Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy
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| - | "[[Death]] is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of [[Dasein]]" --''[[Being and Time]]'' | ||
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| - | '''''Being and Time''''' (German: ''Sein und Zeit'') is a 1927 book by the German philosopher [[Martin Heidegger]], in which the author seeks to analyse the concept of Being. This has fundamental importance for philosophy, he thought, because since the time of the Ancient Greeks, philosophy has avoided this question, turning instead to the analysis of particular beings. Heidegger seeks a more fundamental ontology through understanding being itself. He approaches this through seeking understanding of beings to whom the question of being is important, i.e. ''[[Dasein]]'', or the human being in the abstract. Although written quickly, and though Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in the introduction, ''Being and Time'' remains his most important work. | ||
| - | ''Being and Time'' has profoundly influenced [[20th-century philosophy]], particularly [[existentialism]], [[hermeneutics]], [[deconstruction]], and the [[enactivism|enactivist]] approach to [[cognition]]. The book is dedicated to [[Edmund Husserl]] "in friendship and admiration". | + | '''''Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy''''' (Lukacs et Heidegger) is a book by [[Lucien Goldmann]] published after his death in 1973. |
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| - | ==Background== | + | |
| - | According to Heidegger's statement in ''Being and Time'', the work was made possible by his study of Husserl's ''[[Logical Investigations (Husserl)|Logical Investigations]]'' (1900-1901). Marxist philosopher [[Lucien Goldmann]] argues in his posthumously published ''[[Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy]]'' (1973) that the concept of reification as employed in ''Being and Time'' showed the strong influence of [[György Lukács]]' ''[[History and Class Consciousness]]'' (1923). Heidegger never mentions Lukács in his writing, however, and Laurence Paul Hemming, writing in ''Heidegger and Marx'' (2013), finds the suggestion that Lukács influenced Heidegger to be highly unlikely at best. | + | |
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| - | ''Being and Time'' was originally intended to consist of two major parts, each part consisting of three divisions. Heidegger was forced to prepare the book for publication when he had completed only the first two divisions of part one. The remaining divisions planned for ''Being and Time'' (particularly the divisions on [[time]] and [[being]], [[Immanuel Kant]], and [[Aristotle]]) were never published, although in many respects they were addressed in one form or another in Heidegger's other works. In terms of structure, ''Being and Time'' remains as it was when it first appeared in print; it consists of the lengthy two-part introduction, followed by Division One, the "Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein," and Division Two, "Dasein and Temporality." | + | |
| ==Summary== | ==Summary== | ||
| + | Goldmann tries to bring together the Marxist concept of [[reification (Marxism)|reification]] from [[György Lukács]] and the existential concept of [[Dasein]] from [[Martin Heidegger]]. He argues that the concept of Being in Heidgger, was already present in the concept of [[Universality (philosophy)|Totality]] in Lukács. Lukács's critique of the alienation inherent in capitalism, is thus present in Dasein as an ontological concept. Both Lukács and Heidegger critique the reifcation or thing-ification of the human dasein. Inauthentic dasein is parallel to the failure of the historical subject to awaken to [[praxis School|praxis]]. | ||
| - | ===Being=== | + | Goldmann argues that the concept of reification as employed in ''[[Being and Time]]'' (1927) showed the strong influence of Lukács's work ''[[History and Class Consciousness]]'' (1923). |
| - | Heidegger describes his project in the following way: "our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the sense of ''being'' and to do so concretely." Heidegger claims that traditional [[ontology]] has prejudicially overlooked this question, dismissing it as overly general, undefinable, or obvious. | + | |
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| - | Instead Heidegger proposes to understand being itself, as distinguished from any specific entities (beings). Being, Heidegger claims, is "what determines beings as beings, that in terms of which beings are already understood." Heidegger is seeking to identify the criteria or conditions by which any specific entity can show up at all (see [[world disclosure]]). | + | |
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| - | If we grasp Being, we will clarify the meaning of being, or "sense" of being ("Sinn des Seins"), where by "sense" Heidegger means that "in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something." According to Heidegger, as this sense of being precedes any notions of how or in what manner any particular being or beings exist, it is pre-conceptual, non-propositional, and hence pre-scientific. Thus, in Heidegger's view, ''fundamental'' ontology would be an explanation of the understanding preceding any other way of knowing, such as the use of logic, theory, specific ontology or act of reflective thought. At the same time, there is no access to being other than via beings themselves—hence pursuing the question of being inevitably means asking about ''a'' being with regard to its being. Heidegger argues that a true understanding of being (''Seinsverständnis'') can only proceed by referring to particular beings, and that the best method of pursuing being must inevitably, he says, involve a kind of [[hermeneutic circle]], that is (as he explains in his critique of prior work in the field of [[hermeneutics]]), it must rely upon repetitive yet progressive acts of interpretation. "The methodological sense of phenomenological description is ''interpretation''." | + | |
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| - | ===''Dasein''=== | + | |
| - | Thus the question Heidegger asks in the introduction to ''Being and Time'' is: what is the being that will give access to the question of the meaning of Being? Heidegger's answer is that it can only be that being for whom the question of Being is important, the being for whom Being matters. As this answer already indicates, the being for whom Being is a question is not a ''what'', but a ''who''. Heidegger calls this being ''[[Dasein]]'' (an ordinary German word literally meaning "being-there" i.e. ''existence''), and the method pursued in ''Being and Time'' consists in the attempt to delimit the characteristics of ''Dasein'', in order thereby to approach the meaning of Being itself through an interpretation of the temporality of Dasein. ''Dasein'' is not "man," but is nothing other than "man"—it is this distinction that enables Heidegger to claim that ''Being and Time'' is something other than [[philosophical anthropology]]. | + | |
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| - | Heidegger's account of ''Dasein'' passes through a dissection of the experiences of ''[[Angst]]'' and mortality, and then through an analysis of the structure of "care" as such. From there he raises the problem of "authenticity," that is, the potentiality or otherwise for mortal ''Dasein'' to exist ''fully'' enough that it might actually understand being. Heidegger is clear throughout the book that nothing makes certain that ''Dasein'' is capable of this understanding. | + | |
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| - | ===Time=== | + | |
| - | Finally, this question of the authenticity of individual ''Dasein'' cannot be separated from the "historicality" of ''Dasein''. On the one hand, ''Dasein'', as mortal, is "stretched along" between birth and death, and thrown into its world, that is, thrown into its ''possibilities'', possibilities which ''Dasein'' is charged with the task of assuming. On the other hand, ''Dasein's'' access to this world and these possibilities is always via a history and a tradition—this is the question of "world historicality," and among its consequences is Heidegger's argument that ''Dasein's'' potential for authenticity lies in the possibility of choosing a "hero." | + | |
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| - | Thus, more generally, the outcome of the progression of Heidegger's argument is the thought that the being of ''Dasein'' is time. Nevertheless, Heidegger concludes his work with a set of enigmatic questions foreshadowing the necessity of a destruction (that is, a transformation) of the history of philosophy in relation to temporality—these were the questions to be taken up in the never completed continuation of his project: | + | |
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| - | :The existential and ontological constitution of the totality of Dasein is grounded in temporality. Accordingly, a primordial mode of temporalizing of ecstatic temporality itself must make the ecstatic project of being in general possible. How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way leading from primordial ''time'' to the meaning of ''being''? Does ''time'' itself reveal itself as the horizon of ''being''? | + | |
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| - | ==Phenomenology in Heidegger and Husserl== | + | |
| - | Although Heidegger describes his method in ''Being and Time'' as phenomenological, the question of its relation to the [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]] of Husserl is complex. The fact that Heidegger believes that ontology includes an irreducible hermeneutic (interpretative) aspect, for example, might be thought to run counter to Husserl's claim that phenomenological description is capable of a form of scientific positivity. On the other hand, however, several aspects of the approach and method of ''Being and Time'' seem to relate more directly to Husserl's work. | + | |
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| - | The central Husserlian concept of the directedness of all thought—[[intentionality]]—for example, while scarcely mentioned in ''Being and Time'', has been identified by some with Heidegger's central notion of ''[[Heideggerian_terminology#Care|Sorge]]'' (''Cura'', care or concern). However, for Heidegger, ''theoretical'' knowledge represents only one kind of intentional behaviour, and he asserts that it is grounded in more fundamental modes of behaviour and forms of practical engagement with the surrounding world. Whereas a theoretical understanding of things grasps them according to "presence," for example, this may conceal that our first experience of a being may be in terms of its being "ready-to-hand." Thus, for instance, when someone reaches for a tool such as a hammer, their understanding of what a hammer ''is'' is not determined by a theoretical understanding of its presence, but by the fact that it is something we need at the moment we wish to do hammering. Only a ''later'' understanding might come to contemplate a hammer ''as'' an object. | + | |
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| - | ==Hermeneutics== | + | |
| - | The total understanding of being results from an explication of the implicit knowledge of being that inheres in ''Dasein''. Philosophy thus becomes a form of interpretation, but since there is no external reference point outside being from which to begin this interpretation, the question becomes to know in which way to proceed with this interpretation. This is the problem of the "hermeneutic circle," and the necessity for the interpretation of the meaning of being to proceed in stages: this is why Heidegger's technique in ''Being and Time'' is sometimes referred to as [[hermeneutics|hermeneutical]] [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]]. | + | |
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| - | ==Destruction of metaphysics== | + | |
| - | As part of his [[ontology|ontological]] project, Heidegger undertakes a reinterpretation of previous Western philosophy. He wants to explain why and how theoretical knowledge came to seem like the most fundamental relation to being. This explanation takes the form of a destructuring (''[[Destruktion]]'') of the philosophical tradition, an interpretative strategy that reveals the fundamental experience of being at the base of previous philosophies that had become entrenched and hidden within the theoretical attitude of the [[metaphysics of presence]]. This use of the word ''Destruktion'' is meant to signify not a negative operation but rather a positive transformation or recovery. | + | |
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| - | In ''Being and Time'' Heidegger briefly undertakes a destructuring of the philosophy of [[René Descartes]], but the second volume, which was intended to be a ''Destruktion'' of Western philosophy in all its stages, was never written. In later works Heidegger uses this approach to interpret the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]], and [[Plato]], among others. | + | |
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| - | ==Related work== | + | |
| - | ''Being and Time'' is the major achievement of Heidegger's early career, but he produced other important works from this period: | + | |
| - | *The publication in 1992 of the early lecture course, ''Platon: Sophistes'' (''Plato's Sophist'', 1924), made clear the way in which Heidegger's reading of [[Aristotle|Aristotle's]] ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'' was crucial to the formulation of the thought expressed in ''Being and Time''. | + | |
| - | *The lecture course, ''Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs'' (''History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena'', 1925), was something like an early version of ''Being and Time''. | + | |
| - | *The lecture courses immediately following the publication of ''Being and Time'', such as ''Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie'' (''The Basic Problems of Phenomenology'', 1927), and ''Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik'' (''Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics'', 1929), elaborated some elements of the destruction of metaphysics which Heidegger intended to pursue in the unwritten second part of ''Being and Time''. | + | |
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| - | Although Heidegger did not complete the project outlined in ''Being and Time'', later works explicitly addressed the themes and concepts of ''Being and Time''. Most important among the works which do so are the following: | + | |
| - | *Heidegger's inaugural lecture upon his return to Freiburg, "''Was ist Metaphysik?''" ("What Is Metaphysics?", 1929), was an important and influential clarification of what Heidegger meant by being, non-being, and nothingness. | + | |
| - | *''[[Introduction to Metaphysics (Heidegger)|Einführung in die Metaphysik]]'' (''An Introduction to Metaphysics''), a lecture course delivered in 1935, is identified by Heidegger, in his preface to the seventh German edition of ''Being and Time'', as relevant to the concerns which the second half of the book would have addressed. | + | |
| - | *''[[Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)|Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)]]'' (''Contributions to Philosophy [From Enowning]'', composed 1936–38, published 1989), a sustained attempt at reckoning with the legacy of ''Being and Time''. | + | |
| - | *''Zeit und Sein'' ("Time and Being"), a lecture delivered at the [[University of Freiburg]] on January 31, 1962. This was Heidegger's most direct confrontation with ''Being and Time''. It was followed by a seminar on the lecture, which took place at [[Todtnauberg]] on September 11–13, 1962, a summary of which was written by Alfred Guzzoni.{{refn|"There is put to the thinking of Being the task of thinking Being in such a way that oblivion essentially belongs to it."—Alfred Guzzoni, 1972, p. 29|group=n}} Both the lecture and the summary of the seminar are included in ''Zur Sache des Denkens'' (1969; translated as ''On Time and Being'' [New York: Harper & Row, 1972]). | + | |
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| - | ==Influence and reception== | + | |
| - | ''Being and Time'' is, according to the philosopher Helmut R. Wagner, the "most influential version of existential philosophy." The work influenced many philosophers and writers, among them [[Hannah Arendt]], [[Leo Strauss]], [[Alexandre Kojève]], [[Giorgio Agamben]], [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty]], [[Herbert Marcuse]], [[Jacques Derrida]], and [[Michel Foucault]]. [[Jean-Paul Sartre]] wrote ''[[Being and Nothingness]]'' (1943) under the influence of Heidegger; the critic [[George Steiner]] describes Sartre's existentialism as "a version and variant of the idiom and propositions" in ''Being and Time''. Merleau-Ponty argued in ''[[Phenomenology of Perception]]'' (1945) that, "the whole of ''Sein und Zeit'' springs from an indication given by Husserl and amounts to no more than an explicit account of the 'natürlicher Weltbegriff' or the 'Lebenswelt' which Husserl, towards the end of his life, identified as the central theme of phenomenology". Other philosophical works influenced by ''Being and Time'' include [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]]'s ''[[Truth and Method]]'' (1960), [[Emmanuel Levinas]]'s ''[[Totality and Infinity]]'' (1961), [[Gilles Deleuze]]'s ''[[Difference and Repetition]]'' (1968), [[Alain Badiou]]'s ''Being and Event'' (1988), and [[Bernard Stiegler]]'s ''[[Technics and Time, 1]]'' (1994). | + | |
| - | Heidegger influenced psychoanalysis through [[Jacques Lacan]], whose ''Rome Discourse'' generally links together the subject, language, and speech on a basis of a reading of psychoanalysis that is undeniably hermeneutical phenomenological, a methodology first introduced in ''Being and Time''. A decade later Lacan would criticize that method in [[Seminars of Jacques Lacan|Seminar XI]] where he sought to "radically suspend Heidegger's question of the meaning of being"—a question Heidegger explicitly raises on the first page of ''Being and Time'' and one which forms the exploratory basis of his book. Stephen Houlgate compares Heidegger's achievements in ''Being and Time'' to those of Kant in the ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' (1781) and Hegel in ''[[The Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (1807) and ''[[Science of Logic]]'' (1812-1816). | + | The fundamental goal of both Heidegger and Lukács was to overcome the traditional subject-object dichotomy of Western Philosophy. |
| - | The philosopher [[Simon Critchley]] calls ''Being and Time'' Heidegger's magnum opus, and writes that it is impossible to understand developments in continental philosophy after Heidegger without understanding the work. According to Critchley, while the work is difficult for many reasons, Heidegger's basic idea that "being is time" is "extremely simple". Heidegger has become common background for the political movement concerned with protection of the environment, and his narrative of the history of Being frequently appears when capitalism, [[consumerism]] and technology are thoughtfully opposed. The integral theorist [[Michael E. Zimmerman]] writes that, "Because he criticized technological modernity’s domineering attitude toward nature, and because he envisioned a postmodern era in which people would “let things be,” Heidegger has sometimes been read as an intellectual forerunner of today’s “deep ecology” movement. | + | ==Reception== |
| + | Laurence Paul Hemming, writing in ''Heidegger and Marx'' (2013), finds Goldmann's suggestion that Lukács influenced Heidegger to be highly unlikely at best. | ||
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Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy (Lukacs et Heidegger) is a book by Lucien Goldmann published after his death in 1973.
Summary
Goldmann tries to bring together the Marxist concept of reification from György Lukács and the existential concept of Dasein from Martin Heidegger. He argues that the concept of Being in Heidgger, was already present in the concept of Totality in Lukács. Lukács's critique of the alienation inherent in capitalism, is thus present in Dasein as an ontological concept. Both Lukács and Heidegger critique the reifcation or thing-ification of the human dasein. Inauthentic dasein is parallel to the failure of the historical subject to awaken to praxis.
Goldmann argues that the concept of reification as employed in Being and Time (1927) showed the strong influence of Lukács's work History and Class Consciousness (1923).
The fundamental goal of both Heidegger and Lukács was to overcome the traditional subject-object dichotomy of Western Philosophy.
Reception
Laurence Paul Hemming, writing in Heidegger and Marx (2013), finds Goldmann's suggestion that Lukács influenced Heidegger to be highly unlikely at best.
Unless indicated otherwise, the text in this article is either based on Wikipedia article "Lukacs and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy" or another language Wikipedia page thereof used under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License; or on research by Jahsonic and friends. See Art and Popular Culture's copyright notice.
