Radicalizing Enactivism  

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"The neurons associated with frog's monocular perceptual capacities are only good enough to enable it to orient toward prey; thus, “it is thought that more precise localization is carried out by different sets of tectal and thalmatic neurons”” (Neander 2006, p. 181)."


"This is certainly not too far away from Skinner's view on verbal behavior. In fact, enactivists themselves seem to be aware of the 'danger' of falling back into behaviorism, of being a 'closet behaviorist', as Hutto and Myin (2013:27) put it. In their manifesto of radical enactivism they (2013:17) point to "the standard charge that any enactivism that rejects representationalism - and hence cognitivism - in an uncompromising manner need reduce to some kind of behaviorism". They themselves feel that there is room for an approach that is not representational, yet without becoming behaviorist. Note, however, that they fully accept that "some organisms - language users, at least - are capable of genuinely contentful representational modes of thinking and reasoning" (2013:13-14). Apparently, therefore, there is a limit to their radicalism, which only denies the presence of content in lower cognitive modes."--The illusion of concepts: From Skinner to Dennett by Kees Versteegh, University of Nijmegen [1]

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Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (2012) is a book by Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin.

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