The Naturalistic Fallacy
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| On the second word (''fallacy''), Frankena rejected the idea that it represented an error in [[reasoning]] – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in [[semantics]]. In Moore's [[open-question argument]], because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as: the fact that there is always an open question, merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are. Thus, even if good ''were'' identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument, however Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of [[begging the question]]. | On the second word (''fallacy''), Frankena rejected the idea that it represented an error in [[reasoning]] – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in [[semantics]]. In Moore's [[open-question argument]], because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as: the fact that there is always an open question, merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are. Thus, even if good ''were'' identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument, however Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of [[begging the question]]. | ||
| - | + | ==See also== | |
| + | *[[Sorley]] | ||
| + | *''[[A Study in Moral Theory]]'' (1926) by John Laird | ||
| + | *[[Enthymeme]] | ||
| + | *[[Moral Economy]] (1909) by Ralph Barton Perry | ||
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
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"Objectivism, non‐naturalism, or intuitionism, have frequently charged their opponents with committing the naturalistic fallacy."--"The Naturalistic Fallacy" (1939) by William Frankena |
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"The Naturalistic Fallacy" (1939, Mind. Oxford University Press. 48 (192): 464–477) is an essay by William Frankena. It is a criticism of the naturalistic fallacy coined by G. E. Moore and coined the term definist fallacy.
Overview
In this article Frankena generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy, which argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties, as a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties. Frankena argued that naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms.
On the second word (fallacy), Frankena rejected the idea that it represented an error in reasoning – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in semantics. In Moore's open-question argument, because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as: the fact that there is always an open question, merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are. Thus, even if good were identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument, however Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of begging the question.
See also
- Sorley
- A Study in Moral Theory (1926) by John Laird
- Enthymeme
- Moral Economy (1909) by Ralph Barton Perry
