Posterior Analytics  

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"So goodbye to the Platonic Forms. They are teretismata, and have nothing to do with our speech." --Posterior Analytics, Aristotle

"The Forms may be dismissed -- they are mere prattle1; and even if they exist, they are irrelevant, because demonstrations are concerned only with such predicates as we have described."

1 "In view of Aristotle's debt to the Platonic Forms, it is ungenerous of him to describe the theory by a word which in Greek suggests the twittering of birds or a person's aimless humming." --Hugh Tredennick

{{Template}} The Posterior Analytics is a text from Aristotle's Organon that deals with demonstration, definition, and scientific knowledge. The demonstration is distinguished as a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, while the definition marked as the statement of a thing's nature, ... a statement of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent nominal formula.


In the Prior Analytics, syllogistic logic is considered in its formal aspect; in the Posterior it is considered in respect of its matter. The "form" of a syllogism lies in the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion. Even where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter, i.e. the propositions of which it is composed, which may be true or false, probable or improbable.

When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing. Such syllogisms are called apodeictical, and are dealt with in the two books of the Posterior Analytics. When the premises are not certain, such a syllogism is called "dialectical", and these are dealt with in the eight books of the Topics. A syllogism which seems to be perfect both in matter and form, but which is not, is called "sophistical", and these are dealt with in the book On Sophistical Refutations.

The contents of the Posterior Analytics may be summarised as follows:

  • All demonstration must be founded on principles already known. The principles on which it is founded must either themselves be demonstrable, or be so-called first principles, which cannot be demonstrated, nor need to be, being evident in themselves ("nota per se").
  • We cannot demonstrate things in a circular way, supporting the conclusion by the premises, and the premises by the conclusion. Nor can there be an infinite number of middle terms between the first principle and the conclusion.
  • In all demonstration, the first principles, the conclusion, and all the intermediate propositions, must be necessary, general and eternal truths. Of things that happen by chance, or contingently, or which can change, or of individual things, there is no demonstration.
  • Some demonstrations prove only that the things are a certain way, rather than why they are so. The latter are the most perfect.
  • The first figure of the syllogism (see term logic for an outline of syllogistic theory) is best adapted to demonstration, because it affords conclusions universally affirmative. This figure is commonly used by mathematicians.
  • The demonstration of an affirmative proposition is preferable to that of a negative; the demonstration of a universal to that of a particular; and direct demonstration to a reductio ad absurdum.
  • The principles are more certain than the conclusion.
  • There cannot be both opinion and knowledge of the same thing at the same time.

The second book Aristotle starts with a remarkable statement, the kinds of things determine the kinds of questions, which are four:

  1. Whether the relation of a property (attribute) with a thing is a true fact.
  2. What is the reason of this connection.
  3. Whether a thing exists.
  4. What is the nature and meaning of the thing.

The last of these questions was called by Aristotle, in Greek, the "what it is" of a thing. Scholastic logicians translated this into Latin as "quiddity" (quidditas). This quiddity cannot be demonstrated, but must be fixed by a definition. He deals with definition, and how a correct definition should be made. As an example, he gives a definition of the number three, defining it to be the first odd number.

Maintaining that "to know a thing's nature is to know the reason why it is" and "we possess scientific knowledge of a thing only when we know its cause", Aristotle posited four major sorts of cause as the most sought-after middle terms of demonstration: the definable form; an antecedent which necessitates a consequent; the efficient cause; the final cause.

He concludes the book with the way the human mind comes to know the basic truths or primary premisses or first principles, which are not innate, because we may be ignorant of them for much of our life. Nor can they be deduced from any previous knowledge, or they would not be first principles. He states that first principles are derived by induction, from the sense-perception implanting the true universals in the human mind. From this idea comes the scholastic maxim "there is nothing in the understanding which was not prior in the senses".

Of all types of thinking, scientific knowing and intuition are considered as only universally true, where the latter is the originative source of scientific knowledge.

Full text[1]




p. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. t W. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d.

A. POST, l.h.d. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc.

















© The President and Fellows of Harvard College 1960


Printed in Great Britain


Posterior Analytics — Introduction . Text and Translation- Book I Book II .


Introduction . Text and Translation- Book I

Book II

Book III

Book IV

Book V

Book VI

Book VII


Indices —

To Posterior Analytics To Topica


24 174


272 330 382 420 480 560 648 674

741 751




I. The Composition of the Analytics

It is hardly satisfactory to discuss the contents of the Posterior Analytics without first considering whether the work is rightly named ; that is, whether (upon the whole) it presupposes and forms a logical sequel to the Prior Analytics. Aristotle himself does not distinguish the two ; when, in the course of another treatise, he has occasion to mention either, he refers simply to ra 'KvaXvTiKa. The division into Prior and Posterior is not certainly earlier than about a.d. 200, when Alexander of Aphrodisias wrote his commentary on An. Pr. I ; but it can be traced back with proba- bility to the Alexandrian scholar Hermippus (late third century B.C.). The presumption that the names so assigned correspond to the order of actual com- position has been assailed by Professor F. Solmsen \Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik, Berlin, 1929)- At the time when I was translating the Prior Analytics I was disposed to accept his con- clusions ; but I have since changed my mind. It is not possible here to examine Solmsen's ingenious arguments in detail (this has been done sufficiently by Sir David Ross in the introduction to his edition of the Analytics) ; but it may be useful to summarize some of the more important and to indicate how they may be met.

Assuming that Aristotle's thought became pro- 2


gressively emancipated from Platonic influence, Solm- sen offers (among others) the following grounds for supposing that An. Post is more Platonic, and there- fore earlier, than An. Pr. :

1. It is preoccupied (especially in Book I) with mathematics.

2. Its theory of apxat springs from Plato's doctrine of viroOeaets in Rep. vi-vii,

3. It contains passages implying acceptance of the Theory of Forms (treatment of points, lines, planes and solids as a " chain of Forms," 73 a 35 ; recogni- tion of a eV Trapa to. ttoAAoi, 100 a 7).

4. The word 6po^, common in An. Pr., rare in An. Post., represents the final stage in the development of Aristotle's thought away from the Platonic dSos, by way of KaOokov, to a purely logical conception.

5. In the Politics, if we accept Jaeger's conclusions, discussion of the Ideal State precedes consideration of existing imperfect states ; in the same way the doctrine of scientific demonstration by the first figure should precede the examination of indirect or incon- clusive methods of reasoning, just as in Aristotle himself Platonic idealism gave place to a scientific interest in observable facts.

More generally, (6) the tentative methods of An. Post, provide a significant contrast with the brisk assurance of An. Pr.

Ross has shown (I think) very fairly that, however much truth there may be in these arguments, none is conclusive. (1) Mathematics is the only science that can provide examples of pure demonstration. (2) No one doubts that Aristotle's theory of apxiu owes much to its Platonic prototype, but the differ- ences are at least as great as the resemblances.


(3) The passages cited need not and should not be interpreted as evidence for belief in Forms. (4) opoq (in the sense of " term ") occurs more often in A?i. Post, than Solmsen apparently realized (fifteen times instead of three ?) ; in any case one would expect to find it more often in a discussion of formal logic ; and it is defined only in An. Pr. 24 b 16. (One might add that Aristotle's terminology is so fluid that no argu- ment of this kind can be really cogent.) (5) The argument from analogy (for it is no more than this), though attractive, can hardly be said to prove any- thing ; and if yve^ are assessing probabilities it may well seem strange that Aristotle, having discovered syllogism in Barbara, should elaborate a whole theory of demonstration before experimenting to see what could be done with other combinations of premisses. (6) Apart from the fact that An. Pr. is a more highly finished work, differences of manner and method can be sufficiently explained by differences in the nature and difficulty of the subject-matter.

These counter-arguments weaken but do not destroy Solmsen 's thesis. Far more telling is the evidence of direct reference and presupposition. Ross has shown that all the explicit references from one work to the other support the traditional order, and that at least eighteen of the thirty-four chapters of An. Post. I contain passages that definitely pre- suppose a knowledge of An. Pr. ; so that, to accom- modate the received text to Solmsen 's view, we must assume more re-writing than is consistent with reason- able probability.

If, as I hope, this summary gives a fair picture of the facts, we can be moderately confident that the Prior Analytics is really the earlier work (apart from


a few passages which seem to have been added after the Posterior Analytics was written).

II. The Conditions of Scientific Knowledge

In the Prior Analytics Aristotle has stated and developed his theory of syllogism, analysed and illustrated the various figures, moods and modes, described the conditions under which syllogism is possible, examined its mechanism and properties, given practical advice for its use, and distinguished it from other methods of reasoning. He now turns to the problem of knowledge : what it is, how it is acquired, how guaranteed to be true, how expanded and systematized.

Knowledge and Demonstration

In the first three chapters we are shown that all reasoned acquisition of knowledge involves a process in which the mind advances from something that is already known. This starting-point may be know- ledge of (a) fact, or (6) meaning, or (c) both. It seems clear that Aristotle has already tacitly restricted his survey to eTna-T/jfiT] proper, because he illustrates (a) by a general axiom and (6) and (c) by mathematical examples ; and he goes on to qualify his original statement by observing that when we draw an in- ference by syllogism in the first figure, although the major premiss must be known at the outset, the minor may only be grasped at the same time as the conclusion. Thus he shows (1) that some of our previous knowledge may be only potential, (2) that reasoning consists in the actualization of potential knowledge ; and (pointing out in passing the differ-



ence between universal and enumerative proposi- tions) prepares us for his explicit account of scientific knowledge (ch. i).

We have unqualified knowledge of a fact only if we (1) attribute it to its true cause and (2) recognize it as necessary. One form of such knowledge is ac- quired by demonstration through syllogism. The ultimate premisses from which our conclusions are drawn must be (1) true, or the conclusions would not be demonstrable as necessary, (2) primary and im- mediate, because otherwise they could only be known by demonstration. They must also be causative of the conclusions, prior (as being causative and more fundamental in nature) and better known (i.e.^ more intelligible in themselves, as being more universal). Finally they must be appropriate, i.e., not borrowed from a different genus.

These ultimate premisses are of two kinds. First there are axioms (d^uofiaTa, Kou'd, Koival dpyu/t^, among which Aristotle reckons not only universal principles such as the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, but principles such as " equals subtracted from equals leave equal remainders," which are relevant only to quantities. Perhaps it was his failure to distinguish these that made him uncertain about the precise function of the axioms in demonstration ; at any rate he speaks of them some- times as the source (ef wv), sometimes as the means {pi wi/). Secondly, there are ^eo-et's, principles special to individual sciences : these are either vTrodecriis, assumptions that the primary subjects of the science exist, or opio-jwi, nominal definitions of technical terms. These principles are not demonstrable. If knowledge were only possible through demonstration,



then either (1) demonstration would consist in an in- finite regress, and we should never reach ^r^^ prin- ciples, or (2) if we did reach them they would be themselves indemonstrable and unknowable. Aris- totle shows that there is no escape from this difficulty by supposing that everything can be proved by cir- cular demonstration, because this does not prove anything at all (chs. ii-iii). How the first principles are known is not explained until the end of Book II.

Demonstration and its Premisses

Scientific knowledge is concerned only with neces- sary facts ; these can only be known as necessary if they are proved as such ; therefore the premisses from which they are proved must be necessary. They must also be scientific ; and this implies certain rela- tions between predicate and subject. (1) The predi- cate must be true of all the subject. (2) The predicate must be essential to the subject, or the subject to the predicate. (3) The predicate must be true of the subject considered strictly as itself, not as a member of a higher class. Only so will the conclusion state a commensurately universal relation between predi- cate and subject (Aristotle shows how we may fail in achieving this result) ; and only so will it be known to be necessary (chs. iv-viii).

It follows that the facts of one science cannot be proved from the principles of another, unless the former is in some sense a sub-genus of the latter ; that facts which are not eternal {viz. intermittent phenomena) can be proved and known only in so far as they exhibit eternally necessary connexions ; and that the special principles of single sciences cannot be proved from common principles (chs. ix-x). How



the common principles can be used (1) by science and (2) by dialectic is briefly indicated in ch. xi.

Faulty conclusions may be reached by (1) the right use of premisses which, though appropriate to the subject-genus, state false connexions ; (2) the wrong use of true and appropriate premisses ; (3) the use (right or wrong) of inappropriate premisses. Further, a logical proof may fall short of scientific demonstra- tion if it fails to show the reason as well as the fact ; e.g., if the premisses are not immediate, or if proof is in the second figure where the middle term does not exhibit the cause. (Fact and explanation may even fall under different sciences, if one is in any sense subordinate to the other.) Only the first figure can satisfy the requirements of science by demonstrating the reason as well as the fact (chs. xii-xiv).

There can be immediate negative as well as affirma- tive premisses — not if either term belongs to a class which excludes the other (nor, it would seen, if both belong to the same class), but only if both are summa genera or categories (ch. xv).

Forms of Error or Ignorance

Error with regard to an immediate proposition may be due either to assuming or to falsely inferring its contrary. Aristotle enumerates the forms that such false inference can take, and then shows how it is possible to infer falsely the contrary of a mediated proposition. Lack of a sense-faculty may hinder one 's grasp of a general principle (chs. xvi-xviii).

There can he no infinite chain of Predication The steps of Aristotle's reasoning are not always


easy to follow, and it may be helpful to set them out in some detail.

How can we be sure that propositions are imme- diate ? Is it not always possible to interpolate middle terms ? If so, predication will form an infinite chain.

Since there are predicates which cannot be subjects and subjects which cannot be predicates, we can restate our problem in the form : If a chain of pre- dication in which the predicate (or subject) of one proposition becomes the subject (or predicate) of the next is limited in one direction, can it be infinite in the other ? If not, the chain must be finite, and our ori- ginal question is answered : there cannot be infinite interpolation, because if there could be an infinite number of middles between any two terms in our chain, the chain as a whole would be infinite ; which e.r hypothesi it is not.

To ensure that his proof shall be comprehensive Aristotle shows that if a chain proving an affirmative conclusion must be limited at both ends, so must a chain proving a negative conclusion ; because the mediation of a negative premiss always involves (in any figure) the introduction of a new affirmative premiss, so that if the number of affirmative premisses in a chain is limited, so is the number of negative premisses. It remains to prove that an affirmative chain must be limited at both ends.

Aristotle first offers two dialectical proofs. (1) In strict predication as it is used by the sciences the subject is a substance, which (not being itself pre- dicable) is the downward limit of predication. From this extend upward chains of predication (whether of essential attributes, properties or accidents) ter- minating in the categories, which are the upward


limit ; they are finite in number, and so are the attri- butes in any category ; therefore there can be no infinite chain.

(2) The conclusion of any chain of propositions can be known only if it is proved ; but if the chain is in- finite it cannot be traversed and proof is impossible. Therefore, unless the claim of certainty made by science is to be abandoned, the chain cannot be infinite.

(3) The third proof is called analytical as being based upon arguments proper to demonstrative science. Essential attributes (with which alone science is concerned) either are elements in the defi- nition of their subject or include their subject in their own definition. Catenary predication to infinity of either kind of attribute would entail definition containing an infinite number of elements, and this, as Aristotle has observed (84 a 7), is impossible (chs. xix-xxii).

Two corollaries follow : (1) that an attribute is not necessarily to be proved common to two subjects in virtue of something else common to them — this would result in an infinity of middle terms ; (2) to prove a connexion we must pack the interval by selecting middle terms that give a chain of immediate premisses, whether affirmative or negative (ch. xxiii).

Sundry comparisons and distinctions

Aristotle now discusses at some length the respective merits of universal and particular demonstration, and shows that on many grounds the former is superior. Similarly, affirmative is superior to negative demon- stration, and ostensive proof to reductio ad impossibile (chs. xxiv-xxvi). Next he shows (1) on what grounds 10


)ne science is to be preferred to another, and (2) how one science may be distinguished from another (chs. xxvii-xxviii).

The rest of the book (except ch. xxxii, which con- sists of arguments to show that syllogisms cannot all have the same premisses) touches upon various devia- tions from or approximations to scientific knowledge. First we are shown that there may be more than one proof (but not scientific proof) of the same conclusion ; then that there is demonstration (in some sense) of connexions which are not invariable. Finally, know- ledge is contrasted with sense-perception and opinion, and " quickness of wit " is mentioned as a special flair for apprehending causes (chs. xxix-xxxiv).

Demonstration and Definition

In the second book Aristotle turns to definition. Difficulties begin as soon as he enunciates the " four kinds of question " which science tries to answer :

TO OTt, TO 5tOTi, €1 'icTTi, Tt kcTTLV. " Thc faCt, thc

reason, whether it is, what it is " ; it seems clear from Aristotle's first examples that his questions are (1) Is X Y ? (2) Why is X Y ? (3) Does X exist ? (4) What is X ? — X being a substance (centaur, god, man). But when he goes on to say that in every case we are looking for a middle term or cause, doubts arise ; because it is not obviously true that when we ask whether a substance exists, or what it is, w^e are inquiring for its cause. It is true that every substance has its place in the natural order, and that it is what it is for some natural purpose ; but to judge from the examples which follow in ch. ii, that is not the sort of cause that Aristotle has in mind ; he has already turnecl his attention to attributes and events, with



which the rest of his discussion is chiefly concerned. It seems, then, that the opening formula, designed to be comprehensive, is misleading, and the questions resolve themselves into two : Is X Y ? and Why is X Y ? The implication is that definition should be causal ; we shall see later how Aristotle develops this view (chs. i-ii).

There follows an aporematic survey of problems connected with demonstration and definition. Among the conclusions tentatively drawn are (1) that the two operations are quite distinct, (2) that a definition cannot be proved (a) by syllogism or (b) by division or(c)hypothetically,(3)that definition proves nothing, and (4) that neither demonstration nor definition enables us to know the essence of a thing (chs. iii- vii).

Aristotle now begins to inquire how definition really is related to demonstration. Bare knowledge that a given event, e.g., eclipse, exists leads to nothing ; but if we once grasp by induction what sort of thing it is, i.e. to what genus it belongs, we can then look for the cause that explains why that generic attribute belongs to the subject. Any middle term that estab- lishes an actual connexion between attribute and subject will prove that the event takes place or exists ; thus we can prove that privation of light (the genus of eclipse) applies to the moon ; and this by re- arrangement gives (1) the crude verbal definition that eclipse is privation of light of the moon. But if we can prove the attribute of the subject by immediate premisses through one or more middle terms we can, by a re-arrangement of the whole demonstration, reach (2) a causal definition, viz., that eclipse is a privation of the light of the moon by such-and-such



a cause or causes. Thus, although definition cannot be demonstrated, we can reach it by the help of demonstration (ch. viii).

These are the two methods by which the definitions of attributes and events can be exhibited. There is a third kind of definition — that of substances and the primary subjects of the sciences — which can only be directly apprehended or assumed (chs. ix-x).

Inference and Causation

From considering the place of cause in definition Aristotle now turns to discuss certain problems of causation in their bearing upon demonstration. First he tries to show how each type of cause can stand as middle term. The types are not the usual four ; the place of the material cause (which is clearly inappro- priate) is taken by the necessitating condition or eternal ground, which operates as a cause in mathe- matical reasoning. It cannot be said that Aristotle's arguments are always convincing ; in fact, it is some- times hard to be sure what he is trying to prove. But his general contention can be justified in so far as all the other three can be regarded as aspects of the formal cause and therefore part of the essence (ch. xi).

Turning next to deal with the causation of events, Aristotle begins by considering events (such as eclipse or the formation of ice) in which cause and effect are complementary aspects of the same process, and rightly says that here cause and effect are simul- taneous. But causes frequently appear to precede their effects in time. Assuming that in such a case the cause and effect are single events separated by an interval of time, Aristotle argues that although



the earlier can be inferred from the later, the later cannot be inferred from the earlier event ; because during the interval it will not be true to say that the later event has happened, or even that it will happen ; therefore the earlier does not directly imply the later. What then is the bond of connexion between a completed event and another subsequent event ? Aristotle approaches the problem along the lines of his discussions of time and continuity in Physics IV and VI, and arrives at no satisfactory conclusion. This is hardly surprising ; for he appears to confuse a past or completed event with the completion of a process, which is an indivisible limit, and therefore cannot be contiguous either with another completion or with a process. From this he seems to infer (though he has not proved that two processes cannot be contiguous) that no two events can be contiguous. This naturally makes it doubtful whether in reasoning from effect to cause we can ever reach immediate premisses (ch. xii).

(But the whole of Aristotle's reasoning rests upon a false assumption. Events are not discrete units ; they are merely such portions of the continuous world-process as we choose to isolate in thought because, for a particular purpose, it suits us to con- sider them as units. There is no actual completion — or beginning — of any such " event " ; only the limit set to it in our minds. When we relate two such " events " as cause and effect we are really isolating a minute section of the world-process and trying to trace the connexions that traverse it in so far as they link a particular aspect of the " event " regarded as cause to the " event " regarded as effect. But (1) we beg the whole question if we assume as the whole



cause what is only one factor or stage in the process ; the whole cause is the sum of all the connexions viewed from one direction, and the whole effect is the same viewed from the opposite direction : in fact, the question of an interval does not arise ; (2) unless the section that we are examining is infinitesimally small the connexions will be so complex that some at least will escape our knowledge or attention, and so give the impression of an interval.

I hope that I make my general meaning plain ; my excuse for the disquisition is Ross's remark on p. 80 of his introduction : "Aristotle is clearly conscious of the difficulty which everyone must feel if he asks the question why a cause precedes its effect ; for it is hard to see how a mere lapse of time can be neces- sary for the occurrence of an event when the other conditions are already present ; this is a mystery which has never been explained." Unless I misunder- stand him utterly, the mystery (if such it is) is ex- plicable along the lines which I have indicated : there is no " mere lapse of time " ; as soon as all " the other conditions are already present " the so-called effect follows as part of the same continuous process.)

Dejinition, Division and Systematization

After noting the possibility of cyclic sequence and of reasoning about that which happens usually but not invariably, Aristotle returns to complete his account of definition. He has shown in ch. viii how to reach definitions of attributes ; now he explains how to do the same for the primary subjects of a given science. We take one of the injimae species and look for all the attributes within the genus that apply to the whole of that species and to others as well ;



collectively these attributes will be commensurate with the species and will give its definition. When we have defined all the infimae species we proceed to infer the properties of the more complex species, and so by degrees systematize the genus. In so doing we ensure accuracy and completeness by the use of dichotomic division. In defining we must move up- wards from narrower to wider terms, because this is both the easier way and the only way in which to avoid ambiguity. On the other hand, when we come to study the problems of a given science we should work downwards from genus to species. In so doing we must be careful to distinguish species correctly, even if there are no ready-made names to fit them. Several problems may have a common explanation, and the solution of one problem may lead to the solution of another (chs. xiii-xv).

This suggests the question whether there can be more than one cause of the same effect. Cause and effect certainly imply one another, but they are not reciprocal causes ; the cause explains the effect, but the effect does not explain the cause. In general, if an attribute belongs to the whole of a subject, it must do so through a cause that is commensurate with that attribute. But can the same attribute belong to different subjects through different middle terms ? Aristotle first points out that the attribute may be the same only by equivocation, and then the causes are different ; or both attribute and subject may be the same by analogy, and then so is the middle term. But it is also possible, within the same genus, for different species to have the same attribute. When this is so, the attribute is connected to each subject by two middle terms ; the first, which is




nearer to the attribute and definitory of it, is the same for each ; the other, which connects the common middle to the separate subjects, is different for each. Thus in so far as there is a different middle term for each species, there is more than one cause (chs. xvi- xviii).

There remains the question for whose answer Aristotle has repeatedly — by a dramatic instinct — whetted our appetite : How do we apprehend the first principles themselves, which are not susceptible of demonstration ? Is it by scientific knowledge — the same kind of knowledge by which we cognize de- monstrable facts — or by a different faculty ? If it is by a different faculty, how is this acquired ? Still dramatic, Aristotle postpones his climax by taking the second point first. The faculty of sense-percep- tion is common to all animals ; but whereas in some the act of perception leaves no lasting impression, in others the impression persists and gives rise to memory ; and (in rational beings) repeated memories produce experience, that is the establishment in the mind of a " universal " or general notion, which is the first step in the development of a coherent art or science. When we have once learned to generalize we can advance higher and higher until we reach the most universal concepts of all ; and by the same in- ductive process we can advance from simple proposi- tions to immediate truths and the axioms themselves. As for the faculty by which we know these, since it cannot be either science or inferior to science, it must be the only other intellectual faculty that is infallible, viz., i'ov<i or intuition, which supervenes upon our logical processes as a direct vision of the truth (ch. xix).



There are obvious defects in this treatise. One could wish that Aristotle had edited it a little more ; that he had made his meaning a little plainer, and had been more consistent in his use of technical terms. There are hasty statements and misappre- hensions as well as deficiencies of knowledge ; and on the positive side it is easy to see (in spite of frequent repudiations) how much is owed to Plato's teaching at the Academy. Nevertheless, the Posterior Analytics is the work of a remarkably acute and discriminating mind ; and it is the first systematic attempt to apply logic to the ordering of scientific knowledge. If Aristotle had left us nothing else we should still be greatly in his debt.

III. Manuscripts and other Sources

The five oldest manuscripts of the Posterior Analytics are :

A Urbinas 35 saec. ix-x ineunt.

B Marcianus 201 an. 955

C Coislinianus 330 (ad 82 a 2) saec. xi d Laurentianus 72.5 ,, ,,

n Ambrosianus 490 (L 93) ,, ix

These are the five chosen by Ross to establish his text, and there can be little doubt that they are the most important. Ross has shown that ABCd belong to one family and n to another ; and that, while B is the best representative of its group and in general the most accurate manuscript, n is very often alone in preserving the right reading.

I have occasionally recorded the readings (when 18


they seemed to have any evidential value) of six other manuscripts, viz. :


Parisinus 1843

saec. xiii


Marcianus App. iv. 51



Vaticanus 1024

saec. x-xi


Marcianus App. iv. 5

saec. xiv


Ambrosianus 535 (M 89)



Basileensis 54 (F ii. 21)

saec. xii

The commentaries of Philoponus (6th cent.) and Themistius (4th cent.) on both books, and those of Eustratius (about 1100) and an anonymous scholar (of uncertain date) on Book II, sometimes throw some light on the text. A reading implied by any one of these commentators is attributed to him by name, but where they seem to be unanimous I have referred to them collectively as " comm.".

In the critical apparatus I have only recorded de- partures from the wording of Bekker's text. I worked from this in the first place, modifying the punctuation as seemed necessary, and referring fre- quently to the edition of Waitz, which was then without a rival. In this way I established a pro- visional text incorporating a good many of Waltz's readings and some suggestions of my own. When Ross's edition of the Analytics was published in 194<9 I found myself in rather an awkward position. I had completed a first draft of my translation, but there were still many points about which I felt extremely doubtful ; and in trying to clear these up I could neither ignore the conclusions of a leading authority nor seem to appropriate them, while if I disagreed with them I must be prepared to defend my conduct. Moreover, the interruption caused by the war, and



an infinity of unavoidable distractions, had already delayed my work to an exasperating degree. How- ever, it seemed necessary to be realistic, so I carefully read through Ross's text and commentary. In doing so I found, with some natural regret, that he had anticipated most of the suggestions that I had in- tended to make. In such cases I hope that I have always yielded him full credit for the improvement. Where his reading or interpretation was different from mine, it was generally better ; and I adopted it with proper acknowledgement. There remain a few places in which I still prefer my own view. But I am conscious that I (like all amateur Aristotelians) owe an immense debt to Sir David's profound scholarship and penetrating criticism, which have opened my eyes to many things that I should otherwise have missed. I must also pay tribute to the Oxford Trans- lation by G. R. G. Mure, which I have often consulted and always found helpful and stimulating. Finally, I am greatly obliged to the late Professor J. Tate for clarifying my mind on some difficult points, and to my colleague Miss N. P. Miller for saving me from many inaccuracies. In spite of these aids I cannot claim to have carried out this task even to my own satisfac- tion. I should have liked to continue the effort ; but it has taken far too long already.

The Traditional Mood-Names

In my notes I have frequently had occasion to use the Latin (or quasi-Latin) names invented by medieval logicians to designate the various moods of syllogism. They are as follows :

First figure : Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. 20



Second figure : Cesare, Camestres,Festino, Baroco.

Third figure : Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

For present purposes this Hst is sufficient ; a fuller one with more detailed information will be found in the introduction to the Prior Analytics. Here it is only necessary to understand that in each name the vowels indicate the quantity and quality of the premisses and conclusion : thus A stands for the universal affirmative (All X is Y), E for the universal negative (No X is Y), I for the particular affirmative (Some X is Y), and O for the particular negative (Some X is not Y).



I append a short list of the principal editions, trans- lations, works of reference and articles that are likely to be helpful in a study of the Posterior Analytics.

Texts and Editions

Aristotelis Opera, ed. I, Bekker (Berlin, 1831 ; Oxford,

1837). Organum, ed. I. Pacius (Frankfurt, 1592). Organon, ed. T. Waitz (Leipzig, 1844-1846). Prior and Posterior Analytics, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford,



Posterior Analytics in English by E. Poste (Oxford, 1850), E. S. Bouchier (Oxford, 1901) and G. R. G. Mure (Oxford, 1906) ; in French by J. B.-Saint- Hilaire (Paris, 1837) and J. Tricot (Paris, 1938) ; in German by J. H. von Kirchmann (Heidelberg, 1877) and E. Rolfes (Leipzig, 1922).

Works of Reference

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca :

Themistii in An. Post, ii Paraphrasis, ed. M.

Wallies (Berlin, 1899). Eustratius in An. Post, ii, ed. M. Hay duck

(Berhn, 1907).




loannes Philoponus in An. Post, et Anonymus in An. Post, ii, ed. M. Wallies (Berlin, 1909). Cherniss, H. : Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the

Academy (Baltimore, 194^4?). Gohlke, P. : Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik

(Berlin, 1936). Heath, Sir Thomas : Mathematics in Aristotle (Oxford,

1949). Maier, H. : Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles (Tiibingen,

1900). Solmsen, F. : Die Entivicklung der aristotelischen Logik

und Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929). Zabarella, I. : In duos Arist. lihros Post. An. Commen-

taria (Venice, 1582).


Einarson, B. : " On certain Mathematical Terms in

Aristotle's Logic " {A.J.P. (1936), pp. 33-54,

151-172). Lee, H. D. P. : " Geometrical Method and Aristotle's

Account of First Principles " (CQ. (1925), pp.

113-129). Stocks, J. L. : " The Composition of Aristotle's

Logical Works " (C.Q. (1933), pp. 115-124).



71 a 1 I. riatja StSaCT/caAta Kal Trdoa fJiddrjaL^ Siavo- rjTiKr] €K TTpoVTTapxovoTjg yiyverai yvcoaeojs. <f)av€- pov Se TOVTO deojpovoiv IttI rraocov at re yap piadrjpLarLKal rcov €7TLGrr]ficov Sta tovtov tov rporrov TTapaylyvovrat /cat rcov dXXojv iKaarr] T€.yyG)v. 5 ofjLOLOJs 8e Krat Trepl rovs Xoyov? ol re 8td GvKKoyio- fjLCOv Kal ol St' eTrayojyrjg- dfjLcfyorepoi yap Sta TTpoyiyvwGKOfJievajv TTOiovvrai rrjv hihaaKaXiav, ol fiev Xafji^dvovres (hg irapd ^vviivTOJV, ol 8e heiK- v6vr€s TO KadoXov 8ta rod St^Aov etvat ro Kad^ eKaoTOV. d)S 8' avrws Kal ol prjropLKol arvjJLveidov- 10 CTtv 7] yap Sid TrapaSety/xarajv, o Iutlv eTrayajyr] , 7] St* ivdvfjLrjfidTCjov, oirep iarl ovXXoyiaixos.

Aixojs 8' dvayKacov TTpoyiyvcooKeLV rd /xev ydp

" rixft] is used here, as often, to cover the sense of produc- tive (as opposed to theoretical) science ; cf. 100 a 9.

  • Clearly Aristotle is thinking of " dialectic," as a means

of instruction distinct from science (which seeks only to discover and demonstrate the truth) and rhetoric (which aims at persuasion by means of probabilities). For Aristotle dia-




I. All teaching and learning that involves the use of book i. reason proceeds from pre-existent knowledge. This Sdge and is evident if we consider all the different branches of demon- learning, because both the mathematical sciences and Reasoned every other art " are acquired in this way. Similarly j^g^^i^avf^ too with logical arguments,^ whether syllogistic or based on inductive ; both effect instruction by means of facts knowledge. already recognized, the former making assumptions as though granted by an intelligent audience, and the latter proving the universal from the self-evident nature of the particular. The means by which rhe- torical arguments carry conviction are j ust the same ; for they use either examples, which are a kind of induction, or enthymemes,'^ which are a kind of syllogism.

There are two senses in which previous knowledge This may

lectic is the application of logical methods to argument with a real or imaginary opponent ; it is by no means infallible, since neither its premisses nor its conclusions are necessarily true, but (properly used) it can be a useful auxihary to science.

An. Pr. II. xxiv. id. 70 a 10-24.




71 a ^

on €GTL 7Tpov7roXafx^dv€Lv dvayKoloVy rd 8e tl to Aeyo/xevdv ecrrt ^uvteVat Set, rd 8' d/jLcfyoj, otov on fxev dnav r] (f)rJGaL rj dnocfyrjoaL dXrjOes, on eon, to

15 he rplycuvov, on roSt Gr]fxaiv€L, ttjv Se fjLovdSa dfJL(f)a), /cat rl orijiaivei /cat on eanv ov ydp ofjuoloj^ rovTCOv e/cao-TOV SrjXov rjfjuv. eon Se yvoipit^eiv rd fjiev TTporepov yvojplaavra,^ rcbv 8e /cat d'/xa AajLt- ^dvovra ttjv yvcJocnv, otov oaa rvyxdvei ovra vtto TO KadoXov ov^ ^X^^ '^W y^^^^'^' on /xev ydp ndv

20 rpiycovov ex^t, Svcrlv opdals taas rrpoT^Sei, on 8e ToSe TO iv Toi tjjjllkvkXlcp Tptyojvov ecrrtv d/xa iv- ayofievo? iyvoipioev {iviwv ydp tovtov tov Tporrov 7] piddr](jLS €.GTi, /cat ov 8td tov fxioov to eaxoLTOV yycopt^erat, oaa rjSr] twv Ka6^ e/cacrra Tvyxdvet ovra /cat firj Kad^ VTroKeifievov tlvos). rrplv 8'

25 iTTaxBrjvat rj Xa^eZv ovXXoyiofxov Tporrov [xev rtva tcro)? </>aTeov evrtWacr^at, Tponov 8' d'AAov oy. o ydp /XT7 T78et et eoTiv dTrXo)?, tovto ttcos jj^eu otl Svo opddg e^tt dnXcos ; dXXd SrjXov co? a>8t fiev eTrtcrrarat, ort KadoXov eTrtcrrarat, dTrAd)? 8e ou/c eTrtcrrarat.

Et 8e /XT], TO €v TO) MeVcDvt drroprjixa avfJL^rjGeTai-

30 "^ ydp ou8ev [jLadrjaeTai t) d ot8er. ou ydp 8')7 d)? ye

^ Ross : yvcopiCovra codd. ^ Ross : (St- codd.

« Probably we should suppose that the figure is not drawn as a triangle ; cf. Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 38.

^ The attributes of an individual are inferred from a knowledge of the attributes of the species, but the individual itself is directly apprehended as such.

« Plato, Meno 80 d-e.



is necessary. Sometimes it is necessary to assume be know- ihefact beforehand, and sometimes one must under- fact or of stand the meaning of the term ; sometimes both are meaning. necessary. E.g., we must assume as a fact that either the assertion or the negation of every statement is true ; and we must know what the term " triangle " means ; and as regards the unit, we must both know what it means and assume that it exists. This is because these truths are not all equally apparent to us. Recognition of a fact may sometimes entail both Previous previous knowledge and knowledge acquired in the JistS-^^^^ act of recognition ; viz., knowledge of the particulars guished which actually fall under the universal, which is actualiza- known to us. We knew already that every triangle tionof po- has the sum of its interior angles equal to two right knowledge, angles ; but that this figure " inscribed in the semi- circle is a triangle we recognize only as we are led to relate the particular to the universal (for some things, viz., such as are ultimate particulars not predicable of anything else as subject, are only learnt in this way, i.e., the minor is not recognized by means of the middle term ^). Before the process of relation is com- pleted or the conclusion drawn, we should presum- ably say that in one sense the fact is understood and in another it is not. For how could we know in the full sense that the figure contains angles equal to the sum of two right angles if we did not know in the full sense whether it exists ? Clearly we apprehend the fact not absolutely but in the qualified sense that we apprehend a general principle.

Unless we make this distinction, we shall be faced This is the with the dilemma reached in the Meno ^ : either one tKf-^'^^"" can learn nothing, or one can only learn what is lemma of already known. We certainly must not offer the



TLves eyx^ipovGL Xvetv XeKreov ap* olSa? diroaav Svdha on dprla rj ov ; ^T^cravro? Se TrpoijveyKdv Ttva SvdSa t]v ovk 4>eT* etvai, lout ovV dpr lav. XvovGL yap ov (fydoKovres etSevat Trdorav SvdSa dp- 71 b riav ovuav, d\X rjv loaoLV on Sua?. Kalrot toaoi fjiev ovvep Trjv diroh^i^iv exovai Kal ov eXa^ov, eXa- ^ov 8' ov^L TTavros ov dv elSwoLV on rpiywvov r^ on dptd/Jios, aAA' dirXajg Kara Travrog dptdfiov Kal rpi- ycovov ovSe/uLLa yap rrporaGLS Xajx^dveTai roiavrrj, 5 on ov Gv otSa? dpidfiov rj o crv otSa? evOvypapL/jLov, dXXd Kara Travros. dAA* ovSev (ot/xat) Ka)Xv€L o fjiav9dv6L eanv (hs eTrioraodaiy eon 8* cos" dyvoeZv droTTov yap ovk el otSe ttojs o /.lavddvei, aAA* et CLi8t, olov fj [xavOdvei, Kal cjg.

II. ^^TTLGraodaL 8e olopeO* eKaorov aTrXcjs, dXXd 10 pLTj Tov oo(j)iGnK6v TpoTTov Tov Kara GVfi^e^rjKog, drav TT^v r' alriav olayfjieOa yiyvwGKeiv hi tjv ro TTpdypd ionv, on eKeivov alria iori, Kal [jlt] iv- Sex^Gdai rovr^ d'AAcos" €;)(etv. SrjXov roivvv on roLovrov n ro eVto-racr^at earf Kal yap ol pLrj eTTLGrdfievoL Kal ol eTrtcrrd/xevot ol pev o'iovrai avrol 15 ovrojg ^X^^^' ^^ ^' i7TLGrdp,€voi Kal cxovglv ojGre

" The reference is unknown.

^ The sophist's knowledge is called " accidental " because, not knowing the species as such, but only as qualified by accidental attributes, he has no conception of what is essen- tial to it. 28


explanation by which certain thinkers " attempt to solve the difficulty. Supposing that a man is asked " Do you or do you not know that every pair is even ? " When he says " Yes," his opponents pro- duce some pair which he did not know to exist, and therefore did not know to be even. These thinkers solve the difficulty by saying that they do not know that every pair is even, but only that such things as they know to be pairs are even. But what they know to be even is that which they have proved to be such, i.e., that which they have taken as the subject of their premiss : and that is not everything which they know to be a triangle or a number, but every number and every triangle, without qualification. No premiss is ever assumed with such a term as " what you know to be a number " or " what you know to be a recti- linear figure " ; the predication applies to every in- stance of the subject. But I presume that there is no reason why a man should not in one sense know, and in another not know, that which he is learning. The absurdity consists not in his knowing in some qualified sense that which he learns, but in his knowing it in a certain particular sense, viz., in the exact way and manner in which he learns it.

II. We consider that we have unqualified know- Absolute ledge of anything (as contrasted with the accidental ^'^'^ ^^ knowledge of the sophist) ^ when we believe that we know (i) that the cause from which the fact results is the cause of that fact, and (ii) that the fact cannot be otherwise. Clearly knowledge is something of this sort ; for both those who do not know and those who do know agree on the subject ; but whereas the for- mer merely think that they are in the condition described above, the latter are actually in it. Hence



71 b ^

ov oLTrXa)? €OTLV i'TTKJT'qfJir), Tovr* aSwarov aXXtos

Et jjikv ovv KOL erepos eon rod iTTLoraudaL rpo- TTog varepov ipovfjiev, <f)api€V 8e Kal St' aTroSet^ecos" elSevai. OLTToSei^iv 8e Xeyco avXkoyLopiov eTTtarrj- fjLovLKov €77 LorrjiJLoviKov 8e Xeycx) Kad^ ov rco e^€LV avTov eTTLordpLeda.

20 Et Toivvv iorl ro iirioTaodai olov edepuev, dvdyKrj Kal TTjv dTToSeLKTLKTjP i.TTioT'qpL'iqv i^ dXrjdaJv r* etvat /cat TTpwTCov Kal dpLEOCov Kal yvcopipLiorepojv Kal nporepcov Kal alriojv rod ovpLnepdopLaros' ovtoj yap eoovrai Kal at dpx^l oiKeiai rod hecKvvpievov. ovXXoyLopios pL€v yap eorai Kal dvev rovrcov, drro-

25 Setfts" S' ovK eWat- ov yap TroL-^oei iTTiOTrjpLrjV.

^AXr]drj jLtev ovv Set etvai, ort ovk eon ro p,rj ov iTTLoraodai, olov on rj Sta/xerpos" ovfipberpog. €K TTpcJorojv 8' dvarroSeLKrajv , on ovk eTTionqoerai pLrj €-)(WV aTToSet^tv avrcbv ro yap iTrioraoOai cLv (XTro- Setft? eon pLrj Kara ovpb^e^iqKos ro €X€iv aTioSetf tV

30 ionv. a'ind re Kal yvajpipLcorepa Set etvai Kal 7T pore pa, alna jjuev on rore emordpLeda orav rrjv alrtav etScDjU-ev, Kal rrporepa, elirep alna, Kal npo- yiyvojoKopLeva ov pLovov rov erepov rpoTTov rco ^vvievaL, dXXd Kal rco elSevat on eonv.

II pore pa S* eorl Kal yvcopLpLcorepa St;\;d»?* ov yap ravrov nporepov rfj cjyvoei Kal TTpo? rjpidg nporepov,

« In ch. iii and Book II, ch. xix. ^ C/. 71 a 11 fF.




||f any fact is the object of unqualified knowledge, that fact cannot be otherwise than it is. Whether there is any other method of knowing will is acquired be discussed later." Our contention now is that we {jy demon-^^ do at any rate obtain knowledge by demonstration, stration. By demonstration I mean a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge, in other words one which enables us to know by the mere fact that we grasp it.

Now if knowledge is such as we have assumed, The pre- demonstrative knowledge must proceed from pre- demonstra- misses which are true, primary, immediate, better tion. known than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion. On these conditions only will the first principles be properly applicable to the fact which is to be proved. Syllogism indeed will be possible without these con- ditions, but not demonstration ; for the result will not be knowledge.

The premisses, then, must be true statements ; because it is impossible to know that which is contrary to fact, e.g., that the diagonal of a square is commen- surable with the sides. They must be primary and indemonstrable, because otherwise we shall not know them unless we have proof of them ; for to know (otherwise than accidentally) that which is capable of proof implies that one has proof of it. They must be P causative, better known and prior : causative, because ^ we only have knowledge of a thing when we know its cause ; prior, inasmuch as they are causative ; and already known, not merely in the one ^ sense that their meaning is understood, but also in the sense that they are known as facts.

There are two senses in which things are prior and Sundry dia- more knowable. That which is prior in nature is not and*^deflni- the same as that which is prior in relation to us, and tions.



72 a ovSe yvcDpL^corepov Kal rjfuv yvcopiixcorepov. Xeyoj 8e TTpos rjfjids /xev nporepa Kal yvcopLficorepa ra eyyvrepov rrjs aladrioeijjs , airXihs Se irporepa Kal yvwpLfjLa)T€pa ra TToppcorepov. eon Se TToppajraroj 5 fjiev ra KadoXov fidXiura, iyyvrdroj 8e ra KaO^ e- Kaara- Kal dvrLK€iraL ravr dXXrqXois.

'Eav: TTpcoTOJV 8* iarl ro i^ dp-)(a)V oIk€lojv' ravro yap Xeyoj TTpcorov Kal dpxrjv, dLp)(r) 8' iarlv diro- 8et^eajs" TrporaoLS a/xeaos", dfieaos 8e t^? i^'T] eonv dXXrj TTporepa. nporaoLS 8' icrrlv aTTocfydvaews to krepov fjiopLov, eV KaO^ ivos, StaXeKTLKrj pL€v rj

10 ofJLOLCos Xajji^dvovcra onorepovovv , aTToSeLKTLKrj 8c r] (LpLGfievcos Odrepov, on dXrjdeg. drro^avois 8e dvn- (f)a(J€a>9 oTTorepovovv fioptov. dvr t^acrts" 8e avrlOe- crts' rjs ovK ecrrt fiera^v Kad^ avrrjv. pLopiov 8' dvTL(f)dG€a)s TO fxev rt /card tlvos KaTd(f)aaLS y to

15 8e Tt ciTrd Ttvo? diTocfyacn^ . dfieaov 8* dp)(f\s ovX- XoyLGTiKTJ? deaiv fxev Xeycx) tjv jjlt) eart 8€t^at firjB* dvdyKTj e-)(eiv tov fjLadrjaojJLevov tl' '^v 8' dvdyKT] kx^LV TOV OTiovv ixadrjoopi^vov y d^lajfjLa' eoTi yap kvia ToiavTa' tovto yap jLtdAtcrr' €7tI toIs tolovtols elwOafiev ovofia Xiyeiv. deoeojg 8' 7] jxev ottotc-

20 povovv Tcjv ixoptcov TTJs d7TO(j)dvo€OJs^ Xapi^dvovoa, olov XeycD to elvau tl rj {jltj elvai tl, VTrodeaLS, rj 8'

^ dvTi(f>daecos n, Ross.

« Cf. Met. 1029 b 3 fF.

^ Or simply " starting-point."

" i.e., it is either affirmative or negative.

•* The dialectician is equally prepared to accept " A is B " or " A is not B " as the object of his attack. 32



that which is (naturally) more knowable is not the same as that which is more knowable by us. By " prior " or " more knowable " in relation to us I mean that which is nearer to our perception, and by " prior " or " more knowable " in the absolute sense I mean that which is further from it. The most universal concepts are furthest from our perception, and particulars are nearest to it " ; and these are opposite to one another.

To argue from primary premisses is to argue from appropriate first principles ; for by " primary pre- miss " and " first principle " I mean the same thing. The first principle ^ of a demonstration is an imme- diate premiss ; and an immediate premiss is one which has no other premiss prior to it. A premiss is one or the other part of a proposition," and consists of one term predicated of another. If dialectical, it assumes either part indifferently ^ ; if demonstrative, it definitely assumes that one part is true. A pro- position is either part of a contradiction. A contra- diction is an opposition which of its very nature excludes any middle. That part of a contradiction which affirms something of something else is an affir- mation ; that which denies something of something else is a negation. I apply the term thesis to an immediate indemonstrable first principle of syllogism the grasp of which is not necessary for the acquisition of certain kinds of knowledge ; but that which must be grasped if any knowledge is to be acquired, I call an axiom ; for there are certain things of this nature and we are accustomed to apply this name especially to them. A thesis which assumes one or the other part of a proposition, i.e., that something does, or does not exist, is a hypothesis ; a thesis which does

c SS


72 a

dv€V TOVTOV opLorfJLos. 6 yap opiofios 6 dais fxev iari' rider ai yap 6 apiOpLrjriKos {xovaSa ro aStatpe- rov etvat Kara ro ttooov virodeais S* ovk karf ro

25 yap ri ion fjiovas /cat ro elvat jjiovaSa ov ravrov. 'E77€t Se Set TTLoreveiv re /cat elSevai ro rrpdyfjia rep roLovrov ex^iv ovXkoyiapiov ov KaXovjxev oltto- Sei^LVy eon 8' ovros rep rahV etvat e^ cov d ovX- XoytopLo?, dvdyKT] fjLT) pLovov TTpoyiyvoiOKeiv rd TTpcora, 'q rrdvra rj eVta, dAAct /cat pidXXov del yap

30 8t' o virdpxei eKaorov, eKeivco^ pidXXov vnapx^^y otov St' o (jiiXovpieVy eKeZvo c/)lXov puaXXov wor elirep tc/xev Std rd Trpcbra /cat TTiorevopiev, /ca/cetva tcTjLtev re /cat TTiorevopiev pidXXov, on St' e/cetva /cat rd vorepov. ovx otov re he TTioreveiv fidXXov cLv otSev d pbT] rvyxdvei pu'qre elSojg pnqre ^eXnov Sta-

35 Keipevos r] el ervyxoivev etScos". ovp.P'^oeraL Se rovro el pbiq ns rr poyvuioer ai rajv St' aTrdSet^tv TTLorevovrojv /xdAAov ydp dvdyKT] moreveiv rats dpxcu9 7] Trdoais r] nol rod ov pLirepdo pharos . rov Se pieXXovra e^eiv rrjv e7nor'^p,r]v rrjv St' dTToSel^eojs ov piovov Set rds" dpxds pdXXov yvcoplt^eiv /cat jLtdA-

^ raSt n, Ross : raS'. 2 €KeLvco Ross, habent comm. : eVetw codd.

" The latter part of this attempt to systematize termino- logy seems rather abortive. Elsewhere (e.g. 76 b 23 ff.) a ■uTTodems is not necessarily indemonstrable, and Oeais does not seem to be used technically at all. It is even difficult to be sure what Aristotle includes under a^taj/xara. From a com- parison of 76 b 11-22, 77 a 26-34, 88 a 31-b 29 it would seem that the term is convertible with /coif at dpxai or ra Koivd, and covers not only principles like the Law of Contradiction, which are really " common," but also others, like the mathe-




hot do this is a definition. A definition is a kind of thesis (or laying-down), because the arithmetician lays it down that to be a unit is to be quantitatively indivisible ; but it is not a hypothesis, because to define the nature of a unit is not the same as to assert its existence."

Now since the required condition of our knowledge The primary or conviction of a fact consists in grasping a syllogism S[ustTe^ of the kind which we call demonstration, and since {jJe^a^^^J*^" the syllogism depends upon the truth of its premisses, better than it is necessary not merely to know the primary pre- skfn?^"^'"" misses — either all or some of them — beforehand, but to know them better than the conclusion. For that which causes an attribute to apply to a subject always possesses that attribute in a still greater degree ; e.g., that which causes us to love something is itself still dearer to us. Hence if the primary premisses are the cause of our knowledge and conviction, we know and are convinced of them also in a higher degree, since they cause our knowledge of all that follows from them. But to believe in anything more than in the things which we know, if we neither actually know it nor are in a better situation than if we actually knew it, is impossible ; yet this is what will happen if anyone whose conviction rests upon demonstration is to have no prior knowledge ; be- cause we must believe in the first principles (some if not all of them) more than in the conclusion. And if a man is to possess the knowledge which is effected by demonstration, not only must he recognize and

matical axioms about equals, which are at once common and special to a particular group of sciences. For a discussion of the use of such terms in logic and mathematics see H. D. P. Lee in C.Q. xxix, pp. 113-124, and Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, pp. 53-57.




72 b Xov avrals TTiareveiv rj rch heiKvvjJievcp, aAAa /xr^S' aAAo avTcb TTiarorepov elvai fjnqhe yvcjpLfjiCjorepov Twv dvTLKeifievojv rals dpxcus cf cSv ecrrat avX- XoyLGfJLOs 6 rrjs evavrias dirdTr]?, €tW/> hel rov ctti- arafxevov dirXcos dpLerdTreLarov elvai. 5 III. 'Evtot? [Mcv ovv Sid TO Seiv rd irpoira cttl- araadai ov Sok€l iTnari^fJir] elvat, rots 8' elvat /xeV, Trdvrojv fxivroi drrohei^eLs^ etvat* a)V ovSerepov ovr dXrjdeg OVT* dvayKoiov. ol fiev ydp VTTodefievoL p,7] elvai oAoj? eTTioraadai, ovroi els direipov d^iovoiv dvdyeadai co? ovk dv emorapievovs rd varepa Sid

10 rd TTporepa, (Lv puj ean Trpcbra, opdcos Xeyovres' dhvvarov ydp rd direipa hieXdeZv. el re lorarai Kal elcrlv dpxcth ravras dyvojurovs elvai dTToSel^eo)? ye pLTj ovoTjs avrcjv, onep (jyaolv elvai ro eTTioraadai pLovov el he pirj eun rd Trpcora elSevai, ovSe rd eK

15 rovrwv elvai eniaraadai ctTrAcos" ovSe Kvptcos, dAA' e^ vTTodeGeojs, el eKeZva eonv. ol he Tvepl piev rov eTTioraGdai opioXoyovai' 8t' aTTohei^ecDs ydp elvai pLovov dXXd TTavrcov elvai dnohei^iv ovhev KCoXveiv ivhex^adai ydp kvkXco yiyveadai rr]v dirohei^iv Kal i^ oAAtJAcov.

'HjLtets" he (f>apLev ovre rrdoav emar'^pL'qv diro-

20 heiKriKTjv elvai, dXXd rrjv rojv dpLeaajv dvanoheiKrov (/cat rovd^ on avay/catov, (f>avep6v' el ydp dvdyKrj

<• Probably Antisthenes ; see Maier, Syllogistik II. ii. 15, n.2.

" Possibly " certain followers of Xenocrates " ; Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, I. 68. 36


believe in the first principles more than in that which is being proved, but nothing which is opposed to the first principles and from which will result a syllogism of the contrary error, must be more credible or better known to him than those principles ; since one who has absolute knowledge should be unshakable in his belief.

III. The necessity of knowing the primary truths Two false has led some persons ^ to think that there is no know- tS^ ' ^^^ ledge, and others,^ admitting the possibility of know- P®^*/^P„ ledge, to think that all facts are demonstrable. Neither is impos-" of these views is true or logically unavoidable. The JSl'at aif ^ former school, who assume that there is no knowledge truths are at all, claim that there is an infinite regress, on the stnSe'by ground that we cannot know posterior by prior truths circular unless the latter themselves depend upon primary truths (in which they are right ; for it is impossible to traverse an infinite series) ; while if the series comes to an end, and there are first principles, they are unknowable, since they do not admit of demonstra- tion, which these thinkers hold to be the sole con- dition of knowledge ; and if it is not possible to know the primary truths, neither is it possible to know in the strict and absolute sense that the infer- ences drawn from them are true ; we can only know them hypothetically, by assuming that the former are true. The other school agrees with this one as regards the conditions of knowledge, for they hold that it can only be secured by demonstration ; but they maintain that there is no reason why there should not be demonstration of everything, since the demonstration may be circular or reciprocal.

We, however, hold that not all knowledge is demon- Answer to strati ve ; the knowledge of immediate premisses is [g no^infl^-^ not by demonstration. It is evident that this must nite regress,



72 b

fjL€V €7TLGraa9aL ra nrporepa /cat ef a>v 7] aTTohei^is, lurarai Se rrore ra dfieaa, ravr dvaTToSeiKTa oLvdyKT] eivaLJ—ravrd r' ovv ovrco AeyojLtev, /cat ov fjbovov €mGrriiJbr]v dAAa /cat dpx^iv iTTiariqixiqs elvai

25 Ttva (fyafxev fi rovs opovs 'yva}pit,opL€V .

Ku/cAo) S' ort dSi^Farov aTroSet/cvfcr^at aTrAajS", StJAov, etWp e/c Trporepcov Set tt^v aTToSetftr etvat /cat yvojpifjiajTepcov dSvvarov yap ion ra avra rcov avrcov d/xa Trporepa /cat vurepa etvat, et ^t) rov €r€pov rpoTTov, OLOV ra pukv rrpos rjfjLas ra 8' dnXajs,

30 dvirep rpoTTov T] iTrayojyrj Trotet yvwptfJiov. et S' ovrojs, ovK dv eir] ro dirXdjs etSeVat /caAcos" (hpio- fievov, dXXd Sirrov t) oi;^ aTrAcos' r) irepa aTrdSetftS" yiyvofilvr] e/c rdjT^ 77/xtv yvcopifjiajrepajv.

SujLt^atVet 8e rot? Aeyoucrt kvkXco rrjv dTToSetftv etvat ou fjiovov ro vvv elprjpievov y dXX ovhev dXXo Aeyetv 7) drt rovr eoriv et roOr' eonv ovrw Se

35 rrdvra pdSiov Set^at. St^Aov S* drt rovro ov/JL^alvet rpiix)v dpcxjv reOevrojv ro /xev ydp 8td TroAAdjv rj 8t' dAtyoJV dva/cdjLtTrretv (f)dvaL ovSev Stacfyepei, 8t'

    • F*2. voiJs or intuition ; see Book II, ch. xix.

For this sense of opo^ {=dpx'n) cf- Eth. Nic. 1142 a 26, 1143 a 36, b 2.

" Which proceeds from that which is " prior to us " to that which is " prior in nature."

•* As based on " prior " premisses (71 b 22).

  • Although the " terms " doubtless represent propositions,

I suspect that (pace Ross ad loc.) Aristotle here really means " terms " by opot, because he is primarily concerned with the form of the argument. He says that circular proof claims to establish by the propositions " if A is true, B is true " and " if B is true, A is true " (using two terms only) the absolute truth of A ; the fallacy can be easily seen if the argument is cast in the form of a normal syllogism (using three terms), in which the propositions " if A is true, B is true " and " if B 38


)e so ; for if it is necessary to know the prior pre- because not misses from which the demonstration proceeds, and fedge*is ' if the regress ends with the immediate premisses, the (lemonstra- latter must be indemonstrable. Such is our conten- tion on this point. Indeed we hold not only that scientific knowledge is possible, but that there is a definite first principle of knowledge ° by which we recognize ultimate truths.^

Demonstration in the absolute sense is obviously Answer to impossible by the circular method ; that is, if demon- {ar'proof "" stration must proceed from premisses which are ^^M^^JJJJ.* prior and better known ; for the same things cannot be at once prior and posterior to the same things, except in different senses, — I mean the distinction between prior to us " and " absolutely prior " — with which we become familiar through induction.^ In this case our definition of absolute knowledge ^ will be unsatisfactory, because it will have a double mean- ing. But presumably the other mode of demonstra- tion, proceeding from that which is better known to us, is not demonstration in the absolute sense.

Those who profess that demonstration is circular (b) proves are faced not only by the consequence just described, Jew/^^ but also by the following : their theory simply amounts to this, that a thing is so if it is so ; and it is easy to prove anything by this method. That this is all that follows will be clearly seen if we take three terms ; for it makes no difference whether we say that a circular proof is effected through many or few terms, provided that there are not fewer than two.^

is true, C is true " give tlie conclusion " if A is true, C is true " ; because similarly the conclusion of " if A is true, B is true " and " if B is true, A is true " is " if A is true, A is true," which proves nothing.



72 b

oXiyojv 8* 7) SvoLV. orav yap rod A ovros ef dvdy-

KTjg 7^ TO B, TOVTOV Se TO r, rov A ovros eorai ro r. €t 817 rod A ovros dvdyKT] ro B elvai, rovrov

73 a 8* ovros ro A {rovro yap rjv ro kvkXco), k^loOo) ro

A €(j>* ov TO r. ro ovv rod B ovros ro A etvat Xeyeiv icrrl ro F elvai Xeyeiv, rovro S' on rov A ovros ro T iarr ro Se F rep A ro avro. o)ore 5 avfJipatv€L Xeyeiv rovs kvkXw ^doKovras €tvat r7]v dTToSei^LV ovSev erepov ttXtjv on rov A ovros ro A eoriv. ovro) Be irdvra Setfat pdSiov.

Ov fiTjV dAA' ovSe rovro Svvarov ttXtjv inl rovrcov ooa dXXy^Xois eTrerat, axjTrep rd tSta. ivos /xev ovv K€L(JL€vov SeSeiKrau on ovSerror^ dvdyKT] n etvau erepov [Xeyoj 8* ivos, on ovre opov ivos ovre

10 deaeajs /xtas- redeiorjs), eK Svo 8e dicreojv rrpcorajv Kal iXa)(Larcov evBi-)(€rai, etrrep /cat avXXoylaaadaL . idv fiiv ovv ro re A rep B Kal rep V eTrrjrai, Kal ravr dXXrjXois Kal rep A, ovrejj /xev evSexerat i^ dXX^qXejov SeiKvvvai irdvra rd alrrjdevra ev rep Trpeo- rep ax'^fJ^eJ-n, ens SeSeiKrau ev rols Trepl GvXXoyiGpLov.

15 heheiKrai he Kal on ev rols dXXois cr^^T^/xaCTtv -^ ov yiyverai ovXXoyLopios r^ ov Trepl reov Xriejjdevrejjv. rd he p,r] dvriKarrjyopovfjieva ovhafxeJos eon hel^at KVKXep' cucrr' eTreihrj oXiya roiavra ev rats dno- Sel^eaiy ef)avep6v on Kevov re Kal dhvvarov ro

" Sc. in conjunction with the major premiss " when A is, Bis."




For when if A is, B must be, and if B is, C must be, then if A is, C must be. Then if when A is, B must be, and when B is, A must be (this is what is meant by circular proof), let A represent C in the first proof. Then to say that when B is, A is, is equivalent to saying that when B is, C is ; and this " is equivalent to saying that when A is, C is. But C is the same as A. Thus it follows that those who assert that demon- stration is circular are merely maintaining that when A is, A is ; by which method it is easy to prove anything.

Moreover, even this mode of proof is impossible except in the case of attributes which are reciprocal consequents, e.g., properties.^ It has been shown " that from the positing of one thing — by which I mean either one term or one proposition — nothing else ever necessarily follows ; two is the first and least number of propositions from which a necessary consequence is possible, since this is the minimum requirement for any logical conclusion. Thus if A is a consequent of B and of C, and the latter are consequents both of one another and of A, it is possible to prove recipro- cally in the first figure all the assumptions which we have made. This has been shown in our discussion of syllogism.^ But it has also been shown ^ that in the other figures either no syllogism results or none which confirms our assumptions. Propositions whose terms are not reciprocally predicable cannot be proved at all by circular demonstration. Hence, since such terms rarely occur in demonstrations, it is evidently futile

Cf. Top. 102 a 18. Definition and differentia are also predicable convertibly. " An. Pr. I. XXV. <* Ibid. II. V.

  • Ibid, vi, vii.




73 a

Aeyetv e^ aXXrjXwv elvai rrjv aTToSetftv Kal Sio.

20 TOVTO TTOLvrajv ivSex^crOoLi' ctvat aTToSei^LV.

IV. 'ETiet 8' aSwarov a'AAcos" €;(€tv ou eVrtv cVt- GTTiix'q ctTTAa)?, dvay/catov av etry to emGrrjTOV ro Kara rrjv dTroSeLKTLKTjv e7TLGTT]^rjv. aTToheiKTiKTj 8' iorlv Tjv exofiev ro) ex^iv aTrdSetftv ef dvayKaiwv

25 apa cruAAoytcTyLtos' loriv rj oLTroSeL^i?. Xr^Trreov dpa eK rlvojv Kal ttolcov at aTroSel^eLS elaiv. rrpwrov hk hiopiacjoyLev ri Xeyofxev to /caret Travros' Kal tl to Kad^ avTO Kal tl to KadoXov.

Kara TravTOS yuev ovv tovto Xeyoj o dv fj jjltj €.ttI Tivos iJikv TLVos Se [JLij, fXTjSe TroT€ fxkv TTOTe 8e iiri'

30 olov el KaTO. TravTOS dvOpcoTvov ^coov, el dXrjOe? tovS^ etTTetv dvdpojTTov, dXrjdeg Kal ^qjov, Kal el vvv daTepov, Kal BaTepov, Kal el ev Trdarj ypapLfifj OTiypbiq, woavTW? . ori-jfieLov 8e- Kal yap ra? evcrrct- cret? OVTO) (f>epoiJLev d>g Kara rravTOS epwTCOfievoL, rj el erri tlvl [xt^, rj et TTOTe jxifj.

35 Ka^' ai5Ta 8' ocra vrrapxei re ev toj tl Iotlv, OLOV TpLycjvqj ypafjLfjirj Kal ypafxpifj OTLyfirj [rj yap ovoia avTWv eK tovtojv eoTi, Kal ev tw Xoycp tw XeyovTL TL eoTTLV evv7rdp)(€L) • Kal ogol^ tcjv vrrap- xdvTOJv^ avTOLS aura ev tco Xoycp evvndpxovai tw tl



" Here KadoXov is used in a special sense : see 73 b 25 if. ^ i.e., this will be true of any line at any time. " Although Aristotle's examples are of essential constitu- ents, he obviously intends to include essential attributes.




and impossible to maintain that demonstration is reciprocal and that therefore everything can be demonstrated.

IV. Since the object of scientific knowledge in the Before dis- absolute sense cannot be otherwise than it is, the premisses notion reached by demonstrative knowledge m ill be J^j^g^^ necessarily true. Now knowledge is demonstrative certain when we possess it in virtue of having a demonstra- ^^"^' tion ; therefore the premisses from which demonstra- tion is inferred are necessarily true. Therefore we must comprehend the nature and character of the premisses from which demonstrations proceed. Let us first define what we mean by the terms " pre- dicated of all" and per se " and "universal"" (as applied to attributes).

I apply the term " predicated of all " to whatever •• predi- is not predicated of one instance but not of another, ^^j^?,^ ^^ or predicated at one time but not at another. E.g., if " animal " is predicated of all " man," if it is true to call X a man, it is also true to call him an animal ; and if the former statement is true now, so is the latter. Similarly too if every line contains a point. ^ There is evidence to corroborate this definition ; for the objection which we adduce against a proposition which involves " predication of all " implies either an example to which or a time at which the predicate does not apply.

I describe one thing as "belonging per se " to "Perse" another (i) if it is an element in the essential nature J^ attS-*^^ of the other, as, e.g., a line belongs to a triangle and butes, a point to a line (for the line or point is a constituent of the being of the triangle or line, and is an element in the formula which describes its essence) ; (ii) if it is an attribute the formula of whose essence includes




73 a

iart Sr]XovvTiy olov ro evdv vnapx^L ypo-iJLiJLfj Kal

40 TO 7r€pL(f>€peg, Kal ro Trepirrov Kal apriov dpidfia}, 73 b Kal TO TTpwrov Kal uvvd^Tov Kal laoTrXevpov Kal irepopurjKeg' Kal Trdcn tovtols ivvTrdpxovGtv iv rw Xoycp Tip TL icjTL XiyovTi €vda puev ypa/jufjurj evda 8' dpidpLos. ofiolcos 8e Kal eTrl tojv dXXa>v rd roLavd* iKduTOis Kad* avrd Xeyoj, Sua Se pLrj'beTepcos vnap- 5 x^^ uvpL^e^TjKora, olov rd fjuovcrLKov ^ XevKov rep ^cpcp. en o iiT] Kad^ V7Tok€ljjL€Vov Xeyerau dXXov rivog, olov ro jSaSt^ov erepov re ov ^ahitov earl, Kal ro^ XevKov, r) 8' ovorla Kal ocra roSe n orjiiaivei ovx erepov ri ovra icrrlv dnep iori. rd pukv Srj purj KaS^ VTTOKeijJievov Kad^ avrd Xeyw, rd 8e KaO" viroKei-

10 /xevou crvp.^e^TjKora. en 8' aAAov rponov rd puev 8t' avrd vndpxov cKaarcp Kad^ avro, rd 8e pLrj 8t* avrd uvfJi^e^rjKog, otov el ^adit^ovros yjarpai/je, uvpu- pe^rjKos' ov ydp Sid rd ^aSt^eLV -^arpaipev, dXXd crvve^T], (f)a[jiev, rovro. el he hi avro, KaO^ avro, otov e'i ri acfyarrofievov drredave Kal Kard rrjv

15 Gcfyayi^v, on did rd acjidrreadai, dXX ov o'vveprj G(j>arrdpievov aTTodaveiv. rd dpa Xeyopueva eTrl rojv dirXcbs eTTiarrircov KaB^ avrd ovrcog ws evvrrapxecv

^ TO om. ABCd.

" An oblong number is a compound number that is not a square. Both names refer to the geometrical patterns in which pebbles or other objects representing the units can be arranged.

  • Although in Greek a participle or adjective can be used

as an apparent substantive, it is still an attribute predicated of an unexpressed subject apart from which it has no separate existence.

  • We should call them attributes.

"* (iii) and (iv) are irrelevant for Aristotle's present pur-



the subject to which the attribute itself belongs. E.g., " straight " and " curved " belong to " line," " odd " and " even," " prime " and " compound," " square " and " oblong " " belong to number ; and the formula of the essence of each one of these in- cludes line or number respectively. Similarly in all other cases I describe all terms of either of the kinds just described as belonging per se to their several subjects ; whereas such as belong in neither of these senses — as e.g., *' cultured " or " white " belongs to " animal " — I call accidents, (iii) I also describe as individual (existing) per se whatever is not stated of something substances, else as subject. I mean, e.g., that " the walking " is something else which walks, and similarly ** the white " ^ ; whereas substance, or whatever denotes an individual, is not anything other than just itself. Thus I call per se those terms which are not predicated of a subject ; those which are so predicated I call accidents." (iv) Again in another sense that which and events. happens to something else in virtue of the latter's own nature is said to happen to it per se ; while that which does not so happen is called an accident. E.g., if it lightens while a man is walking, it is an accident ; for it was not because he was walking that it light- ened ; it was, as we say, an accident. But an event which happens in virtue of a thing's own nature hap- pens to it per se, e.g., if something dies while being slaughtered and in accordance with the act of slaugh- tering, since it died because it was slaughtered, it was not an accident that it died while being slaugh- tered. Thus '^ in the sphere of what is knowable in the absolute sense, attributes which are called per se

pose ; they may even have been added by another hand ; at any rate Aristotle treats them as parenthetical.



73 b

T019 Karr^yopovfJievoLS tj ivv7Tdp)(€adaL St' avrd re

€GTi KOI i^ dvdyKT]?. ov yap ev'bex^Tai fir] V7rdpx€iv 20 7] dnXcos 7] rd avrLKeipieva, olov ypafjifjufj to evdv t)

TO KafJLTTvXoV Kal dpidjJia) to TVepiTTOV Tj TO dpTLOV.

eoTi yap to ivavTLOV r) OTepiqoLS r) dvT tt^aais iv roi avTcp yev€i, olov dpTiov to fir) irepLTTOV iv dptdixols fj eVerat. wgt^ €t dvdyKT] cfydvai tj d7ro(f)dvai, dv- dyKT] Kal ra Kad^ aura virdp^^LV .

25 To /xev ovv KaTa rravTO? Kal Kad^ avTo hiiopioSoj Tov TpoTTov TOVTOV KadoXov Sc Xiyco o dv KaTa TTavTos re VTrdpxj] Kal Kad^ avTO Kal fj avTO. <j)avep6v dpa otl doa KadoXov ef dvdyKTjs virdpx^i Tols TTpdyfiaGLV. to Kad* avTO 8e Kal fj avTO rau-

30 TOV, olov Kad^ avTTjv Tjj ypafxfjufj virdp^^i GTiyfir] Kal TO evdv- Kal yap fj ypa/x/xTy- Kal tco Tpiywvcp fj TpiycDVov Svo opBai' Kal yap Kad^ avTO to Tpiycjvov hvo opdals Igov. to KadoXov he vtrdp^ei TOTe, OTav eirl TOV TV^dvTos Kal npayTov SeLKvvrjTat. otov to 8vo opQds ^X^*"^ ovTe TO) GX'rjlxaTi Igtl KadoXov

35 {KaiTOL eGTL Sel^ai KaTa gx'tjP^o.tos otl Svo 6 pQ as

« Type (i).

^ Type (ii).

« A colour is either white or not-white in the sense that it is either pure white or a colour containing little or no white (privation) ; number is either odd or not-odd in the sense that if it is not odd it must be even (contradictory).

^ By the Law of Excluded Middle.

  • This limitation of the meaning of Kad^ avro by equating

it with ^ avTo comes in oddly here. The point is that strictly an attribute only belongs per se to the highest class to which it is essential. The same idea is expressed in a different way by TTpwTov below.




as implying or implied by their subjects belong to those subjects in virtue of their own nature and of necessity. It is impossible that they should not belong to their subjects — either absolutely " or in the way that opposite attributes belong,^ e.g., either straight or curved to a line and either odd or even to a number ; because the contrary of an attribute is either the privation or the contradictory of that attribute in the same genus ; e.g., in number the not-odd is even, inasmuch as evenness is a consequent of non-oddness.^ Thus since an attribute must be either asserted or denied of a subject,^ per se attri- butes must belong to their subjects of necessity.

So much for the definition of what is meant by " Univer- " predication of all " and " per se." By a " universal " butes.*"" attribute I mean one which belongs as " predicated of all " to its subject, and belongs to that subject per se and qua itself. Thus it is evident that all universal attributes belong to their subjects of neces- sity. A per se attribute is identical with that which belongs to its subject qua itself^ ; e.g., " point " and " straight " belong per se to " line," for they also belong to it qua line ; and " having the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles " belongs to triangle qua triangle ; for a triangle per se has the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles. An attribute only belongs to a subject universally when it can be shown to belong to any chance instance of that subject, and to belong to that subject pri- marily.^ (i) E.g., " having the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles " is not universally appli- cable to " figure." It is indeed possible to prove of a figure that the sum of its interior angles is equal to

'See previous note.



73 b

ex^t,, aAA' ov rod rv^ovros (jxt^I^citos, ovSe xPV'^^f' Tcp TVXOVTL GX^lJ^o.TL heiKvus^ ' TO yap rerpdycovov GxrjP'OL iJL€Vy ovK e;^et Se Suo opOal? taa?). to S' laoGKeXes e;\;et fiev ro rvxov Svo opOals loas, aAA ov TTpojTOVy aAAa to rpiyajvov irporepov. o roivvv to 40 rvxov TTpcoTov heiKwrai hvo opdas exov ^ onovv

74 a aAAo, rovrcp Trpcorcp VTrdpx^i' KadoXov, /cat r) oltto-

Sttfts" Kad* avro rovrov KadoXov iart, twv 8' dXXcov

rpoTTOv TLvd ov Kad^ avro- ovSe rod laooKeXov? ovk

€ori KadoXov aAA' iirl nXeov.

V. Act Se piTj Xavddv€LV on noXXdKLs oru/Xj8atVet

6 hiapiaprdveLV /cat p,r) vTrdpx^iv ro SeiKvvpievov Trpco-

Tov KadoXov, fj hoKcZ heiKvvadai KadoXov Trpcorov.

aTTarcjpLeda Se ravriqv rr]v aTrdrrjv orav tj firjSev fj

AajSetv dvcorepov Trapd ro /ca^' eKaorov r^ rd /ca^'

€Kaora^ rj fj fiev, dAA' dva)vvjjiov fj irrl SiacfyopoLS

10 €tSet rrpdyixaoiVy r] rvyxdvrj ov cog iv fJLepet oXov e^'

w heiKvvrai' rot? yap iv pbipei VTrdp^ei pLev rj dno-

Setfts", /cat eorai Kara rravros, dAA' opboj? ovk eorai

rovrov Trpcorov KadoXov 7] aTToSet^ts*. Xeya> 8e

^ 8eiKvvs] 6 SeiKvvs Bekker. ^ rq ra Kad^ eKaara secl. Ross.

" Unless Aristotle is writing very carelessly rj ra Ka9* €Kaara is a mistaken gloss, which Ross rightly brackets. Kad*



two right angles, but this cannot be proved of any chance figure ; nor does one use any chance figure for the proof, for a square is a figure, but it does not contain angles equal to the sum of two right angles. Again, any chance isosceles triangle has angles equal to the sum of two right angles, but it is not the first figure to fulfil this requirement ; the triangle is prior to it. Thus that which can be shown in any chance instance primarily to fulfil the condition of containing the sum of two right angles, or any other require- ment, is the subject to which that universal attribute primarily belongs ; and the demonstration that this predicate is true universally of its subject establishes a per se relation between them, whereas the relation established for other predicates is in a sense not per se. (ii) Nor again is " containing angles equal to the sum of two right angles " a universal attribute of " iso- sceles " ; it has a wider extension.

V. We must not overlook the fact that a mistake Error may often occurs, and the attribute which we are trying pJ-oJf of^^ to prove does not apply primarily and universally universal in the sense in which we think that it is being proved. Three We fall into this error either (i) when we cannot find th?s*|rror^ any higher term apart from the individual [or indi- viduals] " ; or (ii) when there is such a term, but it has no name as applied to objects which differ in species ; or (iii) when the subject of the demonstra- tion happens to be a whole w^hich is a part of some other ; for although the demonstration will hold good of the particulars contained in it and will be pre- dicated of all of it, still the demonstration will not apply to it primarily and universally. When I say

€KaaTov seems here to mean not an individual but a single species the genus of which is unrecognizable.



74 a



Et OVV TLS hei^€l€V on at Opdal OV aVflTTLTTTOVGL,

15 So^eiev av rovrov etvat rj dTroSei^cs 3ta to eVt TTaowv etvai tojv opdcov ovk ecrrt 8e, etVe/o pLTj on d)Sl LuaL yiyverai rovro, aAA' fj ottcooovv laai.

Kat et rpiyojvov jxt] t^v d'AAo -^ tVocr/ceAe?, ^ laoGKeXes av eSoKci VTrdp-xeiv.

Kat TO amAoyov oVt eVaAAaf, t? dLpidpLol Kal fj ypapLfJiaL Kal fj areped /cat fj XP^'^^^* woTrep

20 IheiKwro ttote x^P^^y ivSexofievov ye Kara Trdvrojv /xta dTTohei^ei SeixOrjvaL' dXXd 8ta to firj etvai (hvofJLaGfjievov n Trdvra ravra ev, dpidfiol fjLiJKr] Xpdvos oreped, Kal etSei hia^ipeiv aAAo^Acov, x^P^^^ iXafJL^dvero' vvv 8e KaOoXov heiKvvrai' ov yap fj ypafxpial t) fj dpidpLol VTrijpx^v aAA' fj roSl, o

25 KadoXov VTToridevrai virdpxeiv. Bid rovro ouS' av ns Set^ry Kad^ eKaorov rd rpiyatvov (XTToSet^et rj jLtta ri iripa on hvo dpBds e;^et eKaarov, rd lao- rrXevpov x^P^-? x^'^ '^o GKaXrjveg Kal rd loooKeXes , OV7TCO otSe rd rplycovov on Svo dpdaZs et piT] rdv

"■ An example of (iii). The fact is true of the lines pri- marily qua parallel, only secondarily qua perpendicular.

  • An example of (i).

" i.e., that if A : B =C : D, A : C = B : D. The illustration which follows is an example of (ii) ; but cf. Heath, Mathe- matics in Aristotle, pp. 41-44.

^ i.e., with the unco-ordinated unscientific knowledge of the sophist.



that demonstration applies to a subject primarily and universally, I mean that it applies to that subject primarily as such.

Thus if one were to prove that perpendiculars <to the same straight line) never meet, it might be sup- posed that this quality of perpendiculars was the proper subject of the demonstration, since it holds good of all perpendiculars. But it is not ; inasmuch as the result follows, not because the (alternate) angles are equal in this particular way, but if they are equal at all."

Again, if there were no triangle except the iso- sceles, the proof that it contains angles equal to the sum of two right angles would be supposed to apply to it qua isosceles.^

Again, the law that proportionals alternate ^ might be supposed to apply to numbers qua numbers, and similarly to lines, solids and periods of time ; as indeed it used to be demonstrated of these subjects separately. It could, of course, have been proved of them all by a single demonstration, but since there was no single term to denote the common quality of numbers, lengths, time and solids, and they differ in species from one another, they were treated sepa- rately ; but now the law is proved universally ; for the property did not belong to them qua lines or qua numbers, but qua possessing this special quality which they are assumed to possess universally. Hence, even if a man proves separately — whether by the same demonstration or not — of each kind of triangle, equi- lateral, scalene and isosceles, that it contains angles equal to the sum of two right angles, he still does not know, except in the sophistical sense, ^ that a triangle has its angles equal to the sum of two right angles, or



74 a ««»

(jo^LGTiKov TpoTTOVy ovhe KaOoXov rpiycovov, o?58' et

30 fjiTjSev ian mapa ravra rplycovov 'irepov ov yap fj rpiycovov otSev, ovhe ttoLv rpiycovov aXX rj Kar apidpiov Kar elSos S' ov irdv, /cat el fjL7]Sev €gtlv o ovK olhev.

IToT* ovv OVK olhe KadoXov, Kal ttot' otSev oltt- Xcjs; SijXov hr] on el ravrov rjv rpuycovo) etvat Kal laoTrXevpoj -^ eKaarw rj ttoLolv et Se jjirj ravrov aAA*

35 erepoVy vTrdpx^i 3' fj rpiycovov, ovk olhev. irorepov S' f) rpiycjvov r] fj loocrKeXes VTrdpx^i'; Kal irore Kara rov&* V7rdp)(€L Trpcorov; Kal KadoXov rivos Tj aTToSei^Ls; SrjXov on orav d(j)aLpovpL€V(xJV VTrdp^rj npcorcp. olov rep laoGKeXel )(^aXKcp rpiycLvcp vtt- 74 b dp^ovGi hvo opOaly dXXd Kal rod ^P-Xkovv etvat dtfyacpeOevrog Kal rod laooKeXes. dXX ov rod oxr]- ixaros ri Treparos. aAA' ov Trpwrojv. rivos ovv rrpixirov; el Stj rpiyajvov, Kara rovro VTrdp^ei Kal rocg aAAots", Kal rovrov KadoXov eorrlv rj drxo- Sec^LS. 5 VI. Et ovv eonv rj dTToSeiKrLKT] eTnorrjfjLT] e^ dvayKaccDv dpx^JV (o yap irriararaL ov hvvarov dXXa>s ex^Lv), rd 8e Kad* avrd VTrdpxovra dvayKala

" i.e., through induction bj'^ simple enumeration. 52


that this is a universal property of triangles, even if there is no other kind of triangle besides these ; for he does not know that this property belongs to a triangle qua triangle, nor that it belongs to every triangle, except numerically ^ ; for he does not knovi^ that it belongs to every triangle specifically, even if there is no triangle which he does not know to possess it.

When, then, do we not know universally, and when Criterion of do we know absolutely ? Clearly, if" triangle " were gal "attri- essentially the same as " equilateral " in each or butea. every instance, we should have absolute knowledge ; but if it is not the same but different, and the pro- perty belongs to the equilateral qua triangle, our knowledge is not universal. We must ask " Does the property belong to its subject qua triangle or qua isosceles ? When does it apply to its subject pri- marily ? What is the subj ect of which it can be demon- strated universally ? " Clearly the first subject to which it applies as the diiferentiae are removed. E.g., the property of having angles equal to the sum of two right angles will apply to " bronze isosceles triangle " ; and it will still apply when " bronze " and " isosceles " are removed. " But not if you remove ' figure ' or ' limit.' " No, but these are not the first differentiae whose removal makes the attribute inapplicable. " Then what is the first } " If it is " triangle," then it is with respect to triangu- larity that the attribute applies to all the rest of the subjects, and it is of " triangle " that the attribute can be universally demonstrated.

VI. If, then, demonstrative knowledge proceeds Arguments from necessary first principles (because that which the pre- we know cannot possibly be otherwise), and essential J^isses of



74 b

rots' irpdyiiaoiv (ra ^ikv yap iv rw ri eariv vndpx^^'

rols S' avTCL iv ro) tl icrrtv vnapx^i' KarrjyopoviJievoLS

avrcov, cov Odrepov rwv dvriKeiiievojv dvdyKTj

10 VTrapx^iv) y (f)avep6v on e/c tolovtcx)V tlvcov av €Lrj 6 OLTToSeLKTiKos ovWoyiGfios' oiTTav yap r] ovrcos vtt- dpx^L rj Kara avfJif^e^rjKos, ra 8e ovjJL^e^rjKora ovk dvayKala .

"H Srj ovTCO XeKreov, -q dp)(r]v ^e/xeVots" on rj drco- Set^t? dvayKolov^ eon, /cat et (XTroSeSet/crat, ov^

15 olov T aAAcos" ex^LV i^ dvayKauajv dpa Set etvat rov crvXXoyicrfJiov. i^ dXrjdcov /xev yap ean Kal jjutj aTTo- SeLKVvvra GvXXoyLGacrOaiy i^ dvayKatajv 8* ovk eanv dXX t) aTroSet/cvuvra* rovro yap tJSt] dno-

SctfeCtJS" €CTTt.

Si^jLtetov 8' on 7) dTToSei^LS i^ dvayKaicov on Kal rds €VGrdG€Ls ovtcd ^ipofiev irpos rovs olopievovs 20 djroheiKvvvaiy on ovk dvdyKrj, av olwfjieda rj oXws evSex^crOai aXXw? t) €V€Kd ye rov Xoyov.

^rjXov 8' CAC rovrcov Kal on evrjdeis ol Xafx^dveiv oto/xevot KaX(jL)£ rds dp^ds idv ei^So^os fj rj nrporaGLS Kal dXrjdrjgy olov ol GO(j)iGral on to CTTto-racr^at to eTnGTiqpi'qv ex^tv. ov yap to evSo^ov ^ pbrf dpxr]

^ avayKaioiv Philoponus (?), Ross : ovayKaLov Mure. ^ V y-'vi] W^v n^» Ross.

« e.g., ' nose ' is part of the definition of ' snubness ' {Met. 1064 a 25), and every nose is either snub or not snub.

^ i.e., necessary.

^ This sense can, I think, be extracted from the vulgate without having recourse to emendation. 54


attributes are necessary to their subjects (for some demonstra- of them inhere in the essence of their subjects, while neces^Sy. others have the subjects of which they are predicated inherent in their own essence, and in this latter class one member of the pair of opposite attributes must apply)," it is evident that the premisses from which demonstrative syllogisms are drawn will be of this nature * ; for every attribute applies either in this or in the accidental sense, and accidental attributes are not necessary.

We may either argue in this way, or lay down the principle that demonstration implies necessity,^ i.e., that if a thing has been proved, it cannot be otherwise. Then it follows that the premisses of the (demonstra- tive) syllogism must be necessary ; for whereas it is possible to draw a conclusion from true premisses without demonstrating anything, it is impossible to draw one from necessary premisses without doing so ; for necessity directly implies demonstration.

Evidence that the premisses from which demon- stration proceeds are necessary may be found in the fact that the way in which we raise objections against those who imagine that they are demonstrating is by saying " it is not necessary, that is if we think that it is possible, either without qualification or for the purposes of the argument, that the fact should be otherwise.

(It is also clear from these arguments that it is foolish to think that one is choosing the right starting- point if the premiss is (merely) generally accepted and true ; as the sophists assume that to know is to have knowledge. The starting-point is not that which is generally accepted or the reverse, but that

^ Cf. Plato, Euthydemus 277 u.



74 b 25 icrnv, dXXa to irpcorov rod yevovs ire pi o heiKwrar

Koi rdXrjOks ov ttoLv olKeiov.

"Otl 8* e^ dvayKaicDv elvai Set rov ovXXoyioixov

(fyavepov koi €K rowSe. ct yap 6 fxr] ex^JV Xoyov rod

hid TL ovGr]g drrohei^eays ovk eTnarrjiJLOjv, etrj 8' dv

wore TO A Kard rod T i^ dvdyKrjs vnapxeiv, to 8e

30 B TO /xeCTov 8t' ov dTTeSelxOrj prj i^ dvdyKrj?, ovk

oTSe SiOTi. ov yap €gtl tovto hid to fjueaov to piev

ydp ivhex^Tai firj elvai, to 8e crvfiTrepaaiJia dvay-


"Eti ei Tis fJirj oihe vvv e;)^ct)v rdv Xoyov Kai ctoj^o-

fji€vo9, ucpt^ofjievov Tov 7T pay i^aTO? , [atj iTriXeXrjG-

pievoSy ovhe npoTepov rjhei. (f)dap€i7] 8' dv to fieaov

35 €1 pLT) dvayKalov, woTe e^ei jjiev tov Xoyov gco^o-

/xevos" Gq)l,oiJL€vov tov TrpdypiaTOS, ovk oihe 8e' oi58'

dpa rrpoTepov rjSei. et 8e {jLtj e^Sapraiy ivhex^Tai

8e (jidaprivai, to avfji^aivov dv eirj SvvaTOV Kai

ivSexopievov. dAA' cgtiv dhvvaTov ovtcds exovTa


75 a "OTav fiev ovv to ovp^irepaopba i^ dvdyKT]^ fj,

ovhev KCoXvei to {jbdaov [.Lr) dvayKalov etvat 86* ov

iheixOrj' euTi ydp to dvayKalov Kai [it] i^ dvay-

Kaiojv^ ovXXoy iGaoOai, WGirep Kai dXrjOe? /jltj i^

5 dXrjdwv OTav 8e to p.eGov i^ dvdyKr]s, Kai to

^ avayKaiwv n, Philoponus : avayKaiov.

    • But in neither case is the conclusion proved. This para-

graph is a parenthetical comment on the main argument. 56


which is primarily true of the genus with which the demonstration deals ; and not every true fact is peculiar to a given genus.)

That our syllogism must be based upon necessary premisses is evident also from the following argument. Since the man who cannot give an account of the reason for a fact, although there is a proof available, is not possessed of scientific knowledge, if we assume a syllogism such that while A necessarily applies as predicate to C, B, the middle term by which the conclusion was proved, is not in a necessary relation to the other terms, then he does not know the reason. For the conclusion does not depend upon the middle term, since the latter may not be true, whereas the conclusion is necessary.

Again, if a man does not know a fact now, although he can give an account of it and both he himself and the fact are unchanged, and he has not forgotten it, then he was also ignorant of it before. But if the middle term is not necessary, it may cease to operate. In that case, although the man himself and the fact are unchanged, and he will still have his account of it, he does not know the fact. Therefore he was also ignorant of it before. Even if the middle term has not actually ceased, if it may cease, the conclusion will be problematic and contingent ; and under such conditions knowledge is impossible.

(When the conclusion is necessary, it is not essen- Parenthe- tial that the middle term by which it was proved neceSary should be necessary, for it is possible to reach a neces- premisses sary conclusion even from premisses which are not buTneces- necessary, just as it is possible to reach a true con- J^fg^^jj^^J^^gt elusion from premisses M'hich are not true." But give, a* when the middle term is necessarily true, the con- conclusion.



75 a

avfJLTTepaGiJia i^ dvdyKrjg, ixionep koX ef dXrjdcov

dX7]6€s del' earco yap to A Kara rod B ef dvdyKrjg,

/cat TOVTO Kara rod F* dvayKaZov roivvv /cat to A

ra> V VTrdpx^LV orav 8e pbrj dvayKalov fj ro ovfi-

TTf-paopia, ovhk ro fieaov dvayKalov olov t' etvat*

earcx) yap ro A rep T pir) ef dvayKr^g vTrdpx^iv, rq)

10 Se B, /cat rovro rep T ef dvdyKr]s' /cat ro A dpa rtp r ef dvdyK7]g vTrdp^et- dXX ovx V7T€K€iro.

  • E7ret roivvv et eTrioraraL dnoSeLKriKajg, Set i^

dvdyKrjg vrrapx^iv, SrjXov on /cat Sta pueoov dvay- Kalov Set e^eiv rr]V aTrdSet^ti^- r] ovk imurricjer at

15 oure Stort ovre on dvdyKT] eKelvo elvai, dXX tj oliq- crerat ovk elSws, idv VTroXd^rj ws dvayKalov ro pirj dvayKalov, rj ovS^ olrjaeraiy o/xotct)? idv re ro on elhfj Sid fjieacjov idv re ro Stori /cat St' dpLeaojv.

Tcov Se GvpL^e^TjKorojv purj /ca^' ai5Ta, ov rpo- 7TOV hicopiGOri rd KaO^ aura, ovk eanv iTncrr'^pirj

20 (XTroSet/crt/cTy. ov yap ecrrtv i^ dvdyKrjs Setfat ro GvpTTepaGpLa- ro GvpL^ej^rjKo? yap ivSex^rai pbrj vrr- dpx^tv rrepl rov^ roiovrov yap Xiycx) GvpL^e^rjKoros. Kairoi dTropTqG€L€v dv rt? lgcos rivos eVe/ca ravra Set ipcordv rrepl rovrcov, el jjutj dvdyKT] ro GvpuTri- paGpia etvat- ovSev yap Sta^epet et ng ipo/nevos rd

25 rvxovra etra etVetev ro GvpuTrepaGpia. Set S' ipo)- rdv ovx ^-'^ dvayKalov etvat Sta rd rjpcorTjpiiva, dAA'

^ oni. Ad.

« 73 a 37 ff., 74 b 8 if. 58


elusion is also necessary ; just as the conclusion from true premisses is always true. For let A be neces- sarily predicated of B, and B of C ; then the con- clusion that A applies to C is also necessary. But when the conclusion is not necessary, neither can the middle term be necessary. For suppose that A applies necessarily to B but not to C, and that B necessarily applies to C. Then A will also apply necessarily to C. But this was not the original assumption.)

Therefore since, if we have demonstrative know- Thus in ledge of a proposition, the predicate must apply tion^the'^* necessarily to the subject, it is obvious that the middle "diddle term upon which the proof depends must also be be neces- necessary. Otherwise we shall recognize neither the ^^^^' fact of the conclusion not the reason for it as neces- sary ; we shall either think that we know, although we do not — that is if we assume as necessary that which is not necessary — or we shall not even think that we know, alike whether we know the fact by intermediate terms or whether we know the reason immediately.

Attributes which are not essential in the sense No demon- which we have defined " do not admit of demon- knowledge strative knowledge, since it is not possible to ffive a of non-


necessary proof of the conclusion ; for an accidental attributes. attribute may not apply to its subject, and it is of this kind of attribute that I am speaking. At the same time it might be questioned why (in dialectic), if the conclusion is not necessarily true, we should ask for the concession of such premisses for such a con- clusion ; one might as well suggest any premisses at random, and then state the conclusion. The answer is that we should put definite questions, not because the answers affect the necessity of the conclusion, but



75 a

on XeyeLV dvdyKTj rep eKelva Xeyovri, kol dXrjdcog

Xeyeiv, idv dXrjdaJ? fj vTrdp^ovTa.

'Ettci 8' i^ dvdyKTj? v7Tdp)(€L TTcpl €KaoTov yivos oua Kad^ avrd VTrdpx^i, Kal fj eKacrrov, cfyavepov on

30 7T€pl Tibv Kad^ avrd VTrapxovrcov at imaTrjiJiovLK at dTToSel^eis Kal e/c rcov roiovrajv eluiv. rd /xev ydp ovfjL^ejSrjKora ovk dvayKola, ojcrr' ovk o^vdyKiq to GVfJLTTepaopia etSeVat Ston vudp^^L, ou8' el del eirj, fjir] Kad^ avTO Sc, olov ol hid o7][jLeiojv cruAAoyta^ot. ro ydp Kad^ avrd ov Kad^ avrd e7nGTrj(Tero.i , ovSe

35 Sion. TO 8e Sion eTTtcrracr^at ion to hid tov aiTLov eTTLCTTaodai. St' avTo dpa Set Kal to fieuov Tip rpLTO) Kal TO TTpwTov TO) fjueGcp VTrdpx^Lv.

VII. Ovk dpa eoTiv e^ aAAou yevov? fjieTajSdvTa Set^at, OLOV TO yecopLeTpiKov dpid/jirjTiKfj. rpta ydp

40 ecrrt ra iv rats' dTroSet^ea-Lv, ev fiev rd dTToSeiKvv- jxevov TO GViXTTepaofxa {tovto S' ecrt to VTrdp^ov yivei Tivl KaO^ avTo), ev Se Ta d^iajyiaTa (a^tco/xaTa 75 b 8' eorlv e^ (Lv), TpiTOV to yevog to imoKeifjievov, ov TO TTadrj Kal to Kad^ avrd avpu^e^r^KOTa SrjXot rj aTToSet^tS". i^ d)v /xev ovv rj aTroSetfts", evSexeTac Ta auTO, £tvaf cov Se to yevos erepov, woTrep dpidfjurj- TLKTJs Kal yewpieTpias, ovk eWt ttjv dpidpLrjTLKTjv 5 (XTroSet^tv ecfyappiooaL irrl rd Tots" fxeyeOecn ovp-^e- ^rjKOTa, el piTj rd fjueyedr] dpidpioi eloL- tovto S' cos

" P^ven the syllogisms of dialectic should be formally valid.

^ Where the connexion is neither causal nor necessary ; cf. An. Pr. 70 a 7 ff.

" To describe the common axioms as e^ (Lv suggests that they serve as premisses ; but this is true only of such as are



because in stating them our opponent must state the conclusion, and state it truly if the attributes apply truly."

Since in each genus it is the attributes that belong Hence our essentially to that particular genus that belong to it musTstate of necessity, it is evident that scientific demonstra- per se tions are concerned with essential attributes and ^°"°^^**^"3- proceed from them. For accidental attributes are not necessary, and therefore we do not necessarily know why the conclusion is true ; not even if the attributes belong always, but not per se, as in syllo- gisms through signs. ^ For w€ shall not have know- ledge of the essential fact as essential, nor shall we know its reason. To know the reason of a thing is to know it through its cause. Therefore the middle term must apply per se to the third, and also the first per se to the middle.

VII. Hence it is not possible to prove a fact by They must passing from one genus to another — e.g., to prove a state them geometrical proposition by arithmetic. There are butes be- three factors in a demonstration : (1) The conclusion tKame^ which is required to be proved, i.e., the application genus as of an essential attribute to some genus ; (2) the tion^to^b? axioms, on which the proof is based ^ ; (3) the under- Proved. lying genus, whose modifications or essential attri- butes are disclosed by the demonstration. Now where different genera, e.g., arithmetic and geo- metry, are involved, although the basis of proof may be the same, it is not possible to apply the arith- metical demonstration to the attributes of extended magnitudes, unless extended magnitudes are num- bers. '^ How transference is possible in some cases

quantitative. Normally the axioms are hi (Lv {cf. 76 b 10, 88 a 36 ff.). '^ For Aristotle they are not ; rf. Cat. 4 b 22 ff.




75 b

ivSex^rai iiri tivcjv, varepov Xe'^d'Tloerai. r) 8'

dptdfjLrjTLKr] oLTToSei^is del e;^et ro yevos Trepl o rj aTToSei^LS, Kal at aAAat ofjuoicos' iour t) aTrAcos" dvdyKT] TO avTO etvai ylvos r] nfj, el /xeAAet rj diro-

10 Sct^t? fiera^aiveiV' dXXcog 8' on dSvvarov SijXov CK yap rod avrov yevovs dvdyKrj rd aKpa Kal rd jLtecra etvat. €t ydp (jltj KaO^ avrd, ovpi^e^rjKora eorai. 8ta rovro rfj yecjofierpia ovk ean 8et^at on Tcov evavriiov /xta iTnoTiqiir], dXX ovh^ on ol hvo KV^OL Kv^os' ovh^ dXXr) eiTiaTriiirj to irepag, aAA' 'q

15 oaa ovTCxis ^x^i irpos dXX7]Xa ioar elvai Odrepov vtto ddrepoVy olov rd oTrrtAco, Trpos yeajfierpiav Kal rd dpfJiovLKd TTpos dpidfirjnK'rjv. ovS* el n virdpx^i rat? ypafipials pLrj fj ypajJLjJLal Kal fj eK rcJov dpxa>v rojv Ihiwv, olov el KaXXtarrj rcov ypajjifjicov rj evdela

20 rj el evavrio)? e;j(et rfj 7Tepi(j)epeia' ov ydp fj ro lSlov yevo? avrcov VTrapx^t, aAA' fj kolvov n.

VIII. (^avepov 8e /<:at edv (Loiv at rrpordaeig KadoXov ef 60V o GvXXoyLGfxog, on dvdyKT] Kal ro GVpLTrepaafJia d'tSiov etvai rrjs roiavriqs drrohei^eajg Kal rrJ9 aTrXcos elTretv dTToSel^ecos. ovk eanv dpa

25 dTToSeL^LS rcov (j)9aprcov ouS' einorrip.r] ctTrAcDs", aAA' ovrats a)G7Tep /caret avfJL^e^rjKoSy on ov KaOoXov avrov eanv dXXd TTore Kal rro)?. orav 8' fj, dvdyKTj rr]v erepav [jltj KadoXov elvat irporauiv Kal (j)daprijv.

« 76 a 9 if., 78 b 34 ff. ^ In the case of subaltern sciences.

" The reference is to cube numbers ; cf. Euclid, Elementa ix. 4.



will be explained later/* Arithmetical demonstration always keeps to the genus which is the subject of the demonstration, and similarly with all other sciences. Thus the genus must be the same, either absolutely or in some respect,^ if the demonstration is to be transferable. Clearly this is impossible in any other way ; the extreme and middle terms must belong to the same genus ; if the connexion is not essential it must be accidental. This is why we cannot prove by geometry that contraries are studied by the same science, nor even that the product of two cubes is a cube. '^ Nor can a proposition of one science be proved by another science, except when the relation is such that the propositions of the one are subordinate to those of the other, as the propositions of optics are subordinate to geometry and those of harmonics to arithmetic. Nor can geometry decide whether a given attribute applies to lines otherwise than qua lines and derived from their own peculiar principles, e.g., whether the straight line is the most beautiful of lines, or whether it is the contrary of the curved ; for these attributes apply to lines not in virtue of their peculiar genus, but in virtue of a characteristic com- mon to other genera.

VIII. It is also evident that if the premisses of the Only syllogism are universal, the conclusion of a demon- nSns^Sn stration of this kind — demonstration in the strict ^^ demon- sense — must be eternal. Hence of connexions that are not eternal, there is no demonstration or know- ledge in the strict sense, but only in the accidental sense that the attribute belongs to the subject not universally but at a given time or under given con- ditions. When this is so, the minor premiss must be non-eternal and non-universal : non-eternal because



75 b

^^apTT^y fiev on Kal^ ro aujitTTepaa/xa ovarj?, [xr] KadoXov 8e on tCo" /xev ecrrat to) Se ou/c earac e^*

30 cov, tocrre ou/c ecrn ovWoyiuaoOaL KaOoXov, aAA' ort vvv. ofioLOJS 8' e;)^et /cat Trept opiaixovs, eTretVep eo-riv o opLOfios tj dpxv OLTToSet^eaJs rj aTTohei^Lg 6€G€L oia<j)epovGa r^ ovixTTepaopid n aTTohei^ecos . at 8e Toiv TToAAa/cts" yiyvofidvcov aTTohei^eis kol eVt- arrjixaL, olov aeXi^vrjs eVAete/f ecus', 8'^Aov ort tiJ jLtev

35 TotouS'^ eloLV, del, eloiv, fj 8' ovk det, /caret fMepos

elalv. oiOTT^p 8' T^ €KXenpL9y (hoavTOJS rols dXXois.

IX. 'ETTet 8€ (f)av€p6v on eKaurov a7ro8etfat ouk:

€Gnv aAA' t) ex: rcov cKdarov dpx^ov, dv to SeLKVv-

fievov VTTdpxjj f) eKelvo, ovk eon ro eTrtcrracr^at

40 rovTO, dv i^ dXr]da)v /cat ava7ro8et/CT60v SeuxOi] /cat dfjieowv. ecrrt yap ovro) 8et^at, woTrep Bpvoojv tov rerpayajVLOTfJiov. /caret kolvov re yap 8et/cvuouo-tv ot TOLOVTOL Xoyoi, o /Cat irepoj vrrdp^ei' 8to /cat

76 a ctt' aAAcov icjiappLorrovoLV ol Aoyot ou CTuyyevcov.

ou/couv ou;^ ^ e/cetvo eTTtWarat, dAAa /card CTU/xjSe- ^TjKos' ov yap dv icfyi^ppiOTTev rj d7ro8et^t? /cat e7r* dAAo yevos".

••^ Kat] eo-rai Kai n, Ross.

2 Toi . . . Toi Ci : TO . . . TO C2 n : 4; . . . tS ABd.

^ ToiouS' B, Philoponus : (/u,€V)toi ou8' A : ToiaiS' C : alii alia.

« If the minor premiss stated an eternal connexion the conclusion M^ould also be eternal.

^ Cf. Book II, ch. X.

  • What Bryson actually tried to prove is not clear (though

the attempt is also described — guardedly — as ' squaring the circle ' in Soph. Elench. 171 b 16, 172 a 3); but he seems to have used the comparative areas of inscribed and circum- scribed figures, whether squares or polygons. The objection, however,- is to his ' sophistical ' method of starting from a



only so will the conclusion also be non-eternal,^ and non-universal because the conclusion will be true in some cases but not in others, and so cannot be proved to be true universally, but only at a given time. Similarly too with respect to definitions, inasmuch as a definition is either a starting-point of demon- stration, or a demonstration in a different form, or a conclusion of a demonstration.^ It is clear that demonstration and knowledge of intermittent events, such as an eclipse of the moon, are eternal in so far as they refer to events of a specific kind ; but in so far as they are not eternal, they are particular. Attributes may apply intermittently to other subjects just as an eclipse does to the moon.

IX. Since it is evidently impossible to demonstrate The pre- the application of a particular attribute as such to its S^monstra- subiect except from the first principles proper to its tionmust genus, scientific knowledge does not consist in proof to their own from principles which are merely true, indemonstrable ^^^^'^®' and immediate. I say this because one can conduct a proof in this way, just as Bryson, for example, proved his theory of squaring the circle ^ ; for such arguments prove the conclusion by using a common middle term which will refer equally to a different subject ; hence they are also applicable to subjects of other genera. Thus they enable us to know the attribute as applying to its subject not qua itself but only accidentally ; otherwise the demonstration M'ould not be applicable to another genus also.

general postulate of the form ' Things which are both greater than the same < set of > things and less than the same < set of > tilings are equal to one another ' (obviously invalid, by the way, unless the two sets taken together exhaust all the possi- bilities) instead of a geometrical axiom. See Heath, Greek Mathematics^ I. 223-225 ; Mathematics in Aristotle^ 48-50. D 65


76 a ^

"^Kaarov 8' eTrtCTra/xe^a [xr] Kara ovfJi^e^r^Kos,

5 orav Kar cKelvo yiyvcoGKajfiev KaO^ o vnapx^i, iK

rcov apx^v t'ojv eKeivov fj €Kelvo, olov to hvolv

opOals Lcras ^X^^^> 4* virapx^i KaO^ avro ro elprj-

jLteVov, eK Tchv apx^v rcJov rovrov. cocrr' €t Kad^

avro KdK€iVo vTrdpx^i (h vnapx^L, dvayKt) ro pieaov

10 ev rfj avrfj avyyeveia elvai. el Se {jltj, dW cLg rd appLovLKa 8t' dpidpL,rirLKr]s. rd Se rotavra SeuKvvraL /xey woavrco? , Stacj^epei St'* ro ptev yap on irepa? iTTLcrr'ijpL'qg (ro yap VTTOKeipievov yevog erepov), ro Se Stort rrjs dva>, 97? Kad^ avrd rd TTadr] eariv. oiGre KoX eK rovrcov (fyavepov on ovk eonv drrohel-

15 ^at eKaorov drrXo)?, dXX ri eK rcov eKaorov dp^f^V' dWd rovrwv at dp^al exovoL rd kolvov.

Et he (jiavepdv rovro, ^avepdv Kal on ovk ean rds eKaorov ISlas dpxd? aTToSet^at- eoovr ai ydp eKelvai drrdvroiv dpxoih Kal eTTiariqpLri rj eKeivojv Kvpia rravrajv. Kal ydp errLoraraL p^aXXov 6 eK rcov

20 dvcorepov^ alrlcov elScog' eK rcov nporepcov ydp otSev orav eK pbrj alnarcov elSfj alricov. cScrr* el fjidXXov oiSe Kal (judXiara, Kav eTnarrjiJLr) eKeivq e'lrj Kal pidXXov Kal p^dXtora. rj 8' a.7roSet^t? ovk ecftap- pLorreL err* dXXo yevo£, aAA' rj cog etprjrai at yeco-

^ dvcorepcov AM : dvcorepo} B^.

« The middle term, subject of the major, predicate of the minor premiss.

^ e.g.t Plato's dialectic, which Aristotle repudiates. " 75 b 14 ff., 76 a 9 ff.



Our knowledge of any given attribute is only non- accidental when we recognize it in respect of the subject in virtue of which it is an attribute, and from the principles proper to that subject as such ; e.g., the attribute of " having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles " as belonging to the subject to which it applies per se, and from the principles proper to this subject. Therefore if this latter term ^ applies per se to its own subject, the middle must belong to the same genus as the extreme terms. The only except in exceptions are such as the propositions of harmonics sJjbaUern ^ which are proved by arithmetic. Such propositions sciences. are proved in the same way, but with this difference ; that while the fact proved belongs to a different science (for the subject genus is different), the grounds of the fact belong to the superior science, to which the attributes belong per se. Thus it is evident from these considerations also that absolute demonstration of any attribute is impossible except from its own principles. In the examples just given, however, the principles have a common element.

If this is evident, it is evident also that the special Hence the principles of each genus cannot be demonstrated ; pSipies for the principles from which they would be demon- of the strable would be principles of all existing things, and Se'mcm^^^ the science of those principles would be supreme over strable. all.^ For a man knows a fact in a truer sense if he knows it from more ultimate causes, since he knows it from prior premisses when he knows it from causes which are themselves uncaused. Thus if he knows in a truer or the truest sense, his knowledge will be science in a truer or the truest sense. However, demonstration is not applicable to a different genus, except as we have explained '^ that geometrical proofs




76 a

fierpiKal inl ras iJLiq')(aviKa? r^ otttikcl^ kol at

25 dpidfjLrjTLKal iirl ras apiioviKas .

XaAcTTOv 8' ecrrt to yvchvai et olhev 'q fjirj. ^aAe- TTov yap TO yvayvai el e/c rtov eKaarov ap)((x)v Icrpiev 7) p/Tj' oTTep €orl TO elSevac. olopeda 8', av ep^co/xev

€^ OlXtjOlVCOV TLVcbv GvXKoyiOp.6v Koi TTpWTOJV, €Tt[-

30 OTaadaL. to 8' ovk eoTLV, dXXa ovyyevrj Set etvat


X. Aeyco 8' ap^^as" ev eKaoTcp yeVet TavTas dg OTL ecrrt ju-t) eV8e;^CTat 8etfat. rt /xev ow orjp^aLveL Kal TO, TTpaJTa kol ra eV toutcdv, Xapb^dveTai, ort 8' ecrrt, ras" />tev dpxds dvdyKiq Aa/x^avetv, ra 8*

35 d'AAa heiKvvvaLy olov tl piovds "^ rt to eu^u Kal Tpi- yojvov elvai 8e ttjv fiev piovdha Xa^elv Kal pbeyedo?, Ta 8' €T€pa SeLKvvvai.

"Ectti 8' CUV ;)^/3a>VTat ev Tats" a7ro8et/<:Tt/<:ats' iTnoT'q- puais TO. p,€V t8ta eKaaTrjg iiriOTripris Ta 8e KOLvd, KOLvd 8e /caT* dvaAoytav, eTret ;)^p7yCTt/xdv ye ooov ev

40 TOJ VTTO TT7V €7TiGTrjpir]v y€V€L. t8ta jLtev otov ypap.pir)v etvai TOiavSty Kal to evdv, KOivd 8e olov to toa diro laojv av a(j)iXrj otl toa Ta Xonrd. iKavov 8' eKaoTov 7Bh TOVTCOV doov iv tco yeVet- TauTO yap TrotTyoet, Kav p,r] KaTa rrdvTOiv Xd^r) dAA' inl pieyedojv piovov, tco 68


apply to the propositions of mechanics or optics, and arithmetical proofs to those of harmonics.

It is difficult to be certain whether one knows or not ; for it is difficult to be certain whether our know- ledge is based upon the principles appropriate to each case — it is this that constitutes true knowledge —or not. We suppose that we have scientific know- ledge if we draw an inference from any true and primary premisses, but it is not so ; the inference must be homogeneous with the primary truths of the science.

X. I call " first principles " in each genus those Every facts which cannot be proved. Thus the meaning assumes both of the primary truths and of the attributes certain demonstrated from them is assumed ; as for their ^""^^^ ^^' existence, that of the principles must be assumed, but that of the attributes must be proved. E.g., we assume the meaning of " unit," " straight " and " triangular " ; but while we assume the existence of the unit and geometrical magnitude, that of the rest must be proved.

Of the first principles used in the demonstrative which are sciences some are special to particular sciences, and fpe^^al to it, some are common ; but only in the analogical sense, or special

1. i.v 1 J. r -^ ' aspects of a

smce each is only to be employed in so tar as it is common contained in the genus which falls under the science P"ncipie. concerned. Special principles are such as that a line, or straightness, is of such-and-such a nature ; com- mon principles are such as that when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal. Each of these latter truths need only be assumed for the given genus. The effect will be the same for the geometri- cian if he assumes the truth not universally but only of magnitudes, and for the arithmetician if he assumes


76b ^ ^

S* dpid^rjTLKW 677* apidjjbcjv. eon 8' t8ta jiev koI a XajJL^dveraL etvat, rrepl d rj imarrijiJLr] decopel rd 5 VTrdpxovra Ka9* avrd, otov fiovdSas r) dpLdfJLTjriK'q, rj 8e yecofjierpLa crT^/xeta Kal ypafifidg. ravra ydp XafjLpdvovGL TO etvai Kal roSl etvai. rd Se tovtcov Trddr] Kad* avrd, ri (lev crrjpiaLveL e/cacrrov, XajJL^d- vovGLV, olov 7} fjiev dpidfjLrjrLKr] rt Trepirrdv '^ dpnov 7J rerpdyojvov rj kv^os, t) Se yewpierpia ri to dXoyov

10 ri rd KCKXdodai rj veveiv, on 8' eon SeLKi'vovai Sid re TCJV Koivcjv /cat €k tcov diroheheiypievojv. Kal tj dorpoXoyia (hoavrays.

Yidua ydp diroSeiKnKrj eTnGrrjpr] rrepl rpia iartv, ocra T€ elvai riderai {ravra 8' lorl rd yevos, ov rcov Ka9^ avrd Tradrjpdrcov earl deojprjnKij), Kal rd KOLvd Aeyo/xeva d^Lwpara, i^ Sv irpcorcov aTToOeiK-

15 vvGL, Kal rpirov rd Trddrj, Sv ri (TT^/xatVet cKaarov Xap^dvec. ivias pevroL imarT^pa? ovSev KwXvei evia rovrcov napopdv, olov rd yivos pr] vTroriOeodai etvac dv fj (jyavepov on eanv {ov ydp opoiojs SrjXov on dpiOpos €on Kal on ipvxpov Kal Oeppov), Kal

20 TO, TTadrj prj Xap^dvetv ri oiqpaiveL dv rj SrjXa' a)G7T€p ov8e rd KOivd ov Xap^dvet ri orjpaivec ro t'cra ajTO 'iacnv dcfyeXelv, on yvajpipov. dXX ovhev rjrrov rfj ye (f)VG€i rpia ravra eon, rrepl o re SeiK- vvGL Kal a SeiKvvGL Kal e^ wv.

OvK eon 8' VTTodeGLS ovh^ airrjpa d dvdyKrj elvai 8t* avro Kal hoKelv dvayKT). ov ydp rrpds rdv

" vcveiv is used technically of a straight line's tending, when produced, to pass through a given point. The term is unimportant and scarcely appropriate here ; I suggest a more general sense.

  • They are common only by analogy ; cf. 75 a 38. Ross

compares Met. 1005 a 20 to. eV rdls ixadrj^aai KaXovfxeva d^iio-



it only of numbers. Also special to each science are those subjects whose existence it assumes, and whose essential attributes it studies, as arithmetic studies units and geometry points and lines. Of these sub- jects both the existence and the meaning are as- sumed ; but of their essential attributes only the meaning is assumed. E.g., arithmetic assumes the meaning of odd or even or square or cube, and geo- metry that of incommensurable or of deflection or inclination « ; but their existence is proved by means of the common principles and from conclusions already demonstrated. The same is true of astronomy.

Every demonstrative science is concerned with Thus there three things : the subjects which it posits (i.e., the Sd?o? genus whose essential attributes it studies), the so- primary called ^ common axioms upon which the demonstra- though not tion is ultimately based, and thirdly the attributes gxnyj.^t\y ® whose several meanings it assumes. There is no assumed, reason, however, why certain sciences should not dis- regard some of these three things ; e.g., omit to posit the existence of the genus if its existence is evident (for the existence of number is not so obvious as that of hot and cold), or to assume the meaning of the attributes if it is quite clear ; just as in the case of the common principles the meaning of" when equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal " is not assumed, because it is well known. Nevertheless there holds good this natural threefold division into the subject, the object, and the basis of demonstration.

That v/hich is in itself necessarily true and must be Axioms, thought to be so is not a hypothesis nor a postulate ; anJ^pS-

lates. ixara. If the term was generally accepted by mathema- ticians in Aristotle's time, it was abandoned by Euclid.



76 b

25 €^a) Xoyov Tj a77o8etf IS", dAAa rrpos tov ev rfj ^vxfj, inel ovSe avWoyiafio?. del yap euriv ivorrjvai TTpos rov €^(jj Xoyov, dXkd rrpos rov euo) Xoyov ovk dei. oaa puev ovv Set/era ovra Xafi^dvei avrog fxrj Setfas", raur', idv fxev SoKovvra Xafi^avr] rco [xav- ddvovTLy VTroTiderai, /cat eWtv ovx aTrXcog virodeaLS

30 aAAa TTpos iK€Lvov fjLOVov, dv Se tj jLti^Se/xtas' ivovarjs So^Tjs 7j Kal evavrtas" ivovarj? Xafji^dvr) to avro, atretrat. Kal rovrcp hia(j)ip€L VTTodeGLS Kal atrrjixa' eon yap airrnxa to virevavTcov tov piavOdvovTos ttj So^T), Tj o dv Ti9 drroSeiKTOv ov Xap.pdvrj Kal xP'^'^oll jjiT] 8et|^as".

35 Ot piev ovv opoL OVK €lgIv v7To9eG€LS (ovSev^ yap etvai t) fjir] elvai XeyeTat^), aAA' ev rats" TrpoTdaeaiv at vTTodeoeis. tovs 8* dpovs fiovov ^vvUodaL 8et' TOVTO 8* ovx y'^ddeoLSy el p^rj Kal to dKoveiv vtto- deoiv Tis (jiTjoeiev elvai, dXX doiov ovtojv tco eKelva elvai yiyveTai to (jvpLTrepaorpLa. oi)8' o yea>p,eTp7]s

40 ipevSrj VTTOTideTai, oyuirep Tives e<f)aGav, XeyovTes (hs ov hei TCp ifjevSec XPV^^^^> '^^^ ^^ yecjpLeTpiqv ifjevhe- adai XeyovTa Trohiaiav ttjv ov Trohiaiav tj evdelav

77 a TTjv yeypapLpievrjv ovk evdeXav ovoav. 6 8e yewpce-

Tpr]g ovSev ovpLTrepaiveTai to) Tiqvhe elvai ypapLpuj^v rjv avTOS e^deyKTai, dXXd to, 8ta tovtojv hrjXovpieva.

^ ovhkv ABdn, Philoponus : ouSe B^C. ^ Ross : Aeyovrat.

" The axioms used in demonstration appeal directly to the inner reason and are accepted by it, but the assumptions of spoken argument or instruction are always open to verbal objection.

  • > There is perhaps a reference to the narrower sense of

hypothesis given in 72 a 18 ff.

<= I doubt whether " two definitions of atriy/xa are offered " 72


for demonstration, like syllogism, is concerned not with external but with internal discourse ; and it is always possible to object to the former, but not always possible to do so to the latter.'* Thus any provable proposition that a teacher assumes without proving it, if the student accepts it, is a hypothesis — a hypothesis not absolutely but relatively to the stu- dent ^ ; but the same assumption, if it is made when the student has no opinion or a contrary opinion about it, is a postulate. This is the difference between a hypothesis and a postulate ; the latter is the contrary of the student's opinion, or any provable proposition that is assumed and used without being proved.^

Definitions are not hypotheses, because they make Deflnition no assertion of existence or non-existence. Hypo- gSg^he'd theses have their place among propositions, whereas from hypo- definitions only need to be understood ; and this does not constitute a hypothesis, unless it is claimed that listening is a kind of hypothesis.*^ Hypotheses consist of assumptions from which the conclusion follows in virtue of their being what they are. Thus the geometrician's hypotheses are not false, as some have maintained, saying that one should not make use of falsehood, and that the geometrician is guilty of falsehood in asserting that the line which he has drawn is a foot long, or straight, when it is not ; the geometrician does not infer anything from the exist- ence of the particular line which he himself has men- tioned, but only from the facts which his diagrams

here, as Ross concludes. What Aristotle appears to say is that any provable but unproved assumption is a postulate unless it is accepted by the respondent, when it becomes (relatively to him) a hypothesis.

    • If the qualification is not entirely sarcastic it may hint

that listening implies some degree of acceptance.



77 a ^

en TO airrjixa kol VTrodecrt? rrdaa rj cos" oXov 'q cLs iv fJLepet, ol 8' opoi ovSerepov tovtojv. 5 XI. EI'St] p,ev ovv etvai rj ev n irapa ra iroXXa ovK avdyKiq, el aTToSet^ts" eurai, elvai fxevroi ev Kara TToXkcbv dXrjdeg elTxelv dvdyKTj' ov yap eorai TO KadoXov dv fXTj rovTO fj- edv Se to KadoXov jxr) fj, TO pLeaov OVK eoTai, cocrr* ouS' aTToSet^ts". Sei dpa TL ev Kal to avTO enl rrXeiovajv etvai firj ofxco- vvfjbov}

10 To Se (jLTj evSex^crdai dfia (j)dvai Kal diro^dvai ouSe/xta XafjL^dvet ciTroSet^ts" aAA* 'q edv Serj Bet^at Kal TO (JvpLTTepaGfjua ovtojs. SeiKVVTai he Xa^ovai TO TTpcJjTov KaTa Tov fJLeGov oTi dXrjdes, diro^dvai S' OVK dXrjdes. to 8e fjueaov ovSev 8ta0epet etvau Kal

15 (JLTj etvac Xa^elvy cos" 8' avTOJS Kal to TpiTOV. el yap eSodr] Kad' ov dvOpojirov dXiqOes elTreiv — el Kal pirj dvQpcDTTov dXrjdes, aAA* el fjiovov dvOpconov — l,ipov etvai, fXT] ^(pov 8e p.-q, eWat [yap]^ dXrjde? elneiv KaAAtav, el Kal p.rj KaAAtav, dpicos ^coov, p,rj ^cpov 8' ov. aiTiov 8' OTi TO rrpaJTOV ov piovov KaTa tov

20 peaov XeyeTai dXXd Kal Krar' aAAof 86a. to etvai errl TrXeiovcov, wgt ovV el to pieoov Kal axno ecrt Kal purj avTOy TTpds to avpLTTepaapia ovhev hia^epei.

^ eihT] fiev ovv . . . ofxiovvfjiov ad 83 a 35 transponenda ci. Ross. ^ seclusit Ross.

« Cf. An. Pr. 49 b 35, Met. 1078 a 20.

  • Aristotle's objection to the Platonic Forms is that they

exist independently of particulars, whereas his own univer- sals are abstractions. The paragraph seems to be displaced. Ross would transfer it to 83 a 35.

" Because the middle must be distributed in at least one premiss.



illustrate.* Further, all postulates and hypotheses are either universal or particular, whereas definitions are neither.

■^y XI. It is not necessary, in order to make demon- pemonstra- stration possible, that there should be Forms or some universais. One apart from the Many ^ ; but it is necessary that ^j^it not it should be true to state a single predicate of a plurality of subjects. Otherwise there will be no universal term ; and if there is no universal there will be no middle term,^ and hence no demonstration. Therefore there must be something which is one and the same above the several particulars, and does not merely share a common name with them.'^

No demonstration makes use of the principle that How de- simultaneous assertion and negation are impossible, U^esfhe*'*^" unless it is required to prove the conclusion also in Lawof Cou- this form.^ The proof is effected by assuming that it is true to assert and not true to deny the first term of the middle. It makes no difference to add the negation of the contradictory to the middle or to the third term. For if it is granted that whatever is truly called " man " is truly called an animal — even if

    • not-man " is also truly called an animal, provided

only that it is true that man is an animal, and not true that he is not an animal — it will be true to call Callias an animal even if it is true to call not- Callias an animal, and it will not be true to call him not-animal. The reason for this is that the first term is stated not only of the middle but also of another term or terms, because it has a wider extension ; so that even if the middle term is both itself and its contradictory the conclusion is unaffected.

^ Sc, without sharing their common character.

  • In the form " C is A and not not- A."



77 a

To 8' airav (fxivau t] dirocfxivaL rj els to dSuvarov

aTroSetftS" XafjL^dvei, Koi ravra ouS* aet KadoXov, aAA' oaov LKavov, LKavov S' inl rod yevovs. Xeyco

25 8* eTTL rod yevovs otov rrepl o yevos rds dirohei^eLS (j)epei, cjOTTep e'lprjrai koL rrporepov.

^^TTLKOLvajvovai Se Trdaai at eTTiorrjiiaL dWrjXais Kara rd Koivd {Koivd Se Xeyoj ols ;\;/3cDvTat ws eK TOVTCxJV diToSeLKVvvTes , dAA' ov nepl Sv SeLKvvovaiv ouS' o SeLKVvovai) , Kal 7] SiaXeKriKrj irduais, kol el

30 TL£ KadoXov TTeipcpTO SeLKvvvaL rd Koivd, otov on dnav (f)dvaL t) d7TO(f)dvaL, 'q on tcra 0.770 lgcov, t] rcJov roLovrojv drra. ri 8e BiaXeKnKrj ovk eonv ovrws ajpLupLevojv nvojv, ovhe yevovs nvds evos. ov ydp dv Tjpwra' dTroSeiKVvvra ydp ovk eonv ipojrdv Sid ro rcjv dvnKecfjievcov dvrcov fir) heiKvvodai ro avro.

35 SeSeiKrai Se rovro ev roXs nepl avXXoyiGpiov.

XII. Et he rd avro eonv epcorrjfxa avXXoyiGnKov Kal TTporaoLS dvn(f)dGea)s , TTpordoeis 8e Kad* eKaa-

« 76 a 42.

^ The reference is probably to An. Pr. 57 b 4 fF. Dialectic proceeds by interrogation, giving the opponent an open choice between opposite answers, either of which it is pre- pared to attack. Science is concerned with the proof of facts ; and since the same conclusion cannot be correctly inferred from opposite data, the " questions " of science offer no real choice, because only the right answer will furnish a true premiss for the required proof.

" I3y " syllogistic question " Aristotle means the interro- gative form of an affirmative or negative premiss from which it is proposed to draw a scientific conclusion. Since (as we



The law that either the assertion or the negation and the Law of every predicate must be true is used in demonstra- Middle. tion by reductio ad impossibile. It is not always applied universally, but only so far as is sufficient, i.e., in reference to the genus. By " in reference to the genus " I mean, e.g., as regards the genus which is the subject of the demonstrations in question, as we have observed above. '^

All the sciences share with one another in the use All the of the common principles. By " common principles " Ind^dia- I mean what they use for the purpose of demonstra- ^g^g^^^^e^^' tion, not the subjects about which they conduct their common proofs, nor the connexions which they prove. Dia- ^^^^o"^^- lectic shares the principles of all the other sciences ; and so too would any science which might attempt to prove universally the common principles, e.g., that either the assertion or the negation of every pre- dicate is true, or that equals subtracted from equals leave equal remainders, or any other axioms of this kind. But dialectic has no sphere thus defined, nor j^ is it concerned with any one class of objects. If it IP were, it would not proceed by interrogation ; for interrogation is impossible in demonstration, since the opposite facts do not allow proof of the same result. This has been explained in my treatise on the syllogism.^

XII. If a syllogistic question is the same as a Every proposition stating one half of a contradiction,^ and -^^^ proper every science has its own premisses from which are qviestions.

have seen) only the right answer will serve, Ross regards epioTTjfia as meaning " assumption " in this chapter. But Aristotle seems (to judge from the context and the examples quoted below) to be thinking of discussion rather than formal

» demonstration, so that the normal sense should perhaps be preferred. 77


77 a

rr)v i7TLaTrifxy]v i^ cLv 6 GvXkoyiafxo? 6 Kad^ iKdGTr]v ,

€L7] av n €pcoTr)f.La irridrTjijiovLKov, cf cov o KaO*

40 iKOLGTrjv oLK€Los yiyverai GvXXoyLUfios. SrjXov dpa

on ov TTav ipwrrjjjLa ycajfierpiKov dv etr] ouS' larpi-

llhKOVy ofioicos 8e Kal irrl rcov dXXojv dXX i^ tSv^

heucvvrai n Trepl cav rj yecopLerpta eoriv, r^ d^ e/c

Tojv avTCx)V SeiKvvraL rfj yecoiierpia, cooTrep rd ott-

TLKa. ofJiOLCjg Se Kal iirl rcov dXXcov. Kal Trepl

fiev TOVTOJv Kal Xoyov v^eKreov eV rcov yeaJixerpiKcov

5 dpxd)V Kal GVfJLTTepaGpLaTOJV, Trepl Be rcov dpx^JV

Xoyov ovx V(j>eKTeov rep yeajfjuerpy] fj yeajfierpr^s'

opLOLCOs 8e Kal eTrl rcov dXXcov eTTLGrrj pLcbv .

Ovre TTov dpa eKaarov eTTLarrjiJLova epcjorrjpia epto- rrjreov, ovd* dTrav rd epwrdofjievov dTTOKpireov Trepl eKaarov y dXXd rd Kard rrjv eTnariqpiriv SiopiaOevra. 10 el 8e ScaXe^erau yeajfjuerprj fj yeojjji€rp7]5 ovrcjs, (jyavepov on Kal KaXchs, edv €K rovrcov n SeLKVvr)' el 8e jJL'q, ov KaXcJS. SrjXov S' on ovS^ eXeyxet yecojJLerpiqv dAA* r^ Kard GVfif^e^rjKos' cocrr* ovk dv e'lT] ev dyeojpLerpiqrois Trepl yewfierplag StaXeKreov X'qGeL ydp 6 (f)avXa>s SiaXeyopievog. opioiojs 8e Kal 15 €771 rcxiv dXXixiv ex^t, eTTLGrrjpLcbv.

'E7T€t 8' ean yecjpierpiKd epcorripiara, dp* ecrrt Kal dyeaypierprira; Kal Trap* eKaGriqv eTTLGnqpL'qv rd Kard rrjV dyvoiav rrjV TToiav^ yecofierpiKa

1 Jiv -q ABCd. 2 oin. ABCM.

^ TToiav A^, Philoponus : ttoluv.

« Because the principles of a science are assumed, not proved, by that science.




drawn the conclusions proper to that science, then there must be a scientific question corresponding to the premisses from which the conclusions proper to science are drawn. Hence it is clear that not every question will be geometrical (or medical, and similarly with the other sciences), but only those which corre- spond to the grounds for the proof of geometrical theorems, or the theorems of any science, such as optics, which uses for its proofs the same axioms as geometry (and similarly with the other sciences). Of these questions the geometrician must give an ac- count, based upon the principles and conclusions of geometry ; but he need not, as a geometrician, ac- count for the principles « (and similarly with the other sciences).

Hence we must not ask every question of each individual expert, nor is the expert bound to answer everything that is asked him about each given sub- ject, but only such questions as fall within the scope of his own science. If in arguing with a geometrician qua geometrician one argues by proving any given point from geometrical principles, evidently he will be arguing properly ; otherwise he will not. It is clear also that in the latter case one cannot refute a geometrician, except accidentally.^ Therefore one should not discuss geometry among people who are not geometricians, because they will not recognize an unsound argument. The same applies to all other sciences.

Since there are geometrical questions, are there Sources of also ungeometrical questions ? In any given science Sentiflc {e.g. geometry), what sort of ignorance is it that reasoning.

  • Because qua geometrician he can only be refuted by a

geometrical argument.



77 b

ioTiv ;^ Koi TTorepov 6 Kara ttjv ayvoiav avWoyio-

20 yios 6 eV T(x)v avTiK€LfJiivojv crvXXoyLGfios, rj 6^ irapa- XoyiGjJios, Kara yeoj/JLerpiav 8e; rj i^ dXXrjs Tex^yjs, OLOV ro jJLOVGiKOV iariv ipwrrjjjia dyecofJLerp'qrov TTcpl yeojixerpias, ro Se rag TrapaXX^Xovs GvpLTTi- rrreiv oteadai yecopierpLKov ttojs Kal dyecojJLerprjrov dXXov rpoTTov; hirrov yap rovro, waTrep ro dppvd-

25 fiov, Kal ro fjuev erepov dyecjjJLerprjrov rep pLTj €)(€lv [cocTTTe/) ro dppv9p.ov],^ ro S' erepov rep (fyavXojg ex^LV Kal T] dyvoia avrr] Acat* rj eK rojv roLovrcuv dp)(cJL)v evavria. ev 8e rots' jJLaOrjpiacyLV ovk eanv ofJLOLCjos 6 TrapaXoyLorp^og , on ro pieoov iorrlv del ro^ Sirrov Kara re yap rovrov rravrog, Kal rovro irdXiv

30 K-ar* dXXov Xeyerai uavrog- ro 8e KarrjyopovfjLevov ov Xeyerai irdv. ravra 3' eorlv olov opdv ri] vorjaei, ev Se roLS Xoyocg XavOdvei. dpa rrds kvkXo? (j)(i]pLa; dv Se ypdijjrj, StJAov. ri Se; rd eTTT] kvkXo^; (j)ave- pov on OVK eonv.

Ov Set 8' evoraoiv elg avro (fyepeiv ev fj^ rj rrpo-

^ eartv /cat dyecofierprjTa f : iaxLV •>} dy€0}fJL4Tpr]Ta Bekker.

2 6 om. Cn. ^ secl. Mure.

  • Kal om. Aldina, Bekker. ^ om. CM.
  • eV •§ ci. Ross, leg. fort. comm. : dv fj.

« i.e. relevant although mistaken. A " question " may be (a) proper to a given science, but " ignorant " because based (1) on false premisses or (2) false inference from true premisses, or (6) proper to a quite different science.

^ Cf. Met. 1022 b 35.



makes questions still geometrical ? ** Is an ignorant conclusion one which is drawn from premisses oppo- site to the true ones, or an inference which though invalid is nevertheless geometrical ? Or is it an inference drawn from a different science, as, e.g., a musical question is ungeometrical with reference to geometry, while to think that parallel lines meet is in a sense geometrical, although in another sense ungeometrical ? (For " ungeometrical," like " un- rhythmical," has two senses ; in one sense a thing is ungeometrical because it lacks the quality altogether, and in another sense because it possesses the quality but slightly.^) It is ignorance in this latter sense, i.e., ignorance which proceeds from premisses of this kind,^ which is contrary to scientific knowledge. In mathematics formal invalidity is not so common, because it is always the middle term that provides the ambiguity (for one term is predicated of all the middle, and this in turn is predicated of all another, but the predicate is not distributed ^) ; and in mathe- matics middle terms are clearly visualized whereas ambiguities pass unnoticed in dialectical argument. " Is every circle a figure ? " If one draws a circle the answer is obvious. " Well, are the epic poems * a circle ? " Evidently they are not.

One should not meet an argument with an objec- Objections

" Exhibiting defective knowledge of the right science.

    • Aristotle is thinking of a syllogism in Barbara, the only

figure useful for demonstration.

  • The Epic Cycle was the name given to a sequence of

early epic poems which, supplementing the Iliad and Odyssey^ narrated the whole story of the Trojan War (and perhaps also the legends connected with Thebes). To call this " cycle " a " circle " would be an absurd quibble, although the words are the same in Greek.



77 b

35 raais eVa/crt/CTy . cjGTrep yap ovSe Trporaals eoriv

ri jjirj ioTLV eTTi TxAetovcov {ov yap ecrrat eVi ttolvtojv, €K Tcbv KadoXov S' o ovWoyLOfJios) , SrjXov on oi58' evoTaois. at avral yap TrpordoeLS /cat ivGrdaeLS' rjv yap ^epet evoraoiv, avrrj yivoir av Trporaais '^ dTToSeiKTLKrj rj SiaXeKriK'^. 40 SujLtjSatVet 8' iviovs dcrvWoyiGrcos Xeyeiv hid to Xafji^dvcLV dfjLcf)or€poiS rd eTTOfieva, otov Kal 6

78 a Katveu? Trotet, dri to TTvp iv rfj TroXXarrXaoia dva-

Xoyia- Kal ydp ro TTvp raxv yevvdrai, a)s (f>r]GL, Kal avrrj rj dvaXoyia. ovrco 8' ovk eon avXXoyiojxos' dXX €i rfj Ta)(Larr) dvaXoyia erreraL rj noXXaTrXd- 5 GLOS Kal rep TTvpl rj ra)(L(JTrj iv rfj Kivrjoei dvaXoyia. iviore jxev ovv ovk €vhi-)(€Tai ovXXoyiaaodat ck rcJov €lXrjiJLp€va)Vy ore 8' ivSex^rat, dAA* ovx dparai.

Et 8' rjv dh-uvarov eK ifjevhovs dXrjdes 8et^at,

pdhiov dv rjv to dvaXveiv dvT€GTp€cf}€ ydp av i^

dvdyKrjs. eoTOJ ydp to A ov tovtov 8' ovtos TaSl

10 eanv, d otBa otl ccrrtv, otov to B. eK tovtwv dpa

hei^oj OTL eoTLV eKelvo. dvTiGTpe^ei 8e puaXXov rd

<» For " objections " see An. Pr. 69 a 37 fF. There par- ticular objections are admitted as logically possible ; here they are excluded because we are dealing with scientific demonstration, in which any objection must be capable of serving as premiss in a fresh proof. The reading adopted here seems to be that of the commentators and gives a better sense than the vulgate.

^ Sc. " as middles in the second figure," and undistributed middles at that. It is in fact a common type of paralogism. Aristotle goes on to show how the terms must be related to give a valid conclusion in the first figure. Caeneus may be the Lapith in Antiphanes' play of that name, but he may



tion in which the (minor) premiss is inductive." Just must not be as a premiss which does not hold good of more than one case is no true premiss (because it will not hold good of all cases, and syllogism proceeds from uni- versal judgements), so an objection of this nature is no true objection. Premisses and objections are the same, in that any objection which is brought may become a premiss, either demonstrative or dia- lectical.

We find that some persons argue fallaciously Paralogism through taking consequents of both terms ^ ; as second Caeneus does in maintaining that fire spreads in figure. geometrical progression, on the ground that both fire and this kind of progression increase rapidly. But with these conditions there is no syllogism ; only if the most rapid rate of increase implies geometrical proportion, and fire in its motion implies the most rapid rate of increase. Sometimes it is not possible to draw an inference from the assumptions ; some- times it is possible,^ but the method of procedure is overlooked.

If it were impossible to prove a true conclusion Error in the from false premisses,*^ analysis would be easy ; be- p^oblems?^ cause conclusion and premisses would necessarily reciprocate. Let A be a real fact, whose reality implies that of certain other facts, e.g., B, which I know to be real ; then from the latter I will prove the existence of A. Reciprocation is more usual in

equally well have been a real person, though unknown to us.

« If the major premiss is convertible.

<* But it is not : An. Pr. II. ii-iv. The analysis in question is the analysis of a problem, i.e. the discovery of the pre- misses necessary to prove a given conclusion. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1112 b20 flP.



78 a

ev Tols fxadi^fjiacnv, on ovSev ovfi^e^r^Kog XayL^d- vovoiv (dAAa Kal rovrcn 8ta<^epofcrt tojv ev rot? 8ta- XoyoLs) aAA' opiufJLov?.

Av^eraL 8' ov Sta tojv fxiowv, aAAa rco TrpooXafJi-

15 ^dv€LVy oloV TO A TOV B, TOVTO 8e TOU F, TTCtAtV

Tovro TOV A, /<:at tout' et? drreipov Kal elg to TrAaytoi', otov to A Kal Kara rod F Kal Kara rod E, otoy euTiv dpiOixos ttooos tj Kal aTreipos rovro c^' a> A, o TTepirros dpidpuos ttooos e^' ov B,

dpidpiOS TTCpLTTOS €(j>* OV F" €GTIV dpa TO A ACaTCt

20 TOV F . /<:at eoTLV 6 dpTios ttogos dpidpios icf)* ov A, 6 dpTios dpidpuos e^' ov E' gotlv dpa to A

/CaTO, TOt» E.

XIII. To 8* OTt Stacfyepet Kal to Slotl eTrioTaoBai, rrpoiTOV fiev ev ttj avTrj eTriGTiqpLr], Kal ev TavTr] hixcos, eva puev Tpoirov edv /jlt] 8t' dfieorcov yiyvqTai

25 o o-uAAoytCT/xos" [ov yap XapL^dverai to rrpcoTov atTLov, 7) 8e TOV Slotl eTnaTrjfMrj Kara to TrpdjTov aiTLOv), dXXov 8e el 8t' dfieawv /xeV, aAAd fxr] Std rod alriov dXXd TOJV dvT LOT pe^ovT ojv hid tov yvojpipLOJTepov . KOjXvec ydp ovSev twv dvTLKaTrjyopovjJLevojv yvoj- pipujjTepov etvai evioTe to firj a'lTLOv, iooT eoTai Std

30 TOVTOV rj diroSei^LS, olov otl eyyvs ol irXdvTjTeg Sid

TOV pLTj GTlX^eiV. eOTOJ ecf)^ (X) F 7TXdv7]Tes, €(f>* cL B

TO piTj OTiX^eiv, €(/)' (X) K TO iyyvs etvat. dXrjOes St] TO B Kara tov F eiTTelv ol ydp TvXdvrjTes ov gtCX- ^ovGLV. dXXd Kal TO A Kard tov B* to ydp fXTj

« Cf. 77 b 27.

^ Sc. loM'^er than any which have hitherto been used. In this way the system can be extended downM^ards. The middle terms of the main system are already established ; otherwise it would not be scientific. But it is also possible



mathematical problems, because mathematics never assumes an accident but only definitions. This is another " respect in which mathematical differs from dialectical reasoning.

A science expands not by the interpolation of Expansion middle terms but by the addition of extreme terms ^ ; of * science. e.g., A is predicated of B, and the latter of C, and this again of D, and so ad infinitum. It may also be ex- tended laterally ; e.g., A may be predicated of both C and E. For example, A is number (determinate or indeterminate), B is determinate odd number, C is a particular odd number ; then A is predicable of C. Again, D is determinate even number, and E a par- ticular even number ; then A is predicable of E.

XIII. Knowledge of a fact and knowledge of the Knowledge reason for it differ when both fall under the same knowledge science, under several conditions : (1) if the conclu- of its reason sion is not drawn from immediate premisses (for then although the proximate cause is not contained in them, and ua^e/one knowledge of the reason depends upon the proximate science. cause) ; (2) if the premisses are immediate, but the conclusion is drawn not from the cause but from the more familiar of two convertible terms ; for it may well be that of two reciprocally predicable terms that which is not the cause is sometimes the more familiar, so that the demonstration will proceed by it ; e.g., the proof that the planets are near because they do not twinkle. Let C stand for " planets," B for " not twinkling," and A for " being near." Then it is true to state B of C ; because the planets do not twinkle. But it is also true to state A of B ; because that which

to extend the system laterally at any stage, as in the example, by linking a fresh minor (E) to a given major (A) by a fresh middle (D).



78 a

35 ariX^ov eyyvs eari' rovro 8' elXiqcjydo) hi iTraycDyrjs rj St' aludriaeojs . di^dyKT] ovv to A rw T V7Tdp)(€LVy toGr (XTToSeSetKrat on ol TrXdvrjreg iyyvg elaiv. ovTos ovv 6 GvXXoyiuixos ov rod 8l6tl dXXd rod on ioriv ov yap Sid to firj GTiX^eiv eyyvs etcrtv, aAAa 3ta TO iyyvs etvat ov cttlX^ovglv. iyxcupel Se Kal

40 Sid daTepov ddrepov heixdrjvai, Kal ecrrat tov Slotl

78 b 7] dTTobeL^LS, oloV €(JTCO TO F 7TXdv7]T€g y icf)^ (S B TO

iyyvs €LvaL, to A to p.r] gtlX^6lv v7Tdpx€L hrj Kal

TO B Tip r Kal TO A Tip B \t6 pL7] CTTtA^Ctv]/ COCTTC Kal Tip r TO A. Kal €GTL TOV SlOTL 6 GvXXoyUGpLOS'

etXr^TTTaL ydp to rrpcJoTOV acTCov. ndXiv (hs rrju 5 GcXrjvrjv 8€LKVVovGLV OTL Gcf)aLpoeiSij? , Sid Tcbv av- ^TjGewv' €L ydp to av^avopievov ovtoj G(j)aLpoeihis y av^dvet 8' rj GeX-qi^rj, ^avepdv otl G(f)aLpo€LSrjS' ovtoj p,€v ovv TOV OTL yeyov€v 6 GvXXoyLGpLoSy d^drraXLV Se T^devTos TOV pi€Gov TOV StoTf OV ydp Sid rds

aV^7]G€LS G(j)aipO€lh'qS €GTlVy dXXd hid TO G<f)aL-

10 poeiSrjs etvai Aa/x^ctvet Tas" av^rJGeL? ToiavTas. GeXrjvrj i(f)^ cL T, G(f)aLpo€iSrj9 €(f>^ w B, av^rjGis i(f>^ cS A. ^

'E^' c5v 8e TO, pi€Ga pLT] dvTLGTpi(f)€l Kal €GTL yV(X)pLpia)T€pOV TO dvaLTLOV, TO OTL pi€V SeiKVVTaLy TO SlOTL 8' ov. €TL €^' Sv TO fl€GOV C^CD Tt^eTttt ' Kal

ydp ii' TOVToig tov otl Kal ov tov Slotl rj diToSeL^LS' 15 ov ydp XeyeraL to alVtov. otov 8ta tl ovk dvaTTvel

^ seel. Ross.

" Sc. as middle.

Sc. with the majors. This is a corollary to the foregoing case, the difference being that it is no longer possible to estab- lish the reason by converting the major premiss. 86


does not twinkle is near (this may have been assumed either by induction or through sense-perception). Then A must apply to C ; and so it has been proved that the planets are near. Thus this syllogism proves not the reason but the fact ; for it is not because the planets do not twinkle that they are near, but because they are near that they do not twinkle. (It is possible, however, to prove the middle by means of the major term, and then the demonstration will establish the reason. E.g., let C stand for " planets," B for " being near " and A for " not twinkling." Then B applies to C, and A — ['* not twinkling "] — to B, and so A also applies to C ; and the syllogism establishes the reason, because the proximate cause has been assumed. '^) Or again as the moon is proved to be spherical from its phases ; for if that which exhibits phases of this kind is spherical, and the moon exhibits phases, it is evident that the moon is spheri- cal. In this form the syllogism proves the fact, but when the middle term is interchanged with the major, we can establish the reason ; for it is not on account of its phases that the moon is spherical, but because it is spherical that it exhibits phases of this kind. C stands for " moon," B for " spherical " and A for

  • ' phase."

(3) Where the middle terms are not convertible ^ and that which is not the cause is better known than the cause, the fact can be proved but the reason cannot. (4) This is true also of syllogisms whose middle term falls outside '^ ; in these too the demon- stration establishes the fact and not the reason, since the cause is not stated. E.g., why does the wall not

" In the second figure ; the third, giving no universal conclusion, is useless for demonstration.



78 b

o TOLXos ; OTL ov t,chov . €1 yap rovTO rod firj avaTTvelv a'iriov, eSet ro t,coov elvai alriov rod dva- TTveZv, olov el r) dirocfyaGLs alria rod firj vrrapx^iv , rj

20 Kardcjiaois rod VTrdpx^^v, axmep el to dovfipuerpa etvai rd Bepfxd /cat ^v^pd rod firj vyiatveLV, ro avfx- fxerpa etvat rod vyiaiveiv' ofioiojs Se /cat et r] /cara- (fyacTLS rod VTrdpxeiv, rj dnocfyaoris rod /jlt) V7Tdp)(€LV. €771 8e rcbv ovrojs drroSeSopLevajv ov orvpL^alveL ro Xe)(dev ov ydp drrav dvanvel ^coov. 6 Se cruAAoyta- /xos" yiyverat rrjs rotavrrjg alrias iv rw ixeoco crxH'

25 jLtart. olov eorcx) ro A t,woVy €^' ov rd B rd dvaTTvelv, e^' & V rolxos. rep fiev ovv B navrl vndpx^i rd A (Trdv ydp rd dvavviov ^cpov), rw Se r ovdevL, ware ovSe rd B rep T ovSevi' ovk dpa dvaTTvel d rolxos. eot/cacrt 8' at roiavrai rcjv alrccbv roLS /ca^' VTrep^oXrjv elpiqp.evois' rovro 8'

30 eon rd TrXeov dnooriquavra rd jxeuov elrre'lVy olov rd rod 'Avaxdpotos, on ev HKvdaLs ovk elalv avXrj- rptSes"/ ovSe ydp dpLTreXoi.

Kara p.ev Stj rrjv avrrjv eTn(jrrip.7)v /cat /cara T17V rcbv pieoojv deuiv avrai hia^opai eloiv rod on TTpds rdv rod Stort ovXXoyLupidv aAAov 8e rpdnov Sia<f)epei

35 rd Sidn rod on ro)^ St' aXXr]? eTTLGri^p.'qs eKarepov decopeXv. roiadra 8' eorlv daa ovrcos ex^L Trpd?

^ avX-qTplSes np, Philoponus, Themistius : avXrjTai ABCd. ^ to) np : TO.

<» But it is not ; see below.

^ According to Aristotle only warm-blooded animals breathe {cf. Be Resp. 478 a 28 ff.), so in the example " animal " is too wide a middle term.



breathe ? Because it is not an animal. If this were the reason for its not breathing, " being an animal " ought to be the reason for breathing ° ; on the prin- ciple that if a negative statement gives the reason for an attribute's not applying, the corresponding affir- mative statement will give the reason for its apply- ing ; e.g., if the disproportion of the hot and cold elements in us is the cause of our not being healthy, their due proportion is the cause of our being healthy. Similarly too if the affirmative statement gives the reason for an attribute's applying, the negative statement will give the reason for its not applying. But in the given instance the conclusion does not follow ; for not every animal breathes.^ A syllogism which proves this sort of cause occurs in the middle figure. E.g., let A stand for " animal," B for " re- spiration " and C for " wall." Then A applies to all B (for everything that breathes is an animal), but to no C, and so neither does B apply to any C. Hence the wall does not breathe. Such causes as these are like far-fetched explanations ; I mean stating the middle term in too remote a form, e.g., the dictum of Anacharsis that there are no flute-players among the Scythians because there are no vines.*'

These, then, are the differences between the syllo- gism which proves the fact and that which proves the reason, within the same science and according to the position of the middle terms. But there is another A fact and way in which the fact and the reason differ, viz., in may^Song each being studied by a different science. This is to different true of all subjects which are so related that one is

•= The full chain of implication is something like " fiute- playing — thirsty work— heavy drinking — wine — grapes — vines." Anacharsis was a Scythian ethnologist of the sixth century b.c. (Herodotus iv. 76).




78 b

dXXrjXa iOGT etvat Odrepov vtto ddrepov, olov rd OTTTLKa TTpos y€(x)fX€rpLav Kal rd fjirj^avLKa rrpog arepeopierpLav Kal rd dppioviKd rrpos dpLdpir]TiKrjv Kal rd <^atvo/xeva rrpog dGrpoXoyiKiqv. Gx^hov 8e 40 ovvojvvpLoi elcjLV eVtat rovrcov rdJv iTncrrr] fxajv , olov

79 a durpoXoyta yj re p.a6r]p.arLKr] Kal rj vavriKrj, Kal

dpp.ovLKr} 7] re'qpiariKr] Kal rj /caret rrjv dKoijv. ivravda ydp ro fjiev on rwv alodiqrLKdyv elSevai, ro be StoTt rcov pLadrjpLariKCJV ovroi ydp e)(ovoL rojv alrimv rd? drrobei^eis , Kal TroXXaKis ovk tcracrt ro 5 on, KadaTrep ol ro KadoXov decopovvres rroXXaKis evia rwv Kad^ eKaorov ovk loaoi 8t' dveTnoKeifjiav. eon he ravra ocra erepov n dvra rrjv ovalav Ke)(pri~ rat rots' eiheoiv. rd ydp jxad'qp.ara ire pi etSr] eariv ov ydp Kad^ vrroKeip^evov nvos' el ydp Kal Kad^ VTTOKeipievov nvos rd yeojpberpiKa ecrnVy dAA' ov)(^

10 27 ye Kad^ vrroKeipievov. ^X^^ ^^ '^^^ Trpos rrjv orrnKT^v, co? avrr] npog rrjv yecopLerpiav, dXXrj rrpos ravrrjv, olov ro irepl rrj? LpLdos' ro fjiev ydp on <f)V(JLKOv elSevai, ro Se Stort orrnKov, rj dnXcog rj rod Kard ro pbddrjpba. TToXXal he Kal ra)v pbrj vrr" dXXriXas emarTjpiOJV exovuLV ovrajs, olov larpiKr)

15 TTpos yeojpierpiav on /xev ydp rd eXKrj rd nepLcfyeprj Ppahvrepov vyidt,erai rod larpov elhevaiy 8tort he rod yecopierpov.

" i.e., studied by more than one science.

  • Up to this point it might be supposed that Aristotle

recognizes two " levels " of science, concerned respectively with form and with informed matter. It now appears that there are three " levels," the highest studying universals, the lowest particulars, and the other mediating between them.

" Philoponus offers two explanations : (1) because such



subordinate to the other, as is the relation of optical problems to plane and of mechanical problems to solid geometry and of harmonical problems to arith- metic and of the study of phenomena to astronomy. Some of these sciences have practically the same name ; e.g., both mathematical and nautical astro- nomy are called astronomy, and both mathematical and acoustic harmonics are called harmonics. In these cases it is for the collectors of data to know the fact, and for the mathematicians to establish the reason. The latter can demonstrate the causes, whereas they are often ignorant of the fact ; just as those who are studying the universal are often igno- rant of some of the particular instances, through lack of thorough investigation. Of this kind " are all objects which, while having a separate substantial existence, yet exhibit certain specific forms. For the mathematical sciences are concerned with forms ; they do not confine their demonstrations to a par- ticular substrate. Even if geometrical problems refer to a particular substrate, they do so only incidentally. As optics is related to geometry, so is another science to optics, namely, the study of the rainbow.^ To know the fact of the rainbow's existence is for the natural scientist ; to know the reason is for the optician, either simply as such or as a mathematical optician. Many of the sciences which are not strictly subordinate stand in this relation ; e.g., medicine to geometry. It is for the doctor to know the fact that circular wounds heal more slowly, but it is for the geometrician to know the reason for the fact.*'

wounds have the greatest area in relation to their perimeter, {'2) because the healing surfaces are farther apart and nature has difficulty in joining them.



79 a

XIV. Tojv he o)(r]iiaT(x)V eTnarrjfiovLKov fJudXiGra TO TTpcoTOV iariv. at re yap fiadr^fxanKal rcov im- GT7]fjicov Slol tovtov cf)€pov(n ras arrohei^eis , olov

20 dpLdfirjTLKr) Kal yewpLerpta Kal otttlkiJ, Kal cr;^e8ov COS" eiTTeiv ooai rod Slotl TTOLOvvrai ttjv OKeifjiv 7) ydp o\(x>s rj (hs €.7tI to ttoXv Kal iv rols 7tX€lgtol? Sta TOVTOV Tov G)('qpLaTOS 6 Tov SiOTL ovXXoyiupios.

a)GT€ Koiv Std TOUT* 617] pidXlGTa €7nGT7]p.OVLK6v'

KvpiojTaTOV ydp tov elSevai to Slotl Oeojpelv. etra


pevGaL SvvaTov. iv pev ydp tw peGco GxrjpiaTL ov yiyveTaL KaTT^yopLKOs GvXXoyLGpLos, rj Se tov tl eGTLV errLGTTipir] KaTa<jydG€cos' iv Se tco iG)(dTCp yiyveTaL puev aAA' ov KaOoXov, to 8e tl iGTi tcov KadoXov iGTLV ov ydp tttj iGTL ^wov Slttovv 6 dv-

30 dpiOTTOS. 6TL TOVTO jLtCV iK€LV(x)V Ovhkv TTpOGScLTaL,

iK€Lva Se Sta tovtov KaTanvKvovTac Kal av^eTac, €a)s dv els rd dpeGa eXOr]. ^avepdv ovv otl KVpLcj- TaTov TOV iTTLGTaGdaL TO rrpcoTov G-)(r]pLa.

XV. "Q.G7T6P 8e v7Tdp)(eLv TO A Tcp B iveSix^To aTO/xcos", ovTOJ Kal pLrj vrrdpx^LV iyx^^p^l- Xeyo) Se

35 TO dTopLOjg vndpx^i'V ^ /x'57 vnapx^LV to pL7] etvat


VTrdpx^i'V "^ P^ VTTapx^LV. oTav pikv ovv r) to A 7) TO B iv oXcp TLvl fj, rj Kal dp,(f)a), ovk ivhix^TaL to

« An. Pr. I. V. * Ibid. vi.

" Cf. An. Pr. 29 a 30 ff.

^ 72 b 18-25.

  • *.«?., immediately.

f Aristotle means when (a) A belongs to a genus which excludes B, or (6) B belongs to a genus which excludes A, or (c) A and B belong to different genera. It is not clear whether he intends the fourth case— when A and B belong to the same


XIV. The most scientific of the figures is the first. Tiie first Not only do the mathematical sciences, such as arith- guprlme for metic, geometry and optics, advance their demon- purposes of strations by means of this figure, but so, broadly speaking, do practically all sciences which investigate reasons ; for it is by this figure, if not universally, at

least as a general rule and in most cases, that the syllogism establishing the reason is effected. Hence on this account too the first figure may be regarded as the most scientific ; for the most essential part of knowledge is the study of reasons. Further, by this figure alone is it possible to pursue knowledge of the essence ; for in the middle figure we get no affirma- tive conclusion,^ and the knowledge of a thing's essence must be affirmative ; while in the last figure we get an affirmative conclusion, but it is not uni- versal,^ whereas the essence belongs to the category of universals ; it is not in any particular sense that man is a two-footed animal. Finally the first figure is independent of the others, whereas they are supple- mented and augmented by it until immediate pre- misses are obtained. '^ Thus it is evident that the first figure is most essential to knowledge.

XV. Just as A may (as we saw^) apply atomically* immediate to B, so also it may not-apply atomically. By apply- prfpoJf ing or not-applying atomically I mean that there is tions, im- no middle term between them ; for in this case the either term applying or not-applying will no longer depend upon g ^ ^^^^ some other term. (1) When either A or B or both contained'in are contained in some whole ,^ it is impossible that A ^ 8^""^'

genus — to be included in his formula, or whether he dismisses it as self-evident. He is probably thinking of A and B as species ; and if they are different species of the same proxi- mate genus their disconnexion can be proved through one or other of their differentiae.


79 a

A TO) B TTpcorojs fir) VTrdpx^LV. earco yap to A ev

oXcp rep r. ovKovv el to B /xt) ioTLV iv oXcp rw T

40 (iyxi^p^^ yo.p TO pi€V A elvai ev tlvl oXco, to 8e B

pLTj etvai ev tovtw), GuXXoyLOfjios earai tov /xt) VTrdp-

79 b X^tv TO A TO) B" el yap tco fiev A TravTi to T tw

Se B fjLrjSevL, ovSevl tco B to A. ofxolcog 8e /cat €t

TO fxev B ev oXcp tlvl eoTiv, otov ev Tip A* to fiev

yap A TTavTL Tcp B vrrdpx^Ly to 8e A ovhevl Tcp" A,

ctJOTe to a ovSevL tco B virdp^ei '^id GvXXoyLop.ov.

5 TOV auTov 8e Tpoirov heixdr^aeTaL Kal el dp.<J)Oj ev

oXcp Tivi eGTLV.

' Otl S' evSex^Tai to B jjutj elvai ev a> oXcp eaTi TO A, ^ TrdXiv TO A ev (L to B, (f)avep6v eK tojv avGTOiXi'O^v, ooai firj eiraXXdrTOVOLV aAAT^Aats". €t yap p,r]8ev tojv ev ttj AFA avoTOix^a Kara firj-

10 Sevos" KaTiqyopelTai tcov ev ttj BEZ, to S' A ev oXcp eoTL Tcp avoToixcp ovtl, <j)avep6v otl to B ovK €CTTat ev Tip 0' eTTaXXd^ovoL yap at gvgto ix^ai. 6p.oLix)s Se /cat et to B ev oXip tlvl eaTiv.

'Eav Se pL7]SeTepov fj ev oXip p,7]SevL, {jltj vrrdpxXj he TO A Tip B, dvdyKTj a.TO/xcos' /xt) vTrdpx^-iv. el

15 ydp eoTai tl fxeaov, dvdyKrj ddrepov avrcjv ev oXip TLVL etvat" 'q yap ev tw TrpojTip ax'^p^OLTL t) ev tw fxecTip euTaL 6 GvXXoyLopios. el piev ovv ev toj rrpiOTip, TO B eoTaL ev oXcp tlvl (/caTa^aTt/cTyv yap 8et TTjV TTpos TOVTO ylyveodaL TvpoTaoLv), el 8' ev Tip pueoipy OTTOTepov ervx^v tt/oos" dpi(f)OTepoLg yap

^ TCOV n, Bekker.

<» This again means " immediately." 94^


should not-apply in the primary sense " to B. For let A be contained in the whole of C. Then if B is not contained in the whole of C (for it is possible for A to be contained in a whole although B is not also contained in it), there will be a syllogism proving that A does not apply to B.^ For if C applies to all A but to no B, A will apply to no B. Similarly too if B is contained in some whole, e.g., D ; for D applies to all B, and A to no D,^ so that by syllogism A will apply to no B. The proof will take the same form also if both terms are contained in some whole.

That B may not be contained in the whole Mhich contains A, and vice versa, will be evident from the consideration of series ^ of mutually exclusive pre- dicates. For if none of the terms in the series ACD is predicable of any of the terms in the series BEF, and A is wholly contained in H, a term in the former series, obviously B will not be contained in H ; for then the series would not be mutually exclusive. Similarly too if B is wholly contained in some other term.

On the other hand if neither is wholly contained are possible in any term, and A does not apply to B, it must not- term is so apply atomically. For if there is to be a middle term, contained. one of the terms A and B must be wholly contained in some genus. The syllogism will occur either in the first or in the middle figure. If it occurs in the first, it will be B that is wholly contained in some genus (for the premiss relating to B must be affirmative) ; if in the middle figure, it will be either A or B indifferently, since we get a syllogism when the negative statement

^ So the relation of A to B is not atomic.

" By conversion.

    • Consisting of genera with their species and sub-species.



79 b

20 X'r](j)devros rod (jreprjnKov ylyveTaL auXXoyidfJiog' dfjL(f)OTepo)V S' aTro(f)aTLKa)v ovuwv ovk eorai.

^avepov ovv on ey8e;^erat re aAAo^ aAAoj /xi) vnapx^LV drojLta)?, Kal ttot ivSex^rai koi tto)? elprjKaixev .

XVI. "AyvoLa 8' 7] fjLT] Kar arro^aoiv aAAa Kara hiddeoiv Xeyojjievr] eon puev r] Std ovXXoyiGpLov yiy-

25 vofievT] aTTarr], avrr] 8' iv puev rotg TTpojrcDs vnap- XovGtv t) fiTj vTrdpxovarL (Jv/jL^atveL St;^c5s" rj yap orav olttXojs VTroXd^r] vTrdpx^LV t) fjirj v7Tdp)(€LV, r) orav Sid cruAAoytcr/xou Xd^rj rrjv viroXrufjiv . rrjs fiev ovv aTrXrjg viToXi^ipecxJS aTrXrj rj drrdrT], rrjs 8e Sid ovXXoyiopiov TrXetovg. firj VTrapx^roj yap to A pLT]-

30 8evt rcp^ B dro/jLOJS' ovkovv edv ovXXoyti^rjraL virdp- X^^^ TO A to) B, fxiuov Xaf^ojv to T, rjirarrj fievog eWat 8ta orvXXoyLGfJLOv. ivSex^Tat /xev ovv dpi(j)o- ripas Tas TrpoTdcretg etvat i/jevSetg, ivSex^rai Se ttjv irepav fxovov. el yap IjLtJt€ to A fjLTjSevl twv V

35 VTrdpx^t pirjTe to V pirjSevl tcov B, etXrjTTTai 8' eVarepa dvdTraXiv, dfjL(f)Oj i/jevSets eoovTai. iyxcopeX 8* OVTCOS ^X^^^ '^^ ^ Trpdg to A Kal B cocrre fjLrjTe VTTO TO A elvai pnqTe KaOoXov ra> B. to jxev yap B dhvvaTOV etvai iv oXcp tlvl [TTpojTcos yap iXeyero avTcp TO A fXT] V7Tdpx€Lv), TO 8^ A OVK dvdyKT) TTaai

40 rots' ovoiv elvai KadoXov, cogt dfxcfjOTepat ipevSeis.

dXXd Kal TTjv irepav ivhex^rai dXrjOrj XapuPdvetv, ov

SOa/xeVrot oTTOTepav ervx^v, dXXd ttjv AT- rj yap FB

TTpoTauis del ipevSrj? eorai 8ta to iv pLTjSevl etvat

TO B, TTjv 8e AT iyxojpeX, otov el to A Kal tco F

^ om. Bekker. 2 ^^^, ABCd, Bekker.



is assumed in connexion with either of them, but when both are negative there will be no syllogism.

Thus it is evident that one term may not-apply atomically to another ; and we have explained when and how this is possible.

XVI. Ignorance, considered not in a negative sense Error in but as a positive disposition of mind, is error reached JerS^im- throuffh inference." In propositions statino^ an imme- mediately

T ^ ^ .^. i- 1 X- -1. • • X related.

diate positive or negative relation it arises in two

ways : (a) when we directly suppose ^ that one term

applies or does not apply to another, and (b) when we

reach this supposition by inference. The error arising

from direct supposition is simple, but that which is

based on inference takes more than one form. Let (i) Negative

A apply atomically to no B. Then if we infer, taking J^eiation.

C as the middle, that A applies to B, our error will be

based on inference. It is possible either for both

premisses or for one only to be false, (i) For if A (i) Both

applies to no C and C to no B, and we have assumed SSe?^^^^

the contrary in each case, both premisses will be

false (it is possible for C to be so related to A and B

that it neither falls under A nor applies universally

to B. For B cannot be wholly contained in a genus,

since we stated above '^ that A is directly inapplicable

to it ; and A need not necessarily apply universally

to everything : hence both premisses are false.) (ii) (ii) Major

It is also possible to assume one true premiss : not faf^'^^"^

either premiss indifferently, but AC (the premiss CB

will always be false, because B is contained in no

genus ; but AC may be true) ; e.g., if A applies

" This is a hasty statement, and Aristotle proceeds at once to correct it ; but since the direct misapprehension described under (a) does not admit logical analysis he says no more about it and confines his attention to (6).

^ Sc. wrongly. <= b 29.

E 97



Kal rco B VTrdpx^i drofjiajs. orav yap Trpcuroj? Karrfyo prjr ai ravro TrXeiovajv ovhirepov iv^ ovSe- 5 repo) €(7Tat. Sta^epet 8' ovSev, ouS' el fxrj drojaoj? VTrdpx^L.

  • H fiev ovv rod VTrdpxeiv drraTiq hid tovtojv re

Kal ovroj yiyverai fiovcos (ov yap t^v eV ctAAo) crxV' fxarL rod VTrdpx^LV ayXXoyiGfios) , tj he rod fXT] virdp-

^etv ev re rw Trpcorcp Kal iv rw /xecro) CT;^7]jLtaTt.

10 TTpcorov ovv e'iTTCopiev TTooax^J^S ev rep rrpajrcp yiy- verai, Kal ttojs exovocov rcov vpordGewv.

^KvBex^rat fxev ovv dfjicj)OTepa>v i/jevScov ovacov, olou el TO A Kal rep T Kal rep B vrrdpxet drd/xcos"" edv yap Xrjcfydfj to puev A rep T p.7]hevL, ro he T TTavrl ro) B, ipevSeX? at rrpordoeis. evSex^Tau he

15 Kal r7J£ erepas ifjevhovs ovorjs, Kal ravrrjs oirorepa^ ervx^v- eyxcopel ydp rrjv /xev AT dXrjdrj etvat, rrjv he FB i/jevhrj, rrjV /xev AT dXrjdrj, on ov Trdai rols ovGiv vndpxei ro A, rrjv he PB ipevhrj on dhvvarov vndpx^iv^ rep B ro T, cp jjirjhevl vrrdpxei ro A- ov ydp en dXrjOrjs earai rj AT TTporaois'

20 d/xa 8e, el Kal eloiv dpi^orepai dXrjdels, Kal ro avpL- rrepaapia eorai dXrjOes. dXXd Kal rrjv FB evhe-

)^eTat dXrjdrj etvai rrjs erepag ovoiqs ipevhov?, olov

el ro B Kal ev rep F Kal ev rep A eoriv dvdyKTj ydp ddrepov vtto ddrepov elvai, eljur dv Xd^rj ro A pLYjhevl rep F VTrdpxetv, ifjevhrjs earai rj rrporaaig.

25 ^avepdv ovv on Kal rrj? erepas ifsevhovs ovar]s Kal djjL(f)oXv eorai ipevhrjs 6 avXXoyiopios.

^ iv om. ABCd, Bekker. ^ inrdpxei, Bekker.



atomically both to C and to B ; for when the same term is immediately predicated of more than one subject, neither of these latter terms will apply to the other. It makes no difference to the result if the relation (of A to C> is not atomic.

Thus erroneous affirmative attribution arises only from these causes and in these conditions (for we have seen " that a syllogism proving the (universal) affir- mative relation occurs in no other figure) ; but (2) Afflrma- erroneous negative attribution occurs in the second [jon/^ ^ figure as well as in the first. Let us first state in how many forms it occurs in the first figure and how the A. Sylio- premisses are related. g™e"' ^^

Error is possible (i) when both premisses are false, (i)Bothpre- e.g., if A apphes immediately to both C and B ; for ^^^^^^^^ ^^ise. if A is assumed to apply to no C, and C to all B, the premisses will be false, (ii) It is possible when either (ii) One pre- premiss indifferently is false. For AC may be true ^^^^ ^ ^^' and CB false : AC true because A does not apply to all things, and CB false because C cannot apply to B when A applies to no C ; for the premiss AC will no longer be true, and moreover, if both premisses are true, the conclusion will also be true. Again, CB may be true, the other premiss being false ; e.g., if B is contained in both C and A. For one of these terms must be subordinate to the other ^ ; so that if we assume that A applies to no C, the premiss will be false. Thus it is evident that the syllogism will be false whether only one of the premisses is false or both are false.

'^ An. Pr. I. v-vi.

^ A to C ; in the other case A would apply to all C, and therefore by inference to B, whereas it applies immediately to B. In fact, as Ross points out, A and C might be co- ordinate and overlapping.




'Er Se TO) iieaco ax'^f^CLri oXag [xev etvat ra? Trpo- roLGeig aix(j>OT€pas ipevheX? ovk ivSdx^rai (orav yap TO A navrl rep B VTrdpxX}, ovSev earai AajSetv o rep

30 fxev iripcp Travrl darepcp 8' ovSevl vrrdp^eL, Set S' ovroj Aa/xj8avetv rdg irpordo^LS wore rep fiev vrrdp- X€LV Tip Se {JLT] V7rdpx€iv, €L7Tep eorai avXkoyi(Tp.6s' el ovv ovroj Aa/xjSavo/xevat ipevSeXs, SrjXov cbs evav- TLOjg dvdTTaXiV e^ovaf rovro 8' dS'vvarov) , IttL tl 8' eKarepav ovhev KOjXvei i/jevSrj etvat, otov el to T

35 /cat TO) A Kal Tip B Tivl VTvdpxoi' dv yap Tip puev A TravTt Xr^ifidfj vrrdpxov TCp 8e B piiqSevi, i/jevSets fJiev dpiijiOTepai at TrpoTdoeig, ov /xeWot oAat dAA' eVt tl. Kal avdiraXLV 8e Tedevros tov (TTe prjTLKov ihuavTOJS. TTjV 8' cTepav etvat i/jevSrj /cat onoTepavovv ev-

^oSex^Tai. o yap VTrdpx^L Tip A vravrt, /cat Tip B 80 b VTrdp^ef edv ovv XrjifyOfj Tip jjuev A oXip VTrdpx^LV to r Tip 8e B oXip fjiT] VTrdpx^LV, rj pAv VA dXrjdrj? eWat, rj 8e FB ipevSi^s. rrdXiv o Tip B purfhevl VTrdpx^i ovSe Tip A rravTi vrrdp^eL- el yap Tip A, /cat TO) B- dAA* ovx VTrrjpx^v. edv ovv XrjifyOfj to T 5 TO) {JLe^ A oXip virdpx^LV Tip Se B iiiqSevi, rj jjiev FB TTpoTaoL? dXrjOrjg, rj 8' erepa i/jevS'q?. 6p.oLix)s Se /cat pieTaTeOevTos tov OTepr]TLKov. o yap piTjSevl vndpx^i' rip A, ovSe tw B ovSevl vrrdp^ei- edv ovv Xr]ij)dfj TO r TO) pev A dXqj pur) vrrdpx^LV Tip Se B oXip wrdpx^i'V, rj pev AT TTpOTaois dXrjdrjs ecrrat,

10 T) €Tepa Se ipevS-q?. Kal TrdAtv, o Travrl Tip B VTrdpx^i, pLTjSevl Xa^elv Tip A vrrdpxov tpevSog. dv- dyKT] ydp, el Tip B Travrly Kal Tip A tlvI vjrdpx^iv

° For a valid syllogism the premisses must be either AaC, 100


In the middle figure (i) it is impossible for both b. Syllo- })remisses to be wholly false ; for when A applies to fecond^ all B we shall not be able to find any term which will flgi^e. apply to all of the one and to none of the other, yet premisses we must assume the premisses in such a way that the ^^^^^ ^^ middle applies to one but not the other extreme term, false, if there is to be a syllogism. If, then, the premisses so assumed are false, clearly if their contraries are as- sumed the converse result should follow ; but this is impossible.'* But (ii) there is no reason why both pre- (ii) but may misses should not be partly false ; e.g., supposing that fais?^^ ^ C should apply to some of both A and B ; for if it is assumed to apply to all A and to no B, both premisses will be false : not wholly, however, but partly. So too if the negative is posited in the other premiss. (iii) Either premiss singly may be (wholly) false. For (iii) and one that which applies to all A will also apply to B ; then wholiv^ if C is assumed to apply to the whole of A but to be in- false.' applicable to the whole of B, CA will be true, and CB false. Again, that which applies to no B will not apply to all A ; for if it applies to A it will apply to B, which ex hypothesi it does not. Then if C is assumed to apply to the whole of A but to none of B, the premiss CB will be true, and the other will be false. Similarly too when the negative premiss is transposed ; for that which applies to no A will not apply to any B. Thus if C is assumed to be inapplicable to the whole of A, but to apply to the whole of B, the premiss AC will be true, and the other false. Again, it is false to assume that that whicli applies to all B applies to no A ; for if it applies to all B it must also apply to some

BeC or Aec, BaC ; and if both premisses are wholly false, either BeC, BaC or AaC, BeC must be true ; but neither pair is compatible with BaA.



80 b

iav ovv Xrj(f)6fj ro) fiev B Travrl vnap^eiv to T to) he A firjSevi, rj fiev FB dXrjdrjs earai, rj Se FA ifjevSi^s. 15 Oavepov ovv on koL dfi(j)orepojv ovowv ^evScbv /cat TTJs erepas pLovov ear at GvXXoyiupios OLTrarr]- Tt/co.9 eV Tols dropiOLs.


virdp^ovGLv ^ OTav piei^ Sid tov oiKeiov pueoov yiy- vrjrai tov ifjevhovs 6 ovXXoyiGpLOs, ouv olov Te dp(l)o-

20 Tepas ipevhels elvai rds" TrpoTdaeis, dXXd pLovov ttjv TTpos TO) pbel^ovL ciKpcp. [Xlyio S' oLKeXov pueaov 8t* ov yiyveTai rrjs dvTL(j)d(jea)s 6 ovXXoyiupios.) vrrap-

YeT6tj yap to A to) B hid pueaov tov F. eTrel ovv

dvdyKT] TTjV FB KaTa(f)aTLKrjv XapL^dveaOac avXXo- yiupiov yiyvopievov, hrjXov otl del avTTj eorai dXiq-

25 B-qs' ov yap avrtcrrpe^erat . 7] he AT ifjevhrjS' TavTrjs yap dvTLGTpe(f)opievr]< s ivavTios yiyveTai 6 cruAAoytcr/xds'. op^otcos he /cat el e( aXXr^? avaTOixias Xr](f)deLr] to pueaov, olov to A el /cat ev tco A oXqj IgtI /cat /cara tov B /caro^yopetrat iravTos' dvdyKT]

30 yap TTjv piev AB rrpoTacnv pieveiv, ttjv S' erepav dvTLGTpe^eoSai, oioB^ rj piev del dXrjdiq?, rj S' aet ifjevhrj?. /cat GX^hov rj ye TOcavTrj drrdTTj rj avTrj eoTL Trj Sid TOV olKeiov pueGov. edv he purj hid tov oiKeiov pieaov yiyvrjrai 6 GvXXoyiGpios, OTav piev vtto TO A jj TO pueoov to) he B pirjhevi virapxij, dvdyKrj

35 ifjevheZs etvai dpL(f)OTepag . XrjTTTeai ydp ivavTiws rj COS" e^ovGiv at rrpoTdoeiSy el fieXXei GvXXoyiGpios eaeadai' ovtcx) he Xapi^avopievcov dpicfjoTepai yiy-

^ TJ fM-f) vndpxovaiv om. ABn. 102


A. Thus if C is assumed to apply to all B but to no A, CB will be true and CA false.

Thus it is evident that in atomic propositions erroneous inference will be possible when both pre- misses are false and when only one is false.

XVII. In non-atomic attribution, whether affirma- Error in re- tive or negative,'^ when the false conclusion is reached terms "medi- by means of the proper middle term, it is not possible ^teiy reia- for both premisses to be false, but only for the major (pAffirma- premiss. (By " proper " middle I mean that by tion."^^^* which the contradictory * conclusion is reached.) Let a. First A apply to B through C as middle term. Then since (i) inference the premiss BC must be assumed as affirmative to pro- ^^^^^^ duce a syllogism, clearly it must always be true ; for middle, it is not converted.^ But AC is false ; for it is upon the conversion of this that the contrary conclusion results. Similarly too supposing that the middle (ii) infer- term should be taken from another series of pre- Sddle^not dicates ^ ; e.g., if D is both wholly contained in A and ^^^jf ^ ^"^ also predicated of all B ; for the premiss DB must remain unchanged while the other is converted, so that the former is always true and the latter always false. Error of this kind is practically the same as that which is inferred by the proper middle. If, how- (iii) infer- ever, the syllogism is not effected by means of the fmpl-oper*" proper middle, when the middle is subordinate to A middle. l3ut applies to no B, both premisses must be false ; for the premisses must be assumed in the contrary sense if there is to be a syllogism, and when they are

" The latter is first considered at 81 a 15.

^ i.e. the true conclusion.

" i.e. changed in quality. Throughout this section avn- aTp€(f>eadai refers to qualitative change, not interchange of subject and predicate. Cf. An. Pr. 45 b 6, and II. viii-x.

    • Non-essential attributes.




vovrai i/jevhels. otov el ro /xev A oXoj ro) A vtt- dpx^t' TO Se A fJirjSevl rcov B* dvriGTpa(f)€vra)v yap TOVTCxiv GvXXoyiGjjLos t' ecxrat /cat at TTpordaeis dfx-

40 ^orepai ijjevhels. orav Se [irj fj vtto to A ro fieaov,

81 a otov TO A, 7^ jLtev AA dXrjdrjs eWat, i] 8e AB

ipev^T]?. 7) fxkv yap A A dXrjd-q?, on ovk rjv iv ro)

A TO A, Tj Se AB e/feuSr^s", ort et Tyv dXrjd'^?, kolv to

GvpLTTepaofjia rjv dXridis' dXX rjv ipevSog.

5 Ata 8e rod fzecrov o'X'^P'Olto? yuyvofxevr^s rrjs dTrdrr]?, dfjic/yorepa? jjiev ovk ivhe)(€rai ifjevSei? etvat rds TTpordaeis oXas (orav yap fj ro B vtto to A, ovSev ivSexerai rw p^ev Travrl rep Se /XT^Sevt vndp- X^f'V} Kaddirep iXexGy Kal TTporepov), rr^v irepav 8'

10 eyxoip^^, Kal oTTorepav ervx^v. el yap ro T /cat rep A /cat TO) B vndpxeL, edv Xrjcfydfj ra> piev A vnapxeiv Tcp he B /xt) vrrapxeiv, rj puev FA^ dXrj6rj9 ecrrat, rj S* erepa i/jevS'^g. TrdXtv 8' et rw p,ev B Xr](f)deLrj TO r virdpxov TO) 8e A p,r]SevL, rj piev FB dXrjOrjs ear at, rj 8' erepa ifsevhiqs.

15 'Eav piev ovv orepT^riKos fj rrjs drrdrr^s 6 ovXXo- yiupLos, eLprjrai TTore /cat 8ta rlvcov ecrrat rj dTrdrrj- edv he KaracfyartKos, orav p,ev 8ta rod olKeiov pieaov, dSvvarov dpLcf)orepas etvat iJjevSeis- dvdyKrj yap rrjv FB pieveuv, e'lTrep ecrrai ovXXoyLopLos,

20 Kadanep eXex^f] Kal TTporepov a)ore rj AF^ aet ecrrat i/jevSrjs, avrrj yap eoriv rj dvriGTpe(jiopLevrj. opioiws 8e /cat et e^ dXXrj? ovoroix^as XapL^dvoiro ro pieaov, woTrep eXexOrj Kal errt rrjs oreprjTLKrjg dTTarrjg' dvdyKrj yap rrjv piev AB pieveiv rrjV 8'

1 TA Mure, Ross : AT. ^ AT Mure, Ross : TA.



so assumed, both become false : e.g., if A applies to the whole of D, and D applies to no B ; for when these propositions are converted, there will be a syllogism and both premisses will be false. But when the middle term, e.g. D, is not subordinate to A, the premiss AD will be true and DB false. AD will be true because D was not contained in A ; DB will be false because if it had been true, the conclusion would have been true too ; whereas it is ex hypothesi false.

When the error arises in the middle figure, it is B. Second impossible that both premisses should be w holly false Either pre- (for when B is subordinate to A, nothing can apply to J{jjg|^^u^^^ all of the one and to none of the other, as we observed both' cannot above "), but one premiss, and that either one indiffer- fa^ig^J^^^'^ cntly, may be false. For when C applies to both A and B, if it is assumed to apply to A but not to B, the premiss CA wall be true, but the other will be false. Again, supposing that C is assumed as applying to B, but to no A, CB will be true but the other will be false.

Thus we have stated when and from what sort of (2) Negative premisses the error will arise if the erroneous con- (Firsi"*^' elusion is negative. If it is affirmative, w^hen (i) it is ^^^^^-^

(i) Inference

reached through the proper middle term, it is impos- by the sible that both premisses should be false ; for the {Jj^i^^ig, premiss CB must remain unchanged, if there is to be a syllogism, as we observed above. ^ Hence AC will always be false ; for this is the premiss whose quality is converted. Similarly too (ii) supposing that the (ii) inier- middle term is taken from another predicate-series, nliTdie not as we observed with reference to negative error ^ ; proper but for DB must remain unchanged, and AD must be

« 80 a 29. * 80 b 23. « 80 b 26.





AA 6.VTiGrpe(f)€G6ai, Kal rj aTrdrrj tj avrr) rij npo-

25 repov. orav 8e [xt] Slol rod ocKeLoVy eav fiev fj to

A VTTO TO A, avTTi fjL€v ecjTat dXrjdij?, r) irepa 8e

ijjevhrjS' iyx<J^p^^ ydp to A TrXeioaiv VTrdpx^i'V d,

OVK €GTIV VTT* oKKv^ka . Idv §€ {JLT] fj TO A VTTO TO A,

avTr) {Ji6v del SrjXov otl eWat ipevh-qs {KaTa^aTiKy] yap XafjL^dv€Tai) , ttjv 8e AB^ ivSe^^TaL Kal dXrjdrj 30 €LvaL Kal ipevSrj' ovSev yap KwXvei to fiev A Tip A fjir]S6vl vrrdpx^iv to Se A tw B TravTi, olov t,(hov iTTiGTrjfJiy], eTTiGTi^pLr] Se fjiovonKfj. ovS^ av pL'^T€ to A pbTjSevl Tcov A /xTJre to A fjirjSevl tcov^ B. [(f)av€-


dpi(j)OTepas ey^^copet ipevhelg elvai Kal onoTepav


35 Y\oGax<J^S fi€V OVV Kal Sid tlvcov iyx(JOp€L yiyve- gB at Tas /caret GvXXoyiGpiov drrdTas €v re rotS" ajLtecrotS" Kal iv tol? Sc' dvoSeL^ecos, (jyavepov.

XVIII. ^avepov he Kal otl, et rts" aiGd-qoLS €K- XeXoLTTev, dvdyKT) Kal irrLGTrjfjirjv TLvd eVAcAotTreVat,

40 yjv dhvvaTov Xa^elv, etnep fxavOdvopiev t) eTraycoyfj

81 b "^ dTToSel^GL, €GTL 8' 7] [jL€V drToSeL^LS 6/C TCOV KadoXoV

Tj S' eTTayajyT] €K tcov /cara fiepos, dSvvaTov Se Ta KadoXov decjDprJGaL fir] 8t' iiraycoyrj? (iirel Kal ra ef d(j)aLp€Gecos Xeyofjueva eo-rat 8t' iirayojyrjs yvcopLpua TTOLelv, OTL VTrdpx^^ eKdoTCp yev€L eVta, Kal el firj

1 BA Bekker.

2 ra> AB, Bekker.

" (f>av€p6v . . . ervx^v secl. Ross.

« Ross points out that this case (in which if the false pre- miss is corrected a valid though unscientific syllogism is obtained) does not belong under (iii) but is identical with that already mentioned under (ii).



converted in quality, and the error is the same as before. But when (iii) the conclusion is not reached (iii) infer- through the proper middle term, if D is subordinate fnijfroper" to A, this premiss will be true, and the other false, since middle. A may apply to two or more terms which are not sub- ordinate to one another ; but if D is not subordinate to A, clearly this premiss will always be false (since it is assumed as affirmative), whereas DB may be true " or false ; for there is no reason why A should not apply to no D, and D to all B (as e.g., " animal " applies to no *' science," but " science " to all " music "), nor why A should not apply to no D and D to no B. [Thus it is evident that when the middle term is not subordinate to A not only both premisses but either indifferently may be false.] ^

Thus it is evident in how many ways and by what sort of premisses syllogistic error may occur both in imme- diate attribution and in demonstrative attribution.

XVIII. It is evident also that if any sense-faculty Lack of a has been lost, some knowledge must be irrevocably faculty as i lost with it ; since we learn either by induction or by pa"se of demonstration. Now demonstration proceeds from ^^^'^^^"*^®- universals and induction from particulars ; but it is impossible to gain a view of universals except through induction (since even what we call abstractions can only be grasped by induction, because, although they cannot exist in separation, some of them inhere in each class of objects, in so far as each class has

^ This sentence is unlikely to be Aristotelian (since if D is not subordinate to A the major premiss must be false) and Philoponus ignores it. It is probably a rash observation by an early " editor."

" TO. €^ d(f>aLp€a€a)s generally means " mathematical ab- stractions," e.g., continuity or dimension (c/. Met. 1061 a 28) ; possibly here the sense is wider.




5 ;i(;a>p6CTTa ianv, fj roLovhl eKaurov), iTraxOrji'aL Se fjurj

exovra? aiCjdrjGiV dSvvarov. rojv yap icad^ e/ca- OTov 7] aiodr]Gig' ov yap ivhex^^^^ Xapclv avrwv TTjV €7noTiqp/r]V' ovre yap €K tcjv KadoXov avev in- aycjyrjS, ovre 8t' €7Tayojyrj? dvev rrj^ alaOrjaeois .

10 XIX. "Ecrrt Se 77a? ovWoyiGfJiO'^ Sta rpiajv opwv, Kal 6 (jLcv SeiKvvvai Swdfievo^ on vrrdpx^i to A toj r Bid TO VTrdpx^tv ro) B Kal rovro rep T , 6 8e arepy]- TLKOS, TTjv fjiev Irlpav TrporaGLV ex^jv on vrrdpx^L n dXXo aAAo), T'r]v 8' irepav on ovx VTrapx^t. <f)av€pdv

15 ovv on at jU-ev dpx^l Kal at Aeyo/xevat VTrodeoeis avrai elui- Xa^ovra yap ravra ovnos dvdyKrj Setfc- vuvai, olov on ro A ra) V virdpx^^ 8ta rod B, TraAtv 8' on TO A TO) B 8t' d'AAou ixiuov, Kal otl to B toj r (haavTOJS . Kara fxev ovv ho^av GvXXoyit^ojJievois Kal fJLOvov hiaXeKTiKoys BrjXov otl tovto [jlovov gk€-

20 tttIov, et ef wv ivSex^Tat ivSo^oTdTCOv yiyveTai 6 GvXXoyiGpLog, ojGT et Acat [lj] ecrrt rt tt^ dXrjdela tcjv AB jjieGov, SoK€L 8e etvat, o 8ta, tovtov GvXXoyi- t,6p.evos cruAAeAoytcrrat 8taAe/<:TtK"cDs" ttpos" 8' dAi^^et- av €K Tcbv vvapxdvTcov 8et GKOTrelv. e;^et 8' ovtojs' iTreihrj ecrrtv o ai^ro juet' Acar' dAAou AcarTyyopetrat

25 /XT] Kara GVfji^e^rjKos — Xeycx) Be to Kara Gvpi^e^T]- Kos olov TO XevKov 7TOT iK€Lv6 ^apb€v elvai dvOpo)-

7TOV, ovx dpLOLCO? XeyOVT€S Kal TOV dvOpcoTTov XeVKOV

6 fJL€v yap ovx ^"^^pov tl ojv XevKoi^ ioTi, to 8e XevKov OTL GVfj,^€^7]K€ Tw dvOpcoTTCp etvac XeVKO) — 108


a determinate nature) ; and we cannot employ in- duction if we lack sense-perception, because it is sense-perception that apprehends particulars. It is impossible to gain scientific knowledge of them, since they can neither be apprehended from universals with- out induction, nor through induction apart from sense-perception.

XIX. Every syllogism is effected by means of three in demon- terms. One kind has the effect of proving that A p/em^Ses^^ applies to C because A applies to B and B to C ; the express true other is negative, and has for one premiss the affirma- tive and for the other the negative attribution of one term to another. It is evident, then, that these are the starting-points and so-called hypotheses (of syllo- gism) ; for it is by assuming them in this way that one must effect one's proof, e.g.^ that A applies by means of B to C, and again that A applies to B through some other term as middle, and similarly that B applies to C. Now if we are arguing with a view to plausibility, i.e., only dialectically, clearly we need only consider whether the conclusion proceeds from premisses which are as widely as possible accepted ; so that although a given term is not really the middle be- tween A and B, provided that it is accepted as such, if we draw our inference through it the inference is dialectically sound. But if our object is truth, we must base our investigation on the actual facts. Now Some terms the position is this. There are terms which are pre- aifvS"*^" dicable of something else not accidentally — by "acci- jects; dentally " I mean as we sometimes say " that white essSitiaiiy (thing) is a man," which is not the same as saying attributes. " the man is white," since a man is not a white thing because he is something else, but the white (thing) is a man because it is an accident of the man to be



81 b

eariv ovv eVta roiavra axjre Kad^ avra Karriyopei-

30 oQai. earoj Sr) ro T rotovrov o avro /xev ixrjKerL

VTTOLpx^i' oiXXo), rovrcx) 8e to B irpajTCp, Kal ovk

'ioTLV d'AAo fiera^v' Kal ttolXlv to E rep Z (LaavTCos,

Kal TOVTO TCp B. a/>' ovv TOVTO avayKrj arrjvat, -^

ivSex^Tai elg dneipov levai; Kal ttolXlv el rod fiev

A puiqhev KarriyopeiraL KaS^ avro ro Se A rep

35 VTTapx^i' TTpajrcpy pera^v Se /XT^Sevt rrporepcp, Kal ro

rep H, Kal rovro rep B, dpa Kal rovro loraoQai

avdyKT], 7] Kal rovr ivSe^erai €tV direipov levai;

hia^ep€L he rovro rod rrporepov roaovrov, on ro

piiv eoriv, dpa evSex^rai dp^apievep 0.77-0 roiovrov o

40 p/iqhevl vTrdpxei ere pep dAA' dAAo eKelvep, IttI ro

dueo els aTrecpov levai, Odrepov Se dp^dpuevov cxtto

82 a roiovrov o avro pev dXXov eKeivov Se pLrjSev Karrj-

yopeXrai, eirl ro Kdrex) GKoireZv el evSex^Tat elg

aTTeipov levai. en ra piera^v dp^ evhex^Tai drreipa

etvai eLpiapuevexiv reov aKpeov; Xeyeo 8' otov et ro A

5 rep r vndpx^i, pieoov 8' avreov ro B, rod 8e B /cat

rod A erepa, rovreov 8' dAAa, dpa Kal ravra els

aTTeipov evhex^Tai teVat, r] dSvvarov ; ean he rovro

GKOirelv ravro Kal el at aTTohei^eis els aTTeipov

epxovrai, Kal el eonv dTTohei^is drravroS) r] TTpos

dXXrjXa TTepaiverai. opioiexts he Xeyeo Kal irrl rwv

10 (jreprjriKebv ovXXoyicrpidjv Kal TTpordaeeov, oiov el ro

A pir) vTTdpx^i rep B purjhevi, rjroi TTpeorep, r) eorr ai

n piera^v ep TTporepep ovx VTTdpx^i (oiov el rep^ H,

1 Tcp A^n : TO ABd.

" The distinction which Aristotle is drawing between natural subjects and natural attributes is partly obscured in Greek by the substantival use of the neuter adjective. What he seems to mean here is that " white " is not really the sub-



white " — , some things, then, are such that they are of Can predi- their own nature predicable. Let C be such that it an infinite does not further apply to any other term, but B apphes aUr^Jtes^^ directly to C, and there is no other term mediating upwards betw^een them. Again, let E apply in the same way to flx^tub- F, and F to B. Is there then any necessary limit to Ject, (2) of this series, or may it proceed to infinity ? Again, if downwards nothing is of itself predicable of A, but A applies J^bufe!"^ directly to H and to no intermediate term first, and H applies to G and G to B, must this series too come to an end, or may it too proceed to infinity ? The latter question differs from the former in that the first asks " Is it possible, if we start from a term such that it applies to nothing else, but something else applies to it, to proceed to infinity in the upward direction ? " and the latter asks w^hether, if we start from a term such that it is itself predicable of some- thing else, but nothing is predicable of it, we can proceed to infinity in the downward direction. Fur- (3) by inter- ther, can the intermediate terms be infinite in number twe^n°flxed* when the extremes are definite ? I mean, e.g., if A extremes? applies to C, and B is their middle term, and other terms are predicable of B and A, and again other terms are predicable of these, can these too proceed to infinity, or is this impossible ? To inquire into this is the same as to inquire whether demonstrations form an infinite series, i.e., w^hether there is a demonstration of everything, or the extremes are limited in relation one to the other. Similarly too in the case of negative . syllogisms and premisses ; e.g., if A applies to no B, either it does so directly, or there will be some inter- mediate term, e.g., G, to which it first does not apply,

ject of which " man " is predicated, but an accidental attri- bute of that subject.



82 a ^

o rep B VTrdpx^L Travrl) Kal iraXiv tovtov en dXXco

TTporepcp, otov el rco^ 0, o rep H Travrl imdp^eL. Kal

yap €776 rovrojv t) drreipa ots" VTrdp^^i Trporepois rj

tararai .

15 'Etti Se Tcov dvriorpe<^6vro}v ovx ofiOLCos e^^L. ov yap eanv ev rols dvnKar'qyopovpLevois" ov Trpcorov KarrjyQpetrai t) reXevraiov rrdvra yap rrpos ndvra ravrj] ye ofxoiojs ^X^^> ^'^'^^ eorlv direipa rd arar' avrov KarrjyopovfjLeva eir dfxcj^orepd eon. rd aTTopr]- devra drreipa' ttXitjv el pbrj ofxoLws evhex^rai dvn-

20 orpe(j)eiv, dXXd ro fxev cos arvfJipeprjKos ro 8' d)S Kary]yopiav.

XX. "On [xev ovv rd [xera^v ovk evSe)(erai drrei- pa elvau, el errl ro Kara) Kal rd dvw loravrai at Karrjyoptai, SrjXov (Xeyw S' dvoj [xev rrjv enl ro KadoXov fjidXXoVy Kara) 8e rrjv errl rd Kard jjiepog).

25 et ydp rod A Kanqyopovfievov Kard rod Z aTretpa rd fiera^v, icj)^ Sv B, SrjXov on evSexotr^ dv o)ore Kal aTTo rov A eirl ro Kara) erepov erepov Karrj- yopeZaBai els direipov [irplv ydp errl ro Z eXOeZv direipa rd p.era^v) Kal diro rod Z errl ro dvo) drreipa rrplv enl ro A eXdeiv ojar el ravra dSvvara,

30 Kal rod A Kal Z dSvvarov drreipa etvai fxera^v.

1 ra> A^n : r6 ABd. ^ KaTrjyopovfievois A-'Bd.

« In the sense that predicate and subject are strictly inter- changeable.

^ i.e., additional attributes or additional subjects. In this case, however, the distinction is meaningless, because (the



but which appHes to all B ; and again some other term prior to G, e.g., H, to which A does not apply, but which applies to all G. In this case too either the intermediate terms to which A is more directly related in attribution are infinite in number, or the series has a limit.

If the premisses are convertible,** however, the if subject conditions are not the same. Where the terms are c?te are^^ reciprocally predicable there is none of which another inter- ^^^^^ is primarily or ultimately predicated, since in this there is no respect all are similarly related, whether the terms ^®"®^- predicated of the subject are infinite in number or both classes ^ about which we expressed uncertainty are infinite in number. The only exception is if the terms are not convertible in the same way, but one only accidentally and the other as a true predicate.*'

XX. It is obvious that the intermediate terms can- Between not be infinite in number if there is an upward and a extremes downward limit to predication (by " upward " I mean f^^^^^ ^° in the direction of the universal, and by " downward " chain in in that of the particular). For if when A is predicated pS^dTcttS, of F the intermediate terms — B — are infinite in num- ber, clearly it would be possible both starting from A to predicate one term of another in the downward direction to infinity (since the intermediate terms before one reaches F are infinite in number), and starting from F to predicate to infinity in the upward direction before one reaches A. Thus if these results are impossible, it is also impossible that there should be infinitely many intermediate terms between A and

terms being mutually predicable of one another) none is either subject or attribute more than another. Such terms {e.g., properties of a species) form a circle, not a series, of predication.

" C/. 81 b 25-29.



2 a

ovSe yap et tls XeyoL on ra fxev ion rdv ABZ^

i)(6fj,€va dAA^^Aa^v ware fir] elvai fiera^v, ra 8* ovk eon AajSetv, ovhev Sta^^epet. o yap av Xd^co rojv B, earai nrpos to A tJ TTpos to X ^ direipa rd fjiera^v rj ov. d(f>* ov Srj TTpcbrov direipa, elr^ evdvs

35 €LT€ fJLTj €v6vs , ovSev Sia^epef TO, yap fjuerd ravra direipd ionv.

XXI. ^avepov he Kal errl rrjs crreprjnKrjs drro- Sei^eojg on orrjoeraL, etirep eiri t't^s Karr^yopLKTJs Lorar at err* a/x<^oT€pa. earoj yap pirj ev8e)(6fievov fjirjTe €771 ro dvco aTro rod vcrrdrov els aTreipov levai 2 b {Xeyoj 8' vararov o avro fiev dXXcp fJbrjSevl VTrapxei, eKetvcp Se aAAo, olov to Z) pirjTe (xtto tov TrpcoTov errl to voTarov {Xeyco Se rrpwTov o avTO fxev /<raT* ttAAou, Krar' eKeivov 8e pLiqhev aAAo). el Sr) TavT ean, Kal eTrl ttj? aTTocfydaecos arrjoeTaL . rpt^j^cos" yap 5 heiKvvTOA [JLTj virdp^ov . Tj yap S fiev ro V, to B VTrdpxei Tiai^rt, cL Se to B, ovSevl to A. tov puev TOLVVV BF, Kal del rod erepov StaaTi^fJiaTOS, d.vdy- K7] ^ahit^eiv els dfieoa' KaTrjyopLKOv yap tovto to StdGTYjfjia. TO 8' erepov SrjXov otl el dXXco ovx VTrdpxei rrpoTepcp, olov Tip A, tovto Se'^aei tw B

10 TTauTl VTrdpxeiv Kal el irdXiv dXXcp tov A TrpoTepw ovx ^'^dpxet, eKelvo heiquei Tip A Traurl virdpxeiv 1 ABZ Waitz : ABF ABdn : AB M, Bekker.

" 8c. , from A or F.

  • The argument is : A negative conclusion can be proved

in each of the three figures. In any example (Aristotle gives one in each figure, viz. Celarent, Camestres and Bocardo) (1) we cannot assume an infmitive number of middles between



F. Nor does it affect the case supposing that it be said that some of the terms in the series AB . . . F are contiguous, so that there can be no intermediates between them, and that others cannot be grasped at all ; for whatever B we take, the intermediates in the direction of either A or F will either be infinite in number or not. It makes no difference where the infinite series first starts, whether immediately ^ or not ; the rest of the terms are infinite in number.

XXI. If there is a limit to the series in both direc- if affirma- tions in affirmative demonstration, evidently there cl^ion^must will be a limit in negative demonstrations also. Let have limits, it be impossible to continue to infinity either upwards negaSve. from the last term (by " last term " I mean that which applies to no other term, whereas some other term, e.g., F, applies to it) or from the first term towards the last (by " first term " I mean that which is predicable of another but has no other term predicated of it). If these conditions obtain, there will be a limit in negation too. There are three ways in which one term can be proved not to apply to another.^ (1) B Proof in the applies to all that to which C appHes, but A to none ^"^ ^^"^®- of that to which B applies. Now in the premiss BC, and generally in the minor premiss, we must reach immediate propositions, because this premiss is affir- mative. As for the other term,^ clearly if it is inappli- cable to another prior term, e.g., D, this term will have to apply to all B. Again, if it is inapplicable to another term prior to D, that term will have to

the terms of an affirmative premiss ; (2) mediation of a negative premiss always gives two new premisses, one affir- mative and one negative ; since the former are limited in number, the latter must be too.

" Viz. A. BeA is proved by DeA and BaD ; and similarly with DeA.



2b ^

WOT e7T€L Yj ettI TO dvo)^ loTarai ooos, Kai rj €7tl to

A^ crro^creTat, Kal ecrrat tl TrpwTOV (L ovx VTrdp-)(€L.

YidXiv et TO fxev B rravTi tco A tco 8e F fjuTjSevL, TO A Tojv^ r ovSevl vTTapx^t'- ttoXlv tovto el 8et Sel- ls fat, hrjXov OTL 'q Slol tov dvcj TpoTrov Seixdijo-CTaL


etprjTaL, 6 Se devTepos Seip^^Tycrerat. ovtco 8' dv SeiKvvoL, olov OTL TO A TO) fiev B TravTL virapx^L tco Se r ovSevt, €L dvdyKT] vrrapxetv tl toI B. /cat ndXiv €L TOVTO TO) r fiT) virdp^ei, dXXo tco A 20 VTrdpx^i', o TO) V ovx VTrdpxet. ovkovv eirel to VTrdpx^LV del tco dvcoTepcj tcrrarat, OTTjoeTai /cat to p^T] virdpx^iv-


vndpx^i, TO 8e F p,7] vTrdpxei, ov TravTL vrrapx^L to T w TO A. rrdXiV Se tovto tj 8ta tcov dvco et-

25 pr]p,€Vcov Tj 6p,OLCos 8et;^^7yCT6Tat . e/cetVcDS" /xev 8?) iCTTaTat* 6t 8' OVTCO, ndXiV Xiqijj€TaL to B to) E vrrdpx^i'V, co to T p.r) Travrt VTrdpxei. Kal tovto 'TrdXiv o/xotCDS". CTTCt 8' VTTO/cetrat laTaadai /cat €7rt TO KdTCO, SrjXov OTL GTiqaeTaL /cat to F ot);)^ virdpxov. ^avepov 8' OTt /cat edv /xt^ /xta o8a) SeLKVvrjTai

80 aAAa Trdaats, 6t€ fxev e/c tou irpcoTov oxr}p^o.TOS OTe

^ /carto fecit n, Bekker. 2 A ni, Ross : A ABd : avoj n^. 3 tw D.

" The required sense is fairly clear, and Ross's readings, which I have adopted, are at least compatible with it ; but the text is barely convincing.

^ Not the conclusion, but the negative premiss CeB.

" i.e., by the first, second or third figure.

<* As before, not only a negative but an affirmative premiss



apply to all D. Thus since the upward (affirmative) process is limited, the (negative) process towards A will be limited too,® and there will be some first term to which A does not apply.

(2) If B applies to all A but to no C, A applies to Proof in the no C. If it is now required to prove this,^ clearly the fig^ure. proof will either be by the method described above,

or by the present method, or by the third. The first has been stated already ; the second will be proved now. The proof will be as follows : D applies to all B, but to no C (since some predicate must apply to B).<* Again, since D is not to apply to C, some other term which does not apply to C applies to D. Thus since the affirmative series of attribution is limited in the upward direction, the negative series will also be limited.

(3) The third case is, as we have seen ^ : if A applies Proof in the and C does not apply to all B, C does not apply to all ^^^^ ^^^^ that to which A applies. This ^ again can be proved

either by the foregoing methods or by a similar one. In the former case the series is clearly limited ; in the latter we shall assume this time that B applies to E, to not all of which C applies ; and this again will be proved similarly. Since we have assumed that there is a downward limit also, clearly there will be a limit to the non-attribution of C.

It is evident that even if the proof is not effected if ail three by one method but by all three— now by the first SfXthe^

result is the must be interpolated. Ross's interpretation " if in fact there same, is any particular term D that necessarily belongs to B " seems improbable.

  • If this is the meaning here of the " philosophical imper-

fect," the reference is presumably to the discussion of the third figure in An. Pr. I. vi.

^ The negative premiss BoC. o 82 a 37.



82 b

Se CK rod Sevrepov rj rptrov, on /cat ovrcj crr'qaerai'

TreTTepao-jLteVat yap eluiv at ohoi, ra 8e TrcTrepacrfjieva 7T€7r€pa(j[JLevdKLS dvdyKr] 7T€7Tepdv6aL Trdvra.

"Ort /xev ovv cttI rrjs orrepTJaeaJS, etvrep K^at e77t 35 Tou VTrdpx^LV, turarai, SrjXov on 8' ctt' e/cetVcov, AoytKrcDs" jLtev deajpovoLV cSSe (f>av€p6v.

XXII. 'Evrt /X6F ouv Tcov er to) rt ean Karrj- yopovpL€va>v SrjXov el yap eanv opioaodai r] et yvwGTov TO Tt Tjv etvai, ra 8' dneLpa pur] eon 8t-

83 a eXOelv, avdyKYj TT€TT€pdvdai ra iv rw ri eon Kar-

Tjyopovpieva. KadoXov 8e wSe XeycopLev. eon yap eiTTelv dXr]da>s to XevKov j8a8t^etv /cat to fieya eKelvo ^vXov etvat, /cat ttoXlv to ^vXov fieya etvai /cat TOP dvdpojTTov ^ahit,eiv. eTepov hrj ecjrt to 5 OVTOJS eiTTelv /cat to eKeivajg. OTav piev yap to XevKov etvai cf)co ^vXov, TOTe Xeyoj ort cL ovpi^e^r]Ke XevKtp etvai ^vXov euTiv, aAA' ov^ d)S ro vnoKei- lievov Tip ^vXcp TO XevKov eoTf /cat yap ovTe XevKov ov ovd^ orrep XevKov rt eyeveTO ^vXov, wot ovk eoTLv dAA' ^ /caret, ovfjL^e^rjKos. oTav Se to ^vXov 10 XevKov etvai c/xi), ovx oti eTepov tI eoTi XevKov, eKeivcp he ovpi^e^rjKe ^vXcp etvai, otov oTav tov p^ovoiKov XevKov etvai (fxi) (tot€ yap ort o dvOpWTTos XevKo? eoTiv, at ovp.^e^'qKev etvai pLovoiKO), Xeyo)), aXXd TO ^vXov eoTi to VTroKelp^evov, oirep /cat eye- veTO, ovx ^T^pdv rt ov t) onep ^vXov ^ ^vXov rt. et

« C/. 81 b 25-29. 118


figure, now by the second or third — even so the series will be limited ; for the methods are finite in number, and the product of a finite number of things taken in a finite number of ways must always be finite.

Thus it is clear that there is a limit to the series of Now to negative attribution, if there is a hmit in affirmative affirmative attribution also. That there is one in the latter case predication will be apparent in the light of the following dialec- ^^ ^ ^"^^ ' tical argument.

XXII. In the case of predicates which form part of Predication, the essence, it is obvious (that there is a limit) ; Sftdbufi since if definition is possible, i.e., if the essential must be nature is knowable, and things infinite in number cannot be exhausted, the predicates which form part of the essence must be limited in number. But we can treat the question generally as follows. It is Predication possible to state truly " the white (object) walks " ffnTuTshid and " that large thing is wood " and again " the from acci- (piece of) wood is large " and " the man walks."" predication. The two latter statements are quite different from the two former. When I say " the white thing is wood " I mean that the subject of which whiteness is an accident is wood, not that whiteness is the substrate in which the wood inheres ; for it was not qua white or qua a particular kind of white that the white thing became wood, and so it is wood only accidentally. But when I say " the wood is white," I do not mean that something else is white, and that it is an accident of that something else to be wood, as when I say " the cultured (person) is white " ; for then I mean that the man, of whom it is an accident to be cultured, is white ; but the wood is the substrate, which actually became white, not qua anything else, but qua wood in general or a par-



83 a

15 8rj Sel vofj-oderrjaai, earco to ovrco Xiyeiv Karrj-

yopelv, TO 8' eKeivojs tJtol jLf)]Sa/,t65s" Karrjyopelv, tj KaTTjyopelv fiev firj aTrXcoSy Kara avfjif^e^riKos 8e Karrjyopeiv. eon S' cos* /x€v to XevKov to KaTT]- yopovjJL€Vov, d)s 8e to ^vXov to ov KaTrjyopeiTaL. VTroKeiadoj Srj to KaTrjyopovpLevov KaTrjyopelod at

20 a€L, ov KaTiqyopeiTaL, anrXibs, aAAd pir^ KaTo. ovpL- ^€^7]k6s' ovtco yap al aTTohei^eis oLTroheLKi^vovcnv. a)(JT€ rj iv TO) tl Igtlv 'q oti ttolov t] rroaov rj Trpos Tt t) ttolovv rj 'ndG-)(ov r^ ttov rj ttotc, oVav ev KaO* ivos KaTTjyoprjdfj. "Eti tcl pL€V ovuiav oiqp.aivovTa onrep eVetvo t)

25 OTTep eKelvo tl OTjpLatveL KaO" ov AcaTr^yopetTat • oora 8e pbrj ovoiav o-9]/xatVet, aAAa KaT aXXov V7tok€l- fjidvov XdyeTai o p^iq e'oTt pnqTe oTrep €K€lvo pnqTe orrep eKelvo tl, Gvp,pel3r]K6Ta, olov KaT a tov dvOpw- 7TOV TO XevKov. OV ydp eoTiv 6 dvdpcoTTos ovTe

30 oTTep XevKov ovTe oirep XevKov tl, dXXd ^coov 'loco?' OTTep ydp t,cp6v eoTiv 6 dvOpconos. doa he {jltj ovoiav orjjjLaivei, Sec KaTd tlvos VTroKeifievov KaTT]- yopeladai, kol pbrj elvai tl XevKov o ovx eTepov tl ov XevKov euTLV. Ta ydp e'lSr] ^aipeTW TepeTLO- /xaTct T€ ydp cgtl, /cat el eoTiv, ovhev rrpos tov

35 Aoyov eoTlv al ydp dnoSel^eLg irepl twv tolovtojv

" Here, as often, the categories of " position " and " state " are omitted (for the full list see Cat. 1 b 25). In any case completeness is unnecessary since the distinction is between essential and non-essential attributes.

  • In the sense of non-essential attributes.



ticular piece of wood. Thus if we are to lay down a general rule, let us call the latter kind of assertion predication, and the former kind either not predica- tion at all, or predication not in an unqualified but in an accidental sense. The predicate corresponds to

  • ' white " in the example, and the subject to " wood."

Let us assume, then, that the predicate is predicated of the subject, not accidentally but always without qualification, for that is how demonstrations conduct their proofs. Then, when one term is predicated of another, that which is stated is either part of the essence, or quality, quantity, relation, activity, passi- vity, place or time."

Further, predicates which denote essence indicate Non-essen- that the subject is identical with the predicate or with cateJre-^

some part of the predicate ; but those which do not fiuixe asub- r /^ , . 1 n ^1 1 ject of their

denote essence, but are stated or some other sub- own.

ject, which is identical neither with the predicate nor with some part of the predicate, indicate acci- dents,^ as e.g., " white " is predicated of " man " ; man is identical neither with " white " nor with some particular form of " white " ; but he is presumably an animal ; for man is identical with a particular kind of animal. Predicates which do not denote essence must be predicated of some subject ; a thing cannot be white unless it is something else first. The Forms may be dismissed — they are mere prattle ^ ; and even if they exist, they are irrelevant, because demon- strations are concerned only with such predicates as we have described.

" In view of Aristotle's debt to the Platonic Forms, it is ungenerous of him to describe the theory by a word which in Greek suggests the twittering of birds or a person's aimless humming. No doubt his indignation is roused by the thought of Forms as self-subsistent attributes.



83 a

"Ert el fji'q ecrri roSe rovSe^ ttolott]? KOLKelvo rovrov, {jLrjSe ttolott^tos ttolott]?, dSvvarov olvtl- KaT7)'yop€LG9aL dXX'^Xajv ovrwg, dAA' dXy^deg /xev ivSex^rai elvetVy dvTLKarrjyop'rjaai 8* dXr)dco<; ovk S3h ivSex^Tac. rj yap rot ws ovala KarrjyoprjOTJuerai, olov rj yevos ov r] hta<f)opd rod KaTiqyopovpilvov . ravra 8e heheiKrai on ovk ecrrat aTTecpa, ovr^ inl TO Karco ovr* errl to dvco [olov dvdpcoTTos Slttovv, Tovro ^wov, TOVTO 8* €T€pov' ovSe TO ^cpov Acar' 5 dvdpcjTTOVy TOVTO 8e Kara KaAAtof , tovto Se /car' dXXov iv Tcp TL eoTiv), TTjV fiev yap ovaiav aTraaav ecTTLV opioaoOai ttjv ToiavTrfv, tcl 8' direipa ovk €(JTL Sie^eXOetv voovvTa. war ovt IttX to dvcD ovt^ €7TL TO KaTOJ CLTTeipa' iK€ivr}v yap ovk €gtiv opioa- aOai, rjs ra aTretpa KaT'qyopelT at. wg pikv hrj yevrj 10 dXXi^Xcov OVK dvTLKaT7]yop7]dr)(7€TaL- ecrrai yap avTO oVep avTO TL. ovSe pLrjv tov ttolov tj tojv dXXwv ovSdv, dv jjiTj KaTa avfjL^e^rjKos KaTrjyoprjdfj- navTa yap TavTa ovfjLl3e^7]Ke Kal Kara tcov ovolojv KaT- rjyop€LTaL. dXXd Stj otl oi;S' els to dvco aTreipa ecrrat* eKaoTov yap KaTrjyopelTai o dv G'qixaivr) 7)


ovala' raura 8e TrenepavTaL, Kal ra yevr] tcov KaTrj- yopLcbv TTeTTepavTaL' r^ yap ttolov -^ TToaov 1) rrpos tl T] 7TOLOVV 'q Trdaxov ^ ttov -^ noTe.

^ ToSe TovSe n, Philoponus : tovto tov81 ABd.

<* Sc, and the downward limit is the individual." ^ If X = part of Y, and Y= part of X, each will be identical with part of (part of) itself. " 82 b 37.



Further, if it is not possible both for X to be a Predication ([iiaUty of Y and vice versa, i.e., if there cannot be a non^recipro- quaUty of a quaUty, X and Y cannot be predicated eating, reciprocally in the way in which we have laid down. It may be true to state one of the other, but the reciprocating statement cannot be true. For (1) the predicate may be stated as substance, i.e., the genus or differentia of the subject. (It has been shown that predication of this kind cannot proceed to infinity either upwards or downwards — e.g., man is biped, biped is animal, animal is something else ; or animal is predicated of man, man of Callias, and Callias of something else which is part of the essence — for every substance of this sort can be defined, but it is impossible to exhaust in thought an infinite series. Hence the series cannot be infinite either upwards or downwards, for we cannot define a substance of which an infinite number of terms is predicated.^) Then they cannot be predicated as genera of each other, for then a thing will be identical with a particular part of itself.^ (2) Nor can anything be predicated reciprocally of quality or any of the other categories, except accidentally ; for all these are attributes and are predicable only of substances. As for the proof that the series will not be infinite in the upper direc- tion, at every step the predicate denotes either quality or quantity or one of the other categories, or else the elements in the essence. But the latter are limited in number, '^ and so are the kinds of cate- gories, viz., quality, quantity, relation, activity, pas- sivity, place and time.^

<* C/. 83 a 21. That even the full list of ten categories is exhaustive is nowhere proved, nor indeed is it capable of proof.



'TTTO/cetrat Se Iv Kad* evo? KarrjyopeLadai, avra Se avra)v, oaa [xt] ri ecrrt, fir] KanqyopelaOai. avfJL-

20 pe^TjKOTa yap ioTi Trdvra, dXXa rd puev KaO^ avrd, rd 8e Kad^ erepov rpoTrov ravra 8e Trdvra KaO^ VTTOKeLfjievov Tivos KanqyopelaOai </>a/xev, to 8e ovp.- fiepTjKos ovK etvai VTroKeipievov n- ovSev yap tcjv TOtovTCOv Tidefjiev etvat o ovx ^repov ri ov Xeyerat o Xeyerac, aAA' avro dXXov Kal dXX* drra Ka9^

25 irepov. ovr* els to dvw dpa ev Kad^ evoc out' els TO Kdro) vrrdpxeiv XexOTJaerat. KaB^ cov jxev ydp Xeyerai rd GvpLpe^rjKora, oaa ev rfj ovaua eKdorov ravra Se ovk drreipa- dvco he ravrd re Kal rd avpu- ^ePrjKora, dpuc/yorepa ovk aTreipa. dvdyKT] dpa elvai ri ov Trpcorov ri Karrjyopelrai Kal rovrov

30 ctAAo, Acat rovro laraodai Kal elvai ri o ovKeri ovre /caT* aAAou irporepov ovre Kar^ eKeivov dXXo irpo- repov Karrjyopelrai.

Ef? fiev ovv rpoTTog Xeyerai drrohei^ecjos ovroSy en 8' ctAAos", el cov rrporepa drra Karrjyopetrai, eon rovrcDV a7ro8et^t9, wv 8' eanv dTToSei^i?, ovre

35 ^eXnov exetv eyx<J^p^l Trpds avrd rov etSeVat, ovr* elSevai dvev aTTohei^eoJS, el he rohe hid rcovhe yvw-

" Definitory predicates are (in a sense at least) convertible with their subjects.

^, as a subject. Mure and Ross seem to be mistaken in taking rotovrajv as referring to avfi^e^rjKOTa.

« Cf. 82 b 37, 83 b 15.

" Cf. 83 b 13.

  • Predication is limited at one end by the individual

substance, at the other by the highest genus or category.

^ i.e., premisses which depend upon other premisses.



We have now established that in predication one Recapituia- predicate is asserted of one subject, and that pre- jng to dicates (except those which denote essence ") are not predicated of one another. They are all attributes, some per se and others in a different sense ; but we hold that they are all predicated of some subject, whereas an attribute is not a kind of subject ; because we do not regard as such ^ anything which is not something else distinct from the statement which is made about it, but is merely stated of some other term, while other attributes are predicated of a different subject. It follows that the assertion of a first dia- single predicate of a single subject cannot form an p^iff infinite series either upwards or downwards ; for the subjects of which the attributes are stated are no more than those which are implied in the essence of the individual, and these are not infinite in number ^; while in the upward direction we have these subjects and their attributes, both of which are limited in number.'* Hence there must be some subject of which something is first predicated, and something else must be predicated of this, and the series must be finite ; i.e., there must be a term which is not predicated of any other term prior to it, and of which no other prior term is predicated.*

This is a statement of one manner of proof, but Second dia- there is another also ; predicates of whose subjects ^^^^ other prior predicates can be predicated ^ are demon- strable ; and it is not possible to stand in a better relation ^ than that of knowledge to anything which is demonstrable, nor to know it apart from demon- stration. Moreover, if one thing is knowable through

" Aristotle refers to intuition, by which we apprehend the indemonstralale ; cf. Book II, ch. xix.




pufjLov, TctSe 8e (jltj tcr/xev firjSe ^eXrtov exofiev TTpos avTOL rod elSevai, ouSe to Sta rovrcov yvcopijJLOv eVt- orrjcjopi^Qa. el ovv eon n elhivai 8t' diroSei^eajs OLTrXcbs Kal fjLT] e/c rivcbv fjLTjS* i^ vnodeoeo)?, dvdyKr) 84 a loraodai rds Karr^yopias rd? fiera^v. et ydp fir) LaravraL, aAA* ecrnv del rod Xrj^devros indvco, drrdvro)V earrat dTToSei^cs' war' el rd aTretpa {jltj iy- ■^(cope'l hieXOelv, c5v eariv dTToSei^is, ravr* ovk elao- fieda Si* drrohei^eajs ' €t ovv fxr^Se ^eXrtov exopiev 5 TTpos avrd rod elSevau, ovk earat ovSev eTrioraoQai hi diTohei^eajs aTrXais, aAA' e^ virodeaecjs.

AoyLKOJS fjuev ovv eK rovrojv dv ns Tnarevaeie TTepl rod XexOivros, dvaXvnKcjg Se Std rwvSe cfyave- pov GVVTopLwrepov, on ovr* enl to dvco ovr* errl ro

10 /caret) direipa rd Karrfyopov pieva ivSex^rai etvai iv rals dTToSeLKTLKais eTnoTTjpiais , rrepl cLv rj oKexjjis eoTiv.

  • H ju-ev ydp a7To8et^t? eon rcov ocra VTrdpx^i Kad*

avrd Tolg irpdypLaoLV. Kad* avrd Se Sirrcog- ocra re ydp ev^ eKeivois evvTrdpx^L ev rep ri eon, Kal of? aura ev rw ri eanv vmdpxovGLV avroZs' olov rep

15 dpidpicp TO TTepiTTOV, o VTvapx^i puev dpidpLW, ev- VTrdpx^L S' avro? 6 dpiSpios ev rep Xoycp avrov, Kal TrdXiv ttXtjOo? t) to Staiperov ev rep Xoycp rod dpidpiov evvnapx^i. tovtojv 8' ovSerepa evSex^rat

^ €v seel. Jaeger.

« The proof is called analytical because it is based upon a principle of the relevant science, viz., demonstration. ^ See a 18 infra.



certain others, and we do not know the latter or stand in a better relation to them than that of knowledge, we shall have no scientific knowledge of that which is knowable through them. If, then, it is possible to know a thing absolutely through demon- stration, and not as a qualified or hypothetical conse- quence, the series of intermediate predications must have a limit. If there is no limit, and there is always something higher than the term last taken, every- thing will be demonstrable. Therefore, since it is impossible to traverse the numerically infinite, we shall not know by means of demonstration those pre- dicates which are demonstrable. Hence if at the same time we do not stand in a better relation to them than that of knowledge, it will not be possible to have scientific knowledge of anything absolutely through demonstration, but only hypothetically.

One might be convinced dialectically of the truth of our contention from the foregoing discussion ; but by analytical " method it can be apprehended more readily from the following arguments that there cannot be either in the upward or in the downward direction an infinite series of predicates in the demonstrative sciences, which are the subject of our investigation.

Demonstration is concerned with the essential Analytical attributes of things. There are two senses in which P^*^°^- attributes may be essential ; (a) because they inhere in the essence of their subjects, or (b) because their subjects inhere in their essence. An example of (6) is the relation of " odd " ^ to number ; " odd " is an attribute of number, and number itself is inherent in the definition of " odd." On the other hand, (a) plurality or divisibility is inherent in the definition of number. Neither of these processes of attribution



84 a

a7T€Lpa elvai, ovd* cos: ro Trepirrov rod apidjxov [ttoXlv yap av iv rep TrepiTTCp aAAo ctT^ (L ivvTrrjpx^v

20 vTTapxovTL- TOVTo 8' ct ecTTt, 7Tpa>T0v 6 dpidfxog evvTrdp^ei VTrdpxovGLv avrw' el ovv pbr) cvSep^erat direipa roiavra virapx^f-v ev rep ivi, ouS' eirl ro dvoj eorai dTreipa' dXXd jjltjv dvdyKYj ye Trdvra virdpx^LV TO) TTpcjTcp, olov Tip dptdfjia), KaKeivoi? Tov dpidpLOVy WOT* dvTiOTpi(j)OVTa earai, dAA' ovx

25 VTrepreivovTa) • ovhk firjv oaa iv rep ri icrnv iv- VTTapx^i', ovSe ravra dVetpa* ovSe yap dv e'irj oplara- adai. oior el rd /xev Karriyopovixeva KaO^ avrd Trdvra Xeyerai, ravra 8e purj direipa, iGrairo dv rd €m TO dvcjy ware /cat errt ro Kdrcxj.

Et 8* ovrcOy Kal rd iv r(p jxera^v hvo opojv del

30 TreTrepaapLeva. el 8e rovro, SijXov rjSy] Kal rcbv dTTohei^ecjov on dvdyKT] dp'xd? re etvai, Kal purj irdv- rojv etvai dTToSec^iv, oirep e^a/xeV rivas Xeyeiv /car' dpxds. el ydp elolv dpx<^ly ovre irdvr^ drroheLKrd ovr^ els aTreipov olov re ^ahit^eLV rd ydp elvai, rovrcov oTTorepovovv ov^ev dXXo icrrlv ^ ro etvat

35 pnqhev hidor'qpia dpieaov Kal dSuaiperov, dXXd rrdvra hiaiperd. rep ydp ivros ipi^dXXeodai dpov, dAA* ov rep TTpooXapL^dveodai, dnoSeLKwraL ro drroSeLK- vvpuevov, oior el rovr els aTreipov ivSexerac levai, ivhexoir dv Svo opcov aTreipa puera^v etvai pueoa.

" Number is assumed to be the downward limit ; if there is no upward limit there will be terms with infinitely many elements in their essence.

^ Thus they form not a vertical series but a kind of circle. Since they are convertible, " odd " must stand for " odd or even."

" Cf. 82 b 38. ^ Proved in ch. xx.

• 72 b 6.



can proceed to infinity. (6) The series cannot be infinite when the relation is that of " odd " to num- ber ; for then in its turn " odd " would have another attribute in which " odd " w^as inherent ; and if so, number must be ultimately inherent in the several " odds " which are its attributes. Thus since an infinite number of such attributes cannot apply to a single subject, the series will not be infinite in the upward direction either.'* Actually all such attributes must so inhere in the ultimate subject — the attri- butes of number in number and number in them — that they will be commensurate with it and not extend beyond it.^ Nor again are the attributes which inhere in the essence of their subject infinite in number ; if they were, definition would be impos- sible.^ Thus if all the attributes are predicated as essential, and as such cannot be infinite in number, the upward series must have a limit, and therefore so must the downward.

If this is so, the intermediates between any two terms must always be finite in number '^ ; and if this is so, it is obvious at once that there must be first principles of demonstration, and that the view that everything is demonstrable (which we mentioned at the beginning ^ as held by some) is false. For if there are first principles, (1) not everything is demon- strable, and (2) demonstration cannot form an infinite series ; because the rejection of either consequence immediately implies that no premiss is immediate and indivisible, but all are divisible. For it is by adding a term internally, and not externally, that a proposition is demonstrated. Thus if the process of demonstration can continue to infinity, it would be possible for there to be an infinite number of middles

F 129


84 b aAAa tout' aSvvarov, el laravrai at Karr)yopLai iirl TO dvoj Kal ro koltoj. on Se loTavraiy SeSeiKrai XoyiKcbs lJi€V TTporepov, avaXvTLKcos 8e vvv.

XXIII. AeSety/xevcov 8e rovrcov cfyavepov on, idv n ro avTO Svglv VTrdpxr), otov to A rep re T Kal 5 Tw A, pLT] Karr^yopovfJievov darepov Kara daripov, ri fjirjSafioJS '^ piT] Kara iravros, on ovk del Kara KOLVov n VTrdp^ei. otov rep loooKeXel Kal rep GKaXrjvcp ro Svorlv opOais loas e;\;€6v Kara kolvov n VTrdpx^L {fj yap crxVH'^ '^^ vndpxei, Kal ovx fi erepov), rovro 8' ovk del ovrojs exei. ecrro) yap ro

10 B Kad* o ro A rep FA vrrdpx€L. SrjXov roivvv on Kal ro B rep T KaV" A Kar^ dXXo kolvov, KdKeZvo Ka9* erepov, oiore hvo opcov puera^v direipoL dv ipLTTLTTroiev opoL. dAA' dSvvarov. Kara puev roivvv KOLVOV rL vrrdpxeLV ovk dvdyKT] del ro avro TrXeiocFLv,

15 etrrep^ eoraL a/xeoa SLaar^puara. ev pLevroL rep avrcp yeveL Kal eK rwv avrwv dropLOJv dvdyKTj rovs opovs etvaL, etrrep rcov Kad* avrd VTrapxovrojv eoraL ro KOLVOV ov yap rjv ef d'AAou yevovs el? dXXo Sta- ^TJvaL rd SeLKvvpieva.

^avepov Se Kal orL, orav ro A rep B virapxij, el

20 piev earL rL pieoov, eorrL Setf at oVt ro A rep B VTrdpx^L' Kal aroLX^Xa rovrov earl ravrd^ Kal ro-

^ Kal] Kal Tch D.

^ e?7rep ci. Jaeger ; irrciTrep.

  • ravTOL Ross : ravra.

« 84 a 39, «• Ch. vii.



between two terms. This, however, is impossible, if the series of predications lias an upward and a down- ward Hmit. That it has these Hmits was proved above by dialectical, and has now been proved by analytical method.

XXIII. Now that this fact has been established, Corollaries : it is evident that if the same attribute applies to two IVtr^butS^^ subjects, e.g., if A applies both to C and to D, which need not be are not reciprocally predicable of each other, at least mediated. not universally, the predicate will not always apply in virtue of a common characteristic. E.g., " having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles " applies in virtue of a common characteristic to the isosceles and to the scalene triangle : it belongs to each of them qua a particular kind of figure, and not qua different. But this is not always so. Let B stand for the characteristic in virtue of which A applies to C and D. Then clearly B also applies to C and D in virtue of some other characteristic, and this in virtue of another ; so that an infinite number of terms will be interpolated between the original two. But this is impossible.* Thus if there are to be immediate premisses it will not necessarily be in virtue of some common characteristic that the same predicate ap- plies to more than one subject. If, however, it is an essential attribute that is to be proved common, the (middle) terms must belong to the same genus and (the premisses) be derived from the same imme- diate premisses ; for we saw ^ that in proving pro- positions we cannot pass from one genus to another.

It is evident also that when A applies to B, if there (2) Con- is a middle term, it is possible to prove that A applies prJvaWe^lfy to B ; and the elements of this proof are identical niiddle with the middle terms, or rather the same in number ;



84 b

aavd* ocra [leoa iarlv' at yap afxeaoi irporaGeis

aroLX^ta, rj Trdaai 'q at KadoXov. et Se jxtj ecrriv, ovK€TL eoriv cLTTohei^is, aAA* r] errl ra? applet? ohos avrr] lariv. ofxoiios Se koI et to A to) B /xo) virdp-

25 ;\;€t, et /xev eWtv tj fxeoov 7] Trporepov S ovx VTrapx^i, €GTLV aTrdSetfts", et Se ix-q, ovk eartv, dAA* OLpx'q' Kal crTOt;^eta roaavr* icrrlv oaot opoc at yap tovtojv TTpordaeis dpxol ttjs dirohei^ews elaiv.^ Kal axjTrep evtat dpxal elaiv avaTrdSet/crot, ort ecrrt rdSe roSt

30 /cat vrrdpx^f' rdSe raySl, ovrco Kal on ovk eon rdSe t ofo VTrapx^L T00€ Tcpol' ojao at /xev etvat rt, at Se /XT^ etvat rt eaovrai dpx^ii.

"Orav Se SeT^ Set^at, Xrjnreov o rod B rrpcoTov KarriyopelraL. earw ro V, Kal rovrov ofioLO)? ro A/ K:at ovTOJs del ^ahiL,ovTi ovheTTor^ e^ajrepcxj TTporauis ouS' virdpxov Xafi^dveraL rod A iv ro)

35 SeLKVvvaL, aAA' aet ro jxeoov nvKvovrai ecxjs aStat- pera yevrjrai Kal ev. eon S' ev orav dfieaov yevrj- rai, Kal piia rrporaois drrXcbs rj djxeoos. Kal cjoirep iv roZs dXXois rj dpx^ drrXovv, rovro S' ov ravro TTavraxov, dAA* iv ^dpei fjuev fjuvd, iv Se /xeAet Stecrts',

85 a dAAo S' iv dXXcp, ovrcxjs iv ovXXoyiopLCi) ro ev rrpo-

raois dfjieaos, iv S' aTToSetfet /cat eVtcrro^/XTy d vov£. 'Ev jLtev ovv rols Set/crt/cot? GyXXoyLcrfioLS rov

1 A n, Ross : A.

" Assuming that there are several middles, forming with A and B a chain of immediate premisses, all of which, except the last, are " universal, " i.e. majors.



for it is the immediate premisses — either all or those which are universal — that are elements.** If there is no middle term, demonstration is impossible ; we are approaching first principles. Similarly too if A does not apply to B, if there is either a middle or a prior term to which A does not apply, demonstration is possible (otherwise it is not possible ; we are deal- ing with a first principle) ; and there will be as many elements as there are (middle) terms ; for it is the premisses containing these that are the principles of the demonstration. Just as there are some indemon- strable premisses to the effect that X is Y or X applies to Y, so there are others to the eifect that X is not Y or does not apply to Y ; so that some will be principles making an affirmative and others making a negative statement.

When, however, proof is required, we must assume How to (as middle) the immediate predicate of B. Let this ?^'(^) ^ffl?- be C, and let D similarly be predicated of C. If we mative

.. .1 . J r- ^ prool,

contmue this process we never assume in our prooi a premiss or an attribute which falls outside A, but we go on packing the space between until the inter- vals are indivisible or unitary : and we have one unit when the premiss is immediate. It is only the imme- diate premiss that is one in the unqualified sense. Just as in all other genera the basic measure is something simple, and this is not the same in all cases, but in weight is the mina,^ in music the quarter-tone, and so on in each genus, so in syllogism the unit is the immediate premiss, while in demonstration and understanding the unit is an act of intuition. '^

In affirmative syllogisms, then, nothing falls outside (6) negative

  • About 1 lb. avoirdupois.

" Which cognizes the immediate premiss.



85 a

VTToipxovros ovSev e^oj 7tl7TT€l, iv 8e rots" arepr]- TLKois, €vda fxev o Set VTrdpx^i'V, ovSev rovrov e^oj 5 TTtWet, olov el TO A rep B hia rod T pLiq (et yap rep ju-ev B TTavrl to F, Tip Se V pirjSevl to A)* ttolXlv dv Sir) OTL TCp r TO A ovScvl VTrdpx^L, piiaov XrjTrTeov Tov A Kal T, Kal ovTCog del TTopevaeTaL. edv he her) Set^at otl to A to) E ovx vrrdp^ei Tcp to T Tcp piev A TTavTL virdpxeiv ro) Se E pnqhevl [r] p^rj TravTt]/

10 TOV E ovheTTOT^ e^co TTeoretTai' tovto 8' earlv cp [ovY

Set vndpx^iv. inl Be tov TpiTOV Tpoirov ovTe dcf)^

ov Set ovTe o Set GreprjaaL ovBIttot efco ^aStetTat.

XXIV. Ovarjs S* aTTohei^eajs ttjs puev KadoXov

TTJs Se Kara pepos, /cat tt^s pev KaTrjyopiKrjs ttjs

15 Se GTeprjTiKTJg, df.i(f>i,G^r]Te'LTaL rroTepa ^eXriiov cos S* avTOJs Kal TTepl ttjs aTToSeLKVvvat XeyopLevrjs Kal rrjs etV to dSvvaTov dyovG7]s aTToSet^ecus". TrpojTov piev ovv eTTLGKei/jcopeOa rrepl ttjs KadoXov Kal ttjs KaTCL pLepos' hiqXwGavTes Se tovto, Kal ire pi ttjs SeLKVvvai Xeyopievrjs Kal ttjs els to dSvvaTOV eLTTOjpiev.

^ ^ fjLTj navTi seel. Ross. 2 ov om. Dn^, Ross.

" «.«., no middle term is assumed that is wider than the predicate.

^ Celarent in the first figure.

" Strictly non-attribution ; Aristotle again means the predicate or major term.

•* Ross is doubtless right in bracketing rj ixtj iravTi and so confining the reference to Camestres, because Aristotle seems to have only universal conclusions in view.

  • Since the major and minor terms are regarded as ex-

tremes, " outside " here means " below " ; no middle will be narrower than the subject. It may, however (though Aristotle does not actually say so), be wider than the predicate. 134


the attribute." In negative syllogisms (1) in one mood ^ nothing falls outside the term whose attribu- tion ^ is required to be proved ; e.g., supposing that it is required to be proved by means of C that A does not apply to B (the premisses being C applies to all B, and A to no C) ; if in turn it is required to prove that A applies to no C, a middle term must be assumed between A and C, and the process will continue in this way. (2) If, however, it is required to prove that D does not apply to E because C applies to all D but to none [or not to all] <^ of E, the additional terms will never fall outside ^ E, i.e., the subject to which the predicate is required <not>^ to apply. (3) In the third mood ^ the additional terms will never proceed be- yond the subject or the predicate of the required negative conclusion.

XXIV. Since demonstration may be either uni- la universal versal or particular,'^ and either affirmative or nega- pa?tfcSfa? tive, it may be debated which is the better. So too demonstra- with regard to so-called ostensive proof and reduc- tio ad impossihile. First, then, let us consider uni- versal and particular demonstration. When we have cleared up this question let us discuss direct proof and reductio ad impossihile.^

f The negative, required in English, is dispensable in Aris- totle's fornuila {cf. 8 Sei VTrdpxeiv in a 3 above). It was pro- bably inserted in the text by a zealous corrector.

f Clearly not the third figure (which, as Ross points out, does not satisfy the conditions) but Cesare in the second — the only other mood which gives a universal negative con- clusion.

'^ Not in the ordinary sense of the terms, because demon- stration proper is not concerned with particular or singular propositions (the argument adduced and rejected below is unscientific) ; the distinction is between degrees of univer- sality. * See ch. xxvi.



85 a ^

20 Ao^ete fxev ovv rdx av rioiv coSl (jko7tov(7lv tj

Kara fjuepos etvat ^eXriajv. el yap Kad^ rjv fjLoiXXov irrLGrdfjieda aTToSei^tv ^eXricov d77o8et^ts' {avrrj yap dperr] drrohei^ecos) , fxaXXov 8' eiridrdixeda eKaarov orav avTO elScj/uiev Kad^ avro rj orav /car' aAAo [olov

25 rov pLovoiKov Ys^opiuKov orav ore 6 KoplarKos fjiov- GLKog •^ orav on dvOpojTTos^ fxovGiKos' o/jlolcos 8e /cat errt rcov dXXojv), r] 8e KadoXov otl dXXo, ovx on avro r€TVxr]Kev iTTiSeiKWcnv {olov on to luo- (jKeXeg ovx ^'^^ looGKeXes dXX on rpiycovov), r) 8e Kara [JLepog on avro' el Sr] ^eXricxiv fiev rj Kad^ avro,

30 TOLavrr] 8' rj Kara fiepos rrjs KadoXov p.dXXov, Kal PeXriajv dv rj Kara fiepos drroSei^LS eirj. en el ro jxev KadoXov jxrj eori n irapd rd Kad^ eKaara, rj 8* aTrdSeifts" So^av epbTroiel elvai n rovro Kad* o dno- heiKwoiy Kai nva (j)vaLV VTrdpxeuv ev rots ovoi rav- rrjv, olov rpuyoivov irapd rd nvd Kal Gxyjp^ciros napd

35 rd nvd Kal dpidfjuov irapd rovs nvds dpiOfjiovs,

^eXricov 8' rj irepl ovros tj pAj ovros Kal 8t* rjv p/r)

drrarrjdrjuerai rj 8t' rjV, eon 8' rj p,ev KadoXov roi-

avrr) {rrpo'Covres ydp SetKvvovGLV, (Lonrep rrepl rod dvd

^ dvdpojTTos Ross.

<• Of Scepsis in Mysia ; a friend whose name Aristotle often uses in illustrative examples. The epithet /xovaiKos is probably used with its wider meaning.

  • Probably either Academic mathematicians or actual

disciples of Eudoxus, who discovered the general theory of proportion.



Some people, looking at the question in the follow- Arguments ing way, might suppose that particular demonstration vlSde-"'" is superior. (1) If the superior method of demonstra- monstra- tion is that by which we gain more knowledge (since this is the distinctive merit of demonstration), and we have more knowledge of an individual thing when we recognize it in virtue of itself than when we do so in virtue of something else (as, e.g., we have more knowledge of " cultured Coriscus " " when we know that Coriscus is cultured than when we only know that man is cultured ; and similarly in all other cases) ; and whereas universal demonstration informs us that something else, not that the particular thing, has a given attribute — e.g., does not tell us that an isosceles triangle has a given attribute because it is isosceles but because it is a triangle — , particular demonstration informs us that the particular thing has it ; — if, then, the better demonstration is that which informs us of something in virtue of itself, and particular is more of this nature than universal demonstration, then particular will also be superior to universal demonstration. (2) Further, if the uni- versal does not exist apart from particulars, and demonstration produces in us a belief that there is something of this nature in virtue of which the demonstration proceeds, and that this inheres as a definite characteristic in things (e.g., the character- istics triangle, figure and number apart from par- ticular triangles, figures and numbers) ; and if the demonstration which treats of the existent and is infallible is superior to that which treats of the non- existent and is fallible ; and if universal demonstra- tion is of the latter kind (since it is by proceeding in this way that they ^ attempt proofs like that which



86a ^

Xoyov, olov on o av fj tl tolovtov earat dva Xoyov,

o ovT€ ypafifXT] ovr dpidfjios ovre arepeov ovr^ irri- 85 b TTcSov, dAAa TTapd ravrd ri) • — el ovv KaOoXov fiev fjidXXov avTTiy 7T€pl ovros 8' rjrrov rrjs Kara fidpos /cat ifjLTTOLet So^av ifjevSrj, x^tpcov dv eirj rj KadoXov rrjs Kara fiepos.

'^H TTpcoTOV fji€V ouSev fxdXXov €ttI rod KadoXov t] 5 Tov Kara piipos drepos Xoyos iariv ; et yap to '^vglv dpdalg VTTapx^t' P^ fj IcroGKeXes aAA' fj rptyajvov, 6 etScos" on laoaKeXes rjrrov olhev fj avro t) o etScos" on rptycDvov. oXcos re, el fiev p.rj ovros fj rpiyojvov elra SelKvvcnv, ovk dv etrj dirohei^iSy el 8e ovros, 6 elhd)s eKaarov fj eKaarov vnapxec fidXXov otSev. el

10 Srj ro rptycovov enl rrXeov earl, /cat o avros Xoyos, /cat fir) KaO* o/Ltcovu/xtav to rplyojvov, /cat virapxec rravrl rpiycovo) ro bvo, ovk dv ro rplyojvov fj lao- GKeXes, dAAa ro laoGKeXes fj rpiycovov, e^oi roiavras rds yojvias. oiare 6 KadoXov elSojs pcdXXov otSev fj

15 vnapx^t rj 6 Kara p.epos. ^eXrlwv dpa r] KadoXov

rrjs Kara piepos. en el puev e'er] ns Xoyos els /cat pirj

opLCovvpLia ro KadoXov, etr) r'^ dv ovSev rjrrov eviojv

^ T* om. n. 138


asserts that a proportional is anything which has a certain definite characteristic, and that it is neither a line nor a number nor a solid nor a plane, but some- thing distinct from these) — , if, then, this kind of proof is closer to universal demonstration, and treats less of the existent than particular demonstration, and produces a false opinion, universal will be inferior to particular demonstration.

In point of fact, however, (1) the first argument Jiefutation applies no more to universal than to particular above, demonstration. If the attribute of having the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles belongs to a figure not qua isosceles but qua triangle, the man who knows that the figure possesses this attribute because it is isosceles knoM's less of the essential reason for the fact than he who knows that it is so because the figure is a triangle. And in general if, when an attribute does not belong to a given subject qua triangle, the attribute is proved of that subject, the proof cannot amount to demonstration ; but if it does apply to the subject (^qua triangle), then he has the greater knowledge who knows that a given attri- bute belongs to a given subject as such. Thus if " triangle " is the wider term, and has an invariable meaning, the term " triangle " not being equivocal ; and if the attribute of having the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles applies to every triangle, then it is the isosceles qua triangle, and not the triangle qua isosceles, that will possess such angles. Thus the man who knows the universal has more knowledge than he who knows the particular. Therefore universal is superior to particular demon- stration. (2) If the meaning is invariable and the universal term is not merely equivocal, it will be not




T(hv Kara fjuepo^, dXXa /cat /xaAAov, oao) ra acjiOapra

iv €K€LVOLS earl, ra 8e Kara fiepos c/ydapra fxaXXov, ert T€ ovSefJLLa dvdyKT] VTToXapi^dveLV tl etvat rovro 20 napa ravra on ev Sr^Xoi, ovSev fiaXXov t] €7tI tcjv aXXojv oaa firj rl arjpLaivet dAA' r] ttoiov t] npos tl "5 7TOL€LV. el Se dpa, ovx "^ aTToSei^Ls alrla aAA' o


"Ert €t rj (XTroSetf ts" /xeV icm ayXXoyiaiJios SeiKri- Kos alrtag Kal rod Sid tl, to KadoXov S* aiTioJTepov 25 {(L yap Kad* avTO VTrdpx^L tl, tovto avTO avTO) aiTLOv TO 8e KadoXov TrpcoTov a'lTLOv dpa to Kado- Xov)' cucrre Kal r) aTroSeifts" ^eArtcuv puaXXov yap tov aiTLOV Kal TOV Sta tl €(jtlv.

"Ert fX^Xpi TOVTOV ^7]TOVfjLeV TO 8ta TLy Kal t6t€

OLOfJieda ctSeVat orav pLT) fj otl tl dXXo tovto t}

30 yiyvofjievov t) ov tcXos yap Kal rrepa? to eaxaTov

-rjSr] ovTCog eoTLV. olov TLVog eVe/ca rjXdev ; ottcjs

Xd^j] TdpyvpLov, TOVTO 8' oTTCos dnoScp o axfyetXe,

TOVTO 8' 0776US" piT] dSLKT^GT)' Kal OVTCO? l6vT€S , OTaV

pir]K€TL 8t' d'AAo pLTjS^ dXXov ev€Ka, 8td tovto (Ls re-

Xos (jyapiev iXdeXv Kal etvaL Kal yiyveodaL, Kal t6t€

35 elSevaL jLtdAtcrra SLa tl rjXOev. et Srj d/xotcos" eyet cttI

TTaoojv Tixiv aLTLcov Kal Twv 8td TL, IttI 8e Tcov oaa

°- Genera and species being (for Aristotle at least) perma- nent types.

  • In the sense that the subject of a (commensurately) uni-

versal attribute is the first subject to which it can be shown to apply : 73 b 32.



less but more really existent than some of the par- ticulars, inasmuch as universals include imperishable things,*^ whereas particulars tend rather to be perish- able. Further, there is no need to assume that the universal is some one entity apart from the particulars simply because it has a single denotation ; no more than in the case of the other categories which denote not substance but quality or relation or activity. If this assumption is made, the fault lies not in the demonstration but in the hearer.

(3) There is also the argument that demonstration Further

is a syllogism proving the cause or reasoned fact, and a?guments. the universal is more of the nature of a cause (for a subject which possesses an attribute per se is itself the cause of its own possession of that attribute ; and the universal is primary ^ ; therefore the universal is the cause). Therefore universal demonstration is superior, because it more properly proves the cause or reasoned fact.

(4) Again, we cease our inquiry for the reason and assume that we know it when we reach a fact whose existence or coming into existence does not depend upon any other fact ; for the last stage of an inquiry by this method is ipso facto the end and limit. Eg-, why did X come ? To get the money ; and this was in order to repay what he owed, and this again in order not to do wrong. When, as we proceed in this way, we reach a cause which neither depends upon anything else nor has anything else as its object, we say that this is the end for which the man came, or exists, or comes into being ; it is then that we say that we understand most completely wki/ the man came. If, then, the same principle applies to all causes and reasoned facts, and if our knowledge of




atrta ovrcog cos ov eveKa ovtojs taixev jLtaAtdra, kol

irrl tcl)V dXXcov dpa rore /xaAtara LGfiev orav fJbrjKerL vnapxi) Tovro on dXXo. orav [xev ovv yiyvoiGKO}- fi€v OTL rirrapoiv at e^co taai, ort laoaKeXeg, en 86 a AetVerat Sta tl to laocrKeXes, ore rpiyoyvov, kol TOVTO, on Gx^jpiOL evdvypapLfjiov. el Se rovro pLrjKen Stdrt aAAo, Tore pLaXcara tcr/xev. Kal KaBoXov 8e t6t€' t] KaBoXov dpa ^eXricov. Ert oacp dv pidXXov Kara puepog fj, et? rd direipa

5 €pL7rL7TT€L, Tj Sk KadoXoV 61? TO aTrXoVV Kal TO TT€paS .

eaTi 8', fj jLtev direipd, ovk iTTiuTiqTd, fj 8e ne-

TTepavTai, eTrLGTrjTa. f dpa KaBoXov, pidXXov eTTL-

OTYjTd Tj fj KaTa pL€po9. aTToSecKTa dpa pidXXov rd

KaBoXov. Tcov 8e aTToSeiKTcbv pidXXov pidXXov diro-

Sei^LS' a/xa yap pidXXov Ta TTpos tl. ^eArtcov dpa rj

10 KaBoXov, i7T€L7T€p Kal /xctAAov aTToSetfts".

"Ert el^ alp6TOJT€pa KaB^ rjv tovto Kal dXXo r) KaB^

rjv tovto piovov otSev 6 Se riyv KaBoXov e;^ajv otSe

Kal TO KaTa puipos, ovtos 8€ to KaBoXov ovk otSev

a)GT€ Kav ovTOJS alpeTOJTepa clt].

"Ert 8e coSe. to yap KaBoXov puaXXov SeiKvvvai

1 61 om. DM. 142


all final causes is most complete under the condi- tions which we have just described, then in all other cases too our knowledge is most complete when we reach a fact which does not depend further upon any- other fact. So when we recognize that the sum of the exterior angles of a figure is equal to four right angles, because the figure is isosceles, there still remains the reason why the figure is isosceles, viz., that it is a triangle, and this because it is a right-lined figure. If this reason depends upon nothing else, our knowledge is now complete. Moreover our know- ledge is now universal ; and therefore universal know- ledge is superior.

(5) Again, the more particular causes are, the more they tend to form an infinite regress, whereas uni- versal demonstration tends towards the simple and finite ; and causes qua infinite are not knowable, whereas qua finite they are knowable. Hence causes are more knowable qua universal than qua particular ; and therefore universal causes are more demon- strable. But the demonstration of things which are more demonstrable is more truly demonstration ; for correlatives vary simultaneously in degree. Hence universal demonstration is superior, inasmuch as it is more truly demonstration.

(6) Again, that kind of demonstration by which one knows a given fact and another fact as well is prefer- able to that by which one knows only the given fact. But he who has universal knowledge knows the par- ticular cause as well, whereas the man who has only particular knowledge does not know the universal cause. Hence on this ground also universal demon- stration will be preferable.

(7) Again, there is the following argument. Proof



86 a

15 iarl TO Sta fjueaov heiKvuvai eyyvripw ovros rrjs

dpxrjs. iyyvrdroj Se to d/JLeaov tovto 8' dp^^rj. €L ovv T] ef dpxrjs ttj? puT) ef ^PX1^> V pidXXov ef dpx^js TTJs rJTTOV dKpi^eoTepa drrohei^Ls . euTi Se TOLavTTj Tj KadoXov pidXXov KpeLTTCxJv dp^ dv ciq rj KadoXov. olov el eSet diroSei^aL to A /caro, tov A*

20 /xecra ra e^' Sv BF* dvcoTepoj Stj to B, cScrre 7y 8td TOVTOV KadoXov pidXXov.

'AAAa Tcbv pLev elpr^pievcov evta XoycKa eoTi' pid- Atcrra Se SrjXov otl rj KaOoXov KvpLWTepa otl tcov rrpoTdoeajv ttjv pLev rrpoTepav exovTes tapiev ttcxjs

25 /cat TTjv VGTepav kol exopiev Swdpiet, olov e't Tcg olSev OTL ndv Tptycovov Svalv 6p9ai£y olSe ttcjs kol TO LGOGKeXeg otl Svo opdalg, Swdpuei, kol el pbrj oiSe TO laoGKeXeg otl Tpiycovov 6 Se TavTTjv e^cuv ttjv irpoTaoLv TO KadoXov ovSapbOJs otSev, ovTe SwdpueL ovT^ evepyeia. Kal rj puev KadoXov vor^Tij, rj Se

30 /card [juepo? elg aiuBr]ULV reAeura.

XXV. "Otl pL€V ovv rj KadoXov jSeArtcov rry? KaTa piepos, Tooavd^ rjpuv elprjodo)' otl S' rj SeLKTLKrj Trjs

" The implication is that (6), which Aristotle now proceeds to expand, is (or can be made) truly scientific.

  • > Not a major and a minor, but the two premisses men-

tioned in the following lines.

" When it reaches individuals, which are ])erceptible rather than intelligible.



of the more universal fact consists in proving by a

middle which is nearer to the first principle. Now

that which is nearest to the first principle is the

immediate premiss, i.e., the first principle itself. If,

then, demonstration from the first principle is more

accurate than demonstration which is not from the

first principle, that demonstration which is more

nearly from the first principle is more accurate than

that which is less nearly from it. Now it is universal

demonstration which is more truly of this nature ;

and therefore universal demonstration is superior.

E.g., suppose that it is required to demonstrate A of

D, the middle terms being B and C. B is the higher

term, and so the demonstration by means of B is the

more universal.

Some of the foregoing arguments, however, are Final proofs

merely dialectical." The clearest indication that l^^^ univer-

•^ , T . . 1 ... 1 sal demon-

universal demonstration is more authoritative is that stration is

when we comprehend the former of the two pre- ^"P^^^°^- misses ^ we have knowledge in a sense of the latter as well, and comprehend it potentially. E.g., if any- one knows that every triangle has the sum of its interior angles equal to two right angles, he knows in a sense also (viz., potentially) that the sum of the interior angles of an isosceles triangle is equal to two right angles, even if he does not know that the iso- sceles is a triangle. But the man who comprehends the latter premiss does not in any sense know the universal fact, neither potentially nor actually. More- over universal demonstration is intelligible, whereas particular demonstration terminates in sense percep- tion.^

XXV. The foregoing account may suffice to show Affirmative that universal is superior to particular demonstration, to^^^^ative



86 a

areprjrLKrjg, ivrevdev SrjXov. earo) yap avrrj r) OLTToSeL^LS peXrlojv rcbv dXXoJV rwv avrcov VTrap- 35 )(6vTOJVj Yj i^ iXaTTOVCov alrrifidrcov rj VTToOeueojv tj Trporaaecov. et ydp yvwpijJiOL ofiOLCoSy to ddrrov yvaJvai Sid tovtojv virdp^ei' rovro 8' alperwrepov. Xoyos Se rrjs Trpordaecus, on ^eXrlojv rj i^ iXarro- vcjv, KadoXov oSe^* el ydp ofioioj? e'lr) to yvojpipia etvai rd fxeoa, rd Se nporepa yvojpLfJicnrepa, earco S&h rj fiev Sid fieaojv aTroSetft? rcov BFA on ro A ro) E VTrapx^iy rj 8e Sid rcov ZH on ro A toj E. ofxoicos Srj^ ex^i ro on ro A rw A VTrdpx^i Kal ro A rep E. TO 8* on ro A rep A irporepov Kal yvojpijjLO)- repov rj on ro A rep E* Sid ydp rovrov eKelvo drro- 6 SeiKvvrai, mororepov Se ro 8t' ov. /cat rj Sid rcjv iXarrovcov dpa drroSci^is ^eXrlcov rcbv dXXcov rcbv avrcbv VTTapxovrcxJV. d/JLcfyorepai fiev ovv Sid re opojv rpicbv Kal jrpordoeojv Svo SeiKvvvrai, dAA' rj fxev elvai n Xaji^dvei, rj Se Kal elvai Kal jxrj elvai Tf Sid rrXeiovcov dpa, coore -yeipcxiv. 10 "Ert eTTeiSrj SeSeiKrai on dSiJvarov dji^orepcjav ovacbv GreprjriKcbv rcbv rrpordaecov yeveadai avX- XoyiGfjiov, dXXd rrjv jiev SeZ roiavrrjv elvai, rrjv 8'

^ oSe Dnp : tSSc Waitz : 84 codd. plerique. 2 8i) np : 8e.

  • • i.e., more universal.

^ Presumably because it is proved by the same number of middle terms.

<* The argument is blatantly dialectical, since it turns upon an equivocation. The premisses of a negative syllo- gism are the same in number as those of an affirmative one ; they are " more " only in kind.

•* An. Pr. I. vii.




That affirmative is superior to negative demonstra- demonstra- tion will be clear from the following argument. (1) It FiSt argu- may be assumed that, given the same conditions, ^^^^*' that form of demonstration is superior to the rest which depends upon fewer postulates or hypotheses or premisses ; for supposing that they are equally well known, when there are fewer of them knowledge will be more quickly attained, and this result is to be preferred. The argument that demonstration from fewer premisses is superior may be stated universally as follows. Supposing that in both cases alike the middle terms are known, and that middle terms are better known in proportion as they are prior," let us assume demonstration that A applies to E in one case by means of the middle terms B, C and D, and in another by means of F and G. Then the proposition that A applies to D is equally evident ^ with the pro- position (in the second case) that A applies to E. But the proposition that A applies to D is prior and more knowable than the proposition (in the first case) that A applies to E ; for the latter is proved by the former, and the means of proof is more certain than the thing proved. Therefore the demonstration which proceeds from fewer premisses is superior to any other conducted under the same conditions. Now both affirmative and negative demonstration are proved by three terms and two premisses, but whereas the former assumes that something is so, the latter assumes both that something is and that something is not so. Hence it proceeds from more " premisses, and is therefore inferior.

(2) It has already been proved ^ that there can be Second no syllogism when both premisses are negative ; if ^'^S"™®"*- uL ^^^ ^^ ^^ *^^^ kind, the other must make an affirmative




86 b

OTL VTrdpx^i, €Tt Trpos" TOVTCO Set roSe Xa^eZv. ret? jxkv yap KarriyopiKas av^avojiivris rrjs OLTroSel^eajs dvayKOLov yiyveodaL nXeiovs, rds Se orepiqTiKds 15 dhvvarov TrXeiovs elvai fjuds ev aTravri auXXoyiajjicp. ear CO yap firjSevl VTrdp)(ov ro A €^' ogojv to B, TO) Se r V7Tdp)(ov TTavrl to B. dv orj Serj ttoXlv av^€LV dfjicborepas rd? mpoTdG€is, f^ieaov epb^Xririov .


20 Br) E (jyavepov on KarrjyopiKoVy to Se A rov fjiev B KarrjyopLKov, rrpo? Se to A co? areprjTLKov KetraL. TO jLtev yap A Travros rov B, to Se A oi)Sevt Set tojv A VTrdpx^LV. yiyverai ovv fxia arepr^rLKr] irporaGis

7) TO AA. O S' aVTOS" TpOTTOS Kal iirl TCOV €T€pCxJV

GvXXoyLOfjLcov. del yap to jxeaov tojv KaT'qyopLKOjv 25 dpojv KaTTiyopiKov ctt' djxcfiOTepa' tov Se OTeprjTiKov eTrl ddTepa GTeprjTiKov dvayKalov elvai, ojOTe avTif] fila TOiavTTj y[yv€TaL npoTaaiS, at 8' aAAat KaTf]- yopiKai. et St) yvcDpifjicaTepov St' ou SetVvuTat /cat


KaT'qyopLKTJs, avTrj Se St' e/cetvT^s" ou SetWuTat, 30 TTpOTepa Kal yvcDpifxajTepa ovoa Kal TTUGTOTepa jSeA- Ttcuv av etTy.

"ETt et ap;Y7 GuXXoycG/jLov r) KadoXov TTpOTaats djJLeGos, 6GTL S' ev /xev tt^ heiKTiKfj KaTacfyaTLKTj iv

Se T7y GT€pr)TLKfj d7TO(f)aTLKrj Tj KadoXoV TTpOTaOLS, T)

Se KaTa(j)aTiKri ttjs dTTO^aTLKrjs TrpoTepa Kal yvco- pifjiCOTepa (Std yap ttjv KaTd<^aGiv rj dTTO^aGLS 35 yvaypLfios, Kal irpoTepa rj KaTd<j)aGi£ , cjGTrep Kal to elvai tov /jli] elvai)' a)GTe ^eXTiajv rj dpxrj Trjg 148


statement. Now in addition to this we must grasp the following fact. As the demonstration is ex- panded,** the affirmative premisses must increase in number, but there cannot be more than one negative premiss in any syllogism. Let us suppose that A applies to no instances of B, and that B applies to all C. Then if it is further required to expand both these premisses, a middle term must be interpolated in them. Let D be the middle of AB, and E of BC. Then obviously E is affirmative, but D, though related affirmatively to B, is related negatively to A ; for D must be predicated of all B, but A must apply to no D. Thus we get one negative premiss, vis., AT). The same holds good of all other syllogisms. Where the terms are affirmative, the middle is always related affirma- tively to both the others ; but in a negative syllogism the middle term must be related negatively to one of the others, and therefore this is the only pre- miss of this kind that we obtain ; the rest are affirma- tive. Now if the means of proof is more knowable and more certain than the thing proved, and negative is proved by affirmative demonstration, but not affir- mative by negative, the affirmative, being prior and more knowable and more certain, must be superior.

(3) Again, if the starting-point of a syllogism is the Third universal immediate premiss and if in affirmative argument. proof the universal premiss is affirmative and in negative proof negative, and if the affirmative is prior to and more knowable than the negative premiss (for it is through the affirmation that the negation be- comes known, and the affirmation is prior to the nega- tion, just as being is prior to not-being), — then the starting-point of the affirmative is superior to that of

" By the interpolation of middle terms.



86 b

SeiKTiKYJ^ -^ rrjs GT€pr]TLKrjs' rj Se ^eXrioaiv dpxcus XpojfJi€V7] peXricov.

"Ert apxcetSearepa' dvev yap rrjs SeiKwovar]?

OVK eOTLV T) (TT€p7]TLK'q.

87 a XXVI. 'Evret 8' rj KarrjyopiKrj rrjg GT€p7]TiKrJ9

jSeArtcuv, SrjXov on /cat ri^s els to dSvvarov dyoijcrrjs. Set 8' elSevai ris r) Sia(f)opd avrajv. earoj Sr] to A pL7]Bevl vTTapxov tw B, tco 8e r to B rravTi' dvdyKTj

5 877 TO) r fJi7]S€VL VTrdpX^^V TO A. OVTOJ [xev ovv

X7jcf)d€VTCjov SeLKTLKT] 7) GT€pr]TLKrj dv €Lr} aTroSet^ts* OTL TO A TO) r ovx vnapxet. rj 8' els to dSvvaTov 0)8' ex^L. el SeoL 86tfat on to A toj B ot);\; VTrdpxeL, XrjTTTeov VTrdpxeiv, Kal to B tco T, cjGTe GVfJL^aiveL TO A Tw r VTrdpx^i'V. TOVTO 8' eaTO) yvcoptpLov Kal 10 opioXoyovfxevov otl dSvvaTov. ovk dpa olov Te to A Tw B VTTapxeiV. el ovv to B tco T opioXoyeiTai VTTapxeiV, TO A TO) B dSvvaTOV VTrdpx^iv. ol fxev ovv opoL ofxoLCos TdTTOVTai, hia^epei he to otto- Tepa dv rj yvajpufxcoTepa tj irpoTaois rj OTeprjTLKifjy

TTOTepOV OTL TO A TO) B OVX ^'^dpX^L t) OTt TO A Tip

15 r. OTav fxev ovv fj to avpiTrepaafxa yvcjpifxwTepov OTL OVK eoTLV, Tj els TO dSvvaTov yiyveTaL diroheL^LS ,

OTav 8* 7) iv TW GvXXoyLCFfJiCpy Tj dTToSeLKTLKlj . <j)VGeL

" Here again there seems to be an equivocation, though Aristotle may not have been conscious of it. In the previous sentence apxq has been translated " starting-point " because that is all that it seems to be intended to mean ; but here it seems rather to mean " logical principle." The argument which follows tends to confirm this view.

  • i.e.^ an affirmative premiss.



the negative demonstration. But the demonstration which uses superior first principles " is itself superior.

(4) Again, affirmative demonstration is more of the Fourth nature of a first principle ; for negative demonstra- ^rgi'^^ent. tion is impossible without another (affirmative) demonstration ^ to prove it.

XXVI. Since affirmative demonstration is superior Ostensive to negative, clearly it is also superior to reductio ad t^nTs^*^^^' impossibile. We must, however, understand what is superior to the difference between them.*' Let us suppose that Zllmpos- A applies to no B, but that B applies to all C ; then «^^«- A must apply to no C. When the terms are taken in this way the negative demonstration that A does not apply to C will be ostensive. But reductio ad impos- sibile takes the following form. Supposing that it is required to prove that A does not apply ^ to B, we must assume that it does apply, and that B applies to C, so that it foUow^s that A applies to C. Let it be known and admitted that this is impossible. Then A cannot apply to B. Thus if B is admitted to apply to C, A cannot apply to B.^ The terms, then, are arranged in the same way ; the difference depends upon this : in which form the negative premiss is better known, whether as the statement " A does not apply to B " or " A does not apply to C." Thus when it is the negative statement in the conclusion that is better known, we get demonstration by reduc- tio ad impossibile ; when it is one of the premisses of the syllogism, we get ostensive demonstration.

" Sc, negative ostensive proof and reductio ad impos- sibile .

In this example Aristotle ignores quantity as being complicative and unnecessary for his argument.

  • Because the conjunction of two true premisses cannot

give a false conclusion : An. Pr. II. 53 b 12-25.



87 a

Se TTporepa r] on to A ro) B r^ on ro A rw T.

TTporepa yap ion rod ovpLirepdo pharos i^ tSv to GvpiTT€paGp,a- 'ion 8e ro puev A ro) T pr) vnapx^i^v

20 avpLTTepaap^a, to Se A rep B €$ ov ro avpLTTepaapia. ov yap el avpL^aivei avaipeZadai n, rovro ovpiTTe- paapid eanv, eVetva 8e ef c5v, aAAa ro /xev ef ou GvXXoyiapLO? iarnv o dv ovroj? exjj (joore tj oXov TTpos piipos rj piepos rrpos oXov e)(€iv, at he ro AF

25 Kol BF^ TTpordoeis ovk exovoiv ovrco irpos dXXijXas. €1 ovv Y] e/c yvcopipLOjrepcjv Kal iTporepojv Kpeirrcjv, elol S' dp.(f)6repaL e/c rod pLTj elvai n jnorai, dXX r) /xev eK TTporepov rj S' e^ varepov, ^eXriojv drrXoJS dv etr] TTys" ets" ro dSvvarov r) urepiqnKri diToheL^is , ware Kal rj ravrrjs ^eXrtojv rj KarrjyopLKrj SrjXov

30 on Kal rrjs elg ro dSvvarov ecrn ^eXricov.

XXVII. ^AKpc^earepa 8' eTnarijpLr] eTTiorrjpLrjs Kal TTporepa rj re rod on Kal Scon rj avrrj, dXXd p,r) X^pls Tov on rrjs rod Sion, Kal r) pur] KaO^ viroKei- pievov rrjs Kad^ vnoKeipievov, otov dpidprjnKrj dp-

35 piovLKrj?, Kal r) e^ eXarrovojv rrjs eK rrpoadeaeojs,

otov yecopierpias dpcdpLrjriKTJ. Xeyoj 8' e/c Trpoade- 152


But the statement " A does not apply to B " is prior in nature to " A does not apply to C " ; for the pre- misses from which the conclusion is drawn are prior to the conclusion, and the statement " A does not apply to C " is the conclusion, while " A does not apply to B " is one of the premisses from which the conclusion is drawn. For if we obtain a destructive result," this result is not a conclusion, nor are the statements from which it is drawn premisses, in the strict sense. The statements from which a syllogism follows are premisses related to one another as whole to part or part to whole ; and the premisses AC and BC are not so related to one another. Therefore if that demonstration is superior which proceeds from better known and prior premisses, and both these kinds of demonstration depend upon negative statements, of which one is prior and the other posterior, then negative demonstration will be absolutely superior to reductio ad impossibile ; and therefore affirmative demonstration, being superior to negative, will a fortiori also be superior to demonstration by reductio ad impossibile.

XXVII. Knowledge at the same time of the fact Ranking of and of the reasoned fact, as contrasted with knowledge |c?or^hig to of the former without the latter, is more accurate and their aims prior. So again is knowledge of objects which do not matter. inhere in a substrate as contrasted with that of objects which do so inhere {e.g., arithmetic and har- monics) and that which depends upon fewer factors as contrasted with that which uses additional factors (e.g., arithmetic and geometry). What I mean by

" Involving the disproof of a hypothesis.

1 Br C\ Ross : AB.



87 a

accos" oLov fjiovas ovata aOeros, Griyfirj 8e ovaca deros' ravr7]v eK Trpocrdeaeajs.

XXVIII. Mta S' iTTLGrrjiJLTj iorlv rj ivos yevovg,

oaa €K Tcov ttocotcov avyKeirai koI fJieprj iorlv r)

40 Trddr] TOVTCxJV Kad* aura, irepa 8' iTncrr'^fjiT] iarlv

87 b irepa?, oorcov at dpxoLt fJirir* iK rcov avrcov p.i]6* drepat^ iK rajv iripcov. rovrov Si arjpieiov orav etV rd dvaTToSeiKra eXdr)- Set yap avrd iv rw avrco yiv€L etvai rots dTToheSeiypiivoLS. (jr]iJL€Lov Si /cat rovrov orav rd SeiKVvpieva 8t' avrcov iv ra> avraj yivei WGL /cat avyyevrj. 5 XXIX. YiXeiovs 8' drroSel^eL's elvai rod avrov iyXcopeZ ov p,6vov iK rrjg avrrjs ovorocx^a? Aa/x- ^dvovn pLT) rd ovvexis fiicrov, otov rwu AB to F /cat A /cat Z, aAAa /cat ef irepa?. otov earoj rd A fierapaXXeiVy rd 8' e^' S A KLveladai, rd Si B '^Seadai, /cat 77-aAtv rd H r^pepLit^eoSai. dXrjdeg ovv 10 /cat rd A rod B /cat to A tou A Karrjyopelv d yap rjSdpLevo? KLveirai /cat rd Kivovfxevov puera^aXXei. mdXiv rd A rod H /cat to H tou B dXrjOis Karrj- yopelv rrdg ydp d r^Sopievos ripepiit,erai /cat o T^pepa- ^dpLevos pLera^dXXet. ware 8t' irepcxjv pieawv /cat ou/c e/c rrjs avrrjg GvaroLXtas d GvXXoyiupids. ov pLrjv 15 C0CTT6 fxrjSerepov Kara purjSeripov Xeyeudai rcbv piiacov' dvdyKrj ydp rep avrd) rivi dpi^w VTrdpx^iv.

1 drepaL Philoponus (?), ci. Mure : erepai, Bn : erepa Ad.

" Not in the strict sense : cf. Met. XIII (M) ii,

  • The species and their essential attributes.

' If one set of principles is derived from the other, they belong respectively to a lower and a higher branch of the same science. <* The ultimate truths or postulates.

  • Sc, with either or both of the extreme terms.


makea a science one.


additional factors is this : a unit is a substance " without position, but a point is a substance with position : I regard the latter as containing an addi- tional factor.

XXVIII. A science is one if it is concerned with a what single genus or class of objects which are composed of the primary elements of that genus and are parts of it or essential modifications of those parts. ^ One science is different from another if their principles do not belong to the same genus, or if the principles of the one are not derived from the principles of the other. This is verified when one reaches the in- demonstrables,^ because these must be in the same genus as the things demonstrated. This again is verified when the conclusions proved by their means

are in the same genus and cognate.

XXIX. It is possible to have more than one demon- There may stration of the same conclusion, not only by selecting Jhan'on^e

a middle term, not directly connected,^ from the proof of the same series, e.g., by choosing C or D or F as the chSfon?"" middle term for AB, but also by choosing one from another series.^ For example, A is change, D being moved, B pleasure and G relaxation. Then it is true both to predicate D of B and A of D ; because if a man is pleased he is moved, and that which is moved changes. Again it is true to predicate A of G and G of B ; because everyone who is pleased relaxes, and one who relaxes changes. Thus the conclusion can be drawn by means of different middle terms which do not belong to the same series. Of course the two middles must not exclude one another ; both must apply to some of the same subject. We must

^ i.e., another chain of reasoning. There can, however, be only one scientific demonstration of any given fact.



87 b

eTrLGKei/jaaOai Be Kal 8ta rcov dXXojv ax^jfidrcov oaaxcos ivSex^rai rod avrov yevdordai avWoyiuyiov. AAA. lov o aTTo rvxf]S ovk ecrnv eTTioriqixri oi

20 aTTohei^ews . ovre yap W9 dvayKalov ovO^ ws ivl TO TToXv TO OLTTO Tu;^')]? €GTLV, dXXd TO TTapd TavTa yiyvo/jievov rj 8' drroSeL^LS darepov rovrajv. rrds yap avXXoyLOfjios ?) 8t' dvayKaicov r) hid rwv (hs iirl TO TToXv TTpordaeojv Kal el fxev at TT-poTacrets" dvay-

25 KaZoAy Kal TO avfJiTrepaapia dvayKalov, el 8' (l)s cttI


aTTO TVX^? P'rjd^ to? eirl to ttoXv {jliJt* dvayKalov, OVK dv e'liq avTov drrohei^ig .

XXXI. Ou8e hi alodriaeois eoTiv eTTiOTaodai. el yap Kal eoTLV r) aiGBiqcjLs rov rotouSe /cat /jltj rovSe

30 TLVos, aAA' aladdveoO at ye dvayKalov To8e rt Kal TTOV Kal vvv. TO 8e KadoXov Kal eirl ttolglv dSvvaTov aloddvecrdaf ov yap Tohe ovhe vvv ov yap dv rjv KadoXov TO yap del Kal TravTaxov KadoXov (/yajjuev I etvat. errel ovv at /xev dirohel^eLS KadoXov, TavTa 8* OVK eoTiv alaOdveodaL, (f)avep6v otl ovS^ eTrtcrra-

35 cr^at 8t' alodrjoreoj? eoTLV, dXXd 87yAov ort /cat el rjv aladdveadai to rplycovov ort Svolv opdalg luas ex^i' TO,? yojvias, etpr^Tovpiev dv dnoSeL^LV Kal ovx

" It is tempting to regard this observation as a sort of " marginal jotting " in Aristotle's lecture notes. The project is not carried out.

For chance see Physics II. iv-vi, and cf. Met. 1064 b 32 if.

  • When we perceive a sensible object, what we perceive is,

in one sense, a complex of sensible qualities (colour, shape, size, etc.) which constitute a recognizable type. But the



examine this point in the other figures to see in how many ways it is possible to draw the same inference.'*

XXX. There can be no demonstrative knowledge There is no of the fortuitous.^ What happens by chance is the fortSi neither a necessary nor a usual event, but something toua. which happens in a diflPerent way from either ; whereas demonstration is concerned with one or the other of them. Every syllogism proceeds through premisses which are either necessary or usual ; if the premisses are necessary, the conclusion is necessary too ; and if the premisses are usual, so is the conclusion. Hence if the fortuitous is neither usual nor necessary, there can be no demonstration of it. yj XXXI. Scientific knowledge cannot be acquired Sense-per- by sense-perception. Even granting that perception caSno?give is of the object as qualified, and not of a mere par- scientific ticular,^ still what we perceive must be a particular ° ^ ^*^' thing at a particular place and time. On the other hand a universal term of general application cannot be perceived by the senses, because it is not a par- ticular thing or at a given time ; if it were, it would not be universal ; for we describe as universal only that which obtains always and everywhere. There- fore since demonstrations are universal, and univer- sals cannot be perceived by the senses, obviously knowledge cannot be acquired by sense-perception. Again it is obvious that even if it were possible to perceive by the senses that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, we should still require a proof of this ; we should not (as some ^

fact remains that the object perceived is only one particular instance of the type.

^ e.g.^ Protagoras— if Plato represents his meaning fairly (which is questionable) in Theaetetus 151 e. Cf. Diogenes Laertius ix. 51.



87 b ^^

cooTTep (fyaori rives r^mard^eOa' aladdveodai fxev yap

I dvayKT] KaO^ eKaarov, rj 8' iTnar'ijfJir] rch^ ro KaOoXov

\ yvcopit^eiv eoriv. Sto kol el IttI rrjs creXTJvqs ovreg

40 eojpcjfxev avrLcfypdrrovaav rrfv yrjv, ovk dv rjSeLfjLev

SSaTTjV alriav rrjs eKXeli/jeajs. fjoOavofjieda yap dv on

vvv eKXeiiTei, Kal ov Slotl oXcos' ov yap rjv rov

KadoXov aLGdr]GLg. ov fxr]v aAA* eK rod Oewpelv

rovro TToXXdKLS crvfju^alvov ro KadoXov dv Orjpev-

aavres aTToSetftv e'l^ofJiev eK yap rwv Kad^ eKaara

5 TrXeiovcxiV ro KadoXov SrjXov. ro 8e KadoXov ripaov,

on SrjXoL ro atnov (Lore rrepl rwv roLovrojv rj

KadoXov nfJiLOjrepa rdJv aladijaeajv Kal rrjs voiq-

oeayg, docov erepov ro atnov irepl 8e rcov TTpcorojv

dXXos XoyoS'

^avepov ovv on dSvvarov rep aladdveodai eVt-

10 oraodai n rcJov dTToSetKrcbv,^ el firj ns ro alodd-

veadai rovro Xeyei^ ro eTnorrnir^v e^etv hi diro-

Sel^eojs. eon fievrot evia dvayopueva els aladrjoecos

eKXenpLV ev rots Trpo^XrjixaGLV. evia yap el ewpchpLev

OVK dv e^TjrovpLev, ovx d)s elSores rco opdv, dXX

COS e^ovres ro KadoXov eK rod opdv. olov el rrjv

15 vaXov rerpvTTrjfjievrjv ecopcopiev Kal ro (jycos Sttov,

1 rat] TO B, Philoponus (?), Ross. ^ aTToSei/cTt/ccDv ABd.

" Particular facts (given by sense-perception) have their causes in ultimate laws or truths (apprehended by intuition).



maintain) know that it is so. Sense-perception must be concerned with particulars, whereas knowledge depends upon recognition of the universal. Hence if we were on the moon and saw the earth intercepting the light of the sun, we should not know the cause of the eclipse. We should only perceive that an eclipse was taking place at that moment ; we should have no perception at all of the reason for it, because (as we have seen) sense-perception does not tell us any- thing about universals. If, however, by observing repeated instances we had succeeded in grasping the universal, we should have our proof ; because it is from the repetition of particular experiences that we obtain our view of the universal. The value of the universal is that it exhibits the cause. Thus in considering facts of this kind which have a cause other than themselves, knowledge of the universal is more valuable than perception by the senses or intuition." Primary truths call for separate con- sideration.^

Clearly then it is impossible to acquire knowledge although its of any demonstrable fact by sense-perception, unless USy fmpede by sense-perception one means the acquisition ofourcompre- knowledge by demonstration. There are some pro- blems, however, which are referable to a failure of sense-perception ; e.g., there are phenomena whose explanation would cause no difficulty if we could see what happens ; not because we know a thing by seeing it, but because seeing it enables us to grasp the universal. For example, if we could see the channels in the burning-glass and the light passing

Logic shows their connexion by proving the specific truth which covers all relevant particulars. li " Gf. 100 b 12.

IE 159


8 a

SrjXov av tJv /cat 8ta rl KaUt, rep opdv fiev X^P^? 60' iKaarris, vorjaat 8* dfia on IttI Traacbv ovrcog.

XXXII. Ta? 8' avras OLpX^^ OLTTOLvrajv etvat rcav avXXoyLGfjLcov dSvvarov, npajrov fiev Aoyt/ccD? deoj-

20 povGiv. ol fX€v yap dX7]d€L£ elcn rcov ovWoyio- fxojv, OL Se ipevSels. f<al yap el^ eoriv dXrjdeg e/c i/j€vS6jv ovXXoyiaaod at, dAA* dVaf rovro yiyverai, olov el TO A Kara rod T dXrjdes, ro Se fjiecrov ro B ipevSos' ovr€ yap ro A to) B virapx^L ovre ro B

25 rep r. dAA' edv rovrcov fieaa XapL^avr^rac rcov TTpordoecDV, ipevSels eoovrai Std to irdv ovpLTri- paufjia i/j€vSos iK ipevSojv etvat, rd 8' dXrjdrj i^ dXrj6a)V, erepa 8e rd ipevSrj Kal rdXrjdrj. elra ovSe rd i/jcvhrj eK rcov avrcov iavrol?- eon yap ijsev^rj dAAi^Aot? Kal ivavria Kal dhvvara d/xa elvai, olov ro rr]V StKaLoavvrjv etvai dhiKiav tj heiXiav, Kal rov

30 dvdpcoTTOv Ittttov rj jSovv, t) to to-ov (JLel^ov '^ eXarrov. 'Eac 8e rcov Ketfievcov She- ovSe yap rcov dXrjdcov at avTat dp;;^at rravrcov. erepai ydp iroXXcbv rep yev€L at dpxoLh f<OLi ovS* eejiapfiorrovoai, olov at piovdhes Tat? oriypiaZs ovk icfyappiorrovcnv at jxev ydp OVK exovGL deotv, at 8e exovoiv. dvdyKT) 8e

35 ye t) els fieoa dpfiorrecv rj dvcodev t) Karcodev, t)

^ el cm. ABd.

" According to Gorgias, fr. 5 (Diels) =Theophrastus, de Igne 73.

^ Cf. An. Pr. II. ii-iv.

  • This is inaccurate. A false conclusion can have one

true premiss, and a true conclusion can have one or both premisses false. Thus there is no guarantee that the irregu- larity " only happens once." However, the general distinc- tion between true and false syllogisms is fair enough.

^ As being peculiar to different sciences.




through,** it would also be obvious why it burns ; because we should see the effect severally in each particular instance, and appreciate at the same time that this is what happens in every case.

XXXII. Syllogisms cannot all have the same first Syllogisms principles. (1) This can be shown, in the first place, have^the^^ by dialectical arguments, (a) Some syllogisms are same flpt true, others are false. It is, of course, possible to First dia-' draw a true conclusion from false premisses,^ but p^oof*^ this only happens once (in a chain of inference) ; e.g., if it is true to assert A of C, but false to assert the middle term B, because A does not apply to B nor B to C ; now if we take middle terms in these premisses, the (new) premisses will be false, because every false conclusion is based upon false premisses, whereas true conclusions are drawn from true pre- misses,^ and what is false is different from what is true. (6) Even false conclusions do not always have Second dia- identical first principles ; because a false judgement p^roo? may either involve a contradiction, e.g., that justice is injustice or that the equal is greater or smaller ; or incompatibility, e.g., that justice is cowardice, or that a man is a horse or an ox.

(2) The impossibility can be shown from what we Five logical have established already, as follows, (a) Not even all ^'■^""^^"ts. true syllogisms have the same principles. Many have first principles which are generically different,** and cannot be interchanged ; as for example units cannot be interchanged with points, since the latter have position and the former have not. In any case the terms ^ must be introduced either as middles, or as majors or minors, to the original terms ; or partly as

  • Sc, belonging to the principle of the second science, by

which it is hoped to prove the facts of the first.

G 161




ovBe rajv kolvcov dpxojv otov r' etvat rivas i^ ojv

J b airavra BeLxO'qaeraL (Aeyco 8e kolvols olov to ttolv

0avat T] oLTTocfxivaL) ' ra yap ydvr] rcbv ovtojv erepa,

/cat TO, fiev TOL9 ttogoZs ra hk rols ttoioZs VTrdpx^t

jjLovoiS, pi^O^ CUV Set/cvurat 8td rcov kolvcov. ert at

dpxdl ov TToXXcp iXdrrovg rcov avpLTrepaapbdrajv'

5 dpx^l jLtev ydp at Trpordoei?, at 8e irpordoeis r] irpoo-

XapLpavopiivov opov t] epb^aXXopbivov elaiv. eVt rd

avpLTTepdapiara ctTrct/ja, ol 8' o/)ot TreTrepacrfxevoL.

ert at dpxoX at />tev e^ dvdyKrj?, at 8' eV8e;)(d/xevat.

OuTCO jLtev ouv GKOTTovpbivoLS dhvvarov rds" aurd?

10 etvat 7T€7repaopL€vaSy diTeipwv ovrcov rcov avp,7T€paG-

pbdrcov. et 8* ctAAws" tto;? Aeyot rts", otov ort at8t

« *Sc., so that terms from different genera will be predi- cated of one another ; which is impossible (75 b 10).

^ It would be truer to say that the common principles provide the general conditions of the proof which is drawn from the special principles.

  • This argument smacks of equivocation. In the hypo-

thesis that all syllogisms have the same apxal the word dpxai seems to bear the sense of " ultimate principles," which might well be expected to be few in comparison with the many conclusions drawn from them. On the other hand premisses are surely dpxal only as " starting-points " rela- tively to the conclusion. If there is no equivocation, the hypothesis is equivalent to " All syllogisms have the same premisses," which scarcely needs refutation.

The effects of adding terms to a syllogism have been con- sidered in An. Pr. 42 b 16 ff., where Aristotle decides that " there will be many more conclusions than either terms or premisses." Noting the inconsistency, Ross suspects that the present passage expresses an earlier and superficial view. But the rule stated in the other passage (quoted by Ross in



the former and partly as the latter.** (6) It is impos- sible that any of the common principles {e.g., the law of the excluded middle) should serve as premisses for all proofs ; because subjects belong to different genera, some of which are predicated only of quan- tities and others only of qualities. It is with the help of these that proofs are effected by means of the common first principles.^ (c) The principles are not much fewer in number than the conclusions ; because the premisses are principles, and premisses are formed by adding another term either externally or inter- nally.^ (d) The conclusions are infinite in number whereas the terms are finite.'^ (e) Some principles are apodeictic, others problematic.^

If we regard the question in this way the principles cannot be the same for all or finite in number when the conclusions are infinite, (3) Supposing that " the Answers to the form " n premisses give n(n - 1) conclusions ") is valid

2 only if we deny the name " premiss " to those conclusions from which as premisses the remaining conclusions are proved. E.g., to take one of Ross's examples : " from four premisses 'A is B,' ' B is C,' ' C is D,' ' D is E ' we get six conclusions ' A is C,' ' A is D,' 'A is E,' ' B is D,' ' B is E,' ' C is E ' " ; here only the first, fourth and sixth are proved directly from the original four premisses ; the remainder are proved by the help of three further premisses supplied from the conclusions. By this more accurate reckoning the premisses will always be one more than the conclusions, so Aristotle's statement in the present passage (if treated as a meiosis) is not far from the truth.

^ The conclusions are infinitely many because we know of no limit that can be set to them ; but the principles, if " the same for all," must be limited, and so must the premisses and terms, if the premisses are principles. Yet we have just seen that the principles are " not much fewer " than the con- clusions.

  • And the conclusions drawn from them differ accordingly.




fjiev yeajfjuerplas alSl Se Xoyiorficov atSt Se larpLKrjg,

TL av elr] to Xeyofievov dXXo ttXtjv otl cIgIv a/D^at

TOJV €7naT7)fjia>v; to Se tol? avTa? ^dvau yeXolov,

15 OTL avTal avTOi? at avTar TvdvTa ydp ovtoj ylyveTai

TavTOL. dXXd jjLTjv ovSe to ef diravTajv SeLKWodai


auras' dpxds' Xiav ydp evrjdes. ovt€ ydp iv rot? ^avcpoZs pLadrjpiaGL tovto ylyveTai, ovt^ iv ttj dvaXvo^ei SvvaTov at ydp djjLecroi 7TpoTdo€is dpxal,

20 €T€pov 8e GVfiTTepaGfia TrpouXiq^deiorj^ ytyverat irpo- Taaeojs dpieaov. et he Xeyoi Ttg ra? irpcoTag a/xe- Govg TTporao-et? TavTag etvat dpxds, ju-ta iv eKdoTCO yivei ioTLV. et 8e ju,7yr' ef dTraocbv ojs heov Sclk- vvaOai OTLOVV pi'qO^ ovtojs erepa? wad^ eKdaTrj? iTTiGTTJpLrjs etvau erepa?, AetVerat et ofyyei^ets' at

25 dpxo-l rrdvTOJV, dXX iK Tcjvhl /xev raSt, e/<: 8e rcovSt ra8t. ^avepdv 3e /cat rou^' ort ou/c eV8e;^eraf 8e8etKrat ydp ort aAAat dp^al tco yeVet etctv at roJv Scacftopajv tco yeVet. at yd/) dpxdl 8trrat, ef c5v re Kal irepl o* at /xev ovv ef cSv Koivai, at 8e Trept o t8tat, otov dpidpLOs, /xeye^os".

" Fiiz., the definition of the subject-matter.

  • In ch. vii.

" Cf. 75 b 2.



fc,ame " is used with another meaning, as if one should possible ob- say " these are the very principles of geometry and iv*i?om°^ these of arithmetic and these of medicine," this would simply mean no more than that there are principles of the sciences. It is absurd to say that they are the same as themselves ; because on this basis anything can be called the same. (4) Nor again does the attempt to maintain that all syllogisms have the same principles mean that any given proposition can be proved from the totality of first principles. This would be too absurd. It is not the case in the mathematical sciences whose methods are obvious ; and it is not possible in analysis, because here it is the immediate premisses that are the first principles, and each new conclusion is formed by the addition of a new immediate premiss. (5) If it be suggested that it is the primary immediate premisses that are the first principles, there is one " in each genus. (6) If, however, while it is not claimed that any con- clusion must be provable from the totality of the first principles, it is still denied that the latter differ to the extent of being generically different for each science, it remains to consider whether the first principles of all propositions are cognate, but some are proper to the proofs of one and some to those of another particular science. It is obvious however that even this is impossible, because we have shown ^ that the first principles of things which differ in genus are themselves generically different. The fact is that first principles are of two kinds : the premisses from which demonstration proceeds, and the genus with which the demonstration is concerned.^ The former are common, while the latter (e.g., number and mag- nitude) are peculiar.



88 b

30 XXXIII. To 8* iTTLGrrjTOV /cat emorrjiiri hia(j)ip€i

\ rod So^aoTov kol ho^iqs, on rj fxkv eTTLGrrjfjir) Kado-

\ \ov KOL hi dvayKatajv, to 8* dvayKaXov ovk ivSe-

^eTat aAAco? ex^Lv. 'ion Se nva dXrjdrj fxev kol

ovra, ivSexofieva 8e /cat dXXcos ix^iv. SrjXov ovv

on Trepi fxev ravra eTTLGrrjix'q ovk eanv eiiq yap

35 dv dSvvara dXXcos ex^LV rd Sward dXXojg e;\;etv.

aAAa fJLTjv ouSe vovs {Xeyoj ydp vovv dpxrjv imorri-

jjLTjs) ovS^ eTTLdrrjiJLT] dvarroSeLKros (rovro 8* ecrrtv

89 a VTToXiqijjis rrjs dfieaov irpordoecos) • dXrjdr)? 8' iarl

vovs /cat einorrjiiT] /cat 8ofa /cat ro 8ta rovrcjv Xeyofievov ware AetVcrat 8d^av eu^at Trepl ro dXrj- Oes fiev Tj i/j€v8os, evh^xopLevov 8e /cat aAAajs" e;Yetv. rovro 8* iarlv VTroXrji/jc^ rrjs dfjLeaov Trpordueajs 5 /cat puTj avayKaias. /cat opLoXoyovpuevov 8* ovrco rols (f)aLVOfi€VOLS- rj re ydp 8ofa a/3ej8atov, /cat rj (jyvGLS rj roiavrrj. irpos 8e rovroLS ovhels otcrat 8ofa^etv orav oLTjrac dSvvarov aAAaJS" e^^tv, dAA* eTTLaraadaf aAA' orav eti/at p,€V ovr cjs, ov jjltjv aAAa /cat d'AAcos' ou8€v /ccuAuetv, rdre 8o^d^etv, ojs 10 Tou jLtev roLovrov So^av ovoav, rod 8' dvayKaiov e7Tiorrjpi7]v .

ricos" owv eWt ro avro So^dcrai /cat iTTior aoOaiy /cat 8td Tt ov/c eorai^ tj 8ofa iTTianqpLri, et rt? OrjaeL drrav o olSev ivSexeodai So^dl,€Lv; dKoXovdrjuei

^ eanv Dc.

" It does not seem that Aristotle intends any distinction between intuition and indemonstrable knowledge. ^ i.e., mental states or activities.



XXXIII. Knowledge and its object differ from Knowledge opinion and its object in that knowledge is of the ^.Jt'"^*®^ universal and proceeds by necessary propositions ; opinion, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise ; but there are some propositions which, though true and real, are also capable of being otherwise. Ob- viously it is not knowledge that is concerned with these ; if it were, that which is capable of being otherwise would be incapable of being otherwise. Nor is it intuition — by which I mean the starting- point of knowledge — or indemonstrable knowledge," which is the apprehension of an immediate premiss. But the only things ^ that are true are intuition, knowledge and opinion, and the discourse resulting from these. Therefore we are left with the conclusion that it is opinion that is concerned with that which is true or false and which may be otherwise. In other Opinion is words opinion is the assumption of a premiss which is thigent^.^^^" neither mediated nor necessary. This description agrees with observed usage ; for opinion, like events of the character which we have just described, is un- certain. Besides, no one thinks that he is " opining " when he thinks that a thing cannot be otherwise ; he thinks that he has knowledge. It is when he thinks that a thing is so, but nevertheless there is no reason why it should not be otherwise, that he thinks that he is opining ; which implies that opinion is concerned with this sort of proposition, while knowledge is con- cerned with that which must be so.

How, then, is it possible for the same thing to be How can an object of both opinion and knowledge? and if and^oph§on someone maintains that he can opine everything that have the he knows, what reason can we give to show why ject ? opinion is not knowledge ? Both the man who knows



89 a

yap 6 jLtev etScos" o 8e 8ofa^a>v Sta rwv iiidcjv ecus" 15 et? ra a/xecra €Xdr), ojot eiTrep eKelvos olSe, Kal 6 So^dl,(x)v olhev. wairep yap Kal to on Sofa^etv eoriy Kal to Slotl- tovto Se to pbiuov. -^ el p,€v ovTCog v7ToXrnJj€TaL Ta jjLr] ivSexop^^va dXXojg exeiv a)G7Tep [ex^t']^ rovs opiupLovs St' a)V at (XTT-oSctfet?, ov ho^daei dXX eTTto-TT^crerat • el S' dXrjdrj puev elvai, 20 ov fievTOL TavTa ye avTols VTrapxetv KaT ovuiav Kal KaTCL TO ethos, ho^doei Kal ovk eTTiOTiqoeTai dXrjdcxJS, Kal TO otl Kal to Slotl, edv puev 8ta tojv dfjieaatv So^darj' edv Se /jltj Sid twv d/xecrcop, to otl fjiovov So^daei; tov 8' avTov Sofa Kal eTnGTrjfjLT] ov TrdvTCjJS eaTLV, dAA' axjirep Kal ipevSr^s Kal dXr]-


Sofa TOV avTOV. Kal ydp Sofav dXrjOrj Kal ifjevSrj d)g jLteV Ttves" Xeyovoi tov avTOV elvai, droTra au/x- ^alvet alpetodai dXXa Te Kal firj Sofd^etv o Sofd^et ipevScos' eTrel Se to avTO nXeovaxcos XeyeTat, eoTi

30 fxev (hs evhex^Tai, eoTi S' ojs ov. to fxev ydp avfi- fxeTpov etvai ttjv htdpieTpov dXrjdojs So^d^euv aTOTTov dAA' ort 7] SidjjLeTpos, irepl rjv at Sdfat, to auTo, ovTCO TOV avTOVy TO Se Tt '^v elvai eKaTepcp /caTa TOV AdyoF ov TO avTo. opbolajs Se Kal emoTiqpirj Kal Sofa TOV avTov. rj fiev ydp ovtojs tov t^cpov woTe

35 /XT^ evhex^crdaL p/rj elvai t^cpov, tj S' coot' evSex^ordau,

1 seel. Ross : €X€iv M, Bekker, Waitz.

" Cf. the discussion of the Law of Contradiction in 3fet. W (F) iv-viii.

    • The true opinion — that the diagonal is incommensurable

— recognizes a property of the diagonal which follows from its essence as expressed in definition ; the contrary false opinion does not.



and the man who opines will proceed by means of the middle terms until they reach the immediate pre- misses ; so that if the former knows, so does the latter ; because it is equally possible to opine the fact and the reason for it ; i.e., the middle term. The solution is probably this. If you apprehend Because propositions which cannot be otherwise in the same ft^dlffef-*^^ way as you apprehend the definitions through which entiy, demonstrations are effected, you will have not opinion but knowledge ; but if you only apprehend that the attributes are true and not that they apply in virtue of the essence and specific nature of their subject, you will have not true knowledge but an opinion, of both the fact and the reason for it, — that is, if you have reached your opinion through the immediate premisses ; otherwise you will have an opinion only of the fact. It is not in every sense that opinion and just as true knowledge have the same object, but only in the sense opinioifdo, that true and false opinion have, in a manner, the same object. (The sense in which some authorities " hold true and false opinion to apply to the same object involves, amongst other absurdities, the view that false opinion is not opinion at all.) Since '* the same " is an equivocal expression, there is a sense in which this is possible, and another in which it is not. It would be absurd to have a true opinion that the dia- gonal of a square is commensurable Vvith the sides ; but since the diagonal, with which the opinions are concerned, is the same, in this sense the true and the false opinion have the same object ; but the essence (in accordance with the definition) of the two objects is not the same.^ It is in this sense that knowledge and opinion can have the same object. Knowledge knowledge apprehends the term " animal " as a necessary, essentiaf



89 a ^

oloV €L Tj fJL€V OTTCp dvdpCOTTOV eCTTtV, T] 8' avdpCxiTTOV

fiev, jXTj oTrep 8* dvdpwTTov. to avro yap on dv-


^avepov 8' e/c tovtcjv oti ovSe So^d^etv a/xa to avTO /cat eTTLGTaodai ivSex^rai. dfxa yap dv exoi 89 h VTToXrjipLV Tov dXXoJS ^'x^tv Kal firj dXXojs to avTO- OTTep ovK ivSex^Tai. iv d'AAo) fjuev yap GKaTepov etvat ivhex^Tat tov avTov cos" e'iprjTai, iv 8e to) avTcp ovS^ ovTCos olov re* e^et yap VTToXr^ijnv dpia,


5 pLT) ivSex^adai etvai p.rj ^cpov) Kal fir) orrep t,^ov' TOVTO ydp €GTo/ TO Ivhix^oOai.

Ta 8e Xoirrd Trdjg Set Siavelfxai eTTL re hiavoias Kal vov Kal eTTiCTTrjixiqs Kal Texv7]s Kal c/jpovijaeajs Kal (lochias, ra pikv (fyvGCKTJs Td 8e rjdiKrjs Oewpias fjidXXov iuTLV. 10 XXXIV. 'H 8* dyxivoid ioTiv evaToxioL tls iv duKeTTTip xpovcp TOV fiiaov, otov et tls ISojv oti tj GeXrjvrj to XapuTTpov del €;^e6 irpos tov rjXiov, Taxv


rfXiov 7] SiaXeyofjievov ttXovglo) eyvco 8tort Sanct- is ^erat* 7} Siotl (f)iXoLy oti ixdpol tov avTOV. rrdvTa ydp Td atrta Td jxiaa [o]^ Ihojv ret aKpa iyvwpiaev.

^ eCTTtti A^. 2 sgcl. Ross : om. Philoponus (?).

« Cf. 73 b 16 ff.

^ Exact equivalents are hard to find in English. Siavom is a comprehensive term for coherent thinking ; vovs is direct apprehension of the indemonstrable {cf. De Anima III. iv- vii) ; eTTiGT-qfiT) is the logical exploration of scientific facts ; tc^vt; the application of thought to production ; (f>p6v7}ais the appreciation of moral values ; ao^la the study of reality at the highest level. The last five are discussed in Eth. Nic. VI. iii-vii.



opinion as a contingent attribute ; e.g., knowledge connexion apprehends it as essentially predicable of " man " ; opinion opinion as predicable of " man " but not essentially, tioes not. The subject " man " is the same in both cases, but the mode of predication is not the same.

These considerations make it clear that it is impos- Hence one sible to have opinion and knowledge at the same time Sth a\**^^^ about the same object ; otherwise one would ap- once about prehend that the same thing both could and could object, not be otherwise, which is impossible. Knowledge and opinion of the same object may exist separately in different minds in the sense which we have ex- plained ; but they cannot so exist in the same mind. This would imply the apprehension at one and the same time (e.g.) that man is essentially an animal (we have seen ° that this is what it means to say that it is impossible for man not to be an animal) and is not essentially an animal (which we may take to be the meaning of the contrary assertion).

How the other modes of thought should be dis- other tributed between cogitation, intuition, science, art, thought to practical intelliffence and wisdom will be better con- ^e discussed sidered partly by natural science and partly by ethics. ^

XXXIV. Quickness of wit is a sort of flair for hitting Quickness upon the middle term without a moment's hesitation. ° ^^ ' A man sees that the moon always has its bright side facing the sun, and immediately realizes the reason : that it is because the moon derives its brightness from the sun ; or he sees someone talking to a rich man, and decides that it is because he is trying to borrow money ; or he understands why people are friends, because they have a common enemy. In all these cases, perception of the extreme terms enables him to recognize the cause or middle term.



9 b

TO XafjLTTpov etvai ro vpos rov tJXlov icf)^ ov A, to Aa/X7r€tv OLTTO rov rjXlov B, oeXijvr] to T. V7Tdp)(€L 8rj rfj fjiev aeXrjvr] tw F to B, to XdfjLTTeiv dno tov rjXlov TW Se B TO A, to TTpos TOVT elvai to

20 XapiTTpOV d^' ov Xdl-L7T€l' C0OT€ Kol Tip F TO A StCt TOV B.



A stands for " bright side facing the sun," B for " deriving brightness from the sun," and C for " moon." Then B, ** deriving brightness from the sun," applies to C, " moon," and A, " having its bright side facing the source of its brightness," apphes to B. Thus A apphes to C through B.



b 23 I. Ta ^r]TOVfjLevd ionv laa rov dpidfjLov ooairep imGrdfxeda. ^7]TovfX€v 8e rerrapa, to otl, to 25 Stort, et €GTL, ri ecmv. orav fiev yap irorepov roSe rj ToSe ^r]ra)pL€v, elg dptOpLov Bivres, olov irorepov €/<:Aet7r€t d T^Ato? rj ov, to otl ^TjTOVjJiev. ornxeZov 8e TOVTOV €vp6vT€S yoLp OTL e/cAetTTCt 7T6TravfX€da' /cat idv i^ OLpx'fjs elSojfjLev otl €/cAet7T€t, ov ^7]Tovp.€v TTOTepov. OTav 8e elSwjjiev to otl, to Blotl ^tjtov-

30 fXeV, olov €lS6t€S otl eK\eL7T€L KOL OTL KLVCLTaL Tj yfj ,

TO Slotl eKXeLTT€L Tj StoTt KLV€LTaL ^rjTovpi€v. TavTa fiev ovv ovTOJs, €VLa 8' aAAov Tpoirov l,'r]TovfJi6v, otov el €GTLV T] fir] €GTL K€VTavpos Tj Oeog (to 8* el eoTiv 7} fxr] dirXa)? Xeyoj, aAA' ovk el XevKog ■^ (jltJ)- yvovTes he OTL eoTL, TL eoTL ^rjTovfjLev, olov TL ovv eoTL Oeos, 35 7) TL eaTLV dvdpojrrog;

II. *^A p.ev ovv t,riT0vixev Koi a evpovTes tcr/xev, TavTa KOL TOoavTa Igtlv. ^rjTovpiev 8e, orav fxev J^TjTcbfJiev TO OTL Tj TO el 'ioTLV ctTrAcDs', d/o' eGTL fxeaov

" i.e., a predicate as well as a subject.

^ The four questions intended seem clearly to be (1) Is S P ? (2) Why is S P ? (3) Does S exist ? (4) What is (the 174


I. There are four kinds of question that we ask, book ll. and they correspond to the kinds of things that we ^^Jfoji know. They are : the question of fact, the question and Defi- of reason or cause, the question of existence, and the The four question of essence. (1) When we ask whether this ^^^^j^^ or that is so, introducing a pluraUty of terms " (e.g., and their whether the sun suffers ecHpse or not), we are asking ^^J^^^^- the question of fact. The proof is that when we have discovered that it does suifer ecUpse our inquiry is finished ; and if we know at the outset that it does so, we do not ask whether it does. It is when we know the fact that we ask (2) the reason ; e.g., if we know that the sun suffers ecHpse and that the earth moves, we ask the reasons for these facts. That is how we ask these questions ; but there are others which take a different form : e.g. (3) whether a centaur or a god exists. The question of existence refers to simple existence, and not to whether the subject is (say) white or not. When we know that the subject exists, we ask (4) what it is ; e.g., " what, then, is a god ? " or " a man ? " ^

II. These are the four kinds of question which we Each kind ask and the four kinds of knowledge which we have rdate?tc?a when we have discovered the answers. When we middle ^ ask the question of fact or of simple existence, we ^^^'

definition of) S ? — i.e., it is implied that each is asked about a subject term or substance. But cf. Introd. p. 12.



89 b

avrov rj ovk eanv orav 8e yvovres r] to on r] et

90 a eo-TLV, 7] TO IttI fjuepovs rj ro olttXc^?, TrdXcv ro 8ta rt

^r]Ta)fJL€V t) to ri icrri, rore ^T^rou/xev rt to fxeaov. Xeyco 8e to on 'q el eonv iirl yuepovs koL airXcos, irrl fjLepov? /-teV, ap* c/cAetVet rj aeX-qvrj rj av^erai; el yap eon rl t} pLrj ean rl ev rols tolovtois t^qrov- 5 puev olttXcj^ 8*, el eonv r] p,7] aeXrjvr) t) vv^.

HvjJLpalveL apa ev ctTrao-at? Tat? ^rjr'qcreaL ^rjreiv ^ el ean jxeaov -^ rl eon ro fJLeoov. ro fiev yap a'inov ro pueoov, ev airaoi he rovro tpqreZrai. dp* eKXeiireL; dp' eon n alnov rj ov; fxera ravra yvovres on eon n, ri ovv rovr eon t^qrovfxev. ro 10 yap ainov rod elvai fJL'q roSl t) toSi dAA' aTrAcDs' rrjv ovoiav, Tj rov^ fir) olttXcJos dXXd n rwv Kad^ avro 7] Kara ovfji^e^rjKos, ro pueoov eoriv. Xeyoj he ro fiev olttXcjs to VTTOKetfxevov, OLOV oeXijvrjv rj yrjv -^ 'qXtov r) rpiycovov, ro he rl eKXenjjiv loorrjra dvio6rr]ra, el ^ Tov Bonitz : to codd.

" The " thing " for which the middle term is sought must properly be an attribute or a connexion. It is only in so far as middle term = cause that the formula can be applied to substance. In a strictly teleological system to ask whether a substance exists is to ask whether it has a cause, and to ask what a substance is amounts to demanding a causal definition. (Ross well compares Met. 1041 a 26, b 4, 1043 a 14-21, remarking truly that Aristotle seldom observes this principle of definition.) But, as the examples show, Aristotle is already thinking less of substances than of phenomena and attributes. His analysis is indeed over-simplified.



are asking whether the thing <* has a middle term or not ; but when, after ascertaining that the proposi- tion is a fact or that the subject exists (in other words, that the subject is in a particular sense, or simply is), we then proceed to ask the reason for the fact, or what the subject is, we are asking what the middle term is. In describing the " fact " and " existence " as particular and simple modes of being I mean this : an example of particular being is " Does the moon suffer eclipse ? " or " Does the moon wax ? " because in such questions we are asking whether an attribute is predicable of the subject ; an example of simple being is " Does the moon exist ? " or " Does night ^ exist ? "

It follows, then, that in all these questions we are asking either " Is there a middle term ? " or " What is the middle term ? " because the middle term is because we the cause, and that is what we are trying to find out seeidngY'* in every case. " Does it suffer eclipse ? " means " Is cause. there or is there not a cause (for its being eclipsed) ? " ; and then, when we have ascertained that there is a cause, we ask " then what is the cause ? " The cause for a substance's being — not being this or that, but simply existing — and the cause, not for its simply existing, but for its being coupled with some essential or accidental " attribute — is in both cases the middle term. By that which simply exists I mean the sub- ject — moon, earth, sun or triangle — ; by that which the subject is in a particular sense I mean the pre- dicate : being eclipsed, equality, inequality, inter-

^ Night is not a substance, like the moon, but either an event or a privative attribute. If Aristotle intends to vary his choice of subject, he should do so explicitly.

  • Or rather " non-essential." A purely accidental attri-

bute would be outside the scope of science.



90 a

iv fxecro) "^ ^ti). iv dVaat yap rovrois (jyavepov iariv

15 on TO avro icm ro ri eari koI hia ri eariv. tl ioTLV eKXenfjLs ; areprjais <f)Cor6s oltto aeXi^vrjs vtto yijs avTL^pd^eojs . Sta ri eariv e/cActi/fts', rj 8ta ri e/cAetVet 7] oeXi^vrj; 8ta ro aTroAetVetv ro ^cog dvri- (j)parrovarj9 rrjg y/Js". ri iari ovpi<j)Cx)via; Aoyo?

20 dpidpLwv iv o^€L Kal^ ^apec. 8 to, ri cri»/x^6t)vet ro o^v rep ^apel; 8t(x ro Xoyov €-)(€lv dpLdpiaJv ro o^v Kal ro ^apv. dp* eari avjJLcfxxJvelv ro o^v /cat ro ^apv; dp* icrrlv iv dpidpuols 6 Xoyos avrwv; Xa^ovres 8' on eon, ris ovv ionv 6 Xoyos ;

"On 8* iorl rod fxioov rj ^TJrT^crts', StjXol oawv ro

25 jJieaov alaOrjrov. ^rjrovfJLev yap purj fjodrjpiivoL, otov rrjs iKXeitpeo)?, et eanv t) fiij. el 8' T^/zev e77t ri]? aeXrjViqs, ovk dv i^rjrovjjiev ovr^ el yiyverai ovre hid ri, dXX* dfjia SrjXov dv rjv. iK yap rod aiadeadaL /cat ro KadoXov iyevero dv rjfjuv et8eVat. r) piev yap

30 aLadfjuLS on vvv dvn^pdrrei (/cat yap hi^Xov on

vvv e/cAetVet)- e/c 8e rovrov ro KaBoXov dv iyivero.

"Q.G7T€p ovv Xeyopiev, rd ri ionv elhivai ravro

ion /cat Sta ri eonv rovro 8' r) aTrAcDs" /cat pir^ rcov

A Kol n, Philoponus : rj.

o Of the earth, in an eclipse of the moon. That this is the sense of eV ficao) here seems clear from 95 a 14, 15, 98 b 18 ; I do not see why Ross takes it to mean " centrality in the universe."

  • Viz., 1 : 2 (octave), 2 : 3 (fifth), 3 : 4 (fourth) ; their dis-

covery is attributed to Pythagoras.



position or non-interposition." In all these cases it is obvious that the question of essence and the ques- tion of cause are identical. Q. " What is an eclipse ? " A. ** The moon's deprivation of light through obstruc- tion by the earth," is the same as Q. " What is the cause of an eclipse ? " or " Why does the moon suffer eclipse ? " A. " Because the (sun's) light fails owing to the obstruction of the earth." Again, Q. " What is a concord } " A. " A numerical ratio ^ of high and low pitch," is the same as Q. " Why is the high note concordant with the low one ? " A. " Because they exhibit a numerical ratio " ; and Q. " Are the high and low notes concordant ? " is the same as Q. " Is their ratio numerical ? " And when we have grasped that it is, the question follows " Then what is their ratio ? "

That the object of our inquiry is the middle term Thisia can be clearly seen in cases where the middle term when"he is perceptible by the senses. We ask our question pai'i'iie term when we have not yet perceived whether there is a tlweTo^ middle term or not ; e.g., in the case of an eclipse. ^®"^®' If we were on the moon, we should ask neither whether nor why it was taking place ; the answers to both questions would be simultaneously obvious, because from the act of perception we should be able to apprehend the universal.^ The fact that the eclipse was now taking place would be obvious, and since sense-perception would tell us that the earth was now obstructing the light, from this the universal would follow.

As we said, then, to know the essence of a thing is Toknowthe the same as to know the cause of it. This is so whetlier know'^the **^ the subject simply is, apart from being any of its cause.

" Cf. 88 a 12.



90 a

VTrap^ovTCov rt, 7] rcJov VTrapxovTOJV oiov on ovo

opdaly 7] OTL jJLeit,ov t) eXarrov.

III. "On fxev ovv iravra ra l,rjroviieva [leaov

35 ^7]r7JGLS eGTiy hrjXoV' 7TOJS §€ TO TL ioTi SeiKVVTai,

Kal TLS 6 TpoTTos rrjs avaycxjyrjs, kol tl ianv opia- fiog Kal rivcov, e'LTTCOfJiev, Siarropijaavres Trpcorov 90 b Trepl avTCJV. OLpx'r) 8* earo) roiv fieXXovrcov '^Trep iarlv olKeLordrr] rajv i^ofievcov Xoycov,

'ATTopT^crete yap dv ns, dp* ean to avTO Kal /card

TO avTO opiGpicp elSevau Kal aTToSct^ct, t) dSvvaTov ;

6 fjL€v yap opLGfjLos Tov TL ioTLV elvai SoKel, TO Se

5 rt ioTLV drrav KaOoXov Kal KaTTjyopLKov' avXXoyi-

opLol 8* etcrtv ol fxev OTepr^TiKoi, ol 8* ov KadoXov,

oloV ol pL€V iv TO) S€VT€p(X) GX'y]I^CLTL GT€p7]TlKol

TTavTeSy ol 8* iv tco TpiTCO Ol) KadoXov. eVra ovhk TWV iv Tip TrpWTCp G)(^T^fiaTL KaTTjyopiKcov diravTCDV

ecrrtv opLGpios, olov otl rrdv Tpiyojvov hvGlv opdalg

10 tO-aS" €X€L. TOVTOV 8 6 XoyOS OTL TO ilTLGTaGdaL iGTLV

TO diToheLKTOV^ TO diToheL^LV €;^€tv, CJGT €L iirl TWV TOLOVTOJV drroSeL^LS €gtl, SrjXov otl ovk dv elr] avTOJV Kal opLGpLos. iiTLGTaLTo yap dv tls Kal Krard tov opLGfxov, ovk e;^6ov ttjv diroheL^LV ovhkv ydp KCoXveL pbrj d/xa ex^LV. LKavr] 8e ttlgtls Kal iK 15 Tris iTTaycoyrjs' ovSev ydp 7T(x>7tot€ opLodpievoL eyvoj-

^ dvoBciKTov c^, Philoponus : drToBeiKTiKov Ad : aTroSei/cTt/cals BDMnu.

<» As usual, Aristotle prepares for his own positive teaching 180



attributes ; or whether it is one of its attributes, e.g., having the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, or greater or smaller.

III. It is clear, then, that in all our inquiries we Programme are trying to find a middle term. We must now f^^^^y explain how the essence is brought to light, and in what way it is referable to demonstration, and what definition is, and what things are definable ; first ex- amining the difficulties involved in these questions." Let us begin this next section with a discussion First we which is most pertinent to the ensuing inquiry. ?iss*some

It might be asked whether it is possible to know difficulties, the same thin^ in the same respect both by definition Can we gain and by demonstration. (1) Definition is generally knowledge held to be of the essence, and essence is always gtrati^Tnd universal and affirmative, but some conclusions are definition ? negative and some are not universal. E.g., all those thing de-

in the second figure are neg-ative, and those in the mofstrabie 1.1 ? 1 / N * . 1 m IS definable,

third are not universal. (2) Again, even the affirma- tive conclusions in the first figure are not all appro- priate to definition (e.g., " every triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles "). The reason for this is that to have scientific knowledge of what is demonstrable is the same as to have a demonstra- tion of it, and so if demonstration is possible in the case of the aforesaid conclusions, clearly they cannot be definable as well ; otherwise one could know the conclusion in virtue of the definition without posses- sing the demonstration, since there is no reason why he should not have one without the other. (3) Induc- tion too affords sufficient grounds for holding that definition and demonstration are not the same, be-

(beginning in ch. viii) by an aporematic survey (chs. iii-vii) of possible theories and arguments.



90 b

/xev, ovT€ Tcov KaB" avTO VTrapxovrojv ovre tojv GVfJL^e^rjKorajv. en el 6 opiajjios ovoias rivos yvo)- piofios, rd ye roiavra (J)avep6v on ovk ovoiai.

"On (lev ovv ovk eonv opiafios anavros ovirep Koi diToheL^LS, StjAov. ri Sai;^ ov opiGpLOS, dpa

20 navros aTroSetfts" eanv rj ov; ets fxev St) Xoyos Kal TTepl Tovrov 6 avro?. rod yap evos, fj ev, /xta iTTLGTTjiJLT]. iOGT etiTep TO eTTLGTaodai TO aTToheiK- Tov eon ro rr]v OLTToSeL^iv ex^iv, ovix^rjaerai n dhvvarov 6 yap rov opiapiov exojv dvev rrjs aTToSet- ^eojs eTTLGTiquerai . en at dpxo-l tcDv dTToSel^eajv

25 optafiOL, d)v on ovk eaovrai drrohei^eis SeheLKrat 77 pore pov t) eaovrai at dpxol diroheiKTal Kal tojv dpxcov dpxoih '<0'(' TOVT^ ets" aTTeipov jSaScetrat, tj ret TrpcxJTa opLGfjiol eoovTai dvaTroSeiKTOL.

'AAA' dpa, el pjT] TTavTOS tov avTOv, dXXd tlvos Tov avTov ecjTiv optcj/xos" Kal aTToSetft?; tj dhvva-

30 TOV ; ov yap eoTLV dTToSei^cs ov opicrpLos. opiopLOS fjLev yap tov tl Iutl Kal ovatas' at 8' dirohei^eis cfyaivovTaL Trdoai vvotlO epievai Kal Xapb^dvovaau to Tl eaTLV, OLov at fxadrj/jiaTLKal tl piovds Kal tl to nepLTToVj Kal at a'AAat o/xota>s". en ndaa aTToSetfts" TL Kara tlvos SeLKVVGLV, otov otl eoTLV r^ ovk euTLV

35 ev he Tip opLOfjLcp ovSev erepov erepov /carr^yopetrat, olov ovTe TO t,cpov Kara tov SlttoSos ovTe tovto Kara tov t^cpov, ovhe 8r] Kara tov eTTLTveSov to

VSai'B: S'. 182


cause we never get to know any attribute, whether essential or accidental," by defining it. Also, (4) if definition is the method of getting to know the essence, obviously such attributes are not essences.

Clearly then not everything that is demonstrable is also definable. Very well ; is everything that is definable demonstrable, or not ? (1) One of the norisevery- arguments given above also applies here. Of one abie^demon- fact, qua one, there is only one knowledge ; therefore strable ; if to know the demonstrable is to possess the de- monstration, an impossible result will follow : the possessor of the definition will have knowledge with- out possessing the demonstration. (2) The starting- points of demonstrations are definitions, and it has been shown above ^ that of these there can be no demonstration : either the starting-points will be de- monstrable, and will have starting-points that are demonstrable, and there will be an infinite regress ; or the primary truths will be indemonstrable defini- tions.

But perhaps some things, if not all, are both defin- in fact, able and demonstrable. Surely this is impossible ; £°botSfde- because (1) there is no demonstration of the defin- monstrabie able. Definition is of the essence or essential nature, definable. and it is obvious that all demonstrations assume the essence as a received fact ; e.g., mathematics assumes the nature of unity and oddness, and similarly in the other sciences. (2) Every demonstration proves some predicate of some subject, either affirmatively or negatively ; but in a definition nothing is predicated of anything else ; " animal " is not predicated of " two-footed " nor vice versa, nor is " figure " pre-

» 72 b 18-25, 84 a 29-b



90 b

GX'^fiCL- ov yap eon to CTTtVeSov a^'^f^cL, ovSe ro GX'^(JiOL €7rt77eSov. en erepov to tl €gti koL otl ecrrt 91a hel^ai. 6 piev ovv opiapios tl €<jtl StjXol, r) Se dno- Set^tS" OTi^ ioTL ToSe KaTa rouSe 7J ovk ecrrtv. €Tepov Se eTepa aTroSet^LS, iav pbrj cus" piipos Jj tl ttjs oXt]?. tovto Se Xeyo), otl SeSet/crat to laoGKeXes 5 Svo opdaZs, €L rrdv Tplycovov SeSetAcrat* jLtepos" ydp, TO 8' oXov. TavTa 8e npos dXXrjXa ovk ep^et ovTWSy

TO OTL koTL KOL TL €(JTLl^' OV ydp €GTL 6aT€pOV

OaTCpov pilpos.

^avepov dpa otl ovt€ ov opLGpios, tovtov TravTOS


pLOS, ovT€^ oXcos Tov avTOv ovSevos ivSex^TaL dpicfya) 10 €X^iV' cucrre SrjXov ws ovSe opLGpLos /cat a77-o3et^tS" ovT€ TO o.vt6 dv e'lr) ovt€ ddTepov ev daTepco' kol ydp dv ra vnoKetpLeva opioicos ^^x^v.

IV. TavTa /xev ovv pLCXpt tovtov StrjTTop'qGdo).


SeL^Ls t) ovk €gtl, KadaTTcp vvv 6 Xoyos virideTo; 15 o juev ydp GvXXoyLGpLOS tl Kara tlvos Sclkvvgl 8td


KaT'qyopelTGL. raura 8' dvdyKrj dvTLGTpecjieLV. el ydp TO A TOV T lSlov, SrjXov otl kol tov B koL TOVTO TOV T, ooGTe TtdvTa dXXriXixiv. dXXd pLTjv

^ ore rj n. 2 Pacius : (Lore.

<* By " definition " Aristotle means the complex of genus and differentia {e.g. " two-footed animal " or " plane figure bounded by three straight lines ") which is itself predicated of the definiendum.

^ Aristotle is tiresomely vague in his use of the phrase ri eari, which approximates sometimes to tI ^v efv-at, sometimes to opiGfios. Here it seems to mean first one and then the other. « Cf. note on 73 a 7.




dicated of " plane " ; a plane is not a figure, nor a figure a plane.** (S) To reveal the essence of a thing is not the same as to prove a proposition about it ; now definition exhibits the essence, but demonstra- tion proves that an attribute is, or is not, predicated of a subject. Also different things have different demonstrations, unless they are related as part to whole (by this qualification I mean, e.g., that if it is proved that every triangle has the sum of its angles equal to two right angles, this is also proved of the isosceles triangle, " isosceles " being the part and " triangle " the whole). But the proposition and the essence are not so related, because one is not a part of the other.

It is evident, then, that not everything that is definable is demonstrable, and not everything that is demonstrable is definable ; and that in no case is it follows it possible to have both definition and demonstration stratkS"^'^ of the same thing. Thus it is clear also that definition and deflni- and demonstration cannot be the same, and that quite neither can be included in the other ; otherwise their distinct. objects would be similarly related.

IV. The foregoing difficulties may now be regarded Can a defi- as sufficiently stated. But is syllogism or demonstra- pioved ^ tion of the essence possible, or is it impossible, as our syiiogisti- discussion assumed just now ? Syllogism proves an attribute of a subj ect through the middle term ; but the definition ^ is both (1) peculiar ^ to its subject and (2) predicated as belonging to its essence. Now (1) terms so related must be convertible ; for if A is peculiar to C, clearly it is also peculiar to B, and B to C, so that all are peculiar to one another.*^ Further,

^ Since A and C are co-extensive, B, the middle term, must be co-extensive with them both.




Kal el TO A iv rw ri iariv v7Tdp)(€L navrl rep B, 20 Kal KadoXov ro B rravTOS rod T iv rep ri ion Aeye- rat, OLvdyKT] Kal to A iv rep ri ion rov T Xeyeodai. el he fXT] ovTO) ns Xn^iperat StTrAcocras", ovk dvdyKiq eorai to A tov T Kariqyopeiod ai iv Tcp tI ionv, el

TO fXeV A TOV B iv TCp TL ioTL, flTj Kad^ OOOJV he TO

B iv Tip TL ioTLV. TO St] TL ioTLV dpi<j)<jLi TavTa e^eL' 25 eWat dpa Kal to B Acara rod T to tl ioTLV. el Srj TO TL ioTL Kal TO TL 7)v etvaL dfjL(f)(jj e)(eL, irrl tov jjiioov eoTai rrpoTepov to tl rjv etvaL. oXoJs re, el eoTL Setfat tl ioTLV dvOpajTro?, eoTOJ to V dvBpoj- 7T09, TO Se A TO TL ioTiv, e'lre t,cpov Slttovv etV aAAo TL. el TOLVVv cruAAoytetrat, dvdyKT] Kara tov 30 r^ TO A TTavTO? KaT7]yopeLo6aL. tovtov^ 8' eoTaL dXXo? Aoyos" fJLeooSy oiOTe Kal tovto ecrrat tl ioTLV dvdpcoTTo?. XapL^dveL ovv o Set Self at* Kal yap to B carat' rt ioTLV dvOpoirros. Set 8' iv rats' Sucrt TrpordoeoL Kal toIs rrpcoTOLg Kal djJieooLS oKorrelv 35 /xaAtCTra yap <f)avep6v to Xeyofievov ytyverat. ol fiev ovv Sta tov dvTLOTpe^eLV heLKVvvTes tl ioTL ifsvx't], ^ TL ioTLV dv6pa>7Tos rj dXXo otlovv tcjv ovTOJV, TO i^ dpxrjs atrowrat, otov el tls d^LwoeLe ifjvx'^v etvaL TO avTo avTCp atrtov tov ^rjVy tovto 8* d.pL9fJi6v avTov avTov KLVovvTa' dvdyKTj yap aWijoaL

^ r scrips! : B.

2 TovTov] TOVTO cl. Boiiitz, prob. Ross.

^ eoTai ci. Bonitz : ecrrt codd.

" Presumably Aristotle means that the minor premiss (in which B is predicate) will supply the definition, so that we are assuming what we arc trying to prove.

  • It is hard to get a satisfactory sense from the vulgate,



(2) if A is an essential attribute of all B, and B is asserted universally and essentially of all C, A must be asserted essentially of C ; but without this double assumption it will not necessarily follow that A is })redicated essentially of C — I mean, if A is essen- tially predicated of B, but B is not essentially true of everything of which it is predicated. So both Only by a premisses must state the essence ; therefore B too ^^^^^'^"" will be predicated as essence of C. Then since both premisses state the essence or essential nature, the essence will appear in the case of the middle term before it appears in the conclusion." In general, if it is required to prove the essence of " man," let C be "man" and A the essence — "two-footed animal," or whatever else it may be. Then if we are to have a syllogism, A must be predicated of all C.** But this premiss will be mediated by another definition, so that this too will be the essence of " man." Thus we are assuming what we are required to prove, since B will also be the essence of " man." We should consider the case, however, in relation to the two premisses and to primary and immediate connexions ; because this throws most light upon the point that we are discussing. Those who try to prove the essence of " soul " or " man " or anything else by conversion are guilty oi petitio principii. E.g., suppose that somebody asserts that soul is that which is the cause of its own life, and that this is a self-moving number ^ ; he is necessarily postulating that soul is

and Bonitz' touto, which Ross adopts, seems barely convin- cing. I have therefore ventured to write Y for B, which I suppose to be a " correction " made by an editor or copyist who was puzzled by finding B first at 1. 31.

" Cf. iJe Anima 404 b 29, 408 b 32. The view is ascribed to Xenocrates by Plutarch, Moralia 1012 d.



91 b TTjv ifjvx'^v 07T€p apiBixov elvai avrov avrov Kivovvra, ovrcjjs COS" TO avTO 6v. ov yap el aKoXovdel to A


etvai, dAA' dXrjdeg^ eLTreXv 'ioTai jjlovov ouS' €6 eWt TO A orrep tl Kal KaTo, tov B KaTT^yopeiTaL iravTOS. 5 Koi yap TO ^cocp etvai KaTiqyopelTai KaTO, tov dv- dp(x}TTO) etvai- dXrjdeg yap ttclv to dvdpwTTcp etvat Ccpo) etvai, oionep koI rrdvTa dvdpwTTov ^coov, cxAA' ovx 0VTW9 a)(TT€ ev etvai. edv /mev ovv fir] ovtcj Xd^Tj, ov crvXXoyieiTaL otl to A €ctt6 tco F to tl 7]v etvai Kal 7] ovula' edv Se ovtoj Xd^rj, irpoTepov

10 ecTTai eLXr](j)(l)9 tco F tl Igti to tl rjv etvai [to B] .^ COOT* ovK dTToSeSeiKTai' to yap iv dpxfj eiXr](J)ev.

V, 'AAAa [xrjv ovS^ rj Sid tcov hiaipeaecov oSo? ovAAoyt^eTat, Kaddnep ev Tjj dvaXvaei Tjj rrepi Ta aX'^f^OLTa eiprjrai. ovSafiov yap dvdyKrj yiyveTai

15 TO TTpdyfia eKeivo etvai tcdvSI ovtwv, dAA' a)G- TTep ovS^ 6 eTrdywv dTToheiKwaiv. ov ydp Set to GvpiTTepaGpia epcoTav, ovSe tco Sovvai etvai, dAA* dvdyKrj etvai eKeivcov ovtcov, Kav fir] cf)f] 6 drroKpi- vofievos. dp" 6 dvOpcoTTOs ^djov r] dipvxov; etT* eXa^e ^cpov, ov crvXXeXoyicjTai. ndXiv drrav t,chov

20 T] 7ret,6v T] evvhpov eXa^e rrei^ov. Kal to etvai tov dvdpcoTTov TO oXov, l^ojov TTe^ov, OVK dvdyKrj Ik rcov eiprjfievcov, dXXd Xafi^dvei Kal tovto. hia^epei S'

1 aX-qdes n, Eustratius (?) : aXrides ■fjv. ^ seel. Ross.



essentially a self-moving number in the sense of being identical with it. For if A is a consequent of B, and B of C, A will not be the essence of C — it will only be true to predicate it of C ; nor (will A be the essence of C> if A is predicated of all B as genus of species. Animality is predicated of all humanity, because it is true that all humanity is a species of animality, just as it is true that every man is an animal ; but not in the sense that they are identical. Thus unless the premisses are taken in the way that we have described, it cannot be inferred that A is the essence or real nature of C ; and if they are so taken, it will have been already assumed what the essence of C is. Therefore the conclusion is not proved, because there has been petitio principii.

V. Nor again does the method of division lead to A definition a conclusion, as has been explained in my logical proved by analysis of the figures." At no stas^e do we find the division, for

1 • 1 -J. J.U J. • j_ • tj_- ^1. this proves

logical necessity that, given certain conditions, the nothing. object must have the required definition ; the process is just as inconclusive as induction. The conclusion must not be a question, nor stand by concession only ; it must follow necessarily from the premisses, even if the respondent rejects it. <The exponent of division asks) " Is ' man ' animate or inanimate?" and then assumes " animate " ; it is not the result of inference. Next " every animal is either terres- trial or aquatic," and he assumes " terrestrial." It does not follow necessarily from stated premisses that " man " is the whole expression, " terrestrial animal " ; he assumes this too. (It makes no differ-

  • An. Pr. I. xxxi. The Platonic method of division is

illustrated in Sophist 219 a ff., PoUticus 258 b if. For Aristotle's view of the proper use of division see chs. xiii and xiv.




ovBev €7tI ttoXXcov ^ oXiycuv ovro) ttoi^lv to avro yap icTTLV. dcrvXXoyiGrog fiev ovv Kal rj XPV^^ yiyverai rots ovrco ixeriovui Kal rcov ivSexofxevcov 25 GvXXoyiGdrjvaL. tl yap KcoXvet tovto dXr^des fiev TO TTav elvai Kara rod dvOpcjirov, pur) /xeVrot to tl

€C7Tt /AT^Se TO TL rjv €LVaL StjXoVV ; €TL TL KOjXveL

■^ TTpoadelvaL tl -^ dcj^eAetv t] vTrep^e^rjKevaL ttj^ ovaias ;

TavTa jLtev ovv TrapUraL pL€V, evhix^raL 8e Aucrat TO) XapL^dv€LV rd iv tco tl €(jtl rrdvTa, Kal to

30 i(j)€^rjs Tjj ^LaLpioeL ttol^lv, aLTOvpuevov to TTpwrov, Kal pLTjSev TTapaXeiireLV . tovto 8e dvayKalov, el drrav et? ttjv StatpecTtv €pi7TL7TT€L Kal pirjSev eAAetVet* [tovto S* dvayKatov,Y ctro/xov yap tJSt] Set etvaL.

'AAAct o-uAAoytCT/xo? opLOJS ovK eVecrrtv/ aAA* ecTrep, aAAov TpoTTov yvcopl^eLV TroLeX. Kal tovto piev ovSev

35 aTOTTOv ov'^e yap 6 eTrdycDV taojs dTToSelKWOLV, aAA' opLOjg SrjXot TL. GvXXoyLGpLov 8* ov XeyeL 6 c/c TTJs" Statpeorecos" Xeyojv tov opLapuov cjGirep yap iv Tots (jvpurepdopiaaL toZs dvev tcov jLtecrcov, idv tl£ eLTTTj OTL TOVTOjv ovTCOv dvdyKT] ToSt 6LvaL, ivSe^eraL ipcoTTJoaL 8ta tl, ovrcog Kal iv toIs SLaLpeTLKols

92 a 6pOL£. TL iuTLV dvdpOJTTO? ; ^CpOV, dvTjTOV, VTTOTTOVV,

hLTTovv, diTTepov. Sta tl; irap* iKaoTrjv irpoode-

OLV ipel ydp, Kal hei^eL ttj Statpecrct, a>s oteTaL, otl

1 seel. Waitz. ^ ^p^anv] eari n, Philoponus, Ross.

" i.e.f including a non-essential or passing over an essen- tial element in the definition.

  • i.e.., the next widest.


POSTERIOR analytics; II. V

ence whether the process involves many steps or few ; the position is just the same.) Indeed the method, when used in this way, fails to draw even those inferences that are available. It is quite pos- sible that the whole expression should be truly pre- dicable of " man," and yet not exhibit the essence or essential nature of man. Besides, what is there to prevent the division from adding something, or omit- ting something," or missing out a step in the definition of the real nature ?

These defects are usually ignored, but they can be though it dealt with by («) taking at each stage only elements gyJtemS in the essence, (b) dividing consecutively, always pos- caiiy. tulating the first ^ (differentia), and (c) leaving out nothing. This result is bound to follow if the term to be defined is entirely covered by the division (at each stage), without any omission ; for the process must lead directly to a term that requires no further division.

Even so, however, there is no inference in the pro- The results cess ; if it conveys any knowledge to us, it does are noT'^'^

so in a different way. There is nothing abnormal in reached by , . . 11.1. ^ 1 . inference,

this, since presumably induction too proves nothing,

but nevertheless it gives us some information. But in selecting the definition by means of division one does not state a logical inference. As in the case of conclusions reached without the use of middle terms, if it is stated that, given certain conditions, such- and-such must follow, one is entitled to ask " Why ?", so too in definitions reached by division. What is man ? An animate being — mortal — footed — two- footed — wingless. At every added predicate one may ask " Why ? " ; because the divider can state, and prove (as he supposes) by his division, that everything



92 a

rrdv ri 6v7]t6v rj dddvarov. 6 Be tolovtos \6yos

dVas" ovK eoTiv opLcrfxos, wcrr^ el koI OLTreSeiKwro 5 rfj hiaipeoei, dXX 6 y 6pio[ios ov avWoyiafjios yiyverai.

VI. 'AAA' apa eari /cat aTToSetfat ro ri eari Kar ovoiaVy e^ vrroOeaecos Be, Xa^ovra to fiev ri rjv elvai TO e/c Tcav ev rep ri eariv lSlov,^ raSl Be ev rep ri eari piova, /cat tStov to irdv; rovro yap eari ro

10 €tvat eKeivcp. rj ttolXlv elXrj^e ro ri rjv etvat /cat ev rovrcp; dvdyKr) yap Bid rod pieoov 8etfat. eVt uiorrep ouS' ev ovXXoytcrpLcp Xapb^dverat ri eari ro GvXXeXoyiaOai (del yap oXr) rj puepos rj Trporaoig, €$ (Lv 6 (JvXXoyLCTpLOs) , ovrojs ovBe ro ri rjV elvai Bel ivelvai ev rep ovXXoyiopicpy dXXd xcopt? rovro rajv

15 KeipuevcDV elvai, /cat 7Tp6< s rov dpi(f)i(j^rjrovvra el gvX- XeXoyiarai 'q pLrj, rovro dnavrdv on " rovro yap '^v avXXoyiopios "- /cat npos rov on ov ro ri tjv elvai ovXXeXoyiarai, on " vat* rovro yap e/cetTo Tjpiiv ro ri rjv elvai." ioare dvdyKTj /cat dvev rov ri ovXXoyiopLOS rj ro^ ri rjv elvai avXXeXoyiod ai n.

20 Kav e^ VTTodeaecos Be BeiKVvrj, oiov el ro^ /ca/co)

^ i8iov Pacius, Ross : ISiwv. 2 to] tov Bn. ' to] Tip Adn2.

« Which is here lacking, the minor premiss being a mere petitio principii. The hypothetical proof rejected here is used in Top. 153 a ff., but dialectically (c/. Cherniss, Aris- totle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy, i. 34-6, note 28).

^ Aristotle is thinking of the first figure (which alone is



is either mortal or immortal ; but such a proposition, taken as a whole, is not a definition. Thus even if the proposition could be proved by division, the definition still does not amount to a logical inference.

VI. It may be suggested, however, that it is One sug- actually possible to demonstrate the essential defini- J^thod of tion of a subject hypothetically by assuming that proving a the definition consists of the elements in the essence, not only and is peculiar to the subject ; and that this and that ^^^^f^ l^l are the only elements in the essence ; and that the improperly aggregate of them is peculiar to the subject, because deflnftion of this ag-ffreg-ate represents its essential nature. But f^eflnition as /,\ ^ 1 • ^i-. / • • V ^1, J ii •^- 1, a premiss.

(1) surely m this <mmor premiss) the dennition has

once more been assumed ; because proof must pro- ceed through a middle term." (2) Just as in a syllogism we do not assume <as a premiss) the defini- tion of syllogism (since the premisses from which the conclusion is drawn are always related as whole and part ^), so neither must the definition of definition appear in the syllogism '^ — it must be something apart from the premisses laid down ; and when an opponent disputes whether there has been syllogistic proof or not, we should <be able to) answer " Yes, because we agreed that that is what syllogism is " ; and if one objects that the syllogism has not proved the definition, *' Yes, because that is what definition was assumed to be." Thus we must have already drawn some inference without (using as a premiss) the definition of syllogism or of definition.'^

Equally invalid is proof from a hypothesis in the Another

useful for establishing scientific facts) where the relation is normally genus : species or species : sub-species.

" Sc. by which we hope to prove a particular definition.

^ Sc, before appealing to the said definition, which is a pre-condition, not a part, of the argument.

H 193


2a ^ ^ ^

ioTL TO Siaipera) elvai, ro^ 8' ivavrlw to toj ivavTLCp (evavTicoY elvai, oools €otl tl ivavTiov TO 8' dyadov Tch KaKco ivavTtov Kal to aStatperov Tw SiaLpeTcp' eoTiv dpa to dyadcp etvai to dSiac- p€TCp elvai. Kal yap ivTavda Xa^cbv to tl rjv elvai

25 heiKvvGi' Xa/jL^dvei 8' etV to 8et^at to tl t^v etvat. €T€pov jJievTOL- €OTU)' Kal ydp iv rats' a7ro8etfecrtv, OTL eoTl To8e KaTa TOvSe dXXd firj avTO, fjirjhe ov 6 avTOS X6yo9, Kal dvTiOTpe^ei.

Ylpos d[jL(f>OT€povs 8e, Tov T€ KaTa hiaipeoLv heiK- vvvTa Kal irpos tov ovtoj ovXXoyiopioVy to avTO

30 aTTOprjfjia' Sid tl eo-rat o dvOpojiros l,a)ov [8t7roL»v]^ Tre^ov, aAA' ov l,cpov Kal Tve^ov; eV ydp tojv Aa/x- Pavofjbevojv ovSefila dvdyKT] egtIv eV ylyveadaL to KaTrjyopovfievov, aAA' axjTrep dv dvdpojTTOs 6 avTog €Lr] pLovGLKos Kal ypa/XjLtartACos".

VII. Yichs ovv Srj 6 6pL^6p.€vos 8et^et ttjv ovoiav

35 Tj TO TL €GTLv; ovT€ ydp COS" aTToheLKvvs i^ opLoXo- yovpuevcjv elvaL ^rjXov TroLijoeL otl dvdyKT] eKelvcov ovTCov eT€p6v TL €LvaL [dTToSeL^L? ydp TOVTo), ovd* (hs 6 irrdycxjv 8ta Tiov KaO^ e/cacra hriXajv ovtcov,

^ TO Bonitz : to). 2 evavTico add. Bonitz.

' hiTTovv seclusi : Slnovv ne^ov codd. : neCov Slttovv comm., Ross, qui post koI ne^ov add. /cat hiTTOvv.

" This method of proof, eV tov evavTiov, is illustrated and discussed in Topics 153 a 26-b 24 and 147 a 29-b 25 (where it is criticized as in the present passage). It was freely used in the Academy ; cf. Cherniss, op. cit. i. 36-38.

^ Speusippus' view ; for the evidence see Cherniss, loc. cit.

" Viz., that of the subject's contrary.

^ The major term.

  • To secure consistency we must either bracket Slttow

here or add kol biirovv in 1. 30. The former course seems



following way " : If evil is definable as divisibility, assumes a and if any term that has a contrary is definable by lative with the contrary of that contrary's definition, and if good the essence, is contrary to evil, and indivisibility to divisibility, then goodness is definable as indivisibility. Here too the proof first assumes the definition, and assumes it to prove the definition. " But it is a different defini- tion." ^ Granted, (but the objection still holds,) because in demonstrations too we assume that one term is predicable of another, but it '^ must not be the very term (that is to be proved), nor one which has the same definition or rather is correlative with it.

Both the opponent who attempts proof by division and the one who offers syllogism in this form have to None of face the same difficulty : why should " man " be slJows^/hat^ " terrestrial animal " * and not " terrestrial " and the cieflni- " animal " ? There is nothing in the assumptions to unity. make it necessary that the predicate should be a unity, and not (consist of non-essential attributes), as the same man may be musical and literary.-'^

VII. How then can the person who is trying to How can define prove the essence or definition ? (1) He cannot the essence? exhibit deductively from admitted facts that, given (D if these facts, a conclusion distinct from them must ductively follow — that is demonstration ; nor can he show ^vefy^jJow inductively by enumeration of manifest particular else ? ' instances that every case is like this, because none

better. Only two attributes are required, and I believe biirovv to be an intruder from the parallel passages in Met. 1037 b 11 ff'., 1045 a 14 if., where the attributes are l,u)ov and hiiTovv. The fact that the commentators have Slnovv after rre^ov may point the same way, since an added word is always liable to displacement.

' Cf. Met. locc. citt. Aristotle gives his own sohition of the " difficulty " in the latter passage.



92bOTt Tray ovtojs rch fxrjSev dXXajg- ov yap ri eon

heiKvvuiv, aXX on ?) eariv tj ovk earcv. ris ovv

aAAos" rpoTTos Xolttos; ov yap Srj Sel^ec ye rfj

alad-qacL t) rw SaKrvXco.

"Ert 7TCOS Set^et to tl iornv; dvdyKrj yap rov

5 elSora ro ri iariv dvOpioiros t) aAAo ortow, elSevat

Kal on eanv to yap {jLtj ov ovSels olSev otl ioTiv,

dXXd Tl fiev arnxaivei 6 Xoyos "^ to ovopua, OTav

eiTTO} TpayeXa(f)o?, tl S* ecrrt TpayeXacjyos dSvvaTov

elSevai. dXXd p.7]v el 8etfet tl idTL Kal otl eaTL,

TTCjg Tw avTW Xoyo) hei^ei; d re yap opLopuos ev

10 TL SrjXoL Kal Tj a,7ro8et^ts" to 8e tl euTiv dvdpojTTos

Kal TO elvaL avSpcovov d'AAo.

Etra Kal 8t* a,77o8etfea)S" (f)afjLev dvayKaXov etvai SeLKWodaL dirav otl eoTLV, el pir) ovoia etrj. to 8' elvaL OVK ovuia ovSevr ov yap yivos to ov. diro- 15 heL^LS dp^ ecrrat otl eoTLV. direp Kal vvv ttolovglv at eTTLGTTJpiaL' TL fxev yap cro^jU-atWt to Tpiyojvov, eXapev 6 yeojpLeTprjs, otl 8' eciTi, heLKvvGiv. tl ovv heL^€L 6 6pLt,6pi€Vos TL eoTLV ; ri^ TO Tpiycovov ; et86os" dpa TLS opiopid) tl cotlv, el eoTiv ovk etcrerat. dAA* dhvvaTOV.

^avepov 8e Kal /card tov'S vvv Tponovg t(x)V

^ ri eanv; rj] rj ti iart Ross.

« Strictly " goat-deer," a type of fabulous animal : cf. An. Pr. 49 a 24.

It is hard to accept Ross's o n dartv. Aristotle could not, like a modern editor, make his meaning plain by spacing and accentuation ; and without these aids, in such a context, the phrase would have been quite misleading. In b 6 above, on the other hand, the sense is sufficiently obvious.



is otherwise ; for this does not prove what the subject is, but theyac^ that it is, or is not. What other way then remains ? because he cannot presumably prove (the definition) by reference to sense-perception, or point to it with his finger.

(2) How can one prove the essence ? Anyone who (2) Know- knows ivhat " man " or any other thing is must also essenc?iin- know that it is ; because^ no one knows what a non- f^^^^ know-

1 . . /XT 1 .1 . /• ledge of

existent tlung is. (He may know the meaning or a existence ; phrase, or of a name if, e.g., I speak of a unicorn « ; \ll^^^ ^e*^ but it is impossible to know what a unicorn is.) But proved by (a) if it is proposed to prove what a thing is and that argument, it is, how can they be proved by the same argument ? Both definition and demonstration give us one piece of information ; but what man is and that man is are two different things.

(6) Again, we hold that it is by demonstration that (6) if the everything must be proved to exist,^ except essence ; SisUucrwe and existence is not the essence of anything, because can have being is not a genus. So there will be demonstra- the other, tion that a thing is. This is how the sciences actually proceed ; the geometrician assumes what " tri- angle " means, but proves that the triangle exists.** Of what, then, will the definer exhibit what it is * ? The triangle ? Then one will know by definition what a thing is without knowing that it exists ; but this is impossible.

(c) It is evident also from the methods of defining (c) defini- now in use that those who define do not prove the p^a"t1sed

" Cf. Met. 998 b 22 if.

    • i.e.^ proves it as an attribute; cf. 71 a 14, 76 a 35,

93 b 31.

  • Understood in this waj^ the vulgate gives quite a good

sense ; and although the commentators give some support to Ross's transposition, I question its necessity.




92 b / --- -^ 20 OpCOV (Ls OV SeiKVVOVGLV ol 6pit,6lJL€VOl '^OTl eUTLVJ)

el yap /cat ecrriv €K rod piiaov n^ luov, aAAa 8ta ri v^Tt^TO opiudev; kol Sta rt rovr eori kvkXos; eXr] yap av Kal opet;^aA/<:ou ^dvai elvai avrov. ovre yap on Svvarov etvat to Aeyo/xevov TTpoohriXovGLV ol opoL ovre on eKelvo ov ^aolv elvai opcajJiOL, dAA*

25 del e^eun Xeyeiv ro Sta ri.

Et dpa 6 opL^ofjievo? SetKVVGLV t) rl eornv tj ri urjfiaivei rovvopia, el purj eun /XT^Sa/xais" rod ri eanVy e'ir] dv 6 opiopos Xoyos ovofxan ro avro G7]p.aiva>v. aAA* droTTov. rrpajrov jiev yap Kal purj ovaiwv av

30 e'iri Kal rcov jjltj ovrcov arjpLaiveiv yap eon Kal rd fjiTj dvra. en nd^vres ol Xoyot opiupiol av elev e'ir] ydp av dvofjia deodai ottolcoovv Xoyco, ooare opovs av StaXeyoifjieda irdvres Kal tj 'lAtas" opiapids av e'ir]. 'en ovbefjiia drroSei^Ls^ drrohei^eiev^ av on rovro rovvopa rovrl 8r]XoL' ouS' ol opiajjiol roivvv rovro TrpoGSr]XovGiv.

35 'E/c fjiev roivvv rovrojv ovre opLGfidg Kal crvX- Xoyiupios (jyaiverai r avrov ov, ovre r avrov avXXo- yLGfjidg Kal opiapios' rrpos 8e rovrots, on ovre 6 opiopios ovhev ovre drroSeiKWULV ovre heiKwoiv, ovre rd ri iornv ovd^ optap^w ovr^ drrohei^ei 'eon yvdjvai.

93 a VIII. IlaAtv Se OKenreov ri rovrojv Xeyerai

^ Tt] TO B, Bekker.

^ avoh^L^LS d : om. AB : imaT-^firj B^n.

3 etev d.

" Viz., a line ; the reference is to a crude definition of a circle.

  • • Or " non-essences." In an aporematic passage it is not



existence of the definiendum. Even supposing that proves there is something ^ equidistant from the centre, Existence why does the object so defined exist ? and why is it a °°fi*!°^" circle ? One might equally well assert that it is the definition of mountain-copper. Definitions do not include evidence that it is possible for what they describe to exist, nor that it is identical with that which they claim to define. It is always possible to ask why.

Thus since in defining one exhibits either what the it is no object is or what its name means, if definition is in gay^that ^ no sense of the essence, it must be an expression definition meaning the same as a name. But this is absurd- plains the

(1) In the first place, there would be definition not na™^. only of non-substances ^ but also of non-existents ; because even these can have a significant name.

(2) All expressions would be definitions, because a name could be attached to any one of them ; so we should all converse in formulae, and the Iliad would be a definition.*' (3) No demonstration can prove that a given name has a given meaning ; therefore neither do definitions (in establishing the meaning of a term) furnish evidence also that the name has a given meaning.

These considerations make it clear that definition Conclusions is not the same as syllogism, and that they have not arguments the same objects. It is also clear that definition ^[.^^^- "*' neither demonstrates nor exhibits anything ; and that neither by definition nor by demonstration can we acquire knowledge of the essence.

VIII. We must now review what we have said above, and consider which of the arguments are valid

easy to be certain from what standpoint Aristotle is argu- ing. « Cf. Met. 1030 a 7 If.



•3 a

KaXcos Kal ri ov KaXco?, Kal ri ioriv 6 optcrjU-os", kol rod ri eoriv apd vws ecrrtv arrohei^i? Kal opiGfios Tj ovSafjicos .

'EvT-et 8' eoriv, ws e^a/xev, ravrov to etSeVat rt 5 ccrrt Kal ro elSevai to aiTiov tov el^ eoTi (Aoyos" 8e TOVTOV OTi ecrrt rt to aiTiov Kal tovto t] to avTO t) aAAo, Kav fj dXXo, rj avroSet/crov rj dvaTToSeiKTOv) — €L TOLVVV €gtIv dXXo Kal ivSex^Tai aTroSetfat, dvdy- KT] (jieaov etvai to aiTiov Kal iv to) gx^I^o^tl tw 7Tp(x)T(jo SeLKVvadaL' KadoXov re yap Kal KaTTjyopL-


10 Et? /xev Sr] TpoTTOs dv etrj 6 vvv i^rjTaufJLevos, to 8t' d'AAof TO T6 eGTL SeLKwaOai. twv re yap rt Igtiv dvdyKr] to jxeGov etvai tl eGTL, Kal tojv ISlcov lSlov cucrre to /xev Sel^et, to S' ov Set^et tcov tl t^v etvai Tw avTCp TTpdy/jLaTL.

OvTO? fJLeV OVV 6 TpOTTOS OTI OVK dv €17] (XTToSet^tS",

15 eLprjraL npoTepov aAA' €Gtl XoyiKos GvXXoyLGfios TOV TL eGTLV. OV Se TpoTTov ivSix^TaL XiyojfjLev, €L7r6vT€5 vdXiV ef dpxrjS' a)G7T€p yap to 8l6tl i^rj- Tovfjiev exovT€s to otl, €Vlot€ 8e Kal dpua S'^Aa yiyveTaL, aAA' ovtl jrpoTepov ye to 8toTt hvvaTOV yvojpLGaL TOV OTL, SrjXov OTL opLoiaJS Kal to tl rjv

20 etvai OVK dvev tov otl eGriv. dhvvaTOV yap etSeVat TL eGTLV dyvoovvTas el eGTiv. to S* el eGTLV ore jjiev

1 ei ABM : tl Bn.

« In ch. ii.

^ Substance has no cause other than its own form ; that which has an external cause is an attribute or event. It is with these latter that the following chapters are chiefly concerned. 200


and which are not ; and what definition is ; and whether the essence is in any sense demonstrable and definable, or not at all.

As we have said above," to know what a thing is is the same as to know the cause of its existence ; and the reason for this is that the thing has a definite cause, which is either identical with it or distinct from it,^ and which, if distinct, is either demonstrable '^ or indemonstrable. Then if this cause is distinct and can be demonstrated, it must be a middle term, and be proved in the first figure ; for (only) in this is the proved connexion universal and affirmative.

Now one way of employing such a proof will be the method which we criticized just now,^ of proving one definition by another. For the middle term through which essences are inferred must itself be essence, and that through which peculiar attributes are inferred must be a peculiar attribute. Thus for the self-same subject one statement of its essential nature will be proved and one will not.

It has been observed above * that this method cannot have the force of a demonstration ; it is only a dialectical inference of the essence. Let us now make a fresh start and explain in what way demon- stration is possible. It is when we are sure of the To know fact that we look for the reason ; sometimes we |^ we niust^ become aware of them simultaneously, but it is quite ffpsp impossible to recognize the reason before the fact, it is. Clearly in the same way the essential nature implies the fact ; it is impossible to know what a thing is if we do not know whether it exists. Now we may be

" Not demonstrable itself, but serviceable for demonstra- tion, i.e., for explaining the attribute or event. <* 91 a 14-b 11. « 91 b 10.



3 a

Kara avjJL^eprjKog €XOfi€V, ore 8' exovris tl avrov rod TTpdyfjLaros, olov ^povr'qv, on tjjo^os res V€(f)a)v, Kal €kX€h/jlv, on oreprfais ns (j>ojr6sy koI dvdpoj- Ttov, on ^wov n, /cat i/jvxyjv, on avro avro klvovv.

25 ocra /xev ovv Kara ovfi^e^rjKos o'cSafxev on eonv, avayKolov /xTySa/xcas" e'x^tv Tvpos ro ri ianv ovSe yap on eonv tcr/JLev' ro 8e t^'qrelv ri eon fxr] exovras on eon, p.rjSev ^iQrelv eonv. KaO^ oocdv S' exopuev n, paov. a)ore cos" exofxev on eonv, ovrojs exofxev Kal TTpos ro ri eonv.

'^iQv ovv exofJiev n rod ri eonv, eorco irpajrov fxev

30 (Lhe- eKXeiipLS e^' ov ro A, oeXijvrj €(/>' ov T, dvri(f)pa^LS yrjs e<^' ou B. ro fxev ovv norepov eK- Xeinei rj ov, ro B i,rjreiv eoriv, dp' eonv t) ov. rovro 8* ovSev hia^epei tpqrelv t) el eon Xoyos av- rov ' Kal edv rj rovro, KdKelvo <f>ap,ev elvai. tj TTorepas rr\s dvn<j)doe(x)s eonv 6 Xoyo?, rrorepov

35 rod e;^6tv Svo dpOds t] rod [xtj ex^tv. orav 8' evpco- fxev, d'/xa ro on Kal ro Scon topuev, dv 8t* dfjueocov^ rj. el he fiiq, ro on, ro hion 8' ov. oeXi^vr] T, eKXen/jLS A, ro rravoeXrjvov OKidv pbrj hvvaodai TTOieXv pL7]Sev6g rjfjLOJV puera^v dvros (f>avepod, ecf)' ov B. el roivvv rep V vrrdpxei ro B to /mrj hvvaoOai

3 b TTOielv OKidv pLTjSevo? fiera^v rjp.(x)v ovros, rovrcp

^ 8t' dfxeacov n : Sta fxiaoiv.

" i.e., on the ground of some non-essential connexion.

^ Plato's view : cf. Phaedrus 245 c ff., Laws 895 e. If Aristotle is here assuming Xenocrates' definition of soul (91 a 37 supra), all four examples illustrate knowledge of the genus without knowledge of the differentia.

" Here the " grasp " is so good that the true reason is



aware of a thing's existence either accidentally ^ or because we have some grasp of the thing itself, e.g., that thunder is a noise in the clouds, that an eclipse is a privation of light, that man is a kind of animal, and that soul is self-moving.^ When our knowledge of the thing's existence is only accidental we cannot be in any position to grasp what the thing is, because we do not even kno?v that it exists ; and to inquire what a thing is when we are not sure that it exists is no inquiry at all. But when we have some grasp of the thing itself, the task is easier. Thus our capacity for discovering what a thing is depends upon our awareness that it is.

Let us first take an example of something of whose We may essence we have some grasp, and let A stand for fonmme- " eclipse," C for " moon," and B for " obstruction diate pre- . 1 ^ 1 > > rr^i . . 1,1 .1 • misses to

by the earth. " I hen to mquire whether there is an explain the eclipse or not is to inquire whether B exists or not ; comiexion. and this is equivalent to inquiring whether there is anything to account for it ; if there is, we assert that B is too. Similarly we may ask which of a pair of contradictories is true (e.g., having or not having the sum of the angles equal to two right angles) ; and when we have discovered the answer we know simul- taneously both the fact and the reason for it — if the premisses are immediate ; otherwise we know the fact but not the reason. C is " moon," A " eclipse," B " the inability of the moon at its full to cast a shadow, there being nothing visible in the way." Then if B, " inability to cast a shadow although there is nothing in the way," applies to C, and A, " being

directly assumed, so that fact and reason are discovered simultaneously.

    • As in the following example, where the minor premiss

is not immediate, and the real reason has to be sought.



3b ^ ^

8e TO A ro eKXeXoiTTevai, on jxev c/cAecVet StJAov,

hiOTi 8* OV7TOJ, Kal on fxev eonv eKXeiiptg^ lg[jl€V, ri

8' eanv ovk lofjiev. hiqXov S' ovro? on to A rw T

5 VTrdpx^i', dXXa Sta, rl V7Tdp)((^i, ro ^rjreiv ro B rt ecrrt, TTorepov dvri(ppa^L9 rj arpocjirj rrjs aeXrjvrjs rj diTocj^eGL? . rovro 8' iorrlv 6 Xoyo? rod irepov aKpov, olov iv rovro L? rod A* ean yap rj eVAece/ft? dvrl- <f>pa^LS VTTO yrjs. rl ion ppovr'^; irvpos dTroof^eais iv ve<f)€L. 8ta rt ^povra; Sta ro dTToarjBevvvGOaL ro

10 TTvp iv rep v€(f)€L. v€(j)os V , ^povrTj A, drroG^eoLg TTvpo^ ro B. rw Sr) F ro) vicfyei VTrdpx^i^ ro B, o-tto- G^ewvrai yap iv avrco ro TTvp- rovrw 8e ro A, ip6cf)os- Kal €Gn ye Xoyos ro B rod A rou Tvpwrov aKpov. dv 8e TraAtv rovrov dXXo fxeGov fj, iK rwv TTapaXoLTTOJv eorai Aoycov.

15 'Q? fxev roLVVv Xafi^dverai ro ri ion Kal yiyverai yvwpipioVy e'lp-qraiy wore GvXXoyLGfio? fxev rod ri iGnv ov yiyverai ovK a7ro8etft?, S-xjAov piivroi hid GvXXoyiGpLod Kal 86* d7roSei^€co£- iiior ovr dvev diTohei^ecos €Gn yvcovac ro ri ionv, ov ionv a'inov

20 aAAo, ovr^ eonv d77d8et^t? avrod, djGTrep /cat ev rot?

hiaTTOpTjlXaGLV €L7ropi€V.

IX. "Ecrrt 8e rojv fiev 'irepov n atnov, rcov 8 OVK eonv. oiore SrjXov on Kal rojv ri ion rd [lev

^ eoTiv cKXeiipLS n : e/cAett/rtV iarLV ABd.

" Or " explanation " ; see below. ^ i.e., major.

" Xoyos seems to have a wider meaning here than in b 6. Aristotle means that B either is itself the definition or implies



eclipsed," to B, it is obvious that there is an ecHpse, but it is not yet obvious why ; and we know that the ecUpse is a fact, but we do not know what it is. When it is clear that A applies to C, to ask why it does so is equivalent to asking what B is : whether an obstruc- tion or a rotation or an extinction of the moon ; and this is the definition " of the other extreme ^ term, viz. (in these examples) A ; because an eclipse is an obstruction by the earth of the moon's light. What is thunder ? An extinction of fire in a cloud. Why does it thunder ? Because the fire is being extin- guished in the cloud. " Cloud " is C, " thunder " A, " extinction of fire " B. Then B applies to the cloud, C, because the fire is being extinguished in it ; and A, " noise," applies to B ; and B is undoubtedly the and the explanation of A, the major term. If B in its turn has Sr terms^^"^ another middle term for its cause, this will be one of will consti- the remaining explanations ^ of A. definition.

We have now stated how the essence is appre- Thusde- hended, and becomes known to us, to the effect that {"ou ^oes although it does not admit of syllogism or demonstra- not prove tion, yet it is through syllogism and demonstration the essence. that it becomes clear to us.^ It follows that the essence of a thing which has a cause other than itself cannot be known apart from demonstration, while at the same time it cannot be demonstrated ; as we said ^ in reviewing the difficulties of the subject.

IX. Some things have a cause distinct from them- immediate selves, and others have not.^ Thus it is clear that of ^^^^^^^^^

an additional cause which, together with B, constitutes the definition.

    • Although the essence or definition cannot be proved as

the conclusion of a syllogism, yet syllogism enables us to see the facts in their true relation.

• In chs. ii and iii. f Cf. note on 93 a 5.



98 b ^

afxecra Kal app^at elcnVy d Kal elvau Kal ri eoriv VTToOiodai Set t) aXXov rpoirov ^avepa TToirjoai {oirep

25 O dpLdfjLTjTLKOS TTOLel' Kal ydp TL luTL TTjV flOvdSa

VTTOTideraL, Kal on eomv)' rcbv 8' e)(6vTCOv fjuecrov, Kal wv ecrrt tl erepov alriov rrjs ovcriag, eon 8t* dTToSel^eaJs, a)G7T€p eLTTOfiev, SrjXajaai, jjir] to tl iaTLV dTToSeLKVvvTag.

X. 'Opto-jLtos" 8' iTretSrj XiyeTat etvai Xoyos tov 30 TL ioTiy (f)av€p6v oTi 6 fxev TLS eoTai Xoyos tov ti ar)ixaiv€L to ovofxa t) Xoyos eT€pos ovofjbaTcoSrjs, olov t6^ tl GTifjuaiveL [rt ecrrt]^ Tplycovov. direp exovTes OTL euTL, ^rjTovjJbev Slo, tl €Gtlv' ;^aAe7rov 8' ovtojs CCTTt Xa^elv d pbrj LGfiev otl €gtlv. tj 8' atrta


35 ecTLv rj jjLTj tcr/xev, dAA' rj /cara avfi^e^rjKos. {Xoyos 8' els eCTT6 8t;^a>s", o fiev avvSeop^cp, o^OTrep j] 'lAtas", o 8e TM ev Kad^ ivos SrjXovv [jlt] Acara avpi^e^riKos.) Et? jLtev 807 opos" ioTTlv dpov 6 €LpriiJL€vos, dXXos 8* CCTTtv opo? Aoyos' o 8')7Aa)P' 8ta tl eoTLV djGTe 6 piev 94 a TTpoTepos GiqpuaLveL /xeV, SeLKVvoL 8' ol', o 8* voTepos (f)av6p6v OTL eo-rat otoy 0,770861^19 tov tl €gtl, ttj Secret SLa(j)6pcx)V ttjs dTToSel^ecos. hLa(f>ip€L ydp €LTr€LV 8ta TL ppovTO. Kal TL ioTL ^povTTQ' ip€L ydp


^ TO om. n^. 2 Tl ecTTt seel. Ross : tl iariv 17 Ad.

« In ch. viii.

" Considered (apparently) as an attribute, not as a subject of geometry ; for then it would be a quasi-substance and its definition would fall under type (3).

' 93 a 24 ff.

«* Cf. Met. 1045 a 13, and supra 92 b 32.



essences too some are immediate ; i.e., they are first must be principles, and both their existence and their defini- foundSr°'^ tion have to be assumed or exhibited in some other another way. (This is what an arithmetician does : he as- sumes both what a unit is, and that it exists.) As for things which have a middle term, i.e., something distinct from themselves which is a cause of their being, it is possible (as we have said «) to exhibit their essence by demonstration, although we do not actually demonstrate it.

X. Since definition means " an account of what a The three thing is," obviously (1) one kind of definition will be deflrfmon. an explanation of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent denomination ; e.g., it will explain the meaning of " triangularity." ^ If we are aware that such a thing exists, we inquire why it exists ; but it is difiicult to apprehend in this way the definition of things which we do not know to exist. We have explained above ^ the cause of this difficulty, viz., that we do not really know, except in an accidental sense, whether the thing exists or not. (An account may be a unity in two ways : either by connexion, like the Iliad,*^ or because it exhibits one term as predicated of one other term in a non-accidental relation.)

The above is one definition of definition ; but (2) in another sense definition is a form of words which explains whi/ a thing exists. Thus type (1) conveys a meaning but does not prove, whereas type (2) will obviously be a quasi-demonstration of the essence, differing from demonstration in the arrangement of its terms. To explain why it thunders is not the same as to explain what thunder is. In the former case we shall say " because the fire is being extinguished in



94 a

5 Tt 8* ecrrt ^povriq; ip6(f)os aiToo^€vvvixevov rrvpos ev V€(f)€GLV a)GT€ 6 avTO? Xoyos aXXov rporrov Xiye- rai, Koi (l)hl fiev aTToSet^LS ovve-p]?, coSt he opi- (jfios. €rL iarlv opos ^povrrjg ifj6(f)0£ iv ve(f)€(TL' tovto S' icrrl rrjs rod ri ionv airoSet^ecos ovpiTTepaapia. 6 8e rcjv dfMeaojv opiufios Oeois earl rod ri eariv

10 avaTToheiKros .

"Ecrrtv apa opiopios els /xev Xoyos rod ri iariv avaTToheiKTOs , els 8e ovXXoyiopLOS rod ri ean tttco- aei SLa(f)epojv rrjs aTTohei^eois , rpiros 8c rrjs rod ri icrnv diToSei^ecos ovpLTrepaafxa. ^avepov ovv eK

15 rcbv elprjfjbevojv /cat vcos ean rod ri eoriv drroSeL^Ls Kal TToJs ovK ean, /cat rivojv ean /cat rivcov ovk eanv, en 8' opiapios 7Toaa)(OJS re Xeyerai /cat TTOis ro ri ean heiKvvai /cat irois ov, /cat rivcov ean Kal rivixiv ov, en he rrpos OLTToSeL^LV ttws ^X^> '^^^ rr(x)S evSex€rai rod avrod elvai /cat ttcos ovk evhex^rai.

20 XI. 'ETret he eiriaraadai olopLeda orav elSajfiev rrjv alriav, alriai he rerrapes, p^icL fiev ro ri rjv etvai, fjbia he ro rivcov ovrojv dvdyKr] rodr^ elvai, erepa he r] ri npcorov eKivrjae, rerdprr] he ro rivos eveKa, Trdaat avrai hid rod fieaov heiKvvvr at. ro re

" Continuous " because its premisses are parts which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition re- sembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point " (Mure).

" See 93 b 21 ff.

" The three types are recapitulated in reverse order.

^ i.e., in the arrangement of the terms {cf. 94 a 2).

  • Three of these causes belong to Aristotle's standard doc-

trine of causation as set out in Phys. II. iii ; but here the place of the material cause, which is inappropriate for the present logical purpose, is taken by the " necessitating con-



the clouds " ; but the answer to the question " What is thunder ? " is " Noise due to the extinguishing of fire in the clouds." Thus the same account is ex- pressed in a different way ; in one form it is a con- tinuous ** demonstration, in the other a definition. Further, whereas thunder can be defined as a noise in the clouds, which is the conclusion of the syllogism that demonstrates the essence, (3) the definition of immediate terms ** consists in an indemonstrable as- sumption of their essence.

Thus in one sense '^ definition is an indemonstrable account of the essence ; in another it is a logical inference of the essence, differing from demonstration in grammatical form ^ ; and in a third it is the con- clusion of the syllogism which demonstrates the essence. The foregoing discussion shows clearly (a) Summary of in what sense essence is demonstrable, and in what two pre- ^'^^ sense it is not ; (6) of what things the essence is ceding demonstrable, and of what it is not ; (c) the different ^ ^^ ^^^' aspects of definition ; (d) in what sense it does or does not exhibit the essence ; (e) what things are or are not definable ; (^f) the relation of definition to demonstration ; (g) in what sense there can be definition and demonstration of the same thing.

XL We only think that we have knowledge of a The four thing when we know its cause. There are four kinds ^ogSai^^ of cause : the essence, the necessitating conditions, ^?/^^V^^?. , the efficient cause which started the process, and the through a final cause. ^ All these are exhibited through the tem^^(i)

dition " or " ground." The formula (barely reproducible in kt - . English) by which Aristotle describes this recalls the defini- tion of syllogism {An. Pr. 24 b 18 ff.), and in 1. 24 it becomes plain that he has in mind the conjunction of two premisses as the ground of their conclusion. Although there is some analogy between this ground and the material cause, there



94 a

25 yap ov ovros roSl dvdyKT] elvai ixids f-iev TTpordaeo)?

X7)(j)deLoris ovK €GTL, hvoZv Se rovXdxtcTTov tovto S*

eGTLV orav ev jJLeaov e^cocrt. tovtgv ovv ivos Xrjcf)-

divrog TO GVfjLTTepaGfia dvdyKT] etvat. SijXov Se /cat

c58e. 8td Tt opOrj r] iv rjpuKVKXiip ; rtvog^ ovtos

opdiq; earci) 8r] opOrj e^' rj? A, T^ju-tcreta Svolv 6p-

30 Oalv icf)^ rjg B, rj iv rjfjLLKVKXla) icf)^ rjg T. rod hr]

TO A rrjv opdrjv VTrdpx^iV rep T rfj iv rep rjpLLKVKXlcp

alriov TO B. avrr] p^kv yap rij A lgtj' tj Se to V

rfj B- Svo yap opOwv rjpLLGeta. rod B ovv ovtos

T^jLttcreo? Swo opOcov to A Tcp T VTrdp^^t' tovto 8'

T^v TO iv rjpLLKVKXicp opOjjv etvai. tovto Se TavTOv ^ TLvos] TJ rCvos D.

is no reason to suppose that Aristotle means to identify them. The error of such a view is fully demonstrated by Ross ad loc. Here it is enough to point out that the material could never be equated Mdth the formal cause (a 34 infra). Aris- totle is simply trying (with qualified success) to offer an analysis of causation which will enable him to represent each type of cause as a kind of middle term.

'^ From the sequel it appears that this odd and perhaps deliberately vague phrase is intended to mean that each type can actually serve as middle term in a syllogism.

^ i.e., common.

' The choice of " the half of two right angles " as middle term clearly implies that Aristotle had in mind a proof in 210




middle term." (1) There is no necessitating ground if only one premiss is assumed ; two at least are necessary ; and the condition is satisfied when the premisses have one ^ middle term. Thus the assump- tion of this one term necessitates the conclusion. This is clear from the following example. Why is the angle in a semicircle a right angle } What is the ground of its being a right angle ? Let A be a right angle, B the half of two right angles, C the angle in a semicircle.^ Then the cause for the attachment of A, right angle, to C, the angle in a semicircle, is B ; for this is equal to A, and the angle C to B, since B is the half of two right angles. Thus the fact that B is the half of two right angles is the ground neces- sitating that A applies to C, i.e. (by our assumption), that the angle in a semicircle is a right angle. Now

which this expression occurred (probably) at the penultimate step ; e.g., not the proof of Met. 1051 a 27 (cited by Ross), nor that of Euclid iii. 21, but the interpolated proof which follows the latter, to this effect : BAG is an Z in the semicircle ABC, centre O. Since OB, OA, OC are radii, ZOBA = ZOAB and ZOCA = ZOAC. Then ZAOC=2ZBAO, and ZAOB = 2ZCAO.

.-. ZBAC = ZBAO + ZCAO = i(ZAOC + ZAOB) = i ZBOC = 1(2 rt.Zs)=a rtZ. (So Heath, Mathematics in Aristotle, p. 72.) It is tempting to think that Aristotle might have directly perceived that Z BAC = ^ the flat Z BOC standing on the same arc ; for this would go far to justify " some such definition of the Tightness of the angle in a semicircle as its being right in consequence of being the half of two right angles,' " for which " little can be said " (Ross ad loc). But although Aristotle was an acute mathematician, it is hardly likely that he was so far in advance of his times.




35 eari rw ri t^v elvai, rep rovro aiqixaiveiv rov Xoyov. (xAAa ixrjv Kol to ri rjv etvat aiTLOv SeSetAcrat to jjiioov 6v} TO Se Sta Tt o MT78t/<:o? TroAe/xo? iyevero ^Kdiqvaiois; rls alria rod TToXeixelod at 'Adrjvalov?; 94boTfc €i5 SapSet? /xct' ^^perpUcov ive^aXov rovro yap eKLvqae Trpojrov. rroXe/JLos e</>' ov A, 7r/)o- repovs^ elcr^aXelv B, 'A^T^vatot to F. v7Tdp)(€L Srj ro B to) r, TO nporipois^ ipb^aXeiv rot? ^A.drjvaiois' 5 to 8e A to) B- TToAe/xouo-t yap rois vporepov 0,81/07- aaoiv. V7Tdp)(€i dpa rep jjuev B ro A, to TToXepLel- oSai rots TTporepoiS* dp^aai- rovro 8e to B^ tois" ^\6r]vaiOi9' TrporepoL yap rjp^av. fieaov dpa /cat iv- ravda ro a'inov ro Trpchrov Kivrjaav. ogcjjv 8e airiov ro €V€Kd nvog, olov Sid ri TrepLTrarel; ottcxjs vyiaivrj- 10 Sea ri oLKia eoriv ; ottojs GipL,7]rai rd GK€vrj- ro fiev eveKa rod vyiaiveiv, ro Se ev€Ka rov a(x>l,€o6aL. hid ri he dird heinvov Set TrepiTTareiv, /cat eveKa rivos 8et, ovhev 8ta<^epet. rfepirraros drro heiirvov r, rd pLTj eTTiTToXdt^eiv rd ucria e^' ov B, ro vyiai- veiv e^' ov A. earoj hi] ra> drro heirrvov rrepLTrareZv 16 VTrdpxov ro TToielv pur] eTTirroXdt^eiv rd oiria TTpds rep GropLan rrjs KoiXiag, /cat rovro vyieivov. 80/cet ydp virapx^iv rep Trepnrarelv rep F to B to pur] eTTiTToAa^etv to, oiria, rovrep he ro A rd vyieivov. ri ovv airiov rep T rov ro A virapx^iv rd ov eveKa;

1 ov om. ABdn^. 2 ^p^repov Bekker.

^ TTporepov D, Bekker.

  • Tcporipois] vporepov D.

5 B to) r D2 f.

" i.e.^ the necessitating ground. 212


this " is the same as the essence, inasmuch as it is what the definition imphes. (2) The cause in the (2) the sense of essence has also been proved to be the ^^^®°^®' middle.^ (3) Why did the Persian expedition '^ come (3) the against Athens ? or in other words, what was the cSe'^* cause of her becoming involved in war ? Because Athens had, in company with Eretria, raided Sardis ^ ; this was what first started the war. A is " war," B " unprovoked aggression," C " Athens." Then B, unprovoked aggression, applies to C, Athens ; and A applies to B, because war is made upon those who commit an aggressive Avrong. So A, becoming in- volved in war, applies to B, the side which began hostilities ; and B in its turn applies to C, Athens, because she began hostilities. Thus here too the cause — the efficient cause — is a middle. ( i) Now and (4) the take the case where the cause is final : e.g.. Why does Jan aiT"^°' one take a walk ? In order to be healthy. What is stand as the object of a house ? Preservation of the contents, terms. The final causes are respectively health and preserva- tion. It makes no difference whether we ask why or for what purpose one should take a walk after dinner. C stands for " walking after dinner," B for " normal digestion,"* and A for " health." Let us assume that walking after dinner possesses the attribute of promoting normal digestion, and that the latter is conducive to health ; because it is generally accepted that B, normal digestion, applies to C, taking a walk, and that A, healthful, applies to B. Then what is the reason why A, the final cause, applies to C ? The

" In ch. viii ; cf. also 93 b 38 ff. " Under Datis in 490 b.c. ^ Under Aristagoras in 497 b.c.

  • Literally " food not floating on the surface," with the

added qualification in 1. 15 " at the mouth of the stomach."



94 b


20 eKeivov Xoyos' ro yap A ovtcos aTToSoOTJaerai. Slol Tt 0€ TO D TO) 1 ear IV ; on rovr eon ro vytai- veiv, TO ovTOis €X€tv. Set Se fjueTaXafJi^dveLV tov9 Xoyovs, Kal ovtcos jiaXXov eKauTa cfyaveiTaL. at 8e y€V€0€LS dvoLTraXLV ivTavda Kal IttI tojv Acara klvt]- GLV acTLCOv' €K€l [jL€v ycLp TO [xluov Set yeveuBai

25 TTpwTOV, ivTavOa Se to T to €Gxoltov TeAeuTatov

8e TO OV €V€Ka.

'EvSe;)(eTat Se to avTO Kal eveKa tlvos etvat Kal

ef dvdyKTjs, olov Sta tou XafjiTTTrjpos to (f)ws' Kal

1 Se om. D.

  • This passage is not clearly thought out, and interpreta-

tion can only be tentative. It seems that up to this point Aristotle only professes to enunciate a syllogism of which the major term is a final cause. In so doing he overlooks (or disregards) the fact that a final cause can only function as such in a " practical " syllogism, whereas the one which he has in mind seems to be demonstrative, viz..

What promotes digestion is healthful Walking after dinner promotes digestion .•. Walking after dinner is healthful.

This is valid, but it proves nothing about health qua final cause. Aristotle would probably justify his reasoning on teleological grounds by arguing that walking, etc., is healthful because it is an activitj^^ subserving a natural end ; but this is really another matter.

Ross, who interprets the passage quite differently, supposing that Aristotle is already trying to exhibit the final cause as middle term, shows that in this case the middle term must be not " health " but " desirous of being healthy " (Those who wish to be healthy walk after dinner, This man desires to be healthy. Therefore this man walks after dinner), and comments " Aristotle is in fact mistaken in his use of the



answer is " B, normal digestion." ^ This is a sort of definition of A, because A will be explained by this means. ^ Why does B apply to C ? Because health is the condition represented by B. The expressions ^ should be transposed, and then the several facts will become clearer. In these examples the order of events is the reverse of what it is in the case of efficient causes. There it is the middle term that must come first ^ ; but here it is the minor term C, and the end or purpose comes last.

The same effect may obtain both for a purpose and Possibility as a necessary consequence, as, e.g., light shines causation.

notion of final cause. It is never the so-called final cause that is operative, but the desire of an object ; and this desire operates as an efficient cause, being what corresponds, in the case of purposive action, to a mechanical or chemical cause in physical action." If my view is right, this criticism is scarcely justified. Moreover, it obscures the correlativity of the final and efficient causes : if it is the desire that " operates," that desire is still excited by the object of desire (the mouse wants the cheese, and the cheese attracts the mouse) ; the two are always complementary and often no more than different aspects of a single fact.

  • Aristotle now tries to show that A, the final cause, can

stand as middle between B and C. The steps seem to be : (1) B is " a sort of definition " of A ; i.e., the final is expres- sible in terms of the efficient cause. (2) Similarly vice versa. (3) Therefore A and B are convertible, and B can be proved of C through A.

If this interpretation (which is virtually the same as Mure's) is correct, Aristotle can hardly be acquitted of juggling with terms, although the interdependence of efficient and final causes (noted above) and the tendency of both to merge in the formal cause {Met. 1044 b 1, 1070 b 26) provide some justification.

" Or perhaps " definitions," A being defined in terms of B, and vice versa. The vagueness of the language suggests that Aristotle is not quite satisfied with his demonstration.

<* Not really first, but before the major.



94 b

yap ef avdyK7]s Siepx^Tai ro fJUKpofiepdarcpov Std 30 rajv jLtetJovcDV TTopojv, eiTrep ^ojs yiyverai ra> 8t- tevat, Kal 'iveKa rivos, ottcos fJLrj TTralcoixev. dp^ ovv el etvai €v8e;)^eTat, Kal yiyveodai ivSe)(€raL, woirep et ppovra (^ony^ dTroa^evvviJLevov re rod nvpos dvayKJ) ait,eiv Kal i/jocf)€LV, Kal el cLs ol UvOayopetoL (f)a(nv, d7T€iXrJ£ €V6Ka roLS iv rep raprdpcp, ottcds (f)o^a)vraL ; 35 TrAetcrra 8e roiavr ecrrt, Kal pidXiura iv roZs Kara (f)V(TLV avvLGrafxivois koI ovveorwaiv r] fxev yap ev€Kd rov rroiel ^vaiSi r] S' ef dvdyKiqs. rj 8' dvdy-

95 a KT] Sirrrj' rj fxev yap Kara <f)VGLV Kal rrjv opfjLrjv, rj

Se j3ta Tj rrapd rrjv opfiiqv, oioirep Xldog i^ dvdyKrjs Kal dvo) Kal Acarco ^eperat, aAA' ov 8ta, rrjv avrrjv dvdyKYjv. iv Se rots 0,770 Stavotas" rd fxkv ovSeTTore diro rov avrofidrov VTTdp)(€i, otov olKia rj dvhpid'S, 5 ovo eg avayKrjSj aAA eveKa rov, ra oe Kai arro TVX^JS, otov vyteia Kal aajrrjpia. jxaXiora 8e ev oaois evhe^^rai Kal c58e Kal d'AAcus", orav jxrj (xtto rv-)(rjs rj yeveais fj cocrre ro reXo? dyadov, eveKd rov

^ on add. Ross, habent comm. (?).

  • The lantern is probably of the type implied by A. in

Hist. An. 531 a 5, with a cylindrical parchment shield {to kvkXo) Bepixa) ; and the light-particles pass through the pores of the parchment. The theory goes back to Empedocles (fr. 84, quoted in De Sensu 437 b 26 if.), as no doubt does the similar theory about the burning-glass {supra 88 a 14) attri- buted to Gorgias, who was his pupil.

^ The purpose is surely artificial, not (as Ross thinks) an instance of natural design ; for the translucence of (oiled ?) parchment can hardly be tied to this particular use. If the example is meant to be exactly parallel with that which follows, it is ill-chosen.



through a lantern. Being composed of particles smaller than the pores <in the shield) of the lan- tern,'* it cannot help passing through them (assum- ing that this is how the light is propagated) ; but it also shines for a purpose, so that we may not stumble.* If, then, an effect can obtain for two causes, can it also be brought about by two causes ? — e.g., if it thunders both because there must be a hissing and roaring as the fire ^ is extinguished, and also (as the Pythagoreans hold) to threaten the souls in Tartarus and make them fear.^ There are plenty of such examples, especially among the processes and pro- ducts of nature ; because nature in one aspect acts with a purpose and in another from necessity. Now necessity is of two kinds : one acts in accordance with the nature or natural tendency of an object, the other forcibly opposes it (thus both the upward and the downward movements of a stone are due to necessity, but not to the same necessity ^). Among the products of rational thought some, such as a house or a statue, never owe their existence to spon- taneity or necessity but always to some purpose ; others, like health and security, may also be due to chance. It is especially in circumstances that admit of more than one result, when the process is not due to chance, so that the end is some good, that design

•^ iVc, of the lightning. The Greek seems to call for Ross's oTi, which has some support from the commentators ; but I am by no means confident that Aristotle wrote it. It really looks as though the et before ^povra were intended to serve twice over.

•* I know of no other authority for this doctrine.

  • The downw ard movement is the stone's natural tendency

to find its proper place in the universe (cf. De Caelo IV. iv) ; the upward is imparted by some external force.



95 a ^

yiyverai, /cat ri (f)VG€L rj rexvrj. oltto rvx^]? 8* ovSev evcKOL rov yiyverai.

10 XII. To 8' avTO atrtov iart rots yiyvojxivois Koi rols yeyevTjiJidvoLS Kal rols iaofievoi? OTvep Kal rols ovac (to yap fieaov a'lriov), TrXrjv rots fiev ovuiv 6v, ToZs Se yiyvofidvoLS ycyvofjievov, tol9 Se yeyevrj- fjuevoi? yeyevrjfjievov Kal iaojxivoi? iaofxevov. otov

15 8ta rl yeyovev €k\€iiJjis ; hiori iv fidorco yeyovev oj yrj- yiyverai 8e hiori yiyverai, ecrrai 8e Siori earai ev fieacp, Kal eon hiori^ eariv. ri eon KpvoraXXos ; elXrj^dio St] on vScop TreTrrjyos. vScop i(f)* ov F, 7Te7T7]y6s e(f>* ov A, atrtov ro jxeoov ecf)^ ov B, eK- Xeiipis Bepfiov rravreXris. vvapxei Sr) rep T ro B,

20 rovrcp Se ro TreTrr^yevai ro e^' ov A. yiyverai 8e KpvoraXXos yiyvofxevov rov B, yeyevqrai 8e yeyevr]- pievov, eorai 8' eoopievov.

To piev ovv ovroj? a'inov Kal ov atrtov a^a yiy- verai, orav yiyvqrai, Kal eonv, orav fj- Kal enl rov yeyovevai Kal eoeodai choavrco?. enl 8e rolv pLTj

25 dpia dp^ eonv ev rep ovve^ei XP^V^, woTrep SoKei rjpLiv, dXXa dXXa)v airia elvai, rod rohe yeveoSai erepov yevopievov, Kal rod eoeodai erepov eoopbevov, Kal rov yiyveodai 8e, el n epbrrpooOev eyevero ; eon Srj oltto rov vorepov yeyovoros 6 ovXXoyiopios [dpx'y] 8e Krat rourcov ra yeyovora) • 8to /cat errl rcav

^ StoTi Dn : cm. d : Se on AB.

" In the preceding examples the causes are both formal and efficient. Aristotle does not say explicitly that causes which are not simultaneous with their effects are not formal



occurs ; it may be either natural or artificial. No designed result is due to chance.

XII. Present, past and future events are caused Causes in just the same way as existing facts. The cause is fn Ume^with always the middle term ; but whereas the cause of a their effects. fact is a fact, the cause of a present event is a present event, and similarly with the past and the future. E.g., why has an eclipse occurred ? Because the earth has come in between ; and an eclipse is coming about because the earth is coming in between, ?vill be because the earth will be in between, and is because the earth is in between. What is ice ? Assume that it is frozen water. Water is C, frozen A ; the cause is the middle term B, complete failure of heat. Then B applies to C, and A, " frozen," applies to B. Ice forms when B comes about, has formed or will forna when B has come or will come about.

Causes and effects which are related in this way " occur simultaneously when they occur at all, whether in the present, past or future ; and co-exist when they exist. But the question suggests itself whether, Can causes as is commonly supposed, events which do not occur H^^ U|jj. simultaneously in continuous time can be related as effects ? cause and effect — a past effect having a cause in the remoter past, a future effect a cause in the nearer future, and a present effect too a cause prior to it ? On this view inference is possible from the posterior ifso.wecau past event (although past events have their origin in causVfrom previous events ^) — and therefore the same is true of the effect,

^ ^ but not the

but may be eflficient or material ; but he may intend to imply the^cause" it.

  • " This qualification comes in oddly here. It seems to be

merely a reminder that Aristotle does not dispute the causal connexion, although he does not accept it as a sufficient basis for inference.



95 a

30 yiyvofxivcDV coGavrco?. drro Se rod irporepov ovk

euriv olov eTrel roSc yeyovev, on roS* varepov yeyovev /cat e77t rod eacadai (Laavrcos. ovre yap doplarov ovd^ opiadevros eurai rod )(p6vov ajcrr' €7T€i TOUT* dXrjOe? etTretr yeyovevai, roS* dXr]6€^ elrrelv yeyovevai to vcrrepov iv yap rep fiera^v

35 ifjevSos earai to eiTretv tovto, rjSr] Oarepov yeyo- voTog. 6 8* avTOS Xoyos xal iirl tov ecro/xeVou, oz)8' evret roSe ylyove, Toh^ eWat. to yap fieaov 6p,6- yovov Set etvat, tojv yevopievcxiv yevoptevov, rwv iao- puevcov eoopievov, tcov yiyvopLevcov yiyvopievov , tojv ovTCOv ov TOV Se yiyove Kai tov eWat ovk ivSe^^TaL

40 etvai opLoyovov. eVt ovre dopiOTOV ivhlx^rai ctvat

95 b TOV xpo'^ov TOV p.€Ta^v ovO^ (hpiopLevov ijj€vhos yap

eWac TO elrrelv iv to) pi€Ta^v. i7Ti(7K<E7TT€ov 8e Tt

TO CFVvexov a)GTe pLerd to yeyovevai to yiyveodai

vrrapx^iv iv tols irpdypLacnv. tj SrjXov otl ovk eoTLV

" But it might, of course, be true to say that Y will happen ; therefore Aristotle proceeds to deal with this possibility.

As Ross points out, " Aristotle says more than he means here," for this principle would exclude inference from present to past events, which he explicitly allows.

" If the effect does not follow immediately (as it does when " simultaneous " with its cause) other factors may either delay it so that it does not occur within a definite period of time, or prevent it from happening at all. Thus while the cause can be inferred as a necessary precondition of the effect, the effect cannot be inferred to be a necessary con- sequence. On the whole question see Introd. pp. 15 f.

<* The discussion is inconclusive ; its superficiality is at least partly due to an ambiguity in the terms used, and to the lack of a Greek participle expressing continuous action



present events — but not from the prior ; e.g., we

cannot argue that because X happened Y happened

subsequently (and similarly in the case of future

events) ; whether the interval be defined or not, it

will not follow that because it is true to say that X

has happened, it is also true to say that the posterior

event Y has happened ; because during the interval

it will be false to say that Y has happened," whereas

X has happened already. The same argument applies

to future events : it does not follow, because X has

happened, that Y will happen. (1) The middle term

must be homogeneous with the extremes : past when

they are past, future when they are future, present

when they are present, existent fact when they are

existent facts  ; and nothing can be homogeneous at

once with what is past and what is future. (2) The

interval between cause and effect can neither be

indefinite nor definite ; because during the interval

it will be false to assert the effect.^ We must investi- What is the

gate what is the bond of continuity that makes a between"

present process follow the completion of a past event. '^ tS^fn*^^

It is surely obvious that a present process is not con- time ?

in past time. Aristotle asks what is the connexion between a past event {yeyovos or yevoficvov, " a thing-having-happened) and a present one {yiyvonevov, " a thing-happening "). But the former also means a completed process, or the completion of a process, and the latter a process still continuing. wSince the completion of a process is momentary, it is indivisible and has no extremes (Phys. 235 b 30 ff.) and cannot be con- tiguous {i.e., immediately successive : Phys. 227 a 6, Met. 1069 a 2) either to another completion or to a process ; just as a point cannot be contiguous either to another point or to a line (which is not, of course, to be thought of as a finite aggregate of points). What Aristotle overlooks is that the completion of one process might coincide with the terminal point of a line : in other words, two processes may be actually continuous and separable only at an imaginary moment.



95 b

ix6fJi€vov yeyovoros yiyv6ii€vov; ovhe yap yevo- 5 ixevov yevofjievov iripara yap Kal drofjia' axjTrep oSv ovSe anyfjiai eluiv aXkrjXojv exopievai, ovhe yevofieva- apLKJyo) yap ahiaipera. ovSe Sr] yiyvojjie- vov yeyevrjfjLevov Sta to avTO' ro pikv yap yiyvo- pL€vov hiaiperov, ro 8e yeyovos dStaiperov. (LuTrep ovv ypapLjjLTj irpos cmyfjirjv e^et, ovrco ro yuyvo-

10 pL€Vov 7rp6? TO yeyovos ' ivvnapx^t' yd,p dVetpa yeyo-

vora iv rep ytyvop^evcp. fxaWov Se (j)avep(x)S iv rols

KadoXov TTepl Kivrjoecjs Set X€)(drjvai rrepl roijrcov.

He pi /xev ovv rod ttcos dv i(f)€^rjg yiyvopiiviqs rrjs

y€V€G€a)s ^X^^ '^^ fJL€aov ro alriov irrl rooovrov

15 elXri^doj. dvayKT) yap Kal iv rovrois ro fieaov Kal ro rrpwrov a/xecra etvat. olov ro A yeyovev €Tret ro F yeyovev [vorepov he ro V yeyovev, e/x- TTpoadev he ro A* dpx^ he ro V hid ro eyyvrepov rod vvv elvaiy 6 eanv dpx'Tj rod xpo^ov). ro he F yeyovev el ro A yeyove- rod hrj A yevopuevov dvayKT^

20 TO A yeyovevai. a'iriov 8e to F* rod yap A yevo- fjuevov ro F dvdyKrj yeyovevai, rod he F yeyovoros dvayKT] TTporepov ro A yeyovevai. ovro) he Aa/x- pdvovn ro piecrov anqGerai ttov els dpeaov, r] del TTapepirreoelraL hid ro aTreipov; ov yap iariv e;^o/xe- vov yeyovos yeyovoros, worrep eXexOirj. dXX dp^a-

25 adac ye opaos dvdyKrj (xtt' dpieaov^ Kal dno rod vdv

^ drr* dfJLeaov n, Waitz : aTro fxeaov ABd : oltto rov jxiaov comm.

<• See Phys, IV. x-xiv and VI, where Aristotle discusses problems relating to time and continuity, and cf. Introd. p. 15.

  • i.e.^ the immediate cause {causa cognoscendi).



tigiious with a past completion ; no more than one completed process is with another. Such completions are limits and indivisible. They are no more con- tiguous than are points in a line ; both are equally indivisible. For the same reason a present process cannot be contiguous with the completion of a past event, because the former is divisible and the latter is not. Thus the relation of a present process to the completion of a past event is like that of a line to a point because in a process there is an infinite number of completions. We must treat this subject more ex- plicitly, however, in our general discussion of Motion."

We may take it that we have now shown how, in in reason- a sequence of events, the middle term can contain e^et^to* the cause. Here again the middle and major terms cause we must be immediately connected. E.g., A has hap- ceed by pened because C has happened. C is the later, "Annexions- A the earlier event ; but C is the starting-point, because it is nearer to the present, which is the starting-point in time. Now C has happened if D has happened. Then if D happens A must have happened. At w But the cause ^ is C, because if D happens C must 'i w**P have happened, and if C has happened A must have happened first. But if we take the middle term in this way, will the series terminate somewhere in an but will the immediate premiss, or will it be infinite and always termtmi^?? admit of the insertion of another term ? — because one past event is not contiguous with another, as we have observed above. In any case we must start from an immediate connexion and the present time.*^

" 95 b 3-6.

<* Or perhaps (as Ross, following the commentators, pre- fers), " we must start from a connexion that is immediate and is the first of the series, reckoning back from the present."



95 b

TTpcoTOV. OfjLolcxJS §6 ACttt CTTt Tov eoTai. €L yap dXr]" des €L7T€LV OTL eWat TO A, dvdyKT] nporepov dXyjdeg eLTreiv on ro A ecrrat. totjtov 8' ainov to F* et jLtev yap TO A earai, nporepov to T earac el 8e to T

30 €(TTai, TTpOTepov TO A eoTai. oixoicas S' CLTreipos rj TOfjLT] Kal €v TOVTOLS' ov ycLp eoTLV ioofxeva ixofxeva dXXrjXcov. oip)(7] Se Kal iv tqvtoi? dfiecros XrjTTTea. ex^L 8e ovTCDS €7tI twv epycDV el yeyovev olKua, dvdyKT] TeTpbrjoOai Xidovs Kal yeyovevac. tovto Sid tl; OTL dvdyKT] depieXiov yeyovevai, ecTrep Kal olKia

35 yeyovev"^' el he OepLeXiov, rrpoTepov Xidovs yeyo- vevaL dvdyKT]. rrdXiv el eoTai otVta, chaavTajg TTpOTepov eoovTai XlOol. SeLKvvTac Se Sid tov fieaov ofJiOLcog' eoTai yap OefieXtos^ TvpoTepov.

'Evret 8' opdJ/JLev ev tols yiyvopievois kvkXo) Tivd yeveaiv ovaav, evhex^Tai tovto elvat elrrep erroiVTO

40 dXXiqXois TO fxeoov Kal ol aKpoi' ev yap tovtois to

96 a dvTiGTpet^eLV euTLV. heheiKTai 8e tovto ev toZs

TTpOJTOiS, OTL dvTLOTp€(f)eL Ta aVflTTepdofiaTa' TO Se

kvkXo) TOVTO ioTLV. IttI Sc TWV epycov (j^aiveTaL cSSe* ^e^peypbevT]s ttjs yrjg dvdyKT] dTfilSa yeveodaL^ TOVTOV Se yevofievov ve(j)os, tovtov he yevofxevov 5 vha)p' TOVTOV he yevofxevov dvdyKT] ^e^pexOoLL TT]v yrjv TOVTO 8' Tjv TO e^ dpx'^9, oocTe kvkXo) rrepL- eXTjXvdev eVo? yap auTcDv otovovv ovtos eTepov eoTL, KdKeivov aXXo, Kal tovtov to TrpcoTOV. "Ectti 8' evLa fiev yLyvofxeva KaOoXov {del Te yap

  • oiKia yeyovev Ross, habet Eiistratiiis : olKiav yeyovevai


^ defieXios n, Eustratius : defieXiov.

  • ylveadai Aldina, Bekker.



Similarly too in respect of the future. If it is true to say that D will be, it must be true at an earlier time to say that A will be. But C is the cause of A ; because if D will be, C will be before it ; and if C will be, A will be before C is. Here again the series will be infinitely divisible in the same way as before,' because future events are not contiguous with one another. In this case too we must take as our start- ing-point an immediate connexion. The principle is exemplified in practical affairs. If a house has Practical come into being, stones must have been cut and come gSh^hifer-^ into being. Why ? Because the fact that a house ence, has come into being implies that so has a foundation ; and if so, stones must have come into being first. Again, if there is to be a house, similarly there will be stones first. The proof, as before, is by the middle term ; there will be a foundation before there is a house.

It is a matter of observation that events sometimes How events occur in a cycle. This is possible when the middle fn a cycle. and extreme terms are reciprocal consequents ; be- cause under these conditions the sequence is con- vertible. It has been shown in the first part of our treatise that conclusions are convertible," and this is a form of cyclic sequence. The following is a prac- tical example. When the earth is wet mist must form, and after mist comes cloud, and after cloud rain, and after rain the earth must be wet. This was the point from which we started, so events have moved in a cycle. Any one of them leads to another, and that to a third, and that back to the first.

Some events occur universally (for a given state or inference of

" Sc, if both premisses are convertible. Cf. An. Pr. II. v, and supra 73 a 6 if.

I 225


96 a

/cat cTTt TTavTOs ovTCog 7] €)(€i -^ yiyverai) y ra 8e det

10 /XeV OVy (hs CTTt TO TToAz) 3e, OtOV OU TTCtS" avdpcjTTos

dpprjv TO yeveiov rpf)(ovraLy akX (hs eirl to ttoXv. Tcjv Srj TOLOVTOJV dvdyKr) Kal to fxeaov d)s CTrt to TToXv elvat. €1 yap to A /caret tov B KadoXov KaTT]- yop€LTaL, /cat tovto /cara tov T KadoXoVy dvdyKT] /cat TO A /card tov T del /cat eVt Travrds" /car- ls rjyopeLodaf tovto ydp ccrrt rd KadoXov y t6^ inl TTaVTL /cat det. dAA' WTre/cetro co? CTTt rd ttoAw* dv- dy/co7 dpa /cat rd fieoov (Ls irrl to ttoXv etvat rd e^* ov TO B. eoovTat tolvvv /cat rcDv co? €77t rd ttoAu dp)(al dfiecroLy oaa cLs €7tI to ttoXv ovtcos eWtv rj ylyveTai . 20 XIII. naJs" /ttev ovv to rt ioTtv £ts" rous" opovs aTToStSorat, /cat rtVa TpoTTov aTrdSetftS' "^ opLOfios

€GTLV aVTOV Tj OVK €(7TLVy €Lpr]TaL TTpOTepOV TTibs Sc

Set d7jp€V€LV TOL €v Tip TL ioTL KaTTjyopovfjLevay vvv Xeyojfjiev.

Tcov Br) VTTapxovTOJV del eKdoTcp eVta cVe/cretVet

25 eVt TrXioVy ov /xeVrot efa> rou yeVous". Aeyco Se CTrt irXiov V7Tdp)(eLV oaa V7Tdp)(€L fxev eKdoTCO KadoXov, ov fJLTjv dXXd Kal dXXcp. olov €otl tl o rrdcrr] rptdSt virdpx^t^y dXXd Kal pLrj rptdSt, womep to ov vrrapx^i T7] TptdSiy dXXd Kal {jLTj dpidfjia)' dXXd Kal to irepiT-

30 TOV VTfdpx^L T€ ndor) rptdSt /cat inl irXeov VTrdpx^i

1 TO n : Kal ABd.

" For " usual " events as objects of science cf. Met. 1026 b 27 ff., 1064 b 32 ff.

  • Viz.y that in a syllogism which leads to a causal defini-




process may be true always and of every case), while others occur not always but usually '^ ; e.g., not every male human being grows hair on the chin, but it happens usually. In such cases the middle term too must be a usual event. If A is predicated universally of B, and B universally of C, A must also be pre- dicated of C, and of all C ; because " universally " means always and in every case. But ex hypothesi A is predicated usually of C. Then the middle term B must also be " usual." Thus the immediate pre- misses of usual events must also describe states or processes which are usual.

XIII. We have explained above how the essence How to is distributed among the terms, ^ and in what sense elements it does or does not admit of demonstration or defini- jn a defini- tion.^ Let us now consider how we should hunt for the attributes which are predicated as elements in the definition.

Of the permanent ^ attributes of any given sub- by coiiect- ject some^ have a wider application — not, however, JJJft^g '^^" beyond the genus. By an attribute with a wider shared with application I mean one which applies universally to species but a particular subject, and also to some other. E.g., "Jhe^^**^ there are attributes which apply to every 3 and also genera. to what is not 3, in the way that " being " applies to 3 and also to subjects which are not numbers.^ On the other hand, oddness applies to every 3, and has a

tion of an attribute the attribute must be the major, the cause the middle, and the subject the minor term (93 a 14 ff.).

" In chs. viii-x. ** i.e., non-accidental.

  • Others — viz., properties and some differentiae — do not;

but they are not in question here. Note that we are now concerned with the definition of substances.

f This type is mentioned only to be dismissed, because it extends beyond the genus, number.



96a ^ ^

(/cat yap rfj TTevrdSt VTrdpx^i), aAA' ovk e^io rod yevovs' Tj fxev yap Trevrds dpidpios, ovhev 8e efa> dpidpiov TTepiTTOV. rd Srj roiavra Xrjrrreov P'^XP'^ TOVTOV, ecos Toaavra Xr](j)9r\ rrpajrov Sv eKaarov pL€V CTTt TrXeov vrrdp^ei, diravTa Se pur] iirl rrXeov 35 ravTTjv ydp avdyKT) ovalav etvat rod TrpdypLaros. otov TpidSi VTrdpx^i Trdarj dptOpiog, to TTepirrov, to TTpwrov dpi(j)orip(jJS , Kal ojs p-rj pi€Tp€L(jdaL dpidpLcp /cat CO? pi'Tj avyKeladai i^ dptOpiajv. rovro tolvvv rjSr) earlv rj rpids, dpiBpios TTepirrds Trpwros Kal (LSI TTpdjTO?. TOVTCov ydp eKaoTov rd puev Kal 96 b TotS" TTepiTTots TTacnv VTTapx^L, TO 8e reXevraiov Kal rfj hvaSi, Trdvra 8e ovSevt. iirel Se SeSTyAcoTat rjpXv €v Tols dvco on KaOoXov^ /xeV eo-Tt rd iv rco n ian KarrjyopovpLeva, rd KadoXov Se dvayKala, rfj 8e Tpidhi Kal €</>' ov dXXov ovrco Xapb^dverai iv t(x> 6 ri iarv rd Xapi^avopLeva, ovrojs ef dvdyKiqs j^tev av eiTj rpids ravra. on 8' ovaia, eK rcovhe 87]Aov. dvdyKrj ydp, el p.r] rovro '^v rpLaSt etvac, olov yevos n elvac rovro, rj (hvopLaopiivov r^ dvcovvpiov. ear ai roivvv irrl TrXeov^ rj rfj rpudSi vrrapxcv. VTTOKeiodco ydp roLovrov elvai rd yevos wore vnapx^LV Kard 10 SvvapiLV irrl TrXeov.^ el roivvv piiqhevl virapx^i dXXcp Tj Tat? dropbois rpidoi, rovr dv e'lr) ro rpidhi elvai' VTTOKeloOo} ydp Kal rovro, r] ovorla iq eKaorov elvai

^ KadoXov Ross : avayKoia codd. 2 TrAeiov AB. ^ TrAetov D, Bekker.

" i.e.^ this complex of attributes.

i.e.^ as neither having factors nor being the sum of two or more numbers. 3 ==2 + 1, but 1 was regarded not as a number itself but as the " measure " or " starting-point " of number {Met. 1088 a 4 if.).



wider application, because it applies to 5 too ; but it does not extend beyond the genus, because 5 is a number, and nothing outside the genus number is odd. It is attributes of this kind that we must select, up to the point where, although singly they have a wider extension of meaning than the subject, collec- tively they have not ; for this " must be the essence The com- of the thing. E.g., 3 has the following universal wnf^v^S attributes : it is a number, it is odd, it is prime in essence. both senses, as being neither measurable by number nor composed of numbers.^ We now have the essence of 3 : a number, odd, prime, and prime in this par- ticular sense. The first two of these attributes apply to all odd numbers, and the last also applies to 2 ; but no other number has them all. Now since we have shown above ^ that attributes which are pre- dicated as elements in the definition are universal,^ and that universal attributes are necessary, and since the selected attributes are elements in the definition of 3 (or of any other subject in the case of which they are so selected), then " threeness " must consist in just these attributes. That they Proof that constitute its essence is clear from the following ^^^ '^ ^°* argument. If this combination of attributes were not the essence of 3, it must be a sort of genus, either with or without a name of its own. Then its applica- tion must extend beyond 3. Let us assume that the genus is such as to have the widest possible applica- tion. Then if it applies to nothing else but individual 3s, it must be " threeness " ; for we must further assume that the essence of any given thing is the

•^ Book I, ch. iv.

    • Ross's emendation, though supported by no evidence,

seems to be required by the argument.



Tf IttI toZs^ drofioL? eaxoiros roiavTrj Karrjyopia'

cl)gt€ o/jlolcos /cat dXXo) orcoovv rcov ovroj Scixdcv-

tcjov to avrci) elvac eorai.

15 Xpi] Se, orav oXov rt TrpayiJLaTevrjTat rt?, SteAetv to yevos ^Is rd drofxa rw ctSet rd TTpajra, otov dptOfiov €1? rpidSa Kal SvdSa, eW ovrcos eKeivcov opua- fjLovs 7T€Lpd(jdaL Aa/XjSotve'tv, ofov evdeias ypapifirj? Kal kvkXov Kal opdrjs ycovias, jJL€Td 8e rovro Xa^ov-

20 ra ri to yevos, otov Ttorepov rcJov ttogcov tj tcov TTOicbv, rd tSia rrddr] decopeXv Sid TOiv koivcov Trpoj- rojv. rols ydp ovvrideixivois e/c rchv droficov rd GVfJL^aLVOvra €K tcDv opiGfjicbv earai hrfXa, 8ta ro dpx'Tjv etvai Trdvrwv rov opiOfidv Kal to dnXovv Kal TOLS aTrXots Kad^ avrd VTrdp'xeiv rd avpL^aivovra

25 jjiovoig, TOLS S' d'AAots" AcaT* eKelva. at 3e Statpeoets" at KraTo. rds Sta^opd? XPV^^P'^^ etatv ets" ro ovro) jjuerUvaL' cos" fievroc SeLKVvovoiv, etprjrat iv rols TTporepov. xpTJcnpLOL 8' av etev (LSe jjlovov rrpos ro GvXXoyLt,€od ai ro ri icrruv. Kairoi So^etev y* dv ovhev, dAA' evOvs Xafjipdvccv aTravra, cooTrep dv el

30 €^ dpxrjs iXapu^ave ns dvev rijs hiaipeaeojs . Sta- ^ip€i he Tt ro rrpCbrov Kal vorepov rcov Karrjyopov- puevcDV KarrjyopelcrdaL, otov elirelv t,a)ov rjjjLepov hiTTovv rj Slttovv l,a>ov TJfiepov. el ydp drrav eK

^ Tois Ross : TOLS.

^ i.e., those which exhibit the properties of the genus in their simplest form. 3 and 2 are the first odd and even numbers ; straight lines and circles are the simplest lines ; the right angle is that by which other angles are measured



last predicate of this kind that applies to the indi- viduals. Similarly any other combination of attri- butes thus exhibited will be the essence of the subject in question.

In making a systematic study of a whole class of Division ;, objects, one should first divide the genus into the systematic primary " injimae species {e.g., number into 3 and 2), study of a and then try to arrive at the definitions of these (e.g., of straight line, circle and right angle) by the methods described above ; then, after ascertaining what the category of the genus is (e.g., whether it is quantity or quality), examine its peculiar properties in the light of the primary common attributes. The attributes of subjects which are compounded of these inJimae species will become clear from the definitions (of the latter), because in every case the starting-point is the definition and the simple subject and attributes belong per se only to simple subjects, and to others indirectly. For investigations of this kind division in accordance with the differentiae is useful ; how it exhibits the facts has been explained above. ^ But for inferring the essential nature of a in a search subject its use is limited, as I shall explain. It might gence ?t^^' indeed seem that it has no use at all, but proceeds by ^J^^ke "* direct assumption, just as if one took the facts for attributes granted without employing division ; but it makes OTder^ ^^^ an appreciable difference whether the predicates are stated in the right order, e.g., whether you say " animal, tame, two-footed," or " two-footed, animal, tame," because if every definiendum consists of

and defined. When the essence of these has been grasped and formulated, we can compare their properties Math those of the other infimae species, and so, working steadily up- wards, systematize the whole genus. ^ In eh. V ; cf. also An. Pr. I. xxxi.



96 b

Svo early /cat ev rt to t,cpov rj/jiepov, /cat irdXiv e/c

rovTov /cat rrjg Staf^opa? o dvdpcoTTO? 'q ore St^ttot' 35 coTTt TO €v ytyvoiievov, dvayKalov SieXojjievov atVet- cr^at. €TL TTpos TO fiTjSev TTapaXiTretv iv rco tl cotlv ovTCx) {jLovcog ivSex^Tat. orav yap to TTpWTOv A07- (l)dfj yevos, dv puev twv KaTCodev Tiva Siaipeaeajv Xafji^dvrj, ovK e/xTreCTCtrat dnav els tovto, olov ov

TTaV ^(pOV Tj oXoTTTepOV Tj 0-)(lt,67TTepOV , dXXd TTTTjVOV

97 a i,cpov dirav tovtov yap Suacfyopd aur?]. TTpcoTT] Se

hia(j)opd eoTi t^wov els rjv dirav t^cpov ep^TrliTTei. ofjiolws Se /cat tcov dXXatv eKdcTTov, /cat tcov e^co yevcjv /cat tcov vtt* avTO, olov opvidos, els rjv dnas dpvLS, /cat l-)(dvos, els rfv arras Ix^vs- ovroj p.ev ovv 5 jSaSt^ovTt eariv etSeVat ort ovSev rrapaXeXeiTTrai- dXXoJS 8e /cat irapaXiTTelv dvayKalov /cat purj elSevai. OvSev Se Set rov 6pit,6pLevov /cat Statpou/xevov cLTTavra elSevat rd ovra. Kairoi dh-uvarov ^acrt TLves elvai rds Sta^opas" ctSeVat rds TTpds eKaarov fjLT] elSora eKaarov dvev Se tcov hia(f)opa)v ovk 10 €tvat eKaarov elSevaf ov yap p,rj hia(j)epeL, ravrov etvai rovrqj, ov Se ScacfjepeL, erepov rovrov. npcorov fjiev ovv rovro i/jevSos' ov yap Kara ndaav hLa(j)opdv erepov rroXXal yap Sia(j)opal vrrdpxovaL rots avrols rd) etSet, aAA' ov /caT* ovalav ovSe Kad* avrd. elra

<• Viz.., genus and differentia. At every stage of division the compound of these becomes the generic element in the next stage below.

^ All the commentators refer this argument to Speusippus. For his, Plato's and Aristotle's attitudes towards division cf.



two elements," and " animal, tame " is a unity, and if " man " (or whatever single species we are trying to define) consists in its turn of this genus plus its differentia, we must use division in assuming the elements. Besides, this is the only way to ensure and ensures that no element in the definition is omitted. If, after oSVno- taking the highest genus, we next take one of the thing, lower divisions, the class which we are dividing will not all fall into this division, e.g., not every animal is either whole-winged or split-winged, although every winged animal is one or the other, because this is the class to which the differentia belongs. The primary differentia of " animal " is that into which all " ani- mal " falls. The same applies to every one of the other genera, whether co-ordinate or subaltern ; the primary differentia of " bird " or " fish " is that into which all " bird " or " fish " falls. If you proceed in this way you can be sure that nothing has been left out ; otherwise omissions are bound to occur, without any possibility of detection.

In defining by division there is no need to know all To define by the facts. Some,^ however, maintain that it is im- neeli^not^"^ possible to know the differentiae between each thing j>now all the and the rest without knowing each thing severally, and impossible to know each thing severally without knowing the differentiae ; because if A does not differ from B, they are identical, and if it does differ, they are distinct species. Now in the first place this is false, because not every differentia entails a specific distinction ; many differentiae are attributable (but neither essentially nor per se) to things which are specifically the same. Secondly, when one takes a

Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato mid the Academy, i. 59-63.



97 a

15 orav Aa^27 TavriKeifjieva kol rrjv hia(j)opav koX on rrdv e^TrLTTTei ivravda rj ivravOa, kol Xaprj ev darepcp ro l^r]TOV[Ji€vov etvat, Kal rovro yiyvcodKTj, ovhev Sia(/)€p€L etSevat 7) firj elhevai icf)^ ouwv Karrj- yopovvrai aXXatv at Sta^opat. (j)avepov yap on av ovTCxj ^ahit^cov eXdr) els ravra cLv firjKen ean Sta-

20 (fyopd, €^€L Tov Xoyov rrjs ovaias. ro 8* airav e/x7rt- 7TT€iv els rrjv Statpecrtv, av 7^ dvnKelfjieva cov (jlt) eon {jLera^v, ovk airrnxa- dvdyKT] yap dirav iv Oarepcp avrcov elvai, eiTrep eKeivov 8ia(f)opd ion}

Ets" 8e TO KaTa<7K6vdt,€iv opov Sta rcov hiaipe- oreojv rpicbv Set oroxd^eGOaL, rod Xa^eXv rd Karrj-

25 yopovfJLeva iv rep rl ion, Kal ravra rd^ai ri rrpwrov rj Sevrepov, Kal on ravra Trdvra. eon he rovrcov ev TTpcorov Sta rov Svvaodai, coorrep rrpos ovfji^e^rj- Kos avXXoyiaaodai on VTrdpx^i, Kal 8ta rod yevovs KarauKevdoai. ro he rd^ai chs Set eor ai edv ro TrpaJrov Xd^rj. rovro 8* eorai edv Xrj<j)Ofi o Trdoiv

30 dKoXovdeZ, eKeivcp he fir] rrdvra' dvdyKT) yap elvai n roLovrov, X'r)(j)9evros he rovrov rjhr] eirl rcov Kdroj 6 avros rpoTTOs' hevrepov yap ro rcbv d'AAcav TTpojrov eorrai, Kal rplrov ro rwv exofievcov d(j)aipedevros yap rod dvcodev ro exdfJievov rcJov

^ ioTL d, comm. (?), Ross : laTai.

<* i.e., the definition.

^ A topic (tottos) is a commonplace of argument, or set of rules for cogent reasoning, such as are to be found in Aris- totle's Topics. They are not scientific but dialectical, since they are based upon premisses which are not necessarily true, but merely probable as being generally accepted. They are valuable both as an equipment for serious debate and as a supplement to scientific discussion, since they help (as in



pair of opposite attributes and the diflferentia which distinguishes them, and assumes that every individual falls under one or the other, and then assumes that the given term is contained in one of the two, and knows that class, it does not matter whether he knows or does not know all the other terms of which the differentiae are predicable ; because clearly, if he proceeds in this way until he reaches the point where there is no further differentia, he will have the formula of the essence." It is not an *' assumption " to assert that every member of the genus must fall under one or the other division, if the opposites are exhaustive ; because every member of a genus must be in one or the other of two species distinguished by a differentia of that genus.

In order to establish a definition by division, we Three rules must keep three things in mind : (1) to select attri- *^ obs^^"^®- butes which describe the essence, (2) to arrange them in order of priority, and (3) to make sure that the selection is complete. (1) The first object can be achieved through the possibility of establishing the genus and differentia by the topic ^ of genus, just as we can infer the inherence of an attribute by the topic of accident. (2) We can arrange the attributes correctly if we take first the first in order, i.e., that which is implied by, but does not imply, all the rest ; there must be one such term. When we have selected this, we can proceed at once in the same way with the lower terms ; the second will be the first of the remainder, and the third the first of those imme- diately following (because when the first of a series

the present instance) to establish facts or judgements which do not admit of actual demonstration. Books II and III of the Topics deal with accidents and Book IV with genera.



97 a

dXXojv TTpwTOV earai. oiioicjs Se /cat eirl rwv aAAcov. 35 on 8* aTTavra ravra (fyavepov Ik rod XaBelv to re TTpcoTOV Kara SiatpeoLV, on airav t) rohe t] roSe ^cpov, V7rdp)(€i 8e rdSe, /cat TrdXiv rovrov oXov rrfv hia(j)opdv, Tov Se reXevratov /XTy/ceVt etvat Scacfyopdv, rj /cat €v9vs /-tera rij? reXevralag hia^opds rod 97bauvoAoy /XT] hia(j)€peLV etSet ert^ rovro. SrjXov yap on ovT€ TrXetov TrpouKeirai [navra yap Iv rep ri eonv elXriTTrai rovrcov) ovre aTroXcLTrei ovSev t^ yap yivos i) Sta^opa dv eir). yevos /U,ev ovv to re

TTpWTOV, /cat fM€Td TOJV hia(j)OpCl)V TOVTO TTpoorXafjL-

5 pav6fJL€vov' at hiacfyopal Se rracrat exovTau- ov yap €TL eonv vGTepa- etSet yap dv Suecfyipe to reAewratov, TOVTO S* e'iprjTai purj SiacfxEpeiv.

7jr]TeLV Se Set iin^XeTTovTa ettI ra ofjLoia /cat dSta^opa, TTpojTOV tl drravTa Tavrov e^ovGiv, etra TTctAtv e<p erepots", a ev Tavrcp fxkv yeVet e/cetVot?, 10 etCTt Se avTols^ /xev raura to) etSet, e'/cetVcov S* erepa. orav S* eVt toutcof X'q^dfj tl irdvTa TavTov, /cat evrt Toiv (xAAcov 6p.oLOJS, iirl tcjv etAT^/x/xevojy TrdXtv (TK07T€LV €1 TavTov, €(j09 dv etV eVa e'A^T] Aoyov owros" ya/o ecrrat rou rrpdyixaros opiopLos.

^ etSet en B^ (?) : to) eiSet ert n : ei rt Ad : etSct B^, comm. ^ auTots A^, Eustratius : aurd?. 236


is removed, the next is the first of the remainder) ; and so on. (3) The completeness of om* selection is evident from the fact that we first take the first class to be divided, and assume that every animal is either A or B, and then that one of these differentiae belongs to it ; and next take the differentia of the w^hole class thus obtained, until the class which we finally reach has no further differentia : z'.e., as soon as we have assumed the last differentia which characterizes the complex term (to be defined), the latter is not further divisible into species. Clearly nothing super- fluous is included, because all the attributes have been assumed as forming part of the essence ; and nothing is left out — if it were, it would have to be either a genus or a differentia ; now the first term is a genus, and so is the combination of this term with its differentiae ; and the differentiae are all included, because we have reached a point at which there is no further differentiation. If there were, the last term would be divisible into species ; and we have laid down that it is not.

We must set about our search by looking out for a How to group of things which are alike in the sense of being ggnenu specifically indifferent, and asking what they all have deflnition. in common ; then we must do the same with another group in the same genus and belonging to the same species as one another but to a species different from that of the first group. When we have discovered in the case of this second group what its members have in common, and similarly in the case of all the other groups, we must consider again whether the common features which we have established have any feature which is common to them all, until we reach a single expression. This will be the required definition.



97 b

'Eav Se fiT] ^aSt^Ty ets" eVa aAA* els Svo rj TrAetovs"/

15 hjjXov on ovK av etr] ev n etvat to ^Tyrou/xevov, aAAa TrAetct). otov Xeyco, el ri eon fieyaXoijjvxla ^T^rot- fiev, GKeTTreov eiri tlvojv {jbeyaXoipvxoJV ovg tofiev ri exovcnv ev iravres fj tolovtol. olov el ^AXKi^idSr]? fjLeyaXoi/jvxos 'q 6 ^A^i'XXevs kol 6 A!ias, ri ev airavres ; ro fir] dvex^odau v^pL^ofjuevoL' 6 fxev yap

20 iTToXefirjaev, 6 8' ijJLijvLGev, 6 8* oLTTeKreLvev eavrov. ttolXlv €0' erepojv, olov AvadvSpov rj HcoKpdrovg. el Srj ro dSidcfyopoL etvau evrv^ovvre? /cat drv)(ovv- reSy ravra Svo Xa^cbv okotto) ri ro avro e)(ov(jLV rj re aTrddeia r] irepl ras" rvxo,S kol r) fir] virofjuovrj

25 drLijLa^ofievojv. el Se fjirjSev, Svo e'iSr] dv etr] rrjs fjLeyaXoifjV)(ioi9 • cttet 8* ecrrt Trcts" opo? KaOoXov ov ydp rivi 6(j)daXfMa) Xeyei ro vyieivov 6 larpos, dXX r] TTavrl r] ethei d(j)opioas.

'Paov re ro Kad^ eKaarov opiaaodac rj ro KadoXov Sco 8et diTO rwv Kad^ eKaara errl rd KadoXov fiera-

30 paiveiv Kal ydp at ofxcovvp^iaL Xavddvovoi [xaXXov ev roL? KadoXov rj ev rois d8ta<^opotS'. ojUTrep 8e ev rals dTToSei^eot Set ro ye GvXXeXoyioO ai^ virdp-

^etv, ovrcx) Kal ev rols opois ro oa^es. rovro 8'

earaL edv Sta rcx)v Kad^ eKaarov elXrjjijjievcov^ fj ro ev eKdorcp yevei 6pit,eadai x^pis, olov rd djioiov

^ ttXclovs comm. : ttAcioj codd. ^ avXXoyiaaadai Ad.

3 elXtjufjievcDv Eustratius (?), Mure : elfyqfxevcov codd., Philo- ponus.

" This seems to be the least unsatisfactory rendering of a difficult word, which for most Greeks ranked as a virtue. " Pride," advocated by Burnet and accepted by Ross, scarcely conveys this eifect. The quality is discussed in Eth. mc. 1123 a 34 flP.



If the series ends not in one expression but in two The terra to or more, clearly the definiendum cannot be one may^prove thing ; it must be more than one. I mean, for to be equi- example, supposing that we require a definition of high-mindedness," we must consider individual high- minded persons whom we know, and see what one characteristic they all have qua high-minded. E.g., if Alcibiades and Achilles and Ajax were high- minded, what was their common characteristic ? Intolerance of dishonour ; for this made the first go to war, roused the wrath of the second, and drove the third to commit suicide. Then we must apply the same process to another group, e.g., Lysander and Socrates. Suppose that here the common character- istic is being unaffected by good and bad fortune. Now I take these two and consider what there is in common between indifference to fortune and intoler- ance of dishonour ; and if there is nothing, there must be two kinds of high-mindedness.^ But every definition is always universal. A doctor prescribes what is salutary not for some one eye but for all eyes, or for the eye in a specific condition.

It is easier to define the particular ^ than the uni- By working versal ; and therefore we should proceed from par- particulars ticulars to universals. Ambiguities, too, are harder we secure to detect in universals than in injimae species. Just as precision, demonstration demands a completed inference, so definition demands clarity ; and this will be achieved if we can, by means of the common features which we have established, define our concept separately in each class of objects (e.g., define similarity not in

^ i.e., the term is equivocal, being used to describe two distinct species.

" Not, of course, the individual (which is indefinable), but the species as opposed to the genus.



97 b

35 jj.T] irdv aAAa ro ev ^^pcoixaoL kol (T;\;7yju,acrt, koI ogv TO €v ^ojvfj, Koi ovrojs errl ro koivov ^aSl^euv, evXa^ovfjievov /xo) ofJucovvfJiLa ivrvxi). el Se fxr] 8ta- Xeyeadat Set /xera^opat?, SrjXov on ouS' optjecr^at ovT€ fi€ra(f)opaL9 ovre oaa Xeyerai fji€ra(j)o pals' hiaXiyeaOai yap dvdyKr) eorai iJL€Ta(f)opaig.

98 a XIV. Upos 8e TO €X€LV rd TTpo^Xruxara eKXeyeiv

Set rds T€ dvarojjids Kal rag hiaipioeLS , ovrco Se eKXeyeiv, vnodefjievov to yivos to koivov aTrdvTWV, olov €L ^cpa €Lr] Ta Ted €cxj pi) pieva, TToXa TravTL ^cocp 5 VTrdpx^iy Xr](f)6evTa)v 8e tovtcxjv, TrdXiv tojv Xolttwv Tcp rrpayrcp TVoZa iravTi eVerat, olov el tovto opvis, TToia rravTi eWrat opvidi, Kal ovtojs del tco iyyu- rara* SrjXov yap on e^opuev rjSr] Xiyeiv to hid tl VTrdpxeu Ta eTTOfieva tols vtto to koivov, olov 8t<x tl

dvdpWTTCx) 7) LTTTTO) VirdpX'^l- 'ioTix) §€ t,(pOV i(f)^ OV

10 A, TO Se B Td eTTOpbeva mavTl ^cocp, icj)^ Sv Be T A. E ra Tivd ^(pa. hrjXov Brj Std tl to B vndpxei tw A' Sid ydp t6^ a. opLoioJS Se Kal toIs oXXols- Kal del eirl tcov KaTOj^ 6 avTOS Xoyos.

Nw /xev ovv /caret ret TrapaSeSopueva Koivd 6v6- jLtara Xeyopiev, Set Se purj piovov iirl tovtojv UKOTreZv,

15 aAAa Kal dv dXXo tl ocjyQfj virdpxov kolvov eKXapu^d- vovTa, etra rtcrt tovt^ dKoXovOel Kal rrola tovtco eVerat, olov toIs Kepara exovoL to e;!^etv ixLVov, to

^ TO n, Eustratius : rod. ^ Kara) n : aAAoov.

" i.e.^ the propositions or connexions which we are re- quired to prove.



general but in respect of colours or shapes, and define sharpness in respect of sound), and so advance to the general definition, taking care not to become involved in equivocation. If we are to avoid arguing in metaphors, clearly we must also avoid defining in metaphors and defining metaphorical terms ; other- wise we are bound to argue in metaphors.

XIV. In order to formulate the problems " <of a Division given science) we must select the proper sections or formulate^ divisions '^ ; and that in the following way. We must problems first posit the genus which is common to all the par- ticulars ; e.g., if the subject of our study is animals, we must establish what attributes belong to every animal. When we have done this, we must next consider all the attributes belonging to the first of the remaining classes ; e.g., if this class is " bird," we must consider what attributes belong to every bird ; and so on, always taking the proximate sub-genus. In this way we shall obviously be able directly to show the reason why the attributes belong to each of the sub-genera, such as " man " or " horse." Let A stand for animal, B for the attributes belonging to every animal, and C, D, E for species of animal. Then it is obvious why B applies to D, viz., through A ; and similarly with C and E. The same principle holds for all the other sub-genera.

At the moment we are using the traditional class- names, but we must not confine ourselves to these in our inquiry ; we must pick out any other observed common characteristic, and then consider to what subjects it belongs, and what properties it entails : e.g., in the case of horned animals, the possession of

^ Sc, of the subject-matter. The whole field must be mapped out by genera and species.



98 a ^

fjirj dfjL(f)a)SovT* etvai' ttolXlv to Kepar^ €)(€iv tlglv eVerat. SrjXov yap 8ta tl eKelvoL? virdp^ei to elpiq- fxevov 8ta ydp ro Kepar^ ^X^^^ VTrdp^ei.

20 "Ert 8' aAAos" rpoTTos iarl Kara to dvdXoyov e/c- Aeyetv. eV ydp Aa^etv ovk €gtl to avTO o Sel KaXeaai otJttlov^ Kal aKavOav /cat ogtovv eWat^ S' iTTOfJLeva Kal tovtols warrep /xta? tlvos ^i^creco? ttj? TOiavTiqs ovGiqs.

XV. To, S' aura rrpo^XrjixaTd ecrrt to, fiev to) to

25 avTO fiecrov e-xeiv, olov otl TrdvTa dvTLTTepLGTaatg . TOVTCOV S' eVta tw yevet raura, ocra e;)^€t Suacfyopd? Tcp dXXwv r) aAAco? etvau, olov Sua tl i^x^t, rj Sid tl €fjL(f)aLV€TaL, Kal Sta tl TpLS' diravTa ydp TavTa to avTO Trpo^Xiqixd ioTL yiveL (irdvTa ydp dvdKXaoLs) , dXX etSet €T€pa.

30 To, 8e TO) TO fieoov vtto to eTepov /xecrov etvat

SLa(f)€p6L TCOV 7TpO^XrjlJidT(xiV, olov ^Ld TL 6 NciAoS"

(J)9lvovtos tov firjvog /xaAAov pel; Slotl ;)^€t^eptcu- T€pos <f)dLvojv 6 fi€LS.^ 8ta TL 8e ;(et^eptdjTepos" (J)Olvojv; Slotl rj oeXi^vr] dTToXcLTTCL. TavTa ydp OVTOJ9 €X€L TTpos dXXr]Xa.

^ arjTnov n, Elistratius : ai]7T€iov vel arjTrelov.

2 ecrrat dn, Philoponus : eari.

^ jLtei? n : yLTjv volgo, sed o . . . (f>divcov om. ABd.

" *.^., front teeth in the lower jaw only.

^ The extra material for the horns is secured at the cost of the upper front teeth {Part. An. 663 b 31 if.) ; and nature compensates the deficiency of teeth by amplifying the apparatus of digestion {ibid. 674 a 22 ff.).

" " Pounce " is the internal shell of a cuttle-fish, and " spine " a fish-bone. They are analogues of animal bone, and all three must fall under one genus. 242


a third stomach and a single row of teeth " ; and then ask " What animals have the property of posses- sing horns ? " It will be obvious why the specified characteristic belongs to these animals, viz., because they have horns.

There is another method of selection, viz., by analogy. It is impossible to find a single name which should be applied to pounce, spine and bone '^ ; yet the fact that these too have (common) properties implies that there is a single natural substance of this kind.

XV. Some problems are identical in virtue of hav- Problems ing the same middle term ; e.g., they may all be JUf/die^^^ explained by the principle of reciprocal replacement.*^ ^^^rms which Of these middle terms some are (only) generically cal identical, viz., such as differ in virtue of having differ- ent subjects, or operating in different ways : e.g., the phenomena of echo, reflection and rainbow ; in all these the problem is generically the same (because they are all kinds of refraction) but specifically different.

Other problems differ (only) in the fact that the or subordi- middle term of the one is subordinate ^ to the middle Jhe^othS.^^ term of the other. E.g., why does the Nile flow fuller in the latter part of the month ? Because the weather is more stormy then. And why is the weather more stormy then ? Because the moon is waning. The relation of the two middles is one of subordination.

<* The principle (since for Aristotle there is no void : Phys. IV. vii-ix, especially 214 a 28-82) that the space vacated by one body (A) in displacinf^ another (B) must be occupied either by B or by another body displaced by B (Simplicius, Phys. 1350. 31). Ross ad loc. instances various phenomena susceptible of this explanation.

  • As a cause.



98 a 85 XVI. Uepl 8* alriov /cat ov atriov aTToprjoeie. jjuev

dv TiSy OLpa ore V7rdp-)(€i to alriarov, /cat to airiov

VTrdpx^i' (coairep et (f)vXXoppo€L t) eVAetVet, Kal ro

atriov rod eAcAetVetr t) (j)vXXoppoelv eorai' olov el

98 b rovr^ eon ro TrXarea e^eiv rd <f)vXXa, rod 8' e/cAet-

Trecv ro rrjv yr^v ev fxeocp etvau- el yap pLrj VTrdp^eL,

dXXo ri eorai ro atriov avrayv)' et re^ ro atriov

VTrdpxei, a/xa Kal ro alriarov, olov el ev jjieacp rj

yrj, eKXeiTTei, r) el rrXarvcjivXXov , <j)vXXoppoei. el 8*

5 ovrojs, dfjb' dv etiq Kal SeiKvvoiro 8t' dXXijXojv.

eoro) ydp ro <j)vXXoppoelv i<f>* ov A, ro Se irXarv-

(f)vXXov ecj}^ ov B, dfjLTTeXog Se e^' ov T. el Srj rw

B VTrdpxei ro A {ttolv ydp 7rXarv(j)vXXov <j)vXXoppoel) ,

rep Se r vrrdp^ei ro B {rrdaa ydp djJLTreXos rrXarv-

10 (f)vXXos), rw r virdp^ei ro A, Kal Trdaa dpiTreXos <f)vXXoppoel. atriov 8e ro B ro fieaov. dXXd Kal on 7TXarv(f)vXXov rj ajXTreXos eon hid rod (j)vXXop- poelv aTToSei^ai. eoroj ydp ro fxev A 7rXarv(j>vXXov , ro 8e E ro ^vXXoppoelv, dfXTreXos 8e €^' ov Z. to) 87) Z vrrdp^ei ro E {(f)vXXoppoei ydp rrdaa dpiTreXos) ,

16 TOJ 8e E TO A (dirav ydp ro (f)vXXoppoovv rrXarv- (f)vXXov)- TTdoa dpa df.L'neXos TrXarv(f)vXXov . atriov Se ro (f)vXXoppoeiv. el Se /xr/ evSe^erai atria etvat dXXijXojv {ro ydp atriov nporepov ov atriov, Kal rod fiev eKXeineiv atriov ro ev pLeaco rrjv yrjv elvai,

^ e? re] etre AB : e? ye n.

" This punctuation of the passage {i.e.^ treating wairep . . . 244


XVI. With regard to cause and effect the questions Do cause might be raised (1) whether the presence of the effect eJiuach impHes the presence of the cause {e.g., whether, if a other? tree sheds its leaves or an ecHpse occurs, the cause of the ecUpse or of the leaf-shedding must also be present — viz., in the latter case the fact that the tree is broad-leafed, and in the former the fact of the earth's interposition — because if the cause is not present there must be some other cause of these effects) " ; and (2) whether, if the cause is present, the effect will be present too {e.g., if the earth inter- poses there is an eclipse, or if the tree is broad-leafed it is deciduous). If so, cause and effect will be compresent and reciprocally demonstrable. Let A stand for " deciduous," B for " broad-leafed " and C for " vine." Then if A applies to B (since all broad-leafed plants are deciduous) and B to C (since all vines are broad -leafed), A applies to C, i.e., all vines are deciduous. The cause is the middle term B. But we can also prove that the vine is broad-leafed because it is deciduous. Let D be " broad-leafed," E " deciduous " and F " vine." Then E applies to F (since every vine is deciduous) and D to E (since every deciduous plant is broad-leafed) ; therefore all vines are broad-leafed. Here the cause is " shedding leaves." But since it is impossible for two things to Yes, but be causes of each other (for the cause is prior " to its fioes^not*^

effect, and it is the interposition of the earth that is explain the ^ cause.

avTuiv as a parenthesis) had suggested Itself to me before I knew that Ross had adopted it. It certainly tidies up the sense, and I think it must be right.

i.e., if both answers are affirmative.

'^ Not necessarily in time, for the formal cause is simul- taneous with its effect (95 a 14 ff.) ; but naturally and logi- cally.


98 b ^

rod 8' iv fxioco rrjv yrjv elvau ovk airiov to eKXei-

20 TTeiv) — et ovv r) fxev Sta rod airiov airohei^is rod Sea riy rj Se ^rj Sta rod airiov rod on, on /xev iv jjl€- GO) otSe, Sion 8' ov. on 8' ov ro eAcAetVetv atnov rod iv jiiacpy dAAo, rodro rod iKXeLireLV, (fyavepov €v yap rep Xoycp rep rod iKXeirreLV ivvTTap-)(€i ro ev pL€GCpy cctare SrjXov on 8ta rovrov iKelvo yvcopi- t^erai, aAA* ov rodro 8t* iKelvov.

25 H ivhi^erai ivos irXeioj atna elvai; Kal yap et ecrrt ro avro TrXeiovcov Trpcorcjv KarrjyopeicrdaL, euroj ro A rep B TTpcorcp virdp^oVy Kal rep Y aXXcp Trpcorcpy Kal radra rots A E. VTrdp^ei dpa ro A rols A E, ainov 8e rep puev A to B rep 8e E to T' ojore rod

30 [lev airiov v7Tdp)(ovros dvdyKrj ro npayfia VTrdp- X^^^> '^od 8e rrpdypiaros VTrdp-xpvros ovk dvdyKT] TTOLV 6 av fj a'inov, dAA' atVtov /xeV, ov fiivroi TTav.

H €t del KadoXov ro 7rp6pX7]fid ian, Kal ro ainov oXov n Kal ov atnov KaOoXov; olov ro (f)vXXoppo6LV oXep nvl d^coptCjiteVov, kov etbr] avrod

35 fjy Kal roLuSl KadoXov y tj ^vrols r^ roiotaSl^ (j)vroZs' ex)ore Kal ro pbeaov taov Set etvat eTrl rovreov Kal ov ainov y Kal avnorpe^eiv. olov hid ri rd SevSpa epvXXoppoei; el Stj Sid rrrj^iv rod vypody e'ire (f)vX-

^ roLoiaSl] roLoiohe ABd.

  • i.e.y through the effect.



the cause of the ecHpse, and not vice versa) — if demon- stration by means of the cause proves the reasoned fact, while demonstration not through the cause ** proves the mere fact, (one who reasons in the latter way) knows the fact of the earth's interposition, but not the reason for it. That the earth's interposition is the cause of the eclipse, and not vice versa, is obvious from the fact that the former is an element in the definition of the latter ; which clearly shows that we obtain our knowledge of the latter through the former, and not vice versa.

Or is it possible for one effect to have several Can there causes ? If the same attribute can be predicated causeFof ^ immediately of more than one subject, let A apply one effect? immediately to B and likewise to C, and let B and C apply immediately to D and E respectively. Then A will apply to D and E, the causes being B and C respectively. Thus the presence of the cause neces- sarily implies that of the effect, but the presence of the effect does not necessarily imply that of the whole range of possible causes ; it implies so7?ie cause, but not everi^ cause.

But surely if the " problem " is always universal,^ No; the the cause is a whole, and the effect is (commensu- whofeand rately) universal. E.g., deciduousness is appro- commensu- priated to a subject as a whole ; and if this consists the effect. of species, the attribute belongs to these also univer- sally : either to plants or to particular species of plants ; hence in the case of these the middle term and the effect must be commensurate and conver- tible. E.g., why are trees deciduous ? If it is because there is coagulation of the sap, then if a tree is

  • As it must be, since it is a scientific proposition.

" Sc, at the junction of the leaf-stalk (99 a 29).



98 b

AoppO€i hevhpOV, Set V7Tdp-)(€lV TTTJ^LV, €LT€ TTTJ^iS V7T-

dpx^Ly 117] OTCpovv dXXd SevSpo), <f>vXXoppo6iV.

99 a XVII. Uorepov 3' ivSex^rai fir) ro avro alriov

€LvaL rod avrov rrduiv dXX erepov, tj ov ; r) el fiev Kad^ avro aTToSeSetfcrat koL pur] Kara arnjieZov r] GVfjL^e^rjKos, ovx otov re; 6 yap Aoyos" rov aKpov 5 ro fxeaov eariv el Se jjctj ovrco^, evSex^rat. ean Se Kal ov airiov Kal w uKorrelv Kara ovp^^e^iqKos' ov pLTjv SoKel TTpo^XijfjLara elvai. el Se pnq, ofJLolajg egei ro /xeVov el puev 6pia)vvfjia, opLCiyvvp^ov ro pueoov' el 8' COS" ev yevei, opuoicxjs e^ei. otov hid ri Kal €vaAAa^ dvdXoyov; dXXo yap atnov ev ypapLfJiaZs 10 Kal dpLdfiolg Kal ro avro ye, fj fjuev ypa/x/xTy/ d'AAo, fj 8' ^xov av^r)GLV rotavSi, ro avro. ovrays errl rravrojv. rod 8' ofioiov etvat xpd^f^^ ;YPa)/xaTt Kal Gxrjpia (TxrjfJiarL dXXo dXXcp. opwvvpov yap ro ofxoiov en rovra>v evda puev yap lotojs ro dvdXoyov ex€LV rds rrXevpas Kal teas' rds ycjovias, errl Se

^ ypafi/XT] n : ypafifxai.

"■ This chapter appears to contain an alternative and pre- sumably later treatment of the problem discussed in ch. xvi.

^ An event has only one formal cause, which is present in every instance ; but it may be inferred from any of the various properties which are its " signs " {cf. An. Pr. II. xxvii) ; and may have any number of accidental causes.

" Because a " problem " is a scientific proposition, and accidents lie outside the sphere of scientific knowledge.

^ Since the examples which follow do not illustrate acci- dental relations, el Se /xt; must be taken (as Ross takes it) to indicate their exclusion — in spite of the commentators, who understand it to refer to ov SokcI.

  • Aristotle notes three different cases in which the same

effect has, in a sense, different causes, (a) The major may be equivocal : as " similar " has different meanings in different 248




deciduous, there must be coagulation ; and if coagu- lation is present — not in any and every subject, but in a tree — the tree must be deciduous.

XVII. Can the same effect be produced not by the Can the same cause in all cases but (sometimes) by a different ha^ldiffer- cause ?" Surely this is (1) impossible if the effect ent^ causes^? has been demonstrated as essential (not proved from relation is a " sign " or through an accidental connexion),^ for ^^^ then the middle is the definition of the major term ; (2) possible if it has not. It is possible to consider the effect and its subject in an accidental relation, but such connexions are not regarded as " pro- blems." ^ Apart from the accidental relation,^ the middle will correspond to the extreme ^ terms : (a) if they are equivocal, the middle will be equivocal, and (6) if they express a generic connexion, so will the middle. For example, (h) " why do propor- tionals alternate ? " ■'^ The cause is different for lines and for numbers, and yet it is the same ; different if the lines are considered as lines, and the same if they are considered as exhibiting a given increment. So with all proportionals, (a) The cause of similarity between colours is different from that of similarity between figures, because " similarity " in these two cases is equivocal ; in the latter it means, presum- ably, that the sides are proportional and the angles equal, while in colours it means that our perception

genera, so has the middle which is the cause of siniilarity. (6) The major may apply to a whole genus {e.ff., quantity), of which different species may be taken as subjects : then the middle term will vary with the subject, (c) Analogical connexions {cf. 98 a 20 fF.) are in one sense the same and in another different : so are their causes.

f The reference is to the theory of proportion mentioned at 74 a 17, where see note. t'Vi >,, ,




15 )(paJiJLdra)v to ttjv aiGdiqoiv ixiav elvai rj ri d'AAo ToiovTov. ra Se Kar* dvaXoylav rd avrd Kal to [jL€(Jov €^€L KaTCL dvaXoylav.

"E;^^ ^' ovTCO TO TrapaKoXovdelv to atrtov dXXrj- XoL9 Kal ov atrtov Acat a> atrtov Kad^ eKaoTov /xev XafjL^dvovTL TO ov aiTiov €ttI TrXeov, olov to rerrap-

20 (Ttv to-as" ras" e^co irrl irXiov r] Tpiyojvov tj TeTpdyojvoVy aTraot 8e ctt* toov (ooa yap rerrapatv 6pdai< s loas Tas e|a))- Acat to /xeaov ojxoiojs. €gtl Se to fieaov Xoyos Tov npcoTov aKpov, 8to Tracrat at iTnoTrjjxai hi opuGfjiov yiyvovTai. olov to (fyvXXoppoetv djjia dKoXovdeX TTJ dfJiTTeXcp Kal VTrepex^i, Kal orvKrj Kal

25 vnepex^t dXX* ov rravTajv, dAA' toov. et Stj Xd^ots TO TTpcoTOV pbioov, Aoyo? TOV (jivXXoppoelv ioTiv. corat yap TrpcoTOV fiev IttI OdTepa pueaov, otl rotaSt dVayra- etra tovtov pbeoov, otl ottos TrrjyvvTaL rj rt

dAAo TOLOVTOV. TL 8' COrt TO (j)vXXoppO€Zv ; TO

TTriyvvadai tov iv ttj Gvvdipei tov GTrepfxaTos ottov.

30 'Etti 8e rcDv ax^jJidTCOV cSSe dTroSdjaet ^tjtovgl

TTjv TrapaKoXovdrjGiV tov oItlov Kal ov atrtov. €o-ra>

<* E.g., in a proposition relating to bony structure the middle term, though the same by analogy, is in fact different for animal, fish and cuttle-fish {cf. 98 a 22).

That is, with all rectilinear figures ; cf. 85 b 38 ff.

" Cf. ch. viii, and 94 a 20 ff.

As necessary for the proof of their propositions.

  • The two botanical syllogisms of ch. xvi are here combined

in a sorites, viz..

All plants whose sap is coagulated are deciduous,

All broad-leafed plants are subject to coagulation of sap

(.*. All broad-leafed plants are deciduous).

All vines, figs, etc., are broad-leafed,

.'. All vines, figs, etc., are deciduous.

There are two middles, of which " the first," next to the major,



of them is one and the same, or something of that

sort, (c) Things which are the same by analogy will

have a middle term which is analogous."

The proper view of the reciprocation of cause. How cause, . effect and

effect and subject is as follows. If the species are subject are

taken separately, the effect has a wider extension ^^ ^ ' than the subject — e.g., " having the sum of the ex- terior angles equal to four right angles " has a wider extension than has triangularity or squareness — but if they are taken all together, it is coextensive with them, viz., with all figures that have the sum of their exterior angles equal to four right angles ^ ; and similarly with the middle. The middle is the defini- tion of the major term ^ ; this is the reason why all sciences are based upon definitions.*^ ^-g-i decidu- ousness is a universal attribute of the vine or fig, and also has a wider extension than either ; but it is not wider than, but equal to, the sum of all the species. Thus if you take the first ^ middle term, you have a definition of " deciduous." (I say " the first "> because there is (another) middle term which is first in the direction of the subjects, which it describes as all having a certain characteristic ; and this in turn has a middle " because the sap is co- agulated," or something to that effect. What is deciduousness ? Coagulation of the sap at the junc- tion of the leaf-stalk.

If it is required to exhibit the correspondence The same

of cause and effect schematically, it will run like schemati- cally, defines it ; the other, " first in the direction of the subject," is merely a sub-genus of deciduous species.



9 a

TO A ra> B VTrdpx^iv Travrl, to 8e B iKaarco rcov A, enl TrXeov^ 8e. ro fxev Sr) B KadoXov av e'lr] Tot? A* TOVTO yap Xeyco KadoXov ch^ {jltj ayTtoTpe^et, Trpco- 35 Tov Se KadoXov cp eKacrrov puev firj avTi(jrpe^€iy arravra Sc dvTtOTpe^et Kal TrapeKreiveL. rots St) A auTiov Tov A TO B . Set dpa to A €7tI TvXeov rov B

€7T€KT€LV€iV^' Ct 8e fJLTJ , TL fJidXXoV atVtOV CCTTat TOVTO

eKcivov; el Stj Trdaiv vTrdp)(€L tols E to A, cWat Tt eKelva ev avravTa d'AAo tou B. el yap pbrj, ttco? 9 b eoTai elirelv otl a> to E to A iravTi, w Se to A ov TTavTL TO E; Sia Tt yap ovk eoTai tl auTcov olov [to A]* vTrdpxei Tract Tot? A; aAA' apa Kal to, E eoTai Tt eV; eTTioKexjjaadai Set tovto, Kal eaTCO to T. evBe)(eTaL St) tov avTov rrXeioj atVta etvat, dAA' 5 ov TOt9 auTOts" to) €t8et, otov TOV piaKpo^ia elvai to. jLtcv TCTpaTToSa TO ^1^ e;)^etv ;^oAt7V, tcl he TTTTjvd to $7] pa etvai t) eTepov tl.

^ TrXeiov ABd, comm. 2 4; B^ Eustratius : o.


  • TO A seel. Ross : tou to A vTrdpx^Lu coni. Mure : toO A

vndpxei vel to B virdpxei coni. Hayduck.

" The exposition which follows is at best elliptical, and the phrasing is unusual ; it seems likely to be a supplement by another hand. If we try to fit the scheme to the preceding example we get :

All broad-leafed plants (B) are deciduous (A), All vines, figs . . . etc., (D) are broad -leafed (B).

The " first " or definitory middle, " subject to coagulation," is passed over. Probably it is taken for granted ; indeed the remarkable inference " Therefore A must have a wider ex- tension than B " implies that B is not definitory (for if it Avere, B would be co-extensive with A) ; but the omission is



this." Assume that A appHes to all B, and B to each of the species of D, but with a wider extension. Then B will be a universal attribute of the Ds ; for I call an attribute universal ^ even if the premiss is not con- vertible, although I call it universal in the primary- sense only if, whereas each species separately is not convertible with it, the sum of the species is con- vertible and co-extensive with it. Thus B is the cause of A's applying to the Ds. Therefore A must have a wider extension than B ; otherwise A might just as well be the cause of B.^ If now A applies to all the species of E, they will constitute a single whole distinct from B ; otherwise how can it be said that A applies to all that to which E applies, but not vice versa ? Surely there must be some cause <of A's applying to the Es), just as there is for all the Ds. So it seems that the Es too will constitute a single whole. We must consider what this is ; let it be represented by C. Thus it is possible for the same effect to have more than one cause, but not when the subjects are identical in species. E.g., in quadrupeds the cause of longevity is not having a gall-bladder,^ but in birds it is dryness of constitution, or some other distinct characteristic.

hard to condone. The point, however, of " inferring " that A is wider than B is to allow A to be true also of certain other species, E^, E^ . . . E«, to which it is mediated through a different sub-genus, C. Then as B is the cause of the Ds' being A, so is C the cause of the Es' being A : i.e., the same effect is produced by different causes in different subjects.

" Cf. 73 b 26 ff.

  • See note on a 30. In any case the ambiguity is purely

formal ; in any concrete example the cause could easily be identified.

^ A traditional view approved by Aristotle ; cf. Part. An. 677 a 30.



99 b

Et Se ets" TO arofjiov fxrj evOvs epxovrai, /cat firj [xovov €V ro fxeGov dXXa TrAetoj, /cat to. atrta TrAetco. XVIII. TTorepov 8' atrtov rcov /xecrcDV ro Trpos ro

10 KadoXov TTpcorov rj ro Trpo? ro Ka9^ e/cacrrov rot? Kad^ eKaurov; StjAov St) on ro^ iyyvrara e/cao-ro) o) atrtov. rov yap ro TTpojrov vtto ro KaOoXov V7rdp)(€LV rovro atriov, olov rw A ro T rod ro B VTTapx^iV a'iriov. ro) fxev ovv A to F atrtov rov A, raj he T ro B, rovrcp Se avro.

15 XIX. Yiepl fiev ovv avXXoyiopiov /cat aTToSet^ecos", ri re eKarepov ean /cat ttcDs" yiyveraiy (f)avep6v, dfia 8e /cat rrepl eTnorrnxr]? OLTToSeiKrLKrjs' ravrov yap eoriv. ire pi 8e rcjv dpx^v, ircog re yiyvovr at yvcopLpLOL /cat rtV rj yvojpll^ovGa e^ts, evrevdev earai^ StJAov TTpoaTTopTJaao-L Trpcbrov.

20 "On fxev ovv ovk evSex^rai eTriaraodai 8t' (xtto- Sct^eo)? /AT] yiyvojoKovn rds rrpwras dp^ds rds dfjueaovs, eipTjrai TTporepov. ra>v 8' dfieGcov rrjv yvaJGLV, /cat TTorepov rj avrrj eanv 'q ovx 17 avri^, ZiaTroprjaeiev dv ns, /cat TTorepov eTTiarrjiir] eKare- pov \ri ou]/ ri rod fxev e7Tturrj{jir) rod 8' erepov n

1 TO A^n : Tct Bd, comm. : om. A. ^ earat] ecrri ABd. ^ "7 ou seel. Ross.

    • Assuming a series of four terms from D (minor) to A

(major), C and B being consecutive middles.

    • i.e., the immediate premisses upon which all demonstra-

tion depends, described in 72 a 14 if. These include both the axioms or general principles of reasoning (whether common to all categories or proper to a particular category) and the special principles of single sciences, viz., definitions and assumptions. (Cf. 76 a 31 — 77 a 4, and see Heath, Mathe- matics in Aristotle, pp. 50-55.) What Aristotle goes on to describe is the formation of universal concepts rather than



If we do not come directly to immediate proposi- if there is tions, i.e., if there is not merely one but more than ^°/niMd?e one middle term, there will be also more than one term, there cause. XVIII. Is the cause of the several species' more than possessing a given property the middle which is next °"® cause. to the universal, or the middle which is next to the species ? Clearly it is that which is nearest to the particular species which is its subject, because this middle is the cause of the proximate subject's falling under the universal. E.g.,^ C is the cause of D's being B ; then C is the cause of D's being A, and B is the cause of being A for both C and itself.

XIX. We have now explained the nature of syllo- how do we gism and demonstration — and also of demonstrative flrgYprf^-^ science, which is the same as demonstration — and ciplea ? how they are effected. We must next inquire how we obtain knowledge of first principles, and what is the faculty ^ that secures this knowledge. The answer will be clear if we first examine some pre- liminary difficulties.

We have observed above '^ that it is impossible to reach scientific knowledge through demonstration unless one apprehends the immediate first principles. With regard to the apprehension of immediates the questions may be asked : (1) whether it is or is not Three the same <as apprehension of mediated premisses) ; to^bg^faced. (2) whether there is scientific knowledge of both, or only of the latter, the former being cognized by a

the grasping of universal propositions, and it is not until 100 b 3 that he (rather casually) indicates that the processes are parallel.

" 1^1? is a developed faculty, as contrasted with a Bwafxis, which is undeveloped ; but it has not seemed necessary always to mark the distinction in English.

    • Book I, ch. i.



99 b

25 yevos, Kol TTorepov ovk ivovorat at €^€6? eyyiyvovrai

ri ivovoai XeXrjdacrLV.

Et fJLev St) exofiev avrds, droTTov aviM^atvei yap aKpL^€OT€pas exovras yvcLoeis djTo'bei^ecjs XavOd- V€LV. €t 8e Xafi^dvofJLev purj exovres TTporepov, ttcos dv yvcopil,oL[JL€v Koi ixavddvoLpLev e/c pLT] TTpovTrap' 30 xov(^^9 yvcvGecjg; dSvvarov ydp, a)G7T6p kol e77t rrjs dTToSel^ecos iXeyofJuev. (f)avep6v roivvv on ovr* ex^iv OLOV re ovr* dyvoovui kol jJLrjhejJLtav exovaiv €^LV eyyiyveaOai. dvdyKrj dpa e^^etv' fiev nva hvva-


repa Kar aKpi^eiav. (jyaiverai 8e rovro ye rrduiv 85 virdpxov TOLS ^(poLS. e;)(et ydp SvvapuLV GVfic/yvrov KpLTLKrjv, T^v KaXovGLV alodrjuiv ivovoTjs 8' atGOrj- G€ws TOLS /xev Twv ^cpojv iyylyverai fiovr] rod aladrjpiaTos , rols 8' ovk iyylyverai. daoig /xev ovv prj iyylyverai, rj oXw? rj rrepl a pur] iyylyverai, ovk eon rovrois yvwois e^oj rod aiaddveadai- iv oi? 8' 100 a eveariv aloOopievois^ ^'x^t^ i^i iv rfj ifjvxfj- ttoXXojv 8e roiovra)v yiyvopievcov 1787^ hia<j)opd ris ylyverai, wore roZg /xev yiyveadai Xoyov iK rijg rcov roiov- rcov piovrj?, rois 8e /xo].

'E/c /xev ovv aloBrjueojs ylyverai pivyp^r], (ZuTrep XeyopLev, iK 8e pLVijpiT]? noXXdKig rod avrov yiyvo-

^ alado^evots ci. Ueberweg, scripsit Ross : alaOavonevois codd.

" These two questions are answered at the end of the chapter, 100 b 5-17. " 71 a 1 ff.

" ie.t demonstration and scientific knowledge.



different kind of knowledge ° ; and (3) whether we develop cognitive faculties which we did not possess before, or have always possessed these faculties with- out knowing it.

It seems paradoxical that we should have possessed them always, because then it follows that we possess, without knowing it, powers of apprehension which are more accurate than demonstration. If on the other hand we acquire them, not having possessed them before, how can we gain knowledge and learn without some pre-existent power of apprehension ? It is an impossibility, just as we said ^ in the case of demonstration. Thus it is evident both that we cannot always have possessed them and that we cannot acquire them if we are completely ignorant and have no positive capacity. We must, then, have There must some faculty, but not such as to be superior in accu- whkjh^^"^*^ racy to those mentioned above." Clearly this is a starting as property of all animals. They have an innate faculty cepUon?^" of discrimination, which we call sense-perception. All animals have it, but in some the perception per- sists, while in others it does not.^ Where it does not, there is either no cognition at all outside the act of perception, or no cognition of those objects of which the perception does not persist. Where perception does persist, after the act of perception is over the percipients can still retain the perception in the soul. If this happens repeatedly, a distinction immediately arises between those animals which derive a coherent in rational impression from the persistence and those which vliSps ^^' do not.

Thus sense-perception gives rise to memory, as we through hold ; and repeated memories of the same thing give "^^^o'^y

" C/. Met. 980 b 21 ff.

K 257


100 a

5 fji€vr]s ejjLTTeLpLa' at yap noXXal fivrjiJiaL rep apidpLcp efiTreipla /xta icrrlv. €k 8' ipiTTCLpiag t) Ik rravro? rjpefjLTJGavTog rod KaOoXov iv rfj i/jvxfj, tov ivos napa ra ttoXXol, 6 dv iv aTrauLV ev ivfj eKeivois to avro, rexvrj^ OLpx'^j Kal iTnur-^fjir]?, iav fiev nepl yevecLVy rixy^^, ^dv 8e rrepl ro 6v, iTnGrijjJLrj^.

10 ovT€ hrj ivvTrdpxovGLV d(f)a>pLGpL€vaL at €^€ls, ovr am dXXa>v e^eojv yiyvovrai yvojcrTLKatrepajv, dAA' OLTTO al(jQrja€0)s y olov ev piaxji rpoTrrjs yevofievqg €vds" ordvros erepos earr), eW erepos, €OJS eVt dpx^]y '^Xdev. Tj 8e 4^XV y'^dpx^L roiavrr] ovcra ola hvvaoOai Trdox^LV rovro. o 8' iXexdr] jjLev TrdAat,

15 ov cracf)a)? 8e iXex^T], TrdXiv etVco/xev. ardvrog yap rwv dSLa(f)6pojv ivos, Trpwrov fxev iv rfj i/jvxfj KaO- oXov {Kal yap aloddverai fiev ro Kad^ eKaorov, rj 8' 100 b alodrjGis rod KaOoXov ioriv, olov dvOpcorrov, dXX' ov KaAAtou dvdpwTTOv) ' irdXiv iv rovrois lorarai, iojs dv ra dpieprj arfj Kal ra KaSoXov, olov roLovhl

" Or, more exactly, " come to rest." (Ross rightly detects a reminiscence of Plato, Phaedo 96 b ; note especially €k he fjLvqfiTjS Kal So^rjS Xa^ovarjs ro "qpe/jLetv, Kara ravra yiyveadai ent- oTTj^-qv. Whatever the truth about eViCTra/iat and e^iara^ai, Plato and Aristotle clearly connected the two ; cf. Physics 247 b 1 1 ra> yap rjpefxijaai Kal arrjvai ttjv hidvoiav eTTiaraodat, . . . XeyofjLeda.) The stream of transient particular sensations is contrasted with the fixed general impression which they pro- duce in a suitable subject.

^ The point of the comparison is to suggest how a succes- sion of unitary sensations can combine to form a permanent whole. There is also an implication of order emerging from disorder ; but this is to be found in the general sense, not in the phrase ecu? eVt dpxriv ■^Xdev, which simply means " until it reaches the starting-point," i.e. until the rally has extended to the man who first gave way. Perhaps a kind of pun is intended, since Aristotle is considering the approach to the TTpcorai dpxa-i'



rise to experience ; because the memories, though and experi- numerically many, constitute a single experience, p^^gj. of And experience, that is the universal when estab- generaliz- lished " as a whole in the soul — the One that corre- sponds to the Many, the unity that is identically present in them all — provides the starting-point of art and science : art in the world of process and science in the world of facts. Thus these faculties are neither innate as determinate and fully developed, nor derived from other developed faculties on a higher plane of knowledge ; they arise from sense- perception, just as, when a retreat has occurred in battle, if one man halts so does another, and then another, until the original position is restored.^ The soul is so constituted that it is capable of the same sort of process. Let us re-state what we said just now '^ with insufficient precision. As soon as one individual ^ percept has " come to a halt " in the soul, this is the first beginning of the presence there of a universal (because although it is the particular that we perceive, the act of perception involves the universal, e.g., " man," not " a man, Callias "). Then other " halts " occur among these (proximate) uni- versal, until the indivisible genera ^ or (ultimate) universals are established. E.g., a particular species

•^ 100 a 3-9.

    • I do not see how ra ahtd(f>opa can mean infimae species

here. If Aristotle's illustration means anything, it is that the process begins with the perception of individuals, although the species is perceived in the individual. Since Aristotle appears to equate to. Kad' cKaara with ra a.8td(f>opa in 97 b 29- 31, it seems just possible that he is doing the converse here. Otherwise he would seem to be skipping an important stage in his description.

  • The categories, which do not admit of analysis into

genus and differentia. Cf. Met. 1014 b 6 ff.



100 b

Joiov, ecus C^ov /cat iv rovrcp waavrojs. hrjXov Btj

on r]fuv ra rrpcJoTa iTTayojyfj yvo}pit,€iv dvayKOLOv Kal yap r)^ atadrjuL? ovtoj to KadoXov i/jLTTOLel. 5 'Erret Se rwv ire pi ttjv Scdvoiav e^ecov alg dXrj- devojX€v at fxev del dXiqOeLs eloLV, at Se eTnSexovrai TO i/j€vSos, olov S6$a Kal XoyLGpios, dXrjdrj S' aet imGTrjiJL'q Kal vovs, Kal ovhev iTTLGrijjJLr]? dKpL^ea- repov dXXo yevog tj vovg, at 8* dpxo-l tcov dTToSei^ccov

10 yvccipnJicx}T€paiy eTTLGTrjiJi'q S' aTraoa /xeTO, Aoyou eoTt, rcjv dpx^v iTTLorrjfjLT] fiev ovk dv etr), eVet S' ovSev dXrjdecrrepov ivSex^Tai etvat iTnarrjfjiTjs t) vouv, vovs dv elr] Tcov dpxojv, €k re tovtcdv okottovgl Kal otl dvoSet^eaJS dpx'^ ovk aTroSet^tS", war* ouS' eTrLGrrj- ixr]s imanQfiT]. el ovv /JLTjSev dXXo rrapd iTnarTJfjLTjv

15 yeVos" exo^ev dXrjdes, vovs dv etr) iTnarijiJirjs dpx^].

Kal Tj fjLev dpx^j rrjg dpxrj? etr] dv, rj §€ Traoa ofJLola)?

€X€L rrpos TO TTav^ TTpdyixa.

^ ^ n, Eustratius : koL ABd. ^ irdv n : aTrav AB : om. d.



of animal leads to the genus " animal," and so on. Clearly then it must be by induction that we acquire Thus the knowledge of the primary premisses, because this is which we^ also the way in which general concepts are conveyed apprehend to us by sense-perception. cipief^s'^

Now of the intellectual faculties that we use in the ai d^th?'^' pursuit of truth some (e.g., scientific knowledge and faculty intuition) are always true, whereas others (e.g., Stuftion. opinion and calculation) admit falsity ; and no other kind of knowledge except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge. Also first principles are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scien- . tific knowledge involves reason. It follows that there can be no scientific knowledge of the first principles ; and since nothing can be more infallible than scien- tific knowledge except intuition, it must be intuition that apprehends the first principles. This is evident not only from the foregoing considerations but also because the starting-point of demonstration is not itself demonstration, and so the starting-point of scientific knowledge is not itself scientific knowledge. Therefore, since we possess no other infallible faculty besides scientific knowledge, the source from which such knowledge starts must be intuition. Thus it will be the primary source of scientific knowledge that apprehends the first principles, while scientific knowledge as a whole is similarly related to the whole world of facts.





I. The Place of the To pic a


Both the Topica and the de Sophisticis Elenchis have always been regarded as genuine works of Aristotle. The two treatises are closely connected ; the de Sophisticis Elenchis is an appendix to the Topica and its final section forms an epilogue to both treatises ; indeed Aristotle himself seems sometimes to regard the two as forming a single work, since he twice quotes the de Sophisticis Elenchis under the title of the Topica.

It is generally admitted that what we call logic and Aristotle himself calls analytic was an early pre- occupation of the philosopher and a direct outcome of discussions on scientific method held in the Platonic Academy. Plato himself, however, never attempted a formal treatment of the subject and the theories put forward, for example, in the Theaetetits, Sophist, Parmenides and Politicus were never developed into a regular system. But while Aristotle's systematic treatment of the process of inference and, above all, his discovery of the syllogism owe little to Plato, it has been generally recognized that the Platonic dia- logues contain some of the germs from which the Aristotelian system was afterwards developed ; for



example, in the Theaetetus the doctrine of the cate- gories is already implicit in the recognition of the abstract notions of substance, quality, quantity, re- lation, activity and passivity.

Of the logical treatises of Aristotle, which since about A.D. 200 have passed under the title of the Organon or ' instrument ' of science, the most im- portant are (1) the Prior Analytics, in which he sets forth the doctrine of the syllogism in its formal aspect without reference to the subject-matter with which it deals, (2) the Posterior Analytics, in which he discusses the characteristics which reasoning must necessarily possess in order to be truly scientific, (3) the Topica, in which he treats of the modes of reasoning, which, while syllogistically correct, fall short of the conditions of scientific accuracy. The Categories and the de Interpretatione are subsidiary treatises dealing, in the main, with the term and the proposition.

A great deal of time and ingenuity has been expended, particularly by German scholars, in an attempt to fix the exact order in which the various treatises which constitute the Organon were com- posed. The problem is complicated by the fact that the treatises, in the form in which they have come down to us, seem to consist of rough notes, which were evidently subjected to a certain amount of revision due to the modification and development of his original doctrines. This process has naturally given rise to minor inconsistencies such as would naturally occur if corrections were made or additions inserted which were not completely adapted to the context in which they were placed.

It has been generally recognized that the whole



of the Topica does not belong to the same date. H. Maier <* holds that the oldest portion consists of Books II-VII. 2 and that it was written under the direct influence of the Academy and belongs to the same period as the Aristotelian Dialogues, which have survived only in fragments ; in particular, he points out that the term crvAAoyicr/xo^ is not used in the technical sense which it afterwards acquired (or, if it is used in that sense, e.g., in 130 a 7, it is a late inser- tion), whereas in the second half of Book VII the term is used in its well-known Aristotelian sense, and that, consequently, Books II-VII. 2 were composed before the philosopher made his greatest contribu- tion to logic. He holds that Books I and VIII belong to the same period as Book VII. 4-5, and form an introduction and conclusion to the treatise written after the discovery of the syllogism, and that the de Sopkisticis Elenchis was a subsequent addition to the Topica. On the other hand, F. Solmsen" and P. Gohlke « hold that Books I-VII form the earlier portion of the work and that Book VIII and the de Sopkisticis Elenchis were added subsequently.

As regards the relation of the Topica to the rest of the Organon, Maier considers the Topica as a whole to be earlier than the Analytics ; Solmsen suggests that the order was (1) Topica I-VII, (2) Posterior Analytics I, (3) Topica VIII and de Sopkisticis Elenckis, (4) Posterior Analytics II, (5) Prior Analytics ; Gohlke holds that the traditional order of the two Analytics is correct, and that the Topica and de Sopkisticis Elenckis presuppose the Analytics.

In short, there is general agreement that the bulk of the Topica embodies Aristotle's earliest contribu-

" See Bibliography.



tion to the systematic study of logic and that it was written in part before his discovery of the syllogism.

II. The Content of the Topic a

The purpose of the Topica is, in the words of its author (100 a 18 IF.), " to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory " ; that is to say, it aims at enabling the two participants, the * questioner ' and the * answerer,' to sustain their parts in a dialectical discussion. The subject, then, of the treatise may be described as the dialectical syllogism based on premises which are merely probable as contrasted with the demonstrative, or scientific, syllogism, which is the subject of the Posterior Analytics and is based on premises which are true and immediate. The probable premises which make up the dialectical syllogism are described (100 b 21 f.) as " those which commend themselves to all or to the majority or to the wise." The uses of dialectic are, we are told, three in number, (1) for mental training, (2) for general conversation, and (3) for application to the sciences, because (a) if we can argue a question pro and con, we shall be in a better position to recognize truth and falsehood, and (6) since the first principles of the sciences cannot be scientifically demonstrated, the approach to them must be through the study of the opinions generally held about them.

After the general introduction in Book I, Aristotle, in Books II-VII. 3, gives a collection of the tottol which give their name to the treatise. The term tottoi is 268


somewhat difficult to define. They may be described as * commonplaces ' of argument or as general prin- ciples of probability which stand in the same relation to the dialectical syllogism as axioms stand to the demonstrative syllogism ; in other words, they are " the pigeon-holes from which dialectical reasoning is to draw its arguments." "

Books II and III deal with the problems of accident; Books IV and V with those of genus and property ; Books VI and VII. 1-3 with those of definition. Books VII. 4-5, and Book VIII, after giving some additional notes, conclude the treatise by describing the practice of dialectical reasoning.

III. The Manuscripts The chief manuscripts for the Topica are :

A Urbinas 35


ix-x ineunt.

B Marcianus 201

an. 955

C Coislinianus 330

saec. xi

D Parisinus 1843

saec. xiii

u Basileensis 54 (F ii. 21)

saec. xii

c Vaticanus 1024

saec. x-xi

P Vaticanus 207

saec. xiii

f Marcianus App. iv. 5

saec. xiv

q Ambrosianus M. 71

saec. XV

N Laurentianus 72. 18

saec. XV

i Laurentianus 72. 15

saec. xiv

T Laurentianus 72. 12

saec. xiii

Marcianus 204

saec. xiv

Of these A and B are in a

class by themselves.

ekker preferred A, Waitz B ;

the Teubner Editors

« W. D. Ross, Aristotle,

p. 59.


give a slight preference to B, the readings of which are sometimes supported by papyrus fragments. C sometimes preserves the true reading.

IV. Select Bibliography


J. T. Buhle, Text, Latin Translation and Notes,

Biponti, 1792. I. Bekker, Text, Berlin, 1831, Oxford, 1837. T. Waitz, Text and Notes, Leipzig, 1844-1846. Y. Strache and M. Walhes, Teubner Text, Leipzig, 1923. [The Oxford Classical Text, by W. D. Ross, Oxford, 1958, was not available to Professor Forster.]


T. Taylor, London, 1812.

O. F. Owen (Bohn's Classical Library), London, 1902. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge (Oxford Translation), Oxford, 1928.

In French : J. B.-Saint-Hilaire, Paris, 1837.

In German : J. H. von Kirchmann, Heidelberg, 1877. E. Rolfes, Leipzig, 1922.


P. Gohlke, Die Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik,

Berlin, 1936. 270


H. Maier, Die Syllogistik des Aristoteles, Tubingen,

1900. F. Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik

und Rhetorik, Berlin, 1929- J. L. Stocks, " The Composition of Aristotle's Logical

Works," Classical Quarterly, 1933, pp. 115-124.

In translating the Topica I have used the text of Bekker in the Berlin Edition, and when I translate any other reading this is noted at the foot of the page. I have constantly referred to the Teubner text of Strache-Wallies, which does not, however, seem to me to mark any considerable advance on that of Bekker. I have found Waltz's edition of the Organon of great use, and the Latin version of Pacius is often helpful. I have frequently consulted the Oxford translation by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge.

I have to thank my friend and former colleague Professor W. S. Maguinness, of King's College, London, for reading through my version and giving me the benefit of his fine scholarship and accuracy. He has suggested several improvements in the text which I have been glad to adopt.

E. S. F.

[This Introduction is, with some modifications. Professor Forster's. After his death, his edition of the Topica was seen through the press by D. J. Furley, who also compiled the Index.]




100 a 18 I. 'H jLtev TTpoOeais rrjg Trpayixareias fieOoSov evpelv, a^* t^S" Suvqaofjieda ovWoyit^eGd ai rrepl irav-

20 ros rod Trporedevros TTpo^XrijxaTos i^ ivho^ojv, Kal avTol Xoyov VTrexovres firjOev epovfxev VTrevavriov. TTpcjTov ovv prjreov tl ian GvXXoyiopios Kal rive's avTOV hia^opaiy ottcjo? \r]^dfj 6 StaAe/crt/cos" cruA- AoytCT/xo?. rovrov yap ^r]rovfji€V Kara rrjv rrpoKei- IJl4.V7]v rrpaypLareiav.

25 "Ecrrt hr] ovXXoycajJLog Xoyos eV a> redevrcov nvwv erepov n rwv KeL/Jbevcov i^ dvdyKTjs avpL^aiveL Sid Tcov K€i[Ji€vajv. aTToSet^tS" fiev ovv ecrrtV, orav i^ dXrjdoJv Kal Trpcnrcov 6 GuXXoycGfios 7^, rj Ik tolov- Tcov d Sta TLVojv TTpwTWV Kal dXrjdcijv rrjg nepl avrd

30 yvcjGews rrfv dpxrjv €LXr](f)€v StaXe ktikos §€ cruA-

100 b 18 Aoyto-jLtos" o e^ ivSo^ojv cruAAoyt^d/xevos*. ecrrt 8e

dXrjOrj fjiev Kal TTpcora rd fir) St' irepajv dXXd St*

avrojv e^ovra rrjv ttLotiv ov Set ydp iv raZs

20 iTTLarrjixovLKaig dpxous iTn^rjTeiard at rd Sta rt, dAA' eKaGrrfv rwv dpxojv avrrjv Kad^ iavrrjv etvat 7TLGr7]v. eVSo^a Se rd SoKovvra ttololv tj rots TiAet- 272



I. The purpose of the present treatise is to discover Introduc- a method by which we shall be able to reason from rr^i.3). generally accepted opinions about any problem set The design before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an treatise. argument, avoid saying anything self-contradictory. First, then, we must say what reasoning is and what different kinds of it there are, in order that dialectical reasoning may be apprehended ; for it is the search for this that we are undertaking in the treatise which lies before us.

Reasoning is a discussion in which, certain things The dlffer- having been laid down, something other than these o? reaS?n- things necessarily results through them. Reasoning u^g: is demonstration when it proceeds from premises which (a) De- are true and primary or of such a kind that we have ^ve!^*^*' derived our original knowledge of them through pre- mises which are primary and true. Reasoning is (6) Dia- dialectical which reasons from generally accepted ^^^^^^ • opinions. Things are true and primary which com- mand belief through themselves and not through anything else ; for regarding the first principles of science it is unnecessary to ask any further question as to ' why,' but each principle should of itself com- mand belief. Generally accepted opinions, on the other hand, are those which commend themselves



100 b

(Trots' rj TOLs oo<f)o'i9, Kal tovtols Tj TTOLOiv 1] roXg

TrXelaroLg rj rots fxaXiGTa yvcoplfjiOL? Kal ivSo^oL?. ipiGTiKos 8' ecrrt (JvXXoyicjiios 6 Ik (f)aivoiJL€VOJV

25 eVSof 60V, fJLT] ovTCxiV Se, Kal 6 i^ evSo^cuv ^ (j)ai- vofjbevojv ivSo^cov ^atvo/xevos" . ov yap rrdv ro <f>aLv6jjL€Vov evSo^ov Kal 'iariv evho^ov. ovdev yap rojv Xeyopbevcav evSo^cxJV emiroXaiov e;(€t TravreXws rrjv (jyavraoiav, Kada Trepl ras tojv ipiGTiKwv Xoycxjv dpxoL^ GViJLPe^7]K6v e^eiv Trapaxprjl-ia yap Kal ojs

30 inl TO TToXv TOLS Kal fjLLKpa Gvvopdv Swafievotg

101 a /caTaSryAos" iv avrots rj rod ifjevSovs eGrl (f)VGis. 6

fiev ovv nporepos tojv piqQevrojv ipLGTLKOJv gvX- XoyiGfiaJv Kal GyXXoyiGfjiog XeyeGdoj, 6 Se Xolttos ipLGTLKOS fjb€V GyXXoycGfjio? , GvXXoyLGfios S' OV, i7T€LBrj (fiaiveraL pL€v GvXXoyit,€Gd at, GvXXoyl^eraL ov. 6 "Ert Se TTapa rovs elp^qixevovs arravras GvXXoyi- GfJLOVs OL eK TCJV TTCpL Tivas eTTiGTrjfxas olKeiwv ytvo- fjL€VOL TTapaXoyiGpLOL, KaOdnep errl rrjs yeajpLerptas Kal TOJV ravrrj Gvyyevwv GvpL^e^-qKev ex^iv. €olk€ yap 6 rpoTTos ovrog Sta^epetv rcov elprjfjLevojv gvX-

10 XoyLGpLOJV' ovre yap cf dXriOcov Kal Trpcorwv gvXXo- yit^erai 6 i/jevSoypa(f)6jv, ovr €$ ivSo^ojv. etV yap rov opov ovK efjUTTLTrret' ovre yap rd ttolgi hoKovvra Xapb^dvei ovT€ rd rots ttX^lgtols ovt€ rd rotS" go- <j>olSy Kal TOVTOis ovT€ rd TraGiv ovre rols rrXeiGTOis ovre rols evho^ordroLS , dXX €K tojv oIk€L(x)v fxev rfj

15 eTTLGTiqp.ri XrjfjLjjidrojv, ovk dXirjOcJov 8e rov GvXXoyi- Gp.6v TToielrai. rep ydp rj rd rjpLCKVKXia irepiypd- 274


to all or to the majority or to the wise — that is, to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most famous and distinguished of them. Reasoning is contentious (?) Conteu- if it is based on opinions which appear to be gener- ally accepted but are not really so, or if it merely appears to be based on opinions which are, or appear to be, generally accepted. For not every opinion which appears to be generally accepted is actually so accepted. For in none of the so-called generally accepted opinions is the illusory appearance entirely manifest, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments ; for usually the nature of un- truth in these is immediately obvious to those who have even a small power of comprehension. There- fore, of the above-mentioned contentious reasonings the former should actually be called reasoning, but the other should be called, not reasoning, but con- tentious reasoning, because it appears to reason but does not really do so.

Furthermore, besides all the above-mentioned False reasonings, there are false reasonings based on pre- mises peculiar to certain sciences, as happens in geometry and the sciences kindred to it. For this kind seems to differ from the reasonings already mentioned ; for the man who constructs a false figure reasons neither from true and primary premises nor from generally accepted opinions ; for he does not fall within the definition, since he does not take as his premises either universally accepted opinions or those which commend themselves to the majority or to the wise — that is to all of the wise or to the majority or to the most distinguished of them, — but his pro- cess of reasoning is based on assumptions which are peculiar to the science but not true ; for he reasons




(p€LV /X17 COS" 0€L, 7] ypa/x/xas" nvas ayeiv ^rj oj? av axOelrjaav, rov TrapaXoyiorfJuov Troteirat.

EtSr] iJL€V ovv Twv (Tf AAoyicr/xcuv, ws tvttco irepi- AajSetv, eoTW ra elprnxeva. KadoXov 8' etVctv 20 7T€pl iravroiv twv elprjfjLevojv /cat rcov /xerot ravra piq97]uo}xivcjv y €Trl roaovrov rjfjLLV Stcuptcr^co, Stdrt nepl ovSevos avrojv rov aKpi^rj Xoyov olttoSoV" vac TT po at povfieS a, aXK ooov tvttco Tvepl avrojv PovXofjieOa BueXOeiV, TravreAcD? lkovov r]yovp.€VOL Kara ttjv TTpoKeifJidvrjv p^iOohov to SvvaGuai yvwpi-


25 II. 'ETTOjitevoy 8' av etr] roZs elprfpbivoLS etTretv TTpos TToaa re Kal rlva p^pTjort/xos" rj Trpayp^areia. €orL Sr] TTpos Tpta, TTpo^ yvpLyaalav, TTpos ras ivrev^eis, Trpos ras Kara (j)LXooo(f)iav eTncrrrjp^as. on jLtev ovv Trpos yvp^vaalav ;^po7crt/xos', ef avrcov

30 Kar agaves eon- piedoSov yap e^ovres p5.ov Trepl rov TTporeddvros eTn^eLpelv hwrjuopieda. Trpos 8e ra? €vrev^€iSy hion ras rcov ttoXXcjv Kar7]pL6pLr]pi€voi Solas' ovK Ik rcJov aXXorpicjv dAA' ck rcov oIk€lo)V Soyp^drcov opuXriGopiev Trpos avrovs, /xeraptpa- t^ovres o Tt av pur) KaXcos ^aivcovr ai Xeyeiv r]puv.

35 TTpos 8e ras: Kara (j)iXoGO(j>iav iviarripLas , on hvvd- p.€VOL TTpos dpi(f)6r€pa BiaTToprJGaL paov ev eKaaroLS Karoi/jopbeda rdXrjdes re Kal ro i/jevhos. en 8e rrpos ra TTpcora rcov rrepl eKaarrjv eTTianqpuqv [dpx^^Y' eK pi€V yap rcov olKeicov rwv Kara rrjv TrporeOelaav emor^qpiriv dp)(oJV dSvvarov ecTreiv n rrepl avrcov, 101 b cTretSo) TTpcorat at dp^al aTrdvrcxJV elai, hid 8e rcx)v TTcpl e/cacrra ivSo^cov dvdyKTj rrepl avrcov SieXdeXv. rovro 8' t8tov tj pLoXiora OLKetov rijs SiaXeKnKrjs

^ Omitting dpxcov with B corr. and C. 276

TOPICA, I. i-ii

falsely either by describing the semicircles improperly or by drawing lines as they should not be drawn.

Let the above then be a description in outline of the different kinds of reasoning. In general, as regards all those already mentioned and to be men- tioned hereafter, let this much distinction suffice for us, since we do not propose to give the exact defini- tion of any of them but merely wish to describe them in outline, considering it quite enough, in accordance with the method which we have set before us, to be able to recognize each of them in some way or other.

II. After the above remarks the next point is to The uses explain for how many and for what purposes this Jfeatiae treatise is useful. They are three in number, mental training, conversations and the philosophic sciences. That it is useful for mental training is obvious on the face of it ; for, if we have a method, we shall be able more easily to argue about the subject proposed. It is useful for conversations, because, having enumer- ated the opinions of the majority, we shall be dealing with people on the basis of their own opinions, not of those of others, changing the course of any argument which they appear to us to be using wrongly. For the philosophic sciences it is useful, because, if we are able to raise difficulties on both sides, we shall more easily discern both truth and falsehood on every point. Further, it is useful in connexion with the ultimate bases of each science ; for it is impossible to discuss them at all on the basis of the principles peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary in relation to everything else, and it is necessary to deal with them through the generally accepted opinions on each point. This process be- longs peculiarly, or most appropriately to dialectic ;



eanv e^eraarLKT] yap ovaa Trpog ras aTracrojv rojv

jjuedoSojv dpxoiS oSov €X€l.

5 III. "Efo/xev Se reXeoJS Trjv jjLedoSov, orav ojJLolios

exoJjJLev a)G7T€p errl p7]TOpLK7Jg koI larpiKrjs Kal rojv

TOLOvrojv SvvdfJiecjv. rovro 8' earl to e/c tcov iv-

SexofJbevojv iroielv d rrpoaLpovixeda. ovre yap 6

prjTopiKOS €K TTavros rpoirov Tretcret, ovS^ 6 larpiKos

vyLaaei- aAA' idv tojv ivSexofJidvcov purjSev irapa-

10 XeLTTT], LKavois avTov ex^i'V Tr]v iTnariQpbrjv <f>riGOfJL€V.

IV. YipwTOV ovv deojprjreov e/c tlvcdv tj puedoSos-

€i Sr] Xd^oLpLev irpos iroaa koX iroia Kal Ik tlvojv

ol Xoyoiy Kal TTCJS tovtojv evirop'^cropLev, exoipi€V

dv LKaVOJS TO 7TpOK€ipb6VOV. €GTL 8' dpiOpO) tCTtt Kal

15 raura, i^ cLv t€ ol XoyoL Kal Trepl Sv ol avXXoyL- apLoL yivovTai puev yap ol XoyoL Ik tojv TTpOTdaeojv' rrepl cov he ol GvXXoyi(TpLOi, Ta TrpopXi^puaTd cVrt. Trdaa 8e TTpoTaois Kal Trdv TTpo^Xrjpia r^ yivos r] Ihiov 7) ovpu^e^riKos hrjXol- Kal yap Trjv hia(j)opdv (hs ovoav yevLKYjv opLOv tco yevet TaKTeov. inel 8e

20 Tov ISlov to pL€V TO TL TjV elvai ar}piatV€L, to 8* ov orjpaiveii SirjpijcrOa) to ISlov els dpi(f>co Ta rrpoeiprj- pbiva p^eprj, Kal KaXeLaBco to pev to tl tJv etvat GTjpalvov opos, TO 8e Xolttov /caret ttjv kolvtjv TTepL avTCJV dTToSodelaav ovop^aoiav rrpooayopevi- gBo) Ihiov. hT]Xov ovv e/c tcov elprjpevwv otl KaTa Trjv

26 vvv hiaipecFiv T€TTapa Ta iravTa Gvp,^aivei yiveaOai, 278

TOPICA, I. ii-iv

for, being of the nature of an investigation, it lies along the path to the principles of all methods of inquiry.

III. We shall possess the method completely when The limita- we are in a position similar to that in which we are pro^posed^^ with regard to rhetoric and medicine and other such method, faculties ; that is to say, when we carry out our purpose with every available means. For neither

will the rhetorician seek to persuade nor the physician to heal by every expedient ; but if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that he possesses the science in an adequate degree.

IV. We must, then, first consider on what bases our subjects method rests ; for if we could grasp to how many and m^^erials to what kind of objects our arguments are directed of Discus- and on what bases they rest, and how we are to be (1^4.12). well provided with these, we should sufficiently attain

the end which is set before us. Now the bases of

arguments are equal in number and identical with

the subjects of reasonings. For arguments arise Proposi-

from * propositions,' while the subjects of reasonings problems.

are ' problems.' Now every proposition and every

problem indicates either a genus or a peculiarity or

an accident ; for the differentia also, being generic

in character, should be ranged with the genus. But

since part of the peculiarity indicates the essence and

part does not do so, let the peculiarity be divided

into the two above-mentioned parts and let that

which indicates the essence be called a ' definition,'

and let the remaining part be termed a ' property '

in accordance with the nomenclature usually assigned

in these cases. It is clear therefore, from what has

been said, that, as a result of the division just made,

there are four alternatives in all, either property or



r) iSlov t) opov ^ yevog rj avfJipePrjKog. fJUiqSels S' rjfjudg vTToXd^T] Xiyeiv (hs eKaarov rovrwv Kad^ avro XeyojJievov irporaoLS r) TTpo^X'qpbd iariv, dAA' on 0,770 TOVTCJV Kal TO, TTpojSAT^/xara Kal at Trporaaeis yivovrai. hia<^ep€i 8e to TTpo^Xruxa Kal r] rrporaaLS

SO rw rpoTTO). ovTOJ /xev ydp pr^devros, dpd ye to ^wov 77e^ov SIttovv opLOfios ioTLV dv9pa)7Tov; Kal dpd ye to l^cpov yevos ioTl tov dvdpcoTTov;, rrpo- Taoi'S yiveTai. edv Se, TTOTepov to tcpov 7Tet,6v SIttovv opLGfJLog eoTiv dvdpcoTTov -^ ov; [Kal TTOTepov TO i,cpov yevos eortV;]/ irpo^Xruia yiveTai. ofioLCug Se Kal errl twv dXXcjv. wot etKOTCos lua tw

35 dpiOpbcp Ta TTpo^XrjixaTa Kal at TrpoTdaeis eloiv. drro Trdorjs ydp rrpoTdoeoJS Trpo^Xrjfia TTOiiqcreLS fjbeTa^dXXcjv tco TpoTrcp.

V. AeKTeov Se rt opoSy tl ihiov, rt yevos, tl gvjjl- j^e^TjKos. eoTt 8' 6po9 jLtev Aoyos" o to tl j^v elvai 102 a GTjpiaLVCxyv . aTToStSorat 8e r^ Adyos" dvT^ dvo/xaros" rj Xoyos dvTl Xoyov Suvardv ydp Kal tcov vtto Xoyov Tivd ar^fjuaivofjievayv opiuaudai. ooot S' ottcdgovv dvd/xart t7]v aTToSoaiv TroiovvTai, hrjXov ws ovk aTToStSdao-tv ourot tov tov TTpdyfxaTos 6piC7[ji6v, 5 iTTeiSrj 77a? opcafjios Xoyog rtV eoTiv. opiKov fxevTOL


Trperrov. ojjlolojs Se Kal to rroTepov raurdv ato^i^ot? Kal iTTLOTrjijLr] rj eTepov Kal ydp rrepl tov? opLGfxovs, TTOTepov TavTOV -r) eTepov, rj TrXetaTr] yiveTai 8ta- Tpi^Tj. dirXchs 8e opiKa rrdvTa Xeyeadoj ra z577d ttjv 10 avTrjv dvTa fieOoSov Toig opiapbois. otl he TrdvTa

^ Omitting koI TTorepov . . . iariv ; with A B. 280

TOPICA, I. iv-v

definition or genus or accident. But let no one sup- pose that we mean that each of these stated by itself is a proposition or a problem, but only that problems and propositions are made up of these. The problem and the proposition differ in the way in which they are stated. If we say, " Is not ' pedestrian biped animal ' a definition of man } " or " Is not ' animal ' the genus of man ? " a proposition is formed. But if we say, ** Is ' pedestrian biped animal ' a definition of man, or not ? " a problem is formed. Similarly too with the other cases. It naturally follows, there- fore, that the problems and the propositions are equal in number ; for you will be able to make a problem out of any proposition by altering the way in which it is stated.

V. We must next say what definition, property. The four genus and accident are. A definition is a phrase fj)^ Deflni* indicating the essence of something. The definition *^°"- is asserted either as a phrase used in place of a term, or as a phrase used in place of a phrase ; for it is possible to define some things also which are indicated by a phrase. But it is obvious that everyone who makes an assertion by means of a term in any way whatever, does not assert the definition of the thing, because every definition is a phrase of a certain kind. However, such a statement as " That which is seemly is beautiful " must also be put down as being ' de- finitory,' and likewise the question " Are sensation and knowledge the same thing or different } " For when we are dealing with definitions, we spend most of our time discussing whether things are the same or different. In a word, let us call ' definitory ' every- thing which comes under the same kind of inquiry as do definitions ; and it is self-evident that all the above-



ra vvv prjdevra rotaur' ecrrt, SrjXov e^ avrwv. SvvdjJi€VOi yap on ravrov /cat on erepov StaAeye- aOaiy TO) avrco rpoTrcx) /cat Trpos" rovs opiGpLOVS eiri- X€Lp€LV evTroprjGOjJiev Sel^avres yap on ov ravrov ianv dvrjp7]K6r€s ioofjueda rov opLGfjiov. ov fjurjv

15 avnarpi^ei ye ro vvv prjOev ov yap cKavov Trpos ro KaraoKevdaai rov opta/xov ro Sel^ai ravrov ov. rrpos fJidvroL ro dvaGKevduai avrapKes ro Set^at on ov ravrov.

"IStov 8' iarlv o pur) StjXol puev ro rl rjv elvai, pLOVcp 8* V7Tdpx€i /cat avriKarriyopelrai rod Trpdypiaros,

20 olov Ihiov dvOpwTTOv ro ypapbpLanKTJg etvau SeKnKov el yap dvOpwiros eon, ypapLpianKrjs heKriKos eart, /cat el ypapbpbanKTJg SeKriKo? ianv, dvdpojTTOs ianv. ovOelg yap iSiov Xeyei ro evhe^ppi^evov dXXco vtt- dpxeiv, olov ro KaOevSeiv dvOpajTro), ovS^ dv rvxj)

25 Kard nva xpovov puovcp vrrdpxov. el 8' apa n /cat Xeyoiro rcov roiovrcov lSlov, ovx aTrAcDs" aAAa TTore rj irpos n thiov pr]dr)(7eraL- ro puev yap e'/c Se^Lwv etrat TTore 'lSlov ean, ro 8e Slttovv Trpos n lSlov rvyxdvei Xeyopuevov , olov rw dvQpwrrcp Trpos lttttov /cat Kvva. on 8e rojv evhexopievcov dXXo) VTrdpxecv

30 ovdev dvriKarrjyo peer at, SrjXov ov yap dvayKalov, e'i n KadevSet, dvdpcjorrov elvai.

FeVos" 8' eorl ro Kara rrXeiovajv /cat Suacfyepovrajv 282


mentioned instances are of this kind. For when we can argue that things are the same or that they are different, we shall by the same method have an abun- dance of arguments for dealing with definitions also ; for when we have shown that a thing is not the same as another we shall have destroyed the definition. The converse of what we have just said does not, however, hold good ; for it is not enough for the construction of a definition to show that one thing is the same as another ; but, in order to destroy a definition, it is enough to show that it is not the same.

A property is something which does not show the (6) Pro- essence of a thing but belongs to it alone and is pre- ^^^ ^* dicated convertibly of it. For example, it is a pro- perty of man to be capable of learning grammar ; for if a certain being is a man, he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man. For no one calls anything a property which can possibly belong to something else ; for example, he does not say that sleep is a property of man, even though at one moment it might happen to belong to him only. If, therefore, any such thing were to be called a property, it will be so called not absolutely but as at a certain time or in a certain relation ; for * to be on the right-hand side ' is a property at a certain time, and * biped ' is actually assigned as a property in a certain relation, for ex- ample, as a property of man in relation to a horse or a dog. That nothing which can possibly belong to something other than a certain thing is a con- vertible predicate of that thing is obvious ; for it does not necessarily follow that if anything is sleep- ing it is a man.

A genus is that which is predicated in the category (c) Genus.



^^^^rw eiSei iv rw ri ion Karrjyopovfjievov. iv ro) ri icrn 8e Karrjyopeloidai ra roiavra Xeyeadco, oua dpixorrei OLTToSovvaL ipojrrjdevra rl ion to 7TpOK€L- 35 fjievoVy Kaddirep eirl rod dvOpayrrov dpfjuorrei, epcorr]- devra ri ean ro TTpoKeiyievov, elrreZv on ^wov. yevLKOv 8e /cat to rroTepov iv to) aura) yivei aAAo aAAo) Tj iv eTepcp. Kal yap to tolovtov vtto t7]v avT7]v pbiOohov VLTTTeL Tip yev€L' SiaXexOivTes yap otl TO ^cpov yevog tov dvdpojTTOv, opioloj? Se Kal tov ^oos, StetAcyjLteVot icrof-ieda on iv tw avTcp yevet.

102 b idv 8e TOV /xev irepov hel^ojjjLev otl yevos ioTi, tov 8e eTepov otl ovk ecrrt, hL€L\eyp.ivoL iaojjLeOa otl 01) K iv Tcp avTCp y€V€L raur' ecrrtV.

HvfjL^e^rjKos 8e iuTLV o pLvSev fiev tovtcov ioTL, 5 p^TfTe opos ixrjTe 'ihiov jjli^t6 yevog, V7Tdp-)(€L 8e tco TTpdypuaTL, Kal o ivSex^TaL vndpx^LV oTcpovv ivl Kal TO) avTcJ) Kal jJiTj vnapx^LV, otov to Kadi^crdaL iv- Six^TaL vnapx^LV tlvI tco avTco Kal purj VTvapx^LV. opLOLOjg 8e Kal TO XevKov to yap avTO ovdev kojXv^l 10 OTe pL€v XevKov oTe 8e firj X€Vk6v etvat. ectTL 8e Twv TOV avfi^e Br] KOTOS opLaficjv 6 ScvTepo? ^cA- TLCov TOV fikv yap rrpwTov pr]divTos dvayKalov, el

jJ^iXXcL TL? (JVVT]G€LV, TrpOCL^ivaL TL icTTLV OpO? Kal

yevos Kal lSlov, 6 8e SevTepos avTOTeXijs iuTL rrpos TO yv(x)pLl,€LV TL TTOT iorl TO Xeyofjievov Kad^ avTo. 15 7rpoGK€Ladajaav 8e tco crvpL^e^rjKOTL Kal at npos dXXrjXa avyKpLG€LS, ottcjogovv diro tov GvpL^eBr) kotos XeyofxevaL, otov TTOTepov to KaXov rj to GVfJb<j)4pov 284


of essence of several things which differ in kind. Predicates in the category of essence may be de- scribed as such things as are fittingly contained in the reply of one who has been asked " What is the object before you ? " For example, in the case of man, if someone is asked what the object before him is, it is fitting for him to say " An animal." The question whether one thing is in the same genus as another thing or in a different one, is also a * generic ' ques- tion ; for such a question also falls under the same kind of inquiry as the genus. For having argued that * animal ' is the genus of man and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus ; but if we show that it is the genus of the one but not of the other, we shall have argued that they are not in the same genus.

An accident is that which is none of these things — {d) Acci- neither definition, nor property, nor genus — but still ^®°*" belongs to the thing. Also it is something which can belong and not belong to any one particular thing ; for example, ' a sitting position ' can belong or not belong to some one particular thing. This is likewise true of ' whiteness ' ; for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white and at another not white. The second of these definitions of accident is the better ; for when the first is enunciated, it is necessary, if one is to understand it, to know before- hand what is meant by ' definition ' and ' genus ' and ' property,' whereas the second suffices of itself to enable us to know what is meant without anything more. We may place also in the category of accident comparisons of things with one another, when they are described in terms derived in any way from accident ; for example, the questions " Is the honour-



102 b

alpeTwrepoVy Kal rrorepov 6 Kar* dperrjv rj 6 /car'

aTToXavGLV TjBiOJv ^los, Kal €i Tt ctAAo TTapaTrXrjGLCo? TvyxoLV€L TOVTOL? Xey6fi€vov' €7Tt TTavTajv yap rcov

20 roLovrcDV, TTorepcp /xaAAov to KarrjyopovfJievov avfi- p€^7]K€V, rj L^ijrrjaLS yiverai. StJAov S' e^ avTa)V on TO (JVfJL^e^rjKo? ovdkv KcoXvei ttotc Kal irpos tl lSlov yiveoOai, olov to KadrjoOat avfi^e^rjKog 6v, oTav Tl? piovos KaOrjTai, t6t€ lSlov eaTai, fir) puovov 8e Kadiqp.evov rrpo? Tovg pLT] KaOrjpiivovs Ihiov.

25 cocTTC Kal rrpos Tt Kal rroTe ovdev KcoXvei to avp,-

^e^TjKog 'ISlov yiveoOai. airXchs 8' thiov ovk eWat.

VI. Mt) Aav^aveVoj 8' rjiJidg otl tol irpos to tStov

Kal TO yivos Kal to ovpL^elSrjKos TrdvTa Kal irpos

Tovs opiopbovs appLoaei XeyeoOau. hei^avTes yap

80 OTt OV pUOVO) VTTapX^t' TOJ V7TO TOV OpL(jp.OV, wa7T€p

Kal cTTt TOV ISioVy rj OTL OV yevos to aTTOoouev

€V TCp OpLUpLCp, rj OTL OV^ VTrdpX^L TL TCJV eV Tip

Xoycp prjQivTOiVy oirep Kal iirl tov crvpL^e^rjKOTO? dv prjdelrj, dvrjprjKOTeg iaopieda tov opLopbov oj(tt€ 86 KaTa TOV epLTTpoodev diroSodevTa Xoyov drravT dv e'lrj TpoTTov TLvd opLKa TO, KaTrjpLdpbrjp,€va. aXX ov 8ta TOVTO pLiav irrl ndvTCov KadoXov puedoSov ^rjTrj- T€ov' ovT€ yap pd^Lov evpelv tout' cgtlv, €t d cvpedelrj, TravTeXdjs daatftrjs Kal SvoxP'tjcttos dv elr] TTpos Trjv TTpoK€Lpievrjv TrpaypiaTeiav. i8tas" o€ Kao 286

TOPICA, I. v-vi

able or the expedient preferable ? " and " Is the life of virtue or the life of enjoyment more pleasant ? " and any other question which happens to be expressed in a similar kind of way ; for in all such cases the question is to which of the two does the predicate more properly belong as an accident. It is self- evident that nothing prevents the accident from being temporarily or relatively a property ; for example, the position of sitting, though it is an accident, will at the time be a property, when a man is the only person seated, while, if he is not the only person seated, it will be a property in relation to any persons who are not seated. Thus nothing prevents the accident from becoming both a relative and a tem- porary property, but it will never be a property absolutely.

VL We must not, however, omit to notice that How farcan everything which is applicable to property, genus and dicabies be accident can be fittingly applied to definitions also, treated ^ For when we have shown that some attribute does not belong to the subject of the definition only (as we do also in the case of a property), or that what is assigned in the definition is not the true genus of the subject, or that something mentioned in the state- ment does not belong (as would also be asserted in the case of an accident), we shall have destroyed the definition ; and so, in accordance with the statement made above, all the cases which have been enume- rated would be in a sense ' definitory.' But we must not for this reason seek for a single method of inquiry which is generally applicable to all of them ; for it is not easy to discover, and if it were to be discovered, it would be wholly obscure and difficult to apply to our present treatise. If, however, a special method



eKacTTOV rcov SLopiudevrcov yevcov OLTroboOeLGr]? fieO-

103 a oSov paov €K rcbv Trepl eKacrrov oIk€lcov rj 8te^-

oSos" rod 7rpoK€LfJi€VOV yivoir dv. ojare tvttlo

fjiev, KadoLTTep €Lpr)rai TTporepov, htaipereov, rcbv 8e

XoLTTCOV T(X pboXiad^ iKaGTOiS OLKeia 7TpO(ja7TT€OV,

opiKOL T€ Kal yevLKOL TTpouayopevovras aura. (^X^~ 5 8ov he TTpoarjurai rd p7]6dvra Trpos e/cao-rots".

VII. UpcoTov 8e TrdvTOJV Trepl ravrov hiopicrreov, 7TOGa)(a)9 Xeyerat. ho^eie 8' dv ro ravrov c5? rvrrcp Xapelv rpixfj hiaipelcrdai. dpiOfjicp ydp ^ e'lSet tj yevei ro ravrov elwdajjiev Trpooayopeveiv ^ dpidpicp

10 /xev Sv ovojjiara TrXelco ro Se npaypia ev, olov XdjTTLov Kal lixdriov, elhei 8e oaa TrXeUo dvra dhid- (f)opa Kard ro ethos eon, Kaddnep dvdpcjTTOS dv- OpwTTOj Kal 'iTTTTos LTTTTCp' rd ydp roiavra rw eihei Xeyerat ravrd, oaa vtto ravro elhos. opLoioJS he Kal yevei ravrd, oaa vtto ravro yevos eariv, olov

15 LTT7T0S dvdpcxJTTCp. Sofete 8' dv ro aTro rijs avrrjs KprjVTjs vhcop ravrov Xeyo/juevov ex^LV nvd huacfyopdv rrapd rovs elprjiievovs rporrovs' ov pLTjv dXXd Kal ro roLovrov ye ev ro) avra> rerdxOi^ rols Ka6^ ev ethos OTTcuaovv XeyofievoLS. drravra ydp rd roiavra avyyevT] Kal TrapanXTJaia aXXi^XoLS eoiKev etvat.

20 TTav {Jbev ydp vhcnp Travrl ravrov rw ethei Xeyerat htd ro ex^tv rtvd o/xotorT^ra, ro 8' diro rrjs avrrjs Kpiqviqs vhcop ovhevl dXXto hia^epet dXX tj ra> a<j)ohporepav etvat rrjv ofxotorrjra- hto ov xf^P^^ofiev 288


TOPICA, I. vi-vii

of inquiry is provided for each of the different classes which we have distinguished, the exposition of the subject before us would be more easily performed on the basis of what is appropriate to each class. And so, as has already been said, we must make broad divisions and fit into them those of the other ques- tions which are most appropriate to each, calling them * definitory ' and ' generic' The questions to which I referred have now been, for all intents and purposes, assigned to their several classes.

VII. First of all we must distinguish the various The various meanings of 'the same.' In general, ' sameness ' term ' same- would seem to fall into three divisions ; for we usually **^** ' • speak of numerical, specific and generic sameness. There is numerical sameness when there is more than (a) Numeri- one name for the same thing, e.g., ' mantle ' and ' cloak.' There is specific sameness when there are (6) Specific several things but they do not differ in species, e.g., one man and another man, one horse and another horse ; for such things as fall under the same species are said to be specifically the same. Similarly things are generically the same when they fall under the same (^'^ Generic genus, e.g., horse and man. Water from the same fountain described as ' the same water ' might seem to have a sameness differing somewhat from the above- mentioned kinds ; however, a case of this kind ought also to be placed in the same class as those which are called in any sense the same as belonging to one species. For all such things seem to be akin and similar to one another ; for any water is said to be specifically the same as any other water because it lias a certain similarity to it, and water from the same fountain differs in no other respect than in its more striking degree of similarity ; and so we do not

L 289


avro rojv Kau ev etoo? ottwoovv AeyofMevojv. /xa- Atcrra 8' ojJLoXoyovfxevojs to iv dpt^/xo) raurov Trapa 25 Tracrt So/cct XeyeadaL. eiojde 8e /cat tovto aTTO- SiSoaOaL TrXeovaxco^y Kvpiwrara jjiev /cat TTpojrcos orav ovo/xart -^ opa> to ravrov OLTToSodfj, Kaddnep IfjbdrLOV Xcjottlo) /cat ^oiov Trejov Slttovv dvOpcoTTO), Sevrepov 8' orav toj tSto), KaOdirep to eTTLGT'qfxrjs 8e/crt/cov dvOpcoTTco /cat to t^ (j)voei dvco (j)€p6[X€vov

30 TTUpt, TpLTOV 8* oVaV 0,770 To£» CTU/X^e^Sl^/COTOS', OtOV

TO Kadrjixevov ^ to fjLovGLKov Ha)KpdT€L. TrdvTa yap

TauTa TO ev dpuSfJicp ^ovXeTau OT^jU-atVctv. oVt 8*

dXrjOes TO vvv prjdev eoTiv, e/c tcov /xeTajSaAAovTCOV

Ta? rrpocrrjyopLas ixdXiGT dv tis KaTapiddoL. ttoX-

Aa/cts" ya/3 eiTiTdaoovTes ovopuaTi /caAeoat Ttva tcov

35 Ka9rjpL€Vcov jLteTaj3aAAo/xev, oVav tv;^;^] /xt^ o-wtet?

o) TTjv TTpooTa^LV TTOLOvpueda, d)S diTO Tov avjji^e-

^rjKOTOs avTov pidXXov avvT^aovTOS, /cat /ceAeuo/xev

TOV Kadrjp.€Vov -^ 8taA€yo/x€voi^ /caAeWt Trpo? rjjjidg,

SrjXov cos TavTov VTToXapu^dvovTes /caTCt t€ Tovvopua

/cat /caTCt TO Gvpi^e^rjKos or]p.aiv€iv.

103 b VIII. To /xev ow TauTov, KaOdirep etprjTai, TpLxfj

Scrjp'qcjdco. otl 8' e/c tcov npoTepov elpr^piivoiv ol

Xoyoi /cat 8ta tovtcov /cat tt/oos" TauTa, )Ltta /xev

" But not saying he was seated. 290

TOPICA, I. vii-viii

distinguish it from the things called in any sense the same as belonging to one species. The term ' the same ' seems to be applied with the most general acceptance of everyone to that which is numerically one. But even this is usually employed in several senses. Its principal and primary sense occurs when sameness is applied to a name or a definition, e.g., when a * cloak ' is said to be the same as a ' mantle,' or when ' a biped pedestrian animal ' is said to be the same as a ' man.' A second sense occurs when same- ness is applied to a property, e.g., when * capable of receiving knowledge ' is said to be the same as ' man,' and ' that which is naturally carried upwards ' is said to be the same as ' fire.' A third sense occurs when the sameness is based on an accident, e.g., when * that which is seated ' or ' that which is musical ' is said to be the same as ' Socrates.' All these uses aim at indicating numerical oneness. That what we have just said is true can best be understood by a change of the manner of description ; for often when we order someone to summon one of several seated persons, giving his name,* we change the description when the person to whom we are giving the order does not happen to understand, since he will un- derstand better from some accidental feature ; we, therefore, tell him to summon ' the man who is seated ' or ' the man who is talking,' obviously con- ceiving that we are indicating the same thing both when we name it and when we state an accident of it.

VIII. Of ' sameness,' then, as has been said, three Twofold senses can be distinguished. Now that arguments dWisL? of * start from the above-mentioned elements and proceed predicables. through them and lead up to them is proved, in the



TTLGTLS rj Ota TTJs eTTayojyrjs' et yap ris eTnoKOTTOLt) €Kdar7]v TOJV 7Tpordo€0)v koL tcov TTpopXrjfjLdrcJV, 6 (j>aivoiT^ av t) 0.770 rod opov rj oltto rod IStov rj drro rod yevovs r) drro rod ovpL^^^r] kotos yey€vr]p.evrj. dXXr} Se TTioris rj Sid avWoyuGfJiov^. dvdyKTj yap rrav ro rrepi rivos Karrjyopovp^evov rjroL dvriKar- rjyopeiodai rod rrpdy pharos rj pirj. /cat et /xev avri- KarrjyopelraL, opos rj 'i^lov av etrj' et /xev yap

10 ar]p.aiv€L ro ri rjv etvat, opos, et Se p^rj orjpaivei, tStov Tovro yap tJv tStov, ro dvrtKarrjyopovpievov jLteV, pLrj (jrjpalvov 8e ro ri rjV elvai. el Se p,r) dvTLKarrjyopelrai rod Trpdypbaros, tjtol tcov iv rip opiapbip rod VTroKeipievov Xeyopbevojv iarlv rj ov. Kal et puev rcjv iv rep optapLO) Xeyop^evcov, yivos

15 rj hiacjiopd av etrj, evretSo^ o opiopios €k yevovs Kal Siacfiopajv eoriv el Se /xo^ rwv iv rep optapLcp Xeyopbevojv iarl, BrjXov ort crvpL^e^rjKos av etr)- ro yap crvpb^e^TjKos iXeyero o puTjre opos piijre yevos pLTjre tStov ionv, virdpx^t Se rep rrpdyp^an.

20 IX. Mera roivvv radra Set SiopLGaodat rd yevrj reov Karrjyopiojv, iv ots v7rdp)(ov(nv at prjBelaai rerrapes. eari Se radra rov dptOpbov SeVa, rt ecrt, rroGov, ttolov, rrpos rt, rrod, rrori, Keladai, ex^^Vy TTOielv, Trdox^LV. del ydp ro ovpi^e^rjKos

25 Kal ro yevos Kal ro tStov Krat o opiapios iv puia rovrwv rejjv Karrjyopiejjv eorat' rrdaai ydp at Std TOUTCov rrpordoeis rj ri ioriv rj ttoiov t) rroGov rj reov dXXcov nvd KarrjyopieJov arjpaLvovaiv. SrjXov 292

TOPICA, I. viii-ix

first place, by induction. For if one were to examine each separate proposition and problem, it would be clear that it has come into being either from the definition of something or from its property or from its genus or from its accident. Another proof is through reasoning ; for necessarily anything which is predicated about something must either be or not be convertible with its subject. If it is convertible, it would be a definition or a property ; for if it indicates the essence, it is a definition, but, if it does not do so, it is a property ; for we saw " that this was a property, namely, that which is predicated convertibly but does not indicate the essence. If, however, it is not pre- dicated convertibly with the subject, it either is or is not one of the terms given in the definition of the subject ; and if it is one of the terms in the definition, it must be either the genus or the differentia, since the definition is composed of genus and differentiae. If, however, it is not one of the terms given in the definition, obviously it must be an accident ; for the accident was said ^ to be that which, while it belongs to the subject, is neither a definition nor a genus nor a property.

IX. Next we must define the kinds of categories in The ten which the four above-mentioned predicates are found, Sd^fhei? They are ten in number : essence, quantity, quality, relation relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passi- predicables. vity. For the accident, the genus, the property and the definition will always be in one of these categories ; for all propositions made by means of these indicate either essence or quality or quantity or one of the other categories. It is self-evident that he who

« 102 a 18. " 102 b 4.



103 b ,, t y , ■, , t y s

o e^ avTCJV on o to tl eari orjfjiaLVWV ore /xev ovoiav 07]ixaiv€iy ore Se ttoiov, ore he rcov aXXojv TLva KarrjyopLcov. orav fjuev yap eKKeufJievov dv- 30 dpcjTTOv ^fj TO eKKei/JLevov dvOpojirov elvat ^ ^cnov, TL ioTL Xeyei kol ovoiav o-Ty/xatvet* orav 8e XP^~ fiaTOS XevKov eKKecfxevov ^f\ to eKKeifievov XevKov elvaL Tj ■)(po)p,a, tl eoTL XeyeL /cat ttolov orjfJLaiveL. ofJUOLO)? he Kal edv TTTq^vaLov fieyedovg eKKeLpiivov (j)fj TO eKKeifxevov 7Trj)(yalov elvaL {Jbeyedos, tl Iotlv 35 epel Kal ttooov (jrjjjiaLveL. ofiolo)? he Kal €7tI tojv aXXcDV eKaoTOV yap tojv tolovtcjv, edv re avTO rrepl avTov XeyrjTaL edv re to yevos Tiepl tovtov, TL eoTL OTjixaiveL. oTav Se Trepl eTepov, ov tl eoTL (TTjiJiaLveL, dXXd ttooov rj ttolov rj TLva tojv dXXojv KaTiqyopLOJV. oiOTe Trepl c5v /xev ol Xoyoi koX e^ 104a cLv, TavTa Kal rocraura eoTL' ttcjs he Xrnfjopieda Kal hC (hv evTTopri<jofxev, fieTa raura XeKTeov.


SLaXeKTLKTj Kal TL TTpo^Xrjpia SLaXeKTLKOv. ov yap TTaaav TrpoTaoLV ovhe Trdv vpo^XrjiJLa StaAe/crtAcov 5 BeTeov ovhels yap dv TTpoTeiveLe vovv 'e)(0}v to firj- Sevl SoKOvv, ovhe TTpo^dXoL to TrdoL <f)avep6v t) rot? TrXeioTOLS' Ta [xev yap ovk ex^L dTTopiav, ra 8* ousels' dv deLTj. eoTL he TTpoTaoLS hLaXeKTLKrj epw- TrjGLS evho^os ^ TTaoLV r) toIs TrXeioTOLS r] toZs

10 00<f)OL9, Kal TOVTOLS Tj TTOiOLV '^ Tols TrXeLoTOLS T] TOLS


TOPICA, I. ix-x

indicates the essence of something, indicates some- times a substance, sometimes a quaHty, and some- times one of the other categories. For when a man is put before him and he says that what is put before him is a man or an animal, he states an essence and indicates a substance ; but when a white colour is put before him and he says that what is put before him is white or a colour, he states an essence and indicates a quality. Similarly, if a magnitude of a cubit is put before him and he says that what is put before him is a magnitude of a cubit, he will be stating an essence and is indicating a quantity. Similarly with the other kinds of predicates ; for each of such things, both if it be asserted about itself and if its genus be asserted about it, indicates an essence ; but when it is as- serted about something else, it does not indicate an essence but a quality or quantity or one of the other categories. Such then is the nature and such is the number of the subjects about which arguments take place and the materials on which they are based. How we shall derive them and by what means we shall obtain a supply of them, must next be stated.

X. In the first place then let us define the nature Dialectical of a dialectical proposition and a dialectical problem, ^ons^^^' For not every proposition and every problem can be put down as dialectical ; for no man of sense would put into a proposition that which is no one's opinion, nor into a problem that which is manifest to everyone or to most people ; for the latter raises no question, while the former no one would accept. Now a dia- lectical proposition is a question which accords with the opinion held by everyone or by the majority or by the wise — either all of the wise or the majority or the most



104 a

/xaAtcrra yvcoptfJiOL?, /xt) TrapdSo^os' delr] yap dv rt?


TToXXwv S6$aLS fj. elal 8e TTpor duet's hiaXeKTiKol Kal rd rots ivSo^oLS o/xota, Kal rdvavrta /car' dvri- (f)a(jLV Tols hoKovGLV ivSo^oLS elvat TTporeivofjieva,

15 Kal oaat Sdfat Kara rexvas etat rdg €vpr]fji€vas. el yap evSo^ov to ttjv avrrjv etvat rcov evavricov eTTu- OTrjpL7]v, Kal TO aladrjoiv ttjv avTrjv elvai twv ev- avTLOJV evho^ov dv ^aveit], Kal el pLuav dpidfia) ypapifJLaTLKrjv etvau, Kal avXrjTiKTjv /xtW, €6 8e TrAet- ovs ypafJLixaTLKds, Kal avXrjTLKds TrXeiovs' ndvTa

20 ydp ojjLOia Kal avyyevij TavT eoiKev elvai. ofjiOLcos he Kal TO, rots' evSo^ois evavTia /car* dvTLcjyacnv rrpo- Teivopueva evSo^a (^avetrat- el ydp evbo^ov otl Set Tovs (f)lXov£ ev TTOielv, Kal otl ov Set KaKCJS vrotetv evho^ov. eoTL 8' evavTiov fiev on Set /ca/ccDs" TTOielv

25 Tovs <j)iXovSy Kar" avrt^acrtv he otl ov Set KaKco? TTOielv. opLoicDS he Kal el Set tovs (jyiXovs ev TTOielv, tovs ix^povs OV Set. eWt he Kal tovto /car' avrt- <f)aaLV Twv evavTLOJV to ydp evavTLOv IgtIv otl Set TOVS exOpovs ev TTOielv. ojaavTCUs he Kal eirl Tcjjv dXXojv. evho^ov S' ev irapa^oXfj ^avetrat Kal TO evavTLOV nepl tov evavTLOV, otov el tovs <J)lXovs

30 Set ev TTOielv, Kal tovs exOpovs Set KaKcbs. (f)aveirj 296


famous of them — and which is not paradoxical ; for one would accept the opinion of the wise, if it is not opposed to the views of the majority. Views which are similar to received opinions are also dialectical propositions, and so also are propositions made by way of contradicting the contrary of received opinions, and also views which accord with the arts which have been discovered. For if it is a received opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same, it might seem to be a received opinion that the perception also of contraries is the same ; and if it is a received opinion that there is a single art of grammar, it might seem to be a received opinion that there is also only one art of flute-playing, whereas if it is a received opinion that there is more than one art of grammar, it might seem to be a received opinion that there is also more than one art of flute-playing ; for all these seem to be similar and akin. In like manner, also, proposi- tions made by way of contradicting the contrary of received opinions will seem to be received opinions ; for if it is a received opinion that one ought to do good to one's friends, it will also be a received opinion that one ought not to do them harm. Now that we ought to harm our friends is contrary to the received opinion, and this stated in a contradictory form is that we ought not to harm our friends. Likewise also, if we ought to do good to our friends, we ought not to do good to our enemies ; this also takes the form of a contradiction of contraries, for the contrary is that we ought to do good to our enemies. The same is true of all the other cases. The contrary stated about the contrary in a comparison will also appear to be a received opinion ; for example, if we ought to do good to our friends, we ought also to do harm to our



104 a ^ ^^

8* av Kal evavriov to tovs ^tAous" ev Troielv rw tov9

i)(dpovs KaKws' TTorepov Se Kal /car' aXiqdeLav ovTWS ^x^i' '^ oVy iv TOis vrrep rcjv ivavricjv XeyofJLevoLS prjOi^aeraL. SrjXov 8' on Kal ooai ho^ai Kara rexvoLS elat, SiaXeKruKal TTpordaeLS eloi' Oelrj

35 yap av ns ra SoKovvra rols VTrep tovtojv iTreoKe/Jb- puevoLS, olov Trepl pikv tcjv iv larpLKfj ojs 6 larpos, TT€pl he T(x)v iv yeco/xerpta cos 6 yecop^irp-qs' opioiojs 8e Kal iirl rcbv dXXwv. 104 b XI. Ilpo^Xrjpia 8' iorl ScaXeKriKov decoprjpi,a to ovvreZvov r) Trpos atpecnv Kal (f)vyrjv rj Trpos dXij- Beiav Kal yvaJcnv, -^ auro t) wg ovvepyov rrpos ri irepov roJv tolovtcov Trepl ov tj ovSerepcos So^d- t,ovoiv rj ivavTioJS ol ttoXXoI tols (jo(j)oZs r^ ol 5 oo(f)ol TotS" TToXXoLS TJ eKarepoL avrol lavroZs. evia pi€v yap TcJjv TTpo^XrjfMaTOJV ;Yp')^crt/xov elSivat irpos TO iXeodac rj (fyvyelv, olov iroTepov rj rjSovrj alperov "q ov, eVta 8e irpos to et8eVat p,6vov, olov irorepov 6 Koopuos aiSiog t) ov, eVta 8e aura puev Kad^ avTa

10 TTpog ovheTepov tovtojv, ovvepyd 8e ioTi irpos Ttva Twv TOLOVTOJV TToXXd ydp aura piiv Ka9* avTa ov povXopieda yvo}pit,€LV, irepajv 8' eveKa, ottcjs 8ta TOVTOJV dXXo Tt yvojpiaojpLev. eoTi 8e Trpo^Xiq- puaTa Kal cLv ivavTioi elol ovXXoyiopioi [aTToplav ydp ex€v TTOTepov ovtojs ex^i rj ovx ovtojs Std to 298

TOPICA, I. x-xi

enemies. To do good to one's friends might also appear to be the contrary of doing harm to one's enemies ; but whether this is really true or not will be dealt with in our discussions of contraries." It is also obvious that all opinions which accord with the arts are dialectical propositions ; for one would accept the opinions of those who have examined the subjects in question. For example, on questions of medicine one would think as the doctor thinks and in matters of geometry as the geometrician thinks, and so too with the other arts.

XI. A dialectical problem is an investigation leading Dialectical either to choice and avoidance or to truth and know- ^^ ®™^' ledge, either by itself or as an aid to the solution of some other such problem. Its subject is something about which either men have no opinion either way, or most people hold an opinion contrary to that of the wise, or the wise contrary to that of most people, or about which members of each of these classes dis- agree among themselves. The knowledge of some of these problems is useful for the purpose of choice or avoidance ; for example, whether pleasure is worthy of choice or not. The knowledge of some of these is useful purely for the sake of knowledge, for example, whether the universe is eternal or not. Others, again, are not useful in themselves for either of these purposes but as an aid to the solution of some similar problem ; for there are many things which we do not wish to know for themselves but for other purposes, in order that through them we may obtain knowledge of something else. Problems also occur where reasonings are in conflict (for they involve a doubt whether something is so or not, because there

« 112 b27 flf.



104b ^ ,

TTepl diJb(f)OT€po)v etvai Xoyov? TTtdavovs) Kal Trepl

15 Sv Xoyov fJUT] exofjiev ovrojv iJueydXojv, ;)^aAe77-ov oto- fjievoL etvai to Sid ri dirohovvai, olov irorepov 6 KoapLos dtSto? Tj ov' Kal yap rd roiavra /^rjri^GeLev dv ris.

To, jLtev ovv TTpo^XrjpLara Kal at TTpordrjeLs, Kad- aTTGp €Lpr]TaL, hiajpiadco' deuis Se euTLV V7T6Xr]ipL9

20 TTapdho^os rcvv yvajpifjiajv rtvos" Kard (j)iXoao(j>iav , olov OTL ovK eanv avriXeyeuv, Kaddnep ecfyrj 'Avrt- adevTj?, Tj OTL TTavra KLveirai Kad 'Hpa/cAetrov, rj OTL ev TO 6v, Kaddrrep MeAtcrads' (ftrjuLv to ydp Tov TVXpvTOS evavTta rats' ho^ais d7Tocf)r}vapb€Vov (f)povTLt,€LV ev-qdes. r] Trepl cov Xoyov exopiev evav-

25 TLOV Tals ho^aLS, olov OTL ov TTOV TO OV tJtOL y€v6-

jjievov iaTLV rj dtSiov, Kaddirep ol GO(f)LGTaL <^aoLV pLovdLKov ydp ovTa ypap^p^aTLKOv elvaL ovt€ yevo- pL€vov ovTe dtSiov ovTa. tovto ydp, el Kal tlvl pur) SoK€L, S6^€L€V dv Sto, TO Xoyov e^^LV.

"Eart puev ovv Kal rj QioLs Trpo^Xrjpua' ov ndv 8e 30 7Tp6^Xr]p,a BeuLSy eTreLSr] evta twv Trpo^XrjpLaTOJV Totaur' ecrrt Trepl cov ovheTepcDS ho^dl^opiev . otl Se icTTL Kal Tj deoLS TTpo^XrjpLa, hrjXov dvdyKj] ydp e/c Tcbv elprjpievojv rj tovs ttoXXovs tol? go(I)OL£ TrepL TrjV diuLV dp.(f>ia^r)T€LV tj oTTOTepovaovv iavTols, iTreiSrj

35 VTToXrjlpL? TLS TTapdSo^OS Tj QidLS ioTLV. G^^^OV hc

vvv TTavTa rot StaAe/crtKO, TTpo^XrjpLaTa Secret? Ka- XovvraL. 8ta</)€pera) 8e /xT^Sev ottcdgovv Xeyop^evov ov ydp ovopLaTOTTOLTJGaL ^ovX6pL€VOL Sl€lXopl€v ovtcos 300


are strong arguments on both sides), and also where, because the questions are so vast, we have no argu- ment to offer, thinking it difficult to assign a reason, for example, whether the universe is eternal or not ; for one might inquire into such questions also.

Let problems, then, and propositions be defined in Dialectical

1 11 ill..! mK„„^„

the manner already stated. A thesis is the concep- tion contrary to general opinion but propounded by someone famous as a philosopher ; for example, " Contradiction is impossible," as Antisthenes said, or the opinion of Heraclitus that " All things are in a state of motion "or " Being is one," as Melissus says ; for to pay any attention when an ordinary person sets forth views which are contrary to re- ceived opinions is foolish. Or a thesis may concern matters about which we hold a reasoned view con- trary to received opinions ; for example, the view of the sophists that not everything which is has come into being or is eternal ; for a musical man, who is a grammarian, is a grammarian, though he has not come to be so and is not so eternally. This view, even if it is not acceptable to some people, might be accepted on the ground that it is reasonable.

A thesis is also a problem ; but not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are such that we hold no opinion about them either way. That a thesis is also a problem is obvious ; for it necessarily follows from what has been already said that either the many are at variance with the wise about a thesis or that one of these two classes is at variance within itself, since a thesis is a conception which is contrary to accepted opinion. Almost all dialectical problems are now called theses. But it need not matter which of the two names is used ; for we distinguished them



105 a avrd, aAA' tva firj Xavdavcoacv rjfJbdg rives avrojv Tvy')((ivovGLV ovaai Stac/yopaL

Ov Set 8e TToiv Trpo^XrjiJba ovhe irdoav Oeauv eiri-


5 Scofievcov /cat purj KoXdaeojg t) aloO'^aecos' ol fiev yap OLTTopovvres TTorepov Set rovs 6eov? rifidv /cat rovs yoveag dyandv ■r) ov KoXdaeoj? Seovrat, ol Se TTorepov Tj x^^^ XevKTj 'q ov alordiJGeaJS . ovSe Stj ojv ovveyyvs r) dnoSeL^LS, oi5S' wv Xlav iroppoj' rd fjiev yap ovk e^^t dnoplav, rd Se vrAeto) r) /caret yvjJivaaTLK'^v.

10 XII. AtcoptcjjLteVcov Se tovtojv xp'h SteAecr^at TTooa ra>v Xoywv eiSrj rcbv StaAe/crt/ccov. ecrrt Se to /xev €7Taya)yijy to Se ovXXoyLGfjLog . /cat crvAAoytCT/xo? jLtev Tt icTTLV, etpT^rat irpoTepov, iTrayojyr] Se 07 aTTO TcDv /ca^' e/cacrrov evrt rd KadoXov e^oSo?, otoi/ et

15 ecrrt Kv^epvrjTr]s d emoTdpievos KpdriOTOS /cat i^vt- ox^S", /cat oAcDS" ioTLV 6 iTTLOTdpuevos Trepl e/cacrrov dpiGTOS. €GTL S' 9^ jLtev €7Taycjoyrj TTidavcjTepov /cat Ga(f>eGT€pov /cat /card ri^v a'lGdrjGiv yviopipnoTepov /cat rots TToAAots" kolvov, 6 Se cruAAoytcr/xds' ^taart- K(x)T€pov /cat 77po? rou? dvrtAoyt/cou? ivepyeGTepov.

20 XIII. Td jLtev o^v yeV?^ 77ept cSv re ot Aoyot /cat ef CUV, Kaddnep epLTrpoodev etpTyrat, Stajptor^oj- rd S* opyava, St' cSv €V7roprjGop.€V tcov GvXXoyLGp^ojv [/cat ra>v eVaya>yajv,]^ ecrrt reVrapa, ev jLtev rd irpordGeis Xa^eXv, Seurepov Se TTooa^oj? e/cacrrov ^ Omitting /cat tc5v eVayajycDv with AB.

« 100 a 25. 302

TOPICA, I. xi-xiii

thus not from a desire to invent new terms, but that it might not escape us what differences actually exist between them.

It is not necessary to examine every problem and every thesis but only one about which doubt might be felt by the kind of person who requires to be argued with and does not need castigation or lack perception. For those who feel doubt whether or not the gods ought to be honoured and parents loved, need castigation, while those who doubt whether snow is white or not, lack perception. We ought not to discuss subjects the demonstration of which is too ready to hand or too remote ; for the former raise no difficulty, while the latter involve difficulties which are outside the scope of dialectical training.

XII. These definitions having been drawn up, we induction must distinguish how many kinds of dialectical argu- Reasoning, ment there are. Now there is, firstly, induction, and, secondly, reasoning. What reasoning is has been already stated." Induction is the progress from particulars to universals ; for example, " If the skilled

pilot is the best pilot and the skilled charioteer the best charioteer, then, in general, the skilled man is the best man in any particular sphere." Induction is more convincing and clear and more easily grasped by sense-perception and is shared by the majority of people, but reasoning is more cogent and more efficacious against argumentative opponents.

XIII. Let the above, then, be the distinctions The Pro- which we make in the kinds of things with which arqS ^^ arguments are concerned and of which they consist. f^^7^ The means by which we shall obtain an abundance of vii, 5). reasonings are four in number : (1) the provision of ^"^JJ.ggg ^f propositions, (2) the ability to distinguish in how Arguments.



105 a

25 Xeyerai hvvaodai SteAetv, rpirov ra? Sta^opa? ez5-

pelvy rerapTOV Se tJ tou ofJLOLOV GKei/jL?. €Gtl Se

rpoTTOV TLva Kal ra rpia tovtcov TTpordaeiS' €gtl

yap Kad* eKaarov avrcov rroirjaai Trporacnv, olov

on alperov ian to KaXov ^ ro rjSv ^ to aviJL(f)epov,

Kal OTL hia(j)€p€i aladrjGis emGTripbr]^ tw ttjv /x€V

30 aTTo^aXovTi SvvaTov etvat ttolXlv Xa^elv, ttjv 8'

dSvvaTov, Kal otl ofiolcos e;)^et to vyieuvov irpog

vyieiav Kal to €V€Ktik6v rrpos eve^lav. €gtl 8' 'q

jLtev TTpajTT] TTpoTaGis aiTO Tov TToXXaxoJS Xeyofjievov,

Tj 8e Seurepa ano tcjv Suacfyopcov, r) 8e TpiTT] 0,770


XIV. Tas" jU,ev ovv TrpoTOLGeis e/cAeKrreov oGaxc^^

35 SiOjpLGdrj 7T€pl TTpOTOLGeaJS, T} TOLS TTaVTCHV ho^a'S TTpO-

Xetpi^ojJLevov rj tols tcjv TrXecGTCov rf tcls tcov Go^cbVy


105 b pifJbOJTaTOJV, 'q Ta? evavrtas" rat? (^atvojaeVat?, Kal OGai 8of at /cara TexvoLS elGiv. Set 8e TTpoTeiveiv Kal ras" ivavTuag ratS" ^aivopuivais ivho^ois xrar' avTL(f)aGLV, Kaddirep elpr^Tai irpoTepov. ;\;p7yCTt/xov 8e Kal TO 7Toi€iv avTas iv tco e/cAeyetv fjurj fiovov tols 6 oucras" ev8o^ous", aAAa /cat ras" opLoias TavTaig, otov OTL TOJV ivavTLOJV Tj avTYj a'iGdrjGcg [Kal yap rj im- GTTjiJirj) Kal OTL 6pa)[Jb€v elohexoiJievoL tl, ovk €K-

7T€IJL7TOVT€9' Kal ydp Kal CTtI TOJV dXXoJV alGd'iqG€OJV

ovTws' aKovojJiev re ydp eLGSexdfJLevoL tl, ovk Ik- TTejJLTTOVTes , Kal yevojjueda djGavTOJS. ojjlolco? oe

« 104 a 21. 304

TOPICA, I. xiii-xiv

many senses a particular expression is used, (3) the discovery of differences and (4) the investigation of similarities. The last three of these are also in a sense propositions ; for it is possible to make a pro- position in accordance with each of them. For example, we can say (a) " An object of choice is the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient," (6) " Sensation differs from knowledge, because it is possible to recover the latter when one has lost it but not the former," and (c) " The healthy stands in the same relation to health as the sound to soundness." The first proposition is derived from the use of a word in several senses, the second from differences, and the third from similarities.

XIV. The number of ways in which the proposi- How to tions must be selected is the same as the number of pSfons^!^" distinctions which we have made regarding proposi- tions. One may choose either universal opinions, or those of the majority, or those of the wise — of all of them, or of the majority or of the most famous — or opinions contrary to those which appear to be generally held, and also opinions which are in accord with the arts. Propositions must also be formed from opinions contrary to those which appear to be generally accepted put into a contradictory form, as has been described before." Another useful method of forming them is by choosing not only opinions actually received but also opinions which resemble these, for example, " The perception of contraries is the same " (for the knowledge of them is also the same), and " We see by admitting, not by emitting, something " (for this is also true in respect of the other senses) ; for we hear by admitting, not by emitting something, and we taste in the same



105b , , ^ ^ „.. ./ « , \ / .y ^


TrXeiGTCov <f)aiv€TaL, Xiqirreov d>s apxrjv Kal SoKOvaav deoLV TideaaL yap ol jjltj avvopcovres IttL tlvos ovx ovrojs ex^^v} eKXeyeiv Se xp'h '^"^ ^'^ '^^^ yeypa/x- fjiivojv Xoyojv, ras Se hiaypa<f>a'S TTOieioBai irepl eKOLOTOv yivovs viroTidevras ;\;6optV, olov irepl aya-

16 dov Tj irepl ^coov Kal Trepl dyadov Travrog, dp^d- puevov aTTO rod ri ionv. 7TapaGr]pLaiveaOai 8e Kal rds eKaoTOiv So^as, olov on 'EjU77eSo/<:A'rJs' rdrrapa €.(f>riG€ Twv aajpLarajv GroLx^la elvai- Oeiiq yap dv ris TO VTTO TLVOS elpiqpLevov ivSo^ov.

"EcjTt 8' (1)9 TVTTCp TTepiXa^elv Tcbv TTporaoecov /cat

20 TCOV TTpo^X-qpbaTOJV pi€p7] TpLa. at puev yap rjduKal TTpordaeis etVtv, at 8e ^ucrt/cat, at 8e Aoyt/cat. TjOiKal fjuev ovv at Toiavrai, olov TTorepov 8et rot? yovevGi pidXXov tj rot? vopLOL? Treidapx^lv, idv 8ta- (jiCovaiOLV XoycKal 8e olov irorepov ra>v evavricov rj

25 auTT7 eTTLGT'^pur] '^ ov' <j)VGLKal he olov TTorepov o KOGpLos dtStog Tj OV' opLoiojs 8e Kal rd TTpo^XijpLara. TTolai 8' eAcacrrat ra)V Trpoeipiqpiivojv , opLGpLcp jLtev ovK €V7T€T€£ dTToSovvai 7T€pl avTcJov, Tjj 8e 8ta ri]? iiTayajyrjg Gvviqdeia Treipareov yvajpit^eiv eKdGrrjv avTOJV, Kara rd 7rpo€Lprjpieva irapaheiypiara eiri-


30 ripos" /xev ovv (f)LXoGo^iav Kar dXiqdeiav rrepl avTcov TTpaypLarevreov, 8taAe/<:Tt/<:ajS' 8e Trpo? Sogav. XrjTTreov 8* ort pudXiGra KadoXov TraGag rag npo- rao-ets-, Kal rrjv puiav noXXds TTOiiqreoVy olov on rwv dvnK€LpL€vcov rj avrrj eTnGT-qpir], eW^ on rcJov evav-

^ Reading outojs- exeiv with C. exeiv is omitted by the other Mss.



manner. And so with the other instances. Further, opinions which are apparently true in all or most cases must be taken as a starting-point and an accepted thesis ; for they are admitted by such as do not notice that there is a case in which they are not true. We ought also to select from written dis- quisitions and make up descriptions of each class of subject, putting them in separate lists, for example, about ' the good ' (or about ' animal life '), dealing with every kind of good, beginning with the essence. We ought also to note in passing the opinion of individuals, for example, that Empedocles said that the elements of bodies are four in number ; for one may accept the statement of some thinker of repute.

To put the matter briefly, there are three classes Ethical, of propositions and problems. Some are ethical, phys?cat"^ some physical and some logical propositions. Ethical proposi-

... 1 ... (< fi 1 1 tioiis and

propositions are such propositions as should one problems. rather obey parents or the laws, if they are at variance ? " Logical propositions are such as the following : "Is knowledge of contraries the same or not ? " Physical problems are of the type of " Is the universe eternal or not ? " There are similar classes of problems. The nature of each of the above classes is not easily explained by definition, but we must try to obtain knowledge of each of them by the habitual practice of induction, examin- ing them in the light of the above examples.

For philosophic purposes we must deal with pro- positions from the point of view of truth, but for purposes of dialectic, with a view to opinion. Pro- positions must always be taken in their most universal form, and the one should be made into many ; for example, " The knowledge of opposites is the same,"



rtcDV Acat on rwv rrpos ri. rov avrov oe rponov

35 /cat ravra? TraAtv hiaiperlov, ecos" av ivSexrjrai, 8t-

aipelvy olov on ayadov kol KaKOV, /cat Aeu/cou /cat

fieXavos, /cat ipvxpov /cat OepfjLov. ojjlolojs 8e /cat

e77t TcDv d'AAcov.

106 a XV. n€/)t jLtev ow TTpordcrecjog t/cam rd Trpoeiprj-

jLteVa* TO 8e iroaaxo^S, Trpayfjuarevreov firj fiovov oaa

Xiyerai KaO* erepov rporrov, dAAd /cat rous" Aoyous"

avTOJV 7T€Lpar€ov avT-oStSdvat, otov /xt) jjlovov on

6 dya^ov /ca^* erepov fjuev rponov Aeyerat SiKaioavvr]

/cat avhpia, cveKTiKov Se /cat uytetvdv /ca^' erepov,

dAA' OTt /cat rd jLtev rd) at^rd Trotd rtva elvai, ra Se

TO) TTOLrjnKa rtvos" /cat oi5 ro) ttolol avrd nva etvac.

cbaavTCOs 8e /cat CTrt rdiv dXXojv.

Horepov Se 7roAAa;)^d>s' "^ {juovaxcos to) etSet Ac- 10 yeraiy Std rcuvSe Oecuprjrdov. irpojTOV [xev iiri rov ivavTLOV GKOTTetv et TToXXaxoJS Aeyerat, eav t€ tco etSet edv re rd) ovd/xart Sta^cov^. eVta ydp evdvs /cat TOts" ovofJLaaLV erepd ionv, otov rep o^el iv cf)covrj pLev ivavTLOV to ^apv, iv oy/co) 8e to d/xjSAu. 8')7Ao^' 15 ow OTt TO evavT iov tco o^el rroXXaxcos Xeyerai. el 8e TOVTO, /cat to d^u* /ca^* eKarepov yap €K€lvojv 308

TOPICA, I. xiv-xv

then " The knowledge of contraries is the same," and finally, " The knowledge of relative terms is the same." In the same way, those too must be divided again, as long as division is possible, for example, " the knowledge of good and evil," " of black and white," and " of cold and hot is the same " ; and so with the other cases.

XV. On the making of propositions what has been How to said above must suffice. As regards the number of bfgu?ty*of ways in which a term can be used, we must not only meaning, deal with those terms which are used in another way but also try to assign their definitions. For example, we must not only say that in one sense * good ' is said to be ' justice ' and ' courage,' in another sense

  • good ' is said to be ' conducive to soundness ' and
  • conducive to health,' but we must also say that

some things are called ' good ' because they possess certain qualities in themselves, while other things are good because they are productive of a certain result and not because they possess certain qualities in themselves. And so likewise in the other cases also.

Whether a term is used in one kind of sense only (a) From or in many, can be seen by the following method, expressed First, examine the case of its contrary and see if in different it is used in several senses, whether the difference be one of kind or in the use of a word. For in some cases a difference is immediately apparent in the words used. For example, the contrary of ' sharp ' when used of a note is ' flat ' (fSapv), when it is used of a material substance, it is * dull ' (a/x/iAi^. The contrary of ' sharp,' therefore, obviously has several meanings, and, this being so, so also has

  • sharp ' ; for the contrary will have different mean-



106 a ,,

erepov ear at to ivavriov. ov yap to avTO o^v

eo-rat tco oLfx^Xel /cat Tcp ^apel ivavTiov, e/carepo) 8e TO o^v evavTiov. ttolXlv to) ^apeX ev (fxxjvij fjikv TO 6^1) ivavTLOV, iv oyKco he to Kov(f)ov, oiOTe ttoX-

20 Xaxojs TO Papv Aeycrat, eTreiSr) /cat to evavTLOv. opLoicjs Se /cat tco KoXch tco puev inl tov t,cpov to alaxpov, TO) 8' inl ttjs ot/ctas" to iJiox0r]p6v, a)OTe ofJLCovvfjLov TO KaXov .

'Ett' eviojv Se TOts" piev ovopbaoiv ovSapbCJS 8ta- (f)OJveiy TO) 8' et8et KaTaSrjXos ev avTolg evOeojs r)

25 Suacfyopd eoTiv, olov eirl tov XevKov /cat /xeAavos". cfxjovTj yap XevKTj /cat jLteAatva AeyeTat, opuolcos he /cat XP^H'^- TOL? piev ovv ovopLaaiv ovhev hia<j)OJvel, TO) 8' et8et KaTaSrjXos ev avTois evOecJS tj hia(j)opd' ov yap opLOLOJS to tc ;\;pctj/xa XevKov Xeyerai /cat r] (f)a)VT]. hrjXov 8e tovto /cat 8ta ttjs aladiJGeojs- tojv

30 yap avTcov to) elhei rj avrrj aLGdrjaig, to 8e XevKov TO €77t TTJ? (f)a)vrj? /cat TOV ;Ypdj/xaTOS' ov ttj avrfj aloOiqoeL Kpivop^ev, dXXd to piev oi/jeL, to 8' d/coT^. opLOiOJ? 8e /cat to o^v /cat to dpi^Xv ev ;YUjLtots' /cat ev oy/cots"' dAAd to piev d(J)fj, to 8e yevaec. ovSe yap TavTa 8ta<^covet Tots" ovopbaaiv, ovt Itt' avTcov

35 ovT^ eTTL Tojv ivavTiOJV dpi^Xv yap /cat to evavT iov eKaTepcp .

"ETt et Tw piev €GTL Tt ivavTiov to) 8' aTrAcDs" pLTjSev, olov Tjj puev 0,770 tou Triveiv rjSovfj rj drro tov SnJjTJv Xvrrrj evavTLOV, ttj 8' diro tov Oecopelv otl

" Lit. ' white ' and ' black.' 310


ings, corresponding to each of those meanings. For ' sharp ' will not be the same when it is the contrary of ' blunt ' and when it is the contrary of ' flat,' though ' sharp ' is the contrary in both cases. Again, the contrary of fBapv (* flat,' ' heavy ') applied to a note is * sharp,' but applied to a material substance it is ' light ' ; so that fSapv is used in many senses, since its contrary is also so used. Similarly also the contrary of * beautiful ' applied to a living creature is ' ugly,' but applied to a house, ' mean ' ; so that

  • beautiful ' is an equivocal term.

Sometimes there is no difference in the terms (6) From used but the variation in kind is immediately obvious different in in their use ; for example, in the case of ' clear ' kind, and ' dim,' " for sound is said to be ' clear ' and ' dim ' and so is colour. Now there is no difference in the terms used, but the variation in kind is immediately obvious in their use ; for * clear ' is not used in the same sense as applied to colour and as applied to sound. This is manifest also through sense-percep- tion ; for sense-perception of things which are of the same kind is the same, but we do not judge ' clearness ' of sound and of colour by the same sense, but the latter by sight and the former by hearing. Similarly with regard to ' sharp ' and ' dull ' in flavours and in material substances ; we judge the latter by touch, the former by taste. Here, too, there is no difference in the terms used — either in the terms themselves or in their contraries ; for ' dull ' is the contrary of ' sharp ' in both its senses.

Furthermore, we must see whether there is a (c) From contrary of a term in one sense, but absolutely none or^jIb||nce^ in another sense. For example, the pleasure due to of con- drinking has a contrary in the pain due to thirst,



106 b 0^ Sidfjierpo? rfj rrXevpa davfifieTpos ovSev, wcrre 7r\eovax<Jos rj rj^ovr] Xeyerat. Kal rw ju-ev /caret rrjv SidvoLav (jyiXelv to fxioelv ivavrlov, rw Se Kara ttjv GCOfJLaTLKTjv €vepy€Lav ovSev SrjXov ovv on ro ^lXclv

OpLCjOVVfJiOV. €Tl €7tI TCJV dvCL fXeOOV , el TWV jLteV

5 eoTL TL dvd fieaoVy twv 8e jjirjSev, ^ el dpucfyolv /xeV eGTL, jjLT] ravTov Se, olov XevKov Kal pueXavos iv XP^J^p^cLGL piev TO ^aiov, iv (j)OJvfj 8* ovSev, rj el dpa, TO Gopi(f)6v, Kaddirep rives cf)aaL cropi,(l)rjv (fxxjvrjv dvd jLtecrov eTvac, cocr^' opLOJVvpiov to XevKov, opLoicos 8e

10 Koi TO pLeXav. en el rcjv puev TrXeioj rd dvd pueaoVy Tcov Se ev, KaOdirep eirl rod XevKov /cat pueXavos' eTTL puev ydp rcov ;^/oa>/>taTa)v TToXXd rd dvd pieaov, errl 8e tt^s" (fxjovrjg ev ro aopL(f)6v.

IlaAtv enl rod /car' dvricjiaaLV dvnKeipLevov cr/co- TTelv el TrXeovaxcos Xeyer ai. el ydp rovro nXeova-

15 x^^? Xeyerai, /cat ro rovrcp dvriKeipLevov nXeovaxoJS pr]6'qaeraL, olov ro purj ^XerreLV rrXeovaxcos Xeyerai, ev p,ev ro pirj ex^iv oipiv, ev Se ro pbrj evepyeiv rrj oi/jei. el Se rovro rrXeovaxcxiS , dvayKalov Kal rd pXeTTeiv TrXeovaxcos XeyeoOai- eKarepco ydp rep pirj pXeneiv dvriKeiaerai n, olov rw pLev pir) ex^iv oipiv

20 ro e;j(etv, ra> Se purj evepyeiv rf] oipei ro evepyeiv.



but the pleasure due to the contemplation that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has no contrary ; so that ' pleasure ' is used in more senses than one. Also * loving,' used of the mental state, has a contrary in ' hating,' but, used of the physical act, it has no contrary ; therefore ' loving ' is obvi- ously an equivocal term. Further, with regard to (d) From intermediates, you must see whether some meanings medVates. of terms and their contraries have intermediates and others none, or whether both have an intermediate but not the same one. For example, in colours the intermediate between ' clear ' (white) and ' dim ' (black) is ' grey,' but when the terms are used of a note, they have no intermediate, unless it be

  • muffled,' as some people say that a muffled note is

intermediate. Therefore ' clear ' is an equivocal term, as also is * dim.' You must see also whether some terms have several intermediates, others only one, as in the case of ' clear ' and ' dim ' ; for when they are used of colour they have many intermediates, but when they are used of a note only one, namely, ' muffled.'

Again, with regard to the opposite put in a con- (e) From tradictory form, you must see whether it is used in torv"^*^'^ more senses than one. For if it is used in several opposites. senses, then its opposite also will be used in several senses. For example, ' not to see ' is used in more than one sense, firstly, ' not to possess sight,' and, secondly, ' not to exercise the faculty of sight ' ; and if this has more than one meaning, ' to see ' must necessarily also have more than one meaning ; for each meaning of ' not to see ' will have an opposite, the opposite of ' not to possess sight ' being ' to possess sight,' and the opposite of ' not to exercise the faculty of sight ' being ' to exercise the faculty of sight.'



hn €7TL TOJV Kara orepiqoiv /cat e^iv AeyoixevcDv eTTLGKOTTeZv €1 yap ddrepov rrXeovaxci)? Xeyerau, /cat TO XoLTTov, OLov €t TO aloBaveoBai TrXeova^ays Ae- yeTat Kara re ttjv ifjvx'^v /cat to oojp,a, /cat to

25 avaladr^Tov etvat nXeovaxiJ^S p'qBiqaeTai Kara re rr)v ijjvxy]v /cat TO GOJjJLa. on 8e Kara oreprfoiv /cat e^LV avriKeiraL ra vvv Xeyofieva, hrjXov, eireihr] TTe(j)VKev eKarepav rojv aloBr^aewv e^^LV ra Joia /cat Kara rr}V xfsvx^v f<al Kara ro aco/xa.

"Eti 8' CTTt rwv TTrojoecDV eTnGKerrreov. el yap

30 TO SiKaUos TrXeovaxa)9 Xeyerai, /cat to hiKaiov irXeovaxcJog pTjB-qaeraL' KaB" eKarepov yap rcjv St/catojs" €CTTt 8t/catov, otov el ro 8t/catct>? Xeyerai ro re Kara rrjv eavrov yvwjjirjv Kplvai /cat ro chs 8et, ofjiolojs /cat to 8t/catov. cLaavraJS 8e /cat et TO vyueivov irXeovaxcos , Kal ro vyueivajs TrXeovaxcos

35 pr]6iqaeraL , otov el vyieivov ro fxev vyuelas ttoltj- Tt/cov TO 8e (fyvXaKrcKov ro 8e GrjjjiavrLKov, Kal ro vyieivcjs '^ TTOLrjriKOJS rj ^uAa/CTt/ccos" rj o-r^/xav- riKcbs prjBrjGerai. ojjbolcos 8e /cat eTrl rwv dXXcoVy 107 a oVav auTO TrXeovaxo)? Xeyrjr ai, Kal rj TrrwGis rj aTT* auTou 7rAeora;)(aJ9 prjBrjoerau, Kal el r) TrrcoGis, /cat auTO.

S/co7retv 8e /cat to, yevq rcov Kara rovvopua

Karrjyopicbvy el ravrd eGriv eirl Trdvrajv. el yap

5 fJiTj ravrd, 8^Aov OTt opbcvvvpuov ro Xeyopievov, otov

" TTTwais is used of any modification of a word, such as cases and genders of nouns and adjectives, adjectives derived from nouns, adverbs formed from adjectives (as in the ex- amples which Aristotle gives here), and the tenses of verbs. 314


Further, you must examine cases where the (/) From privation and presence of some state is asserted ; tion^or^* for if either of the terms used has several meanings, Jf^g^^'J^g so also will the other. For example, if ' to have sensation ' is used in several senses in connexion both with the soul and with the body, * lacking sensation ' also will be used in several senses in connexion both with the soul and with the body. That the terms under discussion are opposed in respect of the privation and presence of a certain state is obvious, since living creatures naturally possess each kind of sensation, that is to say, as connected both with the soul and with the body.

Further, you must examine the inflected forms of (ff) From words." For if ' justly ' can be used in several senses, forms of ' just ' will also be used in several senses ; for there ^^rds. is a meaning of * just ' for each of the meanings of 'justly.' For example, if to judge 'justly ' means to judge ' according to one's opinion,' and also to judge ' as one ought,' then ' just ' will have the two similar meanings. Likewise if ' healthy ' has several meanings, so also will ' healthily ' ; for example, if ' healthy ' means ' producing health ' and ' preserv- ing health ' and ' denoting health,' then ' healthily ' will mean ' in a manner which produces health ' or ' in a manner which preserves health ' or ' in a manner which denotes health.' Similarly in every other case, when the word itself is used in several senses, the inflexion formed from it will also be used in several senses, and vice versa.

You must also examine the kinds of predicates (h) From denoted by the word used and see if they are the predicates^ same in every case ; for, if they are not, it is obvious denoted by that the word is equivocal. For example, ' good ' as



TO ayaOov iv eSecr/xart fiev ro 'noL7]TiKov -qSovrjs, ev larpLKfj 8e to ttoltjtlkov vyietas, IttI 8e 4'^XV^ TO TTOLOLV ctvat, OLOV O(x)(f)pova rj avSpelav rj StKratav ofJLOicog Se Kal eTrl 6.vdpco7Tov. evia^ov 8e to ttotI,

10 otor TO ev tco Kaipo) \ayaQ6vY' dyaOov yap AeyeTat TO ev TO) Kaipch. ttoXXolkls Se to ttogov, olov enl Tov jjLeTpLOV XeyeTai yap /cat to fxeTpLov ayadov. OJCTTC opbwvvjjLOV TO dyadov. dyGavTCOs Se Kal to XevKov eirl aixijiaTos piev xP^l^^> ^"^^ ^^ (f^covrjs TO evrjKoov. TrapaTTXrjGLajs 8e Kal to o^v' ov yap

15 (hoavTOJ? eTrl TrdvTcov to avTo XeyeTai' ^ayvr] piev yap o^ela tj Tax^-lci, Kadd-nep (jyaolv ol KaTa tovs dpidpbovs dppLoviKoi, yoivia 8' o^ela rj eXdooojv opOrjs, pid-)(o,Lpa 8e r] o^vycovios.

S/coTretv 8e Kal tcl yevr] tojv vtto to avTo ovop^a, el eTepa Kal pLX] vtt* dXXrjXa, oTov ovos to Te t,wov

20 Kal TO GKevos. eTepos yap 6 KaTa Tovvopia Aoyos" avTOJV TO puev yap t,a)ov ttolov tl prjdrjGeTai, TO he GKevos ttolov tl. edv 8e utt' dXXrjXa Ta yevrj fj, ovk dvayKalov eTepovg tovs Xoyov? elvaL. olov TOV KopaKog to ^ojov Kal to opveov yevos eoTLV. OTav ovv Xeycjopuev tov KopaKa opveov elvaL,

25 Kal t^cpov TTOLOV TL ^a/xcv auTOV elvaL, 65o-t' dpL(f)6- Tepa tol yevTj Trepl avTov KaTrjyopelTaL. opbOLOjg 8e Kal OTav t,a)OV TTT-qvov Slttovv tov KopaKa Xeyco- puev, opveov (^a/xev avTOV elvaL' Kal ovtcjs ovv dpucfiOTepa tol yevrj KaTrjyopelTaL KaTa tov KopaKo?,

1 Omitting the first dyadov with W. S. Maguinness.

" i.e. the windlass (Herod, vii. 36 ; [Aristot.] Mech. 853 b 12).



applied to food means * productive of pleasure,' as applied to medicine it means ' productive of health,' as applied to the soul it denotes a certain quality such as * temperate ' or * brave ' or ' just,' and similarly also as applied to man. Sometimes it means what happens at a certain time, for example at the right time ; for what happens at the right time is called ' good.' Often too it is applied to quantity, being used, for example, of that which is ' moderate ' ; for that which is ' moderate,' too, is called ' good.' Thus ' good ' is an equivocal term. Similarly too AeuKoi/ ('white,' 'clear') as applied to a body denotes colour, as applied to a note it means

  • easily heard.' The case of ' sharp ' also is similar,

for it does not always bear the same meaning. For a quick note is ' sharp,' as the theorists of rhythmic harmony tell us, and an angle which is less than a right angle is ' sharp ' (acute), and a knife with a sharp angle (edge) is * sharp.'

You must also examine the genera of the things (*) From an which fall under the same term and see if they tion of the are different and not subaltern. For example, 0V09 f^g^^j/e^'" (* donkey ') is both the animal and the machine " ; the same for the definition applied to the word is different ^^' in the two cases, since one will be described as a kind of animal, the other as a kind of machine. But if the genera are subaltern, the definitions are not necessarily different. For example, ' animal ' is the genus of ' raven,' and so is ' bird.' When, therefore, we say that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a kind of animal, so that both the genera are pre- dicated of it. Likewise too, when we call the raven

  • a flying biped animal,' we are stating that it is a

bird, so that in this way too both the genera are



/cat o Aoyos' avrcov. cttl be rcov [jlyj vtt aAAqAa 30 y€va)V ov GVfjL^aLveL tovto ' ovre yap orav gk€vos Xeycofxev, t,a)OV Xeyoy^ev, ovd^ orav ^(pov, OKevos.

S/coTretv 8e /xt] [jlovov el rod TTpoKeufjievov erepa TO, yevT] Kal pLJ] vtt* oXhrqXa, dAAo, kol €ttl tov evavriov el yap ro evavriov 7ToXXaxco9 Aeyerat, 35 StJAoV OTt Kal TO TTpoKelfievov.

yipiqGipLOV Se Kal to ctti tov opLGfJLOv eTTL^XeTTeiv TOV eK rod ovvridepievov yLVOjxevov, olov XevKov Gcofjuaros Kal XevKTJs (jicovrjs- d(j)aLpoviJLevov yap TOV ISiov TOV avTov Aoyov Set XeiTTeadaL. tovto 107 b 8' ov ovpL^aiveL IttI tcov ojLtcovujLtojv, otov eTrl tojv vvv elpr)fjLeva)V. to jiev yap eoTai ocu/xa TOtdvSe XpiJi>P'CL e^ov, TO 8e (jxxjvr] evrJKOos- a(j)aipedevTos^ ovv TOV Ga)fMaT05 Kal ttJs" <l>ojvrjs ov TavTov iv eKaTepcp to AetTTO/xevo v . e8et 8e ye, ecTrep avv- 5 (jjvvpiov rjv TO XevKov to i(f)^ eKaTepov Xeyojjievov.

IloAAaACt? 8e Kal ev avTolg tols XoyoLS Xavddvei rrapaKoXovdovv to o/xcovujlcov* 8to Kal eirl tcov Xoyojv OKeTTTeov. olov dv tis to GrjfjbavTtKov Kal t6^ jroLTjTLKov vyieLas to GvpLfieTpco? e^ov rrpos 10 vyieiav ^fi elvai, ovk drroGTaTeov dXX eiriGKeiTTeov Tt to GVfJLiJieTpoj? Kad^ eKaTepov eiprjKeVy otov el TO p,ev TO TOGovTov' etvai a)GTe TToieiv vyUiav, TO 8e TO TOLovTov OLOV GrjfjbaLveiv TTola Tis rj e^is.

1 Inserting to with C. 2 Reading Toaovrov with all the best mss.




predicated of the raven, and also their definition. This does not happen in the case of genera which are not subaltern ; for when we say a ' machine ' we do not mean an ' animal,' nor vice versa.

You must also examine not only whether the (j) From the genera of the term in question are different without I^q gSm beine; subaltern but also look into the case of its "sed in contrary ; for if its contrary is used in several senses, senses. obviously the term in question will also be so used.

It is useful also to look at the definition which (k) From results from the use of the term in a composite tion1)?a^" phrase, for example, in XevKov o-wjua (' a white body ') term in a and AevKr; (fnov^) (' a clear note '). For when what is phrase. peculiar is taken away, the same meaning ought to be left. But this does not happen when equivocal terms are used, as in the phrases just mentioned ; for the former will be ' a body having such and such a colour ' the latter ' a note which is easily heard.' If, therefore, ' a body ' and * a note ' are taken away, what remains in each phrase is not the same. But it ought to have been the same if the term AevKo? in each case had been synonymous.

Often too in the actual definitions the equivocal (D From slips in unnoticed ; therefore examination must be ofdeflni-^ made of the definitions also. For example, if some- t^°°- one states that what denotes and what produces health are ' commensurably related to health,' we must not shrink from the task but examine what he has meant by ' commensurably ' in each case, for example, whether in the latter case it means that it is ' of the requisite quantity to produce health,' whereas in the former case it means that it is * of the requisite quality to denote of what kind the state is which is present.'



"Ert et jJLTj GVfJL^X'qTa Kara to [xdXXov rj oyioioi^y olov XevKTj cfxxjvrj Kal XevKov IfJidrLov koI o^vs

ISx^H'OS Kal 6^€ia (f)cuv'^' ravra yap ovd^ ojJiOLWS Xeyer ai XevKa rj o^ea, ovre [jbdXXov ddrepov. cocj^' ojjbcjvvjjbov TO XevKov Kal to o^v. to yap (jvvcjjvvpiov TTav avfjLpXrjTOV rj yap 6p.oiws pr]OiqG€TaL, r) [juaXXov doLTepov.

'Evret 8e tcov iTepcov yevcov Kal fxr] vtt* dXXrjXa

20 eVepat to) etSet Kal at 8ta(^opat, olov t,cpov Kal eiTioTiqfxiqs (eVepat yap tovtojv at hia^opai), OKOTTeZv el to, vtto to avTo ovofjua eTepcov yevcov Kal jJiT] VTT* dXXrjXa hia<f)opai €lglv, olov to o^v (f)a>V'YJ^ Kal oyKov Siacfyepei yap (f)a)vrj (f)a)vrj? tco o|eta etvaiy ofjuotajs 8e /cat oyKos oyKov. cjoTe

25 ofiayvvfJLOv to o^V' eVepcov yap yevcov Kal ovx vtt^ dXXqXa hia(j)opai eloiv.

riaAtv et auTcov tcjv vtto to avTO ovo/xa eVepat at hia<j}opai, olov ;)^pcojLtaTOS' tou tc eirl tcov goj- jLtciTcov Kal Tov iv Tols iieXeoiv tov puev yap inl


TOV 8' eTTt Twv jLteAcov ovx ^^ OiVTal 8ta<^o/3at.

COCTTe OpLCOVVjJLOV TO XP^l^^' '^^'^ 7^9 OL^'T^^ o^t

auTat hia<j)opaL "Eti eirel to et8os" ovhevos cCTTt SLa(f)opd, OKoirelv

" Cf. Met. 1057 b 8; white is 'penetrative' and black ' compressive.' The definitions are Platonic, cf. Tim. 67 d, e.



Further, vou must see whether the terms are not (»») From a

, , •'. ^ n , • -1 J comparison

comparable in respect or greater or similar degree, in respect for example, a * clear ' (Acdko?) note and a ' white ' of degree. (Aei'Kos) garment, and a ' sharp ' flavour and a ' sharp ' note. For these things are not said to be XevKo^ (' white,' * clear ') or ' sharp ' in a similar degree or one in a greater degree than the other ; and so the terms XevKo^ and * sharp ' are equivocal. For every synonymous term is comparable ; for it will be used either of a similar degree or of a greater degree in one thing than another.

Now since the differentiae of genera which are («) From different but not subaltern are also different in kind, tion of the for example, those of ' animal ' and * knowledge ' differentiae, (for the differentiae of these are different), you must see whether the meanings which fall under the same term are differentiae of genera which are different without being subaltern, for example ' sharp ' as applied to a note and to a solid substance ; for voice differs from voice in ' sharpness ' and similarly too one solid substance from another. ' Sharp,' there- fore, is an equivocal term ; for its meanings are differentiae of genera which are different without being subaltern.

Again, you must see whether the differentiae of the actual meanings which fall under the same term are different, for example, those of colour in bodies and colour in tunes ; for the differentiae of colour in bodies are ' penetrative of sight ' and ' com- pressive of sight,' " but the same differentiae do not hold good of colour in tunes. Therefore colour is an equivocal term ; for when things are the same they have the same differentiae.

Further, since the species is never the differentia

M 321


Tihv VTTO TO avTO ovojjua el to fjuev etSd? ecrrt to Se 35 hia(j)opd, otov ro XevKov to ju-ev eTTi rod Gwybaros etSos" XP^i^^'^^^y '^^ ^* ^'^^ "^^S" (fiowrjs hia^opd' 8ta0e/O€t yap (jiojvr) (jjcovrjg rep XevKjj elvau.

XVI. Ilept fiev ovv rod 7roAAa;)(a)? Sta toutcov Koi T(x)V roLovTcov aK€7Tr€ov' rag Se Biacfjopdg iv

108 a avTolg re rolg yevecri, irpog dWrjXa 6€Cjpr]T€ov, otov rivi SuacfiepeL SLKaLoavvrj dvSplag Kal (f)p6vr]GLg aa>(f)poavv7]s {ravra yap aTravra e/c tou avrov yevovs iarlv), Kal i^ dXXov TTpog dXXo tojv /xt) TToXv Xiav hieoriqKorcjv , olov rivi a'tadT^Gig im-


KardSrjXot TravreXctjg at SiacfiopaL

XVII. TrjV he ofJbOLorrjra oKe-nreov eni re tojv iv eTepois yeveuLv, cos" erepov Trpos erepov n, ovTwg dXXo Trpos dXXo, otov cus" emoTripbri TTpog

10 eTTLGTTjTov, ovTCx)s aiodrjais Trpos aladrjTov Kal (Ls erepov iv ere pep tlvl, ovtcos dXXo iv dXXcp, olov d)S oipLs iv 6(f)6aXiJLa), vovs iv ifjvxfjy ^^^^^ ^S" yaXi^vr] iv OaXdodTj, viqvepiia iv dipt. pudXiara S' iv roXg TToXv hieuTwcn yviJivd^^eadat Set* paov ydp iirl tojv XoLTTOJV hvvrjGopieda rd dpLoia ovvopdv. oKeTrreov

15 8e Kal rd iv tco avTco yevei ovra, el tl diraoiv virdpx^t' TavTOVy olov dvdpd)7Tcp Kal LTTTro) Acat kvvl' fj ydp vTidpx^i' Tt auTots" TauTov, TavTjj 6/xota



TOPICA, I. xv-xvii

of anything, you must look whether one of the meanings which fall under the same term is a species and another a differentia, for example, XevKos (' white,' ' clear ') when applied to a body is a species of colour, but when applied to a note it is a diff'erentia, for one note differs from another in being clear.

XVI. The number of meanings, then, of a term How to note must be examined by these and similar methods, ^differences. The differences must be viewed in their relation

with one another both in the genera themselves — for example, " In what does justice differ from courage and wisdom from temperance ? " (for all these belong to the same genus) — and also from one genus to another, where they are not too widely separated — for example, " In what does sensation differ from knowledge ? " — for where the genera are widely separated, the differences are quite obvious.

XVII. Likeness must be examined in things How to note belonging to different genera — as A is to B, so is C Slnces.

to D (for example, ' As knowledge is related to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of sensation '), and also, as A is in B, so is C in D (for example, * As sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul ' and * As is calm in the sea, so is absence of wind in the air '). In particular we must have practice in dealing with genera which are widely separated ; for in the other cases we shall be able to detect the similarities more readily. We must examine also things which are in the same genus, to see if there is any attribute belonging to them all which is the same, for example, to a man, a horse and a dog ; for they are alike in as far as any attribute which they possess is the same.



XVIII. yiprjaifJiov Se to [lev 7Toaa-)(^uj? Aeytrat erreGKe^Oai mpos re ro aacjyls {(JbdXXov yap dv rt?

20 elBeirj ri rtOiqGiV, epL^aviudevros ttooo.x^s Aeyerat) KOI TTpo? TO yiveodai KaT avTo to Trpdyfjua Kal fjLTj TTpos TouVojLta T0V9 GvXXoyLOfjLovs . olStjXov yoLp ovTos 7Tooa-)((jL)S XeyeTai, ivhex^Tai [jlt] €itl raurov Tov re aTTOKpivoixevov koI tov ipcjOTcJovTa (f>ep€LV TTjv Sictvotav ipucjiavLGdevTOS Se TrooaxiMS XeyeTai

25 /cat 6776 rt ^epctiv TiOrjOiy yeXolos av ^aivoiTO 6 ipwTCJV, el fjurj TTpos tovto tov Xoyov ttoiolto. Xpr](Jipiov Se Kal irpos to (jltj rrapaXoyiaOrjvai Kal TTpos TO tt apaXoy to aod at. etSores* yap TToaaxois XeyeTai ov pirj 7rapaXoyLG6a)[xev , dAA' el^TJoofiev iav [MTj irpos rauro tov Xoyov rroLrJTaL o epcjTcov

30 avTOL T€ epcoTCJVTes SwrjaofJieOa TrapaXoyioaoOaL, iav puT] Tvyxo-VTj etStbs" o aTTOKpivopievos TToaa^o^s XeyeTai. tovto 8' ovk eirl iravTOiV hvvaTov, dAA' OTOV fi Tcov TToXXax^og Xeyopievwv to, p,ev dXrjOrj TOL 8e ifjevhrj. eWt Se ovk oiKelos 6 TpoTTog ovtos Trjs SiaXeKTiKTJs' Sio iravTeXaJs evXaj^rjTeov toIs

35 StaAeKTi/cots" TO TOiovTOVy TO TTpos Tovvopia SiaXi- yeoBai, edv ju-tJ rt? dAAcu? i^ahvvaTrj irepl tov TTpoKeipuevov hiaXeyeoOai.

To Sc TCL? hiacfyopds evpelv XPV^^I^^^ rrpos re

Tovs GvXXoyiopbov? TOV? jrepl TavTov /cat eTepov

108 b Kal TTpog TO yvaipil,eiv tL e/cacrrov eVrtv. ort /Ltev

ovv TTpos Tovs GvXXoyiGpiovg Tovg TTepi TavTov Kal


TOPICA, I. xvin

XVIII. It is useful to have examined the various utility of meanings of a term both with a view to clarity (for Jj^J^ oflnV a man would know better what he is stating if the biguity. various senses in which it can be used had been made clear), and also in order that his reasonings may be directed to the actual thing and not to the name by which it is called. For if the various ways in which a term can be used are not clear, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not applying their mind to the same thing ; whereas, if it has been made clear what are the various ways in which a term can be used and to which of them the answerer is referring in his statement, the questioner would look absurd if he did not direct his argument to this. It is also useful so that one may not be misled and that one may mislead others by false reasoning. For if we know the various senses in which a term can be used, we shall never be misled by false reasoning, but we shall be aware of it if the questioner fails to direct his argument to the same point, and we shall ourselves, when we are asking questions, be able to mislead the answerer, if he does not happen to know the various meanings of a term. This, how- ever, is not always possible but only when some of tlie various meanings are true and others false. This kind of argument, however, is not a proper part of dialectic ; therefore, dialecticians must be very much on their guard against such verbal discussion, unless it is quite impossible to discuss the subject other- wise.

The discovery of differences is useful both for utility of reasonings about sameness and difference, and also cSvery'of for the recognition of what some particular thing is. differences. Its usefulness for reasonings about sameness and



irepov ^j^pTyctjit-ov, SrjXov evpovres yap Siacjyopav Tcbv TTpoKeLjjLevcjov oTTOiavovv SeSeixoTeg ioopieSa on ov ravTov npos 8e to yviopit,€LV ri eart, Stort 5 rov Ihiov rrjg ovaias eKaarov Aoyov rals irepl eKaorrov oiKeiais hia(f)Opais x^P^^^^ elwdafxev. 'H Se rod ofJbOLOv Secopla xp'^^^l^os TTpos re rovs

€7TaKTlKOVS XoyOVS Kol 7Tp6? TOU? €^ V7Tod€G€OJS

GyXXoyLGfjiov? Kal Trpo? Tr]v aTTohoGLV rcbv opiGpiwv.

10 TTpos p-^v ovv Tovs €TraKTiKov5 Xoyovs, Stort rfj Kad^ eKaora irrl rihv op^oicov iiraycjyfj ro KadoXov d^Lovp,€v eTrdyeLv ov yap pahiov icrnv inayeiv p,rj elSora? rd o/xota. Trpos 8e rovs ef VTTodeaeoj? GvXXoyiop,ovs, hiOTi evSo^ov icmv, a)S TTore e<f ivog rcbv o/xotcov e;^^* ovtojs Kal iirl tcjv Xolttojv.

15 wore TTpos o rt dv avrdjv evTTopwp^ev SiaXeyecrdai, TTpohLop.oXoyrja6p.e9a, a)£ ttot€ €.Tn rovrwv k^^t,, ovrco Kal irrl rod TTpoKetpbevov ex^iv. hei^avres 8e €Keivo Kal rd TTpoKelp^evov i^ vTTodeaecog SeSct- XOTes ioopbeda' VTTodefievoi yap, d)s TTore €ttl rov- rojv €X^L, ovra> Kal irrl rov TTpoKeipiivov e;!^etv, TT]V (XTToSet^tv TTeTTOLT^p.eOa. rrpos 8e rrjv rcbv

20 opcapLcbv dTTohoGLV, Stort Svvdp,€voL avvopdv n ev iKaorcp ravrov, ovk dTropi]Gop.f.v ets" Tt Set yevos 6pit,opLevovs ro TrpoKeipuevov ridevai' rcbv yap kol- vcbv ro pudXicrra iv ra> ri eon Karrjyopovpbevov 226


difference is obvious ; for when we have discovered a difference of some kind or other between the subjects under discussion, we shall have shown that they are not the same. It is useful for recognizing what some particular thing is, because we usually isolate the appropriate description of the essence of a particular thing by means of the differentiae which are peculiar to it.

The consideration of similarity is useful both for utility of inductive arguments and for hypothetical reasoning cdvel^y'of and also for the assignment of definitions. For similarities, inductive reasoning it is useful because we maintain that it is by induction of particulars on the basis of similarities that we infer the universal ; for it is not easy to employ inference if we do not know the points of similarity. It is useful for hypothetical reasoning, because it is an accepted opinion that whatever holds good of one of several similars, holds good also of the rest. Therefore, if we have the proper material for discussing any one of them, we shall secure beforehand an admission that what holds good of other similars also holds good of the sub- ject under discussion, and, having demonstrated the former, we shall have also demonstrated, on the basis of the hypothesis, the subject under discussion ; for we shall have completed our demonstration by the hypothetical assumption that whatever holds good of other similars holds good also of the subject under discussion. It is useful for the assignment of definitions because, if we can see what is identical in each particular case, we shall have no doubt about the genus in which we must place the subject under discussion when we are defining it ; for, of the common predicates, that which falls most definitely



yevos av eur]. ofJiOLCos be Kai ev rot? ttoau otecrrcDcrt XprjGifJio? TTpos rovs opiufjiovs r) rod oiioiov decopta,

25 otov on ravTov yakqvY] /xev €V OaXoLGcn), vr]vefjLLa 8' iv depL {eKarepov yap rjavx^o), Kal ort cmy/xT) iv ypajjifjifj Kal fjiovag iv dptOfJUO)' eKarepov yap dpx'^' axjre to kolvov inl rtdvrcxjv yevos dirohi- hovre? ho^opbev ovk dXXorpicjos opit^eadai. G^^hov he Kal ol 6pit,6p,evoi ovrcos elwdaaiv a.77o8t8ovar

30 ttJv t€ yap piovdha dpx^v dpiOpLOv (jyacrlv elvai Kal rrfv (7TLy[ji7]v dp^^v ypapufjbrjs. SrjXov ovv on els TO KOLVOV dfJL<f)OTepct}v yevos nOeaaiv.

Ta /xev ovv opyava 8i* cSv ol ovWoyiapLol ravr eoriv ol he tottol TTpos ovs XPI^^I^^ '^^ XexOevra Otoe etotv.


TOPICA, I. xviii

in the category of essence must be the genus. Like- wise also the consideration of similarity is useful for the forming of definitions in dealing with \\adely separated subjects, for example, the statements that " calm at sea and absence of wind in the air are the same thing " (for each is a state of quiet), and that " a point on a line and a unit in number are the same thing " (for each is a starting-point). Thus, if we assign as the genus that which is common to all the cases, our definition will not be regarded as unsuitable. Those who deal in definitions usually form them on this principle ; for they say that the unit is the starting-point of number and the point the starting-point of a line ; it is obvious, therefore, that they assign genus to that which is common to both.

Such, then, are the means by which reasonings are carried out. The commonplaces for the applica- tion of which the said means are useful are our next subject.



108 b 34 I. "EcTTt 8e Tcov TTpo^XrjjjidTCov TO, [lev KaSoXov

35 ra 8' eTTL jjuipovs. KadoXov fiev ovv olov on Trdaa

rjSovT] ayaOov /cat on ovS^jJila rjSovrj dyaOoVy evrt

109 a fjiipovs Se olov on eon ng rjSovrj dyaOov Kal on

earn rts" rjhovrj ovk dyaOov. eon Se rrpos diJL(f)6r€pa

rd yiviq rcov TTpo^Xrjjjbdrojv KOivd rd KadoXov

KaraGKevaoTiKd koI dvaaKevaanKa' Set^avres"

yap on Travn vrrrdp^ei, Kal on nvl VTrdp^^i 8e-

5 8et;)^OTes" icropbeOa. opbOLWS 8e Kav on ovSevl

VTrdpx^L Set^ojfieVy Kal on ov iravrl VTrdp^eu 8e8et-

xdres iaofieOa. irpajrov ovv rrepl tojv KaOoXov

dvacrKevaanKcbv prjrdov 8kx re to KOLvd ctvai rd

Toiavra rrpos rd KadoXov Kal rd €7n piipovs, Kal

8ta TO jLtaAAov ra? Secret? KOfjill^eLV iv rco virapx^i'V

10 rj iLT], rovs 8e hiaXeyofxivovs dva(jK€vdt,eiv. eon

8e x^Xerrchrarov ro dvnGrpe<f)€iv rrjv drrd rod

ovix^e^iqKoros ot/cetav ovofjuaatav' rd ydp ttij Kal

fjuT) KadoXov €7Tt {jLovcov ivSex&rai rojv ovpL^e^iq-

Korcov. (XTTO jLtev ydp rod opov Kal rod lSlov Kal

rod yivovs dvayKalov dvnar p€<^€iv , olov el VTrdpx€i

16 nvl t,cpcx) rr€t,a) 8t7ro8t etvai, dvriGrpeipavn dXiqdes

eorrai Aeyetv on l^cpov 7T€t,6v StVouv eariv. opLoiios



I. Some problems are universal, others particular. Common- Examples of universal problems are " Every pleasure abou? is good," and " No pleasure is good"; examples of Predica- particular problems are "Some pleasure is good," of Acci- and " Some pleasure is not good." Universally dent. constructive and destructive methods are common un°verSl' to both kinds of problem ; for when we have shown and that some predicate belongs in all instances, we shall also have shown that it belongs in some particular instance, and, similarly, if we show that it does not belong in any instance, we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every instance. First, then, we must speak of universally destructive methods, because such methods are common both to universal and to particular problems and because people bring forward theses asserting the presence of a predicate rather than its absence, while those who are arguing against them seek to demolish them. It is very diffi- Peculiar cult to convert an appropriate appellation which is of^^robiems derived from an ' accident ' ; for only in the case of based on accidents can something be predicated conditionally and not universally. For conversion must necessarily be based on the definition and the property and the genus. For example, if " to be a biped pedestrian animal is an attribute of A," it will be true to say by conversion that " A is a biped pedestrian animal."



8e Kal OLTTo Tov yivovs' cl yap t,a)cp VTrdpx^L rivl etvai, t,(h6v eariv. rot 8' avra /cat eirl rod Ihiov el yap VTvapx^L nvl ypaixiiariKrjs SeKTCKO) etvat, ypafjLiMariKrjs SeKTiKov earai. ovhev yap tovtcov

20 ivhe)(eTaL Kara tl vrrapx^iv rj fxr] VTrapx^iv, a\X olttXws rj VTTapx^i'V rj [j.rj VTrapx^^v- €7rt 8e rcbv GVfJupe^TjKOTCov ovhkv Ka)Xv€L Kara tl VTrapx^LV, olov XevKOTTjra rj SiKaioavvrjv, ware ovk aTTOxprj TO Setfat on virapx^^ XevKorrjs rj hiKaioavvrj irpos TO Set^at on XevKos rj hiKaios eanv e;)^et yap

25 aji^LG^rjTrjaiv on Kara n XevKog ^ SiKaios eonv. axjT OVK avayKOiov errl rcbv ovfM^e^rjKorojv ro avnarpe^eiv.

AiopLoaoOaL 8e 8€t Kal ras dfiapnas rag iv rots' TTpo^XijfJiaGLV, on etcrt Strrat, rj rep ijfevheaBai rj Tip rrapa^aiveiv rrjv K€tp,€vrjv Xe^iv. 61 re yap

30 ifjevSojJbevoL Kal to p/rj vrrdpxov virapx^LV nvl Xe- yovres dp^apTavovui' Kal ol toZs aXXoTpiois ovd/xact TO, TTpdyjiaTa rrpooayopevovres y olov Trjv rrXdravov dvdpcjJTTOV, TTapapaivovGL Trjv Keujidvrjv 6vop,aaiav. II. Ets" jLtev hrj TOTTOS to eTrtjSAeVetv et to KaT

35 aAAov TLvd TpoTTov vndpxov d)S o-vfi^eprjKos (xtto- heSwKev. d/Aapraverat 8e pudXiGTa tovto Trept to, yevrj, olov et rts" Tip XevKO) <j>airj uvfJL^e^rjKevai XP^~ jLtart etvat* ov yap GvpuPe^rjKe Tcp XevKw xpc6- jLtart etvat, aAAa yevos avTov to xP^f^^ ioTiv. ivhex^Tai /Ltev ovv Kal Kara Trjv ovop^acrlav hiopioai 109 b TOV TidepuevoVy olov ort Gvp^^e^rjKe Tjj htKaLOGvvrj

" i.e. that colour is an accident of white.

TOPICA, II. i-ii

So too if the appellation is derived from genus ; for, if " to be an animal is an attribute of A," then " A is an animal." The same thing occurs in the case of a property ; if " to be receptive of grammar is an attribute of B," then " B will be receptive of grammar." For it is impossible for any of these attributes to belong or not belong in part only ; but they must belong or not belong absolutely. In the case of accidents, however, there is nothing to prevent an attribute belonging in part only {e.g., whiteness or justice), and so it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to show that he is white or just ; for it is possible to argue that he is only partly white or just. In the case of accidents, therefore, conversion is not necessarily possible.

We must also define the errors which occur in Two com- problems, which are of two kinds, being due either "^°" errors. to misrepresentation or to violation of the established use of language. Those who employ misrepresenta- tion and assert that a thing has some attribute which it has not, commit error ; while those who call things by names which do not belong to them {e.g., calling a plane-tree a man) violate the established nomen- clature.

II. One commonplace is to look whether your Various opponent has assigned as an accident something ^ng problem's which belongs in some other way. This mistake is »/ -^^cidew^. usually committed in respect of genera, for example, that what if someone should say that white happens to be a aSgned as colour " ; for white does not happen to be a colour, accident is but colour is its genus. Possibly, it is true, the man accident, who is making the statement may expressly define the attribute as an accident, saying, for example,



109 b

dperfj €ivaL' ttoXXolkl? Se Kal [jltj hiopiaavri Kard- S7]Xov on TO yevos (hs cru/xjSe^i^/co? cxTroSeScu/cev, olov el Tt,9 rrfv Aeu/coTT^ra Ke-)(^p6joBai (fyrjaeiev -^ 5 TT^v pdSiGLV KivelaOai. drr* ovhevos yap yevovs TTapcjvv^cog r) Karrjyopia Kara rod eiSovs Xeyerat, dXXd Trdvra Gvvcjjvvfxios rd yevq rtov etScuv Karrj- yopeXrai' Kal yap rouVo/xa Kal rov Xoyov iTnSe^^eraL Tcov yevcov rd clStj. 6 ovv K€')(pa}Gfi€vov etVas" to XevKov ovre Jjs yevos dTToSeSwKev, eTretSo^ irapoj- 10 vvixois ecprjKev, ovd^ co? lSlov t) co? opLOfiov 6 ydp opLOfjLos Kal TO ihiov ovSevl dXXo) virdp^^iy K€- ■)(pa)<jraL Se TToXXd Kal rcbv dXXwv, olov ^vXov Xldos dvdpiOTTOs IttttoS' StJAov ovv otl (hs Gvix^e^riKO? dTTohlSwaiV. "AAAo? TO iTn^Xerrecv olg V7Tdp-)(^eiv t) iraGiv r^

(JbTjSevl €Lp7]TaLy GK07T€LV §€ KTaT* etSr] Kal fjUTj €V

15 roZs dTveipoL?' 6h(x> ydp [idXXov Kal iv iXdrrocnv T) GKeifjL?. Set 8e OKOTreiv Kal dpx^adai diro rcov TTpojTCJV, etr' i(f>€^rjs eojg ru)V droficov, olov el rcov dvTLKeifjLevajv rrjv avrrjv eTnarrniiqv e(j)r]aev elvau, oKeirreov el rwv TTpos tl Kal tojv evavrlwv Kal rcov Kard crTepr^oiv Kal e^iv Kal tojv Kar dvricjya-

20 CTtv Xeyofjbivatv rj avrrj emcrrrjiJir)' Kav irrl rovrwv lJ,rjTra> (pavepov fj, ndXiv ravra hiaipereov p^^XP^

" The meaning of napcovv^cos is explained in Cat. 1 a 12 ff. : " Things are named ' derivatively ' which derive their name from something else, being given a different word-form, e.g., ' grammarian ' from ' grammar ' and ' courageous ' from ' courage.' " Cf. also Aesch. Eum. 8 to Ootj3->ys S' ovofi ex^t {sc. Ooi^os') TTapcovvfiov, 334


" Justice happens to be a virtue," but often, even if he does not so define it, it is obvious that he has assigned the genus as an accident, for example, if one were to say that " whiteness is coloured," or that " walking is motion." For a predicate taken from a genus is never applied to a species in a derived verbal form,'* but all genera are predicated un- equivocally of their species ; for the species take the name and the description of their genera. A man, therefore, who speaks of white as ' coloured ' has not assigned ' colour ' as a genus, since he has described it by a derived form of the word, nor as a property, nor as a definition ; for the definition and the property of a thing belong to nothing but that thing, whereas many other things are ' coloured,' for example, a piece of wood, a stone, a man or a horse. It is obvious, therefore, that he is assigning ' coloured ' as an accident.

Another commonplace rule is to examine instances (6) Exami- in which a predicate has been said to belong to all th?sub^ecta or none of a particular thing, and to look at them of predica- according to species and not in their infinite number ; for then the examination will be more methodical and in fewer stages. The examination must be carried on and begin from the primary classes and then go on step by step until further division is impossible. For example, if your opponent has said that " the knowledge of opposites is the same," you must examine whether the knowledge is the same of relative opposites and contraries and predicates based on the privation and presence of certain conditions, and of contradictory predicates. If the matter is not yet clear in the light of these, the process of division must be continued until the



109 b ^ , ,

TcDv arofjicov, olov ei rcov

rj rod SiTrXacjiov Kal rjfjilcreos, rj rvcfyXorr^Tos Kal 6ijj€cos, rj rod etvat Kal (jlt) elvac. iav yap eiri Tivos heL-)(dfj OTL ovx r) aurrj, dvrjprjKores iaofMeda

25 TO TTpo^Xiqiia- opLOLCDS Se Kal iav firjSevl VTrdpxrj. ovro? 8' d TOTTOS" dvrtcjTpe^et npog to dvaoKevdi^eLV Kal KaTaGK€vdi,€LV. idv yap eirl Trdvrcov (jyalvrjraL hiaipeoLV irpoeveyKaoiv t) irrl rnoWcjv, d^tcoreov Kal KadoXov TidevaL r) evoTaoiv cfyepecv iirl tlvos ov)( ovTWS' idv yap jU-T^Serepov TOVTa)V ttoltj, aTOTTOS </)avetTat piT] TiOels.

30 "AAAo? TO Xoyovg jroielv tov t€ ovpL^e^riKOTos Kal (L avpbp€^7]K€v, Tj a,/x<^OTe/3cav KaO* iKdrepov rj tov eTepov, etra GKOTreiv et rt /xt) dXrjdes iv rols Xoyois <hs dXr]des ctAr^Trrat. olov el €(ttl Oeov dSiKeXv, tL to dSt/cetv; el yap to ^Xdrrreiv iKovoicDs, hrjXov (hs ovK €GTi deov dhiKelaOai' ov yap ivSex€TaL

35 pXdTTTeaO at tov deov. Kal el (jyOovepos 6 crirovSaXos , TLS 6 (jyOovepos Kal tls 6 <j)96vos ; el yap 6 (j)d6vos iarl XyTTTj irrl (fiaLvopLevrj evrrpayia tcov imeiKcov TLVOs, SrjXov OTL 6 (JTTOvSaLOS OV (J)dovep6g' (f)avXo£ yap dv eiTy. Kal el 6 vepbearjriKos (j)9ovep6s, tls

110 a e/carepos" avTCJv; ovto) ydp /cara^aves" ecrrat

TTorepov dXrjdeg rj ifjevSos to p7]6ev, oTov el ^Oovepog fjuev 6 XvTTOvjJbevos iirl rat? tcov dyadwv evTrpayiais, 336


indivisible is reached, for example, until you see if it is true of " just and unjust actions," " the double and the half," " blindness and sight," or " being and not-being." For if it is shown in any instance that the knowledge is not the same, we shall have demolished the problem. Similarly, too, if the predicate does not belong in any instance. This commonplace is convertible both for destructive and for constructive purposes ; for if, after a long process of division, the predicate appears to apply in all or in numerous cases, we must claim that our opponent should admit its universal application or else bring forward an objection and show in what case it does not apply. If he does neither of these things, he will look foolish if he refuses to make the admission.

Another commonplace is to make definitions both (c) Defini- of the accident and of that to which it belongs, either accident of both separately or one of them, and then see if g^j^jg^t anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions. For example, to see if it is possible to wrong a god, you must ask, what does * wrong ' mean ? For if it means ' to harm wittingly,' it is obvious that it is impossible for a god to be wronged, for it is impossible for God to be harmed. Again, to see whether the good man is envious, you must ask, who is ' envious ' and what is * envy ' ? For if

  • envy ' is pain at the apparent prosperity of an

honest man, clearly the good man is not envious ; for then he would be a bad man. Again, to see whether the indignant man is envious, you must ask, what does each of these terms mean ? For thus it will be manifest whether the statement is true or false ; for example, if the man is ' envious ' who is pained at the prosperity of the good, and the



ve[JLeG7]TiKos o o Av7rov[X€Vos €Tn rats rwv KaKOJV evTrpaylaLSy SrjXov on ovk dv e'lrj (f)9ov€p6? 6 5 veybeoriTiKos . Aa/xjSaretv Se kol dvrl rcJov iv rots XoyoLS ovofJLOLTOJV X6yov9, Kal [jltj dc^ioraadai ecos dv els yvcxipLfjLov eXdrj- iroXXaKis ydp oXov ju-ev rod Xoyov diToSodevro? ovtto) SrjXov to t,r]Tovp,evov , dvrl 8e Tivos rcbv iv rw Xoyco ovopbdrcov Xoyov prjdevros KardSrjXov yiverai. 10 "Ert TO TTpo^Xriixa TrpoTaoiv iavTco iToiovpievov evtaTaodaL' rj ydp evGTaois ecrrat eTn')(eiprifxa rrpos


TO) iTTipXeTTetv ols vnapxeiv rj Trdaiv t) firjSevl e'lprjTaL' Sta^epet Se Ta> TpoTTcp. "Ert ^iopil,€odai TTola Set KoXeZv co? ol ttoXXoI

15 Kal TTola ov- XPV^H'^^ 7^9 ^<^^ TTpos to /cara- OKevdt,€iv Kal TTpos to dva(jK€vdl,€LV olov otl Tals p^ev ovop^aaiais ra Trpay/xara irpooayopevTeov Kaddirep ol ttoXXoi, TTola 8e twv Trpayp^drajv iarl TOiavTa T] ov TOtavTa, ovkItl TrpooreKTeov tols TToXXoiS. olov vyi€Lv6v jLtev prjTeov to ttolt^tlkov

20 vyieias, (hs ol ttoXXoI Xeyovotv noTepov 8e to


ol TToXXol kXtitIov dXX (I)s 6 laTpos.

III. "Ert idv TToXXaxoJS Xeynqrai, Ketp^evov Se rj (x)S VTrapx^L rj cos ov^ vnapxei, ddrepov SeiKvvvai

" i.e. the objection will enable you to examine the assertion dialectically. " Cf. 109 b 13.


TOPICA, II. ii-iii

indignant man is he who is pained at the prosperity of the wicked, it is obvious that the indignant man could not be envious. One ought also to substitute definitions for the terms used in the definitions and to go on doing this until some familiar term is reached. For often, though the whole definition has been given, the object of our search is not yet clear, but it becomes clear when a definition has been given in place of one of the terms in the definition.

Furthermore, one ought to turn the problem for (d) Change oneself into a proposition and then raise an objection probfem to it ; for an objection will be an argument against intoapro- a thesis." This commonplace rule is almost the same ^°^^ as examining instances in which a predicate has been said to belong to all or none of a particular thing,* but it differs in method.

Furthermore, you must define what kinds of things («) Deflni- should be called as the majority call them, and what vulgar de^^* should not ; for this is useful both for constructive nominations and destructive purposes. For instance, you ought admitted to lay it down that things ought to be described in rSe^te?^ the language used by the majority, but when it is asked what things are of certain kinds and what are not, you must no longer pay attention to the majority. For example, you must say, as do the majority, that

  • healthy ' is that which is productive of health ; but

when it is asked whether the subject under discussion is productive of health or not, you must no longer use the language of the majority, but that of the doctor.

III. Furthermore, if a term is used with more than Rules for one meaning and it has been stated that it belongs ^mHguUy!^ to or does not belong to something, we ought to («) if the



26 TOJV mrAeovaxo)? Aeyo/xevojv, eav iirj afJLcpco ev- Sex^jrau. xprjGreov 8' eTrl rcov Xavdavovrcxjv eav yap 1X7] XavddvY) iroXXaxaJS XeyojJievov, ivar'qaeraL on oi) SieiXeKTai onep avros rjTTopeL, dAAa 6d- repov. ovrog S* o roirog dvriGTpi(f)€i koI irpos TO KaraaKevdcraL Kal dvaaKevdaai. xraracr/ceuajetv

30 jLtev yap ^ovXopLevoL Set^o/x€v on Bdrepov vTrdp^eiy idv firj dixcfya) Svva)fJL€6a' dvacTKevdl^ovreg he on ovx vrrdp^ei Bdrepov Sei^ofiev, idv firj djJL(f)a) hvva)jjLeda. ttXtjv dvauKevd^ovn [xev ovhev Set e| opLoXoyias hiaXiyeadaiy ovr el Travrl ovr el lJb7]hevl VTrdpxetv etprjraL- idv yap hei^ajpLev on

86 ovx V'ndpx€i orcpovv, dvrjprjKore? ioojJbeBa to Travrl V7Tapx€LV, ofxoiois he Kav evl hel^cofjiev VTrdpxov, dvaipijaojJLev rd p/qhevl vvdpx^i'V. KaraGKevdt,ovGi he TTpohLOjJLoXoyrjreov on el orcoovv virdpx^i Travrl 110 b vrrdpx^i', dv TTidavov fj rd d^lajfjua. ov ydp dTTOxpr] TTpo? ro hel^aL on Travrl vrrdpx^^ to i(f)^ ivdg hiaXexB'ijvoLL, otov el 7] rod dvdpcoTTOv ^VXV ^^ctva- Tos", hion ^vxh '^dua dddvaro?, wore TrpoojJio- Xoyr]reov on el rjnaovv ipvx'r} dOdvaro?, Trdoa 6 dQdvaro? . rovro 8' ovk del TToirjreoVy aAA* orav pur] evTTopcjpLev kolvov eVt Trdvrayv eva Xoyov



demonstrate one of the several meanings if it is ambiguity impossible to demonstrate both. This method should escapesThe be used when the variety of meaning is unnoticed ; opponent, for, if it is noticed, the opponent will object that the meaning question which he himself raised has not been dis- ^^ycfur*^^ cussed, but the other meaning. This commonplace argument, is convertible for both constructive and destructive purposes. If we wish to argue constructively, we shall show that the attribute belongs in one of its senses, if we cannot show it belongs in both. For destructive criticism, we shall show that one of its senses does not belong, if we cannot show that both do not do so. In destructive criticism, however, there is no need to argue on the basis of an admission, either if the attribute is stated to belong universally or if it is stated not to belong to anything ; for if we show that there is anything whatsoever to which it does not belong, we shall have destroyed the assertion that it belongs universally, and, similarly, if we can show that it does belong in a single case, we shall demolish the assertion that it does not belong to anything. If, however, we are arguing construc- tively, we ought to obtain a preliminary admission that, if the attribute belongs to any one thing, it belongs universally, provided the claim is plausible. For it is not enough to argue in a single case in order to show that an attribute belongs universally — to argue, for example, that if the soul of man is im- mortal, then every soul is immortal. We must, therefore, obtain beforehand an admission that if any soul whatever is immortal, then every soul is immortal. This method must not be employed always, but only when we are not in a position to state a single argument which applies to all cases



llOb ^ ^

€L7r€LV, Kaddrrep 6 yeajfierpiq? on to rptyajvov

hvGLV opdals Luas e;^et.

'Eav 8e [jLTj XavOdvjj TToXXaxo^S Aeyo/xevov, SteAd- [Jbevov ooaxcj? Aeyerat, Kal dvaipetv Kal Kara-

10 aK€vdt,€LV. olov el to Seov earl ro C7ViX(f)€pov •J) TO KaXoVy TTeipariov dp.(f)OJ KaraGK€vdt,€LV r] dvaipeiv Trepl rod TrpoAcet/xeVou, olov on KaXov Kal GviJic/yepov, rj on ovre KaXov ovre oujit^epoF. idv 8e fjbTj ivSexrjrai dficliOTepa, Sdrepov Set/cTeov, iTTLGTjfjuaLvoiJievov on to /xev to 8' ov. 6 8' auTos"

15 Adyo? Koiv irXeioi rj els a hiaipelrai.

YldXiv ooa p,rj Kad^ ofJiCjovvpLiav Xeyerai ttoX- Xa)(OJ5, dXXd Kar dXXov rpoirov, olov einGTiqixy] jLtta TrAetdvojv -r) (hs rod reXovs Kal rod npos to reXog, olov larpiKi] rod vyieiav Troirjaai Kal rod

20 StatTTJoat, t) CO? ajU-^OTepwv reXojv, Kaddrrep rwv evavTLWV r] avrrj Xeyerai eTTLarrjfir] (ovSev yap jLtaAAov reXos to erepov tov eTepov), r] (hs tov KaO^ avTO Kal tov KaTa avfJL^e^rjKog, olov Kad^ avTo jjiev OTL to Tpiycovov hvulv opdals luas ^X^^> KaTa avjJL^e^TjKos 8c otl to loorrXevpov otl yap Gvpb^e^7]Ke TO) [TpiywvcpY looTrXevpco Tpiywvoj

25 elvai, Kara tovto yvcopl^opiev otl Svcrlv opOals Idas ^X^'" ^^' ^^^ iJir]Sa[jLa)S evhex^rai ttjv avTrjv etvai TrXeiovwv ertiGTrip.'qv, 8'^Aov OTt oAa>? ovk

^ Omitting Tpiyo)vu> with Buhle. 343


alike, as for example, when a geometrician states that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.

If there is no concealing the fact that a term has (b) if the a variety of meanings, you must distinguish all of fg'^i^'^ous, them and then proceed to demolish or confirm it. distinguish

„ 1 ./> 1 « . 1 , . 1 « T > the mean-

ly or example, it the right is the expedient oringsofthe

the ' honourable,' we must try to confirm or demolish ^ijj^th?^'^^ both of these terms as applied to the subject under argument, discussion, sho^ving that it is honourable and expe- dient, or that it is neither honourable nor expedi- ent. If it is impossible to show both, we must show one, indicating also that one is true and the other not true. The same argument also holds good when the meanings into which the term can be divided are more than two.

Again, there is the case of terms which are used in several senses not because they are equivocal but in some other way. Take, for example, " The science of many things is one " ; here the things in question may be the ends or the means to an end (e.g., medi- cine is the science of producing health and of diet), or they may be both of them ends, as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for one contrary is not more an end than the other), or they may be an essential and an accidental attribute — an example of the former being that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, of the latter that this is true of an equilateral triangle ; for we know that it is because the equilateral triangle happens to be a triangle that its angles are equal to two right angles. If, therefore, there is no sense in which it is possible for the science of many things to be the same, it is obvious that it is completely impossible that this can



110 b

ivSex^rai etvai, r) et ttcos" ivbexcraty SrjXov on

ivSex^rai. hiaipeludai 8e 6Ga-)(cx)s xPV^'^f^ov. olov iav ^ovXiOfjieOa KaraaKevdaai , ra roiavra TTpo-

30 oiareov ocra evSe^j^erat, /cat hiaiperiov €is ravra p,6vov Sua Koi ;!^pi7crt/xa Trpos" to KaracrKevdaai' dv 8' dvaGKevdaaiy ocra [jbrj ivhix^rai, rd Se Aoi- TTot TrapaXeiTTTeov . TTOcrjreov 8e (rovroy^ Kal inl Tovrcov, drav Xavddvrj 7TOGaxdj9 Xiyerai. /cat et- vat Se To8e Tovhe tj jjirj elvai €/c rcbv avrcjv tottcov

35 KaradKevaareov, olov iTTLGrrjiJLrjv ri^vhe rovSe tj ws reXovs tj d)s twv Trpos to tIXos "^ (hs rdv Kard ovix^e^TjKos , r] vraAtv fXT] elvai [rif' Kard fjirjhdva Tcjjv prjdevTCJV rpoTTCov. 6 8' avros Xoyos /cat ire pi imdvpLlaSy /cat ooa aAAa Xeyerau TrXeiovcov. eoTt

111 a ydp Tj eTTidvixia rovrov -r) d)S riXovs, olov vyieias,

7] (1)S Tcov TTpds TO TcAos", otov Tov (f)apiJiaK€v6rjvaL, Tj ws TOV Kard (JvjJi^e^rjKo?, Kaddrrep inl rov oivov 6 (faXoyXvKvs ov^ on olvos aAA' ort yXvKvg ianv. Kad* avro jjuev ydp rov yXvKeog iTnOvfJLeL, 5 rod 8' otVou Kard avjJUpelSrjKos' idv ydp avGTrjpos fj, ovKen i7ndv(X€L. Kard GVixp€p7]K6s ovv €77t-

6viM€L, p^pT^O-tjLtOS" 8' O TOTTOS OVTOS iv TOiS TTpOS

Tf Gx^^dv ydp rd roiavra rcov Trpos ri ionv.

IV. "ETt ro jLteTaAa/xjSavetv els rd yvoipifxcorepov

ovojLta, otov avTt rod aKpi^ovs €v VTroXt^i/jeL to

10 Ga(f)€S /cat avTt rrjs TToXvTrpayfJiOGVvrj? rrjv <^tAo-

TTpayfJLOGVvrjv yvojpLjJiOjrepov ydp yivopLevov rod

^ Adding tovto, Pacius renders, in his quoque hoc facien- dum est. 2 Omitting tl with C.

TOPICA, II. iii-iv

be so, or, if there is some sense in which it is possible, then it is obvious that it is possible. We must dis- tinguish as many senses as will serve our purpose. For example, if we wish to argue constructively, we must bring forward such meanings as are admissible and divide them only into those which are useful for constructive argument ; for destructive criticism, on the other hand, we must bring forward only such as are not admissible and omit the rest. This must also be done when the variety of meanings is unnoticed. The same commonplaces must also be used to confirm that one thing is, or is not, ' of ' another ; for example, that a particular science is 'of a particular thing, either as an end, or as a means to an end, or as an accidental circumstance, or, on the other hand, that it is not ' of ' it in any of the above ways. The same holds good of desire and any other terms which are said to be ' of ' more than one thing. For the desire of a particular thing may be the desire of it as an end {e.g., health), or as a means to an end (e.g., taking medicine), or as an accidental circumstance, as in the case of wine the man who likes sweet things desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet. For his essential desire is for what is sweet, and he only desires wine accidentally ; for, if it is dry, he no longer desires it, and so his desire is accidental. This commonplace is also useful in connexion with relative terms ; for cases of this kind generally have to do with relative terms.

IV. Moreover, there is the commonplace of sub- Various stituting for a term one that is more familiar, for ^"^ubsti- example, using ' clear ' instead of ' exact ' in speaking t^te ™ore of a conception, and ' meddlesomeness ' instead of less familiar ' officiousness.' For when the term is rendered more ^'^°^-



111 a ,

pr)BevTOS €V€7nx€Lpr]TOT€pa rj Oeatg. eari 8e /cat


KaraGKCvd^eiv Kal dvaGK€vdt,eiv .

VLpos he TO heZ^ai rdvavria rep avrco vndpxovra

15 oKOTTelv iirl rod yevovs, olov edv ^ovXcofjieda Set^at on ecrrt rrepl ataOrjoLV opdorrjg Kal dfiaprLa, ro 8' aluddveoOai Kpiveiv eori, Kpiveiv 8' eoriv opOcas Kal [JLT] 6p9cx)Sy Kal TTepl atodrjaLV dv etrj opdoTT]? Kal dfjiapTLa. vvv pbev ovv €k tov yevovs irepl ro ethos rj aTTohet^LS' ro yap Kpiveiv yevos rod alodd-

20vecr^af o yap aloOavofJievog Kplvet ttojs. rrdXiv 8' eK rod eihovs rw yevef ooa yap rep ethei VTrdp^ec, Kal rep yevet, olov el eoriv eTTLcrrrjiJir) (fyavXr] Kal GTTOvhaia, Kal hiddeais (f)avXri Kal orrovhaia' rj yap hidOeoi? rrjs iTTiorijixTjs yevos. 6 fiev ovv TTporepos r OTTOS ifjevh'qs eon TTpos ro KaraorKevdaat,

25 o 86 8ei;Tepos' dXrjSris. ov yap dvayKatov, oaa rw yevei vndpx^i, Kal ro) ethei VTrdpxeuv ^wov l-Lev ydp eon Trrr]v6v Kal rerpdrrovv, dvdpojTTOs 8' ov. oua he rw ethei vrrdpx^^, dvayKatov Kal roj yevei- el ydp eunv dvOpwiros OTTOvhaZos , Kal l,(h6v eon OTTovhalov. rrpos he ro dvaoKevdt^eiv 6 fxev

30 TTporepog dXr^OrjS, 6 he vorepos ipevh-qg- dcra ydp rw yevei ovx VTrdpx^i', ovhe rw ethei- doa he rw ethei [Jbrj vrrdpxei, ovk dvayKatov rw yevet fxr] vvdpxeiv.

'EttcI 8' dvayKatov, wv ro yevos Karrjyopetr at, 346


familiar, the thesis is more easily dealt with. This commonplace is common to both processes, the con- structive and the destructive.

In order to show that contrary attributes belong (b) To prove iji j^i- .11^ -J. T- the presence

to the same thmg, we must look at its genus, ror of con- example, if we wish to show that there is correctness ^{f-Ji^f' and error in perception, and it to perceive is to dis- the genus. tinguish and distinguishing can be correct or in- correct, then there can be correctness and error in perception also. Here, then, the proof starts from the genus and is concerned with the species, for

  • distinguishing ' is the genus of ' perceiving,' since

he who perceives is distinguishing in a certain way. On the other hand, the proof may start from the species and be concerned with the genus, for all attri- butes which belong to the species belong also to the genus. For instance, if there is good and bad know- ledge, then there also is good and bad disposition ; for disposition is the genus of knowledge. The former commonplace is fallacious for constructive argument, but the latter is true. For it is not necessary that all the attributes of the genus should also belong to the species ; for ' animal ' is winged and quadruped, but * man ' is not. But all the attributes which belong to the species, necessarily belong also to the genus ; for if ' man ' is good, then ' animal ' also is good. On the other hand, for destructive criticism, the former of these arguments is true, the latter fallacious ; for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either, while all those which fail to belong to the species do not necessarily fail to belong to the genus.

Since of all those things of which the genus is a note on predicated, one of its species must necessarily also specie^^^



111 a ^ ^

KaL Twv eioihv n KarrjyopeLGOai, Kal oaa e;j(^et to

35 yevog -^ Trapwvvixcos arro rod yevovs Xeyerai, Kal TWV etScov Tt dvayKOLOV ex^i'V rj Trapcovv [icog oltto Tivos TWV elSwv Xeyeadai [otov el' tivos eirioTrnir] KaTTjyopeLTaL, Kal ypafjLjjLaTLKTj rj fiovaiKr] 7} rcDv (xAAcov Tis iTTLUTrjfjiwv KaT7]yopr]dr}a€Tai, Kal et tl? Ill b e;^et i7Ti(TTT^p.7]v rj TrapwvvfJLWS oltto ttjs iinorTiQiJbrjg Aeyerat, Kal ypajJbiJiaTiKrjv e^et rj fjLovaiKrjv rj rtva TWV dXXwv eiTiGTiqpiwv 7) TrapwvvfJiwg amo twos avTwv prjdrjcreTai, otov ypajLt/xart/cos' rj jlovoikos), beav ovv tl TeOfj Aeyo/xevov airo tov yevovs ottwoovv, oiov Trjv i/jvx'rjv KLveXadai, gkottcIv el Kara tl twv elBwv Tcov Trjs Kivrjaews evhex^-'^-ai t-yjv ^vx^v Kiveiadaiy otov au^ea^at rj (fidelpeaOaL rj yiveoOai rj oaa aAAa Kivrjoews eihrj' el yap KaTa jJirjSev, SrjXov OTL ov Actvetrat. euros' S' o tottos kolvos TTpog dfjicfyw, rrpos re to dvaGKevdl^eiv Kal KaTaaKev- 10 d^etv el yap KaTa tl rtuv elSwv KLvelTat, SrjXov OTL KLveiTaiy Kal el KaTa pbrjhev twv elSwv KivelTai,


Mt7 evTTopovvTL he errLx^LprjjxaTos rrpos Trjv OeoLV,


KeLjjbevov TTpdyjiaTos rj roJv Sokovvtwv, Kal el^ 15 jirj d<f)^ evos aAA' cxtto TrXeLovwv. paov yap opLoa-

^ Reading, with B, /cai et : Kav ei P : koX Bekker. 348


be predicated, and since all those things which possess that genus, or derive their description from that genus, must also possess one of its species or derive their description from one of its species — for example, if knowledge is predicated of someone, then grammatical knowledge or musical knowledge or one of the other kinds of knowledge will be predicated of him, and if a man possesses knowledge or if the description which he has is derived from his knowledge, then he will also possess grammatical knowledge or musical knowledge, or one of the other kinds of knowledge, or will derive his description from one of them, being called, for example, a ' grammarian ' or a ' musician ' — then, if a state- ment is made which is derived in any way from the genus (for example, that the soul is in motion), you must examine whether it is possible for the soul to be in motion according to any of the species of motion, for example, whether it can increase or decay or come into being or move in any of the other species of motion ; for if it cannot move in accordance with any of them, obviously it is not in motion. This commonplace is common to both processes, the destructive and the constructive ; for if it moves according to one of the species of motion, obviously it is in motion, and if it does not move in accordance with any of them, obviously it is not in motion.

If you have not a supply of material for arguing (c) Obtain against the thesis, you should look for arguments SarcdSng^ taken from the real or generally accepted definitions the deflni- of the subject under discussion, and if you cannot subject. argue from one, you must argue from several. For it is easier to attack the subject when you have



111 b , » ^ ./

IJb€voL9 €7nx^ipeLV karai' npog yap rov? opiapiovs

paov 7] i7nx^Lpr]GL?.

S/coTrctv 8€ CTTt rod TrpoKetfjidvov, rivos ovros to

TTpoKelpLevov eoTLV, 7] Ti ecrrtv e^ dvdyKrjg el to

TTpoKelfxevov eo-rt, KaTaoK€vdl,eiv p,€v ^ovXojjueva),

20 TLVos ovTOs TO TTpoKeipLevov €GTai {ioLV ydp Ikclvo SeLxdfj vrrdpxovy Kal to TTpoKeipLevov SeheiyjJbivov ecrrat), dvaaKevd^eiv 8e fiovXopiivcp, tl €gtlv el TO TrpoKeiixevov eoTiv idv ydp Sel^wfjiev to a/co- Xovdov Tw TTpoKeifxevcx} fiTj ov, dvTjpT^KOTes eGOfieda TO TTpoKeifJievov.

"Ert €77t Tov xpovov im^XeTTetv, et rrov SiacfycjoveL,

25 otov el TO Tpe(l)6fjLevov e(f)rj(jev e^ dvdyKrjs au^ea^af TpecfyeTai /xev ydp del to. ^wa, au^crat S' ovk del. ojJLolios 8e KOL el to eTTiOTaodai e<j)rjGe fiefjivrjodaL' TO jjiev ydp tov TrapeXrjXvOoTos XP^^^^ ecTTL, to Se Kal tov TTapovTos Kal tov jjueXXovTo?. irrLGTaG-

30 doLi fjiev ydp Xeyo/jueda ra rrapovTa Kal ra /xeAAovra, otov on eGTai c/cActe/ftS", fjbvrjpLOveveLv 8* ovk ivSe-

\;eTat aAA' rj to rrapeXiqXvdos .

V. "Ert o GO(j)iGTLKds TpoTTos, TO dyetv el? tol- ovTov TTpds o evTTopiqGop.ev eTTix^ipripidTOJV . tovto 8* €GTaL OTe jxev dvayKalov, oTe 8e ^atvd/xcvov

35 dvayKaiov, OTe 8' ovTe (^aivofjuevov ovt dvayKalov. dvayKalov /xev ouv, otov dpvr]Gaixevov tov diro- KpLvafxevov t<x)V rrpos ttjv OeGiv tl xPV^^P'^^ Trpo? tovto tov? Xoyov? TTOLrJTai, Tvyxdvrj 8e tovto twv 350

TOPICA, II. iv-v

made definitions ; for the attack is easier when it

is aimed at definitions.

You must examine as regards the subject in hand (^) ^^^J^^^'"

what it is on the existence of which the existence of existence of

the subject depends, or what necessarily exists if the ^epl^ds^^*^

subject exists. For constructive purposes, you must

examine what it is on the existence of which the

existence of the subject will depend (for if the former

has been shown to exist, the subject will have been

shown to exist) ; for destructive purposes, we must

examine what exists if the subject exists ; for if we

show that what is consequent upon the subject does

not exist, then we shall have demolished the subject.

Furthermore, you must look into the question of («) The fac- .. J .r T 1 tor of time

time and see it any discrepancy occurs anywhere, must be

for example, if your opponent has said that that considered. which is nourished necessarily grov/s ; for animals are always being nourished but are not always grow- ing. Similarly too, if he has said that knowledge is recollection ; for the latter is of the past, the former also of the present and the future. For we are said to know things present and things future (for example, that there will be an eclipse), but it is impossible to remember anything except the past.

V. Furthermore, there is the sophistic method, by Rules far ex- which we lead an opponent into the sort of assertion nrvument ; affainst which we shall have a supply of arguments. (*) !^}^S

TU.- J- x -n u X- ^x xi, sophistic

Ihis expedient will be sometimes necessary, at others method can it will only appear necessary, at others it neither is iSiSg Jn^ nor appears necessary. It is necessary when, after an opponent the answerer has denied some point that is useful for assertion " employment against the thesis, the questioner directs easily be^ his remarks to the support of this point and it happens refuted. to be one of the kind about which it is possible to



roiovTOJV ov TTpos o evTTOpeiv eariv emx^LprjfjiaTCOv. 112 a ojjboLCJog 8e Kal orav eTraycDyrji' npos n Sta rod Keifxivov TToirjadiJbevos dvaipetv €7n)(eipfi' rovrov yap dvaipeOevTog Kal to 7TpoK€i[JLevov dvaipeZrai. (jyaivofxevov 8' dvayKaiov, orav (f>aivr]Tai fiev XprjoLfJiov Kal oiKeiov rrjs decreet)?, /xt) tJ Se, irpos 6 o yiyvovrai ol Aoyot, etre dpvrjaafiivov rod rov Xoyov vrrexovros, etre eTrayajyrjs evSo^ov Sid rrj? deaeojg Trpo? avro yevopievr]?^ dvaipelv eTTLxeipoLT] avro. ro Se Xolttov, orav /xt^t' dvayKaiov fj jji'^re (f)aLv6iJLevov rrpos o yivovrai ol Aoyot, dWcog §€ TTape^eXeyx'^fyQo.i avfju^acvrj roj dTTOKpLVOfJuevcp. Set

TO 8* evXa^elcrdaL rov eaxcuTov rcov prjOevnov rporrojv 7TavreXa)s yap d7Tr]prr]iJLevo5 Kal dXXorpiog eoiKev elvai rrjs StaXeKriKrjs. hid Set Kal rov dTTOKpivo- fjuevov fjurj SvGKoXaiveiv, dXXd rtdevai rd [ir] XPV~ Gifjua TTpos rrjv Oeatv, emcriqpiaivopievov doa pur) SoKel, ri6r]oi 8e. fiaXXov ydp drropeiv cos" eTrl rd

15 TToXij GvpL^auveu rols epcorayai rrdvratv rtOepbevwv avrdls rchv roiovrcov, idv [xr] Trepalvcooiv.

"Ert TTas" o eip7]Kdjs dnovv rporrov rivd iroXXd etpTjKev, eTTeiSr] TrXeloj eKaorcp e^ dvdyKT]? dKo- Xovdd eariv, otov d elprjKOj? dvOpojirov etvaL Kal on t,cpdv euriv e'ipiqKe Kal on efjbijjvxov Kal on Slttovv Kal on vov Kal emorriprqs SeKnKov, uiore

20 OTToiovovv ivo? Tcov dKoXovOoiV dvaupedevros dv-

^ Reading yevofievTjs with C : ytvojxfVTjs Bekker. 352



have a supply of arguments. It is in like manner necessary also when the questioner, having reached a certain point through induction by means of the view which his opponent has set forth, then attempts to demohsh that point ; for, if this has been de- molished, the view originally set forth is also demolished. It appears necessary, when the point towards which the discussion is tending, appears to be useful and germane to the thesis but is not really so, either when the man who is sustaining an argument has denied the point or if the questioner has reached the point by plausible induction based on the thesis, and then attempts to demolish it. The other case is when the point to which the discussion is tending neither is necessary nor appears to be necessary, and it is the answerer's fate to be defeated on some irrelevant point. We must be on our guard against the last of the above-mentioned methods ; for it seems to be completely divorced from and alien to dialectic. Therefore, also, the answerer must not show bad temper but admit such points as cannot usefully be urged against the thesis, indicating anything which he admits though he does not approve of it. For questioners usually only become involved in greater difficulty, when all such admissions are made, if they cannot reach a conclusion.

Furthermore, a man who has made an assertion of (b) An as- any kind whatsoever, has in a w^ay made a number be'^^^gmo-*" of assertions, because each assertion necessarily in- lished, ifa volves a number of consequences. For example, he of^t^can b? who has said that "X is a man," has also said subverted. that X is an animal and a biped and is animate and is receptive of reason and knowledge ; so that, if any single one of these consequences is demolished,

N 353


112 a

aLpelraL Kal to iv apxfj- evXa^etadaL he XP'^ '<^oit TO ;;^aAe7T60Tej0ou rrjv fjberdXrjipiv TroLeXadai' ivlore fxev yap paov to aKoXovdov aveXelv, ivtore 8' auTo TO TTpoKetpbevov.

VI. "00-01? 8' oLvdyKT] ddrepov fiovov VTrdpxeiv,

25 otov rep dvdpo)7T<jp rrjv vooov r] rr^v vyUiav, idv

rrpos ddrepov eviropchp^ev SiaXeyeadac on VTrdp^ei

rj OVX VTrdpX^l', Kal TrpOS to XoLTTOV €V7TOpT]GO[JL€V.

rovro 8' dvTLGTpe(j)ei irpos apbcfyco' hei^avres fJiev yap on VTrdpx^c ddrepov, on ovx VTrdpx^i ro XoLTTOv heheixores eaopieOa' edv 8' on ovx ^'^dpx^L 30 Sel^ajfjieVy ro Xolttov on vTrdpx^t SeSeuxores eao- fieda. SijXov ovv on rrpos dpu^co ;YP7yo'tjU,os" o


Eti to e7nx€LpeLV piera(j>epovra rovvofia irrl rov

XoyoVy (1)S pudXiora TTpoarJKov eKXajx^dveiv r) ws

KeZrai rovvofjia, otov evifjvxov jir] rov dvhpeiov,

35 KaddTrep vvv Kelrai, dXXd rov ev rrjv ifjvx'rjv exovra,

KaOdirep Kal eveXiriv rov dyadd eXrrit^ovra' opLoiwg

he Kal evhatjjLOva, ov dv 6 haipaov fj oTrovSaios,

KaOdirep "EevoKpdrrjs <l>r]olv evhatfjiova etvai rov

rrjv ifjvxrjv exovra OTTovhaiav ravrrjv yap eKdorov

etvai SaLfjbova.

112 b *E7ret 8e rcov Trpaypidrajv rd [juev e^ dvdyKrj^

iarl, rd 8' cog iirl ro ttoXv, rd 8' oirorep ervx^v,

edv rd e^ dvdyKiqs o)? eirl ro ttoXv redfj rj ro cos"

eTTL ro TToXv e^ dvdyKTjs, ^ avro rj ro evavriov rep

5 (hs errl rd ttoXv, del hlhojcn roirov eTrix^iprnjiaro? .

" As well as one who inspires hope, cf. the English ' young hopeful.'

^ As well as in the meaning of ' possessed of a good fortune ' in the sense of wealth. " Frag. 81 (Heinze).


TOPICA, II. v-vi

the original assertion is also demolished. But we must be on our guard against changing the assertion into something more difficult ; for sometimes the consequential assertion, and sometimes the pro- position itself, is the easier to demolish.

VI. Where of necessity only one of two predicates Various oh- must be true (for example, a man must have either (^7 Where disease or health), if we have a supply of material for ^iiiy oue of arguing with regard to one of them that it is present cates can be or not, we shall have a supply of material also regard- ^^g^' J^ ^r-

inff the other. This rule is convertible for both pur- gue about n T x^ 1 ,-t , • . the other.

poses ; tor it we have shown that one is present, we

shall have shown that the other is not present ; if we

have shown that one is not present, we shall have

shown that the other is present. It is obvious,

therefore, that this commonplace is useful for both


Another method of attack is to refer back a term (6) It can to its original meaning on the ground that it is more thatThe^ fitting to take it in this sense than in that now original established. For example, * stout-souled ' can be a word used to mean not * courageous,' which is its estab- p^gj^^jj^^^ Hshed meaning, but it can be applied to a man its current whose soul is in a good condition ; as also the term ™®^""^s- ' hopeful ' can mean a man who hopes for good things " ; and similarly ' fortunate ' can be used of one whose fortune is good,^ as Xenocrates ^ says " Fortunate is he who has a noble soul " ; for his soul is each man's fortune.

Seeing that some things happen of necessity, (c) The others usually, others as chance dictates, the assertion notloe ^ ^ that a necessary occurrence is a usual occurrence or ^^p/"^^^"^^^ that a usual occurrence (or the contrary oi a usual necessary occurrence) is a necessary occurrence, always gives ^ersa!^^



112 b

€av yap to ef dvdyK7]g cLs iirl ro ttoXv reOfj, hrjXov

on ov rravTi (f)rjOLV V7Tdp')(^Eiv , VTrdpxovro? vavri, a)GT€ rip,dpry]K€v el re to (hs €ttI to ttoXv Aeyo- jjuevov ef dvdyK7]s e^T^ae- Travrl ydp (j)7](jLV vtt- dp-)(€.iv, ovx VTTdpxpvros Travri. ojioicos 8e koL el 10 TO evavriov rw dts eirl to ttoXv i^ dvdyKYj? e'iprjKev' del ydp ctt' eXaTTOv XeyeTai to evavTiov Tcp co?

€7rt TO TToXv, otoV €L (1)9 €771 TO TToXv cf)avXoL ol

dvdpajTTOL, dyaOol kit* eXaTTOVy ojot eVt [xdXXov rj[JbdpTr]K€v, el dyadovg i^ dvdyK'qs eLpr]K€v. wo- avTCJS Se Kal el to oTTOTep* eTvy^ev e^ dvdyKYjg

15 e^7]Gev ri (hs eirl to ttoXv- ovTe ydp e^ dvdyKrjs TO oTTOTep* eTVx^v ovd^ (1)9 €7rt TO TToXv. ivSe-

^eTat §€, Kav fxr] Stoptaas" eLTrrj rroTepov (h< s eirl

TO TToXv ri e^ dvdyK7]s eiprjKev, fj he to irpdyfjia ws eTTL TO TToXvy hiaXeyeoBai (hs i^ dvdyKrjs elpi]- KOTos avTOV, olov el <j)avXovs tovs diroKXripovs

20 e<f)7]oev elvaL jjirj SiopLoas, (1)9 e^ dvdyKrjg elprjKo- T09 avTOV SiaXeyeaOai.

"Eti Kal el avTO avTco ovii^e^riKog edrjKev c6? eTepov 8ta to eTepov elvai 6Voju.a, Kaddirep Ilpo- St/co? birjpelTo to,? rjSovdg ^Ig x^P^^ '^^ '^kpijjLV Kal evcjipocnjvrjv Taxha ydp TrdvTa tov avTOV TrJ9

25 r)SovrJ9 ovo jLtaTci eoTLV. el ovv tl9 to ;^atpetv tco ev(f)paLveadat (fy^qoei GvpL^e^rjKevai, avTo dv avTio cf>al7] (JVfJipeprjKevaL. 356


an occasion for attack. For if a necessary occurrence is asserted to We a usual occurrence, it is obvious that the man who makes the assertion is stating that a universal attribute is not universal, and there- fore he is in error ; and the same is true if he has stated that a usual attribute is necessary, for he has stated that it belongs universally when it does not do so. Similarly, if he has asserted that the contrary of what is usual is necessary ; for the contrary of a usual attribute is always rather rarely predicated. For example, if men are usually bad, they are rather rarely good, so that he has committed an even greater error if he has said that they are necessarily good. In like manner also, if he has declared that a chance occurrence happens necessarily or usually ; for a chance occurrence does not happen either necessarily or usually. Even if he has made his assertion without distinguishing whether it is a usual or a necessary occurrence, and as a matter of fact it is a usual occurrence, it is possible to argue as though he meant that it was a necessary occurrence. For instance, if he has said that disinherited persons are bad, without making any distinction, you can argue as though he has said that they were necessarily bad.

Furthermore, you must see whether your opponent (d) Terms lias stated something as an accidental attribute of oniyiomi- itself, takinff it as something different because it "»i^y ^^^^'^" bears a different name, just as Prodicus divided not be pleasure into joy, delight and merriment ; for these |^^5.ente of are all names for the same thing, namely pleasure, one another. If, therefore, anyone shall assert that joy is an accidental attribute of merriment, he would be saying that it is an accidental attribute of itself.




112 b

VII. 'ETTet Se ra ivavria cruaTrAe/cerat jLcev

aAATJAots" i^a^co?, ivavTLCoaiv Se TToieZ rerpaxoJS avfj^TrXeKOfjieva, Set Xafi^dveiv ra ivavria, ottojs

30 av ^^priGifiov fj Kal avaipovvri Kal KaraorKevdl^ovri. on jjuev ovv i^axoJS crUjUTrAeVeTat, SrjXov tj yap eKarepov rojv ivavrlwv eKarepcp crvfJi,7rXaKrj(j€raL' TOVTO he Sixoj?, olov TO Tovs ^tAous" €V TTOielv Kal TO Tovs ixdpov? KaKojs, rj dvoLTraXiv to tov9 (fiiXov? KaKcog Kal rovs ix^povs ev. rj orav dijucfya) rrepl rod

35 evos' hix^S Se Kal rovro, olov to tou? (f)LXovs

€V Kal TO TOU? (f)LXoV9 KaKWS , Tj TO TOV9 IxBpOVS

€v Kal Tovs exdpovs KaKcos. r) to ev ire pi dp,<j)o- Tepojv 8lxoj9 Se Kal tovto, olov to tovs cf)iXov? ev Kal TO Tov? exOpovs ev, tj tovs (fylXovs KaKcos Kal TOVS exdpovs KaKojs.

113 a At fjiev OVV Trpcx)Tai hvo prjSelGai uvpbrrXoKal ov

TTOiovGLV evavTiojoiv TO yap tovs (J)lXovs ev iroielv TO) TOVS ix^povs KaKcbs ovK eoTiv evavTiov dpi^o- Tepa yap alperd Kal tov avTov yjdovs. ovSe to TOVS (f)iXovs KaKws TO) Tous" ixOpovs ev' Kal yap

5 TavTa dp^cfiorepa (j^evKTa Kal tov avTOV rjdovs. ov hoKel Se (^evKTov (fyevKTw evavTuov elvai, idv pbTj TO /xev Kad^ VTTep^oXrjV to Se KaT^ ev^iav Xeyopuevov fj- rj t€ yap virep^oXr] tcov cbevKTOJV hoKei elvai, opLolojs Se Kal rj eVSeta. to, Se AotTia TrdvTa TeTTapa TToiei ivavTiMOLV. to yap tovs

10 (f^iXovs ev TTOieXv tco tovs ^iXovs KaKcbs evavTiov 358


VII. Seeing that contraries may be combined with one another in six ways, and four of these com- Rules drawn binations make a contrariety, we must avail our- {ro^iesT' selves of contraries in whatever way may be useful («) since both for destructive and for constructive purposes, position That there are six kinds of combination is obvious ; ^verai^con- for either (a) each of the contrary verbs will be trades, the combined with each of the contrary objects, and this table must in two ways, for example, "to do good to friends be selected. and to do harm to enemies," or, conversely, " to do harm to friends and to do good to enemies " ; or (6) both verbs may be used with one object, and this also in two ways, for example, "to do good to friends and to do harm to friends," or, " to do good to enemies and to do harm to enemies " ; or (c) one verb may be used with both objects, and this also in two ways, for example, "to do good to friends and to do good to enemies," or, " to do harm to friends and to do harm to enemies."

The first two of the above combinations do not form a contrariet}^ for "to do good to friends " is not the contrary of " to do harm to enemies " ; for both these actions are objects of choice and belong to the same character. Nor is "to do harm to friends " the contrary of " to do good to enemies " ; for both these actions are objects of avoidance and belong to the same character, and one object of avoidance is not generally regarded as the contrary of another object of avoidance, unless the one is used to denote excess and the other defect ; for excess is generally regarded as an object of avoi- dance, and so likewise also is defect. But all the other four combinations form a contrariety ; for " to do good to friends " is the contrary of " to do harm




113 a

drro T€ yap ivavrlov rjdov? eoriy kol to jU-ev alperov

TO Se (fyevKTOV. dxjavrcos Se kol irrl roav dXXojv Kad^ eKaorriv yap ovt^vyiav to /xev atperov to 8e cfyevKTOv, /cat to fjuev imeLKovs TJdovs to Se cfyavXov. hrjXov ovv €K T(x)V €lpr]jJi€V(x)v OTL TO) avTcp irXeiova 15 ivavTLa (jvjx^aivei yiveaBai. tco yap tovs (jyiXovs

€V TTOielv Kal TO TOV9 €xOpOV9 €V 7TOL€LV ivaVTtOV Kal TO TOVS (ffiXoVS KaKOJS. SfJLolcJS Se Kal TCJV

aAAcov eKOLGTCp Tov avTov TpoTTOv eincTKOTTovGi Suo TO, ivavTia cfiavrjoeTaL . XapL^dveiv ovv twv €vavTia)v OTTOTepov dv fj TTpog TTjv deoiv ■)(^pr)(npLOV .

20 "Eti el eoTi Tt evavTiov tco orvfJb^e^rjKOTt, oKOTreiv

el vnapx^L coTrep to (JVfjL^epTjKos e'iprjTai virapxeiv

el yap tovto vrrapx^t, CKelvo ovk dv VTrdpxoi'

dSvvaTOV yap Tdvavria dfia tco avTco vTrapx^^y-

    • H el Tt TOLovTov eiprjTai KaTa tivos, ov ovtos

25 dvdyKT] Ta cvavTta vvdpx^i'V- olov el to,? tSea? ev rjpXv ecf)r](Tev etvaf KivelaOai Te yap Kal ripepLeiv auTo.? crvfjL^T^ueTat, eTi he aladrjTas Kal vor^Tag elvai. hoKovoL yap at ISeai ■7]p€/xetv Kal vorjTal etvai TOis TiOefjievoLg ISeas elvai, ev '^[ilv 8e ovoas dhvvaTOV dKiVTjTOV? elvai' Ktvovfxevcov yap rjpLOJv

30 dvayKaXov Kal to, ev 'qjjuv rrdvTa ovyKiveZoBai.

hrJiXov S' oTt Kal alodrjTaL, etrrep ev tjijlXv elcrl' 8ta

" iSe'ai seem to be used here in the Platonic sense. 360


to friends," for they proceed from contrary char- acters, and one is an object of choice and the other of avoidance. Similarly, also, with the other com- binations ; for in each pair one is an object of choice, the other of avoidance ; one always belongs to a good character, the other to a bad. It is obvious, therefore, from what has been said that the same thing has in fact more than one contrary. For " to do good to friends " has as its contrary both " to do good to enemies " and "to do harm to friends." In like manner, if we examine them in the same way, it will be apparent that the contraries of each of the others are two in number. We must, there- fore, take whichever of the two contraries is useful for dealing with the thesis.

Furthermore, if the accident of anything has a (b) The contrary, you must examine whether it belongs to the Sfdent that to which the accident has been said to belong, of anything For, if the former belongs, the latter cannot belong ; predicated for it is impossible for two contraries to belong to the ?[.^^^ ^^.^^

. J^ - c? thing as IS

same thing at the same time. the acci-

Again, you should see if anything has been said ^^^^' regarding something, such that, if it exists, contrary wliichcan^ predicates must of necessity belong to the thing, for '^^^ed^^f example, if your opponent has said that " ideas " thing must exist in us." For, if so, it will follow that they are contrary both in motion and at rest, and, further, that they predicates. are objects both of sensation and of thought. For ideas are considered, by those who assert their exist- ence, to be both at rest and objects of thought, but if they exist in us it is impossible for them to be unmoved ; for, when we move, everything that is in us must of necessity also move with us. Obviously, also, they are objects of sensation, if indeed they



113 a

yap ttJs" vrept tt^f oiJjlv alaO'^aeajs rrjv iv iKaoro) IJiop(f)r)V yvcopt^o/xeF.

IlaAtv €t /cetrat avix^e^riKos w eori ri ivavrloVy

(TK07T€LV €1 Kal TOV ivaVTLOV heKTLKOV, 07T€p Kal

35 rod GVfji^ePr] KOTOS- to yap avTO rcov ivavTtcov SeKTLKov, olov €1 TO fjuLGOs €7T€(j9ai opyfj €(f)rjGev, 113 b €L7] av TO fjuGos €v TO) OvpLoeLSel- iK€L yoLp Yj opyt]. GKeiTTeov ovv el Kal to ivavTuov iv tw ^u/xoet8et, Tj (fyiXla- el yap pnQy dAA' ev tw emdviJbrjTLKa) ioTLV 7) </>tAta, ovK av eTTOiTO pXoos opyfj. 6p.oLOjg Se Kal el TO eTndvfJbrjTLKov dyvoelv e(f)r](Tev. etr) yap 5 av Kal eTTiGTiqyLris Se/crt/cov, elrrep Kal ayvolas' orrep ov hoKel, to eTridvjJirjTiKov SeKTiKov etvai eTTiGTrjiLTis . avaGKevdl^ovTi jjiev ovv, KaQdirep eiprj- rat, ;^jOi7(TT€ov KaTaGKevdl,ovTi Se, ort puev VTrdp')(^ei TO Gvp.^ep'qKOS, ov XPW^H'^^ ^ tottos, otl 8' ivSex^Tai vndpx^i'V, XPV^H'^^- Set^^avre? jJiev yap

10 OTL ov SeKTLKov Tov ivavTiov, heSeixoTeg eGOfxeQa OTL ovTe vrrdpx^L to GVfJi^e^rjKos ovt evSex^TaL vndp^aL' idv 8e Set^cojLtev otl VTrdpx^f^ to ivavTLov 7] OTL SeKTLKov TOV evovTLOv eGTiv, ovSeTTw 8e- heLxoTe? eaofjueda otl Kal to Gvpi^e^iqKos VTrdpx^L, dAA' OTL evSex^TaL VTrdpx^i'V, errl togovtov fjiovov SeSeLyfJLevov eWat.

15 VIII. 'ETret 8' at dvTLdeGeLS TeTTapes, GKonelv eK fjLev Toiv avrt^daccuv dvdnaXLV eK Trjg d/coAou- QiqGews Kal dvaLpovvTL Kal KaTaGKevdl,ovTL, Aa/x-


TOPICA, II. vii-viii

exist in us ; for it is through the sensation connected with sight that we recognize the form which is in each thing.

Again, if an accident which has a contrary is (cf) That asserted, you must look whether what admits of the ^its o^an accident admits also of its contrary ; for the same accident thing admits of contraries. For example, if your of its opponent has said that hatred follows anger, then ^^'^^^^^y- hatred would be in the spirited faculty ; for anger is in that faculty. You must, therefore, look whether its contrary, namely friendship, is also in the spirited faculty ; for if it is not there but in the appetitive faculty, then hatred cannot follow anger. Similarly, too, if he has declared that the appetitive faculty is ignorant ; for if it were capable of ignorance, it would also be capable of knowledge, and it is not a generally accepted opinion that the appetitive faculty is capable of knowledge. This method, as has been said, should be used in destructive criticism ; but for constructive purposes the commonplace is of no use for proving that an accident belongs, though it is useful for proving that it may possibly belong. For, when we have shown that something does not admit of the contrary, we shall have shown that the accident neither belongs nor can possibly do so ; but if we show that the contrary belongs or that the subject admits of the contrary, we shall not yet have shown that the accident actually belongs, but we shall only have gone as far as to show that it may possibly belong.

VIII. Since there are four kinds of opposition, you Rules based must see whether arguments can be derived from uMs^orS- the contradictories, taking them in reverse order, vosition ; for both destructive and constructive purposes, and kinds of



113 b

^dv€LV S* i^ iTTaycoyrjs , otov el 6 dvdpcorrog ^(Sov,

TO jJUT] ^cpov ovK dvB pooTTos . ofjiOLa)? 8e Kal irrl

Tctjv dX\ojv. ivravda ydp dvoLTraXiv rj dKoXovOrjaiS'

20 Tip puev ydp dvBpwTTCp ro t,a>ov erreraiy ro) 8e fjurj

dvOpcoTTCp TO jLtr) l,wov ov, dAA' dvaTTaXiv rw firj


ovrov d^LCoreov, olov el to KaXov rjSv, kol to [xtj TjSv ov KoXov el he pur] tovto, ovS^ eKelvo. opioicDS

25 Se Koi el TO pur) r]Sv ov KaXov, to KaXov rjhv. Srj- Xov OVV OTL TTpog dpicfxx) dvTL(JTpe(f)eL 7) Kara ttjv dvTL(l)a(jLV aKoXovdrjois avdiraXiv yivopbevr).

'EttI Se TcDv ivavTiOJV OKorrelv el tco evavTicp to evavTiov eVerat, t) eirl raura r] avdiraXiV, Kal dvaipovuTL Koi KaTaGKevdt,ovTi' Xapu^dveiv 8e Kal

30 TO, ToiavTa e^ eTTayojyijs , icf)^ ocrov xPV^^H^ov. eirl TavTd puev ovv rj dKoXovdr]GL? , olov ttj dvSpia Kal TTJ SetAta- Tjj puev ydp dpeTT] aKoXovOel, ttj he KaKLa, Kal tjj p,ev aKoXovdel to alpeTov, ttj he to (fyevKTov. CTTt TavTd ovv Kal rj tovtojv aKoXovdrjuis' evavTiov ydp to alpeTov Tcp cfyevKTco. opLolcos he

35 Kol €771 Tcov dXXcov. dvaTTaXiV he rj aKoXovdrjais , olov eve^ia puev rj vyUta dKoXovdet, Ka^e^la he vooos ov, dXXd vouip Ka^e^ia. hriXov ovv ort

114 a amTTaAtv eirl tovtojv t] aKoXovOrjoi?. OTrdviov he

TO dvarraXiv enl tcov evavTicnv ovpu^alvei, dXXd TOLS TrXeioTois errl raura r] aKoXovOrjOLS . el ovv /xtJt' CTTt raura Tcp ivavTucp to ivavTiov aKoXovdeZ 364


you should obtain them by induction, for example, opposition " If man is an animal, not-animal is not-man," and used to so with the other cases. For here the order is Jf fSiow1i*^B^ reversed ; for ' animal ' follows * man,' but * not- not-B also ' animal ' does not follow * not-man,' but, conversely, Sot-A^ ' not-man ' follows ' not-animal.' In all cases, an axiom must be laid down of the following type, " If the honourable is pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honourable, but, if the latter is not true, then the former is not true either." Similarly, " If what is not pleasant is not honourable, the pleasant is honourable." It is clear, therefore, that the reversed sequence of the terms used in contradiction is con- vertible for both purposes.

You must look with regard to contraries whether (b) It must contrary follows upon contrary, either directly or in whethe?the reverse order, both in destructive criticism and in f°jJo^g^he constructive argument, and you should obtain such contrary arguments also by induction as far as may be useful, reversely!^ Now the sequence is direct in the case, for example, of courage and cowardice ; for virtue follows the former, vice the latter ; and object of choice follows the former, object of avoidance the latter. The sequence, therefore, in the latter case also is direct ; for object of choice is contrary to object of avoidance ; so too in the other cases also. On the other hand, the sequence is in reverse order in such a case as this : " Health follows upon good condition ; but disease does not follow upon bad condition, but bad condition upon disease." It is clear, therefore, that here the sequence is reversed ; but reversed sequence is rare in the case of contraries, where the sequence is generally direct. If, then, the contrary does not follow the contrary either directly or in reverse



114 a

jLfrJre amTraAtv, SrjXov on ot)8' inl rcbv p'qOivrojv 5 OLKoXovdel TO €T€pov Tip irepo). el 8' eirl rcov ivavTiCDV, Kal iirl rcov prjOevrcov dvayKolov ro erepov rco irdpco aKoXovOelv.

  • 0fJLOLOJS Se rots ivavTLOug Kal IttI tcov oreprjaeoiv

Kal e^ecov OKeTTreov. TrXrjv ovk 'ioriv errl rojv arep'qcrecjv to dvctTraAtv, aAA' eVt ravra Tr]V olko- XovOrjGLV dvayKaiov del yiveoBaiy KaQdirep oipet

10 jLtev aiaOrjGLV, rix^AoTTyrt S* dvaLadrjoiav. dvTLKei- rai yap rj atadrjULS rfj dvaiodriuia (hs e^tS" Kal crreprjGiS' to puev yap e^is avTWV, to he aTepr]OLS eoTiv.

'O/xotco? 8e TTJ e^et Kal Tjj OTepTJoei Kal eirl TcDv rrpog TL ')(^p7]OTeov' iirl TavTa yap Kal tovtojv Tj dKoXovdrjGLS. olov el to TpnrXdaLov TToXXa-

15 nXdaiOV, Kal to TpLTrjfJiOpLOV TToAAocjTT^jLtoptov Ae- yerat yap to fjuev TpiTrXdoiov Trpos to TpiTTjixopiov, TO 8e TT-oAAaTrAacTtov TTpog to TToXXocrTrjfjbopiov. rrdXiv el r) eTnaTrjpirj VTToXrjijjLS, Kal to eTTLCJTrjTOV V'7ToX7]7Tt6v Kal el Tj opaaig aioQiqais, Kal to

20 opaTov alodrjTOV. evGTaGis otl ovk dvdyKT] eirl Tcjjv TTpos TL TTjv dKoXovdr](jiv yiveodai, KaBdirep elp7)Tai- TO yap aladrjTOV eTTioTiqTov cartv, rj 8* aiadriGis ovk eTTiGTrnxr]. ov fir)v dXTjOt^s ye rj evGTaois hoKel elvai- ttoXXoI yap ov <j)aGi tcov alodrjTOJV eTTLGTT^iJirjv etvai. €TL Trpos TovvavTiov

25 ov-)(^ TjTTov ;)(pi7crt/xov TO prjOev, oTov otl to alGdrjTov

OVK eGTiv eTTLGTrjTOV ovhe yap rj atodrjois eTTiGTrjpbrj,

IX. riaAty IttI tcov GVGToi)(cov /cat em twv tttcjo-

Geojv, Kal dvaipovvTa Kal KaTaGKevdt,ovTa. Xeye-

« See note on 106 b 29. 366

TOPICA, II. viii-ix

order, it is clear that neither does one of the terms

in the statement follow the other ; but if one follows

the other in the case of the contraries, one term in

the statement must also necessarily follow the other.

Just as you examine contraries, so also you should (c) Cases of

examine cases of the privation or presence of states, tion^or^^

except that in the case of privation the reverse presence of ■^ . . -1 1 1 ^ ^1 .1 states must

sequence is nnpossible but the sequence must always be

of necessity be direct ; for example, sensation must examined.

follow sight and absence of sensation must follow

bUndness. For sensation is opposed to absence of

sensation ; for they are a state and a privation, the

former being a state, the latter a privation.

You must also deal with relative terms in the same (d) Relative manner as with the privation or presence of states ; Sso^be""^^^*^ for here too the sequence is direct. For example, if considered, three times is a multiple, a third is a fraction ; for three times is described as relative to a third, and a multiple as relative to a fraction. Again, if knowledge is a conceiving, then the knowable is conceivable ; and if sight is a sensation, then the visible is sensible. It may be objected that in the case of relative terms the sequence does not necessarily take place in the manner just described ; for the sensible is knowable, but sensation is not knowledge. The objection, how- ever, is not generally regarded as holding good ; for many people deny that there is a knowledge of sensible things. Further, the above principle is not less useful for proving the contrary, for example, that the sensible is not knowable ; for neither is sensation knowledge.

IX. Again, you must look at the case of the co- Various

ordinates and inflected forms of words " both in («" what is

destructive and constructive argument. By ' co- *^"6 S? o^®

° -^ co-ordinate



114 a

rat 8e avaroLxa [xev ra roidBe otov ra StVata Kal 6 StVatos" rfj SiKaLOGVvr] /cat ra avSpeta /cat o dvSpelos rfj dvhpia. ofJiOLOjg 8e /cat ra rroirjTLKd ^

30 (fyvXaKTiKCL GvaroLXCL eKeivov ov iarl TroLrjrLKd ^ (fyvXaKTiKoi, olov rd vyieivd vyieiag /cat ra eu£/cTt/ca eue^tas". rov avrov 8e rpoTTOV /cat €7rt rtov aAAojv. avGToixci [JL€V ovv TCL TotavTa eLOjQe Xiyeodai, TTTcoaeLS Se otov to St/catco? /cat avSpeto^s" /cat vyteLvoJS /cat ooa rourov rov rpoirov Aeyerat.

35 So/c€t Se /cat TO, /cara ra? TTTOJueLS avaroixa etvat, otov TO jLtev St/catcos" rg St/catoo-uvT?, to Se avSpetcos" T^ avSpta. OT;aTot;(a 8e Aeyerat ra /cara ri^v at}r7]V avaroix^av dnavra, otov hiKaioavvq, 8t/cato?, 8t/catov, 8t/catceJS'. S-i^Aov ouv ort evos" oTTotououv 8et;^^eVros' rcuv /cara ri^v avrrjv avorroLX^av dyadov 114 b "5 inaLverov /cat ra AotTra Travra 8e8etyjLteVa eorat, otov et 77 8t/catoCTi;v7y rcov eVatvercov, /cat o St/cato? /cat ro 8t/catov /cat ro 8t/cata>S' rtov eTratvercov. p7]drJG€raL 8e ro 8t/cata>S' /cat cTratvercDs" /cara ri^v 5 avTrjv TTrdJGLV a770 rou eTratverow, Kaddirep to St/cato)? aTTo r-^? 8t/catoo-uvi]?.

2/co7retv 8e /xt] jjuovov evr' aurou rou elprjfievoVy dXXd /cat eTTt rou evavriov to evavrtov, otov ort ro aya^ov ou/c e^ avay/ci]? 1781; • oi58e yap ro /ca/cov XvTTTjpov Tj et TOVTOy /cd/cetvo. /cat et 9^ SiKaiocrvvr]

10 iTnGTT^fJLr], /cat 7^ d8t/cta dyvota* /cat et ro St/catcos" 368


^ordinates ' are meant such terms as 'just actions ' ia true of and ' just man,' which are co-ordinate with ' justice,' *'^^^^®'^- and ' courageous acts ' and ' courageous man,' which are co-ordinate with ' courage.' Similarly also things which create or preserve something are co-ordinate with that of which they are creative or preservative, for example ' healthy things ' are co-ordinate with ' health,' and ' things which produce a good con- dition ' are co-ordinate with ' good condition,' and so with the other cases. Such things, then, are usu- ally described as ' co-ordinates ' ; ' inflected forms ' are such words as ' justly,' ' courageously ' and

  • healthily ' and other words formed in this way.

Inflected forms are usually regarded also as co- ordinates, for example, ' justly ' as a co-ordinate of ' justice ' and ' courageously ' of ' courage.' All words which are in the same co-ordinate series are called co-ordinates, for example, ' justice,' ' just man,' 'just action ' and 'justly.' It is obvious, therefore, that when any one member of the co-ordinate series has been shown to be good or praiseworthy, all the rest will have been shown to be so also. For example, if ' justice ' is something praiseworthy, then ' the just man' and 'the just action' and 'justly' will be something praiseworthy. And ' justly' will denote ' praise worthily,' this being the same inflexion of ' praiseworthy ' as ' justly ' is of justice.'

You must look for the contrary not only in the (6) it must case of the subject itself which is under discussion, whe°the?the but also in the case of its contrary. For instance, contrary is you can say that the good is not necessarily pleasant, also of the for neither is the evil necessarily painful ; or, if the ^^o^t^ary. latter part is true, so also is the former ; and, if justice is knowledge, injustice is ignorance, and, if



114 b

€TTi(jrr]fxovLKcx)s Kal i[JL7T€i,pojs, TO aStKcos" ayvoovv-

rcx)S Kal aTTelpcus. et Se ravra /xt], ouS' €K€Lva, KadoLTTep inl rod vvv prjOevros- fidXXov yap av (f)aveLrj to dStACCu? ifJiTretpws rj aTreipcos. ovros 8' o TOTTos" etprjTai Trporepov iv rats rcov ivavricov aKoXovdTJGeGLV ovSev yap dXXo vvv d^LoviJiev tj

15 TO ivavTLOv Toj ivavTLO) OLKoXovOeiv.

"Eti €7Ti rwv yeveaeojv Kal (f)6opa)v Kal TToir]- TiKOJV Kal (jidapTLKOJVy Kal dvaipovvTi Kal Kara- GKevd^ovn. cLv yap at yevloeis ra)v dyaOwv, Kal avrd dyadd, Kal el avrd dyadd, Kal at yeveaeis'

20 el Se at yeveoeis rcov KaKchv, Kal avrd rcov KaKcov. eirl Se rcov cfyOopojv dvdTraXuv el yap at cjidopal Tcbv dyadcDV, avrd rcjjv KaKOJV, el 8' at (f)6opal rwv KaKcov, avrd rcov dyaOcbv. 6 8' auros" Aoyos" Kal eirl TTOLiqriKcjv Kal (jydapriKCJV (hv [xev ydp rd 7roL7]rLKd dyadd, Kal avrd rcov dyadajv, cLv 8e rd (j)9aprLKd dyadd, avrd rcov KaKcov.

26 X. IlaAtv irrl rcov ojjlolcov, el opLOicos e-x^ei, olov el eTTKjrriixiq jLtta TrXeiovcov , Kal 8o^a, Kal el rd oxjjiv exeiv opdv, Kal ro dKorjv ex^iv dKoveiv. opiotcos 8e Kal eirl rcov dXXcov, Kal irrl rcov ovrcov Kal rcov

SoKOVVrCOV. ^YpT^OtjltOS" 8' O TOTTO? TTpOS dpLcf)CO'

« 113 b 27 ff. 370

TOPICA, II. ix-x

  • justly ' is ' knowingly ' and * skilfully,' ' unjustly '

is * ignorantly ' and ' unskilfully,' but if the latter part is untrue, so is also the former, as in the example above ; for ' unjustly ' would appear nearer to ' skil- fully ' than ' unskilfully.' This commonplace has been mentioned above in dealing with the sequence of contraries ** ; for at the moment we are not postulating anything more than that contrary follows contrary.

Further, you must examine the generations and (c) The corruptions of things and their creative and corruptive Ind^comip- agencies, both for destructive and for constructive Jj^^ of ^ purposes. For things of which the generations are show good things are themselves also good ; and if they ^^0^0^^^*^ are themselves good, so also are their generations, bad. If, however, their generations are bad things, they themselves are also bad things. Conversely, in the case of corruptions, if their corruptions are good things, they are themselves bad things, but if their corruptions are bad things, then they themselves are good things. The same argument holds good also of creative and corruptive agencies ; for those things of which the creative agencies are good are themselves also good things, while those things of which the corruptive agencies are good are them- selves bad things.

X. Again, you must take the case of like things Rules based and see if the same is true of them ; for example, ^s?q/^^^' if one form of knowledge deals with several subjects, things and so also does one form of opinion, and if to have sight ^dfdZreeT^ is to see, then also to have hearing is to hear, and so [^^ ^^^^^ is with the other examples both of things which are of like like and of things that are generally considered to aiso^rue of be like. This commonplace is useful for both pm-- tiie others.



114 b

el jLtev yap cvrt tlvos rcDv oyioiwv ovtojs e;^et, Kal

80 eTTL TCJV dXXa)v tcjv ofJLolcoVy el Be eiri rivos fJL'q, ouS' €7tI rCiV dXXwv. GKOTTelv Sc Kal el e^' evos Kal el enl ttoXXcjv ojLtotcos" ^X^^' ^^^^X^^ 7^9 ^^^~ ^oivel. olov el to eTriaraadai hiavoeXadaL, Kal TO TToAAo, eTTLGracrdaL ttoAAol Stavoetcr^at. rovro 8* ovK dX7]9es' eTriGTaoOaL fxev yap ivSex^rai

85 TToAAa, SiavoelGdaL 8* ov. el ovv rovro jjirj, ovS^ eKeZvo TO e<j>' evoSy on ro erriGraGdai SiavoeLGdal eGriv.

"Etc eK rod {xaXXov Kal rjrrov. elGl Be rod [xdXXov Kal rjrrov roiroi reooapes, eh piev el aKoXovdel ro pbdXXov rep pbdXXov, olov el rjSovr]

115 a dyadoVy Kal r) pbdXXov rjBovT] pudXXov dyadoVy Kal

el ro dBiKelv KaKoVy Kal ro pudXXov dSiKelv pbdXXov

KaKOV. ;Y/37^(TtjU-09 8' ovv TTpOS dpi(j)OJ 6 rOTTOS'

et jLtev yap dKoXovdei rfj rov vTroKeipievov eirihoGei Tj rov Gvpbpe^rjKoros eTTiSoGLSy Kaddirep eLprjr aiy 5 BrjXov on GVpi^epTjKev, el Be purj dKoXovdely ov Gvpb^e^TjKev. rovro 8' eTraywyfj XrjTrreov. dXXos' evos irepl Bvo XeyopuevoVy el cL pudXXov ecKo? vrrdp- X^i'V fto^ VTrapxei, ovB* a> rjrrov, Kal el a> rjrrov elKog V7Tdpx€iv vrrapxeiy Kal cp pudXXov. rrdXiV, 372


poses ; for if something is true of one of the Uke things, it is also true of the others, but if it is not true of one of them, it is not true of the others either. You must also see whether conditions are alike in the case of a single thing and a number of things ; for there is sometimes a discrepancy. For example, if to ' know ' a thing is to ' think of ' a thing, then to ' know many things ' is to ' think of many things.' But this is not so ; for it is possible to know many things and not to be thinking of them. If, there- fore, the second statement is not true, then the first, which dealt with a single thing, namely, ' to know a thing ' is ' to think of a thing,' is not true either.

Moreover you must derive material from the (b) Four greater and the less degrees. There are four cIS"b? d^- commonplaces connected with the greater and the rjved from less degrees. One is to see whether the greater and ?he less degree follows the greater degree ; for example, if ^®^®®- pleasure is good, and greater pleasure is a greater good, and if to commit injustice is an evil, whether to commit a greater injustice is also a greater evil. This commonplace is useful for both purposes ; for, if the increase of the accident follows the increase of the subject, as described above, it is obvious that it is really an accident of the subject, but if it does not follow it, it is not an accident of it. This result must be obtained by induction. Here is another commonplace ; when one predicate is applied to two subjects, then, if it does not belong to the one to which there is the greater likelihood of its belonging, it does not belong either to the one to which it is less likely to belong ; and if it belongs to that to which it is less likely to belong, it belongs also to that to which it is more likely to belong. Again,



115 a

Svotv 7T€pl evog Xeyoijuevajv, el ro /xaAAov VTrdp'^eLV

10 hoKovv 1X7] VTTapx^^y ovhe to rJTTOV, ^ el to rjrrov SoKovv V7rdp-)(^eiv virapx^i', Kal to ju-aAAov. eVt SvoLV 7T€pl hvo Xeyopbdvajv el to darepw pudXXov VTrdpxeiv hoKovv (jltj VTrapxei, ovSe to Xolttov tw XoiTTco, 7] el TO rJTTOv SoKovv TW eTepcp VTTapxeiv virdpyei, Kal to Xolttov tw Xolttw.

15 "Eti eK Tov ofJiOLwg VTrdpx^t,v rj SoKelv VTrdpxeiv TpLX^S) Kaddirep errl tov pidXXov errl twv voTepov prjdevTWV Tpiwv tottwv eXeyeTo. etVe ydp ev tl hvGiv ofJirOiws VTrapx^L rj SoKel virapxeLV, el tw eTepw fJLT] vTTapx^i', ovhe tw eTepw, el he BaTepw

20 VTrdpx^i, Kal tw Xolttw' etVe 8uo tw avTw ofjbolws, el TO eTepov fjur] v7Tdpx€i, ovSe to Xolttov, el Se ddTepov, Kal to Xolttov. tov avTov Se TpoTTov Kal el hvo hvolv opLoiws VTrdpx^L' el ydp to eTepov to) eTepcp jjbTj vTrdpxeL, ovSe to Xolttov toj Xolttw, el 8e VTTapx^t' to eTepov toj eTepw, Kal to Xolttov

TW Xolttw.



if two predicates are applied to one subject, then, if the one which is more generally regarded as be- longing to the one subject does not belong, neither does that which is less generally so regarded ; or, if the predicate which is less generally regarded as belonging does belong, then so also does that which is more generally so regarded. Further, when two predicates are applied to two subjects, if the predicate which is more generally regarded as belonging to one of the subjects does not belong, neither does the other predicate belong to the other subject ; or, if the predicate which is less generally regarded as belonging to the one subject does belong, then the other predicate also belongs to the other subject.

Furthermore, you can derive material from the (c) Three fact that a predicate belongs, or is generally regarded can"S^de- as belonging, in a like degree, in three ways, namely, Ji7^f jf^"°^ those described in the last three commonplaces degree. already mentioned in connexion with the greater degree. For, if one predicate belongs, or is generally regarded as belonging, to two subjects in a like degree, then, if it does not belong to the one, it does not belong to the other either, and, if it belongs to the one, it belongs to the other also. Or, if two predicates belong in a like degree to the same subject, if the one does not belong, neither does the other, whereas, if the one does belong, so also does the other. The same thing also happens if two predicates belong in a like degree to two sub- jects ; for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject, neither does the other predicate belong to the other subject, while, if the one predi- cate belongs to the one subject, then the other pre- dicate also belongs to the other subject.



115 a

26 XL 'E/c [lev ovv rov [xdXXov /cat '^rrov /cat rov ofJiOLOJS TOoavTax<J^s evhix^Tai CTTtp^etpetv en 8' €K rrjs TTpoodeoecos. iav erepov TTpos erepov TTpou- redev ttoltj dyadov i] XevKOv, fjurj ov TTporepov XevKov t) dyadov, to irpooreSev ccrrat XevKov t) dyadov, olov Trep Kal to oAov TToiel. cVt el TTpos to

30 vTTapxov TTpoareOev tl fjuaXXov 7roi€i roiovrov olov vTTTJpx^, '^^ ctVTO earai roiovrov. 6p,oioJs Se /cat CTTt ro)v d'AAcov. ;^p7jo-tjLtos" 3e ou/c ev diraGiv 6 rOTTOS, dAA' €V OtS" TT^V TOU jLtttAAov VTTepox^v avfjb- jSatVct ylveaOai. ovros Se o tottos" ou/c dvnarpecfyet, TTpog ro dvaaKevdt,€LV. el yap jjutj TToiei ro TTpoor-

35 riSepievov dyadov, ouSeVca StJAov et avTO /X17 115 b dyadov to yap dyadov KaKco TTpoaridepievov ovk e^ dvdyKiqs dyadov ro oXov TTOiel, ovhe XevKov {jbeXavi.

ndAtv ei n fJuaXXov Kal rjrrov Xeyerai, /cat drrXibs VTTapx^L' ro yap fjur] ov dyadov rj XevKov 6 ovSe jjidXXov rj rjrrov dyadov 7) XevKov prjdT^aerai- ro yap /ca/cdv ovSevos pboXXov t) rjrrov dyadov, dXXd fjidXXov /ca/cdv ■^ rjrrov prjdjjoreraL . ovk dvri- orpe(j)ei 8' o?58' outos" d roiros rrpos ro dva- oKevdoai' TroAAd yap rcov ov Xeyojjuevajv fiaXXov (/cat rjrrov}^ aTrXo)? vTrapxev dvdpojTTOs yap ov

10 Xeyerai fjbdXXov Kal rjrrov, dAA' ov Sua rovro ovk ear IV dvdpa>7Tog.

Tov avrov he rporrov OKerrreov Kal errl rov Kara

^ /cat -^TTov added by Wallies. 376


XI. Such then are the various ways in which you Further can argue from the greater and the less and the like (J) how to degrees. You can, moreover, obtain arguments from jpue fro™ the addition of one thing to another. If the addition adding two of one thing to another makes the latter good or JJjgefher. white, whereas it was not white or good before, then that which was added will be white or good, i.e., it will have the quality which it also bestows on the whole. Further, if something added to the existing quality of a thing imparts a greater degree of the same existing quality, it will be itself also of that quality. So likewise in the other cases. But this commonplace is not always useful, but only where the result of the addition is that a greater intensi- fication is produced. This commonplace is not convertible for purposes of destructive criticism. For, if that which is added does not make a thing good, it is not yet clear whether it is itself not good ; for good added to evil does not necessarily make the whole good, nor does white added to black necessarily make the whole white.

Again, if anything is predicated in a greater or (b) Any- less degree, it also belongs absolutely ; for what is is"pfecii "^^ not ffood (or white) will never be said to be ffood (or ^ated in a white) in a greater or less degree ; for an evil thing less degree will never be described as possessing a greater or less gojJJ^^y*^" degree of goodness than something else, but only of evil. This commonplace also is not convertible for purposes of destructive criticism ; for many predicates to which we cannot ascribe a greater or a less degree belong absolutely ; for * man ' cannot be predicated in a greater or less degree, but a man does not on this account cease to be a man.

In the same manner you must examine predicates (c) What is



115 b

Tt /cat 7TOT€ Kal 7TOV- ct ycLp Kara n ivhex^rat,

Kal OLTrXo)? ivSix^rai. o^oiojs Se /cat to rrore r]

TTov' TO yap olttXcos dSvvarov ovre Kara rt ovre

15 7TOU ovre rrore Ivhe^^r ai. evoraois on Kara n jLtev etcrt (jyvaei orrovSaXoi, otov iXevdepiot rj goj- (jypoviKoi, aTrXws Se ovk elol (f)VG€L arrovSaloi' ovSels yap (f)V(jei (f)p6vLjJio? . o/xotco? Se /cat irore fjbev ivSex^Tai rcjv (f)dapra)v rt jjut] (fydaprjvaiy d7TXa>s 8' ovk ivhex^Tai pur] ^daprjvai. rov avrov

20 8e rpoTTov Kal rrov fjuev avpbcf)€p6L roiavrrj SiaLrr] XpyjcrOai, olov iv rots' voGcoSeau rorroig, aTrXcos 8' ov Gvpi(j)€p€L. ert 8e ttov puev eva puovov ^vvarov eti'at, drrXa)S 8e ov hvvarov eva puovov etvai. rov avrov 8e rporrov Kal ttov piev KaXov rov rrarepa dvetv, otov iv TptjSaAAots", aTrXwg 8' ov KaXov. rj

25 rovro puev ov ttov CTT^/xatVet aAAa riuiv ; ovhev yap hia(f>epeL ottov dv Jjgiv Travraxov yap avrotg ear at KaXov ovGL Tpi/3aAAot9. TidXiv rrore piev Gvpi,(j)epei (fyappLaKeveGdat, otov drav voofj, dTrXdjs 8' ov. r) ovSe rovro TTore GiqpLalveL, dXXd rep 8ta/cet^teVa) 7160?; ovhev yap Siacfyepei OTToreovv, idv ovrco

30 pbovov hiaKeipievos fj- to 8' (XttAcus" eGrlv o pLr]Sev6s 378



which capply only in a certain respect or at a certain predicated time or in a certain place ; for, if a predicate is qiaUflca- possible in a certain respect, it is also possible ab- tion can also solutely. The same is true of predicates which are cated qualified in respect of time and place ; for what is absolutely. impossible absolutely is not possible in any respect or in any place or at any time. An objection may be raised that in a certain respect men are naturally good, for example, they may be generous or inclined to self-control, but absolutely they are not by nature good, for no one is naturally prudent. Similarly, too, it is possible at a certain time for something which is corruptible not to be corrupted, but it is impossible for it to avoid corruption absolutely. In the same way, too, it is expedient in certain places to adopt a certain diet, e.g., in unhealthy localities, but absolutely it is not expedient. Further, in certain places it is possible for a man to exist alone, but absolutely it is not possible for him to exist alone. In the same way, also, it is honourable in some places to sacrifice one's father, for example amongst the Triballi," but absolutely it is not honourable. (Or is a relativity to persons rather than places indicated here ? For it makes no difference where they may be ; for, wherever they are, it will be honourable in their eyes because they are Triballi.) Again, it is expedient at certain times to take drugs, for example, when one is ill ; but it is not expedient absolutely. (Or is a relativity to a certain condition rather than to a certain time indicated here ? For it makes no difference when a man takes the drug, if only he is in a condition which requires it.) Now the ' absolutely ' honourable or its contrary, is that

    • A Thracian tribe who dwelt near the Danube.



115 b

TTpoaredevTog ipeig on KaXov iariv r) to evavriov.

olov TO Tov TTarepa Ovecv ovk ipeZs KaXov etvat,, dXXa TLGi KaXov etvat • ovk dpa (IttXms KaXov. dXXd TO Tovg deovs rtfjidv ipelg KaXov ovSev TTpoaridets' dirXaJs yap KaXov ianv. cocttg o dv fjLTjhevos TrpoGTideiievov SoKfj etvat KaXov tj ala^pdv 35 ri dXXo TL rcbv roiovrwVy aTrAco? pr]9fj(T€TaL.



which you will say is honourable or its contrary, without any additional qualification. For example, you will not say that to sacrifice one's father is honourable, but that ' in the eyes of some people ' it is honourable ; it is not, therefore, honourable absolutely. But you will say that to honour the gods is honourable without adding any qualification ; for it is honourable absolutely. So whatever is generally regarded as honourable or disgraceful, or anything else of the kind, without any additional qualification, will be called so in an absolute sense.


116 a 4 I- Horepov 8' alperajrepov 7) ^iXriov SveXv ^ TrAetovcov, ck rojvSe OKeirrlov. TTpcbrov 8e hicopi- 5 aQix) on rrjv okIiJjlv TToiovjJieda ov^ VTvep tojv ttoXv hiearcjTOJV koL jJbeydXrjv Trpos dXXrjXa hia(f>opdv ixovTiov (ouSets" yap diropeZ irorepov r] evSatfjiovla ■^ o ttXovtos alpercojepov) aAA' vnep tcov Gvveyyv?, /cat Trepl cSv d/xt^tajSi^Tot'/xev rrorepcp Set irpou- deadai puaXXov, Sta to fjLrjSepiiav opdv rod erepov 10 TTpog TO €T€pov VTrepox^]^. SrjXov ovv iirl rchv Toiovrcov OTL Secxdeiorrj? virepoxfis t] pads rj ttAcio- va)v GvyKaradtjaeraL rj Stavota on rovr earlv alpercorepov, oirorepov rvyxdveu avrcov virepexov.

npcoTOV jLtev ovv TO TToXvxpoviojrepov t] jSejSato- T€pov alperayrepov rod rjrrov tolovtov. Kal o pLaXXov dv eXoLTO 6 (j)p6vLpLog rj 6 dyadog dvqp, rj 16 o v6p.os 6 6p66s, 'i) ol GTTOvhaiOL rrepl eKacrra alpovpuevoL fj tolovtol elatv, 7) ol iv iKdurco yevec eTTLcrTripLOveg, rj doa ol irXeiovs 7) Trdvres, olov iv larpLKfj Tj reKTOVLKfj d ol TrXeiovs rwv larpcov 7) TTavreg, tj doa oXcos ol TrXeLOvg rj Trdvreg rj Trdvra, 382



I. Which is more worthy of choice or better of two Rules for (or more) things, must be examined in the hght of panoim the following considerations. But first a Umitation valuation of

. , 1 .-,^-1 ,1 . • • J J. two or more

must be laid dow^n that our inquiry does not concern predicates:

things which are widely separated and show a con- siderable divergence from one another (for no one is at a loss to decide whether happiness or wealth is more worthy of choice), but it is concerned ^vith things that are closely related and about which we discuss which we ought preferably to support, because we cannot detect any superiority of the one over the other. It is clear, therefore, that, as regards such things, if one or more points of superiority can be shown, the mind will agree that whichever of the two alternatives is actually superior is the more worthy of choice.

In the first place, then, that which is more per-(a)The manent or constant is more worthy of choice than durable and that which is less so, and also that which the prudent ^^'^^* ^9™",^

' - 1.11 1 mends itself

or good man would preter, or the right law, or those to the wise who are excellent in any particular sphere when p?^fefabfe/^ they make their choice as such, and those who are skilled in some particular subject, or what most of them, or all, would choose, for example, in medicine (or carpentry) what most, or all, doctors would choose, or generally those things which most people or every-



116 a

20 otov rdyaOov rravra yap rayaOov i(f)Ur ai. Set

S' dy€LV TTpos 6 Tt dv fj ^^pT^GLfJiOV TO prjdrjcr6iJL€vov . ean 8' olttXws jjuev ^eXriov koI alpercoTepov ro Kara ttjv ^eXrloj eTTLGTrjinqVy rivl 8e to /caret ry]V OLKelav.

"ETTetra Se ro orrep roSe n rod [xrj ev yevei, otov 7] SiKaioavvrj rov SiKaiov ro fxev yap ev yevec ro) dyaOo), ro 8' ov, /cat ro jjuev oirep dyadoVy ro

25 8' OV' ovSev yap Xeyerau onep ro yevos, o fjurj rvyxdv€L iv rep yivei 6v, olov 6 XevKos dvOpojiros ovK 'ioriv orrep -x^pcbfxa. opboiojs 8e /cat errt rwv dXXcov.

Kat TO 8t' auTo alperov rod 8t' erepov alperov

30 alpercorepovy olov ro vyiatveLv rod yviubvdt,€adaL- ro fxev yap 8t' auTO aiperov, ro 8e 8t' erepov. /cat TO Kad^ avro rod Kara ovfi^epr^Kos, otov ro rovg cjyiXovg 8t/catou<r etvat tou rovs ixOpovg. ro fxev yap /ca^' auTO alperoVy ro 8e Kara gvjjl- pcpTjKos' ro yap rovs l^Gpovs hiKaiovs elvai Kara

35 avjJL^e^TjKog alpovp^eda, onajg fjLTjSev rjfjidg ^Xd- TTrojGLV. eWt ^k rovro ravro rep rrpo rovrov, Siacfyepei be rep rpoircp' ro fxev yap rovg cf)iXovg SiKalovg elvai 8t* awTo alpovfJieOa, /cat el pu'qSev 384


body or all things would choose, for example, the good ; for everything aims at the good. You must direct the future course of the discussion in whatever direction may be advantageous ; but the absolute criterion of what is better and more worthy of choice is the better knowledge, though for the individual it may be his own particular knowledge.

Next, that which is of a certain kind is more (b) The worthy of choice than that which is not in the genus preferable of that thing, for example, justice is more worthy of ^p^fj^lj^f. choice than the just man ; for the former is in the genus ' good,' but the latter is not, and the former is that which is called ' good,' but the latter is not. For nothing is called by the name of the genus which does not actually belong to the genus ; for example, the * white man ' is not a ' colour ' and so likewise in the other cases.

Also, that which is worthy of choice for its own (c) What is sake is more worthy of choice than that which is so its^^^ sake for some other reason ; for example, health is more is prefer- worthy of choice than exercise, for the former is worthy of choice for its own sake, the latter for the sake of something else. Also, that which is in itself worthy of choice is more worthy of choice than that which is accidentally so ; for example, that one's friends should be just is more worthy of choice than that one's enemies should be so, for the former is worthy of choice in itself, the latter accidentally ; for we choose that our enemies should be just only accidentally, in order that they may not do us harm. This rule is the same as the one which preceded it, but differs in the way in which it is stated ; for that our friends should be just is a thing which we choose for its own sake, even if it is not going to affect us

o 385


116 a

rjfjuv fjueXXei ccrca^at, Kav iv *Iv8ot9 (Lglv to 8e

TOV£ ix9povs St' erepov, ottojs ^irjOev rjfjids j3Aa-


116 b Kat TO aLTLOv dyadov Ka6^ avro rod Kara avfi- ^e^TjKog alriov, KaOdirep r) dperr] rr\s rv^r]? (rj ixkv yap KaS^ avrrjv rj 8e KaTO, avix^e^riKo? alria rcjv dyaScjv) Kal el n dXXo roiovrov. o/xotcus' Sc 6 Kal evrt rod evavriov ro yap Kad^ avro KaKov airiov (jievKrorepov rod Kara avfJU^e^r^Kog, olov T) KaKia Kal rj rvx'^' to p,ev yap Kad^ avro KaKov, 7] Se rvxT} Kara Gvpi^e^iqKos .

Kat TO aTrAcDs' dyadov rod nvl alperjjrepov , olov TO vyidt^eaSai rod ripiveadai' ro fxev yap

10 dirXajs dyaOov, ro 8e nvl rw heopiivo} rofXTJ^. Kal ro <f>va€L rod fxr] <j>vaei, olov rj SiKaioavvr) rod SiKavov ro ju.ev yap (f)V(J€L, ro 8' eTTiKrrjrov. Kal ro ro) ^eXriovL Kal rtfjuajrepq) vrrdpxov alpercore- poVy OLOV deep 'q dvdpwTTO) Kal ipvxfj ^ ocopbarL. Kal ro rod ^eXrlovos lSlov ^eXnov rj ro rod x^^~

16 povos, olov ro rod deod t) ro rod dvOpcoirov Kara /xev yap rd Koivd iv dpL(j)orepois ovhev 8ta^e/)€t dXXrjXojVy roZs 8' Ihiois ro erepov rod irepov VTrepdx^L. Kal ro iv ^eXriooiv ri TTporipois r^ 386



at all, and even though they may be in India ; but we choose that our enemies should be just for another reason, namely, that they may do us no harm.

Also that which is in itself the cause of good is (d) What is more worthy of choice than that which is accidentally caus? of^ the cause of good ; for example, virtue is more good is worthy of choice than luck (for the former is in itself toVhat is the cause of good things but the latter only acciden- accidentally tally), and so with any other similar case. So also in the contrary case ; for what is in itself the cause of evil is more to be avoided than that which is only accidentally the cause of evil, as in the case of base- ness and chance ; for the former is in itself an evil, while chance is only accidentally so.

Also, that which is good absolutely is more worthy (e) The ab- of choice than that which is good for an individual, th?^atu^°*^ e.g., the enjoyment of health than a surgical opera- rally good tion ; for the former is good absolutely, the latter preferable, is good only for an individual, namely, the man who requires an operation. Also, that which is naturally good is more worthy of choice than that which is not so by nature, e.g., justice rather than the just man ; for the former is naturally good, whereas the good- ness of the latter is acquired. Also what belongs to (/) What be- that which is better and more highly honoured is bS,te/£ ^^^ more worthy of choice, for example, that which preferable. belongs to God than that which belongs to man, and that which belongs to the soul than that which belongs to the body. Also the property of the better is better than that of the worse, for example, the property of God than that of man ; for in those things which are common to both there is no differ- ence between them, but it is in their properties that the one is superior to the other. Also, that is better



116 b

TLixLcorepois ^dXriov, olov vyleua loxvos kol koWovs.

Y) [JL€V yap iv vypoZs /cat ^rjpoLS Kal Oepfiois Kal 20 ifjvxpoLS, OLTrXctj^ 8' eiTTeZv i^ cSv Trpcorojv ovv- €(Tr7]K€ TO ^a>ov, ra 8' iv rols vorepois' r] ju-ev yap tcjp^us" iv Tols vevpoL? Kal octtol?, to 8e kolXXos rwv fxeXcbv Tts" GVfjbfxerpLa So/cet etvat. Kal to reXog Twv TTpos TO reXos alperayrepov So/cet etvau, Kal hvolv TO eyyiov rod reXovs. Kal oXoj? to TTpos 25 TO Tov ^Lov reXos alperwrepov (jidXXov rj to Trpos" clAAo tl, olov to TTpos evSaLfiovlav ovvrelvov t) to TTpos (^povrjOLV. Kal to ^vvarov rod ahvvdrov. en hvo TTOirjTiKcjv , ov to reXos ^iXriov. ttoit]- TLKov 8e Kal reXovs €ac rod dvdXoyov, orav TrXeiovL VTTepixU '^^ reXos rod riXovs "^ iKelvo rod oIk€lov 7TOLr]rLKov, OLOV el 7] evhaL(jL0VLa nXelovL V7Tepe-)(eL 30 vyLelas rj vyieia vyLeLvov, to ttoltjTlkov eu8at- [jLovlas ^eXriov vyLelag. oaco yap rj evSaifjiovLa vyieias vrrepe^eL, roaovro) Kal ro TTOLrjrLKov ro rrj? evSaLpLOvlas rod vyLeivod vrrepe-)(eL. rj Se vyieLa rod vyLeLvod iXdrrovL virepel^eVy oiare TrXelovL VTrepex^f' to TTOLiqrLKOv evSaLjJbovlas rod

" It is difficult to see what is the syntax of the words voit]- TLKov hk TcXovs CK TOV dvdXoyov, but the meaning is clear. 388




which is inherent in things which are better or prior or more highly honoured ; for example, health is better than strength or beauty. For health is inherent in moisture and dryness and in heat and cold, in a word in all the primary elements of which the living creature consists, whereas the others are inherent in secondary constituents ; for strength is generally considered to reside in the sinews and bones, and beauty to be in a certain symmetry of the limbs. Also, the end is usually regarded as (a) The end more worthy of choice than the means to the end, to^ife^^* and of two means that which is nearer to the end. ^^^ans, and

n 1 ^ • ^ ^ ^^(' the practl-

And, to speak generally, the means which has lite cable to the as its end is more worthy of choice than that which 3?^*^" has some other end ; for example, that which tends to happiness is more worthy of choice than that which tends to prudence. Also the practicable is more worthy of choice than the impracticable. Further, of two productive agencies, that of which the end is better is more worthy of choice. We can judge between a productive agency and an end by drawing up a proportion," when the superiority of one end over the other is greater than that of the latter over its own productive agency. For example, if happi- ness has a greater superiority over health than health has over the health-giving, then that which produces happiness is superior to health. For that which pro- duces happiness is superior to the health-giving in the same degree as happiness is superior to health. But health shows less superiority over the health- giving ; therefore that which produces happiness shows greater superiority over the health-giving than

Pacius renders, cum alterutn sit effectivum^ alterum finis ^ ex proportione iudicandum est, Wallies reads TToirjTiKov.



116 b

35 vyietvov tj rj vyUia rod vyLCtvov. StJAov apa on

alpercorepov to TroLrjTLKov evhaifiovtag tt}? vyieias' Tov yap avTOV vXeiovL VTvepex^i.

"Ert TO kolXXlov Kad^ avro Kal rLfjucoTepov Kal €7TaLV€TcxiT€pov , olov <j>iXia ttXovtov Kal SlKaLOaVVT] laxvos. ra /xev yap Kad^ avra rwv tljjllcov Kal

117 a eTTatvercDv, ra S' ov KaO^ avra dXXa 8t' erepov

ovSels yap rifxa tov ttXovtov hi iavTov aAAa 8t' €T€pov, TTjV 8e ^iXiav Kad^ avTo, Kal el fJbrjSev [jueXXeL rjfuv eTepov (Xtt* avTrjs eaeodac. 5 11. "Ert OTav Svo TLva fj o^ohpa aXXriXois irapa- TrXrjCjia Kal fir) SwcofJueOa VTrepox^v jLtr^Se^Lttav avvihetv TOV eTepov irpos to eTepov, opdv oltto tcov 7Tap€7Topi€va>v' (L yap eVerat /Ltet^ov dyaOov, Tovd^ alpeTcoTepov. dv 8' fj tol eTTOjJbeva Aca/ca, a> to eXaTTOV oLKoXovdel KaKov, Tovd^ alpeTiOTCpov.

10 ovTcov yap dpi(j)OTipiov alpeTOJV ovBev kcoXvcl hvo^^pes Tt TTapeTTeadai. hix^? 8' oltto tov erreadai rj aKeifjiS' Kal yap irpoTepov Kal voTepov erreTaiy olov tco puavdavovTi to /xev dyvoelv rrpo- Tepov, TO 8' eirioTaod ai voTepov. ^cXtlov 8* (hs errl to ttoXv to voTepov iTTOfJuevov. Xafju^dveLV ovv

15 Tcjjv iTTojJbevojv oTTOTcpov dv fj XPV^^H'^'^ •

"Eti Ta TvXeio} dyadd tcov iXaTTovcov, 'q drrXcos, rj OTav Ta €T6pa ev toZs eTepoLS vTrdpxjj, to, iXdTTOj iv TOLS rrXeiooLV. evGTaaiSy €t ttov ddTepov daTepov 390


health shows over the health-giving. It is clear, then, that what produces happiness is more worthy of choice than health ; for it shows a greater superiority over the same thing.

Further, that which is in itself more noble and (h) What is more valued and more praiseworthy is more worthy JobS, ^^^^ of choice ; for example, friendship is more worthy valued and of choice than wealth, and justice than strength, worthy is For the former in themselves are among things P^^^^rable. valued and praiseworthy, while the latter are valued and praiseworthy not in themselves but for some other reason ; for no one values wealth for its own sake but for some other reason, but we value friend- ship for its own sake, even if we are not likely to get anything else from it.

II. Further, when two things are very similar to Rules of pre- one another and we cannot detect any superiority in ^bebafed^on : the one over the other, we must judge from their («) Ante- consequences ; for that of which the consequence is conse- a greater good is more worthy of choice, and, if the Q^iences, consequences are evil, that is more worthy of choice which is followed by the lesser evil. For, if both are worthy of choice, there is nothing to prevent some unpleasant secondary consequence. The examina- tion based on consequence takes two forms ; for a consequence can be prior or posterior in time ; for example, for the man who learns, ignorance is prior, knowledge posterior. The posterior consequence is usually better. You should, then, take whichever of the consequences is advantageous.

Further, a greater number of good things is prefer- (b) Num- able to a lesser number, either absolutely or when ^^^^' the one exists in the other, i.e., the lesser number is included in the greater. An objection may be




117 a

XOLpLV ovhkv yap alpercjrepa ra dfjicjici) rod ivos,

20 OLOV TO vyidl^eadaL Kal rj vyUia rrjs vyieias, iireihri to vyidt,€odai rrjs vyielas ev€K€V alpovjJueOa. Kol pLT) dyadd 8e dyaOwv ovSev kcoXvgl elvai alp€ra)T€pa, olov euSat/xovtav Kal d'AAo rt o /xt} ecrrtv dyaOov SiKaiOGVvris Kal dvhpiag. Kal ravrd ju-e^' TjSovTJg /xaAAov tj dvev rjSovrjs, Kal ravrd

25 /xer' dXvTTLag fxaXXov rj [xerd Xvttt]?.

Kat eKaorov iv cL Kaipo) /x€t^ov Swarat, iv rovrcp Kal alperwrepov, olov ro dXvTTO)? iv rw yripa jjidXXov rj iv rfj veorrjrL' /xet^ov ydp iv toj yqpa SvvaraL. Kard ravra Se Kal rj (f)p6vr]Gi9 iv

30 ro) yqpa alperwrepov ovSelg ydp rovs veovs alpelrai rqyefjLova? Sid ro jjltj d^Lovv (j)povipiovs elvai. Tj 8' dvSpia dvaTraXiv iv rfj veorrjn ydp dvayKaiorepa r) Kard rrjv avSplav ivepy eia. ojjboicos 8e Kal 7] ooj(f)pOGVvr)' p^aXXov ydp ol veot rcbv TTpea^vrepojv vtto ra>v iTnOvpnajv ivoyXovvrai .

35 Kat o ev rravri Kaipco rj iv rots rrXeioroLS XPV~ (TLjJLCjrepov, olov SiKaioavvr] Kal Gwc/ypoovvr] dv- hpuas' at [xev ydp del r) Be nore ■^p'qoiixr). Kal o TTavrojv ixdvrcov jlct^Scv Oarepov SeofieOa, t) o ixpvrojv rrpooSeopieSa rod Xolttov, KadaTrep irrl BiKaLOGVvrjs /cat dvSpias' hiKaiojv jjuev ydp Trdvrojv

" i.e. not both of them good. 392


made if a case occurs in which one thing is preferred for the sake of another ; for the two things taken together are in no way preferable to the one. For example, to become healthy plus health is not prefer- able to health alone, since we choose to become healthy for the sake of health. Also, there is nothing to prevent even things which are not good " from being preferable to things which are good ; for example, happiness plus something else which is not good may be preferable to justice plus courage. Also, the same things are more worthy of choice when pleasure is added than when it is absent, and when accompanied by freedom from pain than when attended by pain.

Also, everything is preferable at the time when (c) Times it has greater importance ; for example, freedom seasons, from pain in old age is preferable to freedom from pain in youth, for it is more important in old age. And on this principle also prudence is preferable in old age ; for no one chooses young men as leaders, because he does not expect them to be prudent. The converse holds good of courage ; for in youth courageous activity is more necessary. So too with self-control ; for the young are more troubled by their passions than the old.

Also, that is preferable which is more useful on every occasion or on most occasions, for example, justice and self-control are preferable to courage, for the two first are always useful, but courage only sometimes. Also, of two things, that one, the W Self- possession of which by all causes us to have no need ^" ^^^^^^y- of the other, is preferable to the one the universal possession of which leaves us still in need of the other. Take, for example, justice and courage ; if




117 b ovTOJV ovhev xP'^f^^l^os 7) avSpla, dvSpetcov 8e ndv- TCDV ovTWV XPV^^H'O? Tj hiKaioavviq.

"Ert €K rwv <j)Bopa)v kol tojv dTTo^oXcov Kal rcov yeveaecov Kal twv Xiqifjecav koI tojv evavriojv a)V 5 yap at <^Bopai (jyevKTorepai, avrd alpercorepa. opiOLCOs 8e Kal inl raJv diro^oXibv Kal tojv evavriayv ov yap rq aTTo^oXr] rj to evavriov (j>€VKr6T€pov, avro alpera)T€pov. eirl 8e rcov yeveoecov Kal rchv Xrjifjeojv dvaTTaXiV Sv yap at Xiji/jeis Kal at yevecrets" alp€TCOT€paL, Kal avrd alperwrepa. 10 "AAAo? roTTos, TO iyyvrepov rdyaOov ^eXnov Kal alp€ra)T€pov, Kal to ofJiOLOTepov rdyado), otov Tj hiKaLoavvrj St/catou. /cat to tco ^eXriovi avrov opiOLOTepov, KaOdnep rov AtavTa rov ^OSvaaecos ^aat ^eXriCx) Ttves" etvat, StoTt opiOLorepos rep 15 'A^tAAet. evGrauLS rovrov on ovk dXrjdes- ovSev yap KcoXveL, purj fj ^iXriaros d 'A^tAAet;?, ravrrj opLOLorepov etvat tov AtavTa, tou irepov ovros puev dyaOov pi7] opuoiov 8e. aKorreiv 8e Kal el inl TO yeXoLorepov eir) opuoiov, KaOdirep 6 Trldr]Kos rep dvdpcoTTCp, rov LTTTTov pLTj ovros opbOLOV OV ydp KaXXiov 6 TTLdrjKos, opiOLorepov 8e rep dvdpwTTCp.

20 TTCtAtV €77( 8i;0tV Ct TO pL€V TO) ^eXriovi TO 8e ro)

yeipovi opLOiorepov, e'lr] dv ^iXriov ro rep ^eXnovi dpLOLorepov. ^X^^ ^^ '^^^ rovro evoraaiv ovo€V ydp KwXveL ro puev rep ^eXriovi rjpepua dpLOiov etvat, 394



all men were just, there would be no use for courage, but if all men were brave, justice would still be useful.

Further, arguments can be derived from the (e) Corrup- corruptions, losses, generations, acquisitions and g^^neraSs,* contraries of things ; for things of which the corrup- acquisitions tion is more to be avoided are themselves preferable, contraries. Similarly, too, in the case of losses and contraries ; for that of which the loss or the contrary is more to be avoided is itself preferable. The converse is true of generation and acquisition ; for things of which the acquisition and generation is preferable are them- selves preferable.

Another commonplace is that what is nearer to (/) Likeness the good is better and preferable, and also what is iJeS™^ more like the good ; for example, justice is prefer- pattern. able to a just man. Also that is preferable which is more like something better than itself ; for example, some people say that Ajax was a better man than Odysseus, because he was more like Achilles. To this an objection may be raised that it is not true ; for nothing prevents Ajax from being more like Achilles, but not in respect of that in which Achilles was best, while Odysseus might be a good man though not resembling Achilles. We must also see whether the resemblance tends towards the ridiculous, for example, that of a monkey to a man, whereas the horse bears no resemblance ; for the monkey is not more handsome than the horse, although he is more like a man. Again, of two things, if the one is more like that which is better and the other more like that which is worse, then that which is like the better would itself be better. Here also an objection is possible ; for there is no reason why the one should not resemble the better in a slight degree only,



117 b

TO he Tw ;^etpoFt Gcf)6Spa, olov el 6 fjiev Atas raj

'A;^'^^ VP^H'^' ^ ^' ^OSvaoevs raJ NeWopt

25 a(f)oSpa. Kal el to fxev ro) ^eXriovi ofjioiov errl ra

X^tpoi ofjLOLOv €17], TO Sc TO) ;)/etpovt irrl ra jSeArto),

KadoLTTep llTTTOS OVCp Kal TTldrjKO? avOpcxjTTco.

"AAAos", TO eTTiSavearepov rod rJTTOv tolovtov, Kal TO ;i^aAe7Tajrepov /jlolXXov yap dyaircopiev exovreg 30 a [jLTj eari paSloJS Xa^elv. Kal to Ihiairepov rod KOLvorepov. Kal to tol? KaKols aKOivcovrjTOTepov alp€TC0T€pov yap (L fJLrjSefjLLa Svaxepeca aKoXovOel rj S oLKoXovdel.

"Eti €t ctTrAaJS" tovto tovtov ^cXtlov, Kal to ^eXriGTOv Tcov iv tovtco ^cXtlov tov ev Tcp eTepcp

35 ^eXTLGTOV, otoV el ^IXtIOV dvOpCOTTO? L7T7TOV, Kal

6 ^eXnoTos dvOpojTTos tov ^eXTiorov tmrov peX- Tiixjv. Kal el TO ^eXTiOTOv tov ^eXriGTOv ^eXTiov, Kal dTTAcD? TOVTO TOVTOV ^eXTLOv, olov el 6 ^eX-


Kal aTrAco? dvOpWTTOs lttttov ^eXTiCjjv.

118 a "Eti a)V eoTL tov9 ^lXovs jLieTaap^etv, alpeTWTepa

Tj Sv (jLTj. Kal a TTpo? TOV (^t'Aov TTpd^ai pidXXov ^ovXojjbeda ^ a irpos tov TV^ovTa, TavTa alpe- TWTepa, olov to hiKaioirpayelv Kal ev TToieZv fiaXXov 5rj TO SoKelv Tovs yap (f>LXovs ev TToielv PovXofjueda fxdXXov Tj SoKelVy Tovs 8e TVxdvTas dvaTraXiv. 396


while the other strongly resembles the worse ; for example, Ajax may slightly resemble Achilles, while Odysseus strongly resembles Nestor. Also, that which resembles the better may resemble it for the worse, while that which resembles the worse may resemble it for the better, as in the likeness of the horse to the donkey and that of a monkey to a man.

Another commonplace is that what is more con- (g) Various spicuous is preferable to what is less conspicuous, desf/able also that which is more difficult ; for we value more qualities highly the possession of such things as are not easy criteria, to obtain. Also, what is more peculiar to ourselves is preferable to what is more common. We also prefer that which has less communion with evil ; for that which is not accompanied by vexation is prefer- able to that which is so accompanied.

Further, if A be absolutely better than B, then also the best specimen of A is better than the best specimen of B ; for example, if man is better than horse, then also the best man is better than the best horse. Also, if the best in one class (A) is better than the best in the other class (B), then also A is absolutely better than B ; for example, if the best man is better than the best horse, then also man is better than horse absolutely.

Further, those things in which our friends can share are preferable to those in which they cannot share. Also, things are preferable which we would rather do to a friend than to any chance person. For example, to act justly and to do good are prefer- able to merely seeming to do so ; for we would rather actually do good to our friends than only seem to do so, whereas the converse is true of our attitude to chance persons.



118 a

Kat ra eK TrepiovGiag rcov avayKalcov ^eXrtco, eviore he kol alperwrepa- ^iXriov yap rod l,rjv TO €v tj]v, TO he ev ^ijv iarlv eK TrepuovcrLa?, avro 8e TO i,rjv dvayKOLov. evlore he ra ^eXrio) ov-)(l

10 Kai aiperciirepa' ov yap el ^eXrlco, avayKolov Kal alperwrepa' to yovv (j)ikoao(f)elv ^eXnov rod XP^p^f^Tit^euOai, aAA* ov')(^ alperwrepov rip evSeel rcov dvayKaiojv. to S' eK TrepLovoias ecFTLV, OTav V7Tap-)(6vT(x>v Tcov dvayKaiwv ctAAa Tivd TrpouKara- GKevd^rjrai, tls tcov KaXcov. o^^hov Se lgws aipeTOJTepov to dvayKaZov eoTi, ^IXtlov he to eK

15 irepiovGias.

Kat o puY] eoTi Trap* dXXov TTopiaaaBai t) o eoTi Kal Trap* dXXov, olov neTTOvBev r] SiKaioorvvr] npos Trjv dvSplav, Kal el Tohe fxev dvev Tovhe alpeTOV, ToSe he dvev Tovhe purj, otov hvvajjus dvev cf)povrj-

20 aecog ovx alpeTov, (j)p6vr]OLs 8' dvev hwdpiecos alpeTOV. Kal hvolv el ddrepov dpvovjjueda, Iva to XoiTfov ho^Tj Tjfjuv vTTapx^iv, eKelvo alpeTWTepov o povX6p,eda hoKelv vrrapx^LV , olov (j)iXoTrovelv dpvovjjueda, tv' ev<f)vels elvai ho^cofxev. "Eti ov Tjj dTTovGia rJTTOv eTTiTLixr^Teov hva-

25 (fiopovGL, TOVTO alpeTWTepov. Kal ov Tjj djTOVG ca fjLT) hvG(f)OpovvTL [JbdXXov emTipiiqTeov , tovto alpe-




TOPICA, III. ii-iii

Also, superfluities are better than bare necessities, and sometimes also preferable. For living a good life is better than merely living ; and a good life is a superfluity, while life itself is a necessity. Some- times better things are not also preferable ; for it does not follow that, if they are better, they are also preferable. For example, to be a philosopher is better than to make money, but it is not preferable for him who lacks the necessities of life. Superfluity exists, when, being already in possession of the necessities of life, a man tries to procure some noble accessories. We shall perhaps not be far wrong if we say that the necessary is preferable, while the superfluous is better.

Also, that which cannot be procured from another is preferable to that which can also be procured from another ; this, for example, is true of justice as compared with courage. Also A is preferable to B, if A is an object of choice without B, while B is not an object of choice without A ; for example, power is not an object of choice without prudence, but prudence is an object of choice without power. Also, if we deny the possession of one of two things in order that we may seem to possess the other, that one is preferable which we wish to seem to possess ; for example, we deny that we work hard in order that we may be thought gifted.

Furthermore, that is preferable at the absence of which it is less reprehensible to be annoyed ; also that is preferable at whose absence it is more repre- hensible not to be annoyed.

III. Furthermore, of the things which fall under FurOm the same species, that which possesses the peculiar ^comparative



118 a

olKeiav dperrjv rod fjur] exovros. diJb(f)a) 8' ixovrwv TO {xaXXov €xov.

"Ert el TO fxev TTotel dyaOov eKelvo (h dv napfj, 30 TO 8e jLCT^ TTOLel, TO TToiovv alp€TcoT€pov , KaddjTep Koi deppLOTepov to depfialvov tov jjurj. el 8' dpLcfyo) TTOiel, TO pidXXov TTOiovv T] el TO ^cXtlov Kal KvpaoTepov TToiel dyadov, otov el to puev tt^v ipvx'Tjy TO 8e TO crco/xa.


35 Tcov TTpd^ecov Kal Twv epyo>v, Kal raura Se (xtt' eKeivcjv dKoXovdel yap dAAT^AotS", otov el to hiKaiws alpeTWTepov tov dv8petcos', Kal tj SuKauo- avvYj TTJs dvSplas alpeTWTepov' Kal el rj hiKaioavvq TTJs dvBplas alpeTWTepov, Kal to 8tK:atcos" tov dv- Spelajs. TTapaTrXrjaiOJS 8c /cat irrl twv dXXojv. 118 b "Ert et TLVos TOV avTOV to puev jLtetJov dyaOov eoTL TO 8e eXaTTOVy alpeTWTepov to fiet^ov. 7^ el pieit,ovos ixeLl,ov daTepov. dXXd Kal el Svo rtm Ttvos" eir) alpeTWTepa, to pLoXXov alpeTWTepov tov 6 ^TTOV alpeTWTepov alpeTWTepov. ert ov rj virep- ^oXt] ttJs" VTTeppoXrjs alpeTWTepa, Kal avTO alpe- TWTepov, otov (ptXla XPVH'^'^^^' alpeTWTepa yap 7] Trj9 (j)iXias virep^oXr] ttj? twv xPVH'^'^^^- /^^ott ov pdXXov dv eXoiTO avTos avTW a'tTios elvai rj ov eTepoVy otov tov? cfylXovs rwv ;!^po7jLtdrcov.

" That is, we must decide whether one thing (e.g., justice) is preferable to another {e.g., courage) by considering how other words containing these ideas are used. These msij be adverbs which are ■jTTcoaei.s {cf. 106 b 29, note), or denote action or actual deed ; xPW^'-^ seems to refer to the different usages of a word.



virtue of the species is preferable to that which does valuation not possess it. If both possess it, then that which preZates: possesses it in a greater degree is preferable. ^^ce'f^^'

Furthermore, if one thing does good to anything predicate in which it is present and another does not, then pogg^e^eV that which does good is preferable (just as that the peculiar which warms is warmer than that which does not), the species. If both do good, that which does greater good, or ^^^|^ JjJJ" does good to what is better or more important, is greater preferable, for example, if one thing does good to ^°° * the soul the other to the body.

Furthermore, we can judge things from their (b) Con- inflected forms, uses, actions and deeds," and also ofin^flexious vice versa ; for they follow one another. For example, and uses of if ' justly ' is preferable to ' courageously,' then ' justice ' also is preferable to ' courage ' ; and if ' justice ' is preferable to * courage,' then ' justly ' too is preferable to ' courageously.' And similarly too in the other cases.

Furthermore, if one thing is a greater and the (c) Com- other a lesser good than the same thing, the greater wtth some good is preferable ; or if one of them is greater than ^P°^^°^ a greater good. Moreover also, if two things were to be preferable to something, that which was prefer- able to a greater degree would be preferable to that which is preferable to a less degree. Further, if the excess of one thing is preferable to the excess of the other, it is itself also preferable. For example, friendship is preferable to money ; for excess of friendship is preferable to excess of money. Also, that of which a man would prefer to be the cause by his own act is preferable to that of which he would wish another to be the cause ; for example, friends are preferable to money.



118 b

10 "Ert €K rrjs Trpoadeaeajg, el rep avrw rrpoa-

TLOefievov Tt TO oXov alperwrepov TToieZ. evKa-

^elaSai 8e Set Trporeiveiv €^' a>v rw ju,ev irepco


7TOJ9 Gvvepyov ecrrt, rep he Xolttco pur] )(prJTaL pbrjhe Gvvepyov eonv, olov Trpiova Kal hpeiravov pLera

15 reKToviKTJs' alperojTepov yap 6 Trpiojv avvSva- ^opuevo?, olttXojs Se ovx alpeTajrepov. ttolXlv el iXdrrovL TTpoaredev tl to oXov pbell^ov iroiel. opioicjs 8e Kal Ik rrjs a<j)aipeoeco?' ov yap d(f)aLpedevros aTTo rod avrov to Xenropievov eXarrov, eKelvo pbeit,ov dv eir], oirore d(f)aipedev to XeiTTop^evov eXarrov TToiel.

20 Kat el TO p.ev 8t' avTO to 8e 8ta, Tr]v ho^av atpeTov, olov vyieia KaXXovs. opos 8e tov rrpos oo^av TO pbTjSevos avveiSoTOS p^rj dv GTTovSdaaL VTrdpx^LV. Kal el to puev 8t' auTo Kal Sua T'r]v ho^av alpeTov, to 8e hid ddrepov pLovov. Kal oTTOTepov pidXXov 8t' auTO TcpLLov, TOVTO Kal jScAtiov

25 /cat atpeTWTepov. TipuLwrepov 8' dv eir] Kad* avTO, o p,r]Sev6s dXXov pieXXovTog VTrdp^eiv 8t* auTO alpovpieOa pbdXXov.

"Eti hieXeodaL TToaaxoJS to alpeTov Xeyerai Kal 402


Furthermore, you can argue by means of an addition, (d) Com- and see if the addition of one predicate to the same predicates thing as that to which another is added makes the ^y adding whole more worthy of choice. But you must beware of subtracting making a proposition in cases where the common term know?*^™ ^ uses, or in some other way co-operates with, one of the value, things added, but does not use or co-operate with the other. For example, if you were to combine a saw or a sickle with the art of carpentry ; for the saw in con- j unction is preferable, but not preferable absolutely. Again, the same is true if something added to a lesser good makes the whole a greater good. So likewise in the case of subtraction also ; for something, the sub- ^ traction of which from the same thing as that from which another is subtracted makes the remainder a lesser good, would be a greater good, when its subtraction makes the remainder a lesser good.

Also, you must consider whether one thing is (e) Corn- worthy of choice for its own sake and the other for thrgrmufd the impression which it makes on others, for example, of prefer- health as compared with beauty. That which is worthy of choice for the impression it makes may be defined as that which one would not be eager to possess if no one knew about it. You must also consider whether one thing is worthy of choice for its own sake and also for the impression it makes, and the other for only one of these reasons. Also whichever is more valuable for its own sake, is also better and more worthy of choice. More valuable for its own sake would mean that which we choose ' by preference for its own sake, when nothing else is likely to result from it.

Further, you must distinguish the various meanings which * worthy of choice ' may bear and what are the




rivcjjv xa/)tv, olov rod GV[Jb(j)€povTos r) rod koXov 7] rod rjSeos- ro yap irpos airavra t) Tvpos rot TrXeiCo

30 XPV^'^H'^^ aiperoirepov av vvdpxoL rod jjut) opLolajs. rwv 8' avrwv ap,<j)orepois VTrapyovrcov, orrorlpo) fiaiXXov vTrdpx^i GKenreov, irorepov rjSiov 7] kolX- Xlov t) GViX(ji€pa}r€pov. irdXiv ro rod ^eXriovos ev€Kev alp€ra)r€pov, olov ro dperrjs eveKev -^ 'j^SovtJs'. oijlolojs he /cat €7tl rcJov ^evKrcbv ^evKro-

85 repov yap ro fxaXXov ifJUTToSiGriKov ra)V alpercov, OLOV voGog aiG^ovs' Kal yap rjSovrjg Kal rod gttov- Salov elvai KcoXvriKcorepov rj voGog.

"Ert eK rod ofjioiojg SeiKvvvai <f)€VKr6v Kal alperov ro TrpoKeifxevov rjrrov yap alperov ro roLodrov, o Kal eXour av rug ofJLOLCos Kal (j)vyoiy rod irepov ovros alperod puovov. 119 a IV. Tas" /xev ovv TTpos dXX7]Xa GvyKpiGeis, Kaddrrep eLprjrai, rroLTjreov. ol avrol 8e tottoi Xp'^cf^P'Oi Kal irpos ro heiKvvvai onodv alperov ^ cf>€VKr6v' a^atpetv yap fiovov Set rrjv TTpos erepov VTTepoxrjV. el yap ro ripnajrepov alperwrepov, Kal 6 ro rifJiLov alperov, Kal el ro ;)^pr^crt/xcoTepo^' alpe- rcorepov, Kal ro ;!^/37ycrtjLtov alperov. opioicos he Kal eirl rwv aAAcov, ocra roiavrr^v ex^c rrjv Gvy- KpiGLV. err* evicxtv yap evdecog Kara rrjv Trpog 404

TOPICA, III. iii-iv

ends in view, such as expediency or honour or pleasure ; for that which is useful for all these ends, or for most of them, would be more worthy of choice than which is not so useful. If the same qualities belong to both of two things, you should examine to which they belong in a greater degree, that is, which is more pleasant or honourable or expedient. Again, that which serves the better purpose is more worthy of choice, for example, that which aims at virtue than that which aims at pleasure. So too with the things which are to be avoided. That is more to be avoided which is more likely to stand in the way of that which is worthy of choice ; for example, disease is more to be avoided than ugliness, for di- sease is a greater preventive both of pleasure and of goodness.

Further, you can argue by showing that the subject under discussion is equally an object of avoidance and of choice ; for the kind of thing which one would equally choose and avoid is less worthy of choice than an alternative which is worthy of choice only.

IV. Comparisons, then, of things with one another Adaptation should be made in the manner described. The same rules to commonplaces are useful also for showing that some- ^J^^^^fll^^f thing is simply worthy of choice or avoidance ; for value. we need only subtract the excess of one thing over the other. For if that which is more valuable is more worthy of choice, then also that which is valu- able is worthy of choice, and, if that which is more useful is more worthy of choice, then also that which is useful is worthy of choice ; and so too in the other cases where such comparison is possible. P'or some- times, while we are actually comparing two things,




119 a

erepov GvyKpioiv koI on alperov eKarepov t) to

€T€pov XeyojJiev, olov orav to jLtev <^vaei ayadov 10 TO 8e fjbTj <I)VG€L Aeyco/xev to yap <j)vaei ayadov hr\Xov on alperov ionv.

V. Arj7TT€Ov 8* oTt ixdXiora KaOoXov rovg TOTTOVS 7T€pL Tov fjudXXov Kal Tov ixeit^ovos' Xr](f)- 9evT€s yap ovrojs Trpos TrXelct) ^^prjaLfJiOi av eirjoav. 16 €o-Tt 8* avTihv TOJV elprjfjievcov ivtovs KadoXov (jidXXov TTOLelv [XLKpov TTapaXXaGUOvra ttJ rrpoa- rjyopla, olov to (^voet roiovro tov [jurj (I)V(J€l


he fjLT] TTOieZ to e-)(ov Toiovhe rj (L av virapx'^, jJidXXov TOLOVTO 6 TTOTe TToiel 7^ o fXTj TToiel. el 8' apL(j)Cx)


20 "Eti el TOV avTov tlvos to fjLev [xaXXov to 8e


TTpooQeGeoys, el to) avrcp irpoaTLdepievov to oXov


TTpoaTLdepievov to oXov jjLaXXov TroLel tolovto. 25 d/xotcDS" 8e Kal eK rrjs d(f)aLpeaeo)S' ov yap a^at-

^ Reading toiovtov </xdAAov> toiovto. Pacius renders, si alterum sit tali re magis tale^ alterum non sit tali re tale, manifestum est^ etc.



we immediately assert that each or one of them is worthy of choice, for example, when we say that one thing is naturally good and another not naturally good ; for what is naturally good is obviously worthy of choice.

V. The commonplaces which deal with the more Rules for the and the greater degree must be taken as generally pmSS* as possible ; for when they are so taken they would ?/ accidents be useful in a larger number of cases. Of the actual instances given above some can be made of more general application by a slight change in the way in which they are worded. We can say, for example, that that which naturally has a certain quality has that quality in a greater degree than that which does not possess it naturally. Also, if one thing does, and another thing does not, create a certain quality in that which possesses it, or in which it is present, then whichever creates it has that quality in a greater degree than that which does not create it ; and, if both create it, then that which creates it in a greater degree, possesses it in a greater degree.

Further, if one thing is of a certain quality in a greater degree and the other in a less degree than the same thing, and also, if one thing possesses a certain quality in a greater degree than some other thing which possesses it, and the other does not, it is obvious that the former in each case possesses the quality in a greater degree. Further, you must see, as a result of addition, whether something added to the same thing makes the whole of a certain quality in a greater degree, or whether, being added to something which possesses the quality in a less degree, it gives the whole that quality in a greater degree. And, similarly, if subtraction is used ; for



119 a

pedevros to AetTTO/xevov rjrrov tolovto, avro [idXXov

TOiovTo. Koi TCL TOL? ivavTLOLS (x/xtyccTTepa [JidXXov TOiavra, oTov XevKorepov to tco [xeXavL aixiyeorepov . en Trapa ra elpiqpLeva irporepov, to fxaXXov eTTiSe- 30 p^OjLtevov Tov oIk€lov rov TTpoKeipuevov Aoyov, ofov el TOV XevKov €gtI Xoyos XP^H'^ hiaKpiTiKov oipecos, XevKOTepov 6 €gtl /xaAAov XP^H'^ SiaKpi-

TLKOV Oxjj€(Ji)S.

VI. "Av 8' €7tI fxipOVS Koi jJLTj KadoXoV TO 7Tp6-

jSAr^/xa Tcdfj, rrpcJJTOV fxev ol elprjfjLevoL KadoXov KaTaGKevauTLKol tj dvaaKevaoTLKol tottol rrdvTes 86 xPV^^P'Oi'- KadoXov yap dvaipovvTes rj KaTaoKevd- ^ovTes- Koi €7tI jjLepov? heiKvvpLev et yap rravTl v7rdpx€L, Kal tlvl, /cat €t fJLrjSevL, ovhe tlvL fjidXiOTa 8* eTTLKaipoL Kal kolvol tcov tottojv ol T €K tcov

dvTLK€Lpbiv<J)V Kal TCOV GVdTOLXCOV Kal TCOV 7TT(i}0€Ct}V'

6fjLOLa)s yap evSo^ov to d^idjcrai, el Trdoa rjSovrj dyadov, Kal Xv7T7]v irdoav elvac KaKov, to) €l tls ii9h rjBovTj dyadov, Kal Xvvr]v elvai TLva KaKov. €tl €t Tt? alodriGis ixTj ioTi hvvafjLis, Kal dvaioS'qoia TVS ovK eoTLv dhvvapiia. Kal et Tt vTToXiqTTTOv iTTLGTrjTOV, Kal VTToXiqijjis Tts" eTTiGTrjiiiq. rrdXiv et 5 Tt TCOV dhiKCDv dyadov, Kal tcov StKaucov tl KaKov Kal et Tt TcDv SiKaloJS KaKov, Kal tcov dhiKWS Tt 408


that the subtraction of which makes the remainder less of a certain quality, itself possesses more of that quality. Also things possess qualities in a greater degree which have less admixture of the contraries of those qualities ; for example, a thing is whiter which has less admixture of black. Further, besides what has already been said, a thing possesses a quality in a greater degree when it admits of the particular definition of the subject in question to a greater degree ; for example, if the definition of ' white ' is ' a colour which penetrates the vision,' that is whiter which is in a greater degree a colour which penetrates the vision.

VI. If the problem is put in a particular and not Particular in a universal way, in the first place the general ^^^' commonplaces mentioned above as applicable in con- («) ^^^P" structive and destructive argument are all of them previous useful. For, when we destroy or construct some- '""^®^- thing universally, we also display it in particular ; for if something belongs to all, it also belongs to a particular one, and if it belongs to none, neither does it belong to a particular one. Those common- (i) Rules places are especially convenient and widely applicable opposites, which are based on opposites and co-ordinates and co-ordinates inflexions ; for the claim that if all pleasure is good, inflexions. then all pain is evil, meets with the same general acceptance as the claim that if some pleasure is good, then some pain is evil. Further, if some kind of perception is not a capacity, then some absence of perception is not an incapacity. Also, if something conceivable is knowable, then some conception is knowledge. Again, if something which is unjust is good, then something which is just is bad ; and if something which can be done justly is bad, something



119 b

dyaOov. Kal et tl tcov rjheojv c/yevKrov, rjhovi^

TL9 ^evKTOv. Kara ravra Se Kal et tl tcov rjheojv (XKJyiXifxov , rihovT] rts" ci^eAt/xov. Kal irrl rcbv (f>dapTLKa)v §€ Kal rwv yevlaecov Kal <f)9op6jv waavTCDS. el yap ri (j)dapriK6v rjSovrj? rj eTnaTrnxrjS

10 6V dyaSov eoriv, eiiq dv tls rjSovrj ^ eTTKJTrjixrj rcbv KaKcbv. o/xotco? 8e Kal el <j)6opd ng eTTiGrrnjir]? rwv dyaOcbv rj rj yeveai'S rcov KaKajv, ecrrai tls eTTLCTTrjiJLT] TCOV KaKcbv, olov el TO eTTiXavddveadaL a TLg alaxpd eirpa^e tcjv dyadcbv tj to dvap,L- pLvrjaKeadaL tcov KaKcbv, etr) dv to eTrioTaoBaL a

15 TLS alaxpd errpa^e tcov KaKCJV. coaavTCOs 8e Kal eirl tcov dXkajv ev aTraoL yap ojjlolcos to evho^ov.

"^TL eK Tov pidXXov Kal '^TTOV Kal OJJLOLCOS. el yap [jLaXXov fiev tcov e^ dXXov yevovs tl tolovto eKelvcov Se purjSev eaTLV, ovS* dv to elprjfievov etrj

20 TOLovTov, OLOV el fjidXXov jxev eTTLOTrjpir] tls dyadov r) TjSovri, jJLTjSefjLLa 8' eTTLOTrnir) dyaOov, ouS' dv TjSovT) etr]. Kal eK tov 6[jlolcos Se Kal tjttov coaavTCOS' ecrrat yap Kal dvaLpelv Kal KaraGKevd- l,eLV, ttXtjv €k jjLev tov ojjlolcos dpLcfyoTepa, eK Se tov TjTTOv KaraGKevd^eLV fxovov, dvaGKevd^eLV Se 410


which can be done unjustly is good. Also, if some pleasant thing is to be avoided, pleasure is some- times to be avoided. On the same principle, too, if a pleasant thing is sometimes beneficial, pleasure is sometimes beneficial. Similarly with regard to destructive agencies and the processes of generation and destruction. For, if something which is de- structive of pleasure or knowledge is good, pleasure or knowledge would sometimes be an evil thing. Similarly, too, if the destruction of knowledge is sometimes a good thing or the production of it an evil thing, knowledge will be sometimes an evil thing ; for example, if the forgetting of someone's disgraceful deeds is a good thing or the remembrance of them a bad thing, the knowledge of the disgraceful things which he has done would be an evil thing. Similarly, too, in the other cases ; for in all of them the generally accepted opinion is formed in the same manner.

Further, arguments can be derived from the (2) Rules greater and the less and the like degree. If some- grllterl^th? thing; in another ffenus has some qualitv in a greater l?ss and the degree than the object under discussion and none of the members of that genus possesses that quality, then neither could the object under discussion possess it ; for example, if some kind of knowledge were good in a greater degree than pleasure, while no kind of knowledge is good, then neither would pleasure be good. We can argue in a similar way from the like and the less degrees ; for it will be possible to argue thus both destructively and con- structively, except that both processes can be based on the like degree, but the less degree can be used for constructive purposes only and not for destructive



119 b

ov. el yap ofjuotcjog Svvajjit? rts" ayaOov Kal iiri-

25 GTT^iJLrj, eon he rt? 8wa/xt? ayaOov, Kal eTnorrnjiri eariv. el he fxrjhejJiLa Swa/xts", o?}S' emGT'qiJirj. el 8' TjTTOV hvvafxis ris ayadov ri eTTKJTrjfjLT], eon he ns hvva[jLL9 ayadov y Kal eTriorrjixri. el he [I'qhefiLa hvvafJLLS ayadov, ovk dvdyKT] Kal emoT-^fJLrjv ^rj- heiiiav elvai ayadov. hriXov ovv on KaraoKevd^eiv

80 fJiovov eK rod rjrrov eonv.

Ov [JLOvov 8' e^ dXXov yevovs eonv dvaoKevdt,eiv, aAAa Kal eK rod avrov XajJL^dvovn to fJudXiora TOiovTOV, olov el Kelrai eTTioTrnxy] ns dyaOov, heLxdeirj 8' on (f)p6vr]Oi9 ovk dyadov, ovh^ dXXrj

35 ovhejjbia eorai, eirel ovh^ rj pudXiora hoKovoa. en e^ VTTodeoews, ofjiolws d^Lwoavra, el evi, Kal irdoiv VTTapxeiv -^ jjltj VTrdpx^LV, olov el rj rod dvdpcniTov ifjvx'^ dOdvaros, Kal rds aAAa?, el 8' avrr] pirj, /x7]Se rag d'AAa?. el jjiev ovv vrrapxetv nvl Kelrai, heiKreov on ov^ vrrdp^ei nvr dKo- XovBrjoei yap hid rrjv VTTodeoiv rd fjir]hevl VTrdpxeiv.

120 a el he nvi [xr] VTrdpxov Kelrai, heiKreov on VTrdpx^i'

nvL' Kal yap ovrois dKoXovQiqoei rd irdoiv VTrdpx^^'V. hrjXov 8' eorlv on 6 vrrondepLevos TToiel rd rrpo- 412


purposes. For if a certain capacity is good in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain capacity is good, then knowledge is also good ; but if no capacity is good, knowledge is not good either. On the other hand, if a certain capacity is good in a less degree than knowledge, and a certain capacity is good, then so also is knowledge ; but if no capacity is good, it does not necessarily follow that no knowledge is good either. It is clear, therefore, that arguments from the less degree can only be used for constructive purposes.

It is possible to destroy an opinion not only by (b) De- means of another genus but also by means of the argument same genus by taking an extreme case ; for example, ^^^ ^^ if it were to be laid down that a certain kind of only from knowledge is good, and it were to be shown that genus^but prudence is not good, then no other kind of know- also from ledge will be good, since not even that kind of know- genus. ledge is good which is generally reputed to be so. Further, you can argue by means of a hypothesis, claiming that if some attribute belongs or does not belong to one member of the genus, it also belongs or does not belong in a like degree to all ; for example, that, if the soul of man is immortal, all other souls are also immortal, but if it is not, then neither are the other souls. If, therefore, it is laid down that an attribute belongs to some member of the genus, you must show that there is some member to which it does not belong ; for it will follow in accordance with the hypothesis that it belongs to no member of the genus. But, if it is laid down that it does not belong to any member, it must be shown that there is a member to which it belongs ; for thus it will follow that it belongs to all the members of the genus. Now it is clear that he who makes the



120 a

^Xr^jxa KaOoXov eirl fxlpov? reOev rov yap inl

fjbdpovs ofioXoyovvTa KadoXov d^ioZ ofioXoyelVy

5 eTreLhrj, el ivi, /cat Trdoiv ofJLOLOJS d^Lol V7Tdp)(€LV.

^ Ahiopiarov jLtev ovv ovtos tov Trpo^Xrjfjiarog

pLovaxoJS dvaGK€vd^€LV ivSexerai, olov el e(j)7](jev

TjSovrjv dyadov etvai t) [xr] dyadov, Kal fJL7]hev dXXo

TTpoaSicopiaev. el fiev ydp riva ecfyrjaev rjSovrjv

dyaOov etvat, heiKreov KadoXov on ovSefxla, el

10 fJLeXXei dvaipeludaL to TTpoKeifxevov. ofJLoiojs 8e Kal el TLva e(f)r)aev rjSovrjv (jltj etvat dyadov, Sei- ktIov KadoXov on Trdaa' dXXa>s 8' ovk ivSe)(eTaL dvaipeiv. idv ydp Set^co/xev on eari ns rj^ovrj ovk dyadov rj dyadov, ovtto) dvaipelraL to TTpoKei- fxevov. SrjXov ovv on dvaipeiv fiev [xovaxo^? evSe-

15 X^'^^^> KaraoKevdl^eiv 8e 8t;^a)S" dv re ydp KadoXov Sei^cofjiev on irdaa rjSovrj dyadov, dv re on ecrrt Tts" rjSovT] dyadov, Seheiyfjuevov earai to TrpoKei- jxevov. ojJUOLOJS 8e Kav Serj SiaXexdrjvac on earl ng rjSovrj ovk dyadov, edv hei^cDpiev on ovhepiia dyadov t) oVt Tts" ovk dyadov, hieiXeypievoi eoojJLeda

20 dix(f)orepcxig , Kal KadoXov Kal em fxepovs, on eari ns rjSovTj OVK dyadov. SLCjopLGfjLevrjg 8e rrjg deoreojs ovGTjs, Blxojs dvaipeiv earai, olov el redeirj nvl fiev v7Tdpx€iv rjSovfj dyadcp etvat, Ttvt 8' ovx VTvapxeiv etVe ydp Trdcra Seixdeir] '^Sovrj dyadov 414


hypothesis makes the problem universal, though it is posited in a particular form ; for he demands that the maker of a particular admission should make a universal admission, since he demands that, if an attribute belongs in a particular case, it belongs in like manner to all.

When the problem is indefinite, there is only one (c) The way of demolishing a statement, for example, if definiteness someone has said that pleasure is good or is not ^^jj \^ good, and has added nothing by way of definition, of the If he meant that a certain pleasure is good, it must pJoo?£md " be shown universally that no pleasure is good, if disproof. the proposition is to be destroyed. Similarly, if he meant that some particular pleasure is not good, it must be shown universally that every pleasure is good ; it is impossible to destroy the proposition in any other way. For if we show that a particular pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition is not yet destroyed. It is clear, then, that there is only one method of destruction but two of con- struction ; for the proposition will have been demonstrated both if we show universally that all pleasure is good, and also if we show that some particular pleasure is good. Similarly, when one has to argue that a particular pleasure is not good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure is not good, we shall have argued in two ways, universally and particularly, that a particular pleasure is not good. On the other hand, when the thesis is definite, it will be possible to destroy it by two methods, for example, if it be laid down that it is the attribute of some particular pleasure to be good, but not of another ; for whether it be shown that all pleasure is good or that none is good, the



120 a

ctre ^TjSefJiLa, avrjprjfjbevov earai to 7TpoK€L[Jb€Vov.

25 el 8e fJLLav tjSovtjv iiovrjv dyadou edrfKev etvat, rpLX^JS ivhe)(€Tai dvaipelv Set^avres" yap on Trdaa '^ on ovSefXia rj on TrXetovg fiids dyaOov, dvrjprj- k6t€s idofjieda to rrpoKeipievov. IttI TrXelov 8e ttJ? deaecos hiopiodeioris, olov on rj (fypovTjGLS pLovrj Tcjv dpercov eTrtOTT^/XTy, rerpaxcos eonv dvaipelv heixQevTos yap on Trdcra dperr] iTnorripLri rj on

30 ovSepLia 'q on Kal dXXrj n9, otov rj hiKaioavvrj , rj on avrrj rj (j)p6vrjois ovk eTTiGTifjii'-q, dvrjprjpulvov eoTat TO TTpoKeifJievov.

^prjcTLfJiov 8e Kal to em^XeTTeiv errl rd Kad^ CKaara, iv ols virapxeiv n rj jxrj ecprjrai, KaOdrrep iv rot? KadoXov Trpo^Xi^iJiaGLV. en S' ev TOt?

35 yiveoLV eTn^Xerrriov , hiaipovvra Kar e'lSrj P'^xp^ T(x)v drofiajv, KaOd rrpoeiprjr ai' dv re yap rravn <j>aivr]Tai virdpxov dv re pLrjhevi, rroXXd npoevey- Kavn d^ioireov KadoXov opLoXoyelv rj ^epeiv ev- oraoiv eirl rivos ovx ovrojg. en ecj) (Lv eonv rj et3et rj dpidp^io hiopioai to avjjL^e^rjKos, GKerrreov 120 b el fjurjhev rovrcov virdpxei, olov on 6 ;)^pdvos' ov KLvetrat ou8' eoTt KivrjuiSy KarapiBjirjodiievov TToaa etbr] KLV7]aea>5- el yap fjurjhev rovrojv virapxet rep Xpovo), S^Aov oTt ov KLvelrai ouS' eorl KivrjGLS. 416



proposition will have been destroyed. If, however, our opponent has stated that one pleasure alone is good, it is possible to destroy the proposition in three ways ; for if we show that all pleasure, or no pleasure, or more than one pleasure, is good, we shall have destroyed the proposition. If the thesis is still more strictly defined — for example, that prudence alone of the virtues is knowledge — four ways of destroying it are possible ; for if it has been shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is knowledge, or that some other virtue (for example, justice) is knowledge, or that prudence itself is not knowledge, the proposition will have been destroyed.

It is useful to look at particular instances where (d) Various it has been stated that some attribute belongs or rules.^^ does not belong, as in the case of universal problems. Further, you must look within the genera, dividing them according to their species until you reach the indivisible, as has already been described." For whether the attribute is shown to be present in all or in none, you should, after bringing forward numerous cases, claim that your contention should be admitted universally or else an objection should be made stating in what instance it does not hold good. Further, where it is possible to define the accident either by species or by number, you must see whether none of them belongs, showing, for example, that time does not move and that it is not a form of motion, by enumerating all the different kinds of motion ; for if none of these belongs to time, it is clear that it does not move and is not a form of motion. Similarly, too, you can

" 109 b 15.

P 417


120 b

ofJLOLOJS Se Kal on r) i/jvxrj ovk apiByios, StcAo/xevov on TTas apidjjbos rj Trepirros ri apnos' el yap rj 5 i/jvx^ fJL'qre Trepirrov [xrjre apnov, StJAov ort ovk dpidfjios.

Upos fjuev ovv TO (JVjJL^e^TjKos Slol tcov tolovtwv Kal ovrojs iTnx^Lp7]T€ov .



show that the soul is not a number by distinguishing all numbers as either odd or even ; for if the soul is neither odd nor even, clearly it is not a number.

As regards accident, then, such are the means and such the methods which you should employ.



120 b 12 I. Mera he ravra Trepl rcov irpos to yivos kol TO Ihiov e7noK€7TT€OV. €GTi he ravra aroLxela rcov TTpog Tous" opovs' rrepl avrwv he rovrojv oXiyoLKLs

15 at GKeijjeLS y ivovr ai rots hiaXeyofievoLS. dv hrj redfj yevos rivos rcov ovrcov, rrpihrov fxev eiri- pXeireiv errt rravra ra ovyyevrj rep XexSevriy e'u nvog fJbTj Karrjyopelrai, Kaddrrep eTTc rod avpu- ^e^r^Korog, olov el rrjs rjhovrjs rdyaOov yevos Kelr ai, el ris rjhovr] fjur] dyaOov el yap rovro, StJAov OTt 01) yevo9 rdyadov rrjs rjhovrjg- ro yap

20 yevos Kara Travrcuv rcov vtto ro avro ethos Kar- rjyopeiraL. elra el fjurj ev rep ri eon Karrjyopeirai, aAA' d)s Gvpi^e^riKos, Kaddrrep ro XevKov rfjs Xi'Ovos, t) ^vxV^ '^^ KLVovfJuevov vcf)^ avrov. ovre yap rj ;)^tcov orrep XevKoVy hiOTrep ov yevos ro XevKov rrjs ;;^tovos', ovd^ r) ipvxrj OTrep KLvovfievov' ovjjl-

25 ^e^rjKe 8' avrfj KiveluQai, Kaddnep /cat rep t,ci)cp TToXXdKLS j3a8t^etv re Kal ^ahl^ovn etvat. en ro KLVovpLevov ov ri eoriv, dXXd ri ttoiovv 'q irdaxov or]p.aiveiv eoiKev. o/xotca? he Kal ro XevKov ov 420


I. The next questions which we must examine are (B) Of those which relate to genus and property. These JbocSiv). are elements in questions relating to definitions, but Various in themselves are seldom the subject of inquiries by disputants. If, then, a genus is asserted of some- (a) The thing which exists, you must first examine all the fnSeaif things which are related to the subject in question members of and see whether it fails to be predicated of one of specie?as them, as was done in the case of the accident. For ^^^.^ipC- .

1 1 . . 1 1 < 1 > which it 13

example, when it is stated that good is a genus predicated. of pleasure, you must see whether some particular pleasure is not good ; for, if so, clearly ' good ' is not the genus of pleasure, for the genus is predicated of everything which falls under the same species. Next, you must see whether it is predicated, not in the category of essence, but as an accident, as ' white ' is predicated of * snow ' or ' self-moved ' of the soul. For neither is ' snow ' ' that which is white,' ^ and therefore ' white ' is not the genus of snow, nor is the ' soul ' ' that which moves ' ; for it is an accident that it moves, just as it is often an accident of an animal that it walks or is walking. Further, ' moving ' does not seem to signify the essence of a thing but that it does something or has something done to it. Similarly also ' white ' ; for it does not signify the

    • i.e. a species of white.



yap TL ecFTLV r) x^^^> aAAa ttoiov tl 07]Aol. ojgt ovSerepov avrcJov iv rep rt iarc Karr^yopeiTai.

30 MaAtCTra 8' errt tov rod avpi^e^r) kotos opiapiov eiTL^XeTTeiv , el e(/)ap/xoTTet iirl to pr]Bev yevos, olov Koi ra vvv elprjjjudva. ivSex^rai yap Kcvelv n avTO iavTO Kal puj, opLoitos Se /cat XevKov elvai Kal fJUTj. ooGT ovSerepov avrcbv yevos aAAa crt>/x- ^e^iqKos, iTTeiSr] avpilSe^rjKos eXiyoixev 6 ivSex^rai

35 VTTapx^iv TLvl Kal pLiq.

"Ert el pLTj ev rfj avrfj SuaLpeaei to yevos Kal to etSos, aAAa to puev ovcria to 8e ttolov, ^ to puev irpos TL TO he TTOIOV, olov rj puev ;^tct)v Kal 6 KVKVog ovGta, TO 8e XevKov ovk ovola dXXa ttolov, coctt' ov yevos to XevKov ttjs ;\;tovos" ov8e tov kvkvov. 121 a TTaXiv Tj puev eTTLOTTjpir] Twv TTpos TL, TO 8' dyaOov Kal TO KaXov TTOLOV, oiOT OV yevos TO aya^ov r) TO AcaAov rris eTTLOTiqpLrjS' to, yap tcoi/ TTpos tl yevq Kal avTOb TWV TTpos tl hel etvaL, KaOdrrep IttI tov 5 8t7rAaortov Kal yap to TroAAaTrAaortov, 6V yevos TOV SLvXaoLOV, Kal avTO twv TTpos tl eoTLv. Kad- oXov 8' elnelv, vtto ttjv avTTjv Statpeatv Sel to yevos TO) etSeL elvaL- el yap to elSos ovala, Kal to yevos, KaL et TTOLOV TO elSoSy Kal to yevos ttolov tl, olov el TO XevKov ttolov tl, Kal to ;)^pa)/xa. opLoioJS 8e Kal errl tcov dXXojv.

10 IlaAtv el dvdyKT] -^ evSex^TaL tov TeOevTOS ev TO) yeveL juLeTex^Lv to yevos. opos 8e tov fJierex^LV

" 102 b 6. 422


essence of snow, but its possession of a certain quality. So neither ' white ' nor * moving ' is predi- cated in the category of essence.

You should look particularly at the definition of (b) Accident the accident and see whether it fits the asserted gui^hed^" genus, as, for example, in the instances just men- from genua tioned. For it is possible for a thing to be and not attribute to be self-moved, and similarly for it to be and not to bSong oT be white ; so that neither attribute is a genus but not belong. both are accidents, since we said'* that an accident is something which can and also can not belong to something.

Further, you must see whether the genus and the (c) The species are not in the same division, but the one is theTpecies a substance and the other a quality, or the one is a P"st fall relative and the other a quality, as, for example, category. ' snow ' and * swan ' are substance, but ' white ' is not a substance but a quality ; so that ' white ' is not the genus of ' snow ' or of ' swan.' Again,

  • knowledge ' is a relative, whereas ' good ' and
  • noble ' are qualities, so that ' good ' and ' noble '

are not genera of knowledge. For the genera of relatives must themselves be relatives, as is true of ' double ' ; for ' multiple,' which is the genus of

  • double,' is itself also a relative. To put the matter

generally, the genus must fall under the same division as the species ; for, if the species is a sub- stance, so also is the genus, and if the species is a quality, the genus also is a quality ; for example, if white is a quality, so also is colour. Similarly also with the other instances.

Again, you must see whether it is necessary or (d) Species possible for the genus to partake of that which general but

has been placed in the ffenus. (The definition of ^o^senera ^ o \ of species.


121 a

TO i7TiSex€(T9aL rov rod ixere^oyievov Xoyov. StJAov

ovv OTL TO, fjL€v etSrj fjuerex^f' twv yevcbv, ra he yevrj

T(x)v elSajv ov- to {juev yap etSos imhlx^Tai tov

Tov yevovs Xoyov, to Se yevos tov tov elhovs ov.

15 GK€7TT€ov OVV el ^eTe)(^ei r] ivSex^Tau ijl€T€X€Lv tov etSovg TO OLTToSodev yevos, olov el tis tov ovtos r} TOV evos yevos tl dTroSoLi]- ovfjupTjaeTai yap /xcr- ex€tv TO yevos tov eihovs' KaTa ttcivtcov yap tcov 6vT(x)v TO ov Kal TO Iv KaTTjyopetTaL, coare /cat o Xoyos avTOJV.

20 "Ert el KaTOL tlvos to drroSoOev elSos dXr)deveTai, TO 8e yevos p^yj, olov el to ov t] to eTTLOTrjTov tov So^aoTOV yevos Tedeirj. KaTa yap tov p,rj ovtos TO So^aoTov KaT7]yopy]drjaeTaL- ttoXXo, yap twv /XT] ovTCov So^acrra. otl 8e to 6V rj to erriGTiqTov ov KaTTjyopeLTaL KaTa tov purj ovtos, SrjXov. coot

25 ov yevos to ov ovhe to eTnaTryrov tov So^aorTov' Kad^ Sv yap to ethos KaTTjyo peiTai, Kal to yevos Set KaTiqyo peloQ ai .

YldXiv el p.rj8ev6s twv elhcov evhe^^Tai p,eTex€iv TO Tedev iv tw yevei' dhvvaTov yap tov yevovs fieTex^i'V p^yjhevos tojv elhojv p^eTexov, dv p.ij tl

30 Tcbv KaTa TTjV TTpcoTTjv hiaipeoLV elhojv fj- TavTa he TOV yevovs p^ovov pieTex^i- dv ovv rj KLvrjais yevos TTJs rjhovrjs Tedfj, oKeiTTeov el purjTe (f)opd piTiT dXXoioyois Tj TjhovT] pnqTe tojv Xolttwv twv 424



  • partaking ' is ' admitting the definition of that which

is partaken.') It is obvious, therefore, that the species partake of the genera, whereas the genera do not partake of the species ; for the species admits the definition of the genus, whereas the genus does not admit the definition of the species. You must, therefore, look and see w^hether the genus assigned partakes, or can partake of the species ; for example, if one were to assign something as the genus of ' being ' or of ' oneness,' for the result will be that the genus partakes of the species, for ' being ' and

  • oneness ' are predicated of everything which exists,

and therefore so is their definition also.

Further, you must look whether there is any case (e) if the in which the species assigned is true but the genus p?eScaSd, is not true, for example, if ' being ' or ' knowable ' the genus were given as the genus of ' conjectural.' For ' con- predicated, jectural ' will be predicated of that which does not exist ; for many things which do not exist are sub- jects of conjecture. But it is obvious that ' being ' and ' knowable ' are not predicated of that which does not exist. And so neither ' being ' nor ' know- able ' is the genus of ' conjectural ' ; for of things of which the species is predicated, the genus also must be predicated.

Again, you must see whether that which is placed (/) A pre- in the genus cannot possibly partake of any of its noTpartake species ; for it is impossible for it to partake of the of .the genus genus if it does not partake of any of its species, takes of unless it is one of the species obtained at the first ^°°^ °^ '^ division, which do partake of the genus only. If, therefore, ' motion ' is laid down as the genus of pleasure, you must examine whether pleasure is neither locomotion nor alteration nor any of the





ovSevos av ra>v elScjv jjierixoc war* ovhe rod yevovSy iTreiSrj dvayKaiov eon to rod yevovs

35 jJi€T€XOV Kal TtOV etSoJV TLVOS ^€re)(€lV 60CTT* OVK

av eiTj etSos" rj rjSovrj Kivr]U€Cx)s, ovhe rcov drofjicov ovSev^ TO)v VTTO ro yevos^ to ttjs Kivijaeajs ovtwv. Kal yap tol aTOjJba jLtere;)^€t tov yivovs Kal tov

etSoU?, oloV 6 TLS dvdpOiTTOS Kal dvdpCxJTTOV ^€T€X€L

Kal l^a)ov. 121 b "Ert et inl rrXiov Aeyerat tov yevovg to Iv tco yevei TeOev, otov to So^aoTov tov ovtos' Kal yap

TO OV Kal TO jJLT] oV So^aGTOV, UiUT OVK dv €17]

TO So^acrrov etSo? tov ovtos' eirl rrXeov yap del to yevos TOV el'SofS" Aeyerat. irdXiv el err* lgojv to 5 etSos Kal TO yevog Aeyerat, otov el rcov irdorLV errofjievcov to jjuev etSo? to 8e yevos TedeiY), Kaddirep TO OV Kal TO ev iravTl yap to ov Kal to ev, cocrr* ovheTepov ovSerepov yevo?, eTreihr] Itt* laoiv Xe- yerat. ojjioicos Se Kal el to rrpcoTov Kal rj dp)(7] V7T*^ dXXriXa Tedeiiq- tj re yap dp)(rj TrpwTov Kal to 10 TTpojTOV dpx'^, oauT J] d/x^orepa ra elpr^Leva TavTov ecTTLV Tj ovheTepov ovSerepov yevos. otol-

)^etov 8e irpos dnavTa Ta ToiavTa to eirl nXeov to

yevos rj to ethos Kal ttjv hiacjyopdv Xeyeadai' err* eXaTTov yap Kal rj Sta</>opa tov yevovs Aeyerat.

^ Reading ovhev with Wallies for ovhk.

^ yevos W. S. Maguinness, eiSos- codd.

^ Reading vn with Waitz for eV*.

" eiSos, ' species,' which the mss. read here, is quite con- trary to the argument, which requires yevost ' genus.'



other generally assigned modes of motion ; for, then, obviously it would not partake of any of the species, and, therefore, cannot partake of the genus either, since that which partakes of the genus must necessarily partake of one of the species also. So pleasure cannot be a species of motion nor any of the individual things which fall under the genus " of motion. For the individuals also partake of the genus and of the species ; for example, the individual man partakes both of ' man ' and ' animal.'

Further, you must see whether that which is (g) The placed in the genus has a wider application than ^y^^^ appit- the genus as, for example, ' an object of conjecture ' cation than is wider than ' being ' ; for both that which is and that which is not are objects of conjecture, so that ' object of conjecture ' could not be a species of ' being ' ; for the genus is always applied more widely than the species. Again, you must see whether the species and its genus are applied to an equal number of things ; for example, if, of the attributes which accompany everything, one were to be put down as a species and the other as a genus, for example, ' being ' and ' oneness ' ; for every- thing possesses ' being ' and ' oneness,' so that neither is the genus of the other, since they are applied to an equal number of things. Similarly, too, if the ' first ' and the ' beginning ' were to be placed one under the other ; for the ' beginning ' is ' first ' and the ' first ' is a ' beginning,' so that either the two terms are identical or neither is the genus of the other. In all such cases the basic principle is that the genus has a wider application than the species and its differentia ; for the differ- entia also has a narrower application than the genus.




15 *Opdv Se Kal et nvos twv dSia(f)6pwv etSet jjiij

€GTL TO €lpr][jL€Vov yevo? Tj iJLTj S6^€Lev CLV , Kara- GKevdlovTL Se, el eari nvos. ravrov yap navrajv T(x)v dhia(j)6pcx)v etSet yevos- dv ovv eVos" SeixOfj, SrjXov on rrdvTCxiVy Koiv ivo? jjltj, SrjXov on ovSevos, olov €L ns dropLovg ndejjbevog ypapLpids to dhi-

20 aiperov yevos avrajv (jiiqaeiev elvai. tojv yap 8tat- peoTLV e;^ouo-cu;^ ypafjbjjiajv ovk eon to elpiqixevov yevos, dhia^opcov ovorcbv Kara to elSog- dhid(j}opoi yap aAAT^Aats" AcaTCt to etSos" at evdelai ypapLjial TTaoai.

II. Y^KOTTelv Se Kal et n dXXo yevos eon rod

25 drroSodevTOS etSous", o jJLrjre 7T€pL€)(€L ro dTToSodev yevos jJiT^O^ utt' eKeivo eGnv, olov et ns rrjs StAcato- GVV7]s rr^v eVtCTTT^jLtT^v ^etT] yevos. €on yap Kal Tj dperrj yevos, Kal o-uSerepov tojv yevwv ro Xolttov rrepiex^t-, oior ovk dv etrj rj eTTicir'iijjJirj yevos rrjs hiKaiouvvqs ' So/cet yap, orav ev ethos vrrd hvo

30 yevr) fj, ro erepov vtfo rod erepov TTepiex^uOai. e^et S' diTopiav Itt* evlcov ro rocovro. So/cet yap evLOLS rj (f)p6vr]aLS dperrj re Kal imGr'rjpLy] elvai, Kal ovherepov rojv yevwv vtt^ ovherepov rrepi- ex^Gdai' ov jjirjv vtto rrdvrcov ye Gvy)((-o pelr ai rrjv (fypovrjGLV eTrLGrrjfJLrjv etvai. el S' ovv ns Gvy-

35 x<^polr] ro Xeyopuevov dXr]9es etvai, dXXd ro ye vtt' dXXrjXa rj vtto ravro a/x^a> yiyveGQai rd rod avrov yevrj rchv dvayKauayv So^etev dv etvai, Kaddrrep Kal errl rrjs dperrjs Kal rrjs erriGrrjiirjs 428

TOPICA, IV. i-ii

You must also see whether the genus stated is in- (h) The

applicable, or would be generally held to be inappli- things not

cable, to somethins: which is not specifically different ^PS^'^^^^y r 1l xi,- J J- • -r differentia

irom the thing under discussion ; or, it you are argu- the same.

ing constructively, whether it is applicable. For the

genus of all things which are not specifically different

is the same. If, therefore, it is shown to be the

genus of one, obviously it is the genus also of all,

and if it is shown not to be the genus of one, obviously

it is not the genus of any, for example, if anyone

positing ' indivisible lines ' were to assert that ' the

indivisible ' is their genus. For the genus stated is

inapplicable to divisible lines, which in species do

not differ from indivisible lines ; for all straight lines

show no difference from one another in species.

II. You must also examine whether there is any (i) When

other genus of the species assigned which neither f^us^mde?

includes the genus assigned nor falls under it, for t^o genera,

example, if someone were to lay down that know- embraced

ledge is the genus of justice. For virtue is also its o^her.^

genus and neither of the genera includes the other,

so that knowledge could not be the genus of justice ;

for it is generally held that, when one species falls

under two genera, the one is included in the other.

But such a principle sometimes involves a difficulty.

For, in the view of some people, prudence is both

virtue and knowledge and neither of its genera is

included in the other ; it is not, however, universally

agreed that prudence is knowledge. If, therefore,

one were to agree that this statement is true, it

would nevertheless be generally held as necessary

that the genera of the same thing must at least be

subaltern either the one to the other or both of

them to the same thing. This happens in the case



121 b

crviJLpaiV€L' a/x^o) yap vtto to avro yivos iariv

cKarepov yap avrcov e^us Kal Siddecris icrnv. GKeTTTeov ovv el fJLrjSerepov VTrdp'xei rep aTTohoQivri

122 a yev€L. el yap /xt]^* utt' dXXrjXd icrri rd yevq jJirjd*

VTTO ravrov diJi,(f)OJ, ovk dv etr] to dnohodev yevo?. HiKOTTeLV Se Set Kal to yevo? tov aTTohoQevTos

yivovg, koI ovtws del to eTrdvoj yevos, el irdvTa 5 KaT7]yopeLTaL tov etSou? Kal el ev to) rt eoTL

KaTrjyopetTai' irdvTa yap ra errdvo) yevrj KaT- "qyopeZod ai 8et tov eihovs ev Tip tl ecrrtv. el ovv 7TOV hia<j>ojveiy hrjKov otl ov yevos to dirohodev. ttoXlv el [leTex^L to yevog tov etSov?, rj avTO ^ TCJV eTTavo) tl yevcov ovhevo? yap tcjv viroKdTO) 10 TO eirdvcx) pieTe-)(ei. dvaoKevdl,ovTi fiev ovv KaS- direp euprjTaL ■)(^p7]OTeov' KaTaoKevdt^ovTi he, opLO- Xoyovfxevov fjuev vTrdpx€iv tw etSei tov prjOevTo? yevovs, otl 8' d)s yevos virdp^ei dpLcfyLG^riTovpievov , diToxpr] TO Sel^aL tl tcov errdvo) yevcov ev tco tl euTL TOV elhovs KaTTjyopovfjievov. ivog yap ev T(p TL eGTL KaTTiyopovpLevov , irdvTa Kal ra eirdvoi


etSovs, ev tw tl ioTL KaTiqyopiqdiqGeTaL' cocrre Kal TO drroSodev yevos ev to) tl ecrrt KaTiqyopelTaL. OTL o evos ev to) tl cgtl KaTr]yopovp.evov TrdvTa TO, XoLTrd, dv Tvep KaTrjyoprJTaL, ev tco tl ioTL KaTr]yopy]dr]GeTaL, hC eTraycuyrjs Xr]iTTeov. el 8' 20 aTrXois V7Tdpx€LV diJL(f)LGp7]TeLTaL TO dnoSodev yevos, 430


of virtue and knowledge, for both of them fall under the same genus, each of them being a state and a disposition. You must, therefore, examine whether neither of these things belongs to the genus assigned ; for, if the genera are subaltern neither the one to the other nor both of them to the same thing, then what was assigned could not be the real genus.

You must also examine the genus of the assigned 0) All

nus and so in succession the genus next above, genera

and see if they are all predicated of the species and "^"^t be

predicated in the category of essence ; for all the of the higher genera must be predicated of the species in JJe^cate^ the category of essence. If, then, there is a dis- gory of crepancy anywhere, it is clear that what was assigned is not the genus. Again, you must see whether the genus itself, or one of its higher genera, partakes of the species ; for the higher genus does not partake of any of the lower. For destructive purposes, then, you must employ the above method ; for constructive purposes, if the asserted genus is admitted to belong to the species but it is a matter of dispute whether it belongs as a genus, then it is enough to show that one of its higher genera is predicated of the species in the category of essence. For, if one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all of them, both higher and lower than this one, if they are predicated of the species, will be predicated in the category of essence ; so that the genus assigned is also predicated in the category of essence. The fact that, if one genus is predicated in the category of essence, all the rest, if they are predicated, will be predicated in the category of essence, must be obtained by induction. But, if it is disputed whether the assigned genus belongs at all, it is not enough



122 a

ovK oLTToxp'^ TO Set^at Tcov iTrdvct) ri yevwv iv rep Tt ian Tov etSovg KarrjyopovfJievov. otov et rig rrjs jSaStcrecos" yevos aneScoKe rrjv <^opdv, ovk OLTToxpy] TO Sel^ai Slotl KLvr)GLS ecrrtv r) jSaStcrts" TTpo? TO 8et|at OTL (f)opd ioTLV, ineLSr] /cat d'AAat

25 KLvqcrets elaiv, dXXd TTpoaheiKriov on ouSevo? pi€ri)(€L Tj jSaStcrts" twv Kara rrjv avrrjv Sialpeatv el fXTj rrjs (f>opds. dvayKiq yap ro rod yevovs fjierexov /cat rcbv etScov rtvos" /xere^j^eiv rojv Kara rrjv TTpcorrjv Statpecrtv. et ovv rj ^olSlgls P^'^t^ av^ijaecos pbrjre p,€ia)G€OJS p^r\r€ rcx)v aXXoiv /civtJ- oeojv pierex^i, SrjXov on rrjs (f>opds dv pierexoL,

30 coct' €Lr] dv yevos rj ^opd rrjs ^aSlcreoJs.

IlaAtv €</>' c5v ro elSos ro redev cos yevos /car- rjyopelrai, OKorreZv el /cat to dirohoOev yevos ev rep ri ecrrtv avroiv rovrojv Karrjyopelrai (Lvrrep ro ethos, opLOiOJS Se /cat et rd eirdvoj rod yevovs

35 Trdvra. el ydp ttov SiacfxjoveL, SrjXov on ov yevos ro aTToSodev el ydp rjv yevos, diravr* dv Kal rd eirdvoj rovrov /cat avro rovro ev rep ri ean Kar- r^yopelro, oivrrep /cat to etSo? ev ro) ri ean Karrjyopelrai . dvaoKevdl,ovn pLev ovv xP'^^^P-ov, el purj Karrjyopelrai ro yevos ev rco ri ecrnv (Lvrrep /cat TO etSo? Karrjyopelrai' KarauKevdt^ovn 8', et 122 b Karrjyopelrai ev rep ri ean, ;j(p7]0't/xov. ovp^^Tjcrerai ydp ro yevos Kal ro eiSos rod avrov ev rep ri eon 432


to show that one of the higher genera is predicated in the category of essence. For example, if some- one has assigned ' impulsion ' as the genus of * walk- ing,' it is not enough to show that walking is ' motion ' in order to show that it is * impulsion,' since there are other forms of motion also ; but it must be further shown that walking partakes of none of the other forces of motion which result from the same division except ' impulsion.' For that which partakes of the genus must necessarily also partake of one of the species resulting from the first division of it. If, therefore, walking partakes neither of increase or decrease nor of any of the other kinds of motion, obviously it would partake of impulsion, so that impulsion would be the genus of walking.

Again, in cases where the species asserted is (k) The predicated as genus, you must look and see whether prJdfcated that which is assigned as genus is also predicated in j.^^^^^. ^^ the category of essence of the very things of which essence of the species is predicated, and likewise, whether the of whiSi'^^ same is also true of all the genera higher than this the species genus. For, if there is any discrepancy anywhere, J^^d. ^ obviously what has been assigned is not the genus ; for, if it were genus, all the genera higher than it and this genus itself would be predicated in the category of essence of all those things of which the species also is predicated in the category of essence. For destructive criticism, then, it is useful to see whether the genus is not predicated in the category of essence of those things of which the species is also ^ predicated. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, it is useful to see whether it is predicated in the category of essence ; for then the result will be that the genus and the species are predicated of the



122 b

KaTrjyop€L(j9 ai, cjure to avro vtto Svo yevr] yiverai.

avayKOLOV ovv vtt' dXX7]Xa ra yevr] etvau. av ovv 5 SeLxdfj, o ^ovXofJLeSa yevos /caracr/ceuacrat, yLTj ov VTTO TO ethos, SrjXov on ro elSos vtto rovr^ dv e'lr], ware SeSety/xevov av eurj on yevos rovro.

TiKOTTeiv he Kal rovs Xoyovs tojv yeva>v, el ecjiap- fjiOTTovGLV erri re ro aTTohodev elSos Kal rd fier- exovra rod ethovs. dvdyKT] ydp rovs rd>v yevd)V

10 Xoyovs KarrjyopeZcjB ai rod elhovs Kal rcbv [ler- exovrcjv rod eihovs' el ovv ttov Sia(f)0)veL, hrjXov on ov yevos ro aTToSoOev.

IlaAtv el rrjv hLa(j)opdv (hs yevos aTTehcuKeVy olov el ro dddvarov yevos deov. hia^opd ydp ean l,o)ov ro dddvarov, iTTeiSrj rd)v ^cpojv rd puev dvrjrd

15 rd 8' dddvara. SrjXov ovv on hir) fjidprrjr ai' ov- Sevos ydp rj Sta^opa yevos eoriv. on he rovr dXrjdes, hrjXov ovhepLia ydp Sia^opo, Gr]piaivei ri eanv, dXXd fxaXXov ttolov n, KaddTrep ro Trefov Kal ro hiTTOvv.

Kat el rrjv hia<j)opdv els ro yevos eOrjKev, olov ro rrepirrov OTrep dpudfjuov. hiacjiopd ydp dpidpiov

20 TO Tre pirrov, ovk ethos eanv. ovhe hoKel fierex^LV Tj hiacfyopd rod yevovs' Trdv ydp ro ixere^pv rod yevovs r] ethos rj drofjiov eanv, rj he htacfyopd ovre ethos ovre dropLov eonv. hriXov ovv on ov pLerex^ei 434



same thing in the category of essence, so that the same object falls under two genera ; the genera, therefore, must necessarily fall one under the other, and so, if it has been shown that what we wish to establish as a genus does not fall under the species, it is obvious that the species would fall under it, so that it would have been shown that it is the genus.

You must also examine the definitions of the W The de- genera to see if they fit both the species assigned the genera and the things which partake of the species. For S^gpecies the definitions of the genera must also be predicated and the of the species and of the things which partake of ^f(fh par- the species. If, therefore, there is a discrepancy ^ke of it. anywhere, it is obvious that what has been assigned is not the genus.

Again, you must see whether your opponent has ^^^^^^j^ assigned the differentia as the genus, for example, must not be ' immortal ' as the genus of ' God.' For ' immortal ' g^S.^^ ^^ is a differentia of ' living creature ' ; for some living creatures are mortal and some immortal. It is, therefore, obvious that an error has been committed ; for the differentia is never the genus of anything. This is clearly true ; for no differentia indicates the essence, but rather some quality, such as ' pedestrian ' and ' biped.'

Also, you must see whether he has put the (n) The differentia inside the genus, for example, whether must not be he has given ' odd ' as a ' number,' for ' odd ' is a Pf^g^ ^j^^ differentia of number, not a species. Nor is the genus, differentia generally held to partake of the genus ; for everything which partakes of the genus is either a species or an individual, but the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. It is obvious, therefore, that the differentia does not partake of



122 b

Tov yevovs rj hiacjiopd, war ouSe to Trepirrov elSos av eij] aAAa Btacjiopd, eTTeihrj ov fjierex^i' tov yevovs.

25 "Ert el TO yevos elg to ethos edrjKev, otov ttjv difjLv oTTep Gvvox'^v ^ Tr]u fjil^tv OTTep KpdaiVy 7} CO? WXdrojv opit^erai (fyopdv rr^v Kara roirov klvt]- GLV. ov yap dvayKotov rrjv dijjiv gvvox'^v elvaL, dAA' avdnaXiv rrjv avvox'^v dijnv' ov yap irdv to

30 diTTopLevov CTi;ve;)^eTat, aAAa to avvexofxevov drr- TCTat. ofJiOLOJS 8e Kal iirl tcov Xoittcjv' ovTe yap Tj (Jil^Ls aTraaa Kpaatg (rj yap tcov $r]p(jjv /xi^ts" ovk eoTi Kpdois) ov6^ r) Kara tottov fxeTa^oXy] udoa (f)opd' rj yap jSaStcTts" ov hoKel <f)opd etvac axehov yap rj (f)opd eirl tcov dKovoiois tottov eK tottov

35 jLtCTajSaAAovTcov AeyeTat, KaQdTTep eTTt tcov dipvxo)v crujLtjSatVet. SrjXov 8* ot6 Kal eTTt ttXIov Xeyerai to eTbos TOV yevovs ev tols dTToboOelcn, heov dvdTraXiv yiveadai.

IlctAtv el TTjv hia<j)opdv els to etSos eOrjKev, otov

TO dddvaTOV onep Oeov. ov/jL^-qoreTai yap [ctt'

LGrjs ^Y ^'^'- "^Xelov TO etSos Xeyeodai' del yap rj

i23a8ta^opa evr' lgtjs '^ cm TrAetov tov e'lSovs Xeyerai.

eTL el TO yevos els ttjv hiacjiopdv, otov to p^pco^ua


Kal el TO yevos cos" hia^opdv eiTTev iyxo^pel ydp

^ Omitting eV tarjs t] with Strache. 436



the genus ; so that * odd ' too cannot be a species but must be a differentia, since it does not partake of the genus.

Further, you must see whether your opponent has (o) The placed the genus inside the species, taking, for not^e™^ example, ' contact * as * conjunction ' or ' mixture ' pI^J^^ as * fusion,' or, according to Plato's definition,"' species, ' locomotion ' as ' impulsion.' For ' contact ' is not necessarily * conjunction,' but the converse is true namely, that * conjunction ' is ' contact ' ; for what is in contact is not always conjoined, but that which is conjoined is always in contact. Similarly also with the other instances ; for ' mixture ' is not always ' fusion ' (for the mixture of dry substances is not fusion) nor is ' locomotion ' always ' impulsion.' For walking is not generally held to be ' impulsion ' ; for ' impulsion ' is generally used of objects which change their position involuntarily, as happens to inanimate things. It is obvious, also, that the species is used in a wider sense than the genus in the above examples, whereas the converse ought to be true.

Again, you must see whether he has placed the (p) The differentia within the species, for example, if he has must not be taken ' immortal ' as what * God ' is. For this will ^^^^.'^ x. result in the species being used in a greater number species nor of cases ; for it is the differentia which is always used JJithln^the in an equal number of cases or in a greater number differentia. of cases than the species. Again, you must see whether he has put the genus within the differentia ; for example, if he has taken ' colour ' as that which is * compressive ' ^ or ' number ' as ' odd.' You must also see if he has stated the genus as the differentia ; for it is possible to produce a thesis of this kind also,

" Theaet. 181 d 5. " Cf. 107 b 30 and note.



123 a

TLva Kal TOLavTTjv KOfJbLGaL BeoiVy olov Kpdoeoj'S ttjv

5 fjit^LV hia<f)opav t) (f)opd? rr^v Kara tottov fJbera^oXiqv .

OKeTTTeov he vravra ra rotavro. 8ta rcDv avrcbv

eTTLKoivoyvovai yap ol tottol' IttI irXeov re yap to

yevos rrjs Sia(f>opds Sec Xeyeadai, Kal [xtj /xeTe;)(etv

T^^S" Sta^opas". ovTOJ S' aTToSodivrog ovhirepov

rcjjv elprjpbivcov Svvarov aviju^aiveiv in* eXarrov

10 T€ yap piqdiqaeTaL, Kal pueOe^ei to yevos ttj? 8ta(^opas'.

HdXcv el jJur^Sefjila hia^opd KaT7]yopelTai tcov tov yevovs /cara tov aTTohodevTOS e'ihovs, ovhe to yevos KaTTjyoprjO'^creTaL, olov ijjv)('^s ovTe to ne- pcTTOv ovTe TO dpTiov KaTTiyopeiTai, wot* ovh* dpiBfxos. ert el npoTepov (f)VoeL to ethos Kal

15 ovvavaipeZ to yevos ' hoKel yap to evavTiov. eVt el evhe)(eTaL aTroAtTretv to elprj/jievov yevos t^ ttjv hLa(f)opdv, OLOV ijjv')(r]v to KiveiuOai tj So^av to dXr]des Kal ipevSos, ovk dv eurj tojv elprjiJbevojv ovheTepov yevos ovhe Siacfjopd' So/cet yap to yevos Kal 7) hiacjjopd TrapaKoXovdelv , ecos dv fj to etSos.

20 III. HKOTTelv Se Kal el to ev Tch yeveu Keipievov fjueTex^i' Tivds evavTiov ro) yevei t) el evSex^rai pLeTe^eiv to yap avTO tcov evavTicov dpua [xede^eiy eirethr) to jjLev yevos ovheTCOT dTToXeiTrei, /xerejj^et Se Kal TovvavTLOV t) evSex^rai (JbeTex^iv. eTi el TLVos Koivojvel TO elSos , o dSvvaTOV dXojs virdpx^LV

25 roLS VTTO TO yevos. olov el tj ipvxrj ttjs ^a>rjs

« Cf. Met. 1059 b 30 if. 438

TOPICA, IV. ii-iii

for example, making ' mixture ' the differentia of

  • fusion ' or ' locomotion ' of * impulsion.' All such

cases must be examined by the same methods (for the commonplaces are inter-related) ; for the genus must both be used in a wider sense than its differentia and not partake of its differentia. But, if the genus is assigned as differentia, neither of the above con- ditions can occur ; for the genus will be used in a narrower sense and will partake of the differentia.

Again, if no differentia belonging to the genus is (3) if no predicated of the species assigned, neither will the of the genus ffenus be predicated of it; for example, neither is predi-

P ,, , \ , . J- 0. J r « 1 » J catedofthe

odd nor even is predicated 01 soul, and so species, the ' number ' is not predicated of it either. Further, S"be*^*^' you must see whether the species is prior by nature predicated and destroys the genus along with itself " ; for the ^^^ contrary view is generally held. Further, if it is genus is possible for the genus stated or its differentia to be l^^^^^^ *^® separated from the species, for example, * motion ' ^^^ rpj^g from the * soul ' or ' truth and falsehood ' from ?,^"J?jj*^^ ' opinion,' then neither of the said terms would be rentia ac- the genus or its differentia ; for it is generally held tKpe^ctes. that the genus and its differentia attend the species as long as it exists.

III. You must also see whether what is placed in (o what is the genus partakes, or could possibly partake, of jj^^^^j^^^g something contrary to the genus ; for then the same cannot par- thing will partake of contraries at the same time, anything since the genus never leaves it, and it also partakes, JJJ" ggj^^ or can possibly partake, of its contrary. Further, you must see whether the species participates in anything which cannot by any possibility belong to anything which falls under the genus. For example, if the soul participates in life, and it is impossible



123 a

KOLVCoveX, TCJV 8' dpiOfjucov fJLTjSeva Svvarov l^7]V,

ovK av etT^ etSos" apiOixov rj ipvxrj.

XK€7rr€ov 8e /cat et ojLtww/xov to etSos ro) yeVet, oroiX'^ioLS xpcojLieFov rot? elpiqiiivois irpos ro 6p,(xj- vvpLov Gvvcovvjjbov yoLp TO yevos koI to etSos". 30 'ETret 8e TravTO? yevou? €1817 ttAcico, GKoirelv el fir) ivSex^Tai erepov etSos etvai rod €lpr]fievov yevovg- el yap purj eon, 8'^Aov on ovk dv etr] oXo)? yevos TO elpTjpievov.

1jK07T€lv Se /cat et to jxeTa^opa Xeyojxevov cos

yevos drroSeScoKev, oiov ttjv CTCo^poawo^v ctuju-^cu-

35 vtav TTav yap yevos Kvplcos /caTCt twv elScJov KaTiq-

yopeiTai, rj 8e crviK^ajvla /caTO, Trjs Gaj(f)poavvr]s

ov Kvpiios dXXd jLteTa^Ojoa* Trdaa yap (jV[Ji(f)a>vLa

ev (f)06yyoLS.

123 b "Eti av fj evavTLOV tl tw et8et, oKOTrelv. ecrTi

8e TrXeova^cos rj GKeipts, rrpaJTOv jiev el ev tw

avTCp yevei /cat to ivavTLOv, jirj ovtos evavTiov tco

yevei' 8et yap to, evavTia ev Tip avTcp yevei elvai,

> dv jxrjSev evavTiov tco yevei fj. ovtos 8* evavTLOV

Tw yeveu, GKoiTeiv el to evavTiov ev Tip evavTico'

avayKrj yap to evavT iov ev tw evavT icp etvai,

dvrrep fj evavTiov tl tw yevei. (f)avep6v 8e tovtwv

eKaoTOV 8ta Trjs eTTaywyrjs. rrdXiv el oXws ev

fxrjhevl yevei to tw €t8et evavTiov, dXX avTO yevos,

iO otov TdyaQov el yap tovto purj ev yevei, ovhe to

evavTiov tovtov ev yevei ecxTai, dAA' auTO yevos.

« 106 a 9 ff. 440


for any number to live, the soul could not be a species of number.

You must also see whether the species is used («) The equivocally of the genus, employing the principles Sust^not already laid down for dealing with the equivocals " ; t>e used for the genus and the species are synonymous. of the

Since of every genus there are always several 8<^'^"^- species, you must see whether it is impossible for cannot eS there to be another species of the genus stated ; ^^ ^^y one for if there is none, it is obvious that what has been stated could not be a genus at all.

You must also see whether your opponent has (w) The use assigned as a genus a term used metaphorically, phOT^cal speaking, for example, of * temperance ' as a * har- Jj??g*f-® ^ mony ' ; for every genus is predicated of its species in its proper sense, but ' harmony ' is predicated of temperance not in its proper sense but metaphori- cally ; for a harmony consists alM'ays of sounds.

Further, you must examine any contrary that Rules draum there may be of the species. This examination |^')"qoji. may take several forms, the first being to see whether traries. the contrary also exists in the same genus, the genus itself having no contrary ; for contraries must of necessity be in the same genus, if there is no contrary to the genus. If, however, there is a contrary to the genus, you must see whether the contrary of the species is in the contrary genus ; for the contrary species must necessarily be in the contrary genus if the genus has a contrary. Each of these points is made clear by induction. Again, you must see whether the contrary of the species is not found in any genus at all, but is itself a genus, for example, ' good ' ; for if this is not found in any genus, neither will its contrary be found in any genus, but will itself



123 b

Kadairep eirl rod dyadov Kal rod KaKov avjJL^alvei'

ovherepov yap rovrcxjv iv yevei, aAA' eKarepov avrcov yivos. en el evavriov rivl Kal ro yivos Kal ro ethos, Kal roJv fxev eon ri fiera^v, rchv he

15 /XT], et yap rchv yevcov eon n jjiera^v, Kal rcbv elhajv, Kal el rchv elhcoVy Kal rwv yevwv, KaBaTrep err* dperijs Kal KaKias Kal hiKaioovviqs Kal dhi- Kias' eKarepojv yap eon ri jjuera^v. evoraois rovrov on vyieias Kal vooov ovhev p^era^v, KaKov he Kal dyadov. t) et eun /xeV n dp^cfiolv dvd fieoov, Kal ra)v elhcov Kal rcov yevcov, [jlt] op^olo)? he, dXXd

20 rwv /X€V Kara dTTocfyaaiv rcov S' cos" vrroKeipievov. evho^ov yap ro o/xotojs" dpL(f)Oiv, Kaddirep err' dperrjg Kal KaKias Kal htKaLoovvT]? Kal dSt/cias" dp,(l)OLV yap Kara a7ro(^aCTtv rd dvd fjueoov. en orav firi fj evavriov rep yevei, GKorrelv jjutj p^ovov el ro evav-

25 riov iv rw avrw yeveu, dXXd Kal ro dvd p^euov iv o) ydp rd aKpa, Kal rd dvd p.eaov, olov irrl XevKov Kal pueXavos' rd ydp -x^pcbpia yevos rovrcov re Kal rcbv dvd pueoov ■)(^pcx)pLdrcx)v drravrcov. evaraais on T) p,ev evheia Kal VTrep^oXr) iv rep avra> yevei (iv rep KaKcp ydp dpicfycx)), ro he piirpiov dvd puioov ov

30 Tourcov ovK iv ra> KaKco dAA' iv rep dy aOw. oko- rreZv he Kal el ro piev yevos ivavriov nvi, ro he 442


be a genus, as happens with * good ' and ' evil ' ; for neither of them is found in a genus, but each of them is a genus. Further, you must see whether both genus and species are contrary to something, and whether there is an intermediate between one pair of contraries but not between the other. For, if there is an intermediate between the genera, there will also be one between the species, and, if between the species, likewise also between the genera, as in the case of virtue and vice and justice and injustice ; for each pair has an intermediate. (It may be objected here that there is no intermediate between health and disease as there is between evil and good.) Or, again, you must see whether, though there is an intermediate between both pairs, that is, between the species and between the genera, yet not in a similar way, but in one case negatively and in the others as a subject. For it is generally held that the intermediate is of a similar kind in both cases, as happens with virtue and vice, and justice and injustice ; for between both of these pairs the intermediates are purely negative. Further, when there is no contrary to the genus, you must see not only whether the contrary is in the same genus, but whether the intermediate is so also ; for the inter- mediates are in the same genus as the extremes, in the case, for example, of black and white, for colour is the genus of both of these and of all the inter- mediate colours. (It may be objected that * defect * and * excess ' are in the same genus — for both are in the genus of * evil ' — whereas ' what is moderate,' which is intermediate between them, is not in the genus of ' evil,' but in that of ' good.') You must also see whether, whereas the genus is contrary to



123 b

elSos fjurjSevL. el yap to yevog ivavrlov rivi, Koi TO elhos, Kadairep dperrj KaKia koi SiKaioavvT] dSiKLa. ofJLOLO)? 8e /cat iirl tcjv dXXojv gkottovvti (f)av€p6v dv Sofetev etvaL to tolovtov. eVoTaot? 35 67Tt rrj? vyieias koi vooov drrXctys /xev yap ndoa vyieia vogco ivavrlov, rj he ng voaos etSos" ov voaov ovSevi evavTiov, olov 6 Trvpero? Kal rj o^daXfxia Kol rojv dXXojv eKaoTOV.

124 a ^ Kvaipovvri jjbev ovv rocravraxo^? eTTiGKeTrreov

el yap p.r] vrrapx^i rd elpiqpieva, hrjXov on ov yevos TO dTToSodev KaraoKevdt^ovTi 8e Tpi-)(cx)s, npajrov fjiev et TO evavriov rep euSei iv rep elprfp^evcp yevei, 5 [jir] ovTog evavriov rep yevev el yap ro ivavrlov ev rovrcpy SrjXov ore Kal ro irpoKelp^evov. en el rd dvd peorov ev rep elprjpievcp yevev ev cp ydp ro ava pueaov, Kai rd aKpa. ndXiv dv rj evavriov n rep yevei, OKorreiv el Kal ro evavriov ev rep evavrlep' dv ydp fj, SrjXov on Kal ro TrpoKelpuevov ev rep TTpoKeipuevep. 10 FlaAtv eTTL reov Trreocreojv Kal eTrl rehv Gvorol')(^exjv, et opoiex><; dKoXovdovGi, Kal dvatpovvn Kal Kara- GKeva^ovn. dpua ydp evl Kal tto^glv VTrdp-)(eL r] ovx VTTapxei, olov el rj hiKaioGvvr] eTTLGrijpr] ng, 4.44


something, the species is not contrary to anything ;

for, if the genus is contrary to something, so also is

the species, as virtue is the contrary of vice, and

justice of injustice. Similarly, if one examines the

other cases also, such a view would appear evident.

(There is an objection with regard to health and

disease ; for health, generally speaking, is always

contrary to disease, yet a particular disease, which

is a species of disease, for example, a fever or

ophthalmia or any other specific disease, is not the

contrary of anything.)

Such then are the various inquiries which should (The use of

be made when one is seeking to demolish an opinion ; i'n co^n"^^

for, if the conditions mentioned above are not present, structive

.1 1 111 . -, . ^ 1 argument.)

it IS clear that what has been assigned is not the

genus. For constructive argument, on the other hand, there are three methods of procedure. Firstly, you must see whether the contrary of the species is found in the genus named when there is no contrary to the genus ; for, if the contrary is found in it, obviously the proposed species is also found there. Further, you must see whether the intermediate is found in the genus named ; for the extremes are found in the same genus as the intermediates. Again, if there is a contrary to the genus, you must see whether the contrary species is also found in the contrary genus ; for, if it is, clearly the proposed species is also found in the proposed genus.

Again, you must take the inflexions and the co- (ft) in- ordinates and see if they follow similarly, both in and co- destructive and constructive argument. For what- ordinatea. ever belongs or does not belong to one, at the same time belongs or does not belong to all ; for example, if justice is a kind of knowledge, then also, ' justly *



124 a

KOi TO hiKalcos iTTLGrrjiJLovcog /cat o StVatos" iTnarrj-

fjLCJV el 8e Tovrwv n /xt^, ovSe rcov XoLTrcov ovSev.

15 IV. IlaAtv iirl rojv ojjlolcos ixovrcov irpos dXXr]Xa,


d)(f)eXifxov TTpos rdyadov eKarepov yap eKarepov 7tol7]tlk6v. el ovv eo-Ttv rj rjSovrj oTrep dyaOov, Kal TO TjSv oTTep <h(j)eXiixov eorai- hrjXov yap on

20 dyadov dv etrj TTOLrjTtKov, iiTeLSrj rj rjhovrj dyadov. (hoavrcjs Se Kal eirl rcov yeveoewv Kal (f)dopa)v, OLOV el TO olKoSofJLeZv evepyeZv, to cpKoSofjir]KevaL evrjpyrjKevai, Kal el to p,avddveLV dvafJUfJuv^GKeGdai, Kal TO fjLejjiaOrjKevaL dvajJbefjLvrJGOai, Kal el to SiaXveadaL ^^et/oca^at, to hiaXeXvaOai ec/yddpOai

25 Kal rj SiaXvais (f)dopd Tts". Kal irrl tcov yevrjTiKcov 8e Kal (jydapTLKOJV coo'avTCOS, Kal eTrl twv hvvd- fjieojv Kal XPV^^^^> '^^^ oXcos KaO^ oTToiavovv opbOLOTTjTa Kal dvaLpovvTL Kal KaTaGKevd^ovTL GKeTTTeoVy Kaddirep eirl ttjs yeveaeats Kal (f)dopds eXeyojiev. el yap to ^OapTLKov hiaXvTiKoVy Kal TO (j)deipeodai hiaXveoQai' Kal el to yevrjTLKov

30 TTOLTjTLKov, TO yiveoOai TToieZoOai Kal rj yeveois TTolrjcnS' ofJLOLcos he Kal cttI tcjv bwdfjueajv Kal Xp'Tjcrecov el yap rj 8wa/xt? Siddeais, Kal to Sv- vaoBai hiaKeiuBaL, Kal el tlvos t] xP'^^^^ evepyeta, TO XPV^^^^ evepyelv Kal to Kexprjo^dai evrjpyrjKevai.

35 *Av Se GTeprjais fj to dvTiKeifjbevov tw eihei, Slxcos eoTLV dveXelVy TTpwTov fiev el ev tw dno- 446

TOPICA, IV. iii-iv

is * knowingly,' and ' the just man ' is ' the man of knowledge ' ; but if one of these things is not true, none of the rest is true either.

IV. Again, you must take things which stand in (c) Simi- a similar relation to one another. For example, the relation. pleasant stands in the same relation to pleasure as the beneficial to the good ; for in each case the one is productive of the other. If, therefore, pleasure is what is good, then the pleasant will be what is beneficial ; for it is clear that it would be productive of good, since pleasure is a good. So likewise with (d) Genera- the processes of generation and destruction ; if, for destruction. example, to build is to be active, to have built is to have been active, and, if to learn is to remember, to have learnt is to have remembered, and, if to be dis- solved is to be destroyed, to have been dissolved is to have been destroyed, and dissolution is a kind of destruction. You must deal in the same way with the agents of generation and destruction and with the capacities and uses of things, and, in short, both (e) Capaci- in destructive and constructive argument, you must t^es of make your examination in the light of any possible things, likeness, as we stated in dealing with generation and destruction. For, if what is destructive is dissolvent, then to be destroyed is to be dissolved ; and if what is generative is productive, then to be generated is to be produced, and generation is production. So, also, with capacities and uses ; if capacity is a dis- position, then to be capable of something is to be disposed to it, and, if the use of something is an activity, then to use is to be active, and to have used is to have been active.

If the opposite of the species is a privation, we can (/) Opposi- demolish an argument in two ways, firstly, by seeing tween states



124 a

hoBevTL yeVet to avrtxret/xevov 7) yap aTrAcDs" €V ovhevl yivei rco avrco rj arep7]cns, rj ovk iv rw eaxo-TO), oTov el rj oijjis iv iaxoi'Tq) yivei rfj aladri- cret, 7] rv(f)X6T'qs ovk ecrrat aioOrjais. Sevrepov 124 b 8* el Kal TO) yevet Kal ro) etSet dvrtVetrat oreprjois, fXT) eoTL 8e TO oLVTiKeLfjuevov iv rw avrtKeLpievcp, ovo av TO anooouev ev rep aTTooouevri eirj. av- aipovvTi fxev ovv KaOdrrep elp-qrai xp^(^^iov, Kara- GKevd^ovTL Be pLovaxojs' el yap to dvriKeipievov 5 iv Tip dvTLKeLfjLevcp, Kal to irpoKeipLevov iv Tcp 7TpoKeip,evcp av eir], otov el rj TVcfyXoTTjs dvaiaOrjoia TL9, rj oijjLs aladrjois tls.

IlaAtv €7rt T60V d7ro(/)daewv OKOTrelv avdrraXiVy KaBdrrep irrl tov ovp^^e^rj kotos iXeyeTOy oTov el TO rjov orrep ayauov, to fjurj ayauov ovx rjov. et

10 yap jJLrj ovTCog exoi, e'irj av Tt /cat ovk dyadov rjhv. dhvvaTov he, elirep to dyadov yevos tov rjSeos, elvai Tt jirj dyadov rjSv' Sv yap to yevos p^rj KaT- rjyopelTai, ovSe tcDv elBcov ovSev. Kal KaTaoKevd- t,ovTi 8e (hoavTOJS OKeTTTeov el yap to p,rj dyadov ovx yjBv, TO rjSij dyadov, cocTe yevos to dyadov TOV rjheos.

15 'Eav 8' fj TTpos TL TO ethos, GKOTTelv el Kal to yevos TTpos Tt- el yap to etSos tcjv TTpos Tt, /cat TO yevos, KaddTTep evrt toi; hnrXaoiov Kal vroAAa- TrXaoiov eKdTepov yap tcov rrpos Tt. €t he to

« 113 b 15 flF. 448


whether the opposite is found in the genus assigned ; and their for either the privation is not found anywhere at all p"^*^^<^^- in the same genus or not in the ultimate genus ; for example, if sight is found in sensation as the ultimate genus, blindness will not be a sensation. Secondly, if a privation is opposed both to the genus and to the species, but the opposite of the species is not found in the opposite of the genus, then neither can the species assigned be in the genus assigned. For destructive criticism, then, you should use the above two methods ; but for constructive argument there is only one method. If the opposite species is found in the opposite genus, then the proposed species would be found in the proposed genus ; for example, if blindness is a kind of insensibility, then sight is a kind of sensation.

Again, you must take the negations and examine (g) Contxa- them, reversing the order of the terms, as was pSitions.^* described in dealing with the accident " ; for example, if the pleasant is what is good, what is not good is not pleasant, for otherwise something not good would also be pleasant. Now it is im- possible, if good is the genus of pleasant, that any- thing not good would be pleasant ; for, where the genus is not predicated, neither can any of the species be predicated. For constructive argument a similar examination must be made ; for, if what is not good is not pleasant, the pleasant is good, and so ' good ' is the genus of * pleasant.'

If the species is a relative term, you must see (/<) Relative whether the genus is also a relative term ; for, if tffi*^* the species is a relative term, so also is the genus, for example, * double ' and ' multiple ' ; for each is a relative term. If, however, the genus is a rela-

Q 449


124 b

yevos rojv npos rt, ovk dvdyKr] Kal to efSos" rj /xev yap eTTiGrrnxr] tcjv irpo? n, rj Se ypaiiyiariKri 20 ov. Tj ovhk TO TTporepov p7]d€v dXrjdes dv So^eiev' rj yap dperrj oirep KaXov /cat oirep dyadov, Kal rj fiev dperrj tcov rrpos tl, to 8' dyadov Kal to koXov


YldXiv el fjbr) TTpog rauro Aeyerat to etSos Kad^ avTo T€ Kal /caret to yevos, olov el to SiTrXdcnov

25 rjfjLiaeo? Aeyerat StTrAaatov, /cat to TToXXaTrXdaiov rjfjilcjeog Set Xeyeadai. et Se ju-t^, ou/c av etrj to TToXXaTrXdaiov yevos tov hiTrXaoiov.

"Ert et pLT] rrpos rauro /cara re to yevos Aeyerat /cat /caret irdvTa ra rou yevovs yevrj. el yap to

30 8t7rAacrtov rifiiaeos TToXXaTrXdaiov ccrrt, /cat ro VTrepexov rjfjLLaeos prjOiqueTaiy Kal dTrAcos" /cara TrdvTa ra errdvo) yevT] rrpos to TJfJLLGV pr^drjoeTai. evoTaais otl ovk dvdyKT] /ca^' ai5ro /cat /card rd yevos TTpos rauro XeyeaOai' rj yap eTTioTijfjLT] eiri- GTTjTov Aeyerat, e^t? 8e /cat Std^ecrts" ou/c eTTLGTTjTOv dXXd ijjv)(r\s.

35 ndAtv et (JjoavTCos Aeyerat rd yeVo? /cat rd etSos" /card rds" rrTOJoeis, olov el rtvt -^ rtvos" '^ oaaxcos dXXojS' diS yap to ethos, Kal to yevos, KaSdirep eTTt TOV hnrXaaiov /cat Tchv errdvco' tlvos yap Kal 450


tive term, it does not necessarily follow that the species is so also ; for * knowledge ' is a relative term, but * grammar ' is not. Or, possibly, it might be held that not even the first assertion is true ; for virtue ' is something * honourable ' and something ' good,' and yet, though ' virtue ' is a relative term, ' good ' and * honourable ' are not relative terms but qualities.

Again, you must see whether the species is not being used in the same relation both per se and in respect of the genus. For example, if ' double ' is used in the sense of double of a half, then also

  • multiple ' ought to be used in the sense of multiple

of a half ; otherwise * multiple ' would not be the genus of ' double.'

Again, you must see whether the species is not being used in the same relation in respect of the genus and in respect of all the genera of the genus. For if the double is a multiple of the half, that which is ' in excess of ' will also be used of the half, and in general it will be used in respect of all the higher genera in relation to the half. (An objection may be raised that a term is not necessarily referred to the same thing when it is used per se and when it is used in respect of the genus ; for * knowledge ' is said to be of the * knowable,' but is a ' state ' or ' dis- position ' not of the ' knowable ' but of the ' soul ').

Again, you must see whether the genus and (i) In- species are used in the same manner in respect of ® ®^ the inflexions which follow them, for example, as pertaining * to ' something, or predicated as being

  • of ' something, or in the other possible ways. For,

as the species is predicated, so also is the genus, as, for example, in the case of the double and its higher



124 b

TO StTrAacrtov Kal to TToXXaTrXdcnov . ofjuolcos Se

125 a /cat im rrjs imorrjyi.y]'?' nvo? yap Kal avrrj Kal

ra yivrjy olov rj re BidOedis Kal rj e^tg. evGraois on ivLaxov ovx ovtcxjs' to /xev yap Bid^opov Kal


ov TLvl dXXd TLvos' €T€pov ydp TLvog Aeyerat. 5 riaAtv el ojJLOLWS tol npog tl Kara rds" TTTCocreis Xeyofjieva jxr] oixoicos dvTioTp€<^€L, KaQdirep iirl Tov hnrXaoiov Kal tov TToXXaTrXaaiov . eKdTepov ydp TOVTOJV TLVOS Kal avTo Kal Acara ttjv dvTi- aTpo(f)rjv Aeyerat' tlvos yap Kal to TJjjbiav Kal to TToXXoGTrjpLopLov. (hoavTOJS Se Kal irrl tt^s Ittl- iO GTr^iLiqs Kal Trjs VTToXrj^eoJS' aurat ydp tlvos,


dvTLGTpe(j)€L, StJAov otl OX) yivos 6dT€pOV 9aT€pOV. HaAtv el fiTj TTpos Loa to etSog Kal to yevos 16 Aeyerat. o/xotco? ydp Kal loaxcos eKdTepov SoKeX XeyeoBaL, KaOdirep errl ttjs Scopeds Kal ttjs hoGecos. Tj re yap 8a>pea tlvos r] tlvI XiyeTaL, Kal rj Bogls TLVOS Kal TLVL. ecTTt Se T) BoGLs yevos TTJs Sojpeds' Tj ydp hojped Socrts" ecrrtv dvairoSoTOS. err' evlcov S' ov Gvix^aLveL rrpds tcra XeyeoBaL' to jLtev yap 452


genera ; for both the double and the multiple are predicated ' of ' something. Similarly, too, in the case of ' knowledge ' ; for both ' knowledge ' itself and its genera, for example, ' disposition ' and ' state,' are said to be 'of something. It may be objected that sometimes this is not true ; for we say

  • alien to ' and ' contrary to,' but when we use

' different,' which is a genus of these terms, we add 'from,' not ' to ' ; for we say ' different yVow.'

Again, you must see whether terms which are used in the same manner in respect of the inflexions which follow them do not take the same cases when they are converted, as is the case with ' double ' and ' multiple ' ; for each of these is said to be ' q/ ' some- thing both in its original and in its converted form ; for one thing is both ' a half of ' and ' a fraction of ' something else. Likewise uith * knowledge ' and

  • conception ' ; for these are followed by the genitive,

and in the converted form ' knowable ' and * con- ceivable ' are both alike followed by the dative. If, therefore, in any instance the converted forms do not take the same case, clearly the one is not the genus of the other.

Again, you must see whether the relative applica- (j) Equality tion of the species and of the genus extends to an of spedes^ equal number of things ; for it is generally held that and genus, the relative application of each is similar and co- extensive as in the case of * gift ' and * giving.' For we speak of a gift of something or to someone, and of a giving of something and to someone ; and ' giving ' is the genus of ' gift,' for a * gift ' is a ' giving which needs no giving in return.' But some- times the relative applications do not extend to an equal number of things ; for double is double of



125 a

20 SiTrXoLGLOV TLvos StTrActcrtov, TO 8' v7T€pexov Kal TO

jLtet^ov TLVo? Kal TLvi' ndv yap to VTrepexov Kal TO fjuel^ov Tivl v7r€p€X€L Kal TLVos UTTepe^^et. cocrr' ov yivrj tol elpr]fjLeva tov StTrAacrtou, €7Teihj] ov irpos toa TO) eihei Aeyerat. t) ov KaOoXov dXrjdes TO TTpos Loa TO ctSos" Kal TO yevos Xeyeodai.

25 'Opdv Se Kal el tov avTiKeifxivov to dvrtAcei/xevov yevog, olov el tov hnrXaaiov to TToXXaTrXdoriov Kal TOV rjfJLLueo? to iToXXoGTiqixopiov' Set yap to dvTi- Keijjievov TOV dvTiKeipievov yevos elvai. el ovv tls OeiTj TTjv eTTLOT'qfjirjv oirep alodrjULV, heiqoei Kal to eTTiGTriTov orrep alGBr]T6v etvai. ovk eoTt Se* ov

80 yap TTciv to emaT7]T6v alodiqTov' Kal yap tojv vorjTcov evia emoTr]Td. oxjt ov yevos to alaQyyrov TOV i7TLGT7]TOV. el 8e TOVTo [JLTj , ouS' a'lGdiqGLg eTTiGTiqfxris .

'ETret he tcov irpo^ tl XeyopLevcuv tol jjiev i^ dvdyKr)s ev eKeivois r] nepl eKelvd eoTi irpos a

35 TTore Tvyxdvei Xeyofjueva, olov rj htddeGi? Kal tj e^is Kal Tj GvpLpieTpia [ev dXXcv yap ovSevl SvvaTov VTrdpx^iv Ta elprjfjLeva t) ev eKeivois TTpos a Aeyerat), TO. 8' OVK dvdyKT] fxev ev cKeivois virdpx^t'V TTpos 454


something, but we speak of ' in excess ' (or * greater *)

  • of ' (or ' than ') something else ; and ' in ' something ;

for what is ' in excess ' (or ' greater ') is always in excess in something as well as in excess of some- thing." So the above terms are not the genera of ' double,' since their relative application is not co- extensive with that of the species. Or perhaps it is not universally true that the relative apphcation of the species and the genus extends to an equal number of things.

You must also see whether the opposite of the (k) The

genus is the genus of the opposite of the species, for the^genus\s

example, whether, if ' multiple ' is the e:enus of ^^^ genus of

. J ifi ' . P . . , . 1 W r « 1, ir ' ^^^® opposite

double, traction is also the genus or hali ; of the

for the opposite of the genus must be the genus of ^p^<^^®^- the opposite species. If, therefore, someone were to lay it down that knowledge is a kind of sense-per- ception, then also the object of knowledge will necessarily be a kind of object of sense-perception. But this is not so ; for not every object of knowledge is an object of sensation, for some of the objects of intelligence are objects of knowledge. And so ' object of sensation ' is not the genus of ' object of knowledge ' ; and, if this is true, neither is

  • sensation ' the genus of ' knowledge.'

Since of relative terms (a) some are necessarily (l) The mis- found in, or employed about, those things in relation ^rtain to which they happen at any time to be employed, relative for example, * disposition,' ' state ' and ' proportion ' (for these terms cannot possibly exist anywhere else except in the things in relation to which they are employed), and (6) others do not necessarily exist in

" For the cases used with the verb vrrepexciv cf. Plato, Tim. 24 D TtdvTUiv . . . VTrepex^t, fieyeOei Kai dpeTj}.



125 a

a TTore Aeycrat, cvSep^erat 8e {olov el iTTiorrrjrov

Tj j/ffXT o^^^^ y^P kojXv€L TTjv avTrJ9 e7nGTriiJLr]v

€X€LV TTjv if)V)(r]v, ovK dvayKOLOV he- hvvarov yap

125 b /cat iv dXXcp VTTapx^i'V ttjv avrriv ravrrjv), rd 8'

olttXcjs OVK evS€;)^eTat iv eKeivois vrrapx^i'V TTpos a

TTore rvyxdvei Aeyo/xeva (olov to ivavriov iv rep

ivavricp ovhe rrjv i7nGT'^fjU7]v iv toj iTnonqrcp, idv

fjLrj TvyxdvTj to iiriGrrirov ijjvx'^ ^ dvOpcoTros 6v) .

5 GK07T€iV OVV XPV > ^^^ '^^ ^^^ yivO? dfj TO TOLOVTOV, (^eiy €L9 TO jJLTj TOLOVTOV, OLOV €L TTjV pLVqfJLiqV [JiOVrjV

irTLGTi^pbrj^ €L7T6V. TTaoa ydp fJLOvrj iv tco /xeVovrt Kal nepl iKelvo, cocrre Kal rj ttjs i7TLOTrjp.rjs pLovrj

iv Tjj iTTLGT-^fjLTj. Tj pLV^fir] dpa iv TTJ iTTLGTI^fJir),

irreLhrj p.ovr] ttjs cttkjttJ/xt^? iarlv. tovto 8' ovk 10 ivSix^TaL- pLV-qpLT] ydp Trdoa iv ipvxfj- ^<ttl 8' o


ovhkv ydp hLa<f)ipeL rrj^ pLVT^fJUTj^ yivos ttjv p^ovrjv elireiv rj cru/xjSejST^/ceVat (^acrKetv avTrj tovto- el ydp OTTcoarovv iaTLV 7) fJLvqp.r] pbovrj eTTtcm^/XT^S', o auTOS" dppLoaeL rrepl avTrjs Xoyo?. 15 V. riaAtv €t Tr)v €^LV etV t')7V ivipyeLav edr]K€V rj TTjV ivepyeLav els ttjv e^LV, olov ttjv aLodiqaLv KLvrjoTLv 8ta (Jco/xaTO?" r] puev ydp alodiqGLS e^LS, r) 8e KLvrjGLS ivepyeLa. opLoiws 8e kol el ttjv pLvrjfjirjv

^ €L added by W. S. Maguinness. 4>56

TOPICA, IV. iv-v

those things in relation to which they are employed at any particular time, though they may so exist (for example, if the soul be called an ' object of know- ledge ' ; for there is nothing to prevent the soul from having knowledge of itself, though it does not necessarily possess it, for it is possible for this same knowledge to exist elsewhere), and (c) others simply cannot exist in those things in relation to which they happen to be employed at any particular time, for example, the contrary cannot exist in the contrary nor knowledge in the object of knowledge, unless the object of knowledge happens to be a soul or a man. If, therefore, someone places a term of a certain kind within a genus, you must look and see whether he has placed it within a genus which is not of that kind, for example, if it has been stated that ' memory ' is the ' permanency of knowledge.' For ' perma- nency ' always exists in, and is concerned with, that which is permanent, so that the permanency of knowledge also exists in knowledge. Memory, then, exists in knowledge, since it is the permanency of knowledge ; but this is impossible, for memory always exists in the soul. The above commonplace is common also to accident ; for it makes no differ- ence whether we say that permanency is the genus of memory or call it accidental to it ; for, if memory is in any way the permanency of knowledge, the same argument about it will be applicable.

V. Again, you must see whether your opponent Some com- has placed a ' state ' in the genus of * activity ' or XuvrSSa- an ' activity ' in the genus of ' state,' for example, ^^^L calling ' sensation ' ' movement through the body ' ; sion of for sensation is a ' state ' while movement is an \ l^i^/ty '^'^

  • activity.' Likewise, too, if he has made ' memory ' and 'state'

4,5-7 'capacity.*


125 b »^^^ KaOeKTiKrjv VTroXtjipeco? elTrev ovSejjLia yap ixvrjiir] €^LS, dXXa fjidXXov evepyeia.

20 ALafjLaprdvovaL 8e xat ol rrjv e^iv els rrjv olko- Xovdovcrav SvvafjuLv TOLrrovres , olov rrjv npaorrjTa eyKpaTecav opyrjs koI ttjv dvhpiav koI rrjv St/cato- Gvvrjv (f)6pajv Kal Kepha>v' dv'bpeios jLtev ydp Kal TTpdos 6 OLTraOrjs Aeyerat, iyKparrjs S' o ttolgxojv Kal fjiT) dyofjuevos. lgcjos /xev ovv aKoXovdel SvvafXLS

25 iKarepcp roiavrr], cocrr' el Trddoi, [jltj dyeaOai aAAa Kparelv ov firjv rovro y iarl rep jxev dvSpetcp rep 8e TTpdcp etvai, dXXd to oXcos jjltj Trdo^etv vtto twv TOLOVTWV pirjSev.

'Evtore 8e Kal to napaKoXovdovv ottojgovv d)s yevos riOeacTLV, olov rrjv Xvtttjv rrjs opyrjs Kal rriv

30 VTToXr^iJMv TTJs TTLGTews. diJb(f)aj ydp rd elprjfxeva TTapaKoXovdel jxev rpoirov rivd rols dTTohodelaiv e'lheoLVy ovherepov 8' avrdjv yevos eartv o jiev ydp dpyit,6p,evos XvTrelrai nporepas ev avrw rrjs Xv7T7]s yevofjidvrjs' ov ydp tj opyr] rrjs XvTrrjs, dXX* rj XvTTTj rrjs opyrjs atrta, cocr^' drrXcJos rj opyrj ovk

35 eoTL XvTTr]. Kard ravra 8' ovS* rj ttlgtls VTToXrjipts' €vSe)(€TaL ydp rrjv avrr^v vTToXrjifjiv Kal fjurj ttl- GTCvovra ex^Lv. ovk ivSex^rai 8', elVep ethos rj TTLOTis VTToXruJjeojs' ov ydp evSex^raL to avrd eTL StapieveLv, dvirep €k tov etSovs oXcos p^era^dXr], KaOdirep ovSe to avTO ^coov ore p.ev dvOpojirov

40 elvai ore he dv he ns (f)fj i^ dvdyKrjs rdv 126 a V7ToXap.^dvovra Kal TTioreveiv, err* loov rj vtto- 458


  • a state which can retain a conception ' ; for memory

is never a * state ' but rather an ' activity.'

They also err who range a ' state ' in the ' capacity * which accompanies it, for example, making * mild- ness ' * the controlling of anger,' and ' courage ' and

  • justice ' ' the controlling of fears ' and of ' gains '

respectively ; for ' courageous ' and ' mild ' are used of one who is free from passion, whereas a * self- controlled ' man is one who is subject to passion but is not carried away by it. Now, perhaps each of the former is attended by a capacity of such a kind that, if he is subjected to a passion, he is not carried away by it but can control it ; this, however, is not to be ' courageous ' in the one case and ' mild ' in the other, but to be absolutely free from any such passion.

Sometimes also, people put down as genus that (b) Mis- which is in any manner attendant on the species, sSmpti^n making, for example, * pain ' the ffenus of * an^er ' that what is and * conception ' the genus of ' belief ; for both upon species in a sense are attendant on the species assigned, but ^^ s^nm. neither of them is its genus. For when the angry man is pained, the pain has been produced in him before he is angry ; for the anger is not the cause of the pain but the pain of the anger ; so that anger simply is not pain. On this principle neither is belief conception ; for it is possible to have the same con- ception even without believing in it, whereas this is impossible if belief is a species of conception. For it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same if it is entirely removed from its species, just as neither can the same animal be a man at one time and not at another. But if anyone asserts that the man who has a conception must necessarily also believe in it, then conception and belief \vill be used



126 a

Xyji/jig /cat rj ttlgtls pridrjuerai, coor ovh^ av ovrois

eir] yevos' €7tI TrXeov yap Set Xiy eodai to yevos.

'Opdv 8e Kal el ev tlvl rw avro) 7T€(f)VK€V dfjucfyaj

yiveodai' iv S yap ro etSos, Kal to yevos, olov

5 ev o) TO XevKov, Kal to ;;^pa)/xa, Kal ev (I> ypap,-

/xart/CTJ, Kal iTTLCTTijfjLr]. eav ovv rts" ttjv alGxvv'r]v

<j)6^ov eLTTTj rj TTJV opyrjv Xvtttjv, ov GVix^iqueTai ev

TO) aura) to elBog Kal to yevos VTrapx^iv 7] fjuev

yap alaxvvT] ev tco XoyiUTLKO), 6 Se (j)6^os ev tco

dviJLoeiSeL, Kal rj piev Xvttt] iv to) eTTiOvpiiqTiKcp

10 (eV TOVTCp yap Kal rj rjhov^), 7] Se opyr] ev to) dvpboeLhel, oiOT ov yevrj to, aTToSodevTa, eireiSr] ovK iv TO) auTo) Tols el'ScCTt 7Tecf>VKe ylveGdai. ofJLOLOJS 8e Kal el rj ^iXia iv to) iTnOvpLrjTLKa), ovk av e'lr] ^ovXiqais tls- Trdcra yap ^ovXrjGLS iv Tch XoyiGTiKcp. xPV^^H'OS 8' o T07T0S /cat npos to

15 ovpi^efirjKos- iv tco avTw yap to avfJu^epriKos Kal w Gvp,pe^7]Kev, coctt' av fjirj iv toj auroj (f)aivr)Taiy hrjXov OTL ov crviJbl3e^r]Kev.

IlaAtv et /caret rt to elSos tov elprjp.evov yevovs jLtere;)(ef ov 8o/cet yap /caret rt /xere';;^ecr^at to yevos ' ov yap icTTLV 6 avOpcoTTOs /caret rt ^cpov, ovS rj

20 ypa[xp.aTLKrj /caret rt iTnaT^fjirj' ojjbolcos 8e /cat evrt Tcbv dXXa>v. GKOTTelv ovv el iirl tlvcov /cara rt fjueTex^Tai to yevos, olov el to ^coov OTrep aiGorjTOV 460


to cover the same ground, so that not even so could the one be the genus of the other, since the genus must cover a wider field of predication.

You must also see whether it is the nature of both (c) Errone- to come into being in some one and the same thing ; tion^of"'"^' for where the species is, there also is the genus ; for things example, where there is ' whiteness,' there is also fail under 'colour,' and, where there is the 'science offacSSes grammar,' there is also ' knowledge.' If, therefore, genus and anyone says that ' shame ' is ' fear ' or that ' anger ' ^p^^^^^- is ' pain,' the result will be that the species and the genus do not exist in the same thing ; for shame exists in the ' reasoning ' faculty of the soul, fear in the ' spirited ' faculty, and ' pain ' in the ' appetitive ' faculty (for pleasure is also in this), anger in the ' spirited ' faculty, so that the terms assigned are not genera, since it is not their nature to come into being in the same thing as the species. Similarly, too, if ' friendship ' is in the ' appetitive ' faculty, it cannot be a kind of ' wish ' ; for a ' wish ' is always in the ' reasoning ' faculty. This commonplace is also useful in dealing with the accident ; for the accident and that of which it is an accident are both in the same thing, so that, if they do not appear in the same thing, it is obviously not a case of accident.

Again, you must see whether the species partakes (d) Error of only partially of the genus assigned ; for it is gener- ^eciesVar^- ally held that genus is not partially imparted ; for a take only man is not merely partially an animal nor is the the genus? science of grammar partially knowledge, and so like- wise in the other instances. You must examine, therefore, whether in some cases the genus is only partially imparted, for example, if ' animal ' has been described as an ' object of sensation ' or an ' object


126 a

rq oparov etprjraL. Kara n yap aladrjrov iq oparov

TO t,a)ov' Kara to aco/xa yap aloBr]T6v Kal oparov, Kara Se rrjv ifjv)(r]v ov, o^ar ovk av etr] yivos ro

25 oparov Kal ro alaOrjrov rod ^coov.

AavOdvovoL 8' ivLore Kal ro oXov et? to p,ipos riBevreSy olov ro t,(hov crajfjua efjLifjvxov. ovSap,oj? 8e TO fjbepos rod oXov Kar'qyopelrai, ojor ovk av €Lrj ro CTcDjLta yevos rod t^cLov, eTreihrj piipos eariv.

30 Opdv 8e Kal e'l n rwv i/jeKrwv rj (f)€VKra)v elg SvvafXLV rj ro Svvarov eOrjKev, olov rov oocfyicrrrjv T] Slol^oXov t) KXerrrrjv rov hwdfievov Xddpa aXXorpca /cAcTTTetv/ ov8etS' yap rcov elprjixevajv rep Bvvaro? elvai ri rovrcov roiovros Xeyerau' Svvarau fjuev

35 yap Kal 6 Oeos Kal 6 aTTOvSalo? rd (jyavXa Spdv,

aAA' OVK elal rotovroL' ndvreg yap ol <j)avXoi Kara

TTpoaipeaiv Xeyovrai. cVt rrdoa hvvapus rcov

alpercjv Kal yap at rcov cfyavXcov 8wajL6e6S" alperal,

8to Kal rov deov Kal rov GTTovSalov ex^i'V (fyapuev

avrds' Svvarov? yap etvau rd (jyavXa TTpduoeiv.

l26b6uo-T* ovhevos av €L7] ifjeKrov yevos r) SvvafiLS. et

8e pirjy GVfJb^'qaeraL rcov ipeKrajv n alperdv etvat'

eorai ydp rig Svvafjiis i/jeKrrj.

Kat et n rcov St' auTO ripbicov tj alpercov els

5 SuvajLttv 'q ro Svvarov 'iq ro rroL-qriKov edrjKev. Trdcra

^ Reading with AB Bwdixevov Xddpa dXXorpia /cAcWeiv. 462



of sight.' For an animal is only in part an object of sensation or of sight ; for it is an object of sensation and sight as regards its body but not as regards its soul ; so that * object of sight ' and ' object of sensation ' cannot be the genus of ' animal.'

Sometimes too people unobservedly put the whole (e) Error of within the part, describing, for example, ' animal ' ofth?^^^' as * animated body.' But the part is not in any way species predicable of the whole, so that ' body ' cannot be the genus of ' animal,' for it is a part only.

You must also see whether your opponent has put anything blameworthy or to be avoided in the (/) Error of category of ' capacity ' or ' capable,' for example, wha"is^ in his definition of a sophist or a slanderer, or a thief ^^^'^'Tl^' whom he describes as capable of secretly stealing capacity, the good of others. For none of the above is described by his particular name because he is ' capable ' in one of these respects ; for even God and the good man are capable of doing bad deeds, but God and man are not of that character ; for the wicked are always so called because of their deliberate choice of evil. Furthermore, a capacity is always among the things worthy of choice, for even capacities for evil are worthy of choice ; and so we say that God and the good man possess them, for we say that they are capable of doing evil. Therefore capacity cannot be the genus of anything blame- worthy ; otherwise the result will be that something blameworthy is an object of choice, for there will be a kind of capacity which is blameworthy.

You must also see whether he has placed anything {g) Placing which is in itself valuable or worthy of choice in the giry of cs^ category of ' capacity ' or ' the capable ' or * the pacity what productive.' For every capacity and everything desirable.



126 b

yap SvvafjiLS Kal Tvdv to hvvarov 7) to ttoititikov

hi aXKo alperov.

'^H €L Tt ra)v iv Svo yiveoiv t] TrXeiooiv els ddrepov €dr)K€v. eVta yap ovk eariv elg iv yevos delvaty olov tov (jyivaKa Kal rov StajSoAov ovr€

10 yap 6 TrpoaLpovfjievos dSvvarcjv 8e, ovO* 6 Svvd- fjuevos fJirj TTpoatpovixevo? Se Sid^oXog rj (j)€va^, aAA' o dpL(f)aj ravra e;^a)v. cocrr* ov Oereov els cv yivos dAA' et? a/x</)orepa rd elpiqpieva.

"Ert ivLore dvctTraAtv to fxev yevog w? 'hia<j)opdv TTjv Be hia^opdv cog yevos (XTroStSoacrtv, olov ttjv

15 CKTTXrj^iv VTreppoXrjV davfxaaL6T7]T09 Kal ttjv ttlotlv G(f)o8p6TrjTa VTToXrjilsecxJS . ovt€ yap rj virep^oXr] ovd^ J) o^ohpoTT]? yevos, dXXd hia^opd- Sok€l yap Tj eKTrXrj^is davfiaoiOTris elvai VTreppdXXovaa Kal Tj TTLGTis VTToXrjipLS G(f)ohpd, oiUTe yivos 7) ^au/xa- GLOTTjs Kal 7) vrroXruJjLS, rj 8' vrrep^oXrj Kal rj a(j)o-

20 SpoTrjs 8ta(^opd. ert et tls Trjv vTTep^oXrjv Kal ocjyohpoTrjTa d)s yevos drrohcooei, Ta d^V)(a m- GTevaei Kal eKTrXayrjoeTai. rj yap eKdaTOV 0^0- hpoTrjs Kal vTTeppoXrj TrdpeoTiv eKeivco ov eoTl CKJiohpoTrjs Kal vrrep^oX-q. el ovv rj eKrrXrj^is VTTep^oXrj eoTL OavfJbacrioTrjTos , TrapeoTai Tjj dav-

25 jxaoioTrjTL rj eKnXrj^is, coct^' rj davjxaoLOTrjs eKirXayrjoeTai. ofjuoiojs 8e Kal rj ttlgtls TrapecrTai Trj vTToXrjijjei , elirep o(f)ohp6Trjs viroX'^ipecDS eoTiv, cocrre rj VTToXrji/jLS moTevoei. ert ovpu^rjaeTaL Tip 464


capable or productive is worthy of choice for the sake of something else.

Or again, you must see whether he has placed W Placing something which falls under two or more genera in g^nus\hSf one of them only. For there are some things which ^^^j^J ^^'^ cannot be placed in one genus only, for example, several the ' imposter ' and the ' slanderer. ' For neither s^"®^*- is he who possesses the inclination but not the ability, nor he who possesses the ability but not the inclination, a slanderer or an imposter, but he who has the ability and the inclination. He must, there- fore, be placed not in one genus only but in both the above genera.

Moreover, by a process of inversion, people some- (i) Error of times assign genus as diiferentia and differentia as genu?as^ genus, calling, for example, ' amazement ' an ' excess differentia of astonishment ' and ' belief ' an ' intensification of versa. opinion.' For * excess ' and * intensification ' are not the genus but the differentia ; for amazement is generally regarded as excessive astonishment and belief as intensified opinion, so that astonishment and opinion are the genus, while excess and intensi- fication are the differentia. Further, if excess and intensification are to be assigned as genus, inanimate things will believe and be amazed. For the intensi- fication and excess of any particular thing are present in that of which they are the intensification and excess. If, therefore, amazement is an excess of astonishment, the amazement will be present in the astonishment, so that the astonishment will be amazed. Similarly also the belief will be present in the opinion, since it is the intensification of the opinion ; and so the opinion will believe. Further, the result of making an assertion of this kind will



126 b

ovTOJS a,7ro8tSdvTt o<j)ohp6rr]Ta a(j>ohpav Aeyetv koX V7T€p^oXr]v VTTep^dXXovGav . €Gtl yap Trioris G(f)o-

30 Spa* et ovv rj Trions O(f)o'bp6rr]'s eori, G(f)oSp6Tr)? av eLTj G(f)oSpd. ofiotajs 8e Kal eKirXiq^i^ ecrrtv VTTep^dXXovGa' el ovv rj eKirXiq^is VTrep^oXrj ianv, VTTepjBoXT] av €L7] VTTep^aXXovoa. ov hoKel 8' ovherepov rovrwv, (LarTrep ot38' iTTioriqfxri eTn<JT7]p.ov^ ovhe KivriGLS KLVovpLevov.

'Evtore 8e hiapLapTavovoi Kal to TvdBos els yevos

35 TO 7T€7Tovd6s TiddvTeg, olov OGOL TTjV ddavaulav t,ojr)v dthiov ^acrtv etvai' irdOos ydp tl ^cut}? ■^ GvpLTTTOJixa rj dOavaGia €olk€v etvai. otl 8' dXr]6€S TO Xeyofjievov, SrjXov av yevouTO, et tls Gvyx<op'qG€Lev €K dvr]TOV TLvd dOdvaTOV yiveGB ai' ovhels ydp ^rjGei eTepav avTOV l,a)rjv XapL^dveiv , dXXd GvpLTTTCJjxd tl

127 a Tf Trddog avTYJ TavTTj TrapayeveGdai. cogt ov yevos

Tj l^corj TTJs ddavaGias.

HaAtv et Tov TrdBovs, ov €gti TrdOos, eKelvo yevos cf)aGLV etvau, olov to TTvevfxa depa Kivovp^evov. 5 fjbdXXov ydp KLvrjGLS depos to TTvevfxa- 6 ydp avTos drip ScapueveL, oTav re KLvrJTai Kal otov p^evT]. coctt* ovK eGTiv oXcos drjp to TTvevfia- rjv ydp av Kal p.T] Kivovp^evov TOV depos TTvevp.a, elirep 6 avTos drjp 8taju-ev€t oGirep rjV TTvevpia. ojjlolcos 8e /cat €7rt Tcov dXXcov Tojv TOLOVTCxJV. el 8* dpa Kal inl 10 TOVTOV Bel GvyxoJprJGau otl drip eoTL KLVovp,evos TO TTvevpua, dAA' ourt /caro, irdvTotv to tolovtov diToheKTeov Kad" cov pirj dXiqdeveTaL to yevos, aAA* e^* OGCjJv dXrjOojs KaTrjyopelTaL to dTTohoOev yevos. 677* evLOJV ydp ov SoKeX dXrjOeveGdaL, olov inl tov

^ Reading imaTijfxov with C. 466



be to call intensification intensified and excess excessive. For belief is intensified ; if, therefore, belief is intensification, intensification would be intensified. Similarly, too, amazement is excessive ; if, therefore, amazement is excess, excess would be excessive. But neither of these things accords with current belief any more than that knowledge is a knowing thing or motion a moving thing.

Sometimes too, people err in placing an affection 0") Error of in that which has been affected, as its genus, for fwng^^ *^^ example, those who say that immortality is ever- affected the lasting life ; for immortality seems to be an affection affection. or accidental property of Ufe. That this description is true would be clearly seen if one were to concede that a man can become immortal after having been mortal ; for no one will say that he is taking on another life, but that an accidental property or affection is added to life as it is. Life, therefore, is not the genus of immortality.

Again, you must see whether they are asserting (k) Error of that the genus of an affection is that of which it is ^^^^ ^^^ an affection, for example, when they say that the affected the wind is * air in motion. ' For wind is rather ' motion f ffection.^^^ of air,' for the same air remains both when it is in motion and when it is at rest. And so wind is not air at all ; otherwise there would be wind even when the air was not in motion, since the same air which was wind still remains. Similarly, too, in the other cases of this kind. But if after all we must in this case concede that the wind is air in motion, yet we ought not to accept such a statement with regard to everything of which the genus is not truly asserted but only where the genus assigned is truly predicated. For in some cases, for example ' mud '



127 a

7Tr]Xov Kal rrjs p^toros". rrjv jxev yap ;Ytdva ^acrtv

15 vScop etvat ireTTiqyog , rov he ttt^Xov yrjv vypo) 7r6(f)Vpa[jievr]V' eon 8' ovd^ tj x^^^ vScop ovO^ 6 TTTjXog yrj, cScrr* ovk av etr] yevo? ovherepov tcjv oLTToSoO evTOJV Set yap to yivo< s dXrjdeveaOaL del Kara rcjv etScov. ofJLoloJS 8' ouS' o otvos €Otiv vSojp (J€G7]7t6s, KaOaTrep ^KfJbTTeBoKXijg <f)r}OL aairev iv ivXo) vSojp' olttXcl)? ydp ovk eoriv vhcop.

20 VI. "Ert et oXoiS TO dnoSodev fjurjSevos eoTi yevos' hriXov ydp (hs ovhk tov Xe^OevTOS. OKoirelv

S' €K TOV fJb7]S€V SLa(j>€p€LV etSct TO, jJL€T€XOVTa TOV

dTToSodevTos ydvovg, otov ra XevKa' ovhev ydp hia(j)€p€L Tip et8et raur' dXXiqXcjv. TravTog 8e yevovg €gtI to, etSr] hid^opa, cuctt' ovk dv eur) to

25 XevKov ycvog ovhevog.

YldXiv et TO TTaoiv dKoXovdovv yivos t} hia^opdv elrrev. rrXeio} ydp Td ndoiv evro/xeva, olov to ov Kal TO ev twv TrdoLv eTTOfJievwv ioTLV. el ovv TO ov yevos aTrihcoKe, hrjXov otl rrdvTcov dv etrj

30 y€vo9, CTTetSo] KaTr^yopelTai avTcov /car' ovSevds ydp TO yevo'S dXX t) /caret Tchv elhwv /carT^yopetrat . o)GT€ Kal TO ev etSos dv etr] tov ovtos. avpL^aivei ovv /caret rravTCov, cLv to yevos KaTr^yopeiTaL, Kal TO €t8os" KaTrjyopeiadaL, irreiSr] to ov Kal to ev

« Fr. 81. 468

TOPICA, IV. v-vi

and ' snow,' it does not seem to be truly asserted. For they describes now as ' congealed water,' and mud as * earth mingled with moisture ' ; but neither is snow water nor mud earth, so that neither of the terms assigned could be the genus ; for the genus must always be truly asserted of every species. Similarly, neither is wine ' putrefied water,' as Empedocles speaks of ' water putrefied in wood ' " ; for it simply is not water at all.

VI. Furthermore, you must see whether the term Varicms assigned is not the genus of anything at all ; for J" xh'e pro- then obviously it is not the genus of the species posed genus named. You must make your examination on the tain subject basis of an absence of any difference in species sp^cies. between the things which partake of the genus assigned, for example, white objects ; for these do not differ at all from one another specifically, whereas the species of a genus are always different from one another ; so that ' white ' could not be the genus of anything.

Again, you niust see whether your opponent has (b) An attri- asserted that some attribute which accompanies i^^v^er- everything is ffenus or differentia. For there are sally present several attributes which accompany everything ; taken as ' being,' for example, and ' oneness ' are among the differentia attributes which accompany everything. If, then, he has assigned 'being' as a 'genus, obviously it would be the genus of everything, since it is predi- cated of everything ; for the genus is not predicated of anything except its species. Hence * oneness ' too would be a species of ' being.' It results, there- fore, that the species also is predicated of everything of which the genus is predicated, since ' being ' and

  • oneness ' are predicated of absolutely everything,



127a ^ ^

Kara Travrajv olttXcos KarrjyopetraL, Sdov ctt' eXar-

85 rov TO etSos Karr^yopeiaOaL. el 8e ro Trdoriv €7r6jJL€Vov SLa<f)opav elire, hrfkov on Itt* Igov t) evrt TrXeov Tj hia<j)opa rov yivovs prjO-qGerai. el [xev yap Kal to yevos rwv irdorLv eVo/xeVcov, ctt' lgov, el Se fJLrj Trdoiv eTrerai to yevos, eTTi irXeov rj Sia(f>opa Xeyoir* av avrov. 127 b "Etc el ev VTTOKeijJievoj rw etSet ro dnoSodev yevos Xeyerau, KaOdrrep ro XevKov eirl rrjs x^ovos, oiore hr\Xov on ovk av elj] yevos ' KaB^ VTroKecfjievov yap rov et'Sous" piovov ro yevos Xeyerai. 5 YiKOTTeiv 8e /cat el pLTj ovvcx)vvp,ov ro yevos ro) elhei' Kara iravrcov yap rcxiv etScov avvcovvpuajs ro yevos KarrjyopeZraL.

"Eti orav ovros Kal rep etSeu Kal rqj yevet evavriov ro ^eXnov rojv evavriwv els ro ')(^eipov

10 yevos 6fj' GVfjLprjGeraL yap ro Xolttov ev ro) XoiiTcp etvai, eTTeuSTj rdvavria ev rols evavriois yeveauv (hare ro ^eXnov ev rep x^ipovi eorai Kal ro -xeipov ev ro) ^eXrlovL' SoKel he rov ^eXriovos Kal ro yevos peXnov etvai. Kal el rov avrov etSovs opLoiws TTpos dpL^oj exovros els ro x^lpov Kal p^rj

16 ecs ro ^eXnov yevos edrjKev, olov rrjv ipv^^v oTrep KLvrjuLV -^ KLvovpuevov. opioiws yap rj avrrj arariKr) 470


whereas the species ought to be less widely predi- cated. If, however, he has asserted that the attribute which accompanies everything is a differentia, it is obvious that the differentia will be predicated to an extent equal to, or greater than, the genus. For if the genus also is one of the attributes which accom- pany everything, the differentia would be predicated to an equal extent, but, if the genus does not accompany everything, to a greater extent than the genus.

Furthermore, you must see whether the genus (c) The assigned is said to be inherent in the subject species not"be^^^" as ' white ' is in the case of snow, so that it is obvious !?^^^?t^ ^^ that it cannot be the genus ; for the genus is only species.^ ^ predicated of the subject species.

You must also see whether the genus is not (d) The synonymous with the species ; for the genus is the^pecies always predicated of the species synonymously. are predi-

Further, there is the case when, both the species onymo^usTy. and the genus having a contrary, your opponent (e) The places the better of the contrary species in the two^con-^ worse genus ; for this will result in the other species trades must being placed in the other genus, since contraries assigned to are found in contrary genera, so that the better gg^^^'^^® species will be found in the worse genus and the worse species in the better genus, whereas it is generally held that the genus of the better species is also better. You must also see whether, when the same species is similarly related to both, your opponent has placed it in the worse and not in the better genus, saying, for example, that the ' soul ' is * a kind of motion ' or * a moving thing.' For the same soul is generally regarded as being in like manner a principle of rest and a principle of motion ;



127 b

Kal KivrjTLKrj So/cet elvai, c5c7t' et ^eXnov r) ardarts,

elg TOVTO eSet to yevog delvai.

"Ert eK rod jLtaAAov Kal rjrrov, dvauKevd^ovTL lJb€V, el ro yevos 8e;j(erat to [idXXov, to 8* etSo?

20 JJUT) Se^^erat fju-qT^ avTO /XT^re to KaT* eKeivo Aeyd- jjbevov. olov el t] dpeTT] he^eTai to yboXXov, Kal rj SiKaLoavvr] Kal 6 SiKatos' XeyeTai yap SuKaiOTepos eTepo? eTepov. el ovv to jjuev diroSodev yevos to (jbaXXov Se^eTat, to 8' elSos [ir] SexeTau /^ctJt* auTO jjb'qTe TO KaT eKeivo Xeyopievov, ovk dv e'lr] yevos

25 TO aTToSoOev.

ndAtv et TO fjbdXXov Sokovv t) 6fJLola>s p^r] eoTi yevos, StjAov otl ovSe to aTToSoOev. ;\;p7yCTtjLtos' 8' o TOTTOS" errl tojv tolovtojv pbdXioTa e</>' cov TrXeico (f)aLveTaL tov etSovs ev tw tl eoTi KaT7]yopovp.eva,

30 Kal p.rj hicx)piGTai, p.r]h^ e^op^ev elirelv ttoZov auTcov yevos, olov ttjs opyrjs Kal rj Xvttt] Kal rj VTToXrji/jis oXiyojpias ev tco tl eoTi KaTiqyopelodai SoKet- XvrrelTai Te yap 6 opyt^op^evos Kal viroXapL^dvei oXiywpeloQai. rj avTrj 8e GKeipis Kal errl tov elhovs TTpos dXXo TL GvyKpLVOVTL- el ydp TO pidXXov rj to

35 opLOLOJS SoKovv etvai ev Ta> drrohoOevTi yeveL puifj eoTLV ev Tip yeveL, SrjXov otl ovSe to dnoSodev etSos e'lrj dv ev Tcp yeveL.

^AvaLpovvTL puev ovv KaOdnep etprjTaL ;YP^crTeov KaTa(jKevdt,ovTL Se, el puev irrLSexeTaL to pidXXov

128 a TO Te aTToSoOev yevos Kal to etSos, ov XPV^^'H'OS



so that, if rest is better, it ought to have been placed in this as its genus.

P'urther, you must arffue from the greater and (/) 4^"^"'

ments from

less degrees. For destructive criticism, you should the greater see whether the genus admits of the greater degree, gq^af '^^^ while neither the species itself nor anything which degrees. is named after it does so. For example, if virtue destructive admits of the greater degree, ' justice ' and ' the criticism. just man ' do so also ; for one man is called * more just ' than another. If, therefore, the genus assigned admits of the greater degree but neither the species itself nor anything which is named after it admits of it, the term assigned cannot be the genus.

Again, if what is more generally or equally gener- ally held to be the genus is not the genus, obviously neither is the term assigned the genus. This common- place is useful especially when several things are clearly predicable of the species in the category of essence and no distinction has been made between them and we cannot say which of them is genus. For example, both ' pain ' and the ' conception of contempt ' are generally regarded as predicates of anger ' in the category of essence ; for the angry man both feels pain and conceives that he is con- temned. The same inquiry is also applicable in the case of the species by means of a comparison with some other species ; for, if what is more generally or equally generally held to be in the assigned genus is not present in the genus, obviously neither could the species assigned be present in the genus.

In destructive criticism, then, the above method (2) in cou- should be employed ; but for constructive purposes IrgunJent. the commonplace of seeing whether both the assigned genus and the species admit of the greater



128 a

o TOTTOS" ovSev yap KCoXvec dijL<f)OTep(x)v iinSexo-

fjuevcov jjiT] etvat Barepov Oarepov yivos. to re

yap KaXov Kal to XevKOV €7rt8e;>^€Tat to [xaXXov,

Kal ovSerepov ovherepov yevos. tj 8e rwv yevcbv

5 Kal Tiov etScov TTpos dXXrjXa ovyKpiGi? XPV^^I^^^>

oiov el ojJiOLCos To8e Kal ToSe yivos, et Barepov

yevo9, Kal Barepov. opiOLCOS he Kal el ro rjrrov

Kal ro fJuaXXov, otov el rrjs eyKpareias puaXXov r)

Swa/xt? "^ rj dperr] yevos, rj 8' dperrj yevos, Kal

Yf SvvapiLS. rd 8' avrd Kal errl rod etSovs dppLocrei

loXeyeaBai. el ydp opboicog roSe Kal roBe rod rrpo-

Keifxevov etSos", et Barepov elSog, Kal ro Xolttov

Kal el ro rjrrov Sokovv etSos eon, Kal ro pbdXXov.

"Eti TTpos ro KaraoKevd^etv GKeirreov el KaB^

chv drre'BoBr] ro yevos, ev rep ri eari KarrjyopelraL,

15 pbT] ovros evds rod dirohoBevros etSovs, dXXd TrXeLovojv Kal 8ta0d/3a>v SrjXov ydp on yevos earai. el 8' ev ro dnohoBev el86s ean, uKorrelv el Kal Kar^ dXXoiv elhchv ro yevos ev rco ri eon Karrj- yopelrai- irdXiv ydp avpL^rjaer at Kard TrXecovajv Kal SiacfyopcDV avro KarrjyopeZaBai.

20 'Ettci 8e SoKel rial Kal rj 8ta</»opa ev rco ri eon rwv elScov Karr^yopeluBat, ;)^6L>ptCTTeov ro yevos 474,


degree is of no use ; for, even though they both admit of it, there is nothing to prevent one not being the genus of the other. For both ' beautiful ' and ' white ' admit of the greater degree, and neither is the genus of the other. The comparison, however, of the genera and the species with one another is useful ; for example, if A and B have equal claim to be regarded as genera, then, if one is a genus, so also is the other. Similarly, too, if the less degree is a genus, so also is the greater degree ; for example, if ' capacity ' has more claim than ' virtue ' to be considered the genus of ' self control,' and ' virtue ' is the genus, so also is ' capacity.' The same considerations will be sui- tably applied also to the species. For if A and B have equal claim to be regarded as species of the proposed genus, then, if one is a species, so also is the other ; also, if that which is less generally held to be a species, is a species, so also is that which is more generally held to be so.

Further, for constructive purposes, you must io) The examine whether the genus has been predicated be^p^di"^^ in the category of essence of those things to which ^^\^^ i" ^^^ it has been assigned, in the case where the species essence, assigned is not a single species but there are several different species ; for then it will obviously be the <>-enus. If, however, the species assigned is a single species, you must examine whether the genus is predicated in the category of essence of other species also ; for then, again, the result will be that it is predicated of several different species.

Since some people hold that the differentia also (A) Method is predicated of the species in the category ofguigJf^Qg" essence, the genus must be distinguished from the genua and



128 a

0,770 Trj9 8Lacf)opd9 ;;^pcu/xevov rots' elpiq^ivois

oroix^iois , TTpojTOV jxev on to yevos irrl irXiov Xeyerai rrjs Stac^opas" eW^ on Kara ttjv tov ri ianv OLTToSocrLV fjidXXov apfMOTrei ro yevo? rj rrjv

25 hia(j)opav eiTreiv' 6 yap l,a)ov etTras" tov dvOpajTrov [jidXXov 8r]XoL TL ianv 6 dvQpojTTos r] 6 7T€l,6v /cat oTt 7] jji€V Sia(f)opd TToiorrjra rod yevovs aei or]- jLtatVet, TO he yivos ttjs Siacfiopds ov' 6 /xcf ydp eiTTas TTel^ov ttoiov tl ^coov Aeyet, o 8e t,a)ov eiiras ov Xeyei ttoiov tl rre^ov.

30 Trjv jJLev ovv hia^opdv diro tov yevovs ovtco XOJpiCTTeov. eirel he hoKel <(€t)^ to p^ovoiKov, fj


CTTtCTTTJ/XT^ TLS etvat, Kal el TO /SaSt^ov Tcp jSaSt^etv KTtvetrat, tj ^dSiGis Kiviqais rts" etvat, oKoireZv iv (L dv yevei ^ovXtj tl KaTaGKevdaaL, tov elprjpLevov 35 TpoTTOv, OLOV ct TYjv iTrLGTrjfJLrjv dnep ttlgtlv, el 6 eiTLGTapbevos fj eTrtorarat Trtorreuef hrjXov ydp otl r) eTTLGTrjpLr] ttlgtls dv tls etrj, tov avTov he Tpoirov


"Ert errel to napeTTopLevov tlvl del Kal pirj dvTL-

GTpe(f)ov x^Xerrdv ;)^a)ptCTat tov pLT] yevos etvat, av

128 b To8e jitev tojS' enr^TaL Travrt, Tohe he Twhe pur]

TTavTL, otov Trj VTjvepuLa tj rjpepLLa Kal t<J) dpLdpLO)

^ el add. Imelmann. 2 Reading ti eort for ri etvai with Imelmann.



differentia by the use of the elementary principles already mentioned, namely, (1) that the genus is more widely predicated than the differentia ; (2) that, in assigning the essence, it is more appropriate to state the genus than the differentia ; for he who describes ' man ' as an * animal ' indicates his essence better than he who describes him as ' pedestrian ' ; and (3) that the differentia always indicates a quality of the genus, whereas the genus does not describe a quality of the differentia ; for he who uses the term ' pedestrian ' describes a certain kind of animal, but he who uses the term * animal ' does not describe a certain kind of ' pedestrian. '

This, then, is how the differentia must be dis- Practical tinguished from the genus. Now, since it is generally ^-^^p'^^- held that, if that which is musical, in as much as it is musical, possesses a certain kind of knowledge, then also ' music ' is a kind of ' knowledge,' and that if that which walks moves by walking, then

  • walking ' is a kind of ' motion ' — you should examine

on the principle described above any genus in which you wish to confirm the presence of something ; for example, if you wish to confirm that ' knowledge ' is a kind of * belief,' you must see whether the man who knows, in as much as he knows, believes ; for then it is obvious that knowledge would be a kind of belief. And you must use the same method in the other cases of this kind.

Further, since it is difficult to distinguish that which always accompanies a thing and is not con- vertible with it and to show that it is not its genus — if A always accompanies B whereas B does not always accompany A ; for example, * rest ' always accompanies ' calm,' and ' divisibility ' accompanies



128 b

TO StaiperoVy dvoLTraXiv 8' ov (to yap Scaiperov ov

Trdv dpid/Jbo?, ovS^ tj rfpefxla vrjvejjbla), avrov /xev XprjcjdaL d)S yivovs ovros rod del dKoXovdovvros , 5 orav {jLTj dvrLOTpe(f)ri ddrepov, aX\ov he rrporei- vovTOS fir] 6771 TTavrajv vrraKoveiv. evuraGis 8' avrov on to firj ov eTrerai ttovtI to) yivopievcp (to ydp yivofJLevov ovk eom) Kal ovk dvTiGrpecfyeL [ov ydp Trdv to firj ov yiveTai), dAA' ojjlcos ovk euTL yevos to fir] ov tov yivofxevov aTrXco? ydp OVK eoTi TOV fir] ovtos e'lSr]. 10 Ilepl fiev ovv tov yevovs, Kaddnep eipr]Tai, fieriTeov.



' number,' but the converse is not true (for the divisible is not always a number, nor is rest always a calm) — you should yourself deal with the matter on the principle that what always accompanies a thing is the genus whenever the other is not con- vertible with it ; but, when someone else makes the proposition, you should not admit it in every case. To this it may be objected that ' not-being ' always accompanies ' that which is coming into being ' (for that which is coming into being does not exist) and is not convertible with it (for what does not exist is not always coming into being), but that, never- theless, * not-being ' is not the genus of ' that which is coming into being,' for ' not-being ' has no species at all.

Such, then, are the methods which must be followed in dealing with genus.



128b 14 I. Ilorepov 8' lSlov t) ovk I'Stov eon to elprjfievov,

15 8 to, TcDvSe GK€7TT€OV.

'ATToStSorat 8e to t8tov -^ K:a^' auro /cat aet rj TTpos erepov /cat TTore, olov /ca^' awro jLtev avdpw-

TTOV TO JoJOV T^'jltepOV ^UCTCt, TTpo? eT€pov 8e otov

ifjvxyjs Trpos CTco/xa, oVt to jLtev TTpouraKriKov to 8* VTTrjperLKov ioTLV, del 8e otov ^eofJ to ^oIov 20 dOdvarov, irore 8' otov tou Ttvos" dvdpconov to ■nepiTTaTelv ev Tcp yvjxvaaico .

"EaTt 8e TO TT/Do? eTepov Ihiov ciTroStSo/xevov t) 8uo TTpo^XrjiJbaTa t] TeTTapa. edv pbev yap tov pLev dTToScp TOV 8' dpvrjarjTaL TavTO tovto, Svo fjbovov TTpo^X'qfJLaTa yivovTai, Kaddirep to dvdpwTTov Trpos

25 tTTTTOV t8tOV OTt 8t7rOUV eCTTtV. /Cat ydp OTL dvdpOJTTO?

OX) hirrovv eoTiv eTn-)(eipoir] Tts" av, /cat oVt d linTog hiTTovv dpL(f)OTepa)g 8' av /ctvot to t8tov. eav 8' eKaTepov eKaTepov d7roS(p /cat eKaTepov dTrapvqdrj, TeTTapa Tvpo^X^fjiaTa eWat, Kaddirep to dvOpcoirov 30 t8toy Trpds" LTTTTov, OTL TO jLtcv 8t7roi>v TO 8e TeTpd- TTOVV ecjTLV. /cat yap oVt dvOpojiros ov SIttovv /cat OTt TeTpdrrovv necfiVKev eoTiv e7n')(eLpelv , /cat 480


I. Whether the attribute assigned is a property or (C) Of not must be examined on the following principles : perty

Property is assigned either essentially and per- y?°^JF '^^• manently or relatively and temporarily. For example, kinds of it is an essential property of man to be ' by nature Property. a civilized animal.' A relative property may be exemplified by the relation of the soul to the body, namely, that the former gives orders and the latter obeys. An example of a permanent property is that of God as ' an immortal living being,' of a temporary property that of a particular man as * walking about in a gymnasium.'

The assignment of a property relatively produces either two or four problems. If the disputant assigns it to one thing and denies it of another, two problems only arise ; for example, when it is stated as the pro- perty of a man in relation to a horse that he is a biped. For someone might argue that man is not a biped and that a horse is a biped ; by both these statements he would seek to remove the property. But if he assigns one of two attributes to each of two things and denies it of the other, there will be four problems ; for example, when he says that the property of a man in relation to a horse is that one is a biped and the other a quadruped. For then it is possible to argue that man is not a biped and that it is his nature to be R 481


128 b


r €TTi-)(^eipeiv . ottcos 8' ovv Setx^evros avatpetrat

TO 7rpOK€Lfl€VOV.

"EoTTi Se TO ju.ev KaS* avro lSlov o Trpos CLTravra 35 (XTToStSoTat Kal TTavTOS ;\;6D/3t^et, Kaddirep dvOpcorrov TO i,a)ov dvqrov iTnar'qpLrjs S€ktlk6v. to 8e rrpog erepov o jjirj oltto Travros dAA' 0,770 nvo? raKTOV Siopi^ei, KaBamep dperrjs Trpos iTncrrijfjirjv, on to jLtev iv TrXeiooi, to 8' ev XoyccmKcp jjiovov Kal TOtS" exovGi XoyiuriKov 7Te<j)VKe yiv^odai. to 8' del o

129 a Kara iravra XP^^^^ dXrjOeveraL Kal pirjSeTroT^

aTToAetVeTat, KadaTrep rod l,ojov to €k j/fu^'^s- Kal acofjiaros (JvyKeip,€vov . to he iroTe o /caTCt Tiva Xpovov dXrjdeveTat Kal (jlt] i^ dvdyKrjs del Trapeire- 5 Tat, KaOdrrep tov tivos dvdpcoiTov to TrepLTraTelv iv dyopa.

"EoTt Se TO Trpos dXXo lBlov dTroSovvai to Sta- (j)opdv elTTeZv r^ ev aTraoL Kal del ri cos eirl to TToXv Kal iv Tols TrXeiaToiSy olov iv aTraot puev Kal del, KaOdrrep to dvOpatrrov ihiov Trpos Ittttov 10 OTt SiTTOvv dvdpcoTTOS /xcv ydp Kal del Kal ttoLs ioTTl Slttovs, lttttos 8' ovSets ioTi Slttovs ovSeTTOTe. (hs irrl to ttoXv Se Kal iv tols TrXeiGTOLs, KaOdnep


TO) TO piev TTpooTaTTeiv TO 8 vTTrjpeTeZv ovTe yap 482


a quadruped, and it is also open to him to argue that the horse is a biped and that it is not a quadruped. If he can prove any one of these statements, the proposed attribute is destroyed.

An essential property is one which is assigned to something in contrast to everything else and sets a thing apart from everything else, for example, the property of man as * a mortal living creature receptive of knowledge.' A relative property is one which dis- tinguishes a thing not from everything else but from some specified thing ; for example, the property of virtue in relation to knowledge is that it is the nature of the former to come into being in a number of faculties, of the latter to come into being in the reasoning faculty only and in creatures possessing that faculty. A permanent property is one which is true at all times and never fails ; for example, that of a living creature that it is * composed of soul and body.' A temporary property is one which is true at a particular time and is not always a necessary accompaniment, for example, that of a particular man as * walking about in the market-place.'

To assign a property to something relatively to something else is to assert a difterence between them either universally and permanently or usually and in the maj ority of cases. As an example of a universal and permanent difference we may take the property of man in relation to a horse, that he is a biped ; for man is always and in every case a biped, whereas no horse is ever a biped. A difference which is found usually and in most cases is exemplified in the pro- perty possessed by the reasoning faculty in relation to the appetitive and spirited faculty, namely, that the former commands while the latter serves ; for



129 a

TO XoyicjTLKOv TTOLVTore TTpoGTarreiy dAA' evtore

/cat TrpoGrdrrerai, ovre to eTTt^u/XT^rt/cov kol uv- 15 iJLiKov ael TrpoGrdrreraL, dXXd Kai TTpoGTarreL

TToriy orav fj puox^'^pd rj '/'fx^ '^^^ dvdpa)7Tov. Tct)v 8' tStcov ecrrt AoytKrd jLcdAtcrra rd re K:a^'

at5Td Kal del Kai rd TTpos erepov. ro fiev yap rrpo?

erepov lSlov TrXeLco TTpopXrjjjbard Igti, KaQdirep 20 eLTTOfJiev Kal Trporepov r^ yap hvo r^ rerrapa ef

dvdyKr]s yivovrai rd TTpo^X^qfjiara' TrXelovs ovv oi

XoyoL yivovraL irpos ravra. rd 8e Kad^ avro Kal

TO del TTpos TToXXd €GTLV e'TTL')(€ip€LV Tj TTpOS TrXeloVS

Xpdvovs 7T apart) pelv y rd [xev KaO* avro irpos rroXXd- irpos €KaGrov ydp rcov dvrcuv Set virdpx^^v avrco

25 rd lSlov, ojGr el (jltj irpos diravra x^P^t^'^^^y ovk dv eir] KaXws diroSeSofJuevov ro lSlov. rd 8' del irpos iToXXovs XP^^^^^ rrjpeiv Kav ydp el p/rj virdpx^t' Kav el p^rj virrjp^e Kav el p,rj virdp^ei, ovk eGrai lSlov. rd 8e ttotg ovk ev dXXoLS rj irpos rdv vvv Xeyopuevov XP^'^^'^ eiriGKoiTovpLev' ovkovv elol

30 Aoyot iTpds avro iroXXoi. XoyiKdv 8e rovr .eorl irpo^Xrjp^a irpos o Xoyou yevoivr^ dv Kal gvx^oI Kal KoXoi.

To jLtev ovv irpos erepov iSiov prjOev eK rcov irepl rd Gvp,^e^r]Kds roirojv eiriGKeirreov eoriv, el rw jLtev Gvp.pep7]Ke rw he p,r] GvpL^e^r)Kev irepl 8e

35 rojv del Kal rojv KaO* avro Sid rwvSe decoprjreov.

« See 128 b 22 ff. 484


neither does the reasoning faculty always command but is also sometimes commanded, nor is the appetitive and spirited faculty always commanded but also sometimes commands, when a man's soul is depraved.

Of properties those which are most suitable for Suitability arguments are the essential and the permanent and Jhe^follr^ the relative. For a relative property, as we have kinds of already said," produces several problems ; for the discussion: problems which arise are necessarily either two or four in number and, therefore, the arguments which arise in connexion with them are several. The essential and the permanent can be discussed in relation to a number of things and can be observed in relation to several periods of time. The essential can be discussed in contrast with a number of things ; for the property must necessarily belong to it as contrasted with everything else that exists, and so, if the subject is not set apart by it in relation to everything else, the property cannot have been duly assigned. The permanent must be observed in rela- tion to many periods of time ; for if it does not at present exist, or, if it has not existed in the past, or if it is not going to exist in the future, it will not be a property at all. On the other hand, we examine the temporary only in relation to what we call present time ; there are not, therefore, many arguments about it, whereas a problem suitable for argument is one about which numerous good arguments may arise.

What, then, has been called a relative property must be examined by means of the commonplaces about accident, to see whether it has happened to one thing but not to another ; but permanent and essen- tial properties must be viewed on the principles which now follow.



129 b II. UpojTov jLtev et fJiT] KaXcbs aTToSeSorat to lSlov t] KaXo)?. rod Se [jltj KaAtos" rj AcaAto? iarlv eV fJiev, €L [JL7] 8ta yvwpifjLwrepcov rj yvojpijjiOJTdpcov Kelrai to tStov, avauKevat^ovra fiev el firj 8td 5 yvo)piixcoT€po)v y KaTaaK€vdt,ovTa Se el 8ta yvwpi- ficorepiov. rod Se pLTj 8ta yvojpifJLOjrepojv eorl to p,eVy el oXoJS dyvaxTTOTepov ecrrt to lSlov o oltto- SlScoort TOVTOV ov TO tSiov eiprjKev' ov yap ecrrat KaXoJS Keljjbevov to lSlov. yvwoeajs yap eveKa to Ihiov TTOLovfJieda' hid yvwpLfjiWTepcov ovv diTohoTeov' ovTOJ yap ecrrat KaTavoelv t/cavcos" puaXXov. otov

10 eTrel 6 dels TTvpo? lSlov elvai to ojaotorarov 4^xfj dyvcjOTOTepcp Ke)(prjTaL tov irvpos ttj ^vxfi (i^ctA- Xov yap LGfJiev rt ccrrt rrvp ?} ifjvxrj), ovk dv elf] KaXws Keifxevov tStov TTvpos to opuoiOTaTov ^vxfj- TO S', el pLTj yvwpipicxJTepov eoTi Tohe roiS' VTrdpxov. Set yap (jltj {jlovov elvai yuajpipicoTepov tov irpdy-

15 piaTos, dXXd Kal otl ra)8' VTrdpx^i^ yvajpipLwrepov VTrdpxetv .^ 6 ydp pur] elSoj^ el Tai8' vndpx^c, ovS^ el TcSS' VTvdpx^i' piovcp yvwpiel, wod^ onoTepov TOVTOJV Gvpi^dvTos d(ja<f)es yiveTai to Ihiov. otov eirel 6 dels TTvpos Ihiov to ev cL TrpajTOJ i/jvxrj

^ Reading vTrapx^t with Wallies. ^ Reading vTrdpx^tv with Wallies.



II. First, you must see whether the property has Methods of been rightly or wrongly assigned. One criterion of yjlS:ra the riffhtness or wronffness of its assignment is to property has


see whether the property is stated in terms which are rectiy less comprehensible or more comprehensible — in J^f^g " destructive criticism whether they are less compre- property hensible, in constructive argument whether they are JU^re evi- more so. To prove that the terms are less compre- dent than hensible, one method is to see whether in general the property which your opponent assigns is less compre- hensible than the subject of which he has stated it to be the property ; for then the property will not have been rightly stated. For it is for the sake of comprehension that we introduce the property ; therefore it must be assigned in more comprehensible terms, for it will thus be" possible to understand it more adequately. For example, a man who has asserted that it is a property of ' fire ' ' to be very like the soul,' in using the term * soul ' has employed something which is less comprehensible than fire (for we know better what ' fire ' is than what ' soul ' is), and so it would not be a correct statement of the property of fire to say that it is ' very like the soul. ' Another method is to see whether the property is not more comprehensibly attributed to the sub- ject ; for not only ought the property to be more comprehensible than the subject, but it ought to be more comprehensible that it is attributed to the subject. For anyone who does not know whether it is an attribute of the subject, will also not know whether it is the attribute of that subject alone, so that, whichever of these two things occurs, the pro- perty becomes a matter of obscurity. For example, a man who has stated that it is a property of ' fire '




129 b

7re(f)VK€v etvau dyvojarorepco Kexp^j^aL rod rrvpos

20 TO) €1 iv TOVrO) VTTOLpX^f' ^^XV '^^^ ^^ ^^ TrpcoTCx) VTTapx^iy ovK av etr] KaXcJS Keipbevov Ihiov irvpos TO iv (L TrpwTOJ i/jvx'^ 7T€(hvKev elvau. KaraoKevd- Jovra 8e ei 8ta yvcopipajrepajv Keirai to lSlov, /cat el Sid yvajpipojTepojv Kad" eKarepov tcjv Tponajv. ecrrat yap KaXcj? Kara rovro /cet/xevov to lSlov

25 TcDv yap KaraGKevauTiKCOv tottojv rod KaXcbs ol fiev Kara rovro p.6vov ol 8* dnXajg Sei^ovauv on KaXcos. olov €7761 o etTTa? l,cpov tSiov ro a'iaB7](Jiv €X€LV hid yvaypipcorepojv /cat yvojpip.(x)repov diro- hehcoK€ rd t8tov /ca^' eKarepov rcjv rporrajv, etr) dv KaXcbs a77o8e8ojLceVov /caret rovro rod t,ipov tStov ro atodrjGLV ^x^iv-

30 "ETTetr' dva(JK€vdl,ovra puev et rt rcDv ovopudrajv rojv iv ro) ISlco aTToSeSo/jLevajv TrAcovap/cos" Xeyerai rj /cat oAos" o Aoyos" TrXelco arjp^aivei- ov ydp ecrrat KaX(x)s Ketp,6vov ro tStov. otov irrel ro aloBdveoBai TrXelo) Gr]p.aLV6L, Iv puev rd aLodrjaiV ^x^iv ev 8e rd

35 alcr6ij<T€L xP'^(^BaL, ovk dv etr) rov i,ci)ov lSlov KaXws

130 a /cet/xevov ro aloddveadai Tre^vKos. hid rovro 8'

ov xPV^'^^ov iarlv ovr ovop^an TrXeovax^JS Aeyo- 488


to be ' that in which the soul by nature primarily exists ' has brought in a consideration which is less comprehensible than fire, by raising the question whether the soul exists in it and whether it exists in it primarily ; and so it could not have been rightly asserted as a property of fire that it is ' that in which the soul by nature primarily exists.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the property is stated in terms which are more com- prehensible and whether they are more compre- hensible in each of the two ways. For then the property will have been correctly stated in this respect ; for of the commonplaces used to support the correctness of the assignment, some will show that it is correctly assigned in this respect only, others that it is correctly assigned absolutely. For example, the man who has asserted as the property of a ' living creature ' that it is ' possessed of sensation ' has both employed more comprehensible terms and made the property more comprehensible in each of the two ways ; and so to be ' possessed of sensation ' would in this respect have been correctly assigned as a property of ' living creature.'

In the next place, for destructive argument, you (6) The must see whether any of the terms assigned in the ^^a^™^.^*^ property is employed in several senses, or whether the perty is whole expression also has more than one signification ; (i) if the ' for if so, the property will not have been correctly Jja's'^ev^ejal stated. For example, since * to be sentient ' signifies signiflca- more than one thing, namely, (a) ' to be possessed of *^°^^" sensation ' and (b) ' to exercise sensation,' ' to be by nature sentient ' would not be correctly assigned as a property of ' living creature.' Therefore, one must not use as signifying property either a word or an



130 a


TrXeovaxoj? Aeyo/xevov acra</>e9 Trotet to prjOev, amopovvTOS rod fieXXovro's iTn^eipeiv irorepov Xeyei 5 TOiv TrXeova^oJS Xeyofxevcov to yap Ihiov rod pbadetv )(dpiv aTroStSorat. ert he irpos tovtols dvayKOLOv eariv €X€.y)(6v riva yiveadai rols ovruis aTToStSouCTt TO tStov, oTav iirl rod SiaScovovvro? Tt? "TTOifj rov GvXXoyi(jpi6v rod 7rAeova;)^cos' Xeyopuivov . KaraGKevat^ovra Se el (jltj TrXeloj oiqpiolveL /xt^tc 10 T(x)v ovopbdrwv pL-qhev jjutjO^ oXog 6 Aoyo?' eorai yap KaXojs Kara rovro Keipievov to Ihiov. olov

€776 1 OVTe TO GOjpia TToXXd SrjXol OVTe TO eVKLVT)-

TOTaTov els Tov dvco tottov ouVe to ctuvoAov to €/c TOVTCJV GVVTidipbevov, etrj dv KaXcjs Keufievov KaTa TOVTO TTvpog lSlov Gcopua TO evKLvr^TOTaTov els


15 "ETTetT* dva(jKevdt,ovTa p.ev el 7rXeova)(CL)s Xe- yeTai tovto ov to lSlov (XTroStScoat, pur] hiajpiGTai he TO TtVo? avTcbv Ihiov tlOtigiv' ov yap eWat KaXojs dnohehop^evov to tStov. 8t' as* S' alTias, ovK dhiqXov eGTiv €K twv TrpoTepov elprjpievwv Ta yap avTa Gvpi^aiveiv dvayKaZov Igtiv. olov

20 errel to eTrtWaa^at tovto ttoAAo, Grjpbaivei (to piev yap iTTLGTrjpirjv ex^iv avTo, to 8' eTTLGTrjpir) ;^p7ya^at auTO, TO 8' eTnGTrjpurjv etvat avTOV, to 8' eTnGTrjpirj XP'^crdai avTov), ovk dv etrj tov eTTtWaa^at tovto 490


expression which is used with several meanings, because anything which has several meanings renders the statement obscure, since he who is about to argue is doubtful which of the various meanings his opponent is using ; for the property is assigned in order to promote understanding. Further, besides this, an opportunity is necessarily offered to refute those who assign the property in this way, by basing one's syllogism on the irrelevant meaning of a term used in several senses. In constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether any of the terms or the expression as a whole does not bear more than one meaning ; for the property will then be correctly asserted in this respect. For example, since neither ' body,' nor ' that which most easily moves upwards,' nor the whole expression made up by putting the two terms together has more than one meaning, it would be correct in this respect to assert that it is a property of fire that it is * the body which most easily moves upwards.'

In the next place, for destructive criticism, you (2) if there must see whether the term to which your opponent flriousVre- is assigning the property is used in several senses dication of but no distinction has been made as to which of them it is whose property he asserts it to be ; for then the property will not have been correctly assigned. The reason for this is quite obvious from what has already been said ; for the results must necessarily be the same. For example, since ' knowledge of this signifies several different things — for it means (a) that it has knowledge, (6) that it uses knowledge, (c) that there is knowledge of it and (d) that there is use of the knowledge of it — no property of ' knowledge of this ' could be correctly assigned unless it has been



130 a

KaXoJS lSlov (XTroSeSojLtevov jxr] hiopioOevros rod

TLVos TidrjaLV avTcbv ro lSlov. KaraaKevdl^ovra 25 Se et jjiTj Aeyerat 7roAAa;^cos' rovro ov to lSlov TiSiqaiv, aXX eomv ev Kal oLTrXovv eurai yap KaXw? Kara rovro KelfMevov ro lSlov. olov inel 6 dvdpojTTos Aeyerat eV, e'er] av /caAcD? Kelfjuevov Kara rod dvdpcoTTOv thiov ro t,ci)ov -fjiJiepov (f>VG€L.

"ETretr' dvauKevdi^ovra fjuev et nXeovdKLs eip-qrai 30 ro avro iv ro) ISlcp. rroXXdKis yap Xavddvovcn rovro TToiovvres /cat ev rot? Ihiois, Kaddrrep Kal iv rols opois. ovK ecrrat Se KaXws Keufjievov ro rovro TveTTOvQos Ihiov rapdrrei yap rov dKovovra TrXeovdKis Xe^div derates" ovv dvayKalov iuri yive- odai, Kal TTpos rovroLS dhoXeox^^v hoKovcrtv. 35 eo-rat Se avpLTTLTrrov ro TrXeovdKL^ etTretv ro avro Kara Suo rpoirovs, KaO* eva /xev orav ovofjudor] TrAeovd/ctS" ro avro, Kaddrrep et ris ihiov dTTo^olr] TTvpos (JojfjLa ro Xerrrorarov rwv aco/xarcov {pvros yap TvXeovdKig €Lpr]Ke ro crcDjita), Sevrepov 8' av ris jLteraAa/xjSdvT/ rovs Xoyovs dvrl rchv ovofidrajv, 130 b Kaddrrep et ris dTTohoir] yrjs lSlov ovaia r) ixdXiara Kara (f)VGiv <f)epopiiv^q rcov awfjudrcov et? rov Kdrcj roTTov, eVetra fjueraXd^OL dvrl rcov awfjuarwv ro ovaiojv TotcovSt* €v yap Kai ravrov eon aajjjia Kal ovoia rotaSt. eorai yap ovro? ro ovoia 5 rrXeovdKis elprjKo)?, o)ar ovSerepov dv elr] KaXws Kelfievov rcov ISlcjdv. KaraoKevdl,ovra he et jJurjSevl XprJTaL irXeovdKLS dvofxari rep avrco' ecrrat yap 492


definitely stated of which of these meanings the property is being asserted. For constructive argu- ment one must see if that of which one is stating the property does not bear several meanings, but is one and single ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For example, since ' man ' is used in only one sense, ' animal by nature civilized ' would be correctly stated as a property in the case of man.'

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (3) if the whether the same term has been used more than once i^J^ed m^e in describing the property ; for, without it being than once in noticed, people often do this in describing properties, the pro- just as they do in definitions also. A property to P^rty. which this has occurred will not be correctly stated ; for frequent repetition confuses the hearer, and this necessarily causes obscurity, and, besides, an impres- sion of nonsense is created. Repetition will be likely to occur in two ways ; firstly, when a man uses the same word more than once — for example, when he assigns to ' fire ' the property of being ' the body which is lightest of bodies ' (for he has used the word body more than once) — ; secondly, when he puts definitions in place of words ; for instance if he were to assign to ' earth ' the property of being ' the sub- stance which most of all bodies tends by its nature to be carried downwards ' and were then to replace ' bodies ' by ' substances of a certain kind ' ; for

  • body ' and ' substance of a certain kind ' are one

and the same thing. He will thus have repeated the term ' substance,' and so neither of the properties would be correctly stated. For constructive argu- ment, on the other hand, one must see whether he avoids using the same term more than once ; for



130 b

Kara rovro /caAco? dvoSeSofJievov to lSlov. olov

iirel 6 eiTTag dvOpcjirov tStov t^coov eTnGTiqii'iqs

SeKTLKOv ov K€XP'!^TaL Tw avTO) TToXXaKis ovd/xart,

10 etr] av Kara rovro KaXo)? aTToheSofjuevov rod dv- OpcjTTov ro lSlov.

"ETTetr* dvaGK€vdt,ovra [juev el roLovrov ri drro- SeScoKev ev rep ISlw ovofia, o Trdoiv V'ndp)(€L. d- XP^^ov yap 'iorai ro [xr] x^pit^ov dno nvcov, ro S' ev Tots" ISlols Xeyofievov x^P^^^^ ^^^y KaOdirep

15 /cat rd iv rot? opoLS' ovkovv ear ai KoXchs KelpLevov ro lSlov. otov eTTel 6 del? eTnarrjjJLr]? tStov vtto- Xrjifjiv dp,erdTreiorov vtto Xoyov, ev 6v, roiovrcp rivi Kexp'^Tai ev rep ISico rep evl o Trdoiv virapxev, ovK av e'ir] KaXchs Keipievov ro rrjs eTnonjjJLrjs lSlov. KaraaKevd^ovra Se el p.r]hevl Kexpy]rai KOLVO), aAA* dno rivos x^P^^^^'^^' ecrrat yap /caAaj?

20 KeijjLevov Kara rovro ro lSlov. otov eirel 6 etnas t,(pov lSlov ro ifjvxrjv ex^f'V ovSevl Kexprjrau kolvco, €117 av Acara rovro KaXcos Kelpbevov l,(pov t'Stov ro ipvxTjV ex€LV.

"Ettcct* avao-zceva^ovra puev el TrXeioi tSta diro- SlScooL rov avrov, pur] SLoptcrag on TrXeiw rldrjoLV'

25 ov yap eorai KaXws Keip^evov ro I'Stov. Kaddirep 494


then the property will have been correctly assigned in this respect. For example, he who has stated as a property of man that he is ' a living creature re- ceptive of knowledge ' has not used the same word more than once, and so the property of man would be in this respect correctly assigned.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (4) if the whether he has assigned in the property any term sfgned has which has a universal application, (for anything which universal does not distinguish the subject from any other things will be useless, but what is stated in properties, Uke what is stated in definitions, must make a dis- tinction) and so the property will not be correctly assigned. For example, he who has laid down as a property of ' knowledge ' that it is * a conception which cannot be changed by argument, because it is one,' has made use in the property of a term, namely, the ' one,' of such a kind as to be universally applicable, and so the property of knowledge can- not have been correctly assigned. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, you must see if he has used, not a common term, but one which distinguishes the subject from something else ; for then the pro- perty will have been correctly assigned in this respect. For example, he who has said that * the possession of a soul ' is a property of ' living creature ' has not used any common term, and so ' the possession of a soul ' would in this respect be correctly assigned as a property of ' living creature.'

Next, for destructive criticism, see whether your (5) if many opponent assigns more than one property to the same are assigned thinjjj without definitely stating; that he is laying; to the same J 4-1. / 4.1, zi 4. -11 ^ thing with-

down more than one ; tor then the property will not out distinc-

have been correctly stated. For, just as in definitions *^^°-



130 b

yap ovh iv rots opoLS Set Trapo, rov hrjXovvra Xoyov rr]V ovauav TrpouKeZaQai tl ttXeov, ovrwg ouS* iv roLS ISiOLS rrapa rov TTOLOvvra Xoyov lSlov ro prjdev ovSev TTpoaaTToSoreov dxp^lov yap yiver ai ro roLovrov. otov eTrel 6 etTras" lSiov nvpos atofjua ro 30 Xenrorarov /cat Kov(f)6rarov ttAcico drroSeScoKev tSta {eKarepov yap Kara p,6vov rod irvpog dXiqdes iartv etTretv), ovk dv etr] KaXcjs Kel^evov lSlov TTvpog crto/xa ro Xenrorarov /cat Kov^orarov. KaraaK€vd^ovra 8' et fjurj TrAetco rov avrov rd tSta (XTToSeSco/cev, aAA' ev ear ai yap Kara rovro 35 KaXa>£ Keufxevov ro lSlov. olov eTrel 6 etTra? vypov tStov orcD/xa TO els dirav (7;^7j/xa dyofievov ev diro- SeScoKe ro tSiov dAA* ov rrXeico, elr] dv Kara rovro KoXcjs Kelfjuevov ro rov vypov tStov.

III. "ETTetr' dva(jKevdt,ovra p,ev el avraj irpoa- Kexpy]raL ov ro tStov dTToSiSojGLV, r) rojv avrov 131 a Ttvt* ov yap earai KaXws Keipievov ro tStov. rov ydp ixadelv X^P^^ aTroStSorat to tStov auTo fxev ovv avro) ofjioicos dyvojarov eon, ro 8e Tt rcbv avrov vorepov ovkovv earl yvcopipLcorepov . oiar ov yiverai 8ta toutcuv jitaAAdv Tt fiadeiv. olov 5 €7T€t o etTTa? ^cpov tStov ovoiav rjs ethos eanv 496


TOPICA, V. ii-iii

also nothing more ought to be added beyond the expression which shows the essence, so too in pro- perties nothing ought to be assigned beyond the expression which makes up the property which is asserted ; for such a proceeding proves useless. For example, a man who has said that it is a property of

  • fire ' to be ' the most subtle and lightest body ' has

assigned more than one property (for it is true to predicate each of these terms of fire alone), and so

  • the most subtle and lightest body ' would not be

correctly stated as a property of fire. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see if the properties which your opponent has assigned to the same thing are not several but he has assigned only one ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For example, a man who has said that it is a property of ' liquid ' to be * a body which can be induced to assume any shape ' has assigned one thing and not more than one as its property, and so the property of liquid would in this respect be correctly stated.

III. Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (6) if the whether he has introduced either the actual subj ect fecUs con- whose property he is rendering or something be- tained in longing to it ; for then the property will not be property. correctly stated. For the property is assigned to promote understanding ; the subject, then, itself is as incomprehensible as ever, while anything that belongs to it is posterior to it and, therefore, not more comprehensible, and so the result of this method is not to understand the subject any better. For example, he who has said that it is a property of ' living creature ' to be ' a substance of which man is a species ' has introduced something which belongs



131 a

avdpojTTOs TLvl rrpoGKexp'^TaL rcov tovtov, ovk dv

eurj KaXojg Kelfievov to I'Stov. KaraaKevd^ovra 8e et jjbrjre avrw fjbrjre rcov avrov fjur^hevl XPV'^^'" ecrrat yap KaXcJbs Kara rovro Keijjievov ro tStov. otov iirel 6 dels ^coov tStov ro €k ipvx'rjs /cat gco- * /xaros" avyKeip.evov ovre avra> ovre rcov avrov

10 ovSevl 7Tpo(JK€Xpi)Taiy e'lr] dv KaXaJs Kara rovro OLTToSeSofjidvov ro rod l,cx)Ov ihiov.

Tov avrov 8e rporrov /cat errl rcov dXXcov OKeirreov €orl rcjv jjLTj TToiovvrctiV ■^ rroiovvrcMV yvojpLjjicorepov , dvaGK€vdt,ovra jLtev et rtvt rrpoGKexp'^jraL 'r) dvri-

15 Keifjuevcp rj oXojs dfjua rfj ^ucret rj varipco rtvt* ov yap eorrau KaXcJos Kel/juevov ro tStov. ro /xev yap dvrt/cet/xevov a/xa rfj (f)VG€L, ro 8' a/xa rfj (fiVGei /cat TO VGrepov ov Trotet yvajpipLajrepov. olov erret o etVas" dyadov t8tov o /ca/coi fxaXcGr* avrt/cetrat, to) avrt/cetjLteVoj irpoGKexp'^TaL rov dyaOov, ovk

20 av etTy roO dyadov KaXws aTToSeSofievov ro uhiov. KaraGK€vd^ovra 8e et pirjSevl TrpoGKexprjrai fjLi^r^ dvrLKeLjJLevo) [jL'qre oXcos d'/xa r^ ^uaet /xtJ^* vGrepoj- eWat ydp /card rovro KaXws d77o8e8o/xeVov ro t8tov. otov e77et d ^et? irriGrrifJLiqs t8tov VTToXiqipLv rrjv TTLGrordrrjv ov8evt tt poo Kexp^]r ai ovr^ dvrt- 498


to ' living creature,' and so the property cannot be correctly stated. For constructive purposes you must see whether he avoids introducing either the subject itself or anything belonging to it ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of living creature ' to be ' composed of soul and body ' has not introduced the subject itself nor anything which belongs to it, and so the property of living creature would in this respect have been correctly assigned.

In the same manner inquiry must be made regard- (7) if the ing the other terms which do or do not make the the^subfect, subject more comprehensible. For destructive or some-

■J ' ^. I. ^u ^ L thing less

criticism, you must see whether your opponent has clear than introduced anything either opposite to the subject gj^jgj^^s a or, in general, naturally simultaneous with it or property. posterior to it ; for then the property will not be correctly stated. For the opposite of a thing is naturally simultaneous with it, and what is naturally simultaneous and what is posterior to a thing do not make it more comprehensible. For example, he who has said that it is a property of ' good ' to be

  • that which is most opposed to bad ' has introduced

the opposite of ' good,' and so the property of ' good ' could not have been correctly assigned. For con- structive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether he has avoided introducing anything which is either opposite to the subject, or naturally simul- taneous with it, or posterior to it ; for then the pro- perty will have been correctly assigned in this respect. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of ' knowledge ' to be ' the most trustworthy con- ception ' has not introduced anything either opposite




25 K€Lfjb€va) ov6* a/xa rrj (f)va€L ovd^ vorepo), eirj av

Kara tovto KaXcos Keiyievov ro rrjs iTTLcrrrjiJLrjs


"ETretr' avaoK€vdt,ovra fxev el to fjur] ael irap-

enofievov tStov OLTroheScDKev, dXXa tovto o ytverat

7roT€ fxr] tStov ov yap ecrrat KaXojg ecpr^jjievov to

30 tStov. ovT€ yap icj)^ a> AcaraAa/xjSavo/xcv vrrdp^ov avTO, KaTa tovtov Kal Tovvofxa i^ dvdyKrjs dXrj- deveTai' ovt icj)^ w KraraAa/xjSaverat [ir] virdp^ov, KaTa TOVTOV ef dvdyKTfs ov prjO'^GeTai Tovvofxa. €TL 8e rrpos tovtols oi)8' 6t€ dTToSeScoKe to tStov, eoTai <fiav€p6v el VTvdpxec, e'lTrep tolovtov eoTiv

35 otov dTToXeiTreiv. ovkovv ecrrat cra^e? to Ihiov' olov eirel 6 delg l^wov lBlov to Kiveladai TTOTe Kai eoTa- vat TOLOVTOV aTToSeScoKe to 'lSlov o ov ytverat ttotc lSlov, ovk av eiT] KaXcjs Kelfjuevov to tStov. /cara- GKevd^ovTa Se el to i^ dvdyKTjs del ov lSlov diro- 131 b SeScoKrev ecTTat yap KaXojg Keijxevov to tStov /caret tovto. olov eTrel 6 Oels dpeTrjs lSlov o tov exovTa TTOiei oirovhalov to del TrapeTTopbevov lSlov dTroheSa>Kev, eir] av KaTa tovto KaXoJS dnoSeSo- p,eVOV TO TTJS dpeTTJ? tStov.

5 "ETTetr' dvaoKevdt^ovTa puev el to vvv lSlov dTToSiSov? pLTj Stcoptcraro ort to vvv tStov drro- SlSojGLv ov yap ecrrat KaXws Kelpuevov to lSlov. 500


to the subject, or naturally simultaneous with it, or posterior to it, and so the property of knowledge will be correctly stated in this respect.

Next, fordestructive criticism, you must see whether (8) if the he has assigned as a property something which does asSgn?d not always accompany the subject but sometimes does not ceases to be a property ; for then the property will accompany not have been correctly asserted. For neither is the ^^^ subject, name of the subject necessarily true of that to which we find that the property belongs, nor will it neces- sarily not be applied to that to which we find that the property does not belong. Further, besides this, even when he has assigned the property, it will not be clear whether it belongs, since it is of such a kind as to fail ; and so the property will not be clear. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of

  • living creature ' ' sometimes to move and sometimes

to stand still ' has assigned the kind of property which is sometimes not a property ; and so the property would not be correctly stated. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see if he has assigned what must of necessity always be a pro- perty ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of * virtue ' to be ' that which makes its possessor good ' has assigned as a property that which always accompanies its subject, and so the property of virtue would have been correctly assigned in this respect.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (9) if the whether, in assigning what is a property at the a^pSnt^^ moment, he has omitted to state definitely that he property is assigning what is a property at the moment ; for distinguish then the property will not be correctly stated. For, ^^® ^"^^•



TTpwrov fjiev yap to Trapa to etfos yivofievov airav SiopLGfxov TrpoaSeiTat' elajdaoL 8' cos e77t to ttoXv rrdvT€s to dec TrapaKoXovdovv lSlov (XTToStSovat. 10 bevTepov he dhrjXos ioTLV 6 ijurj Stoptcrd/xevos' et TO vvv lSlov i^ovXeTO Oelvaf ovkovv Sot€ov €gtIv

€7nTLfJb7]G€OJS GKYJlpLV. oloV €7761 O OefJUEVOS TOV TL-

vos dvOpcoTTOv lSiov to KaOrjuBai p.eTd tlvos to vvv Ihiov Tid-qoLVy ovK dv etr] KaXcos to lSlov drrohe- ScoKO)?, eiTrep fxr) hiopiodpievos €L7T€v. KaTauKevd- 15 ^ovTa 8' et TO vvv lSlov aTroStSous" Stoptod/xevos' edrjKev otl to vvv lSlov Tidrjoiv eoTat ydp ktoAcos' KeLjjievov KaTa tovto to lSlov. otov irrel 6 eirra?


OTeiXdp,evos edrjKe tovto, KaXoJS dv etr] Keipievov TO tStov.

'ETTetT* dvaaK€vdt,ovTa p,€V et tolovto drroSeScoKe

20 ro tStov, o (fiavepov pLiq eoTiv dXXws v7Tdp-)(ov t) aicrdrjaef ov ydp eWat KaXcos Ket/xevov to tStov. dnav ydp to aloOrjTov e^oj yiv6p.evov Trjg aladijaecos dhrjXov yiv€Tai- d^aves ydp ecjTiv et eVt V7Tdp-)(ei, hid TO TTJ aioOr]Gei p.6vov yvajpit^eod ai. eWat 8* dXrjdes TOVTO errl TOiV pit] i^ dvdyKTjs del irapaKo-

25 XovdovvTcov . otov cTTet o dipievos tjXlov thtov doTpov cl>ep6p€vov VTTep yrjs to XapbirpoTaTOV tolovtco KexprjTai iv tco Ihlco tw virep yrjs (jyepeadai, o Trj 502


in the first place, any departure from custom needs to be definitely indicated, and men are usually accustomed to assign as property that which always accompanies the subject. Secondly, anyone who has not definitely laid down whether it was his intention to state what is a property at the moment, is obscure ; no pretext, therefore, should be given for criticism. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of a certain man to be sitting with someone, states what is a property at the moment, and so he would not have assigned the property correctly, since he spoke without any definite indication. For con- structive argument, you must see whether, in assign- ing what is a property at the moment, he stated definitely that he was laying down what was a pro- perty at the moment ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For instance, he who has said that it is a property of a particular man to be walking about at the moment, has made this dis- tinction in his statement, and so the property would be correctly stated.

Next, for destructive criticism, you should see dO) if the whether the property which he has assigned is of Sgnedis such a kind that its presence is manifest only to ^o^^^g ' ^'^^ sensation ; for then the property will not be correctly senses. stated. For every object of sensation, when it passes outside the range of sensation, becomes obscure ; for it is not clear whether it still exists, because it is comprehended only by sensation. This will be true of such attributes as do not necessarily and always attend upon the subject. F'or example, he who has stated that it is a property of the sun to be ' the brightest star that moves above the earth ' has employed in the property something of a kind which




alodiqGei yvcjjpit^eraiy ovk av elif] KaXcbs to rod 7]Xlov

aTToSeSo/xeVov lSlov dh7]Xov yap eo-rat, orav Svr)

30 o tJXlo?, el (fyeperai vnep yrjSy 8ta to rr^v aLadrjaiv

Tore oLTToXeLTreLV rjfJLag. KaraGKevdt^ovra 8* et

roLovrov (XTToSeSco/ce ro lSlov, o fjur] rfj alaSrioei

(f)av€p6v eoTLV t) o aladrjrov ov i^ dvdyKr)s v7Tdp)(ov

SrjXov eoTiv earai yap Kara rovro KaXcos KetfJievov

TO tStov. otov eVet o Odfievos eTTi^aveias Ihiov o

TrpcjTOV KexpojGraL aladrjro) [xev rivi TTpooKexprjrai

35 rep Kexpojodat, roiovrcp 8' o ^avepov eoriv virdp-

Xov del, €17] dv Kara rovro KraAcDs" a7ro8eSo/xeVov

TO rrjs €TTi^aveias tStov.

"ETTetT* dvaoK€vdl,ovra fiev el rov opov ws 'lSlov

a77o8e8aj/<:ev ov yap ear at /caAcos" Keipievov ro

l32at8tov ov yap Set hiqXovv ro ri rjv etvau ro lSlov.

otov eirel 6 etiras dvdpwTTOv lSlov ^a»ov Tre^ov

Slttovv ro ri 7]V elvai ar^pualvov drroSeScoKe rod

dvdpojTTov t8tov, OVK dv etr] ro rov dvdpcorrov lSlov

KaXcos dnoSeSofJievov. KaraoKevdt^ovra he el dvri-

5 Karrjyopovpievov ptev dTToSeScoKe ro t8tov, pur] ro

ri TjV elvai 8e SiqXovv. ecrrai yap Kara rovro

KaXwg drroheSopLevov ro tSiov. otov eTrel 6 dels

dvdp(j)7Tov Ihiov t,cpov TJpiepov (f)VGeL dvriKarrjyo-

povpievov pLev dTToSeScoKe ro 'iSiov, ov ro ri riv




is comprehensible only by sensation, namely, * moving above the earth ' ; and so the property of the sun would not have been correctly assigned, for it will not be manifest, when the sun sets, whether it is still moving above the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the property which he has assigned is such that it is not manifest to the sensation, or, being sensible, obviously belongs of necessity to the subject ; for then the property will be in this respect correctly stated. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of ' surface ' to be ' that which is the first thing to be coloured,' has employed a sensible attribute, namely ' to be coloured,' but an attribute which obviously is always present, and so the property of ' surface ' will in this respect have been correctly assigned.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (ii) if whether he has assigned the definition as a property ; ^gfgVld as for then the property will not be correctly stated, for a property the property ought not to show the essence. For deflation, example, he who has said that it is a property of man to be ' a pedestrian biped animal ' has assigned as a property of man that which signifies his essence, and so the man's property will not have been correctly assigned. P'or constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether he has assigned as the property a predicate which is convertible with the subject but does not signify the essence ; for then the property will have been correctly assigned in this respect. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of man to be ' by nature a civilized animal ' has assigned a property which is convertible with the subject but does not signify the essence ; and so the



132 a

etvai he SrjXovv, etrj av Kara tovto KaXcbs dno-

8e8o/xevov to tStoi-' rod dv6pa)7Tov.

10 "E77€tr' dvaaK€vd[,ov7a fxev el firj els to ri ian Oel?^ OLTToheSwKe to lSlov. Set yap tcx)v Ihicav, Kaddirep koI ra)v opcov, to TrpcoTov aTTohihoodai yevog, eTretd* ovrws rjSr] TrpoadTTreoQaL rd Xoirrd, KOI ■)(0}pit^eiv. woTe rd pbrj rovrov rdv rporrov Keipievov Ihiov ovk dv e'lr] KaXcog dTToSeSopievov.

15 olov iirel 6 eliras ^coov lSlov to ipvxrjv ex^iv ovk eOrjKev els rd ri eon rd ^wov, ovk dv eirj KaXcos Keipevov rd rod t^cdov Ihiov. KaTaGKevdt,ovra 8e el ris els rd ri ean dels ov rd lSlov dTTohiScDGi, rd XoiTrd Trpoadrrrei' ear at ydp Kard rovro KaXojs dTTohehopievov rd 'Idiov. olov irrel d dels dvOpwTTov

20 lSlov t,(x)OV €7rLGrT]iJL7]s SeKrLKdv els rd ri eon dels drrehajKe rd lSlov, e'ir] dv Kard rovro KaXws Keipuevov rd 'iStov rod dvOpwrrov.

IV. Hdrepov piev ovv KaXa)S rj ov KaXcbs dno- SeSorat to 'iSiov, Sud rwvSe oKenreov. TTorepov 8' t8toF ionv dXa)s rd elp7]p,evov rj ovk t8tor, eK

25 rdJvhe Oecoprjreov. ol ydp dnXaJS KaraoKevdt,ovres rd Idiov on KaXcbs Kelrai roTTOi ol avrol eoovrai rols Idiov dXctis TTOLOvoiv iv eKeivoLS ovv prjO^- oovrau.

^ Reading ian dels with Dennison for iariv 6 ^eis.

<» i.e. from other members of the same genus. 506

TOPICA, V. ili-iv

jn-operty of man will have been correctly assigned in this respect.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (i2) if the whether he has assigned the property without placing fg^gned" *^ the subject in its essence ; for in properties, as in without definitions, the first term to be assigned ought to be ^e^essence the genus, and then, and not till then, the other 9^ th^ sub- terms should be added and should distinguish the subject." The property, therefore, which is not stated in this manner will not have been correctly assigned. For example, he who has said that it is a property of ' living creature ' ' to possess a soul ' has not placed ' living creature ' in its essence, and so the property of ' living creature ' would not be correctly stated. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see if he has placed the subject, whose property he is assigning, in its essence and then adds the other terms ; for then the property will have been correctly assigned in this respect. For example, he who has stated as a property of ' man ' that he is ' a living creature receptive of knowledge ' has placed the subject in its essence and then assigned the property, and so the property of * man ' would be correctly stated in this respect.

IV. It is by these methods, then, that examination Rules for should be made to see whether the property has been SSr a correctly or incorrectly assigned. Whether that ^^^ belongs which is asserted to be a property is really a property %Hy7t'aii : or not a property at all, must be considered on the following principles ; for the commonplaces which confirm absolutely that the property is correctly stated will be the same as those which make it a property at all, and will, therefore, be included in the statement of them.



132 a

Ilpwrov fjiev ovv avaoKevat^ovra eTTt^AcTretv €^'

eKaarov ov to lSlov OLTToSeSajKev, [olov] el firj^evl

virapx^i, rj el fXT] Kara rovro aXrjdeveTaL, rj el jxt]

30 ecrrtv I'Stov eKaarov avrcjv Kar eKelvo ov to ihiov

aTTohehcoKev ov yap ecrrai 'Ihiov ro Kel[jLevov etvai

tStov. olov eTTel Kara rod yewfxerpiKov ovk olXt]-

deverai ro ave^aTrdriqrov elvai vrro Xoyov (aTra-

rdrai yap 6 yecofMerpiKos ev rw ^jevhoy pa^elod ai) ,

OVK av elrj rod eTTioriqixovos Ihiov ro pur] OLTrardorOaL

35 VTTo Xoyov. KaraoKevd^ovra 8* el Kara iravros

dXrjOeveraL /cat Acara tout' dXrjdeverai' eorai yap

lSlov ro Keipievov (^p-y]} elvai^ thiov. olov iirel ro

132 b l^cpov eTTLomjpLrjs SeKrtKov Kara Travros dvdpwTTOv

dXriBeverai /cat fj dvOpcoTTOs, etr] av dvOpwirov ihiov

ro Lcpov eTncrrrjpLiqs Se/crt/cov. eon 8' o tottos"

ovros dvaGKevd^ovn puev, el purj Kad* ov rovvopua,

5 /cat o Xoyog dXrjOeverai, /cat el pur] KaO" ov 6 Adyos",

/cat rovvopia dXiqOeverai' KaraoKevdl^ovri he, el

Kad^ ov TOuVo/xa, /cat d Adyoj, /cat et /ca^* ov 6

Adyo?, /cat rovvopia KarrjyopeiraL.

"ETretT* dvaGKevdt,ovra puev el purj KaO^ ov rov- vopia, /cat d Adyo?, /cat et /xt) /ca^' ov 6 Adyos", /cat ^ Reading (/lit)) efvat with Pacius, Waitz and Strache.

    • i.^. that given in the property.

^ i.e. that of the subject.




First of all, then, for destructive criticism, you it is not a must look at each subject of which he has assigned fJJ^&^ft does the property, and see whether it does not belong to not concur any of them, or whether it is not true in the particular individual, respect in question, or whether it is not a property of each of them as regards that of which he has assigned the property ; for then that which is stated to be a property will not be a property. For example, seeing that it is not true to say about a geometrician that he is ' not liable to be deceived by argument ' (for he is deceived when a false figure is drawn), it could not be a property of a scientific man ' not to be deceived by argument.' For constructive pur- poses, on the other hand, you must see whether the property is true in every case and in the particular respect in question ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, seeing that * a living creature receptive of knowledge ' is a true description of every man and true qua man, it would be a property of man to be ' a living creature receptive of knowledge.' The object of this common- place is, for destructive criticism, to see whether the description ° is untrue of that of which the name ^ is true, and whether the name is untrue of that of which the description is true ; on the other hand, in constructive argument, the object is to see whether the description also is predicated of that of which the name is predicated, and whether the name also is predicated of that of which the description is predi- cated.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (6) if the whether the description is not asserted of that of -^^^^o^p^^^^ which the name is asserted, and if the name is not serted of asserted of that of which the description is asserted ; which the



182 b

10 Tovvofjua Xeyerau' ov yap earai lSlov to Keifievov


fju€Texov dXrj deveTau /cara tov deov, 6 8' dvdpojTTOs ov KaT7]yop€LTai, ovK av eur) tov dvdpojTTOv lSlov t,a)ov emoTTip/ris pjeTexov. /caracr/ceuajovra 8e et Kad^ ov 6 Aoyos", Kal Tovvofxa /carT^yo/oetrat, Kal 15 KaO* ov Tovvofia, /cat o Xoyos KaT'qyopelTai' ecrrat yap lSlov to Keipievov pbrf elvai Ihiov. olov errel KaB^ ov TO ipvx'^v ^X^^> '^^ ^cpov dXrjOeveTaLj /cat Ka6^ ov TO t,cpoVy TO ifjvx'^v ^^(eiv, eirj av to ipv^r^v

€X€IV TOV t,(x)OV t8tov.

"Evretr* avacr/ceva^ovra p.ev el to VTroKeifievov 20 tStov ciTreSco/ce tov iv to) VTTOKeipbivcp Xeyopuevov ov yap eoTTai tStov to Keupuevov tStov. otov errel 6 drroSovs t'Stov tov AeTTTO/xe/Deo-Tarou crcajLtaros" to TTvp TO v7roK€Lp,€vov aTToSehujKe TOV KaTTjyopov- puevov tStov, OVK av eto] to TTvp GcopiaTO? tov XeTTTopLepeoTaTOV tStov. 8ta tovto S' ovk eWat

25 TO V7TOK€Lp,€VOV TOV iv Tip V7TOK€LpL€VCp tStOV, OTt

TO avTO 7tX€l6v(x)v CCTTat /cat hia^opwv Tcp ctSct tStov. TO) yap avTcp TrXelco tlvol Sidcf)opa tco etSet vTrapx^c /caTo, piovov XeyopLeva, wv eoTat TravTCUv tStov to VTTOKelpievov, idv tls ovtcj TidrJTaL TO tStov. KaTaoKevdt^ovTa 8' et to iv Tcp vtto- 510


for then the property which is stated will not be a name is property. For example, since a ' Uving creature ^^d^e which partakes of knowledge ' is true of ' God ' but ^«^«a- ' man ' is not predicated of * God,' a ' living creature which partakes of knowledge ' would not be a property of man. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the name also is predicated of that of which the description is predicated, and whether the description also is pre- dicated of that of which the name is predicated ; for then that which is asserted not to be a property will be a property. For example, since * living creature ' is true of that of which ' possessing a soul ' is true, and ' possessing a soul ' is true of that of which ' living creature ' is true, ' possessing a soul ' would be a property of * living being.'

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (c) if the whether he has assigned the subject as a property assig^ned as of that which is said to be ' in the subject ' ; for then the pro- what is stated to be a property will not be a property. For example, he who has assigned * fire ' as a pro- perty of ' the body consisting of the most subtle particles,' has assigned the subject as a property of its predicate, and so * fire ' could not be a property of ' the body consisting of the most subtle particles.' The subject will not be a property of that which is in the subject for this reason, namely, that the same thing will then be the property of a number of specifi- cally different things. For a number of specifically diiferent things belong to the same thing, being asserted to belong to it alone, of all of which the subject will be a property, if one states the property in this manner. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether he assigned what



132 b

30 K€L(Ji€va) OLTTeSajKev ihiov rod vnoKeLfjuevov. carat yap lSlov to Keifievov fir] elvai lSlov, iavnep Kara fjLOVOJV KarrjyoprjraL, c5v etpT^rat ro lSlov. olov €7T€L 6 etTra? yrjs lSlov acbpua to ^apvrarov rep ctSet rod vrroKeipievov airihcoKe to tStov Kara piovov Xeyopuevov rod TTpdypbaro?, Kal ojs ro lBlov Kanqyopeirai, eiiq av ro rrjs yrjs I'Stov opdcjs


35 "ETretT* avaaK€vat,ovra puev el Kara pede^iv

drreScoKe ro tStov ov yap ear at lSlov ro Kelpuevov

133 a elvat lSlov. ro yap Kara puede^tv v7Tdp)(ov el? ro

ri rjv etvau ovp^dXkerai' etrj 8' av to roiovro

hia(j)opd ris Kard rivog evos" eiSovs Xeyop,evrj.

olov eirel 6 etTras" dvdpojTTov lSlov ro ne^ov Slttovv

Kara pueOe^LV dnehajKe ro tStov, ovk av etr] rdv-

5 BpojTTOv Ihiov ro iret^ov Slttovv. Kara(JKevdt,ovra

he el pur] Kara pede^LV aTreScoKe ro lSlov, pr]Se ro

ri r]V elvai hr]\ovv, dvriKariqyopovpbevov rod irpdy-

/xaTOS" eorai yap Ihiov ro Kelpievov pjr] etvau tStov.

OLOV eirel 6 dels t,(x)ov Ihiov ro aloddveodai TrecjyvKog

ovre Kara pede^iv direhajKev tStov oi;Te ro ri rjv

10 elvai Sr]Xovv, dvrLKarr]yopovpLevov rod rrpdypuaro?, [

etr] av ^coov 'iSiov ro aloBdveod ai TrecjiVKos.

"ETretT* dvaoKevdl^ovra pbev el pur] evSexerai dpia 512


is in the subject as a property of the subject ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property, if it is predicated only of those things of which it has been asserted to be the property. For example, he who has said that it is a property of

  • earth * to be * specifically the heaviest body ' has

assigned as a property of the subject something which is asserted of that thing alone, and it is predicated as the property ; and so the property of ' earth ' would be correctly stated.

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (rf) if that- whether he assigned the property as something of ag^pfjf which the subj ect partakes ; for then that which is P^fty which stated to be a property will not be a property. For the subject that which belongs because the subject partakes of flrentla it is a contribution to its essence, and, as such, would be a differentia attributed to some one species. For example, he who has said that it is a property of ' man ' to be a ' pedestrian biped ' has assigned the property as something of which the subject partakes, and so ' pedestrian biped ' could not be a property of ' man.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether he has failed to assign the property as something of which the subject partakes, or as showing the essence, the subject being con- vertible ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, he who has stated that it is a property of ' living creature ' to be ' natu- rally possessed of sensation ' has assigned a property neither as partaken of by the subject nor as showing its essence, the subject being convertible ; and so to be ' naturally possessed of sensation ' would be a property of ' living creature.'

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (e) if that

is assigned

S 513


133 a


ov TovvojJba^ 01) yap earai Ihiov to Ketfxevov elvai

15 I'Stov, ^ ovSeTTore t) ovk del. otov eTret ivSex^rai Kal TTporepov tlvl virdp^ai koL varepov to jSaStJetv Ski t':^? dyopdg rj to dvOpcDvog, ovk dv eiT] to ^aStJetv hid ttj? dyopds tov dvOpcjTTov Ihiov, r^ ou8e770T* Tj OVK del. KaTaoKevd^ovTa 8e el dfxa cf dvdyKTjg del VTrdpx^i', /xrjre opog ov /XTJre Sta-

20 ^o/oa- ecTTai yap tStov to Keipuevov jjlt] elvai lSlov. otov eTTet TO t,(hov eTTLaTi^p.rjs heKTVKOv dfjia i^ dvdyKrjs del vnapx^i Kal to dvdpo)TTOs, ovTe 8ta- ^opd ov ovd^ dpoSy e'lT] dv to ^oiov eiriGT'qpL'qs heKTiKov TOV dvOpajTTOv lSlov. "ETTetT* dvaoKevdi^ovTa fxev el tcov auTcov, ^

25 TauTct eoTt, jLCTJ €CTTt TO avTO tStov OV yap CCTTat lSlov to Keifievov elvau lSlov. otov eirel ovk €gtl Slcjktov to (fyalveodai tlolv dyaOov lSlov, ovS* dv alpeTOV e'lT] thiov to (jiaiveodai tlglv dyaOov TavTOV yap eoTi to Stco/CTOV Kal to alpeTOV. KaTaoKevd^ovTa 8' el tov avTOV, fj TavTO 6CTTt,

30 TavTO t'Stov eoTai yap Ihiov to Kelpievov (xr) etvat 514




whether the property cannot possibly belong simul- as a pro- taneously but must belong as something posterior or S^rloror^'^ prior to that to which the name belongs ; for then posterior to that which is stated to be a property will not be a ^ ^" ^^^ * property, that is to say, it will be either never or not always a property. For example, since it is pos- sible for ' walking through the market-place ' to be an attribute of something as both prior and posterior to the attribute ' man,' ' walking through the market- place ' could not be a property of * man,' that is to say, it would be either never or not always a property. For constructive argument you must see whether the property always belongs of necessity simultaneously, being neither a definition nor a differentia ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, * animal receptive of knowledge ' al- ways belongs of necessity simultaneously with * man ' and is neither a differentia nor a definition, and so ' animal receptive of knowledge ' would be a property of ' man.'

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see whether (/) if the the same thing fails to bcja property of things which faJK^o^be^ are the same as the subject, in so far as they are the the pro- same ; for then what is stated to be a property will not same things, be a property. For example, since it is not a property Jhe'^are the of an ' object of pursuit ' to * appear good to certain same. people,' neither could it be a property of an ' object of choice ' to ' appear good to certain people ' ; for ' object of pursuit ' and ' object of choice ' are the same thing. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the same thing is a property of something which is the same as the subject, in so far as it is the same ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For



133 a

lSlov. olov eTTel dvOpcoTrov, fj avOpcxiiro? icrrt, Xeyerai lSlov to rpi[Jb6prj ^vxk^ ^X^^^> '^^^ ^porov, -^ ppoTog iornv, eirj av tStov to rpifJbeprj ^vx^v

eX^LV. ^^pTyCTtjLtOS" S' O T0770S" OVTOg Kai CTTL TOV

GVjjL^epT] KOTOS- TOLS ycLp avToZs, fj ravrd ian,

ravrd Set VTrdpx^t'V "^ p^'f] virapx^iv-

35 "ETTetr' dvaoKevdl^ovTa jLtev el rcov avrcov rch ei.-

8et puY] ravTov del rep eiSeu ro lSlov Igtlv ovhk yap

133 b TOV €Lpr]p.€vov ccTTat lSlov to Ketp^evov elvau I'Stov.

olov ETTel TOVTOV CCTTt TCp elhei dvdpOJTTOS Kal LTT-

7TOS, ovK del Se tov lttttov ecrrtv lSlov to eoTdvai v(f)^ avTOV, OVK dv eliq tov dvOpwTTOv lSlov to kl- velod ai u</)' avTov- TavTov yap Igti to) etSet to

5 KiveloOai Kal eaTavai vcf)* avTov, fj l,ci)ov 8* iaTLV eKaTepov avTcjv avpL^e^rjKev.^ KaTaoKevdl^ovTa 8' el Twv avTOJV Tcp elhei TavTov del to ihiov eoTai yap lSlov to Ketpievov pur] etvai lSlov. olov irreX dvBpcjTTOv eoTlv t8tov TO elvai ve^ov Slttovv, Kal opvidos dv eiT] lSlov to elvau ttttjvov Slttow eKd-

10 Tepov yap tovtcdv IotI TavTov Tcn elhei, fj to, piev (I)S VTTO TO avTO yevos eGTlv e'tSr], vtto to l,a)OV ovTa, Tct he d)S yevovg Siacjyopat, tov t^cpov. ovtos 8' o TOTTos" ijjevSrjg ccjTtv, oVav to puev eTepov tcov Xex^evTcov evi tlvl piovcp vrrdpxi] et8et, to 8* eTepov TToXXols, Kaddirep to rret^ov TeTpaTTOvv.

15 'ETret 8e to TavTov Kal to eTepov TToXXaxo)?

■•^ fj t,wov <8'> earlv cKarepov avrcov avfx^e^rjKev^ Strache- Wallies.

" Plato, Republic iv. 435 b ff.

"" i.e. there are many pedestrian quadrupeds besides the horse, but man is the only pedestrian biped. 516


example, since it is said to be a property of ' man,' qua man, * to possess a tripartite soul,' <* it would also be a property of ' mortal,' qua mortal, ' to possess a tripartite soul.' This commonplace is useful also in dealing with an accident ; for the same things must necessarily belong or not belong to the same things in so far as they are the same.

Next, for destructive criticism you must see {g) if the whether the property of things which are the same Jhings^^^ °^ in kind are not always the same in kind ; for then which are neither will that which is stated to be a property be tEame L a property of the proposed subject. For example, ^^^ J^^^^^ since man and horse are the same in kind and it is not the same.' always a property of a horse to stand still of his own accord, neither could it be a property of a man to move of his own accord, since to stand still and to move of one's own accord are the same in kind and have occurred in as much as each of them is an animal. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the property of things which are the same in kind is always the same ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, since it is a property of ' man ' to be a ' pedestrian biped,' it would also be a property of ' bird ' to be a ' winged biped ' ; for each of these is the same in kind, in as much as ' man ' and ' bird ' are the same, being species falling under the same genus, namely ' animal,' while ' pedestrian ' and

  • winged ' are the same, being differentiae of the

genus, namely ' animal.' This commonplace is mis- leading when one of the properties mentioned belongs to one species only, while the other belongs to many, as, for instance, ' pedestrian quadruped.' ^

Now, since ' same ' and ' different ' have several (,h) if what

is the pro-



Aeyerat, epyov can oocpiOTiKws AajJipavovrL evos OLTToSovvaL Kal jjiovov TLvog TO ihiov. TO yap

VTTOLpXOV TLvl O) CTUjLC/^e/^Ty/Ce Tt, /Cttt TOJ CTU/XjSejST^/COTt

vrrap^ei Aaju^avo/xeVoj jLteToL tou cS Gvpi^e^r]K€v,

olov TO vTrdp^ov avSpojirco Kal XevKcp dvOpcoTTco

20 VTTap^ei, dv fj XevKos dvdpcoTTo?, Kal ro XevKO) 8e

dvdpwTTCp VTTapxov Kal dvOpcxJTrcp virdp^ei. 8ta-

^dXXoL 8' dV TtS" TO, TToAAct TCOV tStCOV, TO V7TOK€L-

jJL€vov dXXo fjbev KaO^ avro ttolwv dXXo he pierd rod GvpL^e^Tj KOTOS, OLOV dXXo pi€V dvdpcoTTOv etvat

25 Xeyojv dXXo Se XevKov dvdpWTTOVy en 8e erepov TTOiwv T7]v e^LV Kal TO Kard ttjv eftv Xeyopuevov. TO yd/> T7J e^et virdpxov Kal ro) Kard rrjv e^iv Xeyopuevcp VTrdp^ei, Kal ro rco Kard rrjV e^tv Xeyo- fjiivcp vrrdpxpv Kal rfj e^et vTrdp^ei. olov inel 6 eTTiGTTipbOJV Kard rr]v irriGrrjpLTjv Xeyerai hiaKec-

30 oOai, ovK dv etrj rrjs €7nariqp.ris thiov rd dpierd- 7T€i(jrov VTTo Xoyov Kal ydp 6 iTnarrjpbcov ear ai dp.erd7T€iaros vtto Aoyou. KaraoK€vdt,ovra he prjreov on ovk eoriv erepov aTrAo)? to o) avp,- ^e^rjKe Kal ro avpL^e^rjKog puerd rod a) ovpi^e^rjKe XapL^avopievov, dAA' dAAo Xeyerai rat erepov elvai avrois ro elvai- ov ravrov ydp eoriv dvOpcoTTCo re

35 rd elvai dvdp<x)Trcp Kal XevKO) dv9p(x)7Tcp rd elvat dvdpcjTTO) XevKO). en he 6eojp7]reov eorl rrapd rds 134 a TTrcjoeis, Xeyovra hiori ovS^ 6 emorr]piO)v earai rd dpLerdneiarov vtto Xoyov dAA' d dpuerdTTeiGros VTTO Xoyov, ovd^ Tj eTTicrri^pbr] rd dpieraTreiorov vtto 518


meanings, it is a difficult task with a sophistical petty of the opponent to assign the property of some one thing Iu)n?i3 not taken by itself. For that which belongs to something ^j^ n'^^Jhf^J to which an accident is attached will also belong to to an acci- the accident taken with the subject to which it is ^ice'v^rm. attached. For example, what belongs to ' man ' will also belong to ' white man,' if there is a white man, and what belongs to ' white man ' will also belong to ' man.' One might, therefore, misrepre- sent the majority of properties by making the subject one thing when taken by itself and another thing when taken with its accident, saying, for example, that ' man ' is one thing and ' white man ' another thing, and, further, by making a diiference between the state and that which is described in the terms of the state. For that which belongs to the state will belong also to that which is described in the terms of the state, and that which belongs to what is described in the terms of the state will belong also to the state. For example, since the condition of a scientist is described in the terms of his science, it cannot be a property of ' science ' to be ' proof against the persuasion of argument,' for then the scientist also, will be ' proof against the persuasion of argument.' For constructive purposes you should say that that to which the accident belongs is not absolutely different from the accident taken with that to which it is accidental, but is called ' other than it * because their kind of being is different ; for it is not the same thing for a ' man ' to be a * man ' and for a * white man ' to be a * white man.' Further, you should look at the inflexions, maintaining that the scientist is not ' that which ' but * he who ' is proof against the persuasion of argument, while Science is




134 a

Xoyov aAA' 7] djLtcraTretaros" ^5770 Xoyov irpo? yap

Tov TrdvTOJS €vt(jrdiJL€Vov TTOLvrcos OLvrtraKTeov eoriv.

5 V. "ETretr' dvaaK€vdl,ovTa [xkv el to (f)va€L vtt-

dpxov ^ovXofJievos aTToSovvai rovrov tov rpoirov

TidrjcrL rfj Xe^et, cocrre to del vTrdpxov orjixaiveiv

h6^€i€ yap dv Kiveiodai to Keijjievov etvai I'Stov.

otov eTTel 6 elVas" dvdpwTTOv tSuov to Slttovv ^ov-

AeTat jLtev to cjivaei vrrdpxov avroStSopat, oiqpiaivei

10 8e TTj Ae^et to del VTrdpxov, ovk dv etrj dvdpwTTov ihiov TO hiTTOvv ov yap rrds dvdpcoTTos cctti Svo TToSas" ^xc^v- KaTaoTKevd^ovTa 8' el ^ovXeTai to (f)vaeL VTrdpxov iSiov o-TroStSovat Kal ttj Xe^ei tov- Tov TOV TpoTTOv GT^fjiaLveL' OV ydp KivrioeTai KaTa TOVTO TO t8tov. otov eTTel 6 dvdpa)TTov 'ISlov dTTO-

15 SiSovg TO t,a)ov emoTrifjbr]s heKTiKov Kal ^ovXeTai Kal T7J Xe^ei arjiJbaiveL to <j)vaei VTrdpxov tStov, OVK dv KivoiTO KaTa TOVTO, 60? ovk ecjTiv dvdpdi-


"Etc oaa XeyeTai co? KaT* aAAo Tt rrpdjTov rj cog

TTpwTov avTO, epyov IgtIv aTToSouvat tcov toiovtojv

20 TO Ihiov edv /xev ydp tov KaT dXXo Tt tStov

dTTohchSy Kal KaTa tov TrpwTOV dXr]devGeTai, edv

Se Tou TTpwTov dfjs, Kal TOV KaT dXXo KaT7]yo-

"* Scientist being masculine and Science feminine in Greek. 520



TOPICA, V. iv-v

not ' that which ' but ' she who ' '^ is proof against the persuasion of argument ; for against the man who uses every kind of objection, you should use every kind of opposition.

V. Next, for destructive criticism, you should see Various whether your opponent, while he intends to assign subverting a to the subject an attribute which naturally belongs, ^^Jj^^fj^^" •' expresses himself in such language as to signify one whether an which always belongs ; for then that which is stated whicKe- to be a property would seem to be subverted. For longs natu- example, he who has said that ' biped ' is a property sfgned^a?" of man intends to assign an attribute which belongs always by nature, but, by the language which he uses, signifies an attribute which always belongs ; and so ' biped ' could not be a property of man, since every man is not in possession of two feet. For constructive purposes, on the other hand, you must see whether he intends to assign as a property that which belongs by nature and signifies this by the language which he uses ; for then the property will not be subverted in this respect. For example, he who assigns as a property of man that he is * an animal receptive of knowledge ' both has the intention and succeeds in signifying by his language the property which belongs by nature, and so ' an animal receptive of knowledge ' cannot be subverted in this respect on the ground that it is not a property of man.

Further, it is a difficult task to assign the property [Note on of such things as are described primarily in the terms cu?tyof of something else or primarily in themselves ; for if rendering you assign a property of that which is described in which are the terms of something else, it will be true also of that fJJey^a^ which is primary ; whereas if you state it of some- primarily thing which is primary, it will also be predicated of Jhing^eiSr



134 a

prjO-^aerai. olov iav fxev rt? €TTi<j)av€Las Ihiov aiTohcb TO K€Xpci>crdcLL, Koi Kara Gcofiaros dXrj- OevaeraL to Kexpcoadai, iav 8e Ga)[xaros, /cat 25 Acar' iTri(f)av€La5 Karrjyop'qOT^ueraL. axrre ov KaO^ ov 6 Xoyog, /cat rowo/xa aAT^^euo-erat.

SfjLtjSatVet 8' iv ivLOLS rcov tStcov cos" €77t to ttoXv yiveadal riva dfjuaprlav irapd to /xt] hLopit,€o9aL TTCtJS /cat TLVOJV TtdrjGL TO tStov. (iTravTe? ydp €77-t-

X^VpOVGLV aTToSiSovaL TO tStOV ?} TO <j)VOei VTTOLp-

30 ;^ov, Kaddnep dvOpwirov to SIttovv, tj to virdpxov, Kaddirep dvdpwTTOv Ttvos" to rerrapas SaKTvXovs ex^tv, rj etSet, Kaddirep TTvpos ro XeTrrofJuepeGra- Tov, r) aTrAcus", KaOdrrep t^coov ro ^rjv, t) /caT* d'AAo, Kaddrrep ipvxrjs ro (l)p6vLfJLOv, ri d)s ro Trpco- roVy KaOdnep AoytCTTt/cou ro cfypovLfJioVy "^ cos" raj

35 €X€iVy Kaddrrep irriGr'qpLovog ro dpLerdiTeiGrov vtto Xoyov (ovSev ydp erepov rj rep ex^^v n eorai d- 134 b fi€rd7Teiaro< s vtto Xoyov) , tj rep e;)(ea^at, Kaddirep l7narrip.r]s ro djjierdTTeLcrrov vtto Xoyov, ^ rep fierex^oOai, KaddTTep l,o)OV ro alaOdveoB ai (alorOd- verai fxev ydp /cat ctAAo Tt, otov dvBpojTTos, dXXd fjierixojv^ rjSr] rovrov^ aloddverai), ^ rch fierex^iv, 5 KaddTTep rod nvos l^coov ro l.7]v. purj TTpooOelg fiev ovv ro ^uaet dfiaprdvei, StOTt ivSexerai ro (j>VGei VTTdpxov fJLT] vrrdpx^LV eKeivco (L cfyvGei

  • Reading fi€r4x<t>v for fierexov.

^ Reading tovtov for tovto.

"• i.e. ' surface ' will not be applicable to everything which can be described as ' coloured,' since a body is coloured but is not a surface. ' Body ' will not be applicable to everything which can be described as ' coloured,' since a surface is coloured but is not a body.



that which is described in the terms of something else, pr primarily

For example, if one assigns ' coloured ' as a property selves.] '

of ' surface,' * coloured ' will also be true of ' body,'

but if one assigns it as a property of ' body,' it will

also be predicated of ' surface,' so that the name also

will not be true of that of which the description is


With some properties it usually happens that an (b) Observe error arises from lack of a definite statement how ^ann?/and and of what the property is stated. For everyone subject of attempts to assign as the property of a thing either pe?ty^are that which belongs by nature, as ' biped ' belongs to accurately man, or that which actually belongs, as ' possessing four fingers ' belongs to a particular man, or specifi- cally, as ' consisting of the most subtle particles ' belongs to ' fire,' or absolutely, as ' life ' belongs to * living creature,' or in virtue of something else, as * prudence ' belongs to the ' soul,' or primarily, as

  • prudence ' belongs to the ' faculty of reason,' or

owing to something being in a certain state, as ' proof against the persuasion of argument ' belongs to the

  • scientist ' (for it is only because he is in a certain

state that he will be * proof against the persuasion of argument '), or because it is a state possessed by something, as * proof against the persuasion of argument ' belongs to ' science,' or because it is par- taken of, as ' sensation ' belongs to ' living creature ' (for something else also possesses sensation, e.g. ' man,' but he does so because he already partakes of ' living creature '), or because it partakes of some- thing, as ' life ' belongs to a particular * living creature.' A man, therefore, errs if he does not add the words ' by nature,' for it is possible for that which belongs by nature not actually to belong to that to



184 b

VTrdpx^L, KadoLTTep dvOpcjTra) to Suo irohas e;^ety.

pLT] hiopLGas S' ort TO VTrdp^ov aTToStSaxrtv, ort ovK eoTai TOLovTov oiov vvv VTTapx^t, cAcetVo)/ Kadd-

10 7T€p TO T€TTapaS SaKTvXoVS e^etV TOV dvdp0)7T0V.

fiT) SrjXwaas 8e Stort cos' irpajTov ^ ws /car* aAAo TLdrjGLV, OTL ov Kad^ ov 6 \6yos y KoX Tovvofxa dXrj- OevaeTai, Kaddirep to Kexpcoadaiy €lt€ ttjs eTn- <l>aveias €lt€ tov GWfjLaTos aTToSodev tStov. jxr] 7Tpo€L7ras 8e Stort t^ tcv €)(€iv r^ tco ei^ecr^at to

15 tStov aTToSeSco/ce, Stdrt ou/c earat tSiov vrrdp^ei ydp, idv fxkv tco e;)^€cr^at aTroStSo) to t'Stov, roj exovTi, idv he Tcp 'ixovTi, Tip ixofjuivcOy KaBdirep TO djLteraTretCTTOv vtto Xoyov Trjg erriGTripbrjs r] tov eTTiGTriixovos TeBev tStov. /xt^ TTpoGarjfjLT^vas 8e tco pL€Tex^i^v ^ Tip fJbeTex^crd aiy otl Kal dXXoLs tlgIv

20 VTvdp^ei TO Ihiov idv fxev ydp tco fJueTexeadaL

dTToSo), TOLS lJi€T€XOV(JLV, idv 8e TCp [ji€T€X€LV,

Tots" pi€TexopL€VOis y Kaddnep el tov Tivog t,cpov tj

TOV ^(pov TiBeirj to t,rjv tStov. p.'Y] StaaTelXag 8e

TO TCp eiSei, OTL evl p.6vcp virdp^ei tojv vtto tovto

^ Reading iKeivw for eKclvo with Waitz. 524


which it belongs by nature ; for example, it belongs to man by nature to possess two feet. He also errs if he does not state definitely that he is assigning what actually belongs, because it will not always belong, as it now does, to that particular subject, for example, the man's possession of four fingers. He also errs if he has not made it clear that he is stating it as being primary or as being called as it is in virtue of something else, because then the name also will not be true of that of which the description is true, for example * coloured ' whether assigned as a property of ' surface ' or of ' body.' He also errs if he has not stated beforehand that he has assigned the property because something is in a certain state or because it is possessed by something as a state ; for then it will not be a property. For if he assigns the property as a state possessed by something, it will belong to that which possesses the state, while, if he assigns it to the possessor of the state, it will belong to the state which is possessed, as ' proof against the persuasion of argument ' when assigned as a property of ' science ' or of the ' scientist.' He also errs if he has not signi- fied in addition that he assigns the property because the subject partakes of, or is partaken of by, some- thing, since then the property will belong to some other things also. For if he assigns it because it is partaken of, it will belong to the things which par- take of it, while if he assigns it because the subject partakes of it, it will belong to the things partaken of, for example, if ' life ' be stated to be a property of a particular ' living creature ' or merely of ' living creature.' He also errs if he has not distinguished the property as belonging specifically, because then it will belong to one only of those things which come



134 b

ovrojv ov TO I'Stov rlOrjGU' to yap KaB" vrrep^oXrjv

25 €vl IJbOVO) V7Tdp)(€l, KaOaTTCp TOV TTVpOS TO K0V(f)6-

rarov. evioTe he koL to tco etSec rrpoadels 3t- -qfjLapTev. he-qcreL yap iv elSos elvai tojv XexOevTOJV oTav TO TO) etSet TTpooTeOfj' tovto 8' €7r' eviiov ov ovfi7TL7TT€L, Kaddnep ov8^ €771 TOV TTvpos. OV ydp ioTLv €v etSog tov rrvpo?' eTepov ydp ioTi tco etSet

30 avBpa^ Kal cf)X6^ /cat (fxjjs, eKaoTov avTcov TTvp ov. 8ta TOVTO 8' ov hel, orav to tco^ et8et TTpooTeOfj, €T€pov etyat €lSo9 tov XexddvT09, otl tols puev jU-aA- Xov TOLS 8' rJTTOv virdp^ei to Xe^Oev tStov, Kaddirep err I tov TTVpos to XerrTOfJiepecrTaTOV' XeTTTOfjiepe- GTepov ydp ioTL to (j)a)s tov dvdpaKos Kal ttjs (jiXoyos. TOVTO 8' ov Set yiveodaiy OTav [jltj Kal

35 TO ovojLta fiaXXov KaTTjyoprJTai, Kad^ ov 6 Xoyog [jidXXov dXr^devcTaf el 8e /jltj, ovk earat, Ka9^ ov

135 a o Xoyos pidXXov, Kal Tovvofia fiaXXov. ert 8e 77^09

TOVTOL9 TavTov elvai avfi^-qoeTat to lSlov tov re aTrAtos" Kal tov pidXiGTa ovtos ev tco aTrXchs tolov- Tov^ KaOdnep eirl tov TTvpos ex^L to XenTopiepe- OTaTov Kal ydp tov cfiCOTos ecrrat rauro tovto 5 lSlov XeiTTopiepeoTaTov ydp eoTi to (f)ajs. dXXov puev ovv ovTCog aTroStSovTog to tStov eTTLX^iprjTeov, avTCx) 8' ov SoTeov cgtI TavTiqv ttjv evoTaoiv, dXX evdvs TiBepuevov to I'Stov SiopiOTeov ov Tpoirov tI- Biqai TO t^Lov.

^ Reading to roi with D. 2 Reading tolovtov with AB.



under the term of which he is stating the property ; for the superlative degree belongs to one only of them, for example, * lightest ' when used of ' fire.' Sometimes also he has erred even when he has added the word ' specifically ' ; for the things mentioned will have to be of one species when * specifically ' is added ; but this does not occur in some cases, for example, in the case of ' fire.' For there is not one species only of fire, since a burning coal, a flame and light are different in species, though each of them is fire.' It is necessary when ' specifically ' is added that there should not be a species other than that stated, for the reason that the property mentioned will belong to some things in a greater and to others in a less degree, for example * consisting of the subtlest particles ' as applied to ' fire ' ; for light consists of subtler particles than a burning coal or a flame. But this ought not to occur unless the name is predicated in a greater degree of that of which the description is true to a greater degree ; otherwise the name will not be truer when applied to that of which the description is truer. Further, besides this, the same thing will happen to be the property both of that which possesses it absolutely and of that which possesses it in the highest degree in that which possesses it absolutely, as in the case of ' consisting of the subtlest particles ' when used of ' fire ' ; for this same thing will be a property of ' light,' for

  • light ' ' consists of the subtlest particles.' If, there-

fore, someone else assigns the property in this manner, one ought to argue against it, but one ought not oneself to give an opening for this objection, but one ought to define in what manner one is stating the property immediately when one is stating it.



135 a

"ETTetr' avacr/ceuajovra fiev el avTO avrov tStov

10 eOrjKev ov yap eorai Ihiov to Kelfzevov etvai lSlov. avro yap avrov^ ttoLv to etvai SrjXol, to 8e to elvai SrjXovv ovK lSlov dAA' opog eoriv. otov iirel 6 eiTTas KaXov ro TTpeTTov Ihiov elvai avro iavrov Ihiov dneScoKe [ravrov yap ioTi to KaXov Kal

TTpeTTOv), OVK oiv €17] TO 7Tp€7TOV TOV KaXoV tSiOV.

15 KaTaaKevdt,ovTa Se el firj avTO ixkv avTOV tStov OLTTeSajKeVy dvTiKaTiqyopovixevov 8' ed-qKev eo-Tat yap lSlov to Keufjievov firj elvai Ihiov. otov eirel 6 dels ^(pov lSlov to ovaia epujjvxo? ovk avTO [.lev avTOV lSlov edrjKev, dvTLKaTiqyopovpbevov 8' diro- SeScoKev, elrj dv I'Stov tou t,a)ov to ovorla efjbipvxo?.

20 "ETTetT* eTTL TOJV opiOLopLepiov GKeTTTeOV ioTLV dvaaK€vdt,ovTa jJLev el to tov (tvvoXov tStov /xt^ dXrjOeveTai KaTa tov puepovs, rj el to tov puepovs pLTj XeyeTai KaTa tov avpLTravTos' ov yap eWat t8tov TO Keipievov Ihiov elvai. crvpu^alveL 8* in' eviujv TOVTO yiveodai- drroSour] yap dv Tts" €7rl tojv

25 opLoiopiepcJov lSlov ivLOTe puev enl to ovpuTrav ^Xeipas, ivLOTe 8' eTTL to KaTa piepos Xeyopievov avTOS avTov eTTiGTrjoas' eoTai 8' ovSeTepov opdcjjg diroheho- pLevov. otov errl puev tov avpurravTos, eTTel 6 eiTra?

^ Reading avrov for avrw. 528


Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (c) Observe whether your opponent has stated a thing itself as tWngTteetf^ a property of itself ; for then what is stated to be a is assigned property will not be a property. For a thing itself property, always shows its own essence, and that which shows the essence is not a property but a definition. For example, a man who has said that ' decorous ' is a property of * beautiful ' has assigned the thing itself as its own property (for ' beautiful ' and ' decorous ' are the same thing), and so ' decorous ' cannot be a property of * beautiful.' For constructive argument you must see whether, though he has not assigned the thing itself as a property of itself, he has neverthe- less stated a convertible predicate ; for then what has been stated not to be the property will be the property. For example, a man who has stated that ' animate substance ' is a property of ' living creature,' though he has not stated that the thing itself is a property of itself, has nevertheless assigned a con- vertible predicate, and so ' animate substance ' would be a property of * living creature.'

Next, in dealing with things which have like parts, {d) Observe for destructive criticism you must see whether the JjJngg^^' *° property of the whole is untrue of the part or if the which con- property of the part is not predicated of the whole ; similar for then what is stated to be a property will not be p*'^^' ^^^ . a property. This may happen in some cases ; for the whole a man might, in dealing with things which have like the jfarts^^ parts, assign a property sometimes looking at the or that of whole and sometimes directing his attention to what not predi- is predicated of a part ; and so in neither case will '^^^ ^^ ^^® the property have been correctly assigned. For example, in the case of the whole, the man who has said that it is a property of ' sea ' to be ' the greatest


135 a


fiepovs fjuev nvog eOrjKe to lBlov, tolovtov S* oltt-

30 eScoKev o ovk aXrjdeveTai Kara tov fxepovs {ov yap

ioTiv Tj TL9 OdXaTTa to TrXeloTOV vScop dXfjbVpov),

OVK dv €17] Trjs OaXdTTTjg tStov to rrXeZoTov vSojp

dXpLvpov. inl 8e tov piipovs, olov iiTel 6 del?

dipos tStov TO dvairvevoTOV ofjboiojjiepovg /xeV tlvos

eiprjKe to lSlov, tolovtov S' dneSojKev o /cara tov

35 TLVog dipos dXrjdeveTaL, /caret 8e tov avpuravTOS

ov Aeyerat [ov ydp eoTiv 6 cru/XTra? dvaTTvevaTOs) ,

135 b OVK dv €17] TOV depos Xhiov to dvairvevaTov . Acara-

GK€vd^ovTa Se et dX7]9€V€TaL /x€v Kad^ eKdoTov

Tojv ofJLOLoiJiepcbv, ecFTL 8' lSlov aVTCOV /CaTOt TO

GVfJiTTav eoTai ydp 'ihiov to KeLpuevov pLT] etvat tStov.

ofov eTTet dX7]deveTai AcaTO, 7Tdo7]s y7]£^ to /ccxtco

6 (fyepeadai KaTa (I)Vglv, €otl Se tovto Ihiov koI ttjs

TLVog yrjg /caTo, ttjv yfjv, €L7] dv ttJ? yrjs lSlov to

KaTO) (f)6p€GdaL KaTa (J)VGLV.

VI. "ETretT* €K TCOV dvTiK€LpL€Va)V GK€7TT€OV €GtI

TTpcoTOV p.€V €K TCOV ivavTLWV dvaGK€vd^ovTa fiev el TOV evavTLOV jjlt] Igti to evavTiov lSlov ovSe 10 yap TOV evavTLOV eoTai to evavTtov lSlov. olov eTrel evavTLOV eoTL SLKaLoavvT] (juev d^LKLa, tco ^eXTLOTO) Se TO ^^eipLOTOv , ovk eoTL Se t7]s St-


dSt/cta? tStov TO x^eipLGTOV. KaTaoKevd^ovTa Se et

^ Omitting ttjs before yijs with Waitz. 530

TOPICA, V. v-vi

mass of salt-water ' has stated the property of some- thing which has Uke parts, but he has assigned an attribute of such a kind that it is not true of the part (for a particular sea is not ' the greatest mass of salt- water '), and so ' the greatest mass of salt-water ' could not be a property of * sea.' So too in the case of the part ; for example, the man who has stated that ' respirable ' is a property of ' air ' has asserted the property of something which has like parts, but has assigned an attribute of such a kind that it is true of some air but is not predicable of the whole (for the whole air is not respirable), and so ' respirable ' could not be a property of the air. For constructive argu- ment, on the other hand, you must see whether, while it is true of each of the things which have like parts, it is a property of them taken as a whole ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, while it is true of all earth that it is carried naturally downwards, and this is also a pro- perty of a certain portion of earth as forming part of ' the earth,' it would be a property of * earth ' * to be carried naturally downwards.'

VI. Next, you must examine on the basis of Rules opposites and, in the first place, of contraries and, for aiffemnt^^ destructive criticism, see whether the contrary of the modes of term fails to be a property of the contrary subject ; afcoii-"' for then neither will the contrary of the former be a Jjjjlio^" property of the contrary of the latter. For example, since injustice is contrary to justice, and the greatest evil is contrary to the greatest good, but it is not a property of * justice ' to be * the greatest good,' then the ' greatest evil ' would not be a property of ' in- justice.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the contrary is a pro-




Tov ivavTLOV TO ivavriov tStov eoTiv koL yap rod

ivavTLOV TO ivavTLOV lSlov ecrrat. olov inel ivavTtov 15 idTiv dyadcp /xev KaKov, alpero) Se <j)evKT6v, cgti 8e TOV dyaOov lSlov to alperov, elr] dv KaKov Ihiov TO (fyevKTOv.

Aeurepov S' e/c twv irpos tl dvaGK€vdl,ovTa pLev

et TO TTpOS Tl TOV TTpOS TL pbTj €OTlV tStOV Ovhk ydp

TO TTpos Tl TOV TTpos Tl eoTai tStov. olov iiTei 20 Aeyerat SnrXdcriov puev TTpos TJpnGV, virrepexov Se

TTpos VTT€pexdpi€VOVy OVK eUTl 8e TOV SiTrXauLov

TO VTT€p€Xov iSiov, OVK dv e'lT] TOV rjpLiGeos TO vTT€p€Xopi€vov iStov. KaTaGKevd^ovTa 8e el rod TTpos Tl TO TTpos Tt icjTiv iSiov Kai ydp rod TTpos Tt TO TTpos Tl eorrai iSiov. oiov irrei Xdyerai to

25 fiev SiTTXdaiov TTpos ro rjpLiav, ro Se 8vo TTpos ev (^TTpos TO ev TTpos Swo)/ eGTi 8e rod hiTrXaaiov iSiov TO cos Bvo TTpos eVf eirj dv rod rjpiiGeos iSiov ro (Ls ev TTpos Svo.

Tpirov dvaoKevdl^ovra jjiev el rrjs e^ews ro Kad^ e^iv XeyofJLevov p.rj eariv Ihiov ovSe ydp rrjs arepij- aews TO /caret GTep7]Giv Xeyofievov eorai Ihiov. Kdv

30 el 8e ttJs" Greprjaews ro /caret GTep7]Giv Xeyopievov jji'q eGTiv tSiov, ovSe rrjs e^ecos rd Kard rrjv e^iv

^ Reading with Strache-Wallies to Se 8vo npos ev {npos to eu TTpos 8vo), eari. 532


perty of the contrary ; for then the contrary too of the former will be a property of the contrary of the latter. For example, since * evil ' is contrary to ' good ' and * obj ect of avoidance ' contrary to ' obj ect of choice,' and ' object of choice ' is a property of ' good,' ' object of avoidance ' would be a property of ' evil.'

Secondly, you must examine on the basis of relative (2) Relative opposites, and see, for destructive criticism, whether ^ppo^'^^o"- one correlative of the term fails to be the property of the correlatives of the subject ; for then neither will the correlative of the former be a property of the correlative of the latter. For example, ' double ' is described as relative to ' half,' and ' exceeding ' to ' exceeded,' but ' exceeding ' is not a property of ' double,' and so ' exceeded ' could not be a property of ' half.' For constructive argument on the other hand you must see whether the correlative of the property is a property of the correlative of the sub- ject ; for then too the correlative of the former will be a property of the correlative of the latter. For example, ' double ' is described as relative to ' half,' and the proportion 2 : 1 as relative to the proportion 1:2, and it is a property of * double ' to be in the pro- portion of 2 : 1 ; it would, therefore, be a property of ' half ' to be in the proportion of 1 : 2.

Thirdly, for destructive criticism, you must see (3) The whether what is described in the terms of a state (A) of a°ItetT is not a property of the state (B), for then neither and its will what is described in the terms of the privation (of A) be a property of the privation (of B). Also, if what is described in the terms of a privation (of A) is not a property of the privation (of B), neither will what is described in the terms of the state (A) be a



135 b

Aeyd/xevov iSlov eorai. olov iirel ov Xeyer ai rrjs

kw(J)6t7]tos tStov TO dvaLGdrjGiav elvai, ouS' av TTJs oLKovaeaJS eiiq Ihiov ro a'iodr^GLV elvai. Kara- aK€vdt,ovTa 8e el to Kad^ e^iv Xeyofievov eari rrjs 35 e^ecog lSlov Kal yap rrjg arep'^creajg ro Kara arepr^GLv Xeyofjueuov ecxrat lBlov. Kav el rrjs ore- prjoeois TO Kara Greprjoriv Xeyofxevov earnv lSlov,

136 a Kal rr\s e^ecos ro KaO" e^cv Xeyofjuevov eorai tStov'.

ofov 67761 T-^s" oi/jecjs cCTTtv iSiov ro jSAevretv, Ka66 exofJLev oi/jLV, etr] av rrj? rv(f)X6r7]rog lSlov ro pLT] jSAeVetv, Kado ovk €)(OfJL€V oi/jlv TTecfyvKores '^X^^^- 6 ' EvretTa eK rcov cfxicrecov Kal rchv drro(j)do€0)v , vpajrov fJLev ef avrwv ra)v Karr^yopovpievajv. eon 8' o TOTTos" ouTos" XPV^^H'^^ dvaoTKevdi^ovrL puovov. olov el Tj ^doLS Tj ro Kara rrjv (f)dGLV Xeyopuevov avrov lSlov eoriv ov yap eorai avrov rj d7T6<jiaaLS ovhe ro Kara rrjV dnocfyacrLV Xeyopuevov t8tov. Koiv

10 et 8 Tj d7T6<l)aaLg ^ ro Kara rr]v aTTocjyaGLV Xeyopuevov eariv avrov IhioVy ovk eorai rq ^dui£ ovhe ro Kara rrjv <j)d(Jiv Xeyopuevov t8tov olov eirel rod t,(x)ov iarlv iSiov ro epufjvxov, ovk av elr] rod t^wov Ihiov ro ovk epufjvxov.

Aevrepov 8' eK rwv Karrjyopovp^evcov i^ pLrj

15 Karr]yopovp.evajv, Kal Ka6^ cov Karriyopelrai t] prj KariqyopelraL, dvaoKevd^ovra pLev el r) (fydaig rrjg

<» It is not a property of deafness, because it can also be predicated of, for example, blindness. 534>


property of the state (B). For example, since ' absence of sensation ' is not predicated as a property of deafness,' " neither would ' sensation ' be a pro- perty of ' hearing.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether what is de- scribed in the terms of a state (A) is a property of the state (B) ; for then what is described in the terms of a privation (of A) will be a property of the privation (of B). And, again, if what is described in the terms of a privation (of A) is a property of the privation (of B), then, too, what is described in the term of the state (A) will be a property of the state (B). For example, since ' to see ' is a property of ' vision,' in as far as we possess * vision,' ' inability to see ' would be a property of * blindness,' in as much as we do not possess vision, though it is our nature to possess it.

Next, you must argue from affirmations and nega- (4) Con- tion, and first from the predicates themselves. This o^pogfS commonplace is useful only for destructive criticism, applied to For example, you must see whether the affirmation SJjy!*^* ^^ or the attribute predicated affirmatively is a property of the subject ; for then neither the negation nor the attribute predicated negatively will be a property of the subject. Also, if the negation or the attribute predicated negatively is a property of the subject, then neither the affirmation nor the attribute predi- cated affirmatively will be a property of the subject. For example, since ' animate ' is a property of ' living creature,' ' not animate ' could not be a property of it.

Secondly, you must argue from the things which (5) Con- are predicated or not predicated and from the sub- opVsition jects of which they are or are not predicated, and, J^Pi^^ for destructive criticism, see whether the affirmative predicates



136 a

(fxxGecog ju-rj iarLV lSlov ovSe yap rj oLTTocfiaaLS rrjs

a7TO(f)dG€a>9 earai lSlov. koLv el 8' rj aTTO^acrts" rrjs d7To<f)d(J€ios [jltj eoriv Ihiov, ouS' r] (j)dais rrjs ^doecos earai lSlov. olov eirel ovk ecrrt rod dv-

20 dpCOTTOV tStOV TO ^CpOV, Ou8' CtV TOV pLT] dvdpO)-

TTov eit] l'8tov TO puT] t,a)ov. kov el he rod pj] dvBpojTTov cfyaivrjraL purj lSlov to pbrj t,ipov, ovhe rov dvdpcoTTOv eorai t'Stov to t^chov. KaraoKevd^ovra 8' el rrjs <j)d(jea>£ r) cf)daLs earlv t8tov /cat yap rrjs aTTO^daecos rj aTTo^auis eorai tStov. kov el 8e

25 rrjs d7TO(f)daea)s rj d7T6(f)aaLS eoriv t8tov, /cat rj (f)daLS rijs (fydaecos eorai Ihiov. olov errel rov purj t,ci)ov t8tov CCTTt TO pbrj t,rjv, elrj dv rod ^cpov t8tov TO ^rjv Kav el 8e rod t^cpov (j)aivrjrai Ihiov ro JtJv, /cat rod purj t^cpov ^aveirai thiov ro purj tjjv.

Tplrov Se ef avrcov rcbv UTTO/cet/xeVcov dvaoKev-

30 dt^ovra puev el ro diroSeSopbevov 'ISiov rrjs ^doecos iartv tStov ov yap eorai ro avro /cat rrjs drro- cf)d(TeoJs tStov. Kav el 8e rrjs d7TO(f)daea>s tStov to drroSodev, ovk eorai rrjs cfidcreojs t8tor. otov errel rod t,(pov tStov ro epupvxov, ovk dv elrj rod p.rj l,cpov Ihiov ro epii/jvxov. KaraoKevdt^ovra he el ro 536


predicate is not a property of the affirmative subject ; andsub- for then neither will the negative predicate be a pro- ^^^^' perty of the negative subj ect . Also if the negative pre- dicate fails to be a property of the negative subject, neither will the affirmative predicate be a property of the affirmative subject. For example, since * living creature ' is not a property of ' man,' neither could ' not-living-creature ' be a property of ' not-man.' Again, if * not-living-creature ' appears not to be a property of ' not-man,' neither will ' living creature ' be a property of ' man. ' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the affirma- tive predicate is a property of the affirmative subject ; for then, too, the negative predicate will be a pro- perty of the negative subject. And if the negative predicate is a property of the negative subject, the affirmative predicate also will be a property of the affirmative subject. For example, since ' not to live ' is a property of a * not-living-creature,' * to live ' would be a property of ' living-creature,' and, if * to live ' appears to be a property of * living-creature,' ' not-to-live ' will appear to be a property of * not- living-creature.'

Thirdly, you must argue from the subjects them- (6) Con- selves and, for destructive criticism, see whether the ow)osiS property assigned is a property of the affirmative app)Jed to subject ; for then the same thing will not be a pro- only, perty of the negative subject also. And if the pro- perty assigned is a property of the negative subject, it will not be a property of the affirmative subject. For example, since * animate ' is a property of living- creature,' ' animate ' could not be a property of ' not- living-creature.' For constructive argument, you must see whether the property assigned fails to be a



136 a

35 OLTToSodev fjiT] TTJs <j>daeo)s Ihiov (el yap (jltj rrjs (f)do€0)5, tStovy €L7] dv rrjs aTTO^daews. ovros 8* o roTTOS i/jevS'qs €gtlv' <j)d(JLS yap aTTO^^daews Kal dTr6(j)aGis (f)d(T€OJs ovk eanv lSlov. <j)dois /xev 136 b yap (XTTo^acret oi5S' oXcos vnapx^t,, d7T6(f)aaLs Sc (f)d- cret vrrdpx^t' ft-eV, ovx cos lSlov 8e virdpx^^-

"ETretra 8* €k tcjv dvrihiripr^ixivwv dvaaKevd^ovra jLtev el rctjv dvTiSirjprjiJievajv [jurfSev fjLr]Sev6s tojv 5 XoLTTOJV dvTihir^priixevcjv eorlv Ihiov ovhe yap to Keiiievov eorai Ihiov rovrov ov Kelrai tStov. olov eirel l,a)ov aluBriTov ovhevos tcjv dWcov^ l,<jpwv iarlv iSioVy ovk dv etrj ro ^cpov votjtov rod 6eov lSlov. KaraGKevdt,ovra 8* el tcjv Xolttcjv twv dvTLhirjprjiJLevcov otlovv eorlv I'Stov to'Utcjjv eKdorov

10 TCJV dvrihir)priixev(x)V' Kal yap to Xolttov eurai rovrov tStov, ov Kelrai firj elvau t8tov. otov eTrel (j)povriGecx)S eonv lSlov ro Kad^ avro TTe(j)VKevai XoyioriKov dperrjv elvau, Kal rcov dXXa>v dpercov ovrojs eKdarrjs Xaix^avojJievrjs , eur) dv aaxfypoavvrjs lSlov ro Kad* avro 7Te<f)VKevaL eTTidvfxrjriKov dperrjv €tvat .

15 VII. "ETTetT* €K rwv TTrwaeojv, dvaoKevdt,ovra jjiev el 7) TTrcJois rrjs nrcjoeajg purj eariv Ihiov ovhe yap rj rrrtbcris rrjs Trrwaeojs ear ai t8tov. olov

iacreoj?, Ihiov add. Wallies. 2 Omitting dv-qraJv with B^DP.

" A B C D are members of one division which have corre- sponding predicates abed. If any one of 6, c or c? is a pro- perty of any one of B, C or D other than that to which it corresponds, then a cannot be a property of A.

  • It has been alleged that a is not a property of A ; but,

if 6, c and d are properties respectively of B, C and D, then a must be a property of A.



TOPICA, V. vi-vii

property of the affirmative subject ; for, if it is not a property of the affirmative subject, it would be a property of the negative subject. But this common- place is misleading ; for an affirmative term is not a property of a negative subject, nor a negative term of a positive subject ; for an affirmative term does not belong to a negative subject at all, while a negative term does belong to an affirmative subject, but not as a property.

Next, you can take the opposite members of corre- Ruhs sponding divisions and see, for destructive criticism, fj^^/^'^ whether no member of one division is a property of ordinate any opposite member of the other division ; for then ^MvShn. neither will the term stated be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property.*^ For example, since * sensible living creature ' is a property of none of the other living creatures, ' intelligible living creature ' could not be a property of God. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether any one of the other opposite members is a property of each of the opposite members ; for then the remaining one too will be a property of that of which it has been stated not to be a property.^ For example, since it is a property of ' prudence ' to be * in itself naturally the virtue of the reasoning faculty,' then, if each of the other virtues is treated similarly, it would be the property of ' temperance ' to be ' in itself naturally the virtue of the appetitive faculty. '

VII. Next, you can take the inflexions and see, Rules for destructive criticism, whether one inflexion fails //"^„^f^ to be a property of another inflexion ; for then flexions. neither will one changed inflexion be a property of the other changed inflexion. For example, since



136 b

evret ovk €Otl rod hiKaiws Ihiov to Kokcbs, ovh^ av rod hiKaiov etr] lSlov ro KaXov. KaraoKevdt,ovra he el Tj TTrojGLS rrj£ rrrcjaews iuriv lSlov /cat yap

20 T] rrrcoGis rrjg Trrwaecos ear at tSiov. olov eTrel rod dvOpcoTTOv iarlv lSlov ro Tre^ov hirrovVy /cat rep dvdpwTTCp €L7] dv iSiov ro irel^a) StVoSt Xeyeodai. ov pLovov 8' €77* avrov rod elpr^pLevov Kara rds TTTOJcrets" iarl GKerrreov, dXXd /cat €7rt rajv dvri- K€ipb€vcov, KaOdirep /cat cttI rwv Tvporepov roTTCov

25 elpr^rai, dvaGKevdl,ovra puev el rj rod avrt/cetjLteVou TTrwoLS p^r} eariv tStov rrj? rod dvriKeipievov irrod- CTecos" ouSe yap r] rod dvriKeipievov tttojgls ear at lSlov rrjs Tod dvriKeip,evov Trrcocreios. olov iirel OVK eon rod 8t/catajsr tStov ro dyadcos, ovS^ dv rod aSt/ccos" e'lrj thiov ro /ca/ccus". KarauKevdt,ovra 8e et Tj rod dvriKeipAvov rrrchais eariv tStov rrj?

30 rod dvriKeip,evov rrrcoaeajs' /cat yap rj rod dvri-

Keipievov TTrwcTLs eorai tStov rr\s rod dvriKeipievov

7rra)Gea>s. olov errel rod dyaOod iarlv lSlov ro

^eXriorov, /cat rod KaKod dv etr] lSlov rd ;YetptCTTor.

"ETretr* e/c raJv opLOLOJS ixdvrojv, dvaoKevdl^ovra

35 jLtev et rd opLOLwg e;\;ov rod opboiojs e^ovros P'Tj ear IV tStov ovhe yap rd 6p,oia>s ^.^ov rod 6p,oico<^ exovro? carat t8tov. olov errei opuocws exet o ot/coSojLto? rrpog rd TToielv ot/ctar /cat o larpds Trpd?

  • The datives here used cannot be satisfactorily rendered

in Enghsh. They can be expressed in Latin ; Pacius renders : ' homini proprium est did pedestri bipedi.^

^ Cf. 114 b 6 ff. 540


'honourably' is not a property of 'justly,' neither

could 'honourable' be a property of 'just.' For

constructive argument, you must see whether one

inflexion is a property of the other inflexion ; for then

one changed inflexion will be a property of the other

changed inflexion. For example, since ' pedestrian

biped ' is a property of ' man,' the description ' of

pedestrian biped ' would be the property ' of man.' "

You must examine the inflexions not only in the

actual term assigned but also in its opposites, as has

been said in the earlier commonplaces also,^ and,

for destructive criticism, see whether the inflexion of

one opposite fails to be a property of the inflexion

of the other opposite ; for then neither will the

changed inflexion of one opposite be a property of

the changed inflexion of the other opposite. For

example, since 'well' is not a property of 'justly,'

neither could 'badly' be a property of 'unjustly.'

For constructive argument, you must see whether

the inflexion of one opposite is a property of the

inflexion of the other opposite ; for then the changed

inflexion of one opposite will be also a property of

the changed inflexion of the other opposite. For

example, since ' best ' is a property of ' the good,'

  • worst ' also would be a property of ' the bad.'

Next, you must argue from things which stand in (b) From. .11,. J r J . i- '!.• • relations like

a similar relation, and, tor destructive criticism, see the relation

whether an attribute which is similarly related fails «*««'^«<^ (<>

to be a property of the similarly related subject ; perty.

for then neither will that which is related like the

former be a property of that which is related like the

latter. For example, since the builder stands in a

similar relation for the production of a house to that

in which the doctor stands for the production of



136 b

TO 7roL€LV vyieiaVy ovk eari he larpov lSlov to ttol-

137 a etv vyieiav, ovk av e'lrj olkoSojjuov lSlov to TJoielv

OLKLav. KaraaKevat^ovra Se el to ojjloIojs exov rod ofjLoloJS e^ovTOS euTiv I'Stov koI yap to OjLtotcos" €XOV rod ojjiOLCog exovrog earau lSlov. otov eirel oiJLOLOjg e^ei larpos re irpos to 7roir]TiK6s vyieiag 5 elvaL Kol yvjjLvaGTTjs Trpos ro TTOLrjriKos eve^ias, eWt 8' thiov yvfxvaGTov to ttoltjtlkov etvai eve^las, e'lr] av thiov laTpov to TroirjTLKOv etvai vyieias.

"YiireiT eK tcov woavTOJS exovTOiVy avaoKevdl^ovTa fxev el TO (LaavTCog exov tov woavTOiS exovTos jjurj

10 eoTtv lSlov ovSe yap to choavTCjDS ^xov tov woav- TCx)< s exovTos eoTai thiov. el 8' eWt tov (hoavTOJs exovTog to ojoavTOJS exov Ihiov, tovtov ovk eWat lSlov ov KeiTai elvai Ihiov. otov eirei (hoavTCOs exei cf)p6vr)GLg npos to KaXov /cat to alaxpov tco eTTLOTTipLri eKaTepov avTwv etvai , ovk eoTi 8' t8tov

15 (fypovqcreo)? to iTTLGTrjfjLrjv etvai KaXov, ovk av etr] iSiov (f)povi^GeoJS TO eTTiOTripbriv etvai aloxpov. el 8' eoTiV Ihiov <j)povr]ae(x)s to eTTiOT-qfjiriv etvai Ka- Xov, OVK av e'i-q Ihiov avTrjs to eTTiUTrjpLrjv etvai aloxpov' dhvvaTov yap etvai to avTO nXeiovajv iSiov. KaTaoKevdt,ovTi he ovhev ovtos 6 tottos euTl XP1~

20 cfipLos' TO yap (hoavTCos ^xov ev irpos irXeiO) ovy- KpiveTai .

« Let a and 6 be identically related to A ; if A is not a property of a, neither will it be a property of b.

  • » If A is a property of a, it cannot be a property of 6,

because the same thing cannot be a property of more than one subject. 542


health, but it is not a property of a doctor to produce health, it would not be a property of a builder to produce a house. For constructive argument, you must see whether a similarly related attribute is a property of the similarly related subject ; for then an attribute which is related like the former will be a property of a subject which is related like the latter. For example, since a doctor stands in a similar rela- tion as productive of health to that in which a trainer stands as productive of good condition, and it is a property of the trainer to be productive of good condition, it would be a property of the doctor to be productive of health.

Next, you must argue from things which stand in (c) From identical relations and see, for destructive criticism, ^atj^na^ whether what is identically related to two things fails between the to be a property of one of these things, for then it will ar^two not be the property of the other either « ; but if what «w6iec< s. is identically related to two things is a property of one of them, it will not be a property of that of which it is stated to be a property. ** For example, since prudence is identically related to the honourable and the disgraceful, since it is a knowledge of each of them, and it is not a property of prudence to be a knowledge of the honourable, it would not be a pro- perty of prudence to be a knowledge of the disgrace- ful. But if a knowledge of the honourable is a property of prudence, a knowledge of the disgraceful could not be a property of prudence ; for it is im- possible for the same thing to be a property of more than one thing. For constructive argument this commonplace is of no use ; for what is identically related is one thing brought into comparison with more than one thing.



187 a

"Ettcit' dva(JK€vdl^ovra fjuev et to Kara ro etvau

Xeyofjuevov /xt] ecrrt rod Kara to elvai Xeyofjuevov 'ISiov ovSe yap to (^deipeaQai tov Acara to (fidel- peadai, ovSe to yiveoOai tov ko^tcl to yiveodai Xeyofidvov eWat tStov. otov eTrel ovk €Gtiv dv-

25 dp(x)7TOV lSloV TO elvai t,(^OV, OuS' dv TOV dvOpOJTTOV

yiveodai e'lr] tStov to yiveodai t,ci)ov' ouS' dv tov dvdpcoTTov (f)9eip€(j6aL e'lrj tStov to <f)96ipeadai ^a)ov. TOV avTOV §e Tpoirov Xi^TTTeov eoTi Kal ck tov yiveaOai TTpos to elvai Kal (f)Qeip€(jdai Kal €K tov <j)deip€<jdai TTpos TO etvai Kal rrpos to ylvecrOai,

30 KaOdirep etprjTac vvv eV tov elvai Trpos to ytVccr^at Kal (jideipeoOai. /caracrxrcua^ovra Se el tov Kara TO elvai TeTayfievov €gtI to KaT avTO TeTaypievov iSiov Kal yap tov Kara to yiveodai Xeyojievov eoTai TO Kara to yiveodai Xeyofievov iSiov Kal TOV Kara to (f)6eipeGdai to Kara tovto drroSiho-

35 fjievov. olov errel tov dvdpcorrov €<jtIv iSiov to elvai ^poTov, Kal tov yiveaOai dvdpcjTTOv eirj dv iSiov TO yiveodai ^poTov Kal tov (f)9eipeo6ai dvdpcx)Trov TO (j)6eipeo9ai ^poTov. tov avTov Se 137 b TpOTTOv XrjTTTeov IotI Kal eK TOV yiveodai Kal <f)deipeodai Trpos re to elvai Kal rrpos rd i^ avrojv, Kaddrrep Kal dvaoKevdt,ovTi e'iprjTai.

"ETretr* eTTi^XeiTeiv inl ttjv i8eav rod Keifxevov, 544


Next, for destructive criticism, you must see (d) From whether the predicate which is said ' to be ' is not a if comiZ^^" property of the subject which is said * to be ' ; for *^ 5^"^ then neither will the predicate which is said ' to be stmcti/m. destroyed ' be a property of the subject which is said ' to be destroyed,' nor will the predicate which is said ' to be becoming ' be a property of the subject which is said ' to be becoming.' For example, since it is not the property of man to be an animal, neither could ' becoming an animal ' be a property of ' be- coming a man ' ; nor could the ' destruction of an animal ' be a property of the ' destruction of a man.' In the same way you must make the assumption from ' becoming ' to * being ' and ' being destroyed,' and from ' being destroyed ' to ' being ' and ' becoming,' by the process of argument just described from ' being ' to ' becoming ' and ' being destroyed.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the predicate which is laid down as ' being ' is a property of the subject laid down as * being ' ; for then also the predicate which is described as ' becoming ' will be a property of the subject which is described as ' becoming,' and the pre- dicate assigned in virtue of destruction will be a pro- perty of the subject which is said to ' be destroyed.' For example, since it is a property of man to be mortal, ' becoming mortal ' would be a property of

  • becoming a man,' and the * destruction of a mortal '

would be a property of the ' destruction of a man.' In the same way you must make the assumption also from ' becoming ' and ' being destroyed ' to ' being ' and to the other consequences which are derived from them, as was described for destructive criticism.

Next you must look at the idea of that which is (e) From

reference of T 545


137 b

dvaGKevd^ovra fjuev el rfj IBea fXTj virapx^^, ^ et 5 fXT] Kara rovro KaB* o Xiyerai rovro ov to t8tov dneSodr]' ov yap earai Ihiov to Keijxevov elvai tStov. otov €7ret avroavSpcoTro) ovx VTrapxei to r^p€fX€LVy fj dvdpcjOTTOs ioTLV, aAA' fj tSea, ovk dv €L7] dv9pa)7TOV lSlov to rjpepLeLV. KaraGKevd^ovra 8e el rfj tSea vrrdpx^i, /cat Kara rovro vTrdp^ei,

10 fj Xeyerai Kar avrov eKelvo ov KeZrai fXTj etvai iSlov eorai yap Ihiov ro Kelfievov p/q elvat lSlov. otov errel virdpx^i ra> avrot,(pcp rd e/c i/jvx'rjs Kal GO) pharos avyKeZaO ai, Kal fj ^cpov avrcp vTrdpxet rovro y eiT] dv t^cpov t'Stov rd €K ^vxV^ '^^^ acopuaros ovyKeZad ai.

VIII. "ETretTa eK rod pbdWov Kal rjrrov, rrpajrov

15 ju-ev dva(jKevdl,ovra el rd pudWov rod pidXXov pbrj eoriv I'Stov ouSe ydp rd rjrrov rod -qrrov eorai Ihiov, oi)8e rd yJKLara rod rJKLGra, ovde rd pLoXiora rod pLaXicrra, ovhe rd drrXojs rod aTrXw^. otov inel OVK eon ro pbdXXov Kexpd)oB ai rod pudXXov aco- pbaro? t'Stov, ovSe rd rjrrov Kexpojcrdau rod rjrrov

20 GwpLaros eir] dv lSlov, ovde ro KexpcooOai acjpiaros oAcos". KaraoKevat^ovra 8e el rd pidXXov rod pidXXdv eoriv tStov /cat ydp rd rjrrov rod rjrrov 5A>Q


TOPICA, V. vii-viii

stated, and, for destructive criticism, see whether the the property

property fails to belong to the idea, or whether f^^^^a^

it fails to belong in virtue of that which causes that of the

of which the property w as assigned to be so described; * "'^ '

for then what was stated to be a property will not be

a property. For example, since ' being at rest ' does

not belong to ' man-himself ' as ' man ' but as ' idea,'

'to be at rest' could not be a property of 'man.'

For constructive argument, you must see whether

the property belongs to the idea and belongs to it in

virtue of this, namely, in as much as that is predicated

of it of which it is stated not to be a property ; for

then what was stated to be a property will not be a

property. For example, since it belongs to ' animal-

itself ' to be composed of soul and body and it belongs

to it as animal, to be composed of soul and body would

be a property of ' animal.'

VIII. Next, you can argue from the greater and Rides less degrees and, first of all, for destructive criticism, from^the^ see whether the greater degree of the predicate fails ffreater and to be a property of the greater degree of subject ; for **

then neither will the less degree of the predicate be a property of the less degree of the subject, nor the least degree of the least degree, nor the greatest degree of the greatest degree, nor the predicate simply of the subject simply. For example, since to be more coloured is not a property of what is more a body, neither would to be less coloured be a pro- perty of what is less a body, nor would colour be a property of body at all. For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether a greater degree of the predicate is a property of a greater de- gree of the subject ; for then a less degree of the predicate will be a property of a less degree of



187 b

earat iStov, Kal ro '^KLora rod yJKLara, /cat to

jLtaAtcrra rod jJudXiara, Kal to olttXojs tov aTrAaJS". olov iirel rod [juaXXov Jcovtos" to /xclAAov alodd-

25 veaOat, ianv lSlov, kol rod rjrrov ^wvrog to rjrrov alGddveaOai eirj av I'Stov, Kal rod jjudXiora Se to IxdXiora, Kal rod rjKiara to -^KLora, Kal rod CLTrXajs ro aTrAcDs".

Kat e/c rod aTrAcos' 3e TTpog ravrd oKenreov iarlv dva(TK€vdt,ovra /xev el ro aTrAco? tou ciTrAa)? m

30 jLtTy eanv Ihiov ou8e yap to jU-aAAov tou ixaXXov, ovhe ro rjrrov rod rjrrov, ovSe ro ixdXiara rod lidXiora, ovhk ro rJKKjra rod TJKiara ear ai tStov. otov evret ovk eon rod dvOpcoTTOv ro OTrovSatov tSiov, ovS* av rod [xdXXov dvdpwTTOv ro [xaXXov GTTOvSaLov lSlov etrj. KaraGKevdt^ovra 8e €t ro

35 aTrActj? Tou drrXihs iarlv lSlov Kal yap ro fJbdXXov rod jLcaAAov Acat ro rjrrov rod rjrrov Kal ro rJKiara rod rjKiara Kal ro pudXiara rod fidXiara earai thiov. olov eirel rod TTvpos eariv thiov ro dvco 138 a (fyepeadat Kara (jivauv, Kal rod fjidXXov TTVpos etrj dv lSlov ro /xaAAov dvoj ^epeaB ai Kara (jivaiv. rov avrdv he rpouov OKerrreov earl Kal Ik rcJov dXXojv TTpos diravra radra.

IS^evrepov 8' dvaaKevdt^ovra fjuev el ro pLaAXov 5 Tou [xdXXov /xtJ €o-Ttv tStov ouSe yap ro rjrrov rod

" i.e. the more, the less, etc. 548


the subject, and the least degree of the least degree and the greatest degree of the greatest degree, and the predicate simply of the subject simply. For example, since a higher degree of sensation is a pro- perty of a higher degree of living thing, a lower de- gree of sensation would be a property of a lower degree of living thing, and the highest degree of the highest degree, and the lowest degree of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of living thing simply.

Next, you can argue from the simple predication to these same kinds of predication," and, for destruc- tive criticism, see whether the predicate simply is not a property of the subject simply ; for then neither will the greater degree of the predicate be a property of the greater degree of the subject, nor the less degree of the less degree, nor the greatest degree of the greatest degree, nor the least degree of the least degree. For example, since * virtuous ' is not a property of ' man,' ' more virtuous ' could not be a property of * more-man.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the predicate simply is a property of the subject simply ; for then also the greater degree of the predicate will be a property of the greater degree of the subject, and the less degree of the less degree, and the least degree of the least degree, and the greatest degree of the greatest degree. For example, since it is a property of ' fire ' ' to be carried naturally upwards,' it would be a property of ' a greater degree of fire ' ' to be carried naturally upwards to a greater degree.' In the same manner also one must examine these things from the point of view of the other degrees also.

Secondly, for destructive argument, you must see whether the more fails to be a property of the more ;



138 a

rjrrov earat tStov. olov irrel fiaXXov iariv tStov

^a)ov TO aluddveodaL rj avOpcoTTov to iTrioTaadai,

ovK eoTi he l,coov lSlov to alaOdveGdai, ovk dv

€L7] dvdpCOTTOV lSlOV TO iTTLGTaudai. KaTaGK€vd-

t,ovTa 8' el TO rjTTOV tov tjttov eoTiv thiov kol

10 yap TO [xaXXov tov jjidXXov eoTai ihiov. olov errei TjTTOv euTiv ihiov dvdpcoTTov TO rjfjbepov (fivoei tj l,a)ov TO t,rjv, eoTi 8' dvdpaynov Ihiov to -^fjuepov (f)VGei, €17] dv t,(x)ov ihiov to t^riv.

TpiTov 8* dvaGKevdt,ovTa jjuev el ov fiaXXov eoTiv thiov, fJbT) ioTLV ihiov ovhe yap ov tjttov ccttiv 'lSlov,

15 ecrrat tovtov lSlov. el 8* eKeivov eoTiv lSlov, ovk eoTat TOVTOV lSlov. olov eirel to Ke^pdjodai fxaX- Xov TTJ? eTTLcfyavelas rj tov crcojaaros" Igtlv t8tov, OVK eGTL 8e TTJ? eiTi^aveias ihiov, ovk dv eit] tov GcofJbaTos lSlov to Kexpd)GdaL. el 8' eVrt ttJs" e7TL(j)aveia^ Ihiov, ovk dv ely] tov GwfjiaTog lSlov.

20 KaTaGKevdt,ovTi he 6 tottos ovtos ovk eoTi ^^pr^crt-

/xos" dhvvaTOV yap Igti TavTo irXeiovcov Ihiov elvai.

Teraprov 8' dvaGKevdt,ovTa fiev el to fJidXXov

avTov ihiov yLT] eoTLV thiov ovhe yap to tjttov

avTOV Ihiov ecrrat thiov. olov eTrel pudXXov cgtl

25 TOV t,CpOV thiOV TO alGdrjTOV T} TO fJLepLGTOV, OVK

eGTL he TOV t,(x)ov TO alGdrjTov thioVy ovk dv eir) TOV l,ojov TO [xepLGTOv ihiov. KaTaoKevd^ovTa he 550


for then neither will the less be a property of the less. For example, since ' perceiving ' is more a property of ' animal ' than ' knowing ' is a property of ' man,' and ' perceiving ' is not a property of ' animal,' ' knowing ' would not be a property of ' man.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether the less is a property of the less, for then the more will also be a property of the more. For example, since ' to be naturally civilized ' is less a property of ' man ' than ' living ' is a property of ' ani- mal,' and it is a property of * man ' ' to be naturally civilized,' ' living ' would be a property of ' animal.'

Thirdly, for destructive criticism, you must see whether a predicate fails to be a property of that of which it is to a greater degree a property ; for then neither will it be a property of that of which it is to a less degree a property ; and if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. For example, since ' to be coloured ' is to a greater degree a property of ' surface ' than of ' body,' and it is not a property of ' surface,' ' to be coloured ' could not be a property of ' body ' ; and if it is a property of ' surface,' it could not be a property of ' body.' This commonplace is of no use for constructive argument ; for the same thing cannot possibly be a property of more than one thing.

Fourthly, for destructive criticism, you must see whether what is to a greater degree a property of the subject fails to be its property ; for then neither will what is to a less degree a property be its property. For example, since ' sensible ' is to a greater degree a property of * animal ' than ' divisible,' and * sensible ' is not a property of ' animal,' * divisible ' could not be a property of * animal.' For constructive argu



138 a

el TO rjrrov avrov ov lSlov €otlv lSlov /cat yap to

fjbdXXov avrov ov 'ISiov earat lSlov. olov erret rjrrov eoriv Ihiov l,cpov ro aladdvecrdai tj ro ^rjv, eon 8e rod ^cpov ro alaOdveadai Ihiov, eir] av rod l,a)ov ro l,rjv Ihiov.

30 "ETTetr' £K rcbv ojjloicos VTrapxovrojv TTpcjrov /xev dvauK€vdl,ovra el ro o/xotoJS" ov Ihiov purj eoriv Ihiov rovrov ov 6pLOL(x)? earlv I'Stov ovSe yap ro ojJioiws ov thiov eorai Ihiov rovrov ov opboiajs ecrrlv lSlov. olov evel opiOLwg eoriv 'lSlov eTnOvfjirjriKov ro emdvfxeZv /cat XoyiariKov ro Xoyit^eoB ai, ovk

35 eon 8' tStov emdvfjLrjrLKOv ro imdvjJieZv, ovk av

etrj tStov Aoytcrrt/cou to Xoyit^eodai. KaraoKevd-

lovra Se et ro opioiojs ov tStov eon rovrov tStov

ov ojJLolcjjg eoriv t8tov ear ai yap /cat to ojjlolojs ov

l38btS(ov rovrov lSlov ov ofjiolcog eoriv tStov. otov

enel ofiolco? earlv tStov AoytcTt/cou ro npcorov

(fypoviiJ^ov /cat e7TiBviir]rLKov ro 7rpa)rov ow^poVy

eon he rod XoyiariKov tStov to rrpwrov (fipovLpLov,

5 e'lr] av rod emdviJbrjriKod tStov ro Trpcorov awcfypov

Aevrepov 8' dvaoKevdt,ovra jjuev el ro opboicxis ov

tStov pLT] ear IV t8tov auTOU* oi58e yap ro ojjlolcos



ment you must see whether what is to a less degree a property of the subject is a property ; for then what is to a greater degree a property will be a property. For example, since ' sensation ' is to a less degree a property of ' animal ' than ' life,' and ' sen- sation ' is a property of ' animal,' ' life ' would be a property of ' animal.'

Next, you can argue from attributes which belong (b) Frorn a in an equal degree and first, for destructive criticism, '^f^^!^^ see whether what is to an equal decree a property fails bute-reiation to be a property of that which is an equal degree a sembles the property ; for then neither will what is a property f}^p^y. in an equal deg-ree be a property of that of which reiatkm

• ^ • ■ 11 J. T^ 1 (1) between

it IS in an equal degree a property, ror example, ^ ^^j^g^-g^ since ' appetite ' is a property of ' the appetitive aUr^Wuteand faculty ' in a degree equal to that in which ' reason ' siU)ject. is a property of the ' reasoning faculty,' and ' ap- petitive ' is not a property of the * appetitive faculty,' ' reason ' could not be a property of the ' reasoning faculty.' For constructive argument, you must see whether what is in an equal degree a property is a property of that of which it is in an equal degree a property ; for then also what is to an equal de- gree a property will be a property of that of which it is in an equal degree a property. For example, since ' primary wisdom ' is a property of the ' reasoning faculty ' in a degree equal to that in which ' pri- mary temperance ' is a property of the ' appetitive faculty,' and * primary wisdom ' is a property of the

  • reasoning faculty,' * primary temperance ' would be

a property of the * appetitive faculty.'

Secondly, for destructive criticism, you must see (2) Between whether what is in an equal degree a property of a l^^£^^^ subject fails to be a property of it ; for then neither will property and

"' r r J ^ d different

553 "^'^^-


6v lSlov 'iorai Ihiov avrov. olov lirel ofjLOLO}? iorlv


10 o dvdpcoTTOv iSiov TO opdv, OVK av €Lrj dvdpWTTOV tStov TO OLKoveLV. KaTa(JK€vdt,ovTa Se el to ojjiOLOJS avTov ov tSiov eoTLV 'ihiov koL yap to ojjloIco? avTOV ov tStov euTai tStov. olov eirel ofioiajs €gtlv Ihiov ipvxrjs TO fiepos avTrjs iTndvixiqTiKov elvai Kal XoyLGTLKov npcoTov, ecTTL 8e ^VXV^ lSlov to fjbepos avTTjs etvat iTTidvpLiqTLKOv irpcoTov, eirf dv

15 tStov xpvxQS TO fjiepos avTTJs elvai XoycaTiKov


TpLTOV 8* dvaoKevdt^ovTa jjuev el ov ofJLolcog eaTLV lBlov, fXT] euTLV 'ihiov ovhe yap ov ojjloIcos eoTLV tStov, eoTai tStov. el 8' eKelvov eorTuv lSlov, ovk ecTTat OaTepov t8tov. olov eTrel ofJiOLWS eoTiv lSlov TO KaUiv (fikoyos Kal dvdpaKos, ovk eoTi 8' Ihiov 20 (fyXoyos TO Kaieiv, ovk dv elr) Ihiov dvdpaKos to Kaieiv. el 8' eoTt (j)Xoy6s 'Ihiov, ovk dv eir] dv- BpaKos t8tov. KaTaoKevdt^ovTi 8e ovhev ovtos 6 TOTTos eoTi xPV^f'l^os.

Ata<^epet 8' o eK tojv o/xotcos" exdvTOJV tov ck Tcbv ofJLolcos vrrapxdvTWV y otl to puev KaT dva- 554>


what is in an equal degree a property be a property of it. For example, since * sight ' and ' hearing ' are in an equal degree properties of * man,' and ' sight ' is not a property of ' man,' neither could ' hearing ' be a property of ' man.' For constructive argument you must see whether what is in an equal degree a property of the subject is a property ; for then what is in an equal degree a property will be a property. For example, since it is a property of ' soul,' as some- thing primary, for part of it to be ' appetitive ' in a degree equal to that in which part of it is part ' reasoning,' and it is a property of ' soul,' as some- thing primary, for part of it to be ' appetitive,' it would be a property of ' soul,' as something primary, for part of it to be ' reasoning.'

Thirdly, for destructive criticism, you must see (3) Between whether it is not a property of that of which it is in an property and equal degree a property ; for then neither will it be adifferent a property of that of which it is in an equal degree a property ; and, if it is a property of the former, it will not be a property of the latter. For example, since ' to cause burning ' is in an equal degree a pro- perty of ' flame ' and of ' live-coal,' and ' to cause burning ' is not a property of ' flame,' ' to cause burning ' could not be a property of ' live-coal ' ; and if it is a property of ' flame,' it could not be a pro- perty of ' live-coal.' For constructive argument, how- ever, this commonplace is of no use.

The commonplace based on things which stand in a similar relation " differs from that based on things which belong in an equal degree,^ because the former case is derived by analogy and not from a considera-

« See 136 b 33 if. ^ See 138 a 30 fF.



138 b

25 Xoyuav Xajji^dverai , ovk evrt rod V7Tdp-)(eiv rt deoj-

povfxevov, TO S' eK rod VTrdpx^iv n (jvyKpiverai.

IX. "ETTCtr' dvaaKevd^ovra /xev et Swdpuei to lSlov dTTohiSovg /cat Trpo? jjut) ov aTToSeSco/ce to tStov rfj SvvdpLei, pur] ivSexopJvr]^ rrjg Swdp^ecog

30 VTrdpx^iv TO) p/q ovtl' ov yap earau lSlov to KeC- puevov etvai tStov. ofov evret o etTras" depos lSlov TO dvaTTvevoTov Tfj hvvdpL€L pL€v aTTeScoKe TO lSlov {to yap ToiovTOV olov dvaTTveiaOai dvairvevoTov eoTiv), aTToSeScoKC Se /cat rrpos to purj 6V to tSfoi^* Kal yap pLrj ovtos ^<pov, olov dvaTTvelv 7T€<f)VK€ to depa, ivSex^Tai depa etvat* ov piivToi pir] ovtos

35 i,cpov SuvaTov ioTiv dvaiTvelv' loot ovV depos CCTTat t8tov TO TOIOVTOV OLOV dva7TV€t(jdaL, t6t€ 6t€ l^cpov OVK eorai tolovtov olov dvairvelv. ovk dv

OVV €17] dipOS tStOV TO dvaTTV^VOTOV .

139 a KaTaCT/ceua^ovTa Se et ttj Swdpieu aTroStSou? to

tStov rj TTpos ov dTToSlSajGL TO lSlov rj TTpog pbT) ov,

ivSexopidvrjg TTJg SvvdpL€C09 Tcb pur) ovtl VTrdpxecv

euTai yap tStov to Keipievov piTj elvau tStov. otov

5 €7761 o aTToStSous" tStov Tov ovTos TO hvvaTov TTaBelv

Tj TTOLTJaai, SvvdpL€L aTToStSoU? TO tStOV, TTpos OV

drreScDKe to lSlov oVe yap ov ecrri, Kal SvvaTov 556

TOPICA, V. viii-ix

tion about some attribute belonging, while the latter involves a comparison based on the fact that some attribute belongs.

IX. Next, for destructive criticism, you must see Twofurther whether, in assigning the property potentially, your ^ property opponent has also through the potentiality assigned is subverted the property in relation to something which does not assigned exist, since the potentiality cannot possibly belong fo^g^(JJ^'fl^^^ to something which does not exist ; for then what thing which is stated to be a property will not be a property. eS.^and For example, the man who has said that ' respirable ' confirmed 1. r i ' ' \^ ^u \, 1 • J ^^^ versa.

IS a property oi air has, on the one hand, assigned

the property in virtue of a potentiality (for that is ' respirable ' which is of such a kind as to be respired), while, on the other hand, he has also assigned the pro- perty in relation to what does not exist. For air can exist even if no animal exists of such a kind as to respire it ; but it is impossible to respire it, if no animal exists. And so it will not be a property of air to be such as to be respired at a time when no animal will exist of such a kind as to respire it. Therefore * respirable ' could not be a property of air.

For constructive argument, you must see whether in assigning the property potentially he assigns the property in relation either to something which exists or to something which does not exist, when the potentiality can belong to what does exist ; for then what is stated not to be a property will be a property. For example, he who assigns ' able to affect, or be affected by, something ' as a property of * being,' by assigning the property potentially, has assigned it in relation to what exists (for, when ' being ' exists, it will also be ' able to be affected by, or to affect



139 a

iradetv n t] TTOir\oai eurai' o)ot€ e'lr] av tStov rod

ovTos TO hvvarov TraOelv t) TTOtrjcrat.

"Ettcit' ava(JK€vdl,ovra fxev el VTrep^oXfj reOecKe

10 TO lSlov ov yap co-rat lSlov to Kelfievov elvac lSlov. CTU/xjSatVet yap tols ovtojs aTTO^ihovoi to tStov ov KaS^ ov Tov \6yov Tovvofjia dXr)6€V€(jdaL- (jidapevTO? yap TOV TTpdyfjiaTOS ovSev rJTTOV earat o Xoyos' Tcov yap ovTOJV tlvl [xaXiGTa VTrapx^L. olov ei Tt? diTohoiy) tov TTvpog lSlov aco/xa to KovcfyoTaTov

15 (f)9ap€VTOS yap tov TTvpos eoTai tl tcjv owixaTWv o KovcfyoTaTOV euTai, ojot ovk av €L7] tov rrvpos tStov acofJLa to Kov^OTaTOV. KaTaGK€vdl,ovTa hk et iJi,r] VTTeppoXfj redeiKe to lSlov earat yap Kara TOVTO KaXo)? Keifxevov to lSlov. olov inel 6 6elg

dvOpWTTOV lSlOV I^CpOV '^fJL€pOV (f)VG€L OVX V7T€p^oXfj

20 aTToSeScDKe to lSlov, etr] av Krara tovto KaXcbs Kelpbevov TO lSlov.



something else '), and so to be ' able to be affected by, or to affect, something else ' would be a property of * being.'

Next, for destructive criticism, you must see ib) A pro- whether he has stated the property in a superlative subverted degree ; for then what is stated to be a property will ^1^^^^^!." not be a property. For the result of stating the lative. property in this manner is that the name is not true of that of which the description is true ; for, if the thing itself has perished, the description will none the less exist, for it belongs in the greatest degree to something which exists. For example, if one were to assign as a property of ' fire ' that it is ' the lightest of bodies ' ; for, though the fire has perished, there will still be some body which will be the lightest ; and so ' the lightest body ' could not be a property of ' fire.' For constructive argument, on the other hand, you must see whether he failed to state the property in a superlative degree ; for then the property will be correctly stated in this respect. For example, since he who has stated that it is a property of ' man ' that he is * by nature a civilized animal,' has not assigned the property in a superlative degree, the property would be correctly stated in this respect.


139 a 24 I. TtJs" §€ 7T€pl Tovs opov? TTpayfJiaTelag f^^prj 25 7T€vr€ iariv. rj yap on oAco? ovk dXrjdes elTrelv, Kad^ ov Tovvopia, koI rov \6yov (Set yap tov rod avBpojTTOv opLOfJiov Kara iravros avOpojirov aXr]- deveaOai), t) on ovrog yevovs ovk eOrjKev el? ro yevos rj ovk els to olKelov yevos eOrjKev [Set yap TOV opL^ofJievov elg to yevos Bevra ras hia^opas

30 TTpOGOLTTTetV' pbdXiCTTa ydp TCtJV eV Tip OpLGpLCp TO

yevos SoKel ttjv tov opit^opievov ovoiav aiqiiaiveiv) ,

Tj OTL OVK ihios 6 \6yos (Set ydp tov opiafiov lSlov

etvai, Kaddirep /cat irporepov etpj]Tai), t) et ndvTa

TO. elpr]iJbeva TreTTOirjKCJS p^r) copiorai, /itTyS' e'iprjKe

TO Tt '^v etvat ra> 6pi^op.evcp. Xolttov Se rrapd rd

35 elpr]p,eva, el ajpiaTai puev, p.r) KaXa)s 8' wpiorai.

Et jLtev ovv [JLT] dXrjdeveraL, KaO^ ov Tovvofia, Kal

6 Xoyos, eK TCtJV Trpos to avpb^e^rjKos tottcov

eTTioKeTTTeov. Kal ydp eKel, iroTepov dXrjOes rj ovk

1Z9 h dXr^deSi Trdaa rj oKeifjis yiveTai' oTav jxev ydp on

" Sc. in order to overthrow a definition. ^ 101 b 19. 560


I. Of the discussion of definitions there are five (D) of parts. You must prove « either (1) that it is quite J}™^" untrue to use the description also about the subject (Books to which the name is given (for the definition ofyii). » ' man ' must be true of every man) ; or (2) that, General

.1 1., v-j_i -^ "^ ^ . -I division of

though the subject has a genus, your opponent has problems not put it into its genus or has not put it into its defliniuon**^^ proper genus (for he who defines must put the subject some of into its genus and then add the differentiae ; for, bS^ ^^^^ more than any of the other component parts of a jJ^^^^J definition, the genus is generally regarded as indicat- ing the essence of the subject of the definition) ; or (3) that the description is not peculiar to the subject (for the definition must be peculiar, as has been already remarked ^) ; or (4) that, although he has satisfied all the above requirements, he has not given a definition, that is, he has not stated the essence of the subject which he is defining. Apart from the above conditions, (5) it still remains to see whether, although he has given a definition, he has failed to give a correct definition.

The question whether the description is not also true about the subject to which the name is given must be examined on the basis of the commonplaces relat- ing to accident. For there also the question always asked is, 'Is it true or not ? ' For, when we are



189 b

VTrdpx^i TO ovyL^efiiqKos SiaXeycofJLeOa, on dX7]9€s

Xeyofxev, orav 8' on ov^ VTTo.px^i', on ovk dXr]- dis. €t Se pbr] ev ro) olKelcp yevet €d7]K€V, rj el jxr) lSlos 6 drroSodels Aoyos", €k rcjv Trpos to yevos

5 Kal TO lSlov prjdevTOJV tottojv lmoK€Trr€ov.

AoiTTov S', el fXTj cjpiorai rj el (jltj KaXcbg (Lpcorai, 7TCOS ixenreov, eiTreLV. TTpchrov puev ovv eTnGKeirreov el jjiT] KaXa)9 cojOtcrrat. paov yap onovv TTOirjoai rj KaXcjs TTOLrjaaL. hrjXov ovv on rj dfjuaprLa Trepl

10 TOVTO TrXeiojv, iireiSr) ipycoSeGrepov, cocr^' r] ein- X^iprjGLS paojv rj Trepl rovro rj rj Trepl eKelvo yi- verai.

"Ecrrt 8e rod pbr) KaXoj? P'^p'^ Svo, ev piev ro daa(j)el rfj eppLrjveia Kexp'^crOau (Set yap rov opi- t,6p,evov COS" ivSex^rai oa^eordrri rfj eppLrjvela

15 KexpyjcrOcLi, eTreiSr] rod yvcopioai xdpi'V aTToStSorat o opiopLOs), Sevrepov 8', el eVt TrXelov etprjKe rov Xoyov rov Seovrog- ttov yap ro TrpooKeip^evov ev rep 6piopL(h TTepiepyov . ttoXlv 8' eKarepov rajv elprj- pLevojv etV TrXeicx) puepr] SielXrjTTraL.

II. Efs" piev ovv roTTos rod aaa^cos", el 6pLOJVvp,6v

20 eori nvi ro elprjpievov, olov on r] yevecng dyojyrj el? ovalav t) ore rj vyUia Gvpipierpia deppLcov i<al i/jvxpcov. opiwvvpLOS yap rj dycoyrj Kal rj avpLpLerpia' dbrjXov ovv OTTorepov ^ovXerai Xeyeiv ra>v SrjXov- 562


TOPICA, VI. i-ii

arguing that the accident belongs, we assert that it is true ; when we are arguing that it does not belong, we assert that it is untrue. If your opponent has failed to put the subject in its proper genus, or if the description assigned is not peculiar to the sub- ject, we must make our inquiry on the basis of the commonplaces relating to genus and property already mentioned.

It remains to state how we ought to proceed to inquire whether the subject has not been defined or whether it has been incorrectly defined. First, then, we must examine whether it has been incorrectly defined ; for it is easier to do anything, no matter what, than to do it correctly. It is obvious, then, that error is more frequent in the latter task (for it is more laborious), and so the attack is made more easily in the latter than in the former case.

Incorrectness in definition falls under two headings: The first is the use of obscure language (for the framer of a definition ought to use the clearest possible language, since the definition is assigned in order to make the subject known). The second is whether he has used a description which is un- necessarily long ; for anything additional is super- fluous in a definition. Each of these two headings is divided into several parts.

II. One commonplace regarding obscurity is that How to you should see whether what is stated is equivocal obscurity with something else, as, for example, in the state- ment that * coming-to-be is a channel towards being ' or that * health is a balancing of hot and cold.' The words ' channel ' and * balancing ' are equivocal ; it is, therefore, obscure which of the significations of a word which has more than one meaning the dis-



139 b

jxevcov VTTO rod TrXeova^cos Xeyofievov. ofjLolcog Se Kal el Tov 6pit,oyievov rrXeovaxcos Xeyofxevov (jltj

25 SteAcov elirev' aSrjXov yap oirorepov rov opov OLTToSeScDKeVy €vhi)(€Tai re ovKO(j)avr€lv (I)s ovk i(f)apiJi6rrovrog rod Xoyov iirl Trdvra cLv rov opiapLOV aTToSeScoKev. /xaAtcrra S* evhi^erai to roiovrov TTOL€iv Xavdavovcrrjs rrj^ ofJuajvyfjiLas. evhi^erai 8c /cat SteAdjLtevov aurov, Trocrap^cDs' Aeyerat to iv to)

30 opiajjia) oLTToSoOeVy GvXXoyioixov TTOLrjaai' el yap Kara fJir^Seva tcov Tpoircov iKavoj? etprjTac, SijXov OTL OVK dv (hpiGiievos eir] Kara TpoTTov.

"AAAo?, el KaTOL pieTa^opdv etprjKev, otov el tt^v €7nGTrjfj/rjv djU-eraTrrcoTOV rj ttjv yrjv TLdrjvrjv ■^ TT^v GW(f)poavvrjv avfJLf/ycjvlav. rrdv yap daa<j)es to

35 Kara pLeTa(f>opdv Xeyofxevov. evSex^Tau Se tov Kara fxeTacjiopdv^ elTrovTa GVKOcjyavTelv (Lg KVptws elprjKOTa' ov yap e^ap/xoaet o Ae;^^^^^' dpos, otov eirl TTJs Gix}<j)poovvrjg- Trdaa yap Gvp.(f)CJVLa ev (pOoyyoL?. €TL el yevos rj avjji(f)covia Trjg acv^po-

140 a avvrjs, ev Svo yeveoiv earai ravTov ov TreptexovGLv

dXXr]Xa' ovTe yap rj GvpLcjxxJVLa ttjv dpeTTjv ovd* T) dperr) ttjv avfjicjiCOVLav TTepLe)(eL.

"Ert el jJiTj KeijjLevoL? ovofxaoi p^pTirat, otov HAa-

Tojv ocfypvoGKLov TOV 6(f)daXjjL6v, 7] TO (f>aXdyyiov

5 GYjifjiSaKeSy Tj TOV fxveXdv ooreoy eves' Trdv yap

derates" to [xtj elcoOos.

"Evta 8' ovTe Kad^ opLCjJvvpiiav ovTe Kara jxeTa-

^ Reading rov Kara ^eraj)opav with P.

" Presumably the reference is to Plato Comicus, since these words do not occur in the extant works of the philo- sopher. 564


putant wishes to convey. Similarly, too, if he has made a statement, when the subject which is being defined bears several senses, without distinguishing them ; for then it is uncertain of which sense he has given the definition, and it is possible to make a quibbling objection on the ground that the descrip- tion does not fit everything of which he has given the definition. Such a proceeding is especially possible if the equivocation is not detected. Again, it is open to his opponent himself to distinguish the various meanings of the subject rendered in the definition and argue accordingly ; for, if the description is not adequate in respect of any of the various senses, obviously he cannot have given a proper description.

Another commonplace is to see whether he has spoken metaphorically, as, for example, if he has de- scribed knowledge as * unshakeable,' or the earth as a * nurse,' or temperance as a ' harmony ' ; for metaphorical expressions are always obscure. Also, it is possible to quibble against one who has spoken metaphorically, representing him as having used the word in its proper sense ; for then the definition given will not fit, as in the case of * temperance,' for ' harmony ' is always used of sounds. Further, if harmony is the genus of temperance, the same thing will be found in two genera neither of which includes the other ; for neither does harmony include virtue, nor virtue harmony.

Further, you must see if he uses terms of which the use is not well established, as Plato " calls the eye

  • brow-shaded ' or the poison-spider ' bite-morti-

fying,' or ' marrow ' as ' bone-begotten ' ; for unusual words are always obscure.

Words are sometimes used neither equivocally, nor



140 a

cf>opav ovre Kvptaj? etpTjrai, oiov 6 vo/jlos fierpov

7) eiKcbv Tcbv cf)va€L hiKaicxiv. eoTL 8e ra roiavra

X^^P^ 'T'^S pier a(j)o pas ' rj puev yap /xerac^opo, Trotet

10 7TO)s yvaypcpLov to cn^/xatvo/xevov Sua rr]v opLOLorrjra-

Trdvres yap ol fJL€ra(j)€povr€S Kara riva opLOLorrjra


ovT€ yap rj opioioTTjs VTrdpx^L, KaO* rjv pL€Tpov -^ eLKOJV 6 vofjios iuTLv, ovT€ Kvpiios €10)0 € XcyeodaL. cocrre el puev Kvpicog pueTpov 7) eiKova tov vopLov

15 <l)r)Glv etvat, j/feuSerat- elKCJV yap €Gtlv ov tj yevecjL? Sid /xt/XTJcrecos', tovto S' ov^ vnapx^L tco vopicp' el 8e pLTj Kvptojs, SrjXov otl daacfyws e'ipr]Ke /cat X^^pov OTTOiovovv T(x)v KaTOL pLeTa(f)opdv Xeyopie- vwv.

' Ert el fjurj SrjXos 6 tov evavTiov Xoyos eK tov XexOevTOS- ol yap /caAcas" dTToSeSopuevoL /cat tov?

20 evavTLOV? irpoaGiqiiaivovoiv . tj el /ca^* avTov Xex^^ls P^ (jiavepos etr] tlvos ecrTiv opLGpuo?, dXXd Kaddirep ra tcov dpxalojv ypacjyeayv, el p.-q tls eTTLypaifjai, ovk eyvcopit^eTO tl ecTTtv eKauTov.

III. Et jLtev ovv pA] oa<f)(hs, e/c rcDv tolovtcov eoTiv eTnuKeiTTeov. el 8* Ittl rrXelov e'lprjKe tov

25 opov, TTpcJoTov puev oKorreZv et rtvt Kexp^jrai o TrdaLV VTTapxeif ^ oXcos tols ovgiv r^ tols vrrd TavTO yevos


TOPICA, VI. ii-iii

metaphorically, nor in their proper sense ; for example, the law is said to be the ' measure ' or ' image ' of things naturally just. Such phrases are worse than metaphors ; for a metaphor in a w ay adds to our knowledge of what is indicated on account of the similarity, for those who use metaphors always do so on account of some similarity. But the kind of phrase of which we are speaking does not add to our knowledge ; for no similarity exists in virtue of which the law is a ' measure ' or an ' image,' nor is the law usually described by these words in their proper sense. So, if anyone says that the law is a ' measure ' or an ' image ' in the proper sense of these words, he is lying ; for an image is something whose coming into being is due to imitation, and this does not apply to the law. If, however, he is not using the word in its proper sense, obviously he has spoken obscurely, and with worse effect than any kind of metaphorical language.

Further, you must see whether the definition of the contrary fails to be clear from the description given ; for correctly assigned definitions also indicate their contraries. Or, again, you must see whether, when it is stated by itself, it fails to show clearly what it is that it defines, just as in the works of the early painters, unless they were inscribed, it was impossible to recognize what each figure represented.

III. If, then, the definition is not clearly rendered, How to it should be examined by the methods described redundancy, above. If, however, he has stated the definition in too many words, you must first see if he has made use of any attribute universally applicable, that is, either generally to existing things, or to things which fall under the same genus as the subject of the defini-



140 a

TO) opu^ofjiiva)' €7tI 77-Aetov yap elprjaOai avayKOiov

TOVTO. Set yap to fjuev yivos o^tto tcov dXXojv

X<J^pi'^€LV, TTjv Se hia(f>opav 0,770 rivos rcov ev rto

avT CO yevei. to /xev ovv irdoiv VTrdp^ov dirXcxys

30 duTT* ovhevos x^P^^^^y '^^ Se TOtS" vrro ravro yivos irdaiv VTTapxov ov ;)^6opt^€t drro twv iv ravrcp yevet, (x)GT€ jjbdraiov to tolovtov TrpoGKeipievov.

  • H el ecTTL /xev lSlov to upooKeiiJievoVy dcfyaupe-

BevTOS he TOVTov Kal 6 Aoittos" Aoyo? tStos" cctti

35 Kal SrjXoZ TTjv ovaiav. olov ev t<x> tov dvOpcovov Xoycp TO e7TLGT'q[xrjs BeKTiKov TTpooTedev Trepiepyov Kal yap d<j)aipedevT05 tovtov 6 Xolttos Xoyos Ihios Kal hrjXol TTjV ovaiav. aTrAcDs" 8' elTrelv, 140 b drrav nrepiepyov ov d^aipedevTos to Xoittov S-^Aov TToieZ TO 6pil,6}xevov. tolovtos Se Kal 6 ttj? ifjvxrjs opoSy el dpiOpjOS avTos avTov klvojv eoTiv Kal yap TO avTO avTO klvovv ^vxV' Kaddirep YiXdTwv 5 aypiGTai. r^ tStov /xev €OTt to elprjjjievoVy ov SrjXol Se T7]v ovalav d^aipedevTos tov dpcOpbov. TTOTepojs jjLev ovv exei, ;)(;aAe7rov StaoacfyrjaaL' XPV^^^^ ^' €7rt TravTOJV tcov tolovtcjjv Trpos to (JVfJL(J)epov. olov OTL 6 TOV <j)XeyixaTOS dpos vypov rrpcoTov (XTTO Tpocfyrjs aTreTTTOv. ev yap to TTpcoTov, ov TToXXd, cxiOTe Trepiepyov to direTTTOV irpoGKeipbevov

10 Kal yap tovtov d(f)aipeQevTos 6 Xolttos eoTai tSto? Adyos" ov yap evSexeTau dTTo ttjs Tpo<f)rjs Kal tovto

" Xenocrates, fr. 60 (Heinze) ; de Anim. 404 b 29. 568


tion ; for then there must necessarily be redundancy in the statement. For the genus ought to separate the subject from all other things, and the differentia from something in the same genus. Now what is universally applicable does not separate the subject from anything at all, and what belongs to everything which falls under the same genus does not separate it from the other things which fall under the same genus ; and so such an addition has no point.

Or, again, you must see whether, though the addition is peculiar to the subject, yet its removal still leaves the rest of the description peculiar to the subject and demonstrates the essence. For example, in the description of ' man ' the addition of ' receptive of knowledge ' is superfluous ; for, if it is removed, the rest of the description is still peculiar and demon- strates the essence. In a word, anything is super- fluous the removal of which leaves a clear statement of the subject of the definition. The definition of the soul, if stated as a ' number moving itself,' " is a case in point ; for the soul is ' that which moves itself,' according to Plato's definition.^ Or, perhaps, the statement, though it is peculiar to the subject, does not demonstrate the essence if the word ' number ' is removed. Which of the two statements is true, it is difficult to determine ; but in all such cases our procedure must be guided by expediency. For example, take the definition of phlegm as ' the first unconcocted moisture from food.' Here that which is * first ' is one and not many, so that the addition of * unconcocted ' is superfluous ; foi*, if it is removed, the rest of the description will be peculiar to the subject ; for it is not possible for both phlegm and

^ * Phaedr. 245 e.



140 b

Kal dXXo TL rrpcbrov elvai. tj ovx aTrAcDs" TrpcJorov m

dno Tpocf)rjs to (^Aey/xa, dAAa twv oLTTeTrrajv Trpajrov, m

toCTre TrpouSereov ro aTreTTTOv eKeivcog fjLev yap

prjdevTOS ovK dXr]9rjs 6 Aoyos", e'iTT€p jjutj Trdvrojv

15 TTpcjTOV eariv.

"Ert €t Tt rcjv €V TO) Aoyoj /xt) Tracrtv VTrdp^^t rolg VTTO ravro etSos" o yap roiovrog x^lpov wpiGTai Tcov ;^/36t)^eVa)v o Trdoiv VTrdpx^i' tol9 ovGLV. €K€.ivcx)s /X€V ydp dv 6 Xomog tStos" fj Aoyo?,

20 Kal 6 vdg lSlos eorai' dirXdiS yap irpos to Ihiov OTOVovv TTpoGTedevTos dXr^dovs oXos lSlos ytVerat. et 8e TL TCOV iv T(p Xoyw {jlt] ttclctiv VTrdpx^^ tols VTTO TavTO elSos, dhvvaTOV oXov tov Xoyov lSlov €LvaL' ov ydp dvTiKaT'qyopiqd'qaeTaL tov TrpdyfJuaTos. otov TO ^(pov TTe^ov hirrovv T€Tpd7Tr]xv' 6 ydp

25 TOLOVT09 Xoyos OVK dvTLKaTrjyopeLTaL tov npdy- jxaTog Sid to (jltj Trdoiv vTrdp^^iv tol? vtto TavTOV

€lSo? to T€Tpd7Tr]XV.

riaAtv €L TavTov TrXeovaKis eiprjKev, otov ttjv cttl- dvpblav ope^iv rjSeos eiVcuv Trdaa ydp emOvixia -qSeog iaTLVy coo-re Kal to TavTOV ttj eTridvp^ia r)heos earat. 30 yiVerat ovv dpos ttj? imdvpita? dpe^is rjSeo? TjSeos- ovSev ydp Sta^epet iTTidvpiiav elrreLV r) ope- ^LV rjhdog, (jjg9^ eKaTepov avTOJV rjheos eWat. rj 570


something else as well to be the first thing produced from food. Or, possibly, phlegm is not the first thing produced from food, but only the first of things un- concocted, so that the word ' unconcocted ' must be added ; for according to the other statement the description is untrue unless phlegm is the first product of all.

Moreover, you must see whether anything in the description fails to belong to everything which falls under the same species ; for a definition of this kind is worse than one which employs an attribute which is universally applicable. For, in that case, if the rest of the description is peculiar to the subject, the whole definition too will be peculiar ; for, without exception, if anything at all which is true is added to what is peculiar, the whole becomes peculiar. If, on the other hand, anything in the description does not belong to everything which falls under the same species, the description as a whole cannot be peculiar; for it will not be predicated convertibly with the subject. Take, for example, the definition * pedestrian biped animal Four cubits high ' ; such a description is not predicated convertibly with the subject, because

  • four cubits high ' does not belong to everything

which falls under the same species.

Again, you must see whether he has said the same thing more than once, as, for example, if he declares that ' desire ' is an ' appetite for the pleasant ' ; for all * desire ' is ' for the pleasant,' so that what is the same as desire will also be ' for the pleasant.' The result then is a definition of ' desire ' as ' an appetite- for-the-pleasant for the pleasant ' ; for there is no difference between saying ' desire ' and ' appetite for the pleasant,' so that both will be ' for the pleasant.'



140 b

Tovro fxev ovhev aroTTov koi yap 6 avdpcoTTOs St


eorraL. eorri 8e ravrov rep dvdpcoTTCp l^wov ire-

l,6v Slttovv, a)(jr€ ^wov 7r6l,6v Slttovv Slttovv ecrrtv.

'do aAA' ov Sua TOVTO cltottov tl Gvp,^aLV€L' ov yap

Kara ^(pov rret^ov to Slttovv Karr^yopelTai [ovroy

pL€V yap av his Tvepl rov avrov ro SIttovv dv Kar-

141 a o^yopotro) , aAAa rrepl t^cpov ire^ov StVoSos" ro

Slttovv Aeyerat, wore dira^ piovov to Slttovv

/caTT^yo/oetrat . opioiojs Se /cat errl ttjs iTnOvpLtag'

ov yap Kara ttj? ope^eco? to rjSeos elvai /car-

rjyopelTai, dXXd Kara tov avpLTravTo?, cocrre drra^

5 /cat ivTavOa tj KaTrjyopla ytverat. ovk ecrrt 8e

TO Sis (fidey^aadaL TavTov ovopua twv (XTOtrcov,

dAAa TO TrXeovaKLS rrepi tlvos to avTo KaTiqyo-

prjaaiy olov ojs Seyo/cpctTi]? ttjv (f)p6vr]GLV opt-

GTlKrjV KOI 9€a)pr]TLK7]V TOJV OVTCxJV (J}7)gIv €LVaL. 7)

yap opLGTiKT] dea)pr]TLKrj tls ioTiv, a)GT€ StS" to auTO Aeyet n pood els TTokiv /cat Secjjp-qTiKriv.

10 opLoioJS Se /cat oVot ttjv KaTai/jv^iv GTeprjGLV tov] Kara (fyvGLV deppiov (jyaolv elvaf Ttdoa yap GTeprjGLS €GTL TOV Kara <j>VGiv v7Tdp-)(ovTos , a)GT€ TTepUpyov TO rrpoGdelvai tov Kara (f)VGLV, aAA' LKavov rjv eiTTelv GTcprjGiV deppiov, iTTeiSrj avTi) tj GTeprjoLS yvdipipiov TTotet oVt tou Kara (J)Vglv AeyeTat.

15 IlaAtv et TOV KadoXov elpripiivov TrpoGdeiT] /cat

€7Tt piepOVS, olov et TTjV i7TL€LK€LaV iXaTTCOGLV TOJVi

GvpL(f)€p6vTcov /cat hiKalojv TO yap St/catov Gvpi- cpf.pov TL, a)GTe TTepiix^Tai iv tco Gvpi(j>ipoVTi



Or, perhaps, there is no absurdity here. Take the statement, ' man is a biped ' ; then, what is the same as man will be a ' biped ' ; but ' pedestrian biped animal ' is the same as man, and, therefore, * pedes- trian biped animal ' is a ' biped.' But no absurdity really arises here ; for * biped ' is not predicated of ' pedestrian animal ' (for then ' biped ' would be predicated tM'ice of the same thing), but ' biped ' is used in the description of ' pedestrian biped animal,' so that ' biped ' is predicated only once. So like- wise with ' desire ' too ; for that it is ' for the plea- sant ' is predicated not of appetite but of the whole phrase," and so here too the predication occurs only once. The absurdity consists not in uttering the same word twice but in predicating the same thing more than once of anything ; for example, when Xenocrates says that prudence is * definitive and contemplative of things which exist ' ; for what is ' definitive ' is in a way ' contemplative,' so that when he adds ' and contemplative ' he is saying the same things twice. So, too, with those who say that ' cool- ing ' is a * privation of natural heat ' ; for all privation is a privation of that which is natural, so that it is super- fluous to add ' natural,' but it would be enough to say

  • privation of heat,' since the term ' privation ' itself

makes it known that the heat referred to is * natural.' Again, you must see whether, after a universal has been stated, he adds a particular as well, for example, if he has said that * equity is a diminution of the expedient and the just ' ; for the just is something expedient, so that it is included in the expedient.

" i.e. of the phrase ' appetite for the pleasant.' If we pre- dicate ' is for the pleasant' of this, only the second ' for the pleasant ' is in the predicate.




TTepiTTOV OVV TO hiKaiOV , a)GT€ KaOoXoV €LTraS iTTL

fjbepovs 7J pooedriKev . koX el r7]v larpiKTjv em-

20 arrip/qv rcDv vyieivcbv ^coco /cat avdpcoTTW, ^ rov vofjiov eiKova rcJov cf)va€i /caAcov /cat St/catojv to yap St/catov /caAov rt, (Lare TrAeova/ct? to auTO Acy et .

IV. Uorepov /xev ovv /caAco? ^ ov /caAcos", Sta Tovrojv /cat rwv tolovtcjv einoKeTTTeov' TTorepov

25 8' e'lprjKe /cat wpiaraL to Tt i^v etvat t) oi5;^t, e/c TcavSe.

npcoTov /xev et [xrj 8ta irporepcov /cat yvcupL- jjLCDTepojv 7T€7roi7]TaL Tov opiGfxov. €7T€i yap 6 opos aTToStSoTat tou yvcx)pioai xa/otv to XexOev, yvwpit^opiev 8' ou/c 6/c tcDv Tu;^ovTajv aAA' e/c tcuv TTporepwv /cat yvajpLficurepajv, Kaddnep iv rais

30 aiTohei^eoLV (ovtoj yap Traoa StSao/caAta /cat pidOrjois ^X^^)> (f>OLy^pov on 6 [irj 8ta tolovtojv 6pit,6p,evos ovx oipiorai. el Se /xt], TrXeiovs ecrovrat TOV avTOV SpLafxoi. Si^Xov yap on /cat o Sta TTporepcov /cat yvcopLp,corepojv ^eXnov aipiarai, ware dix(f>6Tepoi av e'lrjaav opoL rod avrov. ro

35 Sc roLOvrov ov So/cet* e/caoTO) ya/9 tcov ovtojv ev eon ro elvai oirep eoriv oior el TrXeiovs eoovrai rov avrov 6pLap,oi, ravrov earai rep opL^ofJuevo) ro elvai oirep /ca^' eKarepov rojv opiGfjLOJV SrjXovr ai, 141b TauTa 8* ov ravrd eonv, eTreiZr] ol optofjiol erepoi. 574>


TOPICA, VI. iii-iv

' The just ' is, therefore, superfluous, and so after stating the universal he has added the particular. So too in the definition of ' medicine ' as * knowledge of things healthful for animal and man,' or ' law ' as ' the image of things naturally noble and just ' ; for the just is something noble, so that he is saying the same thing more than once.

IV. Whether your opponent has made a correct Rides for or an incorrect definition should be examined by !^hether the these and similar methods ; but whether he has *^^^. stated and defined the essence or not, should be really Re- examined in the following manner : ^^seme-

First, you must see whether he has failed to make The terms the definition by means of prior and more intelligible \xow should terms. For the object in assiffninff the definition is be prior to make known the meaning of the subject, and we intelligible, make things known by using, not any chance terms, but those which are prior and more intelligible, as we do in demonstrations (for this is true of every kind of teaching and learning) ; it is, therefore, obvious that the man who does not define by means of such terms has not defined at all. With any other method, there will be more than one definition of the same thing ; for clearly he who has used terms which are prior and more intelligible has given another and a better definition, so that both would be definitions of the same thing. But this is not the view generally held ; for everything that is has one single essence, and so, if there is to be more than one definition of the same thing, the essence, which is demonstrated in accordance with each of the definitions, will be the same for the framer of the definition ; but the demonstrations of it are not the same since the definitions are different. It is, therefore, obvious




SrjXov ovv on ovx wpiurai 6 {jurj Sta Trporepcov Kai yvcxjpifJiWTepcDV opiadpievo? .

To /xev ovv puTj hiOL yvajpifjucurdpajv elprjadai rov opov SiXios eanv CAcAa/Setv 'q yap et olttXcos i^ 5 dyvaxjTorepojv -^ et rj/juv dyvcodrorepcov' iuSex^rat yap dpi(l>OT€pcos. ctTrAaJ? pbev ovv yvcapipLCjrepov ro TTporepov rov varepov, olov OTiypir] ypa/x/xTjs" /cat ypafipirj iTrnreSov Kal iiTLTTeSov orepeov, Kad- drrep Kal jjiovdg dpidfiov' irporepov yap Kal dpxy] TTavros dpiQfJLov. opioicos 8e Kal aroLx^iov cruA-

10 XaPi^s. rjfjilv 8' dvdrraXiv ivlore cru/xjSatVet* /xaAtcrra yap TO urepeov vtto rrjv alodiquLV TrtTrret, ro 8' eTTLTTeSov jLtaAAov ttJs" ypafjifxrjSy ypapufjir] Se <7r][jL€LOV fjLoXXov. ol rroXXol yap rd roiavra Trpoyvajpt- l^ovGiV' rd fjuev yap rrjs rv^ovarfs rd 8' dKpi^ovs Kal TTepirrrjg 8tavotas" Karapbadelv eariv.

15 ^AttAcos" ju-ev ovv ^eXnov rd 8ta rchv irporepov rd varepa rreLpdcrdai yvcxipit^eiv iTTiarrjfjbovLKcorepov ydp ro roLovrov iariv. ov pLrjv aXXd npog rovs dSvvarovvras yva)pil,eiv hid rojv roiovrcov dvay- Koiov tcrcus" 8ta rcov eKeivois yvcjoplpiajv Troteto-^at rov Xoyov. elcrl 8e rojv roiovrmv optofjicjv 6 re

20 rrjs (jnypbrjs Kal 6 rrj? ypap^pirj? Kal 6 rov em- rrehov ndvres ydp 8ta rcjv vorepwv rd irporepa SrjXovGLV ro pbev ydp ypapbfjirjs, ro 8' CTTtTTeSou, TO 8e orepeov ^aal rrepas elvai. ov 8et 8e XavBd- veiv on rov? ovrw? opil^opievovs ovk ivSex^rai rd 576



that anyone who has not framed his definition by means of prior and more intelligible terms has not given a definition.

That the definition has not been stated in more How to intelligible terms can be taken in two senses, namely, Sure to^ that it is composed either of terms which are less use more intelligible absolutely or of terms which are less terms^of '^ intelligible to us ; for both meanings are possible, deflnition. Thus absolutely the prior is more intelligible than the posterior ; for example, a point is more intelligible than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid, just as also a unit is more intelligible than a number, since it is prior to and the starting-point of all number. Similarly a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. To us, however, the converse some- times happens ; for a solid falls most under our per- ception, and a plane more than a line, and a line more than a point. For most people recognize such things as solids and planes before they recognize lines and points ; for the former can be grasped by an ordinary understanding, the latter only by one which is accurate and superior.

Absolutely, then, it is better to aim at knowledge of the posterior by means of what is prior ; for such a method is more scientific. Nevertheless, for the benefit of those who are incapable of acquiring know- ledge by such means, it is perhaps necessary to frame the description by means of terms which are in- telligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are those of the point, the line and the plane ; for all these demonstrate the prior by means of the posterior — the point being called the limit of the line, the line that of the plane, and the plane that of the solid. We must not, however, fail to notice that it is impossible

u 577



ri Tjv elvai rep opi^ofjuevcp S7]Xovv, iav firj rvyxoiVD

25 ravTov TjiMV re yvcopLfjucorepov Kal aTrAcDs* yvcopL- fJLwrepov, eiTTep Set p,ev 8ta rod yevovs Kal rcbv hia(j)opcx)v opit^eodai rov KaXcjs opi^ofievov, ravra 8e rcjv CLTrAcD? yvcxipipLCoripcov Kal nporepajv rov €lSov9 idTiV. Gvvavaipei yap to yevos Kal rj Siacfyopa to etSos", cocrre irpoTepa raura tov eiZovs.

30 ecrrt 8e Kal yvcopijJicoTepa' tov piev yap €lSov9 yva)pit,o[Jievov avdyKr) Kal to yevos Kal T7]v 8ta- (f)opav yvcopit^eadat (o yap avOpoiTTOv yvcopl^ajv Kal ^ajov Kal rret,6v yvcopll^ei), tov Se yevovs rj TTJs Siacfyopds yv(Xipit,op.evris ovk dvdyKrj Kal to elSos yvcopL^eaOai, woTe dyvcociTOTepov to etSog. eTL ToXs KaT dXrjdeiav tovs tolovtovs opiGpiovs

35 (jydoKovGiv elvaiy tovs eK tojv eKaarq) yvojpLfjbOJV, TToWovs TOV avTov ovp^^T^oreTat Xeyeiv opiopiovs elvai' eTepa yap erepois Kal ov raura rfdai Tvy- xdvei yvojpLpLCjoTepa ovra, cocrre irpos eKaoTOV 142 a eTepos dv e'lr] opiopLos dTTohoreos, eirrep €k tcov eKdoTOis yvcopipLCjOTepcov tov opiopiov TToieXadaL XP'^' '^'^^ '^^^^ avTols dXkoT dWa pLoiXXov yvcjpLpba, ef dpx^js fJiev ra aladrjTd, dKpi^eorepois 8e yivo- 5 jJievoLS avdnaXiv, cocrr' ovSe irpos tov avTov del 6 avTos opiopLos diTohoTeos tols 8ta rcov e/cacrrots" yvaypipbixiTepiov tov opiopLov (f>doKovoiv diroSoTeov 578


for those who define in this way to show the essence of the subject of their definition, unless it so happens that the same thing is both more intelHgible to us and also more intelligible absolutely ; for the framer of a good definition must define by means of the genus and the differentiae, and these are among the things which are more intelligible absolutely than the species and prior to it ; for the genus and the differentia cancel the species and therefore are prior to it. They are also more intelligible ; for, if the species is known, both the genus and the differentia must also be known (for he who has knowledge of ' man ' has also knowledge of ' animal ' and * pedes- trian '). On the other hand, if the genus and the differentia are known, it does not necessarily follow that the species is also known ; the species, therefore, is less intelligible. Furthermore, those who declare that such definitions, namely, those which are based on what is known to individual persons, accord with the truth, will, as a result, have to say that there are many definitions of the same thing ; for different things are more intelligible to different people, and not the same things equally intelligible to all ; and so a different definition would have to be given to each individual, if the definition has to be framed as the basis of what is more intelligible to each of them. Furthermore, to the same persons different things are more intelligible at different times — first of all the objects of sense-perception, and then, when their knowledge becomes more accurate, the converse occurs ; and so neither would the same definition always have to be given to the same person by those who say that a definition ought to be given by means of what is more intelligible to each individual. It



142 a

€Lvai. hrjAov ovv on ovx opioreov Sio, rwv tolov- rcov, aAAa 8 to, rcDv aTrAcDs" yvajpiiiajrepcov /xovcos" yap av ovrcos ets" Kal 6 avros opiopios act yivoiro. Icrcos' 8e Koi to ctTrAtos' yvajpipjov ov to vraat

10 yvcopifjLov iuTiVy dXXa to tols €v hiaKeifxevois rrjv Sidvoiav, KaOdirep Kal to dirXihs vyL€iv6v to toXs €v €)(ovGL TO CTto/xa. Set [lev ovv €KaoTa tcov ToiovTOiv e^aKpLpovVy ;Yp7Jo-^at Se StaAeyo^ueVou? 7rpo£ TO GViJLcl)epov. jLCaAtCTTa 8' 6pioXoyOVfjL€V(jL>S avaipetv ivSe^^TaL tov opiopiov, idv jlct^t' €k tojv

15 aTrAcos" yvcjpLpLCOTepwv ixiqT eK tojv rjpuv Tvy^avr) TOV Xoyov 7Te7roir][jLevo9.

Efs" jLiev ovv TpoTTog tov /XT] Sea yvcDpipbCDTepcov iuTL TO Sid TOJV VGTepojv TO, TTpoTepa SrjXovv, Kaddnep rrpoTepov €LTTa[jL€V dXXos, el tov iv rjpejjLLa Kal tov dtpiopbivov Sta tou dopioTOV Kal

20 TOV €v Kivr^ueL diTohehoTai 6 Aoyos" irpoTepov yap TO jjievov Kal to wpLOfxevov tov dopiuTov Kal iv


Tov he pLTj €K TTpOTepojv Tpetg elal Tpoiroi, irpa)-

Tog fxev €i Sid tov dvTLKeLpuevov to dvTiKeipievov

wpiOTai, otov Sid TOV KaKov to dyaOov dpua yap

25 TTJ ^vaei Td dvTLK€Lfji€va. iviOLS 8e Kal rj avTT]

eTTLGTiqiiri dficfyoTepcuv SoKet elvai, ojot ouSe

yvajpLjJLCOTepOV to €T€pOV TOV €T€pOV. Set 8e IJLTj

Xavddveiv oti eVta taajs ovk €gtlv opicraoOat dXXcog, OLOV TO SiTrXdoLov dvev tov rjjJiLaeog, Kal oaa Kad^ avTd irpos Tt AeyeTat* Traat ydp toZs

« 141 a 26 f. 580


is obvious, therefore, that definitions ought not to be made by means of terms of this kind but by means of those which are more intelHgible absolutely ; for only thus could one and the same definition be always produced. Perhaps, also, what is intelligible abso- lutely is what is intelligible not to everyone but only to those who are intellectually in a sound condition, just as also what is healthy absolutely is what is healthy to those who are physically in a sound con- dition. All such points must be accurately observed and used in discussion as circumstances demand. But the subversion of a definition is most generally admitted to be possible, if the definer happens to have framed his description neither from what is more intelligible absolutely nor from what is more intelligible to us.

One way, then, of not defining by means of more intelligible terms is to demonstrate the prior by means of the posterior, as we said before." Another way consists in having rendered the description of what is at rest and definite by means of what is indefinite and in motion ; for what stays still and is definite is prior to what is indefinite and in motion.

There are three ways of failing to define by means How to of prior terms, (a) The first is when an opposite has fanu?e to^ been defined by means of its opposite, for example, use prior good by means of evil ; for opposites are naturally definition. simultaneous. In the view of some people, too, there is the same knowledge of both, so that the one is not more intelligible than the other. We must not, how- ever, fail to notice that it is perhaps impossible to define some things in any other way. We cannot, for example, define the double without the half, and the same is true also of things which are described as




142 a

roLOvroL9 ravrov to etvai tco irpos ri ttcd? ex^iv,

30 cocrr' dSvvarov dvev darepov ddrepov yvcDpit^eiv,

hioTTep dvayKOLov iv rep rod iripov Xoycp GVfJb-

7T€pi€i,Xrj(f)6aL /cat ddrepov. yv(x>pit,€iv puev ovv

Set rd roLavra ndvra, y^prjodai 8' avrols (hs dv

SoKjj ovix(j)€peiv.

"AAAos", et avTO) Kexpr}raL rep 6pit,opLevo}. \av-

35 Bdvei 8', orav pbrj avrco rep rod 6pLt,opL€vov ovop^ari

142 b xpi^crrjr at , otov el rov rjXiov dorrpov rjp,epo(f)ave£

(Lplaaro- 6 yap rjpLepa xp^f^^^os rjXicp XPW^'" ^^^

8' 07TC0S (f)iopadfj rd roiavra pLeraXajJi^dveLV dvrl

rod ovofjiaros rov Xoyov, otov on rjpiepa r]Xiov

(f)opd VTTep yrjs icrrlv SrjXov ydp on 6 rrjv <j)opdv

5 rjXiOV VTTep yrjs elprjKOJS rov rjXtov e'upyjKev, wore

Kexp'qrai rep rjXicp 6 rfj rjp^epa xp'^^dpievos .

riaAtv et rep dvnhir]p7]p.ev(jp rd dvnhLrjprjjjuevov

cjpiarai, otov Trepirrdv rd jU-ovaSt jjuel^ov dprlov.

d'jLta ydp rfj (f)VoeL rd Ik rov avrov yevovs avrtSt-

10 Tjprjpieva, rd 8e Trepirrdv /cat dpnov avrtStT^pryrat •

a/x^a> ydp dpidpuov hia^opai.

'Ofiolcog 8e /cat 6t 8ta rojv VTroKaroj rd irrdvco wpioraiy otov dpnov dpidp.6v rdv Slxol Siaipovp^evov

« See 136 b 3 if . 582


in themselves relative ; for in all such things their being is the same as a certain relation in which they stand to something, so that it is impossible to recog- nize the one without the other and, therefore, neces- sary that the one should also be included in the description of the other. We must, therefore, take cognizance of all such facts and make use of them as seems expedient,

(b) Another way is when the term which is being defined is used in the definition itself. This passes unobserved when the actual name of the object which is being defined is not employed, for example, if one has defined the sun as ' a star appearing by day ' ; for in introducing the day one introduces the sun. For the detection of this kind of practice we must substitute the description for the name, saying, for example, that ' day ' is ' the passage of the sun over the earth ' ; for it is obvious that a man who has spoken of * the passage of the sun over the earth ' has spoken of * the sun,' so he who has introduced ' the day ' has introduced ' the sun.'

(c) Again, you must see whether your opponent has defined one of the opposite members of corre- sponding divisions " by means of another, for example, if he has defined ' an odd number ' as ' one which is greater by a unit than an even number.' For the opposite numbers of corresponding divisions taken from the same genus are by nature simultaneous, and

  • odd ' and ' even ' are opposite members of corres-

ponding divisions, for both are differentiae of number.

(d) Similarly also, you must see whether he has defined a superior by means of subordinates, for example, if he has defined an * even number ' as * a number divisible into two parts ' or * the good ' as ' a



142 b

rj TO dyaOov e^iv dperrjs' ro re yap hixoL dno

T(x)V Suo ctAi^TTTat, dpTLCOv OVTOJV , Kal rj dperrj dya-

15 Q6v TL iorriv, a)(j6^ VTroKaroj ravra €K€u>ajv eoriv. €TL 8' dvdyKT] rov rco vTroKarco ;^pa)/xevoF Kal av- TO) -x^pTjodai. 6 re yap rfj dperfj ')(^pwpievos ;)(;prjrat TO) dyaOcpy eTTeiSrj dyaOov n rj dperiq- ofjUOLw? Se Kal 6 Tip Slxa XP^I^^^^^ '^^ dpricp ;)^/37Jrat, €7T£ihri els hvo hirjprjudai arjjjLalvei to Slxoi> to, Se SiJO dprid euTiv.

20 V. Ka^oAou jiev ovv eliTelv els ecrrt tottos to firj Sid TTpoTepojv Kal yvcnpLpuajTepajv TTOLrjuaaOai tov Xoyov, P'epy] 8' avTov ra elp-qixeva. SevTCpos, el iv yevei tov TTpdyfjuaTos ovtos jJir} /cetrat ev yevei. €v dVacTt 8e to tolovtov djjidpTrjiJbd euTiVy ev ols ov TTpoKeiTai TOV Xoyov to tl eoTiv, olov 6 tov ocj-

25 p,aTos opLGfjLos, TO e^ov Tp€.is SiaoTaGeis, rj et TiS TOV dvdpWTTOV OplGaiTO TO eTTLaTdfJLevov dpidfJLelv. ov yap elpriTai tl ov Tpels ex€L SiaaTaaeLS rj tl ov CTTtWarat dpiOfieiv to Se yevos /SouAerat to tl €GTL ar][JLalveLV, Kal npajTOV vnoTideTaL tcjv ev tco opLdfiip Xeyopievcov.

30 "Eti et TTpos TrXeicx) Xeyojievov tov opL^ofJievov fXTj rrpos TTavTa dnoheSajKev, oTov el ttjv ypapi- jjiaTLKTjV eTnorT-qpirjv tov ypdifjaL to vnayopevOev TTpooSelTaL yap otl Kal tov dvayvcovai' ovSev yap 584

TOPICA, VI. iv-v

state of virtue.' For the expression ' into two parts ' is taken from * two,' which is an even number, and virtue is a kind of good ; so that the former terms are subordinate to the latter. Further, in introducing the subordinate term, one is obHged to introduce the term itself also ; for he who introduces the term

  • virtue ' introduces ' the good,' since virtue is a kind

of good ; and similarly, too, he who introduces the phrase ' into two parts ' introduces ' even,' for division

  • into two parts ' signifies division by two, and two

is an even number.

V. Speaking generally, then, one commonplace Rules as to concerns the failure to frame the description by ^^n^\n means of prior and more intelligible terms, and the definition: above are the divisions into which it falls. A second (a) Observe commonplace is to see whether, though the subject Jh^^genus of the definition falls under a genus, it has not been is omitted, placed in a genus. This kind of error always occurs in cases where the essence is not put first in the description, for example, in the definition of ' body ' as * that which has three dimensions,' or the defini- tion of ' man,' if it were to be given as ' that which knows how to count.' For no statement has been given what it is that has three dimensions or what it is that knows how to count ; whereas the genus aims at signifying what it is and is the first thing to be laid down in the description contained in the definition.

Furthermore, you must see whether, though the (6) Observe term which is being defined applies to a number of Jg^g^j^jon 'ig° things, your opponent has failed to apply it to all of applied to them ; for example, if he has defined ' grammar ' as whichcomes

  • the knowledge of writing from dictation ' ; for he "uWect^^

ouffht to add that it is also the knowledge of reading, of the ^ & ft definition.



142 b

(jLoiXXov rod ypdxjjai r] rod avayvibvai airohovs wpi-

araiy coctt' ovhirepos , aXX 6 dfJLcfyco ravr elrrajVy

35 €7Teihri TrXelov? ovk ivSe^^erau ravrov opioiiov'S

I43a€tvat. eiT* ivLOJv /xev ovv /car' dXi^detav e^^t Ka9-

aTTep e'iprjraL, Itt* ivlcov 8' ov, otov €^' ogcjv p/rj

Kad^ avTO TTpos ajLC(/>a> Aeyerat, KaOdiTep laTpiKj]

rod vooov Koi vyUiav TToirjoai- rod p^ev yap Kad^

avrr)V Aeyerat, rod 8e Kara ovp^^e^riKos' aTrXw?

5 yap aXXorpLov rrjg larpLKrjs ro vogov TToielv. cuctt*

ovhev pidXXov ojpiurai 6 irpos dp,(f)a) aTToSovs rod

TTpos ddrepov, aAA' 'Igcos Kal ^elpov, iTreiSrj Kal

rcbv XoLTTcbv oancTodv hvvarog iari vogov TTOLrjaai.

"Ert el piT] TTpos ro ^eXrtov dXXd npos ro x^^P^^

10 aTToSeSco/ce, TrXetovcov ovrcov rrpos d Aeyerat ro

6pit,6pi€VOV' irdaa yap iTTiGrrjp.r] Kal Byvapag rod

^eXrlarov So/cet elvai.

HdXiV el purj Kelr ai ev rw olKelcp yevei ro Xe^Oev,

OKoirelv Ik rcov irepl rd yevq oroL')(eiojv, Kaddirep

TTporepov e'lprjrai.

15 "Ert el VTTeppaiVOJV^ Xeyei rd yevrj, olov 6 rrjv

SiKaLooTJvrjv e^iv laorrjro? TTOLrjrLKrjv -^ Stavepurj-

rLKrjV rod lgov. VTrep^aivei ydp ovrws 6pit,6pievos

^ Bekker's vTrep^aivcLv a misprint for virep^aivcov. 586



For in describing it as * a knowledge of w riting ' he has no more given a definition than he who has called it * a knowledge of reading, 'so that neither of them has given a definition, but only he who makes both these statements, since there cannot be more than one de- finition of the same thing. In some cases, to be sure, the above statement accords with the truth but not in others, for example, where the term is not essenti- ally applicable to both things, for instance in the definition of medicine as concerned with the pro- duction of disease and health. For it is said to do the latter essentially, the former only accidentally, since it is absolutely foreign to medicine to produce disease. So he who has described medicine in refer- ence to both health and disease has given no better a definition than he who has done so in reference to one of them only ; nay, he has perhaps even given a worse definition, since anyone else who is not a doctor is capable of producing disease.

Furthermore, when there are more things than one (c) Observe to which the term which is being defined is applicable, J[ibjec?of '^ you must see whether he has assigned it in reference the deflni-

Lion IS rpicr"

not to the better but to the worse ; for every kind of red not to knowledge and capacity is generally regarded as t,y^t^*fjQ concerned with the best. worse.

Again, if the term which has been described is not (d) Observe placed in its appropriate genus, you must examine it geJfu^^s ^ot according to the elementary rules regarding genera, rightly

11 '11 n constituted.

as has been said above."

Furthermore, you must see whether in his descrip- (e) Observe tion he passes over the genera, for example, when he Jhlre^^'^a defines justice as * a state productive of equality,' or failure to ' distributive of what is equal ' ; for by such a defini- subject in


139 b 3.



143 a

TTjV dperrjv. OLTToXiTTajv ovv to tt^S" hLKaioGvvrjS

yevos ov Xeyeu ro ri rfv elvai' tJ yap ovoia iKOLGrco IJL€Ta Tov yivovs. ean 8e tovto ravrov ro) firj els

20 TO iyyvrdroj yevos delvai- 6 yap etV to iyyvrdrco dels TTavra rd eirdvcx) eiprjKev, eTreLSrj Trdvra rd eirdvaj yevrj rcJov viroKdrco Karr^yopeZr at. wctt* r^ els TO eyyvrdru) yevos Oereov, rj irdaas rds hia(f)opds TO) errdvLO yevei TrpocraTrreov, 8t* Sv opl^eraL to iyyvrdro) yevos. ovrco ydp ovSev

25 dv eiT] TrapaXeXoLTTws , dAA' dvT* ovojLtaTos" Xoyco

elp'qKCJS dv eir] to VTTOKdrw yevos. 6 8' auTO pLO-

vov TO eirdvo) yevos eliras ov Xeyei Kal to vtto-

Karo) yevos ' 6 ydp (f)vr6v eiiras ov Xeyei SevSpov.

VI. HdXiv eirl rcov hiacjyopwv opLOLOJS GKeTneov

30 el Kal rds hiacfiopds elne rds rod yevovs. el ydp [jLTj Tols TOV TTpdyp,aTos ISlais wpLGTai hia(j)opais , ri Kal TTavTeXojs tolovtov e'lpiqKev o p,r]hev6s evSe- X^'^OL^ hia<f)opdv etvai, olov to t,a)ov t) ttjv ovGcav, SrjXov oTi ovx wpiGTai' ovhevds ydp Sia(f)opal Ta elprjpieva. opdv 8e Kal el eGTiv dvTihirjprjpievov

35 Tt TTJ elpiqpLevr] 8ta^opa. el ydp pbiq eoTL, hriXov OTi ovK dv elr) r] elprjijuevr] tov yevovs hiacfyopd' 143 b TTav ydp yevos Tais avTihiripripievais hia^opals SiaipeLTaL, KaBdirep to t,wov to) rre^o) Kal tco TTTrjvcp Kal Tcp evvSpo) Kal to) StTTohi. Tj el euTL puev T) dvTLSLrjp7]iJbev7] hia^opd, pirj dXrjOeveTai 8e 588


TOPICA, VI. v-vi

tion he passes over virtue, and so by omitting the its nearest genus of justice he fails to state its essence ; for the ^®°^' essence of a thing involves its genus. This amounts to the same thing as not putting the subject into its nearest genus ; for he who has put it into the nearest genus has stated all the higher genera, since all the higher genera are predicated of the lower. Either, therefore, it ought to put into the nearest genus, or else all the differentiae, through which the nearest genus is defined, ought to be added to the higher genus. By so doing he would not have omitted any- thing, but would have stated the lower genus instead of mentioning the name. But he who has merely stated the higher genus by itself does not state the lower genus also ; for he who calls a thing a ' plant ' does not call it a ' tree.'

VI. Again, you must, in like manner, consider, as Rules as to regards differentiae, whether he has stated the dif- ^diffSetdiae ferentiae too as those of the genus. For, if he has in defini- not framed his definition by means of the differentiae (aTxhe ratio peculiar to the subject, or else has stated something ^[^^l^u""^"^® such as cannot possibly be a differentia of anything considered. at all (for example ' animal ' or ' substance '), it is obvious that he has not given a definition ; for the above terms are not differentiae of anything. Also you must see whether there is an opposite member of a division corresponding to the differentia stated ; for, if not, obviously the differentia stated could not be a differentia of the genus ; for every genus is distinguished by differentiae which are the opposite members of a corresponding division, for example, ' animal ' by the terms * pedestrian,' ' winged,' ' aqua- tic ' and ' biped.' Or else you must see whether the corresponding differentia exists but is not true of the




143 b

Kara rod yevovs. St^Aov yap on ovherlpa av e'lrj 5 Tov yevovs 8ta<^opa* rrdarac yap at avTt8t7^p7]/xeVat Sta^opat dXrjdevovraL Kara rod oiKelov yevovs. J| ofJiOLCOs 8e Krai €6 aXyjOeverai /xev, jlct] Trotet 8e » TrpoGTiOefJievr] rw yevei ethos. hrjXov yap on ovk av etrj avrrj clSottolos Sta<^opa tov yevovs' Tvaaa yap elSoTTOLog Stacfyopa fiera rov yevovs etSos

10 TToiet. el 8* avTYj fjb-q ian hia<^opd, ovh^ rj Ae^^^etcra, €7ret ravTT] dvnhiripiqrai.

"Etc eav drrocj^doei Siaupfj ro yevos, Kaddirep ol rrjv ypajjbfjuTjv opL^opuevoL [JiTJKOs aTrXares elvai. ovhev yap dXXo cn^jLtatVet 'q on ovk e-)(ei nXdros. avjJL^rjaeraL ovv ro yevos pbeTex^LV rod etSovs'

15 TTttV yap [xrJKos rj dirXares 't] nXdros e)(ov earlv, eiTel Kara iravros rj rj Kardcjyaoris r] rj dTTocfyaais dXr)9everaL, oaare koX ro yevos rr\s ypa\x\Lr\s fJbrjKos ov t) dTrXares rj TrXdros ^X^^ eorai. p,rJKos 8* aTrAares" elhovs earl Xoyos, ojjioicos 8e Kal pirJKOs TrXdros e^ov ro yap aTrXares Kal TrXdros ^X^^

20 Bia(f)opaL elaiv, €K he rrjs SLacf)opds Kal rod yevovs 6 rod ethovs earl Xoyos, wore ro yevos emhexoir^ av rov rod ethovs Xoyov. 6pioicx)S 8e Kal rov rrjs Stac^o/oas", eTTeihrj rj erepa rchv elprjp,eva>v hia<^op(x)v i^ dvdyKrjs Karr^yo pelr ai rod yevovs. eon 8' o elprjixevos roTTos ;)^/37JCTt/xo? TTpos rovs ndepuevovs

25 Ihias elvai. el ydp eanv avro fJirJKos, ttojs Kar- TjyoprjdrioeraL Kara rod yevovs on TrXdros exov iarlv -^ aTrXares ionv; Set ydp Kara Travros 590


genus ; for then obviously neither of them could be a

differentia of the genus ; for all the corresponding

differentiae are true of the proper genus. In like

manner, too, you must see whether, though it is true,

yet its addition to the genus does not make a species.

For then it is obvious that this could not be a specific

differentia of the genus ; for a specific differentia,

combined with the genus, always makes a species.

But, if this is not a differentia, neither is the one

which has been stated, since it is an opposite member

of a division corresponding with this.

Furthermore, you must see whether he divides the (b) Observe u r A.- jj.1. \^ J n whether the

genus by means or a negation, as do those who denne genus is

' line ' as ' length without breadth ' ; for this simply divided by signifies that it has not breadth. The result, there- fore, will be that the genus partakes of its species ; for, since either the affirmation or the negation is true of everything, length must always either be without breadth or possess breadth, and so the genus of ' line,' which is ' length,' will also either be without breadth or possess breadth. But ' length without breadth ' is a description of a species, as similarly also is * length with breadth ' ; for ' without breadth ' and ' with breadth ' are differentiae, and the de- scription of the species is made up of the differentia and the genus ; and so the genus would admit of the description of the species. Similarly, too, it would admit of the description of the differentia, since one of the above differentiae is necessarily predicated of the genus. The above commonplace is useful in dealing with those who assert that * ideas ' exist ; for, if absolute length exists, how is it to be predicated of the genus that it is possessed of breadth or that it is without breadth ? For one of these two state-



143 b

fJL'qKovs TO erepov avrcov a\r]d€V€(jdaL, eiirep Kara m rod yivovs dXrjdeveaOai /.te'AAct. tovto 8' ov GVfJi- J ^aLV€L- €GTi yap aTrXarrj Kal irXdros e^ovra fjLiJKrj.

30 cLcrre Trpos" eKeivovs fiovovs ^^pT^crt/xo? 6 tottos, 61 TTav^ yevos eV dpLdfio) ^aolv etvat. rovro 8e TToiovGiv OL TctS" tSeas" TiOefjievoi' avro ydp jJurJKo? Kal avTO ^a)ov yivo? cfiaalv etvai.

"Icrcos' 8' ctt' evL(x)V dvayKalov Kal OLTroi^dGeL Xpyjf^GoLf^ Tov 6pit,6fJi€Vov, otov €7tI tcJl)v orepTjaecov

35 TV^Xov ydp Ian to pur] e^ov oifjLV, ore 7T€(f)VKev €X€LV. hia^ipei 8' ovhkv drro<^dG€i 8teAetv to yi-

144 a vo?, 7) ToiavTr] KaTacf)d(T€i fj d7r6cl)aaLV dvayKalov

dvT Lhiaipeiodaiy otov el p.rJKos TrAaros" ^X^^ a)pL-

OTai' TO) ydp nXdrog exovri to p.rj e^ov rrXdros

dvTL^ir]pr]Tai, dXXo 8' ovhiv, wgt€ drro(f)doei rrdXiv

hiaipelTai to yevos.

5 ITaAtv el TO elhos co? hia(j)opdv dTreScoKe, Kad-

direp OL Tov TTpoTriqXaKiapiov v^piv /xera ;\;A€uacrtas'

opt^o/xevof rj ydp yXevaaia v^pis tls, coot ov

Biacjiopd dAA' etSos rj yXevaaia.

"Ert el TO yevos (hs hia(f)opdv e'lprjKev, otov ttjv

10 dpeTTjV e^iv dyadrjv rj OTTovhaiav yevos ydp

rdyaOov ttjs dperrjs eoTiv. 7) ov yevos Tdyadov,

dXXd Stacfyopd, elirep dXrjdes otl ovk evhex^rai

ravTov ev hvo yeveoiv etvat (jltj Trepiexovaiv

dXXrjXa. ovTe ydp rdyadov TrjV e^tv TTepiex^L ov6*

^ Reading irdv with AB for to.



ments must be true of every length, if it is going to be true of the genus. This, however, does not happen; for there are lengths without breadth and lengths possessing breadth. This commonplace, therefore, is useful only in dealing with those who say that every genus is numerically one ; and this is what those do who assert the existence of ' ideas ' ; for they say that absolute length and absolute animal are the genus.

Perhaps in some cases the definer must necessarily [Note on an use negation, for example, in defining privations, e^eptionai For * blind ' is that which does not possess sight when it is its nature to possess it. But there is no difference between dividing the genus by means of a negation and by means of such an affirmation as must necessarily have a negation in the opposite member of a corre- sponding division, for example, when a definition has been given as ' length possessing breadth * ; for the opposite member of the corresponding division to that which possesses breadth is that which does not possess breadth, and nothing else, so that again the genus is divided by a negation.

Again, you must see whether he has assigned the (c) Observe species as a differentia, as do those who define ' con- J)ecie3%r tumely ' as * insolence combined with scoffing ' ; for ^^^ genus scoffing is a kind of insolence, and so scoffing is not as a a differentia but a species. differentia.

Moreover, you must see whether he has stated the genus as a differentia, saying, for example, that ' virtue is a good or worthy state ' ; for ' good ' is the genus of ' virtue.' Or perhaps ' good ' is not the genus but the differentia, if indeed it is true that it is impossible for the same thing to be in two genera one of which does not include the other ; for ' good ' does not include ' state,' nor does * state ' include


144 a

7) e^ts" rayadov ov yap Trdaa e^t? ayaOov, ovSe

15 TTdv dyadov e^ts", cocrr' ovk dv eLT] yivrj diJi(f)6T€pa. el ovv 7] eft? rrjs dperrjs yevos, hrjXov otl rdyaOov ov yevos, dAAa /xctAAov hia^opd. en rj fiev efts' Tt eorrt CTT^jLtatvet rj dperrj, to 8' dyadov ov ri eariv dXkd TTOLOV SoKei S' 7^ htacfyopd ttolov tl arniaiveiv .

20 ^Opdv 8e Kal el pir] ttoiov rt dAAa rohe ar]p.aivei 7] aTTohodelaa hia(j)Opd- SoKel yap ttolov tl Trdaa Siac/iopd hrjXovv.

TiKOTrelv Se Kal el KaTa avpi^e^rjKog V7Tdp')(ei tco opit^opuevcp rj SLa(f)opd. ouSe^Ltta yap Sta^opd rcov

25 /card Gvp^^e^riKos V7Tap-)(ovT(x)v ecrrt, KaOdrrep ovhe TO yevos ' ov yap evBex^Tau ttjv hia^opdv VTrdp^eiv TLvl Kal piTj vTTapx^iv.

"Ert et KaTTjyopeLTaL tov yevovs r) hia(j)opd rj TO etSos Tj T60V KaTcodev tl tov e'iSovg, ovk dv etr]

30 tupicr/xeVos" ovSev ydp Td)v elp7][jLeva)v evSe^eTai tov yevovs KaTiqyopelod ai, eTreiSTj to yevos errl irXeloTov TTavTOJV XeyeTai, TrdXiv el KaTTfyopelTai to yevos TTJs SLa(f)opds' ov ydp KaTa ttjs Sta^opas", dAAd Ka6^ Sv Tj hia(j)opdy to yevos SoKel KaTiqyopelaQ ai, olov TO ^a)ov KaTa tov dvOpwirov Kal tov ^oos

35 Kal TcJov dXXoiv 7Tet,a)V l,(x)a>v, ovk avTrjs ttjs 8ta-

cf)opds TTJs KaTa tov etSovs Xeyop.ev7]s. el ydp

Kad^ eKaoTiqs rcov Suacfiopdjv to l,a)OV KaTr^yopr]-

diqoeTai, TroXXd ^(pa tov e'lSovs av KaT7]yopolTO'

144 b at ydp hia<^opal tov elhovs KaTTjyopovvTaL. eTi


  • good,' for not every ' state ' is * good ' nor every

' good ' a * state.' They could not, therefore, both be genera, and so, if ' state ' is the genus of virtue, obviously ' good ' is not its genus but rather a dif- ferentia. Furthermore, a ' state ' indicates the essence of virtue, whereas * good ' indicates not the essence but a quality ; and it is generally held that it is the differentia which indicates a quality.

You must also see whether the differentia assigned (d) Observe indicates not a quality but a particular thing ; for it differenUa*^

is ffenerally held that the differentia always sii^nifies signifies a ^^, ./ o particular

a quahty. thing, or

You must also consider whether the differentia JJotiJS^of an belongs accidentally to the subject of the definition, accident. For no differentia is of the number of things which belong accidentally, as neither is the genus ; for it is impossible for the differentia to belong to something and also not to belong.

Furthermore, if the differentia or the species or (e) Observe anything that falls under the species is predicated differeSia of the g-enus, the definer cannot have ffiven a defini- or species be tion ; for none of the above can be predicated of the of genus or genus, since the genus has the widest field of all. IJffereJjfia Again, you must see whether the genus is predicated or species of of the differentia ; for it is generally held that the ' ^^^" '^" genus is predicated, not of the differentia, but of the things of which the differentia is predicated. For example, ' animal ' is predicated of * man ' and of

  • ox ' and of the other pedestrian animals, not of the

differentia itself, which is predicated of the species. For, if * animal ' is going to be predicated of each of the differentiae, a number of animals would be pre- dicated of the species ; for the differentiae are predicated of the species. Further, all differentiae



144 b

oiacpopai TTaoai t) etS-x^ tj drojjia earai, eivep ^cpa' €Kaorov yap tcjv t,cx)wv r] ethos iornv 7) arofjbov. 'Ofjiolojs 8e GK€7Tr€ov Kal el to erSos" tj tcjv 5 VTroKOLTOJ Tt Tov etSov? TTJs" hia(j)opas KanQyopelraL' dhvvarov yap, cTreSr] inl ttXIov tj Sta^opo, rcbv etScDv Xeyerat. en uvfJu^ijaeTai rrjv Sta^opdv et- 809 etvai, €L7T€p KariqyopeiTai ri avrrjs tojv elSajv el yap KaTriyopelrai dvdpojTTos, SrjXov on rj Sta- (j)opd dvOpojTTos ecrrtv. rrdXiv el fjcrj rrporepov tj

10 8ta<^opa TOV etSov?' rod jxev ydp yevovs vorepov, rod 8' eihovs Trporepov rrjv hiacjiopdv hel elvai.

^Koirelv 8e Kal el erepov yevovs r] p7]deLGa 8ta- (f)opd fir] TTepLexofJievov [jLr]Se TrepiexovTOs. ov SoKei ydp Tj avrrj 8ta</)opa hvo yevcov elvau firj

15 7TepLe)(6vTa)v dXXrjXa. el Se jjurj, avfju^-ijorerai Kal elSos TO auTO iv Suo yevecnv etvat (jltj Trepie')(ovoiv dXXrjXa' eTTKJyepeL ydp eKdorr] rcbv 8ia(f)opd)v to olKetov yevos, KaOdnep to rret^dv Kal to Slttovv to i,a>ov Gvve7Ti(j)epei. a)ore el KaO^ ov r] hia<f)opdy Kal rcov yevcov eKarepov, SrjAov [ovv'] on to ef8os"

20 ev hvo yeveoLV ov TrepiexovGLV dXXrjXa. 7) ovk d8waTov r7]v avrrjv Siacfyopdv Suo yevcov etvat fjLTj 7repie-)(ovTCOv dXX'qXa, dXXd Trpoadereov fjL7]S* dpi(f)cjo VTTo ravTov ovrcov. to ydp Trel,6v ^dwv Kai TO TTrrjVov l^cpov yevrj earlv ov Trepie^ovra dXXr]Xa, Kal d[ji(j)OTepcov avrcov iorl to Slttovv

25 Siacfiopd. wGTe TTpoaSeTeov otl jjltjS* vtto TavTO 596


will be either species or individuals, if they are animals ; for each animal is either a species or an individual.

In like manner you must consider also whether the species or any of the things which come under the species is predicated of the differentia ; for this is impossible, since the differentia is used over a wider field than the species. Furthermore, if any of the species is predicated of it, the result will be that the differentia is a species ; for if ' man ' is predicated, obviously the differentia is man. Again, you must see whether the differentia fails to be prior to the species ; for the differentia ought to be posterior to the genus but prior to the species.

You must consider also whether the differentia (/) observe stated is of a different genus, neither contained by ^ame^^^^ ^^^ nor containing it. For it is generally held that the differentia same differentia cannot attach to two genera neither another ° of which contains the other ; otherwise it will result genus, that the same species also is in two genera neither of which includes the other ; for each of the differentiae involves its own genus, for example ' pedestrian ' and * winged ' involve ' animal.' If, therefore, each of the genera, too, is predicated of that of which the differentia is predicated, it is obvious that the species falls under two genera neither of which contains the other. Or, perhaps, it is not impossible that the same differentia should belong to two genera neither of which contains the other, and we ought to add * if they do not fall under the same genus.' For * pedes- trian animal ' and ' winged animal ' are genera neither of which contains the other, and ' biped ' is a differentia of both of them, so that ' if they do not fall under the same genus ' ought to be added ;



144 b

ovTWV dfjicfyw ravra yap djjicfiOJ vtto to t^wov ianv. hrjXov 8e kol on ovk dvdyKrj ttjv hia(j)Opdv ttov TO oiKeXov eTTi(f)ep€LV yevos, eTretSi^ ivhex^Tai rrjv avTTjV Svo yevcov elvai jjurj TTepiexovrojv aAA-r^Aa* dAAa TO €T€pov puovov dvdyKY] ovve7n(f)€p€iv koI

30 rd iirdvo) tovtov, Kaddirep to Slttovv to 7Ttj)v6v ri TO TTet,6v OVV€Tncf)€p€l ^cpov.

  • Opdv Sc Kal el to ev tlvl Sia(f)opdv dTToSeScoKev

ovaias' ov SoKel ydp hiacj^epeiv ovaia ovoias