
| + | ===Aesthetic realism<!--'Aesthetic realism (metaphysics)' redirects here-->=== | ||
| + | '''Aesthetic realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (not to be confused with the [[Aesthetic Realism]] of [[Eli Siegel]], the philosophy that sees reality as the making one of opposites) may mean the claim that there are mind-independent aesthetic facts, but in general discussions about art [[Realism (arts)|"realism"]] is a complex term that may have a number of different meanings. | ||
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| * [[Analytic philosophy]] | * [[Analytic philosophy]] | ||
| - | * [[Critical realism]] | + | * [[Critical realism (philosophy of perception)|Critical realism]] |
| * [[Epistemological realism]] | * [[Epistemological realism]] | ||
| * [[Legal realism]] | * [[Legal realism]] | ||
| - | * [[Modal realism]] | ||
| - | * [[Moral realism]] | ||
| * [[Moderate realism]] | * [[Moderate realism]] | ||
| - | * [[Naïve realism]] | ||
| * [[Objectivism (Ayn Rand)|Objectivism]] | * [[Objectivism (Ayn Rand)|Objectivism]] | ||
| * [[Philosophy of social science]] | * [[Philosophy of social science]] | ||
| - | * [[Platonic realism]] | + | * [[Principle of bivalence]] |
| - | * [[Scientific realism]] | + | * [[Problem of future contingents]] |
| + | * [[Realism (disambiguation)]] | ||
| * [[Truth-value link realism]] | * [[Truth-value link realism]] | ||
| - | * [[Idealism]] | + | * [[Speculative realism]] |
| - | + | ||
| - | ===Critics=== | + | |
| - | * [[Constructivist epistemology]] | + | |
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
Revision as of 15:18, 30 April 2018
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"George Henry Lewes has observed that the only medieval debate of any philosophical value is the debate between nominalism and realism. This opinion is rather temerarious, but it emphasizes the importance of the persistent controversy provoked at the beginning of the ninth century by a sentence from Porphyry, which Boethius translated and annotated: a controversy that Anselm and Roscellinus continued at the end of the eleventh century and that William of Occam reanimated in the fourteenth." --Jorge Luis Borges , "From Allegories to Novels" "If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd." --Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind |
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Featured: |
Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.
Realism can be applied to many philosophically interesting objects and phenomena: other minds, the past or the future, universals, mathematical entities (such as natural numbers), moral categories, the physical world, and thought.
Realism can also be a view about the nature of reality in general, where it claims that the world exists independent of the mind, as opposed to anti-realist views (like some forms of skepticism and solipsism, which deny the existence of a mind-independent world). Philosophers who profess realism often claim that truth consists in a correspondence between cognitive representations and reality.
Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved. In some contexts, realism is contrasted with idealism. Today it is more usually contrasted with anti-realism, for example in the philosophy of science.
Contents |
History
The oldest use of the term "realism" appears in medieval scholastic interpretations and adaptations of Greek philosophy.
Platonic realism
Platonic realism is a philosophical term usually used to refer to the idea of realism regarding the existence of universals or abstract objects after the Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427–c. 347 BC), a student of Socrates. As universals were considered by Plato to be ideal forms, this stance is confusingly also called Platonic idealism. This should not be confused with Idealism, as presented by philosophers such as George Berkeley: as Platonic abstractions are not spatial, temporal, or mental, they are not compatible with the latter Idealism's emphasis on mental existence. Plato's Forms include numbers and geometrical figures, making them a theory of mathematical realism; they also include the Form of the Good, making them in addition a theory of ethical realism.
Medieval realism
Medieval realism developed out of debates over the problem of universals. Universals are terms or properties that can be applied to many things, such as "red", "beauty", "five", or "dog". Realism in this context, contrasted with conceptualism and nominalism, holds that such universals really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world. Moderate Realism holds that they exist, but only insofar as they are instantiated in specific things; they do not exist separately from the specific thing. Conceptualism holds that they exist, but only in the mind, while nominalism holds that universals do not "exist" at all but are no more than words (flatus vocis) that describe specific objects.
The Scottish school of common sense realism
Scottish common sense realism is a school of philosophy that sought to defend naive realism against philosophical paradox and scepticism, arguing that matters of common sense are within the reach of common understanding and that common-sense beliefs even govern the lives and thoughts of those who hold non-commonsensical beliefs. It originated in the ideas of the most prominent members of the Scottish School of Common Sense, Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson and Dugald Stewart, during the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment and flourished in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Scotland and America.
Its roots can be found in responses to such philosophers as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. The approach was a response to the "ideal system" that began with Descartes' concept of the limitations of sense experience and led Locke and Hume to a skepticism that called religion and the evidence of the senses equally into question. The common sense realists found skepticism to be absurd and so contrary to common experience that it had to be rejected. They taught that ordinary experiences provide intuitively certain assurance of the existence of the self, of real objects that could be seen and felt and of certain "first principles" upon which sound morality and religious beliefs could be established. Its basic principle was enunciated by its founder and greatest figure, Thomas Reid:
- If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them--these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.
Realism in Contemporary Analytic Philosophy
Naïve realism
Naïve realism, also known as direct realism, is a philosophy of mind rooted in a common sense theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast, some forms of idealism assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms of skepticism say we cannot trust our senses. The naive realist view is that objects have properties, such as texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived absolutely correctly. We perceive them as they really are.
Scientific realism
Scientific realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Within philosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of unobservable entities apparently talked about by scientific theories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same ontological status) as observables. Analytical philosophers generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality. The main alternative to scientific realism is instrumentalism.
Realism in physics
Realism in physics (especially quantum mechanics) is the claim that the world is in some sense mind-independent: that even if the results of a possible measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer (contrary to the "consciousness causes collapse" interpretation of quantum mechanics). That interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, states that the wave function is already the full description of reality. The different possible realities described by the wave function are equally true. The observer collapses the wave function into their own reality. One's reality can be mind-dependent under this interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Aesthetic realism
Aesthetic realism (not to be confused with the Aesthetic Realism of Eli Siegel, the philosophy that sees reality as the making one of opposites) may mean the claim that there are mind-independent aesthetic facts, but in general discussions about art "realism" is a complex term that may have a number of different meanings.
See also
- Analytic philosophy
- Critical realism
- Epistemological realism
- Legal realism
- Moderate realism
- Objectivism
- Philosophy of social science
- Principle of bivalence
- Problem of future contingents
- Realism (disambiguation)
- Truth-value link realism
- Speculative realism
