Petro-Islam  

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-"A specific type of Islam has been gathering momentum of late, and the appropriate name that applies to it is `Petro-Islam.` The first and last goal of `Petro-Islam` has been to protect the petroleum wealth or, more correctly, the types of social relations underlying those [tribal] societies that possess the lion's share of this wealth. It is common knowledge that the principle of the `few dominating the largest portion of this wealth` permeates the social structure [of the Gulf region]. ... these petro-Islamites are exploiting the religious sensitivities of the masses for the purpose of `spreading a unique brand of Islam never seen before in history; the Islam of the veil, beard, and the Jilbab; the Islam that permits the stoppage of work during prayers' time, and prohibits women from driving automobiles." --Fouad Zakariyya+"A specific type of Islam has been gathering momentum of late, and the appropriate name that applies to it is `Petro-Islam.` The first and last goal of `Petro-Islam` has been to protect the petroleum wealth or, more correctly, the types of social relations underlying those [tribal] societies that possess the lion's share of this wealth. It is common knowledge that the principle of the `few dominating the largest portion of this wealth` permeates the social structure [of the Gulf region]. ... these petro-Islamites are exploiting the religious sensitivities of the masses for the purpose of `spreading a unique brand of Islam never seen before in history; the Islam of the [[veil]], [[beard]], and the [[Jilbab]]; the Islam that permits the stoppage of work during prayers' time, and prohibits women from driving automobiles." --Fouad Zakariyya
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==Usage and definitions== ==Usage and definitions==
The use of the term to refer to "Wahhabism" (the dominant interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia) is widespread but not universal. Variations on, or different uses of, the term include: The use of the term to refer to "Wahhabism" (the dominant interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia) is widespread but not universal. Variations on, or different uses of, the term include:
-*Use of resources by Saudi Arabia "to project itself as a major player in the Muslim world". The distribution of large sums of money from public and private sources in Saudi Arabia to advance Wahhabi doctrines and pursue the Saudi Arabian foreign policy.<ref name=Hussain>{{cite journal|last=Hussain|first=Hamid|title=Politicization of Islam or Islamization of Politics: Saudi Arabian Experiment|journal=Defense Journal of Pakistan|date=September 2004|volume=8|issue=2|page=104|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IKjfAAAAMAAJ&q=%22hamid+hussain%22+petro-islam%22&dq=%22hamid+hussain%22+petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=m4NaU66pJY2ayQGWkYCgDQ&ved=0CCsQ6AEwAA&surl=1|quote=Saudis have used their resources; mainly cash to project itself as a major player in Muslim world. Fouad Ajami has named this phenomenon `Petro-Islam`. Large sums of money from public and private sources were distributed all around the globe to advance the muwwahhidin doctrine and pursue the country's foreign policy}}</ref>+*Use of resources by Saudi Arabia "to project itself as a major player in the Muslim world". The distribution of large sums of money from public and private sources in Saudi Arabia to advance Wahhabi doctrines and pursue the Saudi Arabian foreign policy.
-* Attempts by the Saudi rulers to use both Islam and its wealth to win the loyalty of the [[Muslim world]].<ref name=Abu-Rabi/><ref name=Mackey-quote/> +* Attempts by the Saudi rulers to use both Islam and its wealth to win the loyalty of the [[Muslim world]].
-* Diplomatic, political and economic—as well as religious—policies promoted by Saudi Arabia.<ref name=GWERTZMAN>{{cite news|last=GWERTZMaAN|first=BERNARD|title=Saudi Arabia, Mideast Power Broker|newspaper=New York Times|date=Oct 23, 1977|quote=... the United States will again be underscoring the importance it attaches to Saudi Arabia's role as a power broker in the Middle East, the driving force that one Egyptian writer calls `Petro-Islam.` ... astute behind-the-scenes diplomatic activity has made Saudi Arabia a kind of fledgling power, not only in the [[Middle East]], but further afield.}}</ref> +* Diplomatic, political and economic—as well as religious—policies promoted by Saudi Arabia.
-*The type of Islam favored by petroleum-exporting Muslim-majority countries, particularly the other Gulf monarchies ([[United Arab Emirates]], [[Kuwait]], [[Qatar]], etc.)—not just Saudi Arabia.<ref name=Al-Azm>{{cite web|last=Al-Azm|first=Sadiq|title=The Fight over the Meaning of Islam|url=http://en.qantara.de/content/essay-sadiq-al-azm-the-fight-over-the-meaning-of-islam|work=14.09.2009|publisher=qantara.de|quote=... "official state Islam". The most prominent form of this kind of Islam at present is the "petro-Islam" of countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, fully funded and supported all over the world by abundant petro-dollars.|accessdate=26 March 2014}}</ref>+*The type of Islam favored by petroleum-exporting Muslim-majority countries, particularly the other Gulf monarchies ([[United Arab Emirates]], [[Kuwait]], [[Qatar]], etc.)—not just Saudi Arabia.
-*A "hugely successful" enterprise made up of a "colossal ensemble" of media and other cultural organs that has broken the "[[secular]]ist and [[nationalist]]" monopoly of the state on culture, media and, "to a lesser extent", education; and is supported by both Islamists and socially conservative business "elements", who opposed the [[Arab nationalism|Arab nationalist]] ideologies of [[Nasserism]] and [[Baathism]].<ref name="ʻAẓmah">{{cite book|last=ʻAẓmah|first=ʻAzīz|title=Islams and Modernities|year=1993|publisher=Verso|page=32|quote=Islamic discourse ... started in the 1950s and 1960s, as a local Arab purveyance of the Truman Doctrine, and was sustained initially by Egyptian and Syrian Islamists -- both earnest ones, and socially conservative, pro-Saudi business and other elements opposed to Nasserism and Baathism. This was indeed the first great cultural and ideological enterprise of Petro-Islam, along with ideas of pan-Islamism as a force counterbalancing Arab nationalism, and Islamic authenticity combating `alien` ideologies. <BR>The Petro-Islamic enterprises has been hugely successful, especially with the substantial influx of the Arab intelligentsia to the relatively backward countries of the Arabian Peninsula, and the colossal ensemble of mediatic and other cultural organs that Petro-Islam has built up, and with which, most importantly, it has broken the secularist and nationalist cultural, mediatic and, to a lesser extent, the educational monopoly of the modern Arab state.}}</ref>+*A "hugely successful" enterprise made up of a "colossal ensemble" of media and other cultural organs that has broken the "[[secular]]ist and [[nationalist]]" monopoly of the state on culture, media and, "to a lesser extent", education; and is supported by both Islamists and socially conservative business "elements", who opposed the [[Arab nationalism|Arab nationalist]] ideologies of [[Nasserism]] and [[Baathism]].
-*More conservative Islamic cultural practices ([[Gender segregation and Islam|separation of the sexes]], [[hijab]] or more complete hijab) brought back (to Egypt) from Gulf oil states by migrant workers.<ref name=Sengers>{{cite book|last=Sengers|first=Gerda|title=Women and Demons: Cultic Healing in Islamic Egypt|publisher=Brill|year=2002|page=240|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ypbI7LHzv3MC&pg=PA240&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=YGxaU_HuO-OiyAGKkYHgBw&ved=0CCoQ6AEwADge#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false|quote=Migration can also have other consequences for the lives of women. In the oil states there is much stricter segregation and a much stricter code of moral behaviour than in Egypt. Many men who return to Egypt want to keep to the attitudes to women than hold sway in the oil states, and require their wives to take on the veil, give up their work outside the home and start to live a stricter `Islamic life`. In Egypt this is mockingly called `petro-Islam`.}}</ref> +*More conservative Islamic cultural practices ([[Gender segregation and Islam|separation of the sexes]], [[hijab]] or more complete hijab) brought back (to Egypt) from Gulf oil states by migrant workers.
-*A term used by secularists, particularly in Egypt, to refer to efforts to require the enforcement of [[sharia]] (Islamic law).<ref name=Monshipouri>{{cite book|last=Monshipouri|first=Mahmood|title=Muslims in Global Politics: Identities, Interests, and Human Rights|page=86|publisher=University of Pennsylvania Press|year=2009|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aWErJvWJlbcC&pg=PA86&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CEgQ6AEwBTgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false|quote=The shari'a has been the primary target of attacks by the secularists [in Egypt]. Some of them deny its relevance to today's mundane affairs; others reject its divine origins; and still others argue that it can be interpreted in many different ways. A popular theory among secularists in Egypt, Azzam Tamimi writes, is that `Shari'a -- as understood by Islamic scholars and Islamic movements -- is alien to Egyptian society and is the product of Saudi influence on migrant Egyptian society.` Some experts have even referred to it as `petro-Islam` imported from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.}}</ref> +*A term used by secularists, particularly in Egypt, to refer to efforts to require the enforcement of [[sharia]] (Islamic law).
-*Islamic interpretation that is "anti-woman, anti-intellectual, anti-progress, and anti-science ... largely funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis".<ref name=Goodwin>(quoted in [https://books.google.com/books?id=JKqkohMVPVsC&pg=PA39&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CDYQ6AEwAjgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false Lifting the Veil: The World of Muslim Women]){{cite book|last=Goodwin|first=Jan|title=Price of Honour: Muslim Women Lift the Veil of Silence on the Islamic World|year=1994|publisher=Warner Books|quote=Very few Muslim countries have given women their full rights, and both Islamic law and the message of Islam have been violated. But today, petro-Islam with its vast amounts of money is letting loose on the Islamic world a wave of fundamentalism. The movement, largely funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis, is pushing a doctrine that is anti-women, anti-intellectual, anti-progress, and anti-science.}}</ref>+*Islamic interpretation that is "anti-woman, anti-intellectual, anti-progress, and anti-science ... largely funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis".
==Background== ==Background==
-[[File:Madhhab Map2.png|thumb]] 
-[[File:Oil revenues by oil exporting country.jpg|thumb|Petroleum products revenue in billions of dollars per annum for five major Muslim petroleum exporting countries. Saudi Arabian production <br>Years were chosen to shown revenue for before (1973) and after (1974) the [[Yom Kippur War|October 1973 War]], after the [[Iranian Revolution]] (1980), and during the market turnaround in 1986.<ref>Ian Skeet, ''OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics'' (Cambridge: University Press, 1988)</ref> [[Iran]] and [[Iraq]] are excluded because their revenue fluctuated due to the revolution and the war between them.<ref> 
-{{cite book 
-|last=Kepel 
-|first=Gilles 
-|title=Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam 
-|year=2003 
-|publisher=I.B.Tauris 
-|page=75 
-|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OLvTNk75hUoC&pg=PA61&dq=petro-Islam&hl=en&sa=X&ei=pEIvU5_tJ-GSyQGS84GgDA&ved=0CEEQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=petro-Islam&f=false  
-}}</ref>]] 
One scholar who spelled out the idea of petro-Islam in some detail is Gilles Kepel.<ref>quoted in a number of [https://www.google.com/search?q=petro-islam&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=sb#channel=sb&q=%22petro-islam%22+kepel&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&tbm=bks sources]</ref><ref>Books quoting Kepel on Petro-Islam include [https://books.google.com/books?id=mGjcXVoSW-AC&pg=PT56&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CFQQ6AEwBzgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East] By Sir Lawrence Freedman; [https://books.google.com/books?id=JvjaS4GXclQC&pg=PA146&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CGAQ6AEwCTgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false Life among the Anthros and Other Essays] By Clifford Geertz;</ref> According to Kepel, prior to the 1973 oil embargo, religion throughout the Muslim world was "dominated by national or local traditions rooted in the piety of the common people." Clerics looked to their different schools of [[fiqh]] (the four [[Sunni]] [[Madhhab]]s: [[Hanafi]] in the Turkish zones of South Asia, [[Maliki]] in Africa, [[Shafi'i]] in Southeast Asia, plus Shi'a [[Ja'fari jurisprudence|Ja'fari]], and "held Saudi inspired puritanism" (using another school of fiqh, [[Hanbali]]) in "great suspicion on account of its sectarian character," according to Gilles Kepel. One scholar who spelled out the idea of petro-Islam in some detail is Gilles Kepel.<ref>quoted in a number of [https://www.google.com/search?q=petro-islam&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&aq=t&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=sb#channel=sb&q=%22petro-islam%22+kepel&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&tbm=bks sources]</ref><ref>Books quoting Kepel on Petro-Islam include [https://books.google.com/books?id=mGjcXVoSW-AC&pg=PT56&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CFQQ6AEwBzgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East] By Sir Lawrence Freedman; [https://books.google.com/books?id=JvjaS4GXclQC&pg=PA146&dq=%22petro-islam%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=C2taU7qNM4WMyQG8uICIBw&ved=0CGAQ6AEwCTgU#v=onepage&q=%22petro-islam%22&f=false Life among the Anthros and Other Essays] By Clifford Geertz;</ref> According to Kepel, prior to the 1973 oil embargo, religion throughout the Muslim world was "dominated by national or local traditions rooted in the piety of the common people." Clerics looked to their different schools of [[fiqh]] (the four [[Sunni]] [[Madhhab]]s: [[Hanafi]] in the Turkish zones of South Asia, [[Maliki]] in Africa, [[Shafi'i]] in Southeast Asia, plus Shi'a [[Ja'fari jurisprudence|Ja'fari]], and "held Saudi inspired puritanism" (using another school of fiqh, [[Hanbali]]) in "great suspicion on account of its sectarian character," according to Gilles Kepel.

Revision as of 19:48, 19 October 2017

"A specific type of Islam has been gathering momentum of late, and the appropriate name that applies to it is `Petro-Islam.` The first and last goal of `Petro-Islam` has been to protect the petroleum wealth or, more correctly, the types of social relations underlying those [tribal] societies that possess the lion's share of this wealth. It is common knowledge that the principle of the `few dominating the largest portion of this wealth` permeates the social structure [of the Gulf region]. ... these petro-Islamites are exploiting the religious sensitivities of the masses for the purpose of `spreading a unique brand of Islam never seen before in history; the Islam of the veil, beard, and the Jilbab; the Islam that permits the stoppage of work during prayers' time, and prohibits women from driving automobiles." --Fouad Zakariyya

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Petro-Islam usually refers to the extremist and fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam—sometimes called "Wahhabism"—favored by the conservative oil-exporting Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its name derives from source of the funding—petroleum exports—that spread it through the Muslim world following the Yom Kippur War. The term is sometimes called "pejorative" or a "nickname". According to Sandra Mackey the term was coined by Fouad Ajami. It has been used by French political scientist Gilles Kepel, Bangladeshi religious scholar Imtiyaz Ahmed, and Egyptian philosopher Fouad Zakariyya and Fouad Zakariyya.


Contents

Usage and definitions

The use of the term to refer to "Wahhabism" (the dominant interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia) is widespread but not universal. Variations on, or different uses of, the term include:

  • Use of resources by Saudi Arabia "to project itself as a major player in the Muslim world". The distribution of large sums of money from public and private sources in Saudi Arabia to advance Wahhabi doctrines and pursue the Saudi Arabian foreign policy.
  • Attempts by the Saudi rulers to use both Islam and its wealth to win the loyalty of the Muslim world.
  • Diplomatic, political and economic—as well as religious—policies promoted by Saudi Arabia.
  • The type of Islam favored by petroleum-exporting Muslim-majority countries, particularly the other Gulf monarchies (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, etc.)—not just Saudi Arabia.
  • A "hugely successful" enterprise made up of a "colossal ensemble" of media and other cultural organs that has broken the "secularist and nationalist" monopoly of the state on culture, media and, "to a lesser extent", education; and is supported by both Islamists and socially conservative business "elements", who opposed the Arab nationalist ideologies of Nasserism and Baathism.
  • More conservative Islamic cultural practices (separation of the sexes, hijab or more complete hijab) brought back (to Egypt) from Gulf oil states by migrant workers.
  • A term used by secularists, particularly in Egypt, to refer to efforts to require the enforcement of sharia (Islamic law).
  • Islamic interpretation that is "anti-woman, anti-intellectual, anti-progress, and anti-science ... largely funded by the Saudis and Kuwaitis".

Background

One scholar who spelled out the idea of petro-Islam in some detail is Gilles Kepel.<ref>quoted in a number of sources</ref><ref>Books quoting Kepel on Petro-Islam include A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East By Sir Lawrence Freedman; Life among the Anthros and Other Essays By Clifford Geertz;</ref> According to Kepel, prior to the 1973 oil embargo, religion throughout the Muslim world was "dominated by national or local traditions rooted in the piety of the common people." Clerics looked to their different schools of fiqh (the four Sunni Madhhabs: Hanafi in the Turkish zones of South Asia, Maliki in Africa, Shafi'i in Southeast Asia, plus Shi'a Ja'fari, and "held Saudi inspired puritanism" (using another school of fiqh, Hanbali) in "great suspicion on account of its sectarian character," according to Gilles Kepel. <ref name=kepel-70> Template:Cite book</ref>

While the 1973 War (also called the Yom Kippur War) was started by Egypt and Syria to take back land won by Israel in 1967, the "real victors" of the war were the Arab "oil-exporting countries", (according to Gilles Kepel), whose embargo against Israel's western allies stopped Israel's counter offensive.<ref name=kepel-69/>

The embargo's political success enhanced the prestige of the embargo-ers and the reduction in the global supply of oil sent oil prices soaring (from US$3 per barrel to nearly $12<ref name=cbc>Template:Cite news</ref>) and with them, oil exporter revenues. This put Muslim oil exporting states in a "clear position of dominance within the Muslim world". The most dominant was Saudi Arabia, the largest exporter by far (see bar chart).<ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name=kepel-69> Template:Cite book</ref>

Saudi Arabians viewed their oil wealth not as an accident of geology or history, but connected to religion—a blessing by God of them, to "be solemnly acknowledged and lived up to" with pious behavior.<ref name=Ayubi>Template:Cite book</ref> <ref>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name=Sayeed>Gilles Kepel and Nazih N. Ayubi both use the term Petro-Islam, but others subscribe to this view as well, example: Template:Cite book</ref>

With its new wealth the rulers of Saudi Arabia sought to replace nationalist movements in the Muslim world with Islam, to bring Islam "to the forefront of the international scene", and to unify Islam worldwide under the "single creed" of Wahhabism, paying particular attention to Muslims who had immigrated to the West (a "special target")."<ref name=kepel-70/>

Influence of "Petro-dollars"

According to scholar Gilles Kepel, (who devoted a chapter of his book Jihad to the subject -- "Building Petro-Islam on the Ruins of Arab Nationalism"),<ref name=Kepel73/> in the years immediately after the 1973 War, `petro-Islam` was a "sort of nickname" for a "constituency" of Wahhabi preachers and Muslim intellectuals who promoted "strict implementation of the sharia [Islamic law] in the political, moral and cultural spheres".<ref name=Kepel51/>

In the coming decades, Saudi Arabia's interpretation of Islam became influential (according to Kepel) through

  • the spread of Wahhabi religious doctrines via Saudi charities; an
  • increased migration of Muslims to work in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states; and
  • a shift in the balance of power among Muslim states toward the oil-producing countries.<ref name=Kepel73>Template:Cite book</ref>

Author Sandra Mackey describes the use of petrodollars on facilities for the hajj—for example leveling hill peaks to make room for tents, providing electricity for tents and cooling pilgrims with ice and air conditioning—as part of "Petro-Islam", which she describes as a way of building the Muslim faithful's loyalty toward the Saudi government.<ref name=Mackey-quote>Template:Cite book</ref><ref name=kepel-hegem>Kepel describes Saudi control of the two holy cities as "an essential instrument of hegemony over Islam". Template:Cite book</ref>

Religious funding

The Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed millions of Qurans free of charge, along with doctrinal texts that followed the Wahhabi interpretation. In mosques throughout the world "from the African plains to the rice paddies of Indonesia and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing projects of European cities, the same books could be found", paid for by Saudi Arabian government.<ref name=Kepel-WML >Template:Cite book </ref>

Imtiyaz Ahmed, a religious scholar and professor of International Relations at University of Dhaka sees changes in religious practices in Bangladesh as linked to Saudi Arabia's efforts to promote Wahhabism through the financial help it provides countries like Bangladesh.<ref name=dw-hijab>Template:Cite news</ref> The Mawlid, the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday and formerly "an integral part of Bangladeshi culture" is no longer popular, while black burqas for women are much more so.<ref name=dw-2>Template:Cite news</ref> The discount on the price of oil imports Bangladesh receives doesn't "come free", according to Ahmed. "Saudi Arabia is giving oil, Saudi Arabia would definitely want that some of their ideas to come with oil."

Mosques

[[File:FaisalMasjid.jpg|thumb|Pakistan's Faisal Mosque, a gift from Saudi Arabia's King Faisal<ref>{{

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More than 1,500 mosques were built around the world from 1975 to 2000 paid for by Saudi public funds. The Saudi-headquartered and financed Muslim World League played a pioneering role in supporting Islamic associations, mosques, and investment plans for the future. It opened offices in "every area of the world where Muslims lived."<ref name=Kepel-WML/> The process of financing mosques usually involved presenting a local office of the Muslim World League with evidence of the need for a mosque/Islamic center to obtain the offices `recommendation` (tazkiya) to "a generous donor within the kingdom or one of the emirates".<ref name=Kepel-WML-73>Template:Cite book</ref>

Saudi-financed mosques were generally built using marble `international style` design and green neon lighting, in a break with most local Islamic architectural traditions, but following Wahhabi ones.<ref name=Kepel-72/>

Islamic banking

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One mechanism for the redistribution of (some) oil revenues from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim oil-exporters, to the poorer Muslim nations of African and Asia, was the Islamic Development Bank. Headquartered in Saudi Arabia, it opened for business in 1975. Its lenders and borrowers were member states of Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and it strengthened "Islamic cohesion" between them. <ref name=Kepel >Template:Cite book </ref>

Saudi Arabians also helped establish Islamic banks with private investors and depositors. DMI (Dar al-Mal al-Islami: the House of Islamic Finance), founded in 1981 by Prince Mohammed bin Faisal Al Saud,<ref>son of the assassinated King Faisal</ref> and the Al Baraka group, established in 1982 by Sheik Saleh Abdullah Kamel (a Saudi billionaire), were both transnational holding companies.<ref name=Kepel-79>Template:Cite book</ref>

Migration

By 1975, over one million workers—from unskilled country people to experienced professors, from Sudan, Pakistan, India, Southeast Asia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria had moved the Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states to work, and return after a few years with savings. A majority of these workers were Arab and most were Muslim. Ten years later the number had increased to 5.15 million and Arabs were no longer in the majority. 43% (mostly Muslims) came from the South Asia. In one country, Pakistan, in a single year, (1983),<ref name=kepel-71-stats/>

"the money sent home by Gulf emigrants amounted to $3 billion, compared with a total of $735 million given to the nation in foreign aid. .... The underpaid petty functionary of yore could now drive back to his hometown at the wheel of a foreign car, build himself a house in a residential suburb, and settle down to invest his savings or engage in trade.... he owed nothing to his home state, where he could never have earned enough to afford such luxuries." <ref name=kepel-71-stats> Template:Cite book</ref>

Muslims who had moved to Saudi Arabia, or other "oil-rich monarchies of the peninsula" to work, often returned to their poor home country following religious practice more intensely, particularly practices of Wahhabi Muslims. Having "grown rich in this Wahhabi milieu" it was not surprising that the returning Muslims believed there was a connection between that milieu and "their material prosperity", and that on return they followed religious practices more intensely and that those practices followed Wahhabi tenants.<ref name=Kepel-71>Template:Cite book </ref> Kepel gives examples of migrant workers returning home with new affluence, asking to be addressed by servants as "hajja" rather than "Madame" (the old bourgeois custom).<ref name=Kepel-72 >Template:Cite book</ref> Another imitation of Saudi Arabia adopted by affluent migrant workers was increased segregation of the sexes, including shopping areas.<ref name=Kepel-72/><ref>examples include residential areas built to "house members of the devoutly Islamic business class who have returned from the Gulf", in Medinet Nasr district of Cairo; and Al Salam Shopping Centers Li-l Mouhaggabat that specialized in "providing shopping facilities for veiled women." (Kepel, Jihad, 2002, 385)</ref>

State leadership

In the 1950s and 1960s Gamal Abdul-Nasser, the leading exponent of Arab nationalism and the president of the Arab world's largest country had great prestige and popularity. <ref name=famous>{{

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}}{{#if: The end of Suez Crisis saw the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the powerful and popular leader of the Arab world. Nasser represented a new, defiant era in Arabic politics. His popularity attracted the other Arab leaders together and started building an Arab state to confront the imperialist-forces of the West. The leadership in almost all the Arabian countries began to see the Western countries as their enemy and pledged to retaliate aggressively.

 |  “The end of Suez Crisis saw the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the powerful and popular leader of the Arab world. Nasser represented a new, defiant era in Arabic politics. His popularity attracted the other Arab leaders together and started building an Arab state to confront the imperialist-forces of the West. The leadership in almost all the Arabian countries began to see the Western countries as their enemy and pledged to retaliate aggressively.”

}}</ref> However, in 1967 Nasser led the Six-Day War against Israel which ended not in the elimination of Israel but in the decisive defeat of the Arab forces<ref name=kepel-63/> and loss of a substantial chunk of Egyptian territory. This defeat, combined with the economic stagnation from which Egypt suffered, were contrasted with the perceived victory of the October 1973 war whose pious battle cry of Allahu Akbar replaced `Land! Sea! Air!` slogan of the 1967 war,<ref name=kepel-63> Template:Cite book</ref><ref>Wright, Sacred Rage, (p.64-7)</ref> and with the enormous wealth of the resolutely non-nationalist Saudi Arabia.

This changed "the balance of power among Muslim states" toward Saudi Arabia and other oil-exporting countries. gaining as Egypt lost influence. The oil-exporters emphasized "religious commonality" among Arabs, Turks, Africans, and Asians, and downplayed "differences of language, ethnicity, and nationality." <ref name=Kepel-states-73>Template:Cite book</ref> The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation—whose permanent Secretariat is located in Jeddah in Western Saudi Arabia—was founded after the 1967 war.

Criticism

At least one observer—The New Yorker magazine's investigative journalist Seymour Hersh—has suggested that petro-Islam is being spread by those whose motivations are less than earnest/pious.<ref>(writing in the New Yorker magazine and quoted by Indian lawyer Menaka Guruswamy, in an article in The Hindu newspaper which in turn was quoted by BBC Monitoring South Asia)</ref> Petro-Islam funding following the Gulf War, according to Hersh, "amounts to protection money" from the Saudi regime "to fundamentalist groups that wish to overthrow it."<ref name=Guruswamy>Template:Cite journal</ref>

Egyptian existentialist Fouad Zakariyya has accused purveyors of Petro-Islam as having as their objective the protection of the oil wealth and "social relations" of the "tribal societies that possess the lion's share of this wealth", at the expense of the long term development of the region and the majority of its people.<ref>(note: link has been messed with to prevent blocking) Template:Cite journal</ref> He further states that it is a "brand of Islam" that bills itself as "pure" but rather than being the Islam of the early Muslims has "never" been "seen before in history".<ref name=Abu-Rabi/>

Authors who criticize the "thesis" of Petro-Islam itself—that petrodollars have had a significant effect on Muslim beliefs and practices—include Joel Beinin and Joe Stork. They argue that in Egypt, Sudan and Jordan, "Islamic movements have demonstrated a high level of autonomy from their original patrons." The strength and growth of Muslim Brotherhood, and other forces of conservative political Islam in Egypt can be explained (Beinin and Stork believe), by internal forces—the historical strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, sympathy for the "martyred" Sayyid Qutb, anger with the "autocratic tendencies" and failed promises of prosperity of the Sadat government.

See also




Unless indicated otherwise, the text in this article is either based on Wikipedia article "Petro-Islam" or another language Wikipedia page thereof used under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License; or on research by Jahsonic and friends. See Art and Popular Culture's copyright notice.

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