Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language  

"What is to be investigated is being only and—nothing else; being alone and further—nothing; solely being, and beyond being— nothing. What about this Nothing? . . . Does the Nothing exist only because the Not, i.e. the Negation, exists? Or is it the other way around? Does Negation and the Not exist only because the Nothing exists? . . . We assert: the Nothing is prior to the Not and the Negation. . . . Where do we seek the Nothing? How do we find the Nothing. . . . We know the Nothing. . . . Anxiety reveals the Nothing. . . . That for which and because of which we were anxious, was 'really'—nothing. Indeed: the Nothing itself—as such—was present. . . . What about this Nothing?—The Nothing itself nothings." --What Is Metaphysics?, 1929, Martin Heidegger

"In his “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1931), Carnap chooses, as examples of metaphysical nonsense, certain sentences from Heidegger’s Was ist Metaphysik? (Heidegger, 1969). This has not normally been taken as a serious encounter with Heidegger’s thought. I wish to argue, on the contrary, that Carnap indeed has a serious understanding and criticism of Heidegger. To this end I will show, first, that both Heidegger and Carnap are reacting against Husserl’s philosophical system, in similar ways and for similar reasons. And I will claim, furthermore, that Carnap understands this, and that he therefore criticizes Heidegger for carrying out their common project incorrectly."[1]