Intention
From The Art and Popular Culture Encyclopedia
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| "In the [[philosophy of mind]], ''[[intentionality]]'' is the property of being "about" something else, or to have some subject matter, in a certain way. Many states of mind, such as ''thinking about the [[pyramid]]s'', are characteristically ''about'' things (in this case, the pyramids). Other things, such as words and paintings, can also have kinds of intentionality. Rocks and tables, in general, do not have intentional states." --Sholem Stein | "In the [[philosophy of mind]], ''[[intentionality]]'' is the property of being "about" something else, or to have some subject matter, in a certain way. Many states of mind, such as ''thinking about the [[pyramid]]s'', are characteristically ''about'' things (in this case, the pyramids). Other things, such as words and paintings, can also have kinds of intentionality. Rocks and tables, in general, do not have intentional states." --Sholem Stein | ||
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| + | "[[The road to hell is paved with good intentions]]" | ||
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| {{Template}} | {{Template}} | ||
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| * [[Scienter]] | * [[Scienter]] | ||
| * [[Intentional stance]] | * [[Intentional stance]] | ||
| + | * [[Intentional community]] | ||
| * [[Intentionality]] | * [[Intentionality]] | ||
| * [[Intentions (disambiguation)]] | * [[Intentions (disambiguation)]] | ||
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| * [[Intraparietal sulcus]] | * [[Intraparietal sulcus]] | ||
| * [[Mindfulness (psychology)|Mindfulness]] | * [[Mindfulness (psychology)|Mindfulness]] | ||
| + | * [[Motivation]] | ||
| * [[Process art]] | * [[Process art]] | ||
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| - | {{redirect-multi|4|Intentions|Intent|Purpose|Purport|"Purpose" or "Purport"|Purpose (disambiguation)|the concept of philosophy|Intentionality |the song|Intentions (song)|the racehorse|Intentionally (horse)|other uses of "Intent"|Intent (disambiguation)|category=false}} | ||
| - | '''Intention''' is a [[mind|mental]] state that represents a commitment to carrying out an action or actions in the [[future]]. Intention involves mental activities such as [[planning]] and forethought.<ref name="Bratman">{{cite book|last1=Bratman|first1=M.|title=Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason|date=1987|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/braipa}}</ref> | ||
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| - | ==Definition== | ||
| - | [[Folk psychology]] explains human behavior on the basis of mental states, including [[beliefs]], [[desires]], and intentions.<ref name="Astington">{{cite book|last1=Astington|first1=J.W.|title=The child's discovery of the mind|date=1993|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Perner|first1=J.|title=Understanding the representational mind|date=1991|publisher=Bradford Books/MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref> Mental mechanisms, including intention, explain behavior in that individuals are seen as actors who have desires and who attempt to achieve [[goal]]s that are directed by beliefs.<ref name="Malle and Knobe">{{cite journal|last1=Malle|first1=Bertram F.|last2=Knobe|first2=Joshua|title=The Folk Concept of Intentionality|journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology|date=March 1997|volume=33|issue=2|pages=101–121|doi=10.1006/jesp.1996.1314|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c991ca269003383d198ba21d8261ecf99613de85}}</ref> Thus, an intentional action is a function to accomplish a desired goal and is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire.<ref name="Malle and Knobe" /> | ||
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| - | There is also a theoretical distinction between intentionality (intentional actions), and a mental state of intention for the future.<ref name="Searle">{{cite book|last1=Searle|first1=J.R.|title=Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind|date=1983|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge, England}}</ref> [[John Searle|Searle]] (1983) labeled these as intention-in-action and prior intention respectively. Prior intentions reflect forethought about intentions-in-action; prior intentions do not need to be carried out to be considered intentions.<ref name="Searle" /> An unfulfilled intention is a prior intention that has no action associated with it.<ref name="Searle" /> | ||
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| - | Astington (1993)<ref name="Astington" /> outlined the connections between mental states (desires, beliefs, and intentions) and actions carried out by an individual in order to reach a goal; these connections are referred to as the Intentional Chain. The proposed connective chain is that desire causes intention, which causes action, which causes outcome. The Intentional Chain maps the linking of a desire to the satisfaction of a goal via the intermediary intention.<ref name="Astington" /> | ||
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| - | ==The development of an understanding of intention== | ||
| - | Psychological research suggests that understanding intentions of others may be a prerequisite for a higher-level understanding of other people's minds or [[theory of mind]].<ref name="Blakemore and Decety">{{cite journal|last1=Blakemore|first1=SJ|last2=Decety|first2=J|title=From the perception of action to the understanding of intention.|journal=Nature Reviews. Neuroscience|date=August 2001|volume=2|issue=8|pages=561–7|pmid=11483999|doi=10.1038/35086023}}</ref> Theory of mind research attempts to map how children come to understand the mind as a representational device for the world.<ref name=Lee>{{cite journal|last1=Lee|first1=E.A.|title=Young children's representational understanding of intention|journal=Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: The Sciences and Engineering|date=1996|volume=56|issue=12–B|id={{ProQuest|618996982}}}}</ref> This research has focused on the development of knowledge that others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are different from one's own. A basic ability to comprehend other people's intentions based on their actions is critical to the development of theory of mind.<ref name="Blakemore and Decety" /> | ||
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| - | Understanding intention is thought to be pivotal in understanding social contexts in numerous ways. First, acquiring an understanding of intention is important for development in that it helps children conceptualize how people and animals differ from objects. Much of behavior is caused by intentions, and understanding intentions helps to interpret these behaviors.<ref name=Feinfield>{{cite journal|last1=Feinfield|first1=Kristin A|last2=Lee|first2=Patti P|last3=Flavell|first3=Eleanor R|last4=Green|first4=Frances L|last5=Flavell|first5=John H|title=Young Children's Understanding of Intention|journal=Cognitive Development|date=July 1999|volume=14|issue=3|pages=463–486|doi=10.1016/S0885-2014(99)00015-5}}</ref> Second, intentions are integral to an understanding of morality.<ref name=Shantz>{{cite book|last1=Shantz|first1=C.U.|editor1-last=Mussen|editor1-first=P.H.|editor2-last=Flavell|editor2-first=J.H.|editor3-last=Markman|editor3-first=E.M.|title=Handbook of child psychology: Volume III. Cognitive Development|date=1983|publisher=Wiley|location=New York|pages=495–555|edition=4th|chapter=Social cognition}}</ref> Children learn to assign praise or blame based on whether actions of others are intentional. Intention is also necessary to understand and predict the plans and future actions of others.<ref name="Bratman" /> Understanding the intentions and motives of others aids in the interpretation of communication,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Bloom|first1=P.|title=How children learn the meanings of words|date=2000|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YWdBM1FxAQ0C&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false|isbn=9780262523295}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Tomasello, M.|editor1-last=Zelazo|editor1-first=P.D.|editor2-last=Astington|editor2-first=J.W.|editor3-last=Olson|editor3-first=D.R.|title=Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control.|date=1999|publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers|location=Mahwah, NJ|pages=63–75|chapter=Having intentions, understanding intentions, and understanding communicative intentions|chapter-url=http://psycnet.apa.org/record/1999-02439-003}}</ref> and the achievement of cooperative goals.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Jenkins, J.|author2=Greenbuam, R.|editor1-last=Zelazo|editor1-first=P.D.|editor2-last=Astington|editor2-first=J.W.|editor3-last=Olson|editor3-first=D.R.|title=Developing theories of intention: Social understanding and self-control|date=1991|publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers|location=Mahwah, NJ|pages=269–291|chapter=Intention and emotion in child psychopathology: Building cooperative plans}}</ref> Social, cognitive and developmental psychological research has focused on the question: How do young children develop the ability to understand other people's behaviors and intentions? | ||
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| - | === Intentional acts in infancy and childhood === | ||
| - | From an early age, typically-developing children parse human actions in terms of goals, rather than in terms of movements in space, or muscle movements.<ref name="Malle">{{cite book|author1=Meltzoff, A.N.|author2=Brooks, R.|editor1-last=Malle|editor1-first=B.F.|editor2-last=Moses|editor2-first=L.J.|editor3-last=Baldwin|editor3-first=D.A.|title=Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition|date=2001|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|pages=171–191|chapter="Like me" as a building block for understanding other minds: Bodily acts, attention, and intention}}</ref> Meltzoff (1995)<ref name=Meltzoff>{{cite journal|last1=Meltzoff|first1=A.N.|title=Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children|journal=Developmental Moisture | ||
| - | |date=1995|volume=31|issue=5|pages=838–850|doi=10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838|pmid=25147406|pmc=4137788}}</ref> conducted a study in which 18-month-olds were shown an unsuccessful act. For instance, children watched an adult accidentally under or over shoot a target, or attempt to perform an action but his hand slipped. The aim of the study was to determine whether the children were able to interpret the intention of the adult, regardless of the actual action performed. Young children have a tendency to imitate other people's actions. The outcome measure was what the child chose to re-enact—the actual event (literal motions), or the adult's goal, which was not accomplished.<ref name="Meltzoff" /> The results of the study suggested that 18-month-olds are able to infer unseen goals and intentions of others based on their actions. Infants who saw unsuccessful attempts at a target act and infants who saw the target act imitated the act at a higher rate than infants who saw neither the act nor an attempt.<ref name="Meltzoff" /> Similar paradigms were conducted with children 9 months old and 15 months old. Nine-month-olds did not respond to the unsuccessful attempt demonstrations; however, 15-month-olds acted similarly to the 18-month-olds. This suggests that between 9 months and 15 months of age the ability to infer intentions in other people develops.<ref name="Malle" /> | ||
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| - | The development of understanding intention has also been studied in toddlers. As mentioned previously, an intentional action is based on the belief that the course of action will satisfy a desire.<ref name="Lee" /> In that case, what was intended can be interpreted as a function of an understanding for what was desired. When outcomes are achieved without the action of the individual directed at the goal, intention is not attributed to the actor; rather, the event is considered an accident.<ref name="Searle" /> Research by Astington and colleagues (1993)<ref name="Astington" /> found that 3-year-olds are skilled at matching goals to outcomes to infer intention. If another individual's goals match an outcome, 3-year-olds are able to conclude that the action was done “on purpose.” Conversely, when goals do not match outcomes, the children labeled the individual's actions as accidental.<ref name="Astington" /> Children may come to distinguish between desire and intention when they learn to view the mind as a medium for representations of the world.<ref name="AstingtonII">{{cite book|last1=Astington|first1=J.W.|editor1-last=Malle|editor1-first=B.F.|editor2-last=Moses|editor2-first=L.J.|editor3-last=Baldwin|editor3-first=D.A.|title=Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of social cognition|date=2001|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|pages=85–103|chapter=The paradox of intention: Assessing children's metarepresentational understanding|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o_KpN-FeM_8C&oi=fnd&pg=PA85&dq=%22The+paradox+of+intention:+Assessing+children%27s+metarepresentational+understanding%22&ots=8TVIJYcmyS&sig=qDnpF5rDKrQtmAbbLIjQ7aIml9o#v=onepage&q=%22The%20paradox%20of%20intention%3A%20Assessing%20children's%20metarepresentational%20understanding%22&f=false}}</ref> Astington argues that initially desire is undifferentiated from intention in that both function as a goal state. Children then develop a more mature command of understanding other's intentions when they are able to represent an action as caused by a prior intention that is separate from desire.<ref name="AstingtonII" /> | ||
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| - | Thus, research suggests that by the age of fifteen months, humans are capable of understanding intentional acts in others.<ref name="Malle" /> The ability to distinguish between intention and desire develops in early childhood. Gestures and object-directed actions have also been studied in connexion with the development of the understanding of intention. The development of the ability to use gestures and object-directed actions in social situations has been studied from numerous perspectives, including the embodiment perspective and the social-cognitive perspective. | ||
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| - | ===Gestures and object-directed intentions=== | ||
| - | Gestures are often recognized as a tool indicative of higher social reasoning. In order to engage in or understand a gesture, an individual has to recognize it as an indicator of an object or event separate from the self or the actor. It is thought that pointing, especially declarative pointing (i.e. pointing intended to direct and share intention rather than request an object), reveals the understanding of others as attentional and intentional agents (e.g. Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007<ref name=Liszkowski>{{cite journal|last1=Liszkowski|first1=Ulf|last2=Carpenter|first2=Malinda|last3=Tomasello|first3=Michael|title=Pointing out new news, old news, and absent referents at 12 months of age|journal=Developmental Science|date=March 2007|volume=10|issue=2|pages=F1–F7|doi=10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00552.x|pmid=17286836|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0013-2510-1}}</ref>). This understanding is indicated by object-directed reactions to pointing (rather than focusing on the hand).<ref name="Woodward and G">{{cite journal|last1=Woodward|first1=Amanda L.|last2=Guajardo|first2=Jose J.|title=Infants' understanding of the point gesture as an object-directed action|journal=Cognitive Development|date=January 2002|volume=17|issue=1|pages=1061–1084|doi=10.1016/S0885-2014(02)00074-6}}</ref> Pointing is also thought to denote perspective-taking ability and understanding of intention, as the individual must be able to understand that the actor is attending to the object and, perhaps most importantly, that the actor is attempting to communicate information regarding the referent.<ref name="Woodward and G" /> The development of pointing is thought to reach a critical stage at around 9 to 12 months in normally developing children (e.g. Leung & Rheingold, 1981; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Schaffer, 2005<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Leung|first1=Eleanor H.|last2=Rheingold|first2=Harriet L.|title=Development of pointing as a social gesture.|journal=Developmental Psychology|date=1981|volume=17|issue=2|pages=215–220|doi=10.1037/0012-1649.17.2.215|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ac58b11387c7839f27bea04d37c1a78a0eb2805e}}</ref><ref name="Moll and T">{{cite book|author1=Moll, H.|author2=Tomasello, M.|editor1-last=Emery|editor1-first=N.|editor2-last=Clayton|editor2-first=N.|editor3-last=Frith|editor3-first=C|title=Social intelligence: From brain to culture|date=2007|pages=245–260|chapter=Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Schaffer|first1=H.R.|title=The child's entry into a social world|date=2005|publisher=Academic Press|location=London}}</ref>). Liszkowski and colleagues (2004)<ref name="LiszkowskiII">{{cite journal|last1=Liszkowski|first1=Ulf|last2=Carpenter|first2=Malinda|last3=Henning|first3=Anne|last4=Striano|first4=Tricia|last5=Tomasello|first5=Michael|title=Twelve-month-olds point to share attention and interest|journal=Developmental Science|date=2004|volume=7|issue=3|pages=297–307|doi=10.1111/j.1467-7687.2004.00349.x|pmid=15595371|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d3be14ba807aa4cb04148e3b6b30bd32c7f55bf1|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0013-2524-6}}</ref> found that human children begin to point at around one year of age and do so with a multiple motives, including sharing attention and interest.<ref name="LiszkowskiII" /> Earlier pointing may be different in nature and is thought to develop from a learned association between reaching and adult responsiveness to the child's desire for a referent object.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Bates|first1=E.|last2=Benigni|first2=L.|last3=Bretherton|first3=I.|last4=Camaioni|first4=L.|last5=Volterra|first5=V.|title=The emergence of symbols: Cognition and communication in infancy|date=1979|publisher=Academic Press|location=New York|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bD60BQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=pointing%20OR%20gesture&f=false|isbn=9781483267302}}</ref> | ||
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| - | Thus, it seems pointing may be more complex than a straightforward indicator of social understanding. Early pointing may not indicate an understanding of intention; rather it may indicate an association between the gesture and interesting objects or events.<ref name="Barresi and M">{{cite journal|last1=Barresi|first1=John|last2=Moore|first2=Chris|title=Intentional relations and social understanding|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date=2010|volume=19|issue=1|pages=107–154|doi=10.1017/S0140525X00041790}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Butterworth|first1=George| author-link1=George Butterworth (psychologist)|last2=Jarrett|first2=Nicholas|title=What minds have in common is space: Spatial mechanisms serving joint visual attention in infancy|journal=British Journal of Developmental Psychology|date=1991|volume=9|issue=1|pages=55–72|doi=10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x}}</ref><ref name=Moore>{{cite book|author1=Moore, C.|editor1-last=Zelazo|editor1-first=P.D.|editor2-last=Astington|editor2-first=J.W.|editor3-last=Olson|editor3-first=D.R.|title=Developing theories of intention|date=1999|publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum Associates|location=Mahwah, NJ}}</ref> However, an understanding of intention may develop as the child develops a theory of mind and begins to use pointing to convey meaning about referents in the world. | ||
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| - | === Embodiment perspective === | ||
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| - | The [[embodied cognition|embodiment]] hypothesis holds that cognition arises out of an individual's physical interactions with the environment. In this way, environment and behavior are an integral part of cognition and what psychologists conceive of as ‘mental representations’ are indistinguishable from perception and action (e.g. Smith, 2005<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Smith|first1=Linda B.|title=Cognition as a dynamic system: Principles from embodiment|journal=Developmental Review|date=2005|volume=25|issue=3–4|pages=278–298|doi=10.1016/j.dr.2005.11.001}}</ref>). The ontogenetic development of social cognition may be thought of as intertwined with the development pointing actions. According to this perspective, gestures are not just indicators of development but play a key role in how children come to develop advanced social cognition, including understanding of object-directed relations and human intention. In particular, engaging in physical actions oneself may provide insight into the structure of another's actions (eventually leading to a more nuanced understanding of another's mind).<ref name="Meltzoff" /><ref name="Barresi and M" /> | ||
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| - | One method of determining developmental relations between actions and an understanding of social nuances behind actions is to assess correlations between infants’ reactions to actions and the frequency with which infants produce actions.<ref name="Gerson and W">{{cite book|author1=Gerson, S.|author2=Woodward, A.|editor1-last=Johnson|editor1-first=S.P.|title=Neoconstructivism: The New Science of Cognitive Development|date=2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford|isbn=9780199864072|chapter=Building Intentional Action Knowledge with One’s Hands}}</ref> Children are generally able to produce actions around the same time they are considered to be capable of understanding the actions in others. For instance, Woodward and Guajardo (2002)<ref name="Woodward and G" /> found a correlation between children's ability to produce points (either during the experience or based on parental report of pointing at home) and their understanding of object-directed pointing (as evidenced by a preference for looking at a new object rather than a new hand path in a habituation paradigm) by 12 months. In addition, Brune and Woodward (2007)<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Brune|first1=C.W.|last2=Woodward|first2=A.L.|title=Social cognition and social responsiveness in 10-month-old infants|journal=Journal of Cognition and Development|date=2007|volume=8|issue=2|pages=133–158|doi=10.1080/15248370701202331|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e5ebbe4bf0cf26f07ee12b4d0f525a661b9408a0}}</ref> found that infants who produce object-directed points tended to have an understanding of pointing and infants who engaged in shared attention tended to have an understanding of eye gaze. Although the findings are correlational, they support the idea that actions may facilitate cognitive understanding. It is unclear whether self-produced pointing gestures causally influence an understanding of pointing as relational; however, there is experimental evidence which suggests that infants supported in a new action skill will subsequently develop an understanding of that action.<ref name="Gerson and W" /> For instance, infants allowed to grasp objects with Velcro mittens gained an understanding of object-directed grasping.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Sommerville|first1=Jessica A.|last2=Woodward|first2=Amanda L.|last3=Needham|first3=Amy|title=Action experience alters 3-month-old infants' perception of others' actions|journal=Cognition|date=May 2005|volume=96|issue=1|pages=B1–B11|doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2004.07.004|pmid=15833301|pmc=3908452}}</ref> | ||
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| - | === Social-cultural perspective === | ||
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| - | A social-cultural perspective includes the notion that not just actions, but partaking in social interactions and [[cooperation]] (both observing and acting) are key to both ontogenetic social development and responsible for larger cultural institutions, symbol systems, and other human social abilities (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005<ref name="Moll and T" /><ref name=Tomasello2005>{{cite journal|last1=Tomasello|first1=Michael|last2=Carpenter|first2=Malinda|last3=Call|first3=Josep|last4=Behne|first4=Tanya|last5=Moll|first5=Henrike|title=Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date=2005|volume=28|issue=5|pages=675–91; discussion 691–735|doi=10.1017/S0140525X05000129|pmid=16262930|url=http://www.eva.mpg.de/psycho/staff/carpenter/pdf/Tomasello_et_al05sharing_intentions.pdf}}</ref>). | ||
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| - | This social-cultural perspective is derived from the Vygotskian view that higher cognitive functions originate in relations between individuals. The strict version of this view is that these functions are social actions that have been internalized.<ref name=Vygotsky>{{cite book|last1=Vygotsky|first1=L.S.|editor1-last=Cole|editor1-first=M.|editor2-last=John-Steiner|editor2-first=V.|editor3-last=Scribner|editor3-first=S.|display-editors = 3 |editor4-last=Souberman|editor4-first=E.|title=Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes|url=https://archive.org/details/mindinsocietydev00vygo|url-access=registration|date=1978|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Oxford, England|isbn=978-0674576285}}</ref> Pointing, according to Vygotsky, starts out as an attempt to grab a desired object. Then, a transitional gesture develops in which the individual reaches toward the object when it is desired as a cue to another to retrieve it. This transitional gesture, says Vygotsky, is an important step toward language in that participation in these social interactions are internalized and become an understanding of the psychological functions of others. Thus, pointing is an example of the internalization process that occurs over a long series of developmental events. These gestures help children to gain an understanding of triadic interactions, as the gestures go from being simply about the objects to being specifically directed at people and conveying intention toward others.<ref name="Vygotsky" /> | ||
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| - | Tomasello and colleagues proposed a social-cultural perspective for understanding human affinity for advanced social cognition (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005<ref name="Moll and T" /><ref name="Tomasello2005" />). This view takes from Vygotsky's theory the idea that social interactions (such as pointing) are not just indicative of higher cognitive functions, such as understanding intention, but play an important role in shaping them. They argue that advanced cognitive abilities are derived from the tendency to cooperate and engage in collaborative activities (e.g. Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005<ref name="Moll and T" /><ref name="Tomasello2005" />). | ||
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| - | It was originally suspected that such foundational cognitive skills leading to advanced social understanding lie in the human ability to understand another's intention. Humans seem to have an affinity for figuring out what others are perceiving, intending, desiring, believing, etc. For example, the use of symbols requires the ability to understand another's action and attention on an entity in the world.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Tomasello|first1=Michael|last2=Kruger|first2=Ann Cale|last3=Ratner|first3=Hilary Horn|title=Cultural learning|journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences|date=2010|volume=16|issue=3|pages=495|doi=10.1017/S0140525X0003123X}}</ref> However, understanding intentions is unlikely to be a species-specific ability.<ref name="Tomasello2005" /> | ||
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| - | Tomasello and colleagues argue that it is possible to break down the advanced understanding of shared [[intentionality]] into two developmental pathways that eventually become intertwined: | ||
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| - | # The ability to understand others as goal-directed and intentional agents and | ||
| - | # A species-unique tendency to share emotions, events, and activities. Other species, such as great apes, understand the basics of intentionality; however, they do not exhibit behavior that suggests a willingness to engage in shared attention.<ref name="Tomasello2005" /> | ||
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| - | This claim may be further investigated by examining the functional origins of pointing. It is possible that the pointing exhibited by other species is different in purpose and origin from the pointing said to be indicative of a developing psychological understanding.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Cochet|first1=Hélène|last2=Vauclair|first2=Jacques|title=Pointing gestures produced by toddlers from 15 to 30 months: Different functions, hand shapes and laterality patterns|journal=Infant Behavior and Development|date=2010|volume=33|issue=4|pages=431–441|doi=10.1016/j.infbeh.2010.04.009|pmid=20546910|url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01464466/file/Cochet%20%26%20Vauclair%202010%20IBD.pdf}}</ref> The former, referred to as imperative pointing, was originally described by Vygotsky (1978)<ref name="Vygotsky" /> as pointing which begins in an attempt to reach for a desired object. When another retrieves the desired object, the individual learns to associate the gesture (typically hand and all fingers extended outward) with a communicated intention to acquire the desired object. However, research suggests not all points develop in this way. A study by Bates, Camaioni and Volterra (1975)<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bates|first1=E.|last2=Camaioni|first2=L.|last3=Volterra|first3=V.|title=The acquisition of performatives prior to speech|journal=Merrill-Palmer Quarterly|date=1975|volume=21|issue=3|pages=205–226}}</ref> distinguished between imperative and declarative gestures. Imperative gestures were described as those directed at an adult in order to obtain an object, while declarative gestures were those simply intended to obtain adult attention. Both types of gestures are social in nature; however, declarative pointing is thought to be linked to more advanced social understanding.<ref>{{cite book|author1=Tomasello, M.|editor1-last=Moore|editor1-first=C.|editor2-last=Dunham|editor2-first=P.J.|title=Joint attention: Its origin and role in development|date=1995|publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc|location=Hillsdale, N.J.|isbn=978-0805814378|pages=103–130|chapter=Joint attention as social cognition}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Pika|first1=S.|title=Gestures of apes and pre-linguistic human children: Similar or different?|journal=First Language|date=2008|volume=28|issue=2|pages=116–140|doi=10.1177/0142723707080966|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/3d9a516fff3d25f789a74a21f973fa09f0e06d33}}</ref> Declarative gestures may involve more complex social and cooperative skills, linked to the development of communication skills (e.g. Liszkowski et al., 2005<ref name=Liszkowski2005>{{cite journal|last1=Liszkowski|first1=Ulf|title=Human twelve-month-olds point cooperatively to share interest with and helpfully provide information for a communicative partner|journal=Gesture|date=2005|volume=5|issue=1|pages=135–154|doi=10.1075/gest.5.1.11lis|hdl=11858/00-001M-0000-0013-24E7-9|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/707a63edc0cc66d29ab8032896a860a293b104d3}}</ref>). For instance, Camaioni and colleagues found that declarative pointing was related to an understanding of adult's intentions, while imperative gestures were not related.<ref name=Camaioni2004>{{cite journal|last1=Camaioni|first1=L.|last2=Perucchini|first2=P.|last3=Bellagamba|first3=F.|last4=Colonnesi|first4=C.|title=The Role of Declarative Pointing in Developing a Theory of Mind|journal=Infancy|date=2004|volume=5|issue=3|pages=291–308|doi=10.1207/s15327078in0503_3}}</ref> | ||
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| - | According to a social-cultural perspective, it is not the actions of pointing themselves, but the tendency to engage in cooperative actions (as indicated by elements such as shared intentionality and declarative pointing) that determines the advanced social-cognitive status of normally developing humans. These cooperative actions reveal an understanding of intention and may be for the sole purpose of interacting or cooperating rather than achieving an end. It may be that declarative pointing (typically exhibited by normally developing children but not children with autism), rather than imperative pointing, is indicative of the tendency to engage in the cooperative interactions believed to be important for developing advanced social-cognitive understanding. This fits in with Tomasello and colleagues’ conception that triadic social interactions in which child and adult engage in cooperative actions with shared intention are not only indicative of advanced social-cognitive ability but critical to the development of it.<ref name="Moll and T" /><ref name="Tomasello2005" /> During these interactions, children gradually begin to conceptualize both first- and third-person perspectives, gaining a “bird’s eye view” of social interactions.<ref name="Moll and T" /> Both the embodiment and social cultural perspectives share the principle that gestures are not just indicators of development, but play an important role in how children come to understand object-directed relations and human intention. | ||
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| - | ==Gaze and attentional acts== | ||
| - | Research suggests that faces are pivotal in offering social cues necessary for children's cognitive, language, and social development. These cues may offer information on another's emotional state,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Bassili|first1=J.N.|title=On-line Cognition in Person Perception|date=1989|publisher=Lawrence Erlbaum|location=Hillsdale, NJ}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Ekman|first1=P.|title=Emotion in the Human Face|date=1982|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York}}</ref> focus of attention,<ref name=Langton>{{cite journal|last1=Langton|first1=S.R.|title=The mutual influence of gaze and head orientation in the analysis of social attention direction.|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. A, Human Experimental Psychology|date=2000|volume=53|issue=3|pages=825–45|pmid=10994231|doi=10.1080/713755908|url=http://dspace.stir.ac.uk/bitstream/1893/21047/1/Langton_2000.pdf|hdl=1893/21047}}</ref> and potential intentions<ref name=Baron-Cohen1995>{{cite book|last1=Baron-Cohen|first1=S.|title=Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind|date=1995|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref><ref name=Baron-Cohen2001>{{cite journal|last1=Baron-Cohen|first1=S.|last2=Wheelwright|first2=S.|last3=Hill|first3=J.|last4=Raste|first4=Y.|last5=Plumb|first5=I.|title=The reading the mind in the eyes test revised version: a study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger's syndrome or high-functioning autism|journal=Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry|date=2001|volume=42|pages=241–251|doi=10.1111/1469-7610.00715|pmid=11280420|issue=2|url=https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4fb57daf528fbd668853cd619e59ee37aca01548}}</ref> (For a discussion see Mosconi, Mack, McCarthy, & Pelphrey, 2005<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Mosconi|first1=M.W.|last2=Mack|first2=P.B.|last3=McCarthy|first3=G.|last4=Pelphrey|first4=K.A.|title=Taking an "intentional stance" on eye-gaze shifts: A functional neuroimaging study of social perception in children|journal=NeuroImage|date=2005|volume=27|issue=1|pages=247–252|doi=10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.03.027|pmid=16023041}}</ref>). | ||
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| - | Intention may be ascribed to an individual based on where in space that individual is attending. Intention is understood not only through actions and the manipulation of objects, but by tracking eye movements.<ref name="Malle" /> Research in this area is focused on how humans develop the understanding that eye gaze indicates that the observer may be psychologically connected to the referent.<ref name="Malle" /> | ||
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| - | Even as infants, humans are able to follow the gaze of others. Further research has aimed to test whether infants are simply inclined to look in the direction of head movements, without any real understanding of another individual's psychological state.<ref name="Malle" /> Brooks (1999) found that children do not direct attention simply toward the visual hemisphere of novel head movements; rather, children as young as 15 months attend to object-directed eye gaze, suggesting that children are attending to referents to which others attend, and are not simply gazing in a similar direction.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Brooks|first1=R.|title=Infant understanding of seeing as a referential event|date=1991|publisher=UMI Dissertations Publishing|isbn=978-0599235663|id={{ProQuest|304492238}}}}</ref> These results support the idea that infants understand eye gaze as an indicator of another individual's psychological state, which is a basic component of understanding that others may have intentions separate from one's own. | ||
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| - | ==Biological motion and inferring intention== | ||
| - | Neuroimaging research suggests that biological motion is processed differently from other types of motion. Biological motion is processed as a category in which individuals are able to infer intention.<ref name=Blakemore>{{cite journal|last1=Blakemore|first1=SJ|last2=Decety|first2=J|title=From the perception of action to the understanding of intention.|journal=Nature Reviews. Neuroscience|date=2001|volume=2|issue=8|pages=561–7|pmid=11483999|doi=10.1038/35086023}}</ref> An evolutionary perspective of this phenomenon is that humans survived on the basis of being able to predict the internal mental states and potential future actions of others. Research on biological motion has found cells in the primate superior temporal polysensory area (STP) that respond specifically to biological motion.<ref name=Baizer>{{cite journal|last1=Baizer|first1=JS|last2=Ungerleider|first2=LG|last3=Desimone|first3=R|title=Organization of visual inputs to the inferior temporal and posterior parietal cortex in macaques.|journal=The Journal of Neuroscience|date=1991|volume=11|issue=1|pages=168–90|pmid=1702462|pmc=6575184|doi=10.1523/JNEUROSCI.11-01-00168.1991}}</ref> In addition, there are brain regions, including the superior temporal sulcus, that respond to biological but not non-biological motion.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Oram|first1=MW|last2=Perrett|first2=DI|title=Responses of Anterior Superior Temporal Polysensory (STPa) Neurons to "Biological Motion" Stimuli.|journal=Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience|date=1994|volume=6|issue=2|pages=99–116|pmid=23962364|doi=10.1162/jocn.1994.6.2.99|citeseerx=10.1.1.330.4410}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Grossman|first1=ED|last2=Blake|first2=R|title=Brain Areas Active during Visual Perception of Biological Motion.|journal=Neuron|date=2002|volume=35|issue=6|pages=1167–75|pmid=12354405|doi=10.1016/s0896-6273(02)00897-8}}</ref> These findings suggest that humans may have a biologically-based affinity for spotting and interpreting purposeful, biological motions. | ||
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| - | In one experiment, 18-month-olds observed either a human or a mechanical arm attempting to perform actions, but failing to achieve a goal. The children imitated the action to complete the intended goal when the arm was human, but not when it was mechanical. This suggests that from a young age, humans are able to infer intention specifically as a biological mechanism between motions and goals.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Meltzoff|first1=A. N.|title=Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children.|journal=Developmental Psychology|date=1995|volume=31|issue=5|pages=838–850|doi=10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838|pmid=25147406|pmc=4137788}}</ref> | ||
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| - | Humans have a tendency to infer intention from motion, even in the absence of other distinguishing features (e.g. body shape, emotional expression). This was demonstrated in a study by Heider and Simmel;<ref name=Heider>{{cite journal|last1=Heider|first1=Fritz|last2=Simmel|first2=Marianne|title=An Experimental Study of Apparent Behavior|journal=The American Journal of Psychology|date=1944|volume=57|issue=2|pages=243|doi=10.2307/1416950|jstor=1416950}}</ref> they had observers view videos of moving triangles, and found that participants tended to attribute intentions and even personality traits to the shapes based on their movements. The movement had to be animate, meaning self-propelled and non-linear.<ref name="Heider" /> | ||
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| - | Johansson<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Johansson|first1=Gunnar|title=Visual perception of biological motion and a model for its analysis|journal=Perception & Psychophysics|date=1973|volume=14|issue=2|pages=201–211|doi=10.3758/BF03212378}}</ref> devised a way to study biological motion without interference from other characteristics of humans such as body shape, or emotional expression. He attached dots of light to actors' joints and recorded the movements in a dark environment, so that only the dots of light were visible. The Johansson figures, as they came to be known, have been used to demonstrate that individuals attribute mental states, such as desires and intentions to movements, that are otherwise disconnected from context.<ref name="Blakemore" /> | ||
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| - | ==Simulation theory== | ||
| - | The [[simulation hypothesis]] holds that in order to understand intention in others, individuals must observe an action, and then infer the actor's intentions by [[estimating]] what their own actions and intentions might be in the situation.<ref name="Blakemore" /> Individuals connect their own actions to internal mental states through the experience of sensory information when movements are carried out; this sensory information is stored and connected to one's own intentions. Since internal mental states, such as intention, cannot be understood directly through observing movements, it is hypothesized that these internal states are inferred based on one's own stored representations of those movements.<ref name="Blakemore" /> | ||
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| - | This theory is supported by research on [[mirror neuron]]s, or neural regions, including the premotor cortex, and parietal cortex, that activate both when individuals are engaging in an action, and when they are observing the actions of others. This suggests individuals may be simulating the motor movements via internal representations of their own motor movements.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gallese|first1=Vittorio|last2=Fadiga|first2=Luciano|last3=Fogassi|first3=Leonardo|last4=Rizzolatti|first4=Giacomo|title=Action recognition in the premotor cortex|journal=Brain|date=1996|volume=119|issue=2|pages=593–609|doi=10.1093/brain/119.2.593|pmid=8800951}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gallese|first1=V|title=Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading|journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences|date=1998|volume=2|issue=12|pages=493–501|doi=10.1016/S1364-6613(98)01262-5|pmid=21227300}}</ref> Thus, research indicates that humans are hard-wired to notice biological motion, infer intention, and use previous mental representations to predict future actions of others. | ||
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| - | ==Intentions and behaviors== | ||
| - | Although human behavior is extremely complex and still remains unpredictable, psychologists are trying to understand the influential factors in the process of forming intentions and performing actions. The theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior are comprehensive theories that specify a limited number of psychological variables that can influence behavior, namely (a) intention; (b) attitude toward the behavior; (c) subjective norm; (d) perceived behavioral control; and (e) behavioral, normative and control beliefs.<ref>Fishbein, M., Bandura, A., [[Triandis, H. C.]], Kanfer, F. H., Becker, M. H., & Middlestadt, S. E. (1992). Factors influencing behavior and behavior change (Report prepared for the National Institute of Mental Health).Bethesda, MD: National Institute of Mental Health.</ref> In the [[theory of reasoned action]], intention is influenced by people's attitude toward performing the behavior and the subjective norm. However, the level of perceived control is believed to be influential on people's behavioral intention along with their attitude and subjective norms, according to the [[theory of planned behavior]]. Not surprisingly, in most studies, intention is driven by attitudes to a greater extent than by subjective norms.<ref name="Eagly, A. H. 1993">Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers</ref> | ||
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| - | The predictive validity of the theory of Reasoned Action has been examined in numerous studies that have previously served as literature for at least three quantitative reviews. Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) reviewed 10 studies and reported a .63 average correlation for the prediction of behavior from intentions and a mean multiple correlation of .76 for the equation predicting intentions from both attitudes and norms.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Ajzen | first1 = I. | last2 = Fishbein | first2 = M. | year = 1973 | title = Attitudinal and normative variables as predictors of specific behaviors | url = | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 27 | issue = | pages = 41–57 | doi=10.1037/h0034440}}</ref> With similar objectives but larger samples, Sheppard et al.'s and van den Putte's meta-analyses estimated correlations of .53 and .62 for the prediction of behavior and multiple correlations of .66 and .68, respectively, for the prediction of intentions.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Sheppard | first1 = B. H. | last2 = Hartwick | first2 = J. | last3 = Warshaw | first3 = P. R. | year = 1988 | title = The theory of reasoned action: A meta-analysis of past research with recommendations for modifications and future research | url = https://semanticscholar.org/paper/313ab834e300d279339f6c517ea77d1105e4c920| journal = Journal of Consumer Research | volume = 15 | issue = 3| pages = 325–343 | doi=10.1086/209170}}</ref><ref>van den Putte, B. (1991). 20 years of the theory of reasoned action of Fishbein and Ajzen: A meta-analysis. Unpublished manuscript. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands</ref> All these studies have reflected the strong correlation that exists between people's attitudes, social norms and their intentions, as well as between their intention and the prediction of their behaviors. However, these correlations do not remain unchanged across all the conditions in people's life. Although people are likely to develop intentions to perform the action in question if they have a favorable attitude and perceive the behavior as controllable, then people's perception of control would be irrelevant to intentions when people have negative attitudes and perceive normative pressure not to perform certain actions.<ref name="Eagly, A. H. 1993"/> Research has also shown that people are more likely to perform an action if they have previously formed the corresponding intentions. Their intentions to perform the action appear to derive from attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Albarracin | first1 = D. | last2 = Johnson | first2 = B. T. | last3 = Fishbein | first3 = M. | last4 = Muellerleile | first4 = P. | year = 2001 | title = Theories of Reasoned Action and Planned Behavior as models of condom use: A meta-analysis | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 127 | issue = 1| pages = 142–161 | doi=10.1037/0033-2909.127.1.142 | pmid=11271752 | pmc=4780418}}</ref> For instance, the reason you are motivated to have a few drinks after work is mostly determined by several factors. The very first one is your intention. Whether you have a positive attitude towards drinking as it can help you relieve stress and enjoy your time can greatly influence your attitude towards drinking after work. The next factor is the subjective norms around you. The level of intention to drink after work you are most likely to develop is influenced by whether significant people around you also hold favorable attitudes towards drinking and whether society tends to reward people who can drink. The last factor is the level of perceived behavioral control you have towards your intended behavior, more specifically how much confidence you have in controlling how much you will drink. If all of these factors tend to enhance your intention to have some drinks after work, you are more likely to do so. The longer you maintain the behavior of drinking after work, the stronger and more consistent your original intention will become. As a result, the greater the likelihood you will have some drinks in the future. | ||
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| - | How people think about and verbally communicate their own intentions also impacts these intentions. For example, asking a question about prior behaviors using the imperfective aspect of language seems to be able to bring out stronger intentions to perform such a behavior in the future.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Conner | first1 = M. | last2 = Godin | first2 = G. | last3 = Norman | first3 = P. | last4 = Sheeran | first4 = P. | year = 2011 | title = Using the question-behavior effect to promote disease prevention behaviors: two randomized controlled trials | doi = 10.1037/a0023036 | pmid = 21553974 | journal = Health Psychology | volume = 30 | issue = 3| pages = 300–309 }}</ref> According to the ''World Atlas of Language Structures'', "[[Imperfective Aspects]]" refers to a specific form of language structure used for reference to the present and the future but also for ongoing and habitual events in the past. For example, ‘He writes/is writing/wrote/was writing/will write letters.’<ref>Östen Dahl, Viveka Velupillai. 2013. Perfective/Imperfective Aspect. In: Dryer, Matthew S. & Haspelmath, Martin (eds.) The World Atlas of Language Structures Online. Leipzig: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Retrieved from http://wals.info/chapter/65 on 2015-07-15.</ref> People are more likely to interpret the event as ongoing, and likely to resume the action in the future when it has been described with the imperfective verb aspect.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Madden | first1 = C.J. | last2 = Zwaan | first2 = R.A. | year = 2003 | title = How does verb aspect constrain event representations? | doi = 10.3758/BF03196106 | pmid = 12956232 | journal = Memory & Cognition | volume = 31 | issue = 5| pages = 663–672 }}</ref> Similarly, using present tense to describe an action as ongoing may strengthen intentions to perform the same action in the future.<ref>Liroz, F. (2010). Web created by F. Liroz Professor in Spanish Language Department at American School of Madrid, Spain, (date Feb. 6, 2012), http://fernando.liroz.es/m/estverbo.htm</ref> Previous research has showed that both information on past behavior and their attitude towards such behavior play crucial roles in predicting people's future behavioral tendency.<ref>{{Cite journal | doi=10.1080/14792779943000116|title = Attitudes and the Attitude-Behavior Relation: Reasoned and Automatic Processes| journal=European Review of Social Psychology| volume=11| pages=1–33|year = 2000|last1 = Ajzen|first1 = Icek| last2=Fishbein| first2=Martin}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Albarracin | first1 = D. | last2 = Wyer Jr | first2 = R. S. | year = 2000 | title = The cognitive impact of past behavior: influences on beliefs, attitudes, and future behavioral decisions | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 79 | issue = 1| pages = 5–22 | doi=10.1037/0022-3514.79.1.5 | pmid=10909874 | pmc=4807731}}</ref> Recent research done by Carrera and others concluded that verb tense may not have direct influence on intentions, however it could still affect the type of information used as a basis of behavioral intentions. When participants described a past episode using the present tense, they consistently used the more concrete past behavior as a basis for their intentions. In contrast, when participants described a past episode using the past tense, they consistently used the more abstract attitude as a basis for their intentions.<ref name=VerbIntention>{{cite journal | last1 = Carrera | first1 = P. |display-authors=etal | year = 2012 | title = The present projects past behavior into the future while the past projects attitudes into the future: How verb tense moderates predictors of drinking intentions | doi = 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.04.001 | pmid = 23606757 | pmc = 3627212 | journal = Journal of Experimental Social Psychology | volume = 48| issue = 5| pages = 1196–1200}}</ref> | ||
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| - | ==See also== | ||
| - | * [[Motivation]] | ||
| - | * [[Collective intentionality]] | ||
| - | * [[Intention (criminal law)]] | ||
| - | * [[Scienter]] | ||
| - | * [[Intentional stance]] | ||
| - | * [[Intentionality]] | ||
| - | * [[Intentions (disambiguation)]] | ||
| - | * [[Telos (philosophy)]] | ||
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
Current revision
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"In the philosophy of mind, intentionality is the property of being "about" something else, or to have some subject matter, in a certain way. Many states of mind, such as thinking about the pyramids, are characteristically about things (in this case, the pyramids). Other things, such as words and paintings, can also have kinds of intentionality. Rocks and tables, in general, do not have intentional states." --Sholem Stein |
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Intention is a mental state that represents a commitment to carrying out an action or actions in the future. Intention involves mental activities such as planning and forethought.
Intention is also an agent's specific purpose in performing an action or series of actions, the end or goal that is aimed at. Outcomes that are unanticipated or unforeseen are known as unintended consequences.
Intentional behavior can also be just thoughtful and deliberate goal-directedness. Recent research in experimental philosophy has shown that other factors may also matter for whether or not an action is counted as intentional.
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Philosophy
G.E.M. Anscombe made the topic of intentional action a major topic of analytic philosophy with her 1957 work Intention. She argued that intentional action was coextensive with action of which one could ask "why were you doing that?" In the sense that Anscombe meant her question, it was "refused application" by the answer "I was not aware that I was doing that", but not by "for no reason at all". Therefore Anscombe held that it was possible to act intentionally for no reason at all. She also claimed that intentional action was subject to "knowledge without observation", and that all intentional action involved acting under a description.
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Ethics
In deontological ethics the intent of an act is the way in which a maxim is supposed to be executed.
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Experimental research
In recent years, there has been a large amount of work done on the concept of intentional action in experimental philosophy. This work has aimed at illuminating and understanding the factors which influence people's judgments of whether an action was done intentionally. For instance, research has shown that unintended side effects are often considered to be done intentionally if the side effect is considered bad and the person acting knew the side effect would occur before acting. Yet when the side effect is considered good, people generally don't think it was done intentionally, even if the person knew it would occur before acting. The most well-known example involves a chairman who implements a new business program for the sole purpose to make money but ends up affecting the environment in the process. If he implements his business plan and in the process he ends up helping the environment, then people generally say he unintentionally helped the environment; if he implements his business plan and in the process he ends up harming the environment, then people generally say he intentionally harmed the environment. The important point is that in both cases his only goal was to make money.
While there have been many explanations proposed for why the "side-effect effect" occurs, researchers on this topic have not yet reached a consensus.
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Related terms
- In the philosophy of mind, intentionality is the property of being "about" something else, or to have some subject matter, in a certain way. Many states of mind, such as thinking about the pyramids, are characteristically about things (in this case, the pyramids). Other things, such as words and paintings, can also have kinds of intentionality. Rocks and tables, in general, do not have intentional states.
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References
- G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention
- Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events
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See also
- Collective intentionality
- Intention (criminal law)
- Scienter
- Intentional stance
- Intentional community
- Intentionality
- Intentions (disambiguation)
- Telos (philosophy)
- Authorial intentionality
- Intension
- Intentions
- Intraparietal sulcus
- Mindfulness
- Motivation
- Process art
Unless indicated otherwise, the text in this article is either based on Wikipedia article "Intention" or another language Wikipedia page thereof used under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License; or on research by Jahsonic and friends. See Art and Popular Culture's copyright notice.
