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BOflFS CLASSICAL LrBRART.

AKISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS.

GEORGE BELL & SONS

LONDON: YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN NEW YORK : 66 FIFTH AVENUE, AND BOMBAY: 53 ESPLANADE ROAD CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON BELL & CO.

THE

METAPHYSICS

OP

ARISTOTLE.

ITiteraUg Sranslateb from l^e (SxttK

WITH NOTES, ANALYSIS, QUESTIONS, AND INDEX.

BT THE

llEV. JOHN H. M'MAHON, M.A.

LONDON GEORGE BELL AND SONS

1896

LIBRARY OF THE LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITf.

Beprinted from Stereotfpe.plalet.

MARS 1901

TRANSLATOK'S PREFACE.

The Metaphysics of Aristotle (if we except Kant's Critique^ and certain portions of the works of the Scholastics) embody, perhaps, the only formal Treatise on the Science yet in the possession of mankind. They, therefore, must be considered as one of the most precious remnants of antiquity; but their intrinsic worth can only be appreciated by those who have read them through with care. And this the student will discover, when, after climbing up the rugged mountain- side of abstract speculation, he finds himself standing on one of its summits, beholding £eir and wide the vales of thought spread before him in expanded glory. In evidence of this, he may at the outset be reminded that the subjects treated of are those which have exercised the highest Acuities of the human reason ; and that he will there find an able Beview of the Greek Philosophy ; a Refutation, most complete and elaborate, of Scepticism; a Demonstration, H priori and d posteriori, of God*s existence; an Examinaticn into the relation of Metaphysics to the other Sciences ; an Overthrow of the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato, as well as of the Theory of Pythagoras ; an Elucidation of the nature of the Infinite ; and an Investigation into Truth, in relation to man's Acuities for the attainment of it.

The present Translation was written before I had an opportunity of consulting the labours of my only predecessor

ri translator's prefaoe.

in the same field, Thomas Taylor. Though by no meikns intending to disclaim the obligations subsequently incurred by his translation being placed in my hands, and most sincerely inclined to award Mr. Taylor considerable merit, I cannot help qualifying it with some censure ; but hope I shall not be deemed ungenerous towards one whose inde&tigable exertions contributed so much in his day to the extension of Greek literature.

The great imperfection of Taylor's Version consists in obscurity — consequent, principally, upon little or no care being taken, by a proper arrangement of the text, to notify transitions to new subjects of inquiry. This is a grave omis- sion in the Metaphysics, above all other of Aristotle's works, because the several clauses of this Treatise, it is by many thought with good reason, have been somewhat arbitrarily grouped together. But, independent of this, I cannot but impute to Taylor the want of sufficient accuracy in the verbal niceties of his author, evinced by his too frequent suppression of the force of the smaller particles; a defect probably arising from having allowed his attention to wander too much from the Greek original to the Latin Version. Now, in a translator — ^whose province it is not to slur over any words contained in his text^ — such an absence of precision must be acknowledged as at least injudicious; but it becomes a very serious error, fraught with hurtfrd consequences, to the student of such an author as Aristotle, who seldom uses a word devoid of emphasis, and who seems designedly to have sacrificed all exuberance to the stem demands of scientific brevity. A style so terse and idiomatic, and at the same time so perfect a model of the inherent capabilities of the Greek language, will, therefore, be deprived of much of its peculiar excellence^ if its entire power, as an engine of abstract thought, be not preserved unimpaired imder the new forms in which the translator arrays it. Now in the pages of Taylor we search in *vain for a realization of the

translatob's frbfaob. ^

philosophio spirit, and the bold, argamentatiTe, deoisiTe. almost abrupt tone, which pervade the original.

Practically speaking, then, Taylor is almost useless to the student who, with a desire to construe the original with proper accuracy, is at the same time anxious to acquire a knowledge of the several doctrines established, and the mode of arriving at them. These imperfections I have attempted to remedy in the present Translation, by a close scrutiny of the Greek, and the assignment to each word of its proper force ; by adopting the scholastic renderings of the technical words (in opposition to Taylor, who often discards them for others not so good); by a scrupulous attention to secure for each para- graph an intelligible opening; and, lastly, by Notes and Marginal References. In the Marginal References I have endeavoured to string together the various links of Aristotle*s argument, so as to form one unbroken chain; and thus sought to unravel for the student the perplexities in which he is likely to become entangled. As to the Notes, I trust I may not be accused of presumption in laying claim to some small originality in them. I can, at any rate, disown being indebted for them to Taylor, whose labours in this department are quite unavailable for any useful purpose. Keeping in view, however, the great length to which the text itself runs, the notes have not been needlessly multiplied, and I have only introduced them where some doctrine or allusion abso- lutely required elucidation.

I may add, that in the execution of my task, I have fol- lowed the text of Bekker ; occasionally deviating in favour of Didot, more particularly in the matter of punctuation ; and have derived much assistance from the works of Thomas Aquinas, Brandis, Tennemann, Archbishop Whately,the Rev. F. D. Maurice, and others mentioned more at large at the end of the Analysi& But I might have despaired at ever overcoming the obstacles lying across my path, were it not for the access which I enjoyed to the many scarce exegetical

Ttll TRANSLATORS FBEFAOB.

works bearing on Aristotle found in the magnificent librarj of Trinity College, Dublin.

In conclusion, I have to tender my thanks to William S. Bohn, Esq., for his unwearied vigilance in watching the pro- gress of this work through the press, and for the many improvements suggested by him from time to time; the adoption of which has enhanced the value of the Translation to the Classical as well as English reader,

JOHN H. M'MAHON

S5, Uppsb Qloucestbb Street, Dcbun, Jun€ 1, 1857.

CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

Mak'i natural desire of Knowledge— Sense, inemory» foresif ht— Art compared witk Experience— The sutject-matter of Metaphysics — Ontologv a speciUatire Science —Ontology a Divine Science— The Ancients pure Materialists— To wit, Tbales, Anaximenes, frc— The efficient Cause— Considered as Twofold— Its treatment by Anaxagoras— The System of the Pythagbreans- Eleatic Philosophy— Plato's Theory of Ideas— Plato compared with Pythagoras— Summary of the foregoing —Faults of the early Atiologists — Bmpedocles and Anaxagoras— Attack on Pytba-

foras— Refutation of the Ideal Theory— Plato's System of Form»— Plato on First 'rinciples— Aristotle's Appeal to Antiquity Pp. 1 — 16.

BOOK I. THE LESS.

'^The Pursuit of Truth— Infinite progression of Causes^Degfees of scientifio Accuracy Pp. 47— 68.

BOOK II.

Doubt in relation to Truth— Questions preliminary to Ontology— Apodeiktic Prin- ciples — Doubts in regard of Substances— Mathematical Media— An Genera First Principles! — Anything separable from Singulars t— Mortal and Immortal natures —Are the Causes of these the same f— Entity and Unitv Tiewed aa Principles — Are Numbers First Principles t— Questions respecting nnt Principles . .

Pp. M— 78. BOOK III.

Unity of Ontology as a Science — The subjects of inquiry in OntolMy-— Ontology and Apodeiktic Principles — The first prineiple of Demonstration— Contradictions not Argument— Absolute existence thereby ignored — This denial amounts to Pan- theism — ^And subverts tiie nature of truth — Its practical Absurdities — Sensational origin of Scepticism— Attack on Heraclitus— Theory of the Apparent as True- Arguments against this Theory— No mean between Contradictitm- Recapitulation

Pp. 79-110. BOOK IV.

Principal Cause defined— The term Element explained— Nature defined— The term^ Necessary— Unity defined— Essential Unity— Logical Unity— Entity defined— Identity and Diversity— Opposition defined— Priority and Subsequence— Poten- tiality defined— Quantity explained— Quality defined— Relation defined— Perfec- tion and Termination— Essence, Disposition, Habit— Passion, Privation, Posses- sion — Procession, Part— Entirety — Mutilation— Geniu, Falsehood — Accident

Pp. HI— IM. BOOK v.

Physics and Metaphysics— Speculative Science Threefold— No Science of Aoeident— To deny Accident is Fatalism— Entity in relation to Truth ... Pp. 156—166.

BOOK VI.

{y 'Bnbdivisions of Entity — Opinions about Substance — Substance as the formal Cause- Questions about the Essence— Certain doubts expressed — ^A question about Essence •^Distitictions about Genen^tn — ^Pre-existence involved in Generation — No Gene> ration of Form— A question about Generation — A question as regards Defini- tion—Discussion cf this question— Solution of it— A question about Form- Recapitulation— Question about Definition — Are universals substances ?— This question discussed — ^Its bearing on Idcaalism-^Ideas indefinable— Capacity not BoiMtance—Mrhat Substance is le-eomsideredt Pp. 166— Si 6

a

X €X)NTENTR

BOOK VII.

Substance cognised by sense— Energy in Substance— Import of the name of a thinft — Substances and their component matter— Relation between these two — The gene* ration of Contraries— This subject further discussed . • . . . Pp. 211— 225

^' BOOK vin.

Ontology treats about Potentiality— Rational and Irrational Capacities — The Mega- rian Theory of Capacity— The Converse of this llieory— Transition of Capacity into Action — The nature of Energy — When hare we a Substance in Capacity t— Energy prior to Capacity — ^In definition, time, and substance — Eternal existences prove this— Energy superior to Capacity— Relation of Actuality to Capacity- Akin to that of Truth to Falsehood . . , Pp. 226— 251.

BOOK IX.

Nature of Unity— Unity viewed as a Measure— Is Unity Substance f— Unity as op>

BNied to Plurality — Concomitants of Unity and Plurality — Contrariety the greatest ifference— Opposition of Greatness to Smallness— Opposition of Unity to Plurality — This Opposition examined — Relation between Media and Contraries— Specific Difierence and Contrariety — Contraries belong to Uie same Species— Generic Dif- ference and Contrariety Pp. 252—277.

BOOK X.

What is the Subject Matter of Ontology? — Anything separable firom Singulars f — Are Entity and Unity First Principles? — Unity of Ontology as a Science— Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics — ^Those who deny Fundamental Axioms — Man viewed as a Measure of Tmngs — Refutation of this Notion — Ontology a distinct Science — Hie very Nature of Ontology proves this — No Science of the Accident— Chance as a Cause of Generation — Motion, Energy, and Actuality— The Infinite defined — The Infinite subsists not in Sensibles— Corporeity not Infinity — Motion and Change — No Motion in Action and Passion — Local Contrariety and Succession

^ . Pp. 277—816.

^ BOOK XI.

Classification of Substances— Under Change lies the subject of it— Diversity in First Principles — Principles, Causes, and Elements— Sameness in First Prmciples — God an Immaterial Eneigy— God's mode of Operation illustrated — The perfection of God's existence— The Divine Essence denned — ^Transcendental Substances- Astronomy in relation to Theology — ^Traditional and Fabulous Theology— Certain Psychological Questions — The Good in the Universe — False solutions of this phenomeuon-Valueof Aristotle's account of it Pp. 316— M7.

• ^BOOK XII.

Inquiries pursued in Book XII. — Mathematical entitles not in sensibles— This subject discussed — Relation between these two — ^Analogy confirms the foregoing- Socrates no patron of Idealism — Inconsistencies of the Ideal Theory — Irrelevancy of this Hypothesis — Pythagoric system of Numbers — Questions respecting Numbers — The Incommensurability of Monads— Absurdities of this Dogma«* Do Monads mutually differ? — Numbers do not exclude Ideas — DifBculties peculiar to the Pythagorics— Is Number Finite or Infinite?— Doubts arising ftom the fore- going Discussions — What does Number consist firom t — Discord in the Pythagoric Schools— Idealism noticed once more— First Principles as Universals Pp. 847 — 989.

BOOK XIII.

Contraries as First Principles— Unity, Inequality, Plurality— Are Things Eternal discerptible ?— Relation and Plurality — Different Pythagorean Theories — Numbers and Mathematical Entities— Mathematical Entities and Ideas— The Good • para- mount Principle — No System can rest on a denial of this — The Causality of Numbers— Is this Theory supported by Facts ?— >ltt Practical Absurdity confirmed

Pp. 390-41S.

/LNALTSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICa

INTEODUCnON,

" The Metaphysics of Aristotle," says Mr. Maurice,* i. importanM

• • are troablesome reading, partly from the frequent re- oi^the M6t»-

petitions which occur in wem, partly from the oifficolty P'^J^**"- of discovering a sequence in tne books. Nevertheless, they should be read by anv student who wishes to investigate the questions which bave occupied men in later times."

Notwithstanding, however, their bearing on modem 2. study of mtems of Ontologpr, and their being occu{)ied in the them neglect tV mscussion of questions of vast importance, in specida- ^

tion, at least, the Metaphysics have abnost since the Middle Ages been buried in obscurity, and, with a few brilliant exceptions in Germany,' have been quite foreotten. This neglect has been c;rowing greater and greater from the §me of Cudworth and More, but has been quite confirmed in the present century ; and in Ex4fland, at least, the Metaphysics of Aristotle have been consigned to utter oblivion. One cause, amongst others, that undoubtedly s. partial has contributed to bring tois odium upon the Meta- cause of this physics, and thus to contract their droulation within ^^8^^- a narrow sphere in our countrv, is the absence of any work that would assist the student in tne entire labour of mastering the difficulties, which confessedly he must make up his mind to en- counter in such a task. No English translation, for instance, that can be said really to have answered such an end as this, has as vet appeared;' and thus, whilst other portions of Aristotle's works have oeen illustrated in this way, the Metaphysics have been left to moulder in the dust of our pubuc Libraries, and have encountered contempt disproportionate to their literaiy value — disproportionate when oompu^ with the attention, and scholarship that nave been hvished upon the rest ci the Stagyrite's FhilosopLy.

(1) In liit incomparable Analygis of Aristotle's Metaphysics, to be found in his "History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy/' published originally in the Cyclopsedia Metropolitana.

(S) Bnhle, for example, in his treatise on the " Authenticity of Aristotle's Meta- physics.

(8) In fiset, the only translation extant of tne Metaphysics is that by Thomas Taylor, but— for the reasons already stated in my PreCsce— there is not much to be found then to assist the student beyond an English version not entirely out of the leach of eensure. Further, the scarcity of tUs not ytry commodious yolnm^ giacet it beyond the hands of ordinary purehaseft.

6

X ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLI!*B METAFHTSICS. [BOOK 1»

Attcm ted ^ deficiency it has been attempted to supply by remedyfor u the present Translation ; and the hope of the Translator in the present ig that it may be fonnd nsefal in this way, if not to very iranBiation, profound Greek scholars and Aristotelians, who do not require such, yet, at least, to those students of ordinary attainments, who, however willing to become acquainted with the Metaphysics, are deterred from the undertaking by as well the actual magmtude of the Treatise as the difficulties of the text. A^d, as tlie Analyst. fittest accompaniment to this Translation, the student is

supplied with the following Analysis of the work itself, in which the connexion of thought that runs through the entire is traced, as well as its bearing on Modem Philosophy illustrated. The contents, moreover, of the several books and chapters are succinctly

fiven in the order in which they occur in the arrangement adopted y Bekker.

BOOK I.

1. The Preface The Metaphysics open with a short Preface, inwliich Chap. I. Aristotle secKS to introduce his readers to the plulo- ®°°^ ^- sophy that he is now about to develop for them, and which he implies is quite distinct ^ in its aim from that found in the other portions of his works ; though at the same time inseparably connected with them, as pieces of that vast edifice of knowledge, practical as well as speculative, which it was his ambition to build up and leave behind him for the service of mankind.

2. Aristotle's ^0^ this purposc he endeavours to exalt* as much as object in this possible the nature of the inquiry undertaken in this Preface. Treatise, and he thereby calculated on enlisting the sympathy of his readers in its behal£ Moreover, by thus arraying Metaphysics in an attractive garb, he was enabled to answer mdi- rectl^ tne objections that were afloat in the popular mind against the practicability of their study. Now both of tiiese ends assuredly were answered in this Preface ; for whatever would have a tendency to promote the dignity of Metaphysics as a science, would necessarily exercise a reflex influence in giving a decided answer to all the sneers that might be levelled against it by the ignorant and presuming Sophists.

8. Positive and "^^^^ Aristotle defends Ontology jpositively and nega- negative de- tivcly : positively, by a bold analysis of the nature and

• iSgy! °^ ^^^^' objects of the science ; and negatively, by maMng this

aaalysis subserve as a plain answer to all the cavils of the Sceptics.

(1) This is apparent from his imposition of the term Sophia, or Wiadom, to desif Ute the science under investigation in this Treatise.

(2) Towards the end of chapter i.

'^ii"^/W^f^>J^

BOfbK I.] AJSALYBIB OF ABIBTOTLE'B HETAFHT8I0& H

In this Preface, therefore, to the Metaphysics, we 4. Aristotie't naay lay it down that the chief aim of Anstotle is to W* p*'?i° invest Ontology with its peculiar attributes as a science, "e»<^e- and this, too, for the p irpose that thereby it shoidd be elevated to its proper position amongst the other sciences ; and this he conceived to be tne most effectual rdutation against dl misconceptions as to its expediency, or scope, or general utiuty.

The course, then, whidi Aristotle pursues to accom- 6. How this T^ish all this is as follows : he aims to establish that "™ *• ***n«d- Ontology, or, as he calls it. Wisdom, was the science properly so called. Viewed in relation to the other sciences, it conudned their most absolute eeneralization& The science of Metaphysics might be said to bear tne same relation to ph;^sical or natural science which logic has to psychology. As l^c exhibits the reasoning process* of the mind, and thus iUustrates ite capabilities for the attainment of knowledge, so Metaphysics, as a science, is conversant about the highest and purest aeauctions from ^Lperimental philosophy, and its province is to exemplify those abstract notions and fondamental ' principles which establisn the certainty of knowledge itself. Sense and experience merely' deal with individual instances, but Ontoloey lays hold on what is ue universal element therein, and thus graduafiy mounts up to be, what it is, a science about causes and fb*st princit)le8.

And this vei^ fact, thai Metaphysics is a science of eauses, it is that invests it with its dignity and import- that invelti' ance, and draws the line of demarcation between it and Metaphysics all other sources of information. The senses merely ^p j^^**"*'^' bear their testimony to the particular fact of a particular sensation, but say nothing about the cause. The practical or expe- rienoed-^the common workman, for instance, — understand the domg of a thing, but they have no perception as to the principle or cause of it ; and for this reason we estimate the architect above the handi- craftsman, inasmuch as the one is, whereas the other is not, conversant with the principle or cause of what is being constructed. To attri- bute, indeed, an acquaintance with the cause to an handicraftsman, would be as absurd as if we were to do so in the case of one of the brute creation; for both fulfil their fonctions, whilst acting, wholly irrespective of a knowledge of causes, and what the latter does from blind instinct, the former accomplishes from the mere impulse of habit ; so thai, ^ short, what sheds such lustre on Metaphysics as a scienoe, what imparts such elevation to it, is its being a science con- versant with causes and first principles.

(1) For • most lucid explanation of this point the student is referred to Arch> bishop Whately's " Elements ct Logic," Analytiral outline, where the nature and DTorince of the science are placed beyond the possibii*^ of misapprehension for tht future.

(2) This counexion between apodeiktic principles and the seienee 9t metaphysia bads Aristotle, in the third Book, into a refutation of soeptieiam.

(.t) This is shown In chap. i.

62

/ iii ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE^S HBTAPHYSICS. [bOOK I.

I

7. Confirmation ^^^> indeed, it may be also said that the origin of the of this from tha sciences kindred to aJetaphysics bears the completest kindred testimony to its dignity and value as a science, that

sciences, ^^^ ^^ pj^^ ^^ loftiest faculties of the human mind,

and elevates them above thmgs sensual and grovelling. The sciences kindred to Metaphvsics, from their very earSest dawn, were pursued not for the sake or any extrinsic advantages ; for they sprang up in places where increasing civilisation had supplied the necessary and

even superfluous wants of the inhabitants. Thus it was niatics."* *" that the mathematical sciences took their rise in Egypt *

amongst the priests ; for the sacerdotal caste, naving their worldly expenses defrayed for them out of the pubKc purse, were permitted to enjoy leisure, and thus were induced to cultivate the abstract sciences, not from their mere utility, but from the pure love of knowledge itself, as such.

And this fact it is which, in the most eminent degree, j.whyOntoiogy evinccs the claim which Metaphysics, as a science, has upon us. ™* yxpoD. our sympathies, because it is a purely speculative

science; that is, a science cultivated for the sake of

the knowledge it furnishes its votaries with. And, indeed, beside the particular instance in the case of the Egyptians just mentioned, that Metaphvsics, or any hi^h order of science, is pursued for the sake of knowledge, as such, is in general proved from the origin of specula- tion its^. Eor mimkind, from wonder,' first forms systems of philo- sophy ; and wonder is attended with a feeling of i^orance, as well as a desire to remove that ignorance. Now this desire to remove ignorance, wherever it exists, at the same time manifests the most unmistakeable love of knowledge for its own sake. In short, what is the love of knowledge, but, in other words, the desire to be liberated from the bondage of ignorance P

10. Chap. iL In this way Aristotle strives to place Ontology in its Detailed proof true position of importance amonsst the other sciences.

MeSphysSfs as -^ ^® ^Jy *^* * °^*"^ ^ fr®® ™® is SO for hls OWn

a science, com- sake and not for the sake of another; so Ontology is ^the^s^ie** *^* puTSued for its own sak^ — ^for the sake, as such, of the glorious knowledge which it unfolds. And, indeed, ^ter all, such is its dignity, uiat we can hardly consider it as of human origin; for allowing it this characteristic of freedom just awarded to it, we can with very little probability on our side attribute it to such a source as that of the mvention of man, seeing that human nature is in itself so generally servile; and, besides this, being a science of causes, and God being the chief amongst causes ' — ^now this is the view of the Divine nature that has ever prevailed amongst mankind, — it would accordingly seem thai

(1) Towards the end of chap. i. (2) Fiiie chap. ii.

13) 'O T€ fap Oe^i ioK€i r6 alriov wArcv «ty«M «•# iipxh t(c. Lib. i. c. i}.

aOOK l] ANALT8IS OF ABISTOTLE'S MBTAFHTBIOB. XI il

such a Bcienoe as this is should be what God would be in pos* lession of, as a sort of prerogative of His Almighty power and perfection.

And, f'irther, Aristotle shows how worthy of onr n. ontology u attention and study metaphysical science in reality was, a niier amongst biasmudi as this Wisdom, or Ontology, was, in its own **** »"«»«». nature, fitted to be a regulator — so to speak — ^to all other systems of knowledge. As in the external world, mind rules rightfully oyer matter; and, as in ourselves, intellect — ^if its sway be not usurped by passion— exercises dominion over the body;* so, according to this constitution of things, should the science investigated in this present Treatise be honoured as the oueen of the other sciences,— as that science to whidi the rest should do homa^^ because it is coi>- yersant about those subjects that are most mtellectual in their essence. And, therefore, on the principle just enunciated, of the subordination of the immaterial to the corporeal, decidedly the most qualified to stand at the top of the material and moral, and, in snort, the whole order of mental sciences, is the science of the Ontologist or Metaphysician.

Now, in aU the foregoing reasoning, doth Aristotle's ^ ^ Aristotle's negative defence of Meta^ysics reside by implication ; negative de- fer the completest answer to all objections is famished fence of on- in the proof of the reality and importance of its subject- to hf?pos?tive matter, and its bearing upon the most dienified portions defence, of Human Nature. His master, Plato, for example, in the Georgias, objects to metaphysical pursuits, in their iJj^JSSJfg®' *'*' tendency to incapacitate men for active life. And answered. Aristotle himself notices how sciences, akin to Meta- physics, were invented and cultivated amongst the sacerdotal caste of a nation,' merely from the fact of their not being engaged in active life, but their being allowed to live, by the liberali^ of the State, in the enjoyment of leisure. But, admitting this, is not specu- lation a hiflher region for the range and exercise of man's intellectual faculties^an action f It develops the more noble portions of his nature than can be done by the wear and tear of the world; it holds u]) to his contemplation the purest and most serene objects that the mind of man can rivet itself upon. And, accordingly, the more speculative, in the higher sense of that word, a science is — and what can be more speculative than Metaphysics P — the more entitled is it, as a science, to the respect and ap][)roval and genuine admira- tion of the world.' And as to the exclusive profession of knowledge by any one class in contradistinction to any other, no system of knowledge can be considered as the peculiar pKiSsession of any particular section of mankind : because ^stotle triumphantly shows

(1) As he lays down in the Pontics, book I. chap. ▼.

(2) Thi< has been shown in chap, i- (3) Fid€ eh«p. ii

\\y ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLR'S METAPHTSTCS. [bOOK t

&hat all men^ are actuated with the deeire of knowledge in and fof itself, and that the aspirations thus implanted by the Creator in all could not possibly be desired only for some. On the other hand* the science whicli^ like this Sophia,' or Wisdom, was a fall snpply to these natural yearnings and desires, ou^ht to command the attention of all who wish really to act up to the law of their being, and to march onwards towards that perfection of their social ari intellectual principles to which Nature points them and God calls them.

Now seeing that knowledge for its own sake is thus est «)Wect8 oV agreeable to man, and is held out to him by Nature as human know- a pursuit Suitable to his faculties and jeamin^, surely ledge the sub- that science which contemplates the highest oDJects of Metaphyslics. knowledge ought to be valued, and cultivated, and prized the more dearly, and to be esteemed amongst men as the most worthy of their study and veneration. And these highest objects of knowledge — the highest to which we can soar in this our state of probation — ^these form the subject-matter about which metaphysical science, is conversant, and may be contemplated under the neads of causes, universals,' entity, materiality, immateri- aUty, existence, from the most insignificant traces of it up to absolute existence, — that is, the Supreme Being. 1 K T*o ««w-«f And it is this very subject-matter which determines the

15. ItSSUDjeCt- ,. . . 1.1 Sr i. 1 • J • • T

matter deter- direction m which Metaphysics moves, and gives nse to ^^h? M those subdivisions of the science which Aristotle, it

must be allowed, very confusedly* hints at in the present Treatise. From this subdivision, however, of the subject-matter of metaphysical science we derive its threefold division mto Theology, as it regards immateriality; into etiology,* or the First Philosophy, as it regards first jjrinciples ; and, thirdly, into Metaphysics properly so called, that is, into Ontology, as it regards being audits seversd cour oomitants or species, such as unity, plurality, capacity, and actuality. 16 Ab t h t Having thus determined the setiological aspect of sort ofTames^ Metaphysics, that is, that its essential distinction as a Metaphysic* is scicncc cousists in its being concerned with the subject chapf'il*" of causes, Aristotle proceed to inquire about what sort

of causes Ontology is conversant ; and he lays down that the sort of causes about which it is employed are such as are primary and universal in the most eminent degree. 1 7; This shown And this Aristotle shows to be the case by an analysis from an ana- of OUT uotious of what the qualifications of the " wise

(1) For the aim of Aristotle in these opening chapters, the student is referred to the expositions of Thomas Aquinas, and of Augustinus Niphus on the ProSmium.

(2) For the nature of the *' Wise Man " of Aristotle, the student should consult the remarks of Mr. Maurice in his Analysis on this <erm.

(S) Thomas Aquinas and Augustinus Niphus on the ProSmium.

(4) Thomas Aquinas explains this in his opemng remarks on the Metaphysics.

(5) This term is borrowed from Dr. Whewell.

BOOK I.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE's HETAPHTSICS. X%

inaii" 9fe, as well as by a definition of *' wisdom." We lysis of the view the "wise man" as endowed with universal know- "wise man »* ledge, and the knowled^ which he has acquired we ««* of wisdom regard as difficult of attamment, and beyond the ordinary powers o«  tiis fellow-creatures. Further, we regard his wisdom as evinced in his accuracy of reasoning on scientific subjects, and in his ability to )/ impart his knowledge to his ignorant brethren. And respecting " wisdom " itself, we must define it as a science eligible for its own sake ; that is, for the sake of the knowledge that it mmishes, and not for the sake of the results that flow therenrom. And further, as ob- gerved above, the science of Metaphysics, such as this Wisdom is described to be, is fitted for pre-emmence above the rest of the sciences.

And to apply all this to the matter in hand, we must remember, according to these notibi;is of the ideal of the of these^ana-^° " wise man," that l£e science professed by him, that is, lyses to the Sophia, or Wisdom, or Metapnysics, call it which you ontoioRr'. may, must be a science conversant with what is uni- versal; for what, it may be asked, is there more difficult for men as a subject of knowledge than the universal P for universals are most remote from the common perceptions of sense. And as to accuracy of reasoning, which must neeos, it is expected, be found in Meta- physics, what can involve more accuracy and certainty than those reasonings that are connected with what is primary P And if this science is to be one which is to be capable of affording instruction to others, as sucl^ then, it must be a science of causes ; for persons who understand causes are the persons that reallv can convey knowledge to their feUow-creatures. And what is true of persons in this respect, is true also of Metaphysics as an etiological science ; for the know- ledge it can furnish is the knowledge of causes, and the knowledge of causes is Imowledge in the best and highest sense of that word. And, moreover, if one should define Sophia, or Wisdom, to be a science that is eligible for its own sake, notning is more worthy of the choice of the phiRsopher than the highest objects of scientific know- ledge : and the highest objects of scientific knowledge are universals, things primary, and first principles.

And from all these statements it is demonstrated that, 19. Metaphy- admittinirMetaphvsics to be an setiolo&ical science, that is, »ic8 therefore

• " *^ •' J. 'XT J.I- i al a concerned witi

a science conversant with causes, that those causes must primary and needs be in themselves primary causes, and universal in universal the most eminent and strict acceptation of that term. ca^ises.

Now this conclusion that Metaphysics is a science 20. This deter conversant about causes and first prmciples, points out "/Seteiop-^**' «' the development of the science of Ontology in a direction ment. as showi contrary to the other sciences. For whereas the pri- »« c^iap. ii. mitive sciences rose up amongst men from wonder, that i^, in reality from an ig'iorance about causes, anr % desire to be rid of their per

Xfi ANALTSIS OF ARISTOTL^S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK I

plexity, and attain unto a solution of the phenomenal difiSpulfies; whereas this was the case with the primitive sciences, it is quite different as regards the science of the metaphysician. Ontology, or the science of Metaphysics, on the other hand, starts out from well«  ascertained and admitted causes, and by leading men on to the yeir topmost heights of knowledge, fills them with wonder, as the resuU of their researches, and not as the stimulating motive to inquiry in the first instance.

21 Why Aria- Aristotlc havmg now shown that Ontology, or Wisdom, totie's fourfold scts out ou its investigations from the starting point of enumeration j^^ examination of certain well-ascertained causes, the adopted in the question immediately presents itself, what are we to Metaphysics; re^gard as well-ascertamed causes? And, in the first chap. iii. place, what do we mean, in a philosophic sense, by the

phrase well-ascertained" causes? We mean, those causes that nave been generalized to the utmost, as far as they will go, and then classified under the highest genera to which they can be extended. This question leads Ajristotle to lay before his readers his fourfold classification of causes, which was adopted by his followers, and for centuries after was acknowledged amongst the Peripatetics as a scientific dogma whose authority dared not be impeached, and its reign lasted down to the very a^ of the Scholsustics. 22. What these ^^^ Aristotle, m the Metaphysics, makes the assump- four causes tion of the same four causes as he had arrived at, after ^^^' successive generalizations in his physical inquiries;

namely, as the first cause he sets down the substance and the essence, rriv oviriav koi to ri ^v ilvai ; the second as the matter and the { subject, Tfjv v\rju Koi t6 vTroKcifievov ; the third as the origin of the ^ principle of motion, oScv i; apxrj rfjs Kiprja-tms ; and the fourth is that which is opposed to this, namely, the good end answered by the existence of anything, TcrdprriP hi rrjv dvriKcifi^vrjv alriav ravrjg mu TO ov lv€K€v Koi TO dyoBov. Aristotle still has reason, now as ever, to express himself satisfied with this division of causes, which is based on the assumption of the completeness of the classification of them into those that are formal, material, efficient, and final. V But, further, the decision of this question, that

view of^the'** Ontology, or Wisdom, is a science of causes, wo^d seem Greek phiio- to assimilate it as a science with the speculations of the d?ce5.*' "**™ ®^?y Greek philosophers, because the subject-matter of their inquiries was manifestly after causes of some sort or other. And independent of the kindred nature of the investiga- tions pursued in both cases, it will be of considerable service^ to Aristotle's present Metaphysicil Treatise, to take a review of the Greek Philosophy, because, after all, this may lead to ulterior and brighter discoveries ; and even though it does not, yet it vrill afford

(1) As is shown at the commencement of chap iii

BOOK I.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHTBICS. ZUli

the Stagyrite an opportonit^r, according to his custom^* 0/ emhracin^ whatever is tnie and nsefol in the scientlAc labours 01 others, and (n rejecting what is illasory and false.

In this review of the Greek Philosophy, — a review Qenermi that testifies how completely the Stagyrite nad mastered objection the details, and penetrated mto the spirit of the varions against the systems of his predecessors as well as contemporaries, — w^hy.^*^*'*' in this review, at the threshold of the inquiry, Aristotle states his conviction that the ancients entertained inade<][nate views in etiology, and that the impression that an examination of their works leaves on the mind is, that out of the fonr causes they merely recognised ike material one. This indubitably appears to be true of the very early philosophers ; but is to be received, perhaps, with some modification m the case of those of more modem oate ; for instance, the followers of Anaxagoras, the Pythagoreans, and the Platonists.

But to prove his position Aristotle brings forward 25. inductive an induction of particulars from the philosophic works proof of thi* of his predecessors, thus adopting tne most effectual ®^j«*'"®"5 mode of proof, quite in accordance with his experimental method. The first philosopher that he brings upon the stage is «.^. i^m the Thales of Miletus, one of the most ancient speculators works of that we have any account of, and, in fact, the founder Shales. of this description of philosophy.' Now, this Thaletian philosophy b decidedly materialistic, so far forth as its author endeavoured to fix on some primary element as the cause and original source of all things. But though there may be some foundation in Nature for the dogma of Thales as regards the rd vypop, yet Aristotle considers that it labours under a radical defect arising irom imperfect observa- tion ; and that it is, after all, but a partial statement of the truth.

And to confirm this view, Aristotle brings forward ^^

the system of the old Thec^ny, which represented stance of Oceanus and Tethys as the parent of generation, and Thales con- made water as an object of adjuration amongst the xheogooSts. gods, which of course was selected for such on account of i1^ being the most ancient element amongst all. Passing over Hippo, who is not worthy of any notice, Aristotle adduces the*

S stems of AnAximcncs, Diogenes, Hippasus of Metapontum, and eraditus of Ephesus, to demonstrate further the justice of this criticism on the Ancient Philosophy.

There were other systems, however, which almost ^^^1,^, might be classed amongst these materialistic ones, p^of from because although the germs of a wiser philosophy systems semi- might on a careful andysis be discovered there, yet SJp.'ui! they lurked in those systems undiscovered by their autoors, who put forward these ][rinciples seemingly without any

(1) The eclectic spirit of Aristotle is erdenced in many passages in the Met*. physics. (3) 'o f'm Tuiol ttt u|Mi»i76t ^tXoao^ias*

xyiii f VALYSis OF abistotle's metaphtsios. [book z,

consciousness of tlieir importance, or of their legitimate consequences, but driven, as it were, into them from the nature of the subjects that they meddled with, and by the pure force of reason. Now all this

applies to such systems as those put forward by Empe- eies and others, doclcs and AnaMgoras; the former in his theory oi

Discord and Harmony, and the latter in his recogmtion of the necessity of Mind as an efficient cause in the formation of the Universe. And the case is the same with the Pythagoric doctrine about numbers, and the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato.

And the account of the matter is simply this. Wh^i bimyo?*the" these philosophers advanced in their systems, the continuance of observation otthe actual occurrence of so many physical materSism. chan^s naturally forced upon their consideration the

question, why do these changes take place ; what is the efficient principle of these changes P Tnese changes, it obviously appeared to them, must presuppose an ultimate substance or body as the subject of them; but yet this subject, they must have seen, -^uld not be instrumental in bringing about its own changes.

Notwithstanding this cogency of Reason and of age of Parme- Nature, vet Aristotle is inclined to think that the only Hides material- philosopher who dccid^y in this age recognised the check.^**^**^ * necessity of other causes besides material ones, was

Parmemdes, and that, after all, not even were his perceptions very clear upon the subject.

Prom this philosophic age onwards. Speculation, however, appeared to take a dinerent turn, to flow in a different channel, and tne pure force of truth and reason evidently was dragging men into the proper paths of inquiry, as well as mto an acbiomedgment of the fact that any division of causes which would ignore the existence of the efficient principle of motion must be a ^ossly inadequate one, and adopted from ignorance as well as imperfect observation. Aristotle, at the same time, is constramed to admit that the dif- ficulties of forming any right judgment about the philosophy of the ancients were incalculable, consequent upon the obscurity with which they have unfolded their several theories.

so. The intro- Although Aristotlc seems inclined to award to Anax* ^fflT *? *" agoras the credit of a discovery of the existence in pie^ment^oned" Nature of an efficient principle, vet he states that, prior m chap. ir. to the Anaxagoreau philosophy, Hermotimus, a native of Clazomenae, was in actual possession of an sBtiological theory of this kind. Aristotle, however, does not expect that all may agree with him on this point, and therefore he mentions the surmise put forward by some as to the introduction of the efficient cause by the Hes iodic school, or that sect of philosophers which recognised the principle of Love^ (epcar) as the paramount principle in creation.

(1) The "Love" of the Theogonlsts is not the same as the "Lore" which Piatt introduces into hit Symposium.

BOOK I.] ANALYSIS OF AB1ST0TLFS METAPHYSICS. xll

Be this as it may, it was impossible for these speca- j], what led tc iators to rest content with assigning one cause of the the recognition phenomena of the nniverse ; that is, if they really ob- jfJJ** ^^^' served the phenomena which they professed to give^solu- * tions of. Now the existence of oppK)site and antagonistic phenomena, such as order and disorder, was plain to any observer ; ana this led to the hypothesis of Empedocles, oia discord and harmony, the latter to account for the order, and the former for the disorder of the Universe. This, Aristotle maintains, is the true point of view from whence to regard all' systems of this kind ; this duality of efficient principles was a<^pted in order to furnish a key to unravel the mystery of the actual existence of good and evU, and of the predominance of tho latter over the former.

But still the whole subject was awkwardly handled by .. ^ _ these philosophers, who iight be compared to undisci- IL^l^

S lined soldiers in battle. They, no doubt, professed a handled awk- uaHsm of causes, but they expanded their theories with ^ijS^JiSj^* obscurity ; and the fact was tmit they did not appear to sophert. have broached their opinions on scientific grounds, and the efficient principle that they put forward in their theories, they, in reality, made use of but to a small extent. Witness, for instance, Ana^uigoras, who, though he brings into his philosophy the principle of mind, yet he practically robs it of its essential causalit^ by em- ploying it as a mere machine in the construction of this fabnc of the world. Witness, too, Empedocles, whose causes have activities assigned to them by their author which, in nature, they do not really possess. And the same mode of argument applies to unintelligible s;^stem8, such as those brought forward hj Leucippus and Democritus m their theories about fulness and vacuity, as oeing elements, and of the assimilation of the former to entity, and of the latter to nonentity. There is not much chronolofficml connexion between , «rx, v these philosophic schools and those two which Aristotle schools of pfatc next proceeds to examine ; namely, those of the Pytha- and Pytha-

foreansa^dthePlatonists. The review of these systems, ^^edtoS? owever, is to proclaim the fact that the attention of speculators began to be attracted towards a consideration of thtf formal principle of thinss — ^the wa-ia Koi to rt ^v flvai — another cause tak^ from the fourfold classification already assumed.

The well-known school of the Pythacoric philosophv, 34. sonrce of in Aristotle's opinion, owes its theory siDout numbers to the Pythagorio the zeal witti which the followers of Pythagoras applied chap7v.*" themselves to mathematical studies. From their par- tiality for these pursuits, as well as their constant examination into the properties and relations of numbers, they transferred both to extemalthinffs, and in the phenomena of Nature t^ey began to fancy that they couM discern several numerical similitudes. A nd so bewitched were they with their favourite hypotheses, tha^ they endeavoured ttt

XX ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'd METAPHYSICS. [boOK X.

establish the same in the case of the heavenly bodies ; in fact, thej were for generating the whole heavens out of number.

Now it will illustrate their system to mention the temuiustxated. grounds that they rested the last assumption upon; which was as follows, that the perfection of the decade was an a priori proof of the number of the heavenly bodies. And when this dogma seemed to totter from a want of verification in the case of the actual pheno nena» there being only nine apparent, they were foroed to throw in the Earth to constitute the tenth.

86. What the ^^^ *^® ^®^ ®^ things which these Pvthagoreans •ystem of the took, was t ) regard number as a first principle, and aa ^hagoricg constituting to tilings their matter and passive conditions, y waa. ^^ ^^ elements of numbers they consider^ to be the odd and the even ; of the odd and even they regarded the one as finite, and the other as infinite ; from both together they generated unity, and number itself they generated from unitv. There was another sect amongst the Pythagoreans that recognised ten principles, arranged according to a certain coordinate^ series. Aldn to these speciuations were those put forward by Alcmson of Crotona, who, by the way, derived his system probably from the Pythagoreans ; for he had reached mature age when Pythagoras was an old man. Per- haps, indeed, the truth was that the Pythagoreans were indebted to AlcmtBon for their philosophy. Be this as it may, however, the latter expressed his sentiments m a manner similar to the former. ^ 87 Thephiio- Now, as already stated, this Pythagoric school waa so'phy of Py- an evidence of human investigation busying itself in an tha«orss an effort to discover the formal principle of things ; but it human'hiquiry farther borc testimony to the truth of another assertion travelling in put forward by Aristotle, in regard of the duaHsm direction**' said to be inlierent in the efficient cause, and which

manifested itself in the production of contrary pheno- mena; such as order and disorder, good and eviL

As to the philosophy of Parmenides, which has been of Pumeni^s! &Uaded to above, Aristotle gives his opinion that it has

no bearing upon an investigation the object of which is to discover the existence of some efficient cause, for it quite ignored the phenomenon of motion in its d(^ma about the immobility of the Universe.

89. Who was I* ^ hardly, however, quite correct to ascribe the the author of invention of tms dogma to rarmenides, though perhaps the t6^7 **' ^® ^^ ^^® philosopher to whom we are indebted for an y *' elaborate application of it to the phenomena of the

Universe. Xenophanes (as Aristotle states) was the first person who introduced it ; and the unity (to tv) thus introduced was viewed in the liffht of a rationalistic unity by Parmenides, and of a sensualistio unity Dy Melissus. This school, however, likewise labours under tho

(1) This is the famous Zvaroixia of the J^thagoreans.

BOOK I.] ANALT8IS OF ABISTOTLfi'8 METAPHYSICS. xxi

defect of an obscare elncidation of its theories; and none of its speculators can we regard as likely to ilhimine Metaphysics by reason 01 their researches, if we are to except Parmenides, who was more judicious, seemingly, than either Xenophanes or Melissns.

Again, we find Aristotle, at the termination of this review of the Pythagoric systems, asserting his con- of'thcnS^ viction, that, amongst the earliest philosophers, we can riaUsm of th» only discover a materialistic princime, the source of one UJhy^CTd of or more principles materialistic like itself; that, at a chap. v. subsequent age, we find speculators not merely pntting forward this principle, but along with it a different one, n;4mely, such a one as would account for the orisin of motion ; and this efficient principle with some was considered as single, and with others aa twofold.. And this miffht be regarded as the extent to which the science of Metaphysics had advanced, in those ages, in the schools of those philosophers who had put forward the theories attributed to them; and some of these philosophers, on examination it will be founcC flourished up to the period of the Italic sects, and even inde- pendent of them.

The chief value, however, of the Pythacoric philo- 41, chiefraiuf sophy, as has been mentioned, consists in the specula- of the phUo- tions it sought to establish in rejgurd of substance — of ^^^^g^^ t6 ri •OT4— of the formal cause. They handled this sub- ject, however, as might be expected, with extreme simplicity : and the definitions which they framed of substance were superficial and fieur from penetrating into the depth of thines.

Having thus brought forward the lea£ng systems 42, Review of of the Naturalists, «aA ascertained their merits and thePiatonie defects, and also having reviewed in part the various Jgjj®^ *" theories of the Supranaturalists, Aristotle now comes ^ ^* ^ to the consideration of what with him was modem philosophy — ^the ideal h^rpothesis of Plato. Platonism he r^ards as, in most of its tenets, in harmony with the Pythagorean {)hflosophy ; but still there were many peculiarities to be found therein, which were not shared in common with the Italic sects. The origin of the Platonic philo- sophy, Aristotle is of opinion, lay in a son of reaction against ' the Heraditics, in their theory about the continual flux of things cognisant to the senses. The Theory itself of Ideas seems to have been sug- gested by the speculations of Soorates, and to have been a mere extension of the conclusions he had arrived at in regard of universal definitions.

As to the points of contact between the Platonic and ^^ ^ the Pythagoric schools, Aiistolie remarks that they betwe^n^he^ developed their systems pretty similarly in the main, systems of save inat what the latter denominated imitation, the pJJJ^"*®™*"^ brmer called panicipation; though in reality the same

CI) Tb) iMne asMrtioa is made in iMok XII« 

ZXil ANALYSIS OF AHI8T0TLE*S HETAFHTSICS. [bOOK I

thing was meant by these two technical words, uifiTi<ns and iitBt^, Plato recognised the existence, beside sensimes and forms, of mathematical entities, as intermediate between both; the sensibles were regarded merely as substantive representations of the forms — jtJie forms were the causes of these and all other objects — ^the elements of the one were the elements of the other; the assimilation of forms to numbers, and of unity to substance, as well as the recog- nition of the causality of numbers in respect of tie essence of other things, — ^these assertions of the Platonists were parallel with those of the Pythagoreans. Wbereas, however, the Platonic school sought to establish the existence of numbers independent of sensible objects, the I^ha^rics, on the other hand, affirmed that the former entirely constitute! the latter, and they did not contend for the existence of those mathematical media which the Platonists did. These diverg- encies of the philosophy of Plato from that of Pythaewras, Aristoile considers resulted from the logical investigations whicn were pursued by the former, and totally neglected in the schools of the latter. 44. Service ^^^ ^^^y ^ ^^^ Qucstion should be askcd, what ser-

conferred by vice Plato performed for the progress of metaphysical SphV" ^^^ science, Anstotle replies, that it is comprehended m his

aetiological system, m which the existence of two dis- tinct genera of causes is acknowledged, namelv, the formal and matermi, because the forms were the causes or the substance of thin^, the t6 rl ecrri, and unitj, as matter was the cause that consti- tutea the forms ; so that if this be the case, what novelties are to be found in Platonism that may not be discovered in the systems of the Italics in equal perfection F But, further, as regards their theory, to account for the phenomena of good and evil, the Platonists came short of systemis quite anterior to them, namely, those of Empedocles and Anaxagoras.

^ We have now a valuable summary presented to us by

of thia^Sw Aristotle of the results of the foregoii^ review. In the of the Greek first place, the Stagyrite reiterat&s the justice of the ?hap " vii'^ ^ assertion made in the very outset of the inquiry ; namely,

that aU schools, ancient and modem, prosecuted their »tiological investigations on the assumption of a fourfold classifi- cation of causes — the very same that Aristotle has already established in his Physics. Still, however, their treatment of these causes has been, in general, obscure, and, indeed, partial, for one or two have been exaRed above the rest ; and thus a complete examination of the entire four has been nullified in the several theories of these philo- sophers. The material cause has had abundance of attention bestowed iipon it, and by some it has been considered as single, but by others as manifold. And this may be observed in Platonism, where it is assimilated with the great and *he small — t6 fuya km to \uko6v — m the Italit? schools, who fixed upon the Infimte, the r6 dneipop, as 9ich, in the theory of Empedocles about the four elements, and in

BOOR I.] 4NALYS1B OF ARISTOTLE's IfETAPBTSICS. IXlil

tliat of ABaxagoras, about liis faTomite hvpotliesis of an infinite HomoeomericB. But still the efficient cause has not been entirely forgotten in the Ancient Philosophy, and faint gleams of it maj w discovered in the adoption by certain speculators of sueh principles into their systems as Harmony, Discord, Soul, and Mind. Still less notice has been vouchsafed to Uie formal cause, and the only traces (^ it are to be found in the Pythagoric system of numbers, and in the Ideal HvpoUiesis of Plato. But, after all, even these two schools laboured, under the defects of being partial statements of truth, and it is not so easy to discern in them the material and efficient causes ; at least in the Ideal Theory, Plato does not make the forms as matter for objects cognisant by the senses, and, far from the efficient prin- ciple being discoverable therein, the forms he views as causes of immobility rather. And as to the treatment of the final cause in the hands of the ancient philosophers, Aristotle considers that it likewise has come in but for a small share of attention, and that its nature has been imperfectly examined into in such systems as put forward the principles of Harmony, or Mind, or Entitjr and Unity both together, as such. There is nothing, however, definite in their theories, and any statement of the truth seems purely accidental with them. Thus Aristotle finds reason again to congratulate himself upon the correct view he has taken of the Ancient Philosophy, as to its treat- ment of cauBcs, and, further, as to his own classification of causes, as well as the mode of inquiry adopted in regard of them.

In connexion with this review of Platonism, Aristotle ^ .fij^ge who g^ces at the systems of those who contended for the recognised one unity of the material cause, and that, too, to the exclu- J5**J2p^ J^'® sion of the other three, and endeavours to point out some of their numerous misapprehensions. Amount the rest of theii errors are stigmatized that of nuUifjrin^ the principle of motion, and that of not attributing to things their formal cause. And, moreover, when they micht have invested with the attribute of unity what we would naturally expect to find thus arrayed, by not taking this course, they have mvolved themselves in inextricable difficulties. This is shown in the case of the four elements, earth, air, water, and fire ; and as re^ds the last, this instance brings these philosophers into collision with antiquity, as is proved by the testimony of Hesiod. Nor would the inconsistencies of such a sjrstem of stioloey be dimin- ished by substituting a plurality of material causes in the place Oj merely one, as Empedocles does, nor even by a dualism of such prin dples, as in the theory of Anaxagoras.

And here, again, imstotle has to repeat the grand ^j j^ie grand lurking imperfection in all such systems, namely, that imperfection o. they are completely buried in matter; that they are the wiyphUo- immersed in material speculations, to the exclusion of '^^ ^' others equally important, and the^ have failed to observe, what ia quite apparent in the philosophy ot others, that beside lliose object*

\1

IXlV ANALYSIS OP ARI8X0TLE*S METAFHTSICS. [bOOK I.

•

which fall under the notice of sense, there are others that are coffni- sant by the mind, and that the latter are as real — ^in fact more red-~ as causes than the former. And this school of the Snpranatnralista has achieved much more towards an advancement of metaphysical science than that of these Naturalists or Physicists but just men- tioned.

Now this fondamental absurdity of the Physicists

mental dSfert*^ ^*^ ^^ P^® ^ *^® systems of the SutranaturaJists ; absent f^om for although those of the latter are loaded with incon- th* l^***™* ^^ sistencies peculiar to themselves, and though they may catunai^' appear to put forward strange causes, yet they avoid the

gross error of the former, who are mere Materialists, and this they do because they derive their principles from supra- sensual sources. And this tells upon their philosophy in seneral, and Ls apparent in the wideness of their speculations, and in the boldness with which they have penetrated into the secret of Nature. And, above all, .what fixes a chasm — ^not to be bridged over — between the schods of the Naturalists and the Supranatiursuists is this, that in the latter there is secured, from the nature of their principles, a necessary transition to a higher order of phenomena; and this is the charm of their philosophy, that it opens up to our view a glimpse into the glorious legions of transcendentalism.^

49 Thi ^® whole of the foregoing review of the philosophy

closed byone^of of the ancicnts is drawn to a dose by an examination the Ideal Hypo- into the Ideal Hypothesis of Plato. The inconsistencies thesis in chap. q£ j-y^ hypothesis are unsparingly exposed; the very

arguments brought forward by its advocates in its favour are in reality subversive of it ; it is quite insufficient to ac- count for actual phenomena; it brings nothing forward that can advance the interests of science ; and therefore for each and all of these reasons is by no means to be received with unhesitating assent.

Likewise is the theory of Plato, in regara of the Satonic tenets, assi^ulation of forms with numbers, attacked, and that of ' the generation of mathematical substances. As to the former, he shows the absurdity of investing numbera with the attri bute of causahty,' which they cannot possess. Ajgain, how wiU you secure the production of one form from many, as is the case with the generation of numbers; and besides all this, such a theory pre- supposes the necessity of the existence of some other desciiption of number, besides that which falls within the province of arithmetic. In his attack on the latter, he stigmatises the over-partiality of the Platonists for mathematics, and their making these studies paramount to all others, though they profess to prosecute them merely in su> lervienoe to and for the promotion of the rest of the sciences

(1) Fide concluding remarlcs of this Aaaljraii. (Si Vide book XIII chapter vi

BOOK I.] ANALTBIS OF ABI&TOTLF^S JIETAPHT8IGB.

But, in fact, the Platonic system of first principles in 50. The Pi»- ffeueral may be said to strike at the roots of all Jbiow- tonic dpxai ledge whatever, because it is based on the assumption fi"eS{J*^^^ **"" of the discoverability of the elements of all thmgs, irrespective of their many distinctions and divisions. But how is this to be the case P — ^how is one to learn the elements of all things P for, in such an attempt, it is evident that he must disclaim any pre- vious knowled^ of the matter in hand. A person, e.^., learning geometry mav be acquainted witn other things previously, but not so with those aoout which the science is immediately conversant. He must then admit the impossibility of his acquaintance with any pre- cxistent principles ; and vet on these, as an essential basis, rests every acquired system of science. Every science, in the mode of acquiring it, is attainable by means of previous data furnished bj demonstiation and definition. For as to any innate knowledge inde- pendent of induction and definition, it is quite contrary to our own experience to say that we possess any such ; or, supposing that we do, it is then quite astonishmg that we should ever have been wholly miconscious of our possession of such a treasure.

In conclusion, Aristotle once more appeals to the jj, conclusion history of the Greekphilosophy as a vinmcation of his of book i. the division of causes. He repeats that the ancient or even ^J**"*" modem speculators, with all their ingenuity, could not ^' fix on any other species of cause wmch would not fall under the category of one or other of these ; and no argument lies against this, from the obscurity or imperfection of the early systems. That is to be anticipated. The dawn of Philosophy may be compared to one whose articulation is not very finished or matured ; and for this very reason, because it is its dawn, when we cannot expect to find its principles enunciated with the same confidence and precision as when men have advanced in speculation, and thus achieved, at the same time, the passage of Philosophy from its early child-like simplicity mto the gravity of a more advanced period of its existence.

BOOK I. THE LESS.

l^' order to show the connexion between Book I. the 1. connexion Greater, the analysis of which has been just brought to between a conclusion, and Book I. the Less, the consideration of g^Ji ^\ which will occupy us now, — in order to show this con- Book i. the nejuon, we must bear in mind that Aristotle considers ^^^■•' speculative science, properly so called, to be synonymous ^ with truth. Now, speculative science, m the strictest sense of the word, he has already defined Metaphysics to te; and therefore he must needs

(1) Alexander Aphrodislecsii on thii ^sage, m veil as Thomaa Aguinaa.

XXV i ANALYSIS OP ARIST0TLE*6 METAPHYSICS. [bOOK I

behold Ontology from this point of view. Accordingly, we are now favoured with a short synopsis of the relations subsisting between truth and scientific knowledge in general, and of the influence exer- cised by the nature of the rormer on the progress and destinies of the latter.

. An inquiry into the subject of truth is partly difficult

about truS7 ^'^^ partly easy : this doffma is capable of verification, partly easy and The difficulty that atten£ philosophers in their pursuit 'aMter 1*°^*' °^ truth, is evinced in the fact that no adequate system of it has been successfully formed ; and yet this implies, Ji a certain sense, the facility of such a search. For it shows that many attempts of the sort have been made from time to time, which, though they have turned out to be incomplete, as far as regards the fall attainment of truth, yet have contained in themselves some portion of it, however inconsiderable.*

8 This shows ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ which should teach us the precise the value of degree of value to be attached to the labours oi those previous phiio- ^j^o toil along with us in the paths of knowledge, sop c a ours, f^^ results of their research, when viewed separately in reference to the speculators individually, amongst those who have brought them forward — ^the results may, in this poiat of view, appear insignificant; and yet the entire labours of all together, in their aggregate condition, may amount to something of considerable mag- nitude. It is under the influence of this very principle that Aristotle himself is careful ever to pierce into the very centre of the philo- sophic systems of others, in order that he may, on the one hand, dis- engage therefrom whatever falsehood may lurk therein, and stigmatise it ; and that, on the other hand, by a careful analysis, he may mscover whatever truth they contain, and appropriate that to himself.

4 An impor- ^^® ^^U i^^fort^^t principle is laid down in reference tant principle to the difficulties of Speculative truth in general, and as regards it is this — ^that the caiisc of these difficulties may reside

• '^* ' not 80 much in the things themselves as in the imper-

fection of the faculties of the searchers after truth. And this Aristotle illustrates, with so much reality and beauty, by the case of l^ats, whose powers of vision, he says, bear the same proportion to the brightness of the noonday as do the principles of the soul and intellect to the splendour of the phenomena of [Nature. And, more- over, upon this subject we should remember how, from age to age, successive improvements are being made towards the formation of a system of truth in the world; how one generation avails itself of the scientific discoveries that have accumulated together from preceding ages ; and how all this stamps on truth itself its noble characterof progressiveness.

s. HowAris- Now, Aristotle, having already established the fact ietie comes to that Metaphysics was a science concerned with causes 5

(1) Fide Dr. Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, book II. chap. L

BDOK I.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS. XXVft

tn order, therefore, from this to demonstrate the reality treat about an of Ontology, he proceeds next to show how, in dealing infinite pro- with stiologicaL speculations, we have something definite KJ'e""'®" <>' to treat about, because we must arrive at some ultimate principle, otherwise we would go ujon the absurd assumption of ar infinite precession of causes. The impossibility of this g r^j^ig i„finiti infinite progression,^ Aristotle demonstrates in the case progression of the material, efficient, final, and formal causes. In disproved. respect of the final cause, he proves, with mnch ability, how that such a supposition would exclude the notion of design from the phenomena of the Universe ; and, by destroying the nature of the good (toO dyaOov), would undermine the entire labric of God's moral government over the world. And again, in respect of the formal cause, the same supposition would overturn the reality of all scientific knowledge; for knowledge cannot be attained witnout one's first being conversant with in£vidual objects : and how can this be done. if those objects are infinite ?

Thus having combated the objection' against the 7. How

we

science of the metaphysician, as though it were merely ^ust prosecut* vague and indetermmate, and the creature of his own after ^nSh. fancy, Aristotle glances at what he conceives should be the mode of prosecuting the search after truth, chiefly as a pattern for the imitation of the ontologist ; and for this purpose he points out the dangerous extremes, on the one hand, of demanding more precision than the subject requires, and, on the other, of resting satisfied with less accuracy than is essential for the interests of truth. Thus, some demand exactness in everything, and some in nothing, as being what is to them painful and irksome. This dislike of accuracy, pernaps, may spring from the weakness of their mental powers, in not oeing able lo connect together their thoughts with sufficient close- ness. Bnt a great deal of this is traceable to the influence of habit upon our spectdative systems, and to the fact that opinions may be rejected on account of their strangeness by persons who, were they more familiar with them, mig-ht be more inclined to adopt them. And all this is borne out by experience ; for instance, in the case of the laws where usage reconciles men with flctions and puerilities. So that the chief point to bear in mind on the subject is this, that different degrees of accuracy are to be adopted in the different sciences ; and that, f(»r example, what is suitable for the mathematician in the

(1) Vide Dr. Clarke in his Essay on the Being and Attributes of God, where ne refutes the same dogma.

(2) It is at the commencement of the last chapter of this hook that Aristotle seems to recognise the distinction that has he^n established in reference to hit works as acroatic, or acroamatic and exoteric. As to the nature and objects of this division of the Peripatetic philosophy, the student should consult Buhle in his Fre> fhce to his edition of Arisiotle ; Blakesley on Aristotle, p. 159, (f^om the Metrop Encycl.) published by Griffin ; and Dr. Gillies' Life of Aristotle, prefixed to tb«  tnnaUition of the Politics in ** Bohn's Classical Library."

o2

xxviii ANALYSIS OF Aristotle's metaphysics. [booku.

pursuit 3f mathematical truth, is not suitable for the natural phikn sophcr in the pursuit of natural or physical truth.

BOOK II.

nature ^^^» previous to his entering directly upon this meta- of booViL physical investigation that he has undertaten, Aristotle, lustifledin m accordance with the usage of disputants, deems it •hapter i. rcc^uisite first to clear the way of whatever doubts there are that may, m connexion with Metaphysics, require a previous solution. And, after all, this is a wise way of proceeding in this and in all sciences; for judicious doubting wHl conduct us to the dis- covery of truth, because knowledge is often the result of previous doubt ; * for persons labouring imder doubt feel Uke captives that are loaded with chams, and that desire to snap them in sunder. £ut, at any rate, for scientific investigators to refuse to entertain any doubts in the outset of their inquiries, would entirely cut off all prospects of advancement ; for such might be compared to travellers commenc- ing a journey, but not knowing which was the right road to strike out upon.

2. Doubts Aristotle, accordingly, sets down what he conceives

found in to constitute the legitimate subjects of doubt in con-

book ii. nexion with Ontology or Metaphysics. And, first, the

question may be asked, Is Ontology, as a science of causes, single or manifold?— IS it conversant about the principles of substance merely, or also about those from whence all demonstrative reasoning is derived P And again. Is the science of the metaphysician concerned with substance ; and if so, is it with one or many ? And as regards substances themselves, are these merely those that are cognisant to the senses, or are there, besides these, others, such as forms and mathematical entities ? And again, is Ontology concerned with the accidents of substances, as well as the substances themselves P

Further, a doubt arises as to whether it falls within doubtratated. ^^® province of the metaphysician to examine into identity and diversity, similanty and dissimilarity, and such other topics as the Dialecticians strive to arrive at some con- clusion upon, by drawing their investigations from probable opinions. And again, there is the (juestion as to whether genera aie first prin- ciples, and whether, beside matter, there is any absolute cause or not ; and if so, whether it is capable of a separate subsistence there- from or not, and is single or manifold ? And again, whether there exists anything beside entirety, or not P— what is the number of first

(1) Bacon has a similar remark in his observations on Hypothesis, m the De Auf < viantis. book V. chapter iii.

BOOK II.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S HETAPHTSIOS. XZh

principles P are tbey even limited in number P And again, are the principles of comiptibles and incomij)tibles the same, or whether are ali incorruptible, or of the corruptible are the principles merelj ccrruptibleP Farther arises the question,— one most difficult tc give a reply to, — as to whether entity and unity ccnstitute the sub- sUmce of things P And, again, are first principles universid, or do they subsist as singulars, and if so, whether in potentiality or in energy? And, agam, are numbers, and lengths, and figures, and points, certain substances or not P and if so, are they in a state of actual separation from sensibles or not, or do they subsist as being inherent m them ? ^

Now all these questions are discussed in detail to the end of the Second Book. But even the discussion of cuasion o? the first may be regarded as prolonged throughout the these questions entire of the third. And, indeed, it may be observed, JJJifT}^"**^ '** that the examination of these several doubts reappears in various parts of the Metaphysics, up to the very close of the entire Treatise. These questions, likewise, are mooted merely in this book ; the reasons for and against are fairly stated, and nothing decisive pronounced thereupon ; but, whenever they reappear in the advanced portions of the Metaphysics, it is in order that Aristotle may pronounce his final judgment upon them. The discussion which they do receive in this book is in the order in which they are stated, witn the exception of the last doubts, where such is inverted.

The questions, from the first to that in regard of the genera of substances, we have examined in chapter ii. discussion^' ^ In chapter iii. we have that discussed, in regard to »doptedin whether genera are first principles and elements. In ^°o*^^' chapter iv. Aristyotle exammes as to whether anything subsists inde- pendent of singulars ; whether there is anything in existence besides entirety, t6 awoXov, whether the principles of conru])tibles and incorruptibles are the same ; whether entity and unity constitute the substance of thin^. In chapter v. we commence with the question. Are numbers, and bodies, and surfaces, and points, substances or notP And tiiis occupies the entire chapt-er. There has been a sort of anticipation in the order of discussion observed; and in chapter vi., which is the last in book IL, Aristotle investigates the remainder of the doubts. For instance, as to whether, besides sensibles and media> there subsist forms; how first principles are disposed in regard of their number ;^ as to the mode of tneir subsistence ; and as to whether they are as universals or singulars.

These questions are all worthy of our attention; g. Relative though at the same time some are more so than others, importance of Chapter iy. decidedly contains the most valuable dis- Jfe?tionV'^*^ cussions in the entire of book II.; and which, on examination, wiU be found to have an intimate bearing upon Meta*

(1) Vide book XII. (2) Fide book XI. chap. viii.

AH ANALYSIS 07 ABI8TOTLE*8 ICJETAFHTSIOS. [BOOK H,

physios. ThiB chapter opens with the discussion of the question, as io tho oxistonoe ofan absolute cause independent of matter ; and he hows tho absurdity of supposing that there is not, which would be itivolvod in the necessary consequence therefrom, of there being iinthing in existence that could be cognisable by the mind, but that a^l things wo\ild fall under the notice of the senses. And this would fxolmlo tho possibility of any thing like scientific knowledge; for YOU otitinot call a mere exercise of sense, science. But, besides this, such a Btinposition ends in positive Atheism, for we thereby ignore iho pnsaibihty of tho existence of an eternal and ingenerable sub utanoc. And this is most absurd, because generation presupposes a Sfrnomtori and this process cannot go on in a proffression ad Ttfffmfffm^ out \vc must ultimately arrive at what is everlasting and iugoncrablo. But the most interesting question of all, iVuiInt-xuT* bcH?H\i»c it illustrates the connexion fctween Ontology tt«J>M»t>« <ith\\ and ThcoU^v, is one discussed likewise in this fourtl tV«t»» in chapter ; namolv, as to whether the principles of

«»\«\t>. V. (l^niga corniptilue and incorruptible are one or dif-

fiMvni Aristotle complains that this question, though of vast (mpovtauiH^, has l>ocn overlooked both by ancient and modem phi- losophers.

R. i>i»cuwirtn Now, if we suppose that the principles of mortals oftbu quw- and eternals are the same, how are we to account for

• ^^'" tho difference in kind that subsists between the two, —

what is the cause of this difference ? The old Theogom'sts gave a v'^illy solution of this difficulty, in the essential difference which they sought to establish between gods and men; for it really, after al^ secured no distinction at all between them, and in their system we in vain look for the existence of immc»^ natures. Attempted ^^ *^® solution put forward by Empedocles is polutionof equally irreconcilable; though one is hardly prepared titU dimouity for this in the case of a philosopher whose theories k>-Kmpcdocie8. j^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^^^ consistent with them- selves. Now, Empedocles fancies that he has discovered an adequate cause of this difference in his theory of Harmony and Discord, for he . is for producing aU thingp from the operation of the latter principle jMive the Deity. But this notion is quite subversive of tne essence of the Divine Nature, for it would set God infinitely below any of jiis creatures in wisdom and prudence ; e.^. He would not have a knowledge of the elements consequent upon the non-residence of 10. It i8 con- discord in his nature, for like is known by like. But triiry to expe- is this theory borne out by experience ? Certainly not : rience. [^ Nature the principles of Harmony and Discord have

often results flowing from them quite opposite to those assigred by Bmpedocles. In short, they do not account at all for the cause why «ome thin^ are corruptible and others are incorruptible; and jet ilis constitutes the entii-e difficultv of the assumption, that tht

BOOK III. J ANALYSIS OP ARI8T3TTiE*S METAPHYSICS. XXXl

principles of comiptibles and incorruptibles, of mortal and inmiortal natures, are the same.

Now this question, as has been remarked, is a most n. The im- fmportant one indeed, on account of its theological po'rtanceof character; but still Aristotle displays no more than gx^'i^gj*"" ordinary interest in the discussion of it ; * takes no pains, ^^^ '^^ ' as a Christian metaphysician would do, to make tnis an opportunity for showing the connexion between Metaphysics and Theology, and for explainmff the chief points of his religious system. This we find, however, is the course always' adopted by Aristotle ; he demonstrates the inevitable necessity of tne existence of a First Cause ; having done so, he does not conceive that he is, as a philosopher, called upon to do any more; and thus he omits, perchance he disdains, to enumerate the practical consequences flowing from the establishment of the dogma, that there exists a Supreme Being over all from the beginning.

It must, notwithstanding, be confessed that the 12. This ques- Stagyrite has handled the question with immense tion skilfully abibfy, and his refutation of the solution put forward fhf8™h5fptCT it by the Natural Philosophers is characterised by that

Slain good common sense which Aristotle possessed in so eminent a egree. Do you acknowledge, Aristotle would ask such, the exist- ence of things eternal ? You must do so ; but then, at the same time, to account for their existence you must assume different priaciples from those that you put forward. You must abandon your present theories. They are very ingenious : but speculation must yield to truth ; systems must harmonise with actual phenomena. We cannot do away with facts because inadequate causes are brought forward to account for them.

BOOK III.

Having thus laid before his refers these several ques- .. tions, Aristotle, in the Third Book, proceeds to institute book iii. such inquiries about the subject-matter of Metaphysics, as not merely in themselves render more clear the precise objects and limits of the science, but are also virtual decisions of some of the problems that were proposed for solution in the Second Book.

So that whereas what has gone before is disputative,* 2. Book 11. what follows now is explanatory. And as an elucidation of disputative ;

(1) There have been found several opportunities of making this same remark hn other parts of this Analysis; for example, book V. chap. i. ; book XI. chaps, vii., ▼iii. ; and at the end of the Analysis itself, where Aristotle's Theology is briefly examined.

(2) This, in all likelihood, arose from the fact that Aristotle viewed The?los| physically in contradistinction to Plato, who viewed Physics theologically.

(8) This is the expression of Thomas Aquinas

XXXii ANALYSTS OF ARISTOTTiB'S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK III,

tooox rii. exe- the position that entity, as such, is the subject-matter oi getical. Metaphysics, he in the first place proceeds to show that

although the ens, or to &v, admits of manifold subdivisions,* yet that the umty of ontological science js not destroyed thereby, because its inquiries are prosecuted in reference to entity in one general aspect ; that is, to entity so far forth as it is entity. And this it is which is the grand characteristic difference between Metaphysics and all other sciences, that whereas the latter merely institute a partial inquiry into entity — ^that is, they have only some n-agment of it for their suoject- matter severally — ^tne former, on the otlier hand, deals with it uni- versally, and contemplates entity, so far forth as it is entity, as wel as whatsoever things as are essentially inherent therein.

Thus, to contend that entity, as far forth as it is proonhaf *^* entity, is the subject-matter of Metaphysics, or, in other Metaphysics is words, that it has a subject-matter, is merely what is

?ity -^chap^S" ^^^® ^^^ evcry system of science, as might be shown in the case of astronomy, grammar, dialectics, and me- chanics. Perhaps the best illustration that can be offered to explain the connexion between Ontology and the rest of the sciences, might be drawn from the relation between pure mathematics and any of those sciences where there is made an application of mathematics to the phenomena of Nature, as in mechamcs and astronomy.

It is in this place likewise that Aristotle announces

4. Entity and the syuonymous nature of entity with unity, and how changeable ^'" ^^^^ to speak of a scicnce of entity is the same thing as terms. to spcak of a scicuce of unity. And this will exmaia

why it is the ontologist, in tho prosecution of his inquiries, comes to deal with privation and contrariety. But still all tills need not shake our conviction of the unity of metaphysical philo- sophy, because all such are examined into merely as the affections or passive states of the to ov or t6 tu. Just as in the science of num- bers, oddness, evennes.s, equality, proportion, are investigated into by the arithmetician on the common ground of their all being properties of number as such.

5. Anappa- ^^ there is another analogy which at first sight rent objection would seem to arguc the supernuousness of ontological a real proof of science, but which in reality strongly confinns the

oregoing. ^Qj-gg^j^^ y|g^ . ^^^^ «,^jj]^ jg \q j^g looked for in the

sciences of the soplust and the dialectician. But, indeed, if there was no other argument to prove the necessity of some such science as Metaphysics, one might say with truth that this instance would be sufficient for tliat purpose. For though entity is the subject-matter of both, and both are thus seeminglv elevated to the same position v.ith Ontology, yet their treatment of entity is so very imperfect, so fantastic, so false, that it quite stultifies any speculations they may put forward about the to 01/ or r' 1v. (1) This is controvertea by UenricuB More, in his "Enchiridion Metaphysicom "

BOOKIII.J ANALTSIS OF ARISTOTLE's HRTAPHTSICS. XXXill

Aristotle now approaches the settlement of a qnes- tion, both sides of wnich have been ab:t;ady dLscussed in !„ regard*of book n, — ^and that is ih reference to how far demon- apoideiktic pnn. strative or apodeiktic principles fall under the depart- jj'P*®* ' ^^*'** ment of the science of Metaphysics. And thei-e can be no doubt, Aristotle thinks, out that these do come within the pro- vince of the ontologist to inquire into, not merely from their belong- ing to all entities, as such, but also from their bemg wholly neglected in the speculations of other sciences, such as those of the geometri- cian or arithmetician. The only exception to this statement is the case of the physical philosophers, whose speculations natui-ally con- duct them to an inquiry into these principles; but even granting that they do so, yet they can never investigate them from that point of view from which Ontology beholds them. For, after aU, phybical is merely a subordinate science when compared with metaphysics; for we must admit that there subsists sometliing that belongs to an order higher up, than what is physical, in the scale of being.

Consequent, then, upon tnis connexion between 7 jjow Aris- Metaphysics and apodeiktic principles, Aristotle is led totie is led into to expose the folly of those sceptics who would endea- J/epJJci*^" °' vour, like the Heraclitics, to suhvert the fundamental axioms that are presupposed in every rational discussion, and upon which, as its pillars, the mighty fabnc of knowledge reposes. But perhaps the best apology that can be made for these sceptics is their Ignorance ; and ignorance they certainly do display in denying these mndamental axioms, or, in other words, in supposing that there can possibly be a demonstration of all things. K it be not ignorance not to know where we are to look for demonstration, and where we are not to expect to find it, if this be not ignorance, — and this is what the sceptics are guilty of, — ^pray, Aristotle asks, what is ignorance P

Now the mere statement of what the fundamental axiom is which these philosophers would call in question, mode of refuta- would almost be a sufficient refutation of the entire tion as adopted system of thfeir scepticism; for what can be more utterly ^ap.**iv.^ ' ridiculous, and suoversive of every rational principle, than to affirm that the same thing can be and not be at one and the same time. Aristotle, however, ppceeds to lay before his readers a most elaboi ate confutation of this sceptical philosophy, and, as we shall see, he adapts his modes of attack to the kind of adversary he has to deal with.

Now, persons who say that the same thing may and 9. Contradfc- may not be at one and the same time, affirm that con- ^"^ ^^^r\ tradictions are true ; aiid that contradictions cannot be *' y ® ' ■• both true, Aristotle den onstratcs by seven arguments. And as a con- firmation of the entire, he proves, in chapter vii., that there cannot subsist any mean between conti*adiction, unless we choose to sweep oway the entire distinction that; lies between truth and falsehood.

ixxiv ANALYSIS OF abistotle's metaphtsigs. [book in.

10 First proof. -^^ ^^® ^^^ argument tliat Ari&totle employs out of the seven is founded on the absurdity into which he drags his adversary, by insisting on his imposing some signification »r other on that whjch he says may be the same and not the same at the «ame time. Now, if his adversary will not submit to this condition, there is no use in arguing further with a man of sudi a frame of mind, because any rational discussion with him would be impossible. lint if, on the other hand, he does submit to this condition, ne must abandon his position of the impossibility of there being anything fixed or certain in reason, for his present admission amounts to demon- stration, because he allows of the existence of some definite object. J And from this argument Aristotle draws the two

iiom this proof! following deductions; first, that the name of anything must be significant with the unity of itself ; and, secondly, that to suppose at all that being and not being^ are the same, whether we assume such as being the case nominaBy or really, that such a supposition is entirely repugnant to every "human being who has not tnought proper to pervert his notions of right reason.

The second argument which he brings against these prooff &c° sceptics, is that their assertions are quite destructive of the substance and formal principle of things ; and this is the same thing as to recognise the existence of nothing save what is an accident. This, however, may be turned against themselves; for if they admit the existence of what is accidental, they must acknowledge what is substantive, for the former could not possibly, m the nature of things, exist without the latter. The third argument IS drawn from the fact that the system of these sceptics, if followed ap, must end in an irrational pantneism. The fourth argument rests on the nature of affirmation and negation, and the fifth on that of truth itself.

13 The racti- ^^ sixth argument is entirely of a practical natuie, cai argument for by it Aristotle shows that the indifference which against the thcsc sceptics assume in their opinions they do not adopt sceptic. ^ ii^gjj. ^^^ conduct. For why, he asks, does a man

in his journey to Megara not choose to remain still, and yet be of the opinion that ne is actually journeying thither P If a man, too, walks on the brink of a precipice, you wifl observe the caution which he displays ; it is quite plam that he, therefore, does not consider that it would be equally for his advantage to fall down into it and not to do 30. So that this fact, that men practically recognise one tiling to be more eligible than another, is a proof from experience agamst these sceptics.

14. Last proof And the seventh argument is of the same nature with of the same thc sixth ; for as the latter turns upon the nature of what '**• is better or worse, so does the former depend on what

IS juore or less. A man who says that four and five are the same^ (I) We have a bjrief examination into the subject of "nonens " in book XIII.

^okul] analysis of abistotlb's meta?htsios. jxx\

ioes not make a statement equally false with one who affirms that ^ur and a thousand are the same. So that, like these sceptics, to «ay down that one thing is not that thing more than another, is prac- tically negatived by this gradation in both falsehood and truth, which Aristotle establishes hy the foregoing illustration.

And it is the adop^tion of this very absurdity, which 15. The origin Aristotle has thus finished the refutation of in chapter of the system iv., that he considers has given rise to the Protagorean toS^a^v*^**' system of the truth of the apparent, or, in other words, the dogma that all things are true and fedse at the same tune. To the refutation of Protagoras he accordingly proceeds, having first premised tliat this controversy with the sceptics is modified by the Kind of sceptic you are dealing with ; for some of them will be brought over by persuasion, and others by force. !For example, if persons entertain these opinions merely m)m want of knowing better, their ignorance is remediable; but if they make these assertions merely for telk's sake, you will have to compel them to resign these sentiments ^or more correct ones, through an elenchtical* argument.

Before giving us a refutation of this Protagorean dogma about the truth of the apparent, Aristotle points explained. ^ out the source of this opinion as springing from sensibles. For the same thing may appear sweet to some and bitter to others ; and in general, if all persons were sick or out of their mind except a few, these few would appear to the others to labour under illness, or an aberration of intellect. And this holds good in the case of several of the animal creation, and even with a man himself the same things do not appear the same at different times. So that all this womd seem to bear out the reality of the assertion, that it is what appears to be true that is true. And further, it has produced in men's minds a doubt as to what thiogs are true and what are false. And this has naturally and necessarily led philosophers into a despondency about truth, so that Democritus used to say that there may, perhaps, be 3uch a thing as truth, but that to us it is wrapt in obscurity.

But even after all, this inconsistency in the testimony of our senses would, comparatively speaking, have been invoived*S°' powerless, had not the sceptical tendencies engendered this origin thereby been perpetuated by another opinion, coin- J^®^*^^^**^ cident with this sensational origin of the Protagorean ^ogma ; namely, that sense constituted wisdom and prudence, and that, therefore, the judgment of the senses was decisive in the matter of truth and falsehood.^ And all this is proved by a reference to the writings of Democritus, Parmenides, and even Homer him-

(1) For the nature of this sort of argument, the student is referred to a note on the first chapter of tbe " Sophistical Elenchi> ' in Mr. Owen's translation of Ailstotle'a Organon, ** Bohn's Classical Library."

(2< This was an ancient controversy, whether tho reuses were to 1>« considered tti eriteria of truth, "an seosus nuncU yen sinfc."

xxxyi ANALYSIS OP aristotle's metaphysics. [book in.

self ; so that this system of scepticism naturally arose from con£ning observation merely to objects of sense as one source, and from the ideas which these sceptics had formed by seeing the entire system of nature in motion; for the continued state of change, which was the result of this, precluded the possibility, as they thought, of theie being anything like truth at all.

18. The most But from this last source has proceeded far the most extreme school extreme school of scepticism ; namely, that which num- of scepticism. \^qj^^ amongst its adherents Cratylus and Heraclitns, the latter of whom was rebuked by the former for saying that he could not enter the same river twice, when he ought to have said that he could not have done so once. But though there may be some shade of truth in their notions about change, yea, even ad- mitting that they were entirely correct, yet they should remember that there was a certain substance incapable of motion,^ and, there- fore, truth must be found there at least.

And now, having shown the origin of this opinion of tack u^n the *^6 Protagoreans, Aristotle proceeds to offer a direct Protagorean refutation of it, first, in the difference between sensation chM*v^^^ *° and imagination — alaOrjan xal (^in-ao-ta — which prac- tically we must acknowledge ; for if a man, while he is in Lybia, dreams that he is at Athens, does he, when he awakes, proceed to walk towards the Odeion? The second argument agaiust it may be found in the fact, that the senses themselves are not en- titled to equal authority under different circumstances ; for example, what falls under the sense of sight, the eye can decide upon more effectually than the touch, and the distance as well as magnitude of objects modify the sensations of them. And, thirdly, if this truth of the apparent be allowed, it must inevitably end in a denial of the substance of things and their formal principles ; and this will cou" duct these sceptics to a system of nihilism.

20. Protagoras This Same dogma Aristotle continues his attack liirther refuted upon, in chapter vi. ; first passing some remarks on the in chap. Yi. practical absurdities of this form of scepticism, which, indeed, the sceptics themselves are forced to acknowledge. The mode of attack which he now pursues is to show that, if the truth of the apparent be admitted, all absolute existences are thereby denied; for the apparent may be true, but relatively only to the

Eerson to whom it appears true ; e. g. if one thrusts his finger beneath is eye, objects will appear to him to be doubled, though, indeed, he may prove this sensation to be false absolutely (though true rela- tively), by means of verifying it by the sense of touch. In addition

(1) The necessity of Aristotle's inresting the First Cause with immobility depends m his principle of there being no infinite progression of causes, which tliere would be if he did not, in his generation of the Universe, and the motion thereof, ultimatelv •iriye at a stage where motion had *.ts rise, and beyond which it was not to be fou.d ^now this was in the sphere of the immorable First Mover.

BOOK lY.] AHALTSI8 OF ABISTOTLS's METAPHTSIOS. XXXVii

to all the arguments that have been urged against tliis opinion of Protagoras, about the truth of the apparent, Aristotle's general ground of objection is, that it makes everything relative. And with the statement of this objection he brings to a close his discussion against those who maintained the possibility of opposite assertions 01 the same thing at the same time ; adding, that in the impossibility of this being true was involved likewise the impossibilitjr of con** traries being found inherent in the same thing at the same time.

The question now discussed, according to the arrange- ment adoj/ted, is as to whether there is a mean between mean'betSwn contradiction. And Aristotle decides this in thenega- contradiction? tive ; first, from the nature of truth and falsehood ; J^'ap*"^ *° secondly, from the change necessarily involved in the notion of contradiction; thirdly, from the relation between the understanding, and what may become an object of the understand- ing, — ^which relation is manifested by definition. And this shows the important bearing of definition upon a correct decision in the case ot this opinion, and in respect of all such sceptics the source of refuta- tion may be best drawn from definition.

In bringing book III. to its conclusion, Aristotle •- ^ i i presents us with a sort of summary, or brief repetition, ©fbook iff. of what has gone before in confutation of the sceptics. Some sceptics will have it that nothing is true; some, that all things are true ; and some, that all things are true and all things are false. Heraolitus, for example, in affirming that all things are and are not, seemed to make all things true; but Auaxagoras, in his tenet of there being a mean between contradiction, would constitute aU things as false.

As Aristotle, however, has stated at the very outset ^^ Deflnitio of this investigation, in chapter iy., that we must affix asaninstm- Bome signification or other to what is said to exist and ™en* fo' «ft>t- not to exist at the same time ; so has he repeated this *°8 *»»« »««?"«• in what he has said, in chapter viL, on the importance of definition : and he now, in conclusion, reiterates this assertion, and puts forward definition as the grand instrument to employ with these sceptics; and he further illustrates his position from the phenomena of rest and motJODL

BOOK IV.

AuiSTOTLE having now given his readers some idea as j. i>],e natura to the mode in wmch metaphysical science carries on of book iv. a«  its investigations, proceeds now to enumerate some of nmons*^^***^" the particulars about which those investigations are concerned ; so that in book IY., which is purely a book of defini* tions, we may consider ourselves as furnished with a sort oi termi

XZXVlii ANALTSIS OF ARISTOTLB*S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK T

iiology or glossary of the leading technical terms of the science. A methodical analysis of each of these terms would be-merely a tran- script of what may be found in the body of the Translation itself; but in its stead will be given an enumeration of all the terms defined, and some remarks on those amongst them that may be considered as the most important in their connexion with Metaphysics. s. Thirty words The terms defined are thirty in number, and are ss

defined in foUoW :-—

book lY.

I. Principle. II. Cause.

III. Element.

IV. Nature. V. Necessity.

VI. Unity. VII. Entity. VIII. Substance. IX. Sameness. X. Opposition.

XI. Priority and Subsequence. XII. PotentiaUty.

XIII. Quantity.

XIV. Quality. XV. Relation.

XVI. Perfection. XVII. Boundary. XVIII. <' The accovdiflg to Trhieh.** XIX. Disposition. XX. Habit. XXI. Passion. XXII. Privation.

XXIII. Possession.

XXIV. Procession. XXV. Part.

XXVI. Whole. XXVII. Mutilation. XXVIII. Genus.

XXIX. Falsehood.

XXX. Accident.

8. Reiatireim- ^^^ numbers prefixed denote the chapters in which p'ortance of these terms are severally defined : they are all most these terms, important and worthy of our attention, particularly the definitions of Nature and Necessity. The first term defined, namely, dp}^if, or first principle, is one of the highest generalizations about which metaphysical science is in the most eminent degree conversant. Aristotle's analysis of this word is remarkable for the association which he makes of it with the good, r6 dyaOov, and free will. In short, under the aspect of a first principle, he wlQ view Nature, and Intellect, and Free-will, and the Final Cause. As to the meaning of the term Nature, one chief sense of it is the substance of those things that contain in themselves the first principle of motion. The chapter on Necessity, elsewhere stated,' is most valuable, chiefly from the ethical point of view from whence Aristotle beholds the word dvayKoSos under definition. Worthy of note, too, is the chapter on Priority and Subsequence, as well as that on Poteu- tialitv or Capacity; likewise the chapters on Relation, Entirety, and Mutilation.

1. Nature of Kx)k V.

BOOK V.

After this Book of Definitions, Aristotle proceeds to enter more fully into the subject he has taken in hand ; and in resuming the consideration of it, which to a (1) In » note on elup. ▼. book IV. ; vide Translation.

BOOK v.] ANALYSIS OF ARlSTOTL£*B METAPHYBICB. .XXXtS

certain extent was interrupted by the last book, he reaffirms what he has already proved, and that is, that entity, as snch, is the subject^ matter of Metaphysics as a science. Other sciences may institute an examination into some one genus of entity, but Ontology takes cognisance of entity universally— entity, as such, simply considered.

But an a fortiori proof of this may be derived from - ^ > . . physics, which, although it might seem, from its beinc: proof that^n- a speculative science, to argue the superfluousness of toiogy is a sci- ontology,* nevertheless proves that there must exist some ^Jp^i ®°^'^' science to contemplate entity in its entirety, for that only a certain genus of it comes under its own province; viz. that sort of entity that is endued with the capacity of receiving tho motion that may be impressed upon it. And the same may be made to appear in the mode of definition adopted by physical inquirers, for the aspect in which they look at things is in that of their connexion with matter ; and therefore there must be^ some science to take cognisance of the immaterial element in entities which will frame its definitions in reference to the formal principles of things. Now this science is the science of the ontologist. The foregoing reason- ing might be confirmed from the instance of mathematical science Lkewise.

But now the whole matter comes to this. We all s. Proper way acknowledge that every science has its own proper of settling tii subject-matter. Physics deal with motive and mate- ^"®***on. rial natures ; mathematics with immobile but yet material substances ; and so forth in other sciences. Yet there is a something that is not merely immovable, but eternal and immaterial, and yet there is nc science to examine into it. Its existence is just as real, thougl* perhaps not quite so obvious as things movable and material, ana therefore the science that takes cognisance of it b just as resd too, and this is the science of the metaphysician.

And these comparisons between physical, mathe- matical, and metaphysical science bring into light the divisiorf of the threefold division oi speculative philosophy into these speculative three very sciences ; namely. Physics, Mathematics, and oJ^chap* 'i ^^^ Metaphysics. The last, however, which is conversant with supra-sensual things must of course institute an inquiry into what may be discovered at the very summit of "Being," and that is what is Divine, and so, in general, into the nature of God, and Meta- physics in this point of view may be styled a science of Theology.

in thus admitting the theological character * of Meta- 5 Admissions physics, and also that Metaphysics, in this point of view, involved in this was amongst the whole order of speculative sciences, division as.

(1) Aristotle's doctrine, however, is that Metaphysics is a transition from Physics to a higher order of phenomena.

(2) The student.is referred to the xemarka on Aristotle's Theology at the close od tills Analysis.

Zi AJTAliTSIS OF AUlSTOTIiSrS METAPSTSIOS. [bOOK V.

'^Ki** * f* *^® ^^® ^^^^ eligible and most entitled to our love and Theology to reverence, Aristotle allows that the discussion of God's Metaphysics, existence and attributes falls necessarily within the pro- vince of the metaphysician. We might, then, expect to find an in- quiry of the sort in this portion of Aristotle^s works, where so fitting an opportunity piesentea itself of his saying something on the subject; but one in vain tries to discover any such investigation. Aristotle could have shown how some mediating principle mi^t have been dis- covered between man's mental and moral faculties, m the fact of our ascending up to a knowledge of God through the exercise^ of reason. Several moral motives might be assigned as sure to act on the heart, in consequence of this previous conclusion at the head. Thus Aris- totle might have gratified his propensity for system, by showing the mutual bond of connexion between ethics and metaphysics through the th^logical element in the science of the latter. That he did not do so, however, is some proof of the vagueness, and looseness, and scantiness of las Theology, and, therefore, for practical purposes, its utter inutility.

No doubt he would have said that he had sufficiently totie would" discussed those subjects that affected the DracticaJ defiend himself interests of mankind in his ethical writings ; out this

• • ^*(ien * would be no apology for the omission complained of ;

mo ern. ^^^ though he nas perhaps touched on this subject in

his Ethics and Politics, yet he has his eye fixed on man merely in his Bocial and con^regative capacity to the total exclusion of him, con- sidered as a religious being.'

f . Book V. -"^^ ^ return to the Metaphysics, from the point that

ciiap. ii. No has given rise to this digression, will bring us to the Mddent°/ **** second chapter of book V. In this second chapter Aristotle shows that though physics is conversant about things that, in their mode of subsistence, admit of accidents, yet that there cannot be a science of accidents ; but the true way to state the matter is, to say that there must be a science of that which is neces- sarily presupposed in accidents, that is, substance, and this science is the science oi Metaphysics.

Wh the ?* ^ ®^ account of one of the denominations of entity

•iiencJof the |>eing according to the accident that Aristotle is led accident is into the inquiry about the science of the accidental ; Skitton!' and the result of this inquiry is, that consequent upon there being no science of the accident, tliis is one of the aspects of entity, the consideration of which will be omitted in the Metaphysics.

(1) This method has heen adopted in many of the schools of German philosophy U is, in the present day, however, a settled question that the hprUyri demonstratioi If God s existence must necessarily he an impossibility. Vide Sir William Hamil- Irn's Dissertation on the •♦ Unconditioned" in his Review of Cousin.

(S) FMf« Cicero De Naturft, lib. I chap. ztL

BOOK V.J ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLe'S HETAPUTSICS. lU

That there is no science of the accident, Aristotle proves by induction from the other sciences, not one of ig iw^gVienoTnf which, practical or speculative, is concerned with the the accident accident, as might be shown in the instances of geo- p"*^®^' metry and of architectural science : the former has nothing to do with what may be accidental with geometric figures, and the latter with what may be an accident to the buildings that are constructed. And all is confirmed from the authority of Plato, who makes the science t)f the sophist, which is not real but apparent science, to be a science i)f the accident. Further, the very nature and cause of the accident reader it an impossibility that there should be a science of it, for in its nature it approximates to nonentity,^ and its cause is not a cause operating always or for the most pirt. Every science, however, is conversant about some sort of entity or other, and about that which subsists either always, or as ii were for the most part ; for this is requisite for the formation of its definitions, as well as for the possi- bihty of its knowledge being acquired or communicated to another.

It is, then, as Aristotle has proved, a settled point, that there is no science of the accident, and that entity, existence of the from this point of view, may be omitted ; but yet all accident an this is no argument acainst the accident itself, which *^*"<^»'y- has been abresSy defined in book IV. chap. xxx. For to adopt the hypothesis of the non-existence of what is accidental, would be to sav that all things arise from necessity, as Aristotle illustrates, bv asking the question, "Will such a man die by disease or violence ? and snows the chain of contingencies that runs through the circum- stances that may bring about the one result or the other. The accident itself, then, certainly exists, and it would be an interesting investigation to determine under what class of caiLse we are to arrange it, whether under that of the material cause, or the final, or the efficient.

But besides this aspect of entitv, there is another of it, which Aristotle omits the consiaeration of, but which aspectl^of the is acquiesced in by the Platonists, namely, its being t6 hv omitted viewed as a sort of synonyme with truth, and nonentity ihapav"*^^" as the same with falsehood. But the truth and false- hood in this case is merely subjective, whereas the metaphysician regards entity objectively ; and besides, this consideration of entity amounts to a view of it as of what is compound or discreet, whereas Metaphysics, as a science, has to do with what is uncompounded and pure.

d

flii ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S kfBTAPUTSICSK. [fiOOK Yt

BOOK VI.

1. Importance ^^^ bnnffs US to book VI., wliich is a most impor- of book VI. in tant one indeed, and has an intimate relation with not regard of the merely what has gone before, but with what follows; entire wor . ^^^ ^^ understanding of the distinctions and principles enunciated in this book is essential for the comprehension of the scope and general reasoning of the Metaphysics as a whole. In order to perceive the Oonnexion oetween book V . and book VI., we must bear in mind the fact of the multifarious predication of entity, accord- ing to accident, truth, and falsehood, and the ten categories. Entity, under some of these aspects, has been already taken notice of, and the further consideration of it under them designedly omitted alto-

S ether ; yet the subject is far from being esJiausted, for we may ivide entity accordmg to the ten categories of substance, quality, quantity, &c. And Aristotle now proceeds to show that the first of tnese, namely, substance, the to ti eort, is what Philosophy primarily and chiefly has busied itself with, as might be proved by a reference to Antiquity. And this is what one should expect ; for the first of the categories presupposes the rest as its qualities, and anything like real knowledge of a thing is the knowledge of its substance, and not of its qualities.

And this is important in determining what are to be b k*v?' regarded as substances, and what are not; and the value of a correct settlement of this question will be evinced in the fixedness and definiteness of Ontology as a science, the subject-matter of which comprehends this very substance or t^ ri €OTi. Accordinffly, Aristotle proceeds to inquire what " substance" is : and this being determined, it will be easy to frame distinctions and definitions thereof, ^.y. as to the number and genera of substances. 3 Is there any- ^^^ *^® ^^^^ obvious and geucralljr received accept- thing trans- atiou of the word substance, is that which would connne cendentait ^ ^0 mere objects of sense; but then the question may ^ *^* * be fairly asked, is there no other substance distinct in

kind from that which comes under the notice of our senses P And if there is, what is its nature? is it the same as the boundaries of bodies, for instance, a surface, and a line, and a point, and so forth ? or is it the same as forms or mathematical entities P Or shall we assume a plurality of such supra-sensual substances, starting, like Speusippus, from unity, and assigning to each substance its own first prmciples, as one set to number, and another to magnitudes ? These, however, are not quite the questions that Aristotle proposes to consider at present; they have already had their share of attention, Kod another opportunity will present itself for such an examination.'

(1) As in books XII. and XIII.

BOOK VI.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE*B HETAPHTSICS. xliil

The precise object at present is to give a faithful re- 4. Diffbrant presentation of what substance — odaia — ^is, and there- senses of th«  tore, in chapter iii we find Aristotle entering npon the JSp.!^*"* settlement of tjis question. Now there are four leading acceptations of the word " substance ; " namely, the essence, or very nature of a thing — t6 ri ^v tlmi — ^the universal, the genus, and the subject.

This point of view, of the substance, as the subject, 5. What the Aristotle discusses first. What then, he asks, is the j^ bwoMi^vo^ subject ? Why, in one way it is the matter, and in another » *^ *p* the form, and. in a third that which is made up of matter and form, viz. the entire, the t6 avvoXov. Now, we mignt at first suppose that matter was the entire subject, and consequently constituted substance ; but tiiere is something else essential to the phenomenal manifestation of the matter, but inseparable from it, and that is the form ; so that when we speak of the subject as substance, we mean that it is sub- stance manifesting itself to us, not as it is in itself, but in the only way po9Hble for us to apprehend it by, namely, according as it is matter moulded by form mto what results therefrom, and that is entirety, or the rd avvokov. Thus, take the case of a statue ; the statue is the r6 wuvokov, made up of the matter of brass manifested under the particular form of a statue. But we know nothing of the substance m itself, except so far forth as it presents itself to us under the appearance of a statue. Now, as to the relation to substance of these three— the matter, the form, and that which results from both, the TO avvokov — as regards matter, Aristotle thinks that the case is plain enough, and therefore will not require discussion; and, aa regards the T6irvvokov\ that will be investigated on another occasion.*

The remaining inquiry, therefore, is about the fZ!8or, g, investiga- ihe formal principle of things, the to n rjv €lvai ; and ti'on into the accordingly this mquiry is taken up at chapter iv. and '*'** "" *" •^•'*"* pursued from that onwards to the end of chapter xiiL; that is, it may oe said, to the end of book YL

Therefore, we have an examination instituted in chapter iv. into the to rt ijv €lvai, or very nature of a It minqS^ thing, and in the outset Ajristotle justifies himself in into the to n q» this proceeding, because, having attained unto a know- *^'"^*' *^^*P- *^* led^ of this^ we will then be able to pass on to more obvious topics; and this is the mode of acquiring information m general, namely, through what is less known to what is more known.

The TO Tt ijv (Ivtu, which, itself, is of a logical import, is oonsidered logically, because it and the absolute or *^'

rntial are the same ; and this is what is proved in chapter iv. As dis3ussion, however, is, perhaps, more subtle than instructive, it 10 hardly necessary to give here what may be found in the Translatioiu ind therefore the si adent is referred for it to book VI. chapter iv.

( ) At is done in books VII. and VIII.

42

iUf analysis of Aristotle's mistafhtsigb. [book ti.

•. chap.T. ^ chapter v. we' have another question of the same

•'question 'as nature as that in chapter iv. ; nameb^, as to how defiiiition^ reprds defi- supposing it not to be from addition, would belong to thuu^ tluKt are not simple, bat that involve a connexion with something ebe.^ And in the mscussion of this question he is conducted to tne conclusion, that of substance merely may we ex])e€i to find definition. Agsdn, one may ask the question. Is the' very nature of a thing, and each tning of which it is the very nature, the same, or different r and the answer given by Aristotle is this, that in the case of things predicated absolutelv, the aflirmative of this is true, and that in the case of things acciaental the negative is true, and all this may be employed for the overthrow of the Sophists.

Aristotle now illustrates what he has laid down in re- of wha/Sw***" 8*^ ®^ matter and form by the case of natural, artificial, been laid down and Spontaneous generations. All things that are being

• "««"<* ®^»> generated are produced from something, that is, from

chap*. viL* matter ; by something, in this case the form ; and into something, that which results from both, the to avvokov — say a plant, or a man. Now, the aim of the Stagyrite in bringing forward the subject of generation, is to confirm what he has already proved; namely, that the etbo^f or form, is an efficient principle operating in every object, to which that object is indebted for the shape it has assumed ; in short, it is the producing power, acting on the matter of that object, and which makes it, to our per- ceptions, the object which it is. If this is the case with natural fenerations, it is so with those that are artificial likewise, only that ere the eZdor, or producing power, resides in the soul ; for example, the plan of a building pre-exists in the mind of the architect. And here, also, we may observe two distinct stages in all this, which Aristotle denominates by the two words, v6r](rii and iroirja-n, and an explanation of these words will show the process as it goes on. HoTjo-is means the previous conception which the artist forms in his mind, and iroirja-is is the application actually of this to the matter 1 1 The neces- ^ ^ worked upon. Moreover, that which is true in sitV of under- artificial changes is true also in those that are spon- standing tancous, and tnis, as well as the whole subject of gene-

c ap. ViL ration, is elucidated in chapter vii, which is well worthy of attention, and which if not thoroughly understood, it Ls

r'te visionary to hope that we can imbibe the spirit which breathes ough this truly noble portion of the Aristotelian philosophy. This theory of Aristotle about the ctfios is the key to his refu- tation of the Ideal Hypothesis; and nothing so strongly illustrates the difference between the Platonic ani Peripatetic philosophy in eeneral, as this diversity of opinion on the subject of the cu^o; oi foroL

(1) Or, in 0th )r words, the r6 cu^oXov,

BOOK VI.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. xlt

Btt although generation necessarily presupposes a 12. *,^ something tbat Is generated, jet we must not lall into theoryof forms, the error of imagining that this is the form, or that the ®*^P- ^^ form is capable of generation at all; for example, to make a brazen sphere is not to make the sphere, but this form in something else. This spherical appearance arises either from Art, or from Nature, or from Capacity, in the way explained above, that is, provided it has some matter to operate upon. But to say this, is to say that form is not generated, but tiiat wnat is, is the ro trvvoKoVy that which is made \vp of matter and form. All this Aristotle is of opinion inoontestably shows the utter inutility of the Platonic forms for the pni*poses of generation or towards the constituiion of substances, because, in their separation from matter, they are entirely destitute of causality ; whereas, causality is essential to them in the Ideal Hypothesis put forward by the Peripatetics ; so that forms are not the causes of gene- ration, either as generating causes or in the way of paradigms or exemplars.

The question of generation, however, suggests jg ^ question another, namely, as to why some things are generated as regards from Art and from Chance, and why some things are generation, not. Now, the answer which Aristotle gives to this *^ ^'**' question has been already hinted at above, and it is this : that some tilings, in contradistinction to others which have not, are endued with some latent capacities within themselves of bringing about certain changes in regard of themselves ; for example, the wood and bricks of a house do not mould themselves into the form of one, but this is done bv the builder from the operation of his art ; but in the promo- tion 01 heat in the body by friction, say for medical purposes, it is merely an emission of the warmth that naturally resides in the body. If, however, we bear in mind the nature of substance and the defi- nitions that have been given of it, Aristotle considers that everything will be plain on this subject, and what applies to the foremost of the categones, may be said to hold good in the case of the other nine.

Aristotle approaches the discussion of another ques- tion, the reply to which is to be found likewise in the 14. Question as distinctions that have already been established : one, he Jj^twee'n^the^" saySy may ask the question how the relation between parts and the the parts and the whole of anything affects the defini- ▼iiole, ehap. x. tion of that thin^. Now this question is obviously suggested by the fact, that in the definition of some things no notice is taken of the parts ; for example, in that of a circle ; whereas, in the definition of other things, for instance, a syllable, the parts are taken into consideration. So that the reply to this question is as follows tliat in some instances the definition of the parts is inherent in that of the whole, and that in other cases it is not so.

But what, it may be asked, gives rise to this P Why, 15. what glToi tk»t which gives rise to this difference involves the rise to the

Xlvi ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLB'S MBTAPHTSIOa [bOOKVI

soiutitfn of this solution of the question itself, and it is this, that in the question. Q^e instance we make use of definition by the material

parts, and in the other of definition by the formal parts. Now, this will affect the parts themselves, because, iu a formal or logical point of view, we regard the parts as antecedent to the whole ; whereas, in a material sense, the whole is antecedent to its parts. Therefore, the entire doubt has arisen from the ambiguity of the word pait ; and this ambiguity is produced because part may itself be viewed either in reference to tne matter or the form of tnat which is com- posed of botL

16 This re- ^^^ *^^^ prepares the way for another question in ^ares the^way the ncxt chapter — chapter xi. — ^what sort the parts of for another form are, and what are not parts of form, but of that re^dTthe which, bearing a certain form, involves a connexion parts of form, with matter. This question, however, seems onl^ to be chap. xi. another question (already discussed), but in a different shape, namely, what is the dinerence between formal and material definition. Now, the decision of the one, as well of the other, indeed, will rest upon a distinction that we must always make allowance for in such cases. If we observe one particular form assumed by different sorts of matter — for example, in the case of a brazen circle and a circle of stone — and if the question be asked, what are the parts of the form that is the circle, 'tis plain that, be they what the^ may, they have nothing to do with the wood or the stone, that is, in a logical point of view ; M'hereas, if one sort of matter, e. g. brass, invariably assumed the form of a circle, then, in explaining what the parts of the form were, it would be next to impossible — in fact, it would be a coi^tradiction in terms — to describe this form in a state of isolation from the matter which it moulded. Take another instance — a man, whuse form always manifests itself in a combination of flesh and bones, and so forth ; what are the parts of the form here P or, rather, is not that question wrongly put, and should we not rather say, what are the parts of the flesh and bones taken in connexion with that form whicn they have invariably assumed in the person of a man P

17 Difficulty Hence then arises the difficidty of defining a thing of logical or by its formal parts, without any reference to the matter formal defi- -^th which they are combined: for it is only under some nition. ioTca. or other that matter makes itself apparent to us. The form is a productive energy that is essential to its phenomenal manifestation : and all this is just what has been alreadv laid down and described, as the key to Aristotle's refutation of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas.

ta w>,„ K««ir The reason why Aristotle is so much busied with the

18. Why Dook v • j /• j i> -x" i • i. i. •

VI. is so much subject 01 definition here, is, because he is exarammg

?fi^id^*^°^* ^^^ ^^® subdivisions of the ovala, or substance, from a

n »o»- logical point of view ; and we shall see how that £tfte^

BOOEVL] analysis op ARISTOTIiirS METAPHTSICS. xlvfi

wards an application is made of these logical principles to substance regarded worn another and different point of view. He is, therefore, careful to say everything that can be said upon the subject; that is, BO far forth as it will not involve a repetition of the statements in regard of definition which are to be found in the Analytics. There remains, however^ one question more on the subject; and that is. How are we to account lor the unity of definition ?

The unity of definition would seem to be destroyed jg ^^ j^, ^^^^ by the multiplicity of the qualities of the thmg defined, unity of defi- Tiie decision of this question Aristotle considers as of Jjj^on* chap, vital importance to any inquiry in regard of substance. But the reply to this question seems simple enough, that whether Kre regard definition in reference to the distinctions involved in genus and difference, or not, yet that its unitv, notwithstanding the manifold qualities that are to be included therein, will always be secured bv the unity of the subject of those qualities. And let the chfferential qualities be ever so numerous, yet we must anive at some ultimate distinction which will constitute the substance of the thing, and, consequently, by its unity produce that of the definition.

But there remains another subject for consideration; ^^ ^ Xiamely, the universal ; for this comes under our notice uon of" he^*^*^ at present, consequent upon the subdivision of the universal, substance, or ovaia, mto subject, essence, entirety, and ^^'^^' ^"' the universal; and with the first three we have been engaged idready, and decided upon their nature; and, therefore, lastfy re- mains to be investigated " the universal" And what Aristotle chiefly seeks to establish, in regard of the universal, is that it does not constitute a substance, for substance is that about which all things else are predicated, but itself is not predicated of a subject, whereas the universal is always afiurmed of a certain subject.

And now Aristotle brings the whole of the foreffoing reasonings in this book, in their accumulated force, gies^befor? upon the Ideal Hvpothesis, when, in the beginning of bears down the 14th chapter, he exclaims, with an au: of apparent 5fe*oVofPi?* triumph, "Ail these statements lay bare the absurdities cha^.^3dv. * **' that ensue unto those who affirm, both the existence of forms, and forms too in a condition of separability from things." The intimate bearing of these discussions in the sixth book, on the Ideal Theory of Plato, has been already pointed out more than once, and need not be repeated here. Aristotle himself, moreover, merely mentions the fact itself, but does not go into particulars, having already furnished his readers with a demonstration in detail of its fidlacy, and reserving the discussion of it to a future occasion, wliich he actually does resume, as we shall see, in book XTT., chaps, iv and V.

He repeats here, however, what, by implication at 22. The tn- kasti he nas already stated in other parts of book VI.; generabmty of

Xlviii ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE S JIETAPHYSIOS. [bOOKYI

forms, namely, the principie of the ingenerability of fonni

chap. XV. aii(j their incorruptuiility. But this is not JPlatonism j

for the forms in connexion with matter — and that is the only know- ledge that we have of them — are capable of both. And this contin- gent nature of matter itself, implied in the corruptibility of the ro <rvvo\ov, shows that there can oe no definition of sensible singu- lars. Therefore, we are to bear in mind, when any person sets down any definition of singulars, that it is always possinle to over- throw such, on recount of this very inadmissibihty of definition belonging unto what is singular. And what applies to singulars, applies to the ideas which tne Platonists maintain, as capable of a separable subsistence from singulars. They are indefinable likewise ; and, in the present case, there is the further reason against the Platonic dogina, from the indefinability of what is eternal.

And this would-be multiplication of substances by virtual confti- ^^® Ideal Hypothesis has led men into the error of con- sionofsub- founding substance with capacity, and of supposing

• Sentijaity Certain things to be substances, which in reality were

chap"xvi. ' merely potentialities, or capacities. The unity of such, e.g. oi animal with its members, may have misled speculators ; but when they should have accomplished the separation of which they were capable, one from another, they would then have seen the true state of the case, and recognised, not substances, but merely elements, or, in other words, matter under different potentialities.

And, therefore, this exposes the Pythagorean theory defect Inth" about unity being the substance of thmgs ; for there is ▼6 ev uf the no usc, in searching after the origin — ytucan — of things ^hl^fS^^^i* to adduce the component elements, no matter how

cnapter zvi. , , ■!• ^ i • 11 i

subtle or searching your analysis may be; because, unless vou can point to some disposing or producing cause, you will never =irrive at the present phenomena. Accordingly, when people speak of what are substances, they should bear in mind, to avoid mistakes, that substance constitutes a causative principle, and that no amount of potentiality is equipollent with it.

And all this Aristotle draws to one conclusion in this settles regard of the existence of anything ; namely, that the the question of phenomenon as such is to be regarded as a matter of exi^tence"*^ fact. There is to be no more questioning about it than

there would be of any other fact. To ask why this very Ihing is this very thing which it is, is really to ask notmnff at all. What course then should an investigator adopt if guided oy what has been already laid down ? Why, assuming that the thing is what it is to our senses, he should proceed to inquire into the cause of its existence, bid n v7rapx€i. For example, take the case of thunder ; the phenomenon itself it w-ruld be a contradiction of the testimony oj our senses to suppose coul be different from what it is. Our bu.si

BOOK VII.] A1ALTSI8 OP ARISTOTLE's MBTAPHTSICa iHx

ness with it is i) try and discover, if possible, the canse oi first principle of it.

And this will explain all that has gone before in gg. "v^iiy so reference to the logical inquiries that we have been much logical engaged in throughout the entire of this sixth book ; for ^quiry in book if all philosophic speculation must ultimately conduct one to an attempt at discovery of the cause, this will involve us m an examination as to formal principles ; for m the present case tne causi3 sought for is the to n ^v ^Ivm. This brings us to the close of this very miportant book, which shows how Aristotle had penetrated into the kernel of the principles that form the basis of our modem systems of philosophv; and, perhaps, if the detractors from the Btagyrite's genius and originahty would deem it theii luty to make themselves a little more familiar with his works, {xerluips, I sav, thej would find abundant refutation here of the anti-experiential spirit with which they have charged him.

BOOK VII.

At the commencement of book VII. we are favoured i. Book VII. with a sort of epitome of the results already attained contains an previous to entermg upon an application of these logical fJe \o-?^2* ^ principles to the case of that substance which falls under principles ihe notice of our senses. It is as well, however, to re- established in mind his readers, as Aristotle thinks, why it was that ^^ ^'• he conducted them through the regions of speculation which he has exposed to their view in Dook YI. But an account ^^ o ch i this matter is simply this. The to ti ^u €ivai is one i,;,ok vii." certain aspect of substance, its locical aspect. Now the principle of this is to be found in definition; hence the various inquiries about definition, and its parts, and those that followed in the way of nece«»sary consequence. Having despatched, however, this logical inquiry about substance, we come now to deal more imme- diately with substance, and our business will be to try and find out its nature, and the number of those things of which we may predicate the term.

Now in regard of the different sorts of substances, we s. Different know that there are some whose existence is acknow- sorts of sub- ledged by all such as sensibles; yet there are others ^^*"*'®*' ibout wnich there is not the same uniformity of opinion, but ih regard of which individual speculators have put forward peculiai sentiments of their own. However, as a more fitting opportunity will present itself for the discussion of these latter theories, thfyv are Cor the prer^ent omitted, but are resumed in books XI. XIL and aIU.

1 AVALTSIS OF ABISTOTLXTB METAFHTSICS. [bOOKVI^

1. Th in uirv ^^^ busincss at present, however, will be with those

re«pe<^ing^^ substances about which there are no diversities of Bible sub- opinion as to their existence ; but which are acknow- c£p!i! *°^ ^ lodged by aL; and these are those substances that are

cognisant by our senses. Now all these sensible sub- stances involve in themselves matter; and to say that a thing has matter, is to say that it has a capacity for undergoing various changes and affections. And these, of course, presuppose a some- thii^g that is the subject of them, which in the present instance constitutes a substance.

But this view of substance, as the subject of certail •iiowsthatel^oc Diaterial changes, identifies matter with capacity ; and, and kvepyeta therefore, Aristotie deems it requisite to state wliat that Mme'nafure. ^ which mav be set alongside as parallel with energy ;

and this, unaoubtedly, is tne €ldos or fto/9^77 ; that is, the form ; and it is the aim of the second chapter to show this. Now, no doubt when we see anything subsisting m any particular condition, e.^, water as ice, in a state of congelation, we make that condition to serve as a proof of there beiog a certain subject of it. And when we come to see what this subject is, as in the instance of ice as water, we sh^ find that it is matter. Matter, however, after all merely amounts to capacity ; and if we cannot discover some productive power to develop potentiality into actuality, we look in vain for the manifestation of the phenomenon before us. The discovery, however, of energy (fvtfyvaa) as a principle of this description, is precisely what we wanted, and a momentary glance at the circumstances of the case will show its perfect identity with the tlBos or form. For instance, what is a oalmP it is evenness in the surface of the sea : here the sea is the subject ; that is, the matter, in capacity, of the evenness ; but the evenness itself is the energy.

6. Diifcrent ^^ ^ ^^^ worthy of remark, that different sorts

•orts of matter of matter have different sorts of energies likewise^ enerefer*'*"^ for in some things energy amounts to a synthesis,

and in others to a mixture, and in others to something else of this sort.

In chapter iiL we have a question discussed as to '* ^linia"' whether the name of a thing bears reference to its question in r«- energy — ^that is, its form ; or to that which is a com- ^ard of the pound of energy and capacity — that is, of matter and thSg. * lorm. But, however important this question may be in

other respects, yet it is entirely irrelevant as regards the present investigation about substance c(^nisant by the senses. But, nevortheJess, it is quitejplain that it is similar to a question already discussed in book VI., as to the inherence of the parts defined in the entire thing defined; and as capacity corresponds to matter, and energy to form, it will be found to turn on the difference ibDeady pointed out between material and formal defimtions.

poOR YII.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE's MFTAPHTSICS. U

And the discussion of this question conducts Aristotle - - , j , i to a solution of the difficulties under which Anti- the paradox 0/ fithenes, and persons similarly uneducated, laboured; Anti»thene«  nanielj, as to the non-definability of the r6 ri iart, or J^Son.^**" very nature of a thinff. Now, no doubt, the definition of this, which is the lo^cal or formal definition, has its difficulties, as Aristotle admits in Book YI. ; but still we may define the 76 ri ioTi, by making people acquainted with some quality or other of it of a positive kmd: for example, take the case of silver; we mi^ht show not what it is, but what it is like, namely, that it resembles tin ; and that this quality, moreover, resides in a substance that has its formal principles, and admits of definition, or, in other words, con stitutes the compound of capacity and energy. And the same solution is further illustrated in the case of the Fythagoric system of numbers viewed as substances.

Thus Aristotle has established the fact that substance

cognisant by the senses involves matter ; yet on the hks its own"^ subject of material substance we must bear in mind — cuUar matter, as IS shown in chapter iv. — that although all things Jhap"*"

IV.

necessarily spring pnmarilv from some onginal matter, yet that each ps^cular thing has its own peculiar or appropriate matter. Though several systems of matter spring from the same primary matter, this is no obstacle to their being different them- selfiBS ; and this may be brought about through the intervention of some efficient cause; for example, a chest and bed are both made from wood. But still, where the things themselves are different, the matter is different ; as you cannot by any efficient means make a saw from wood or wooL ^ that from the same matter we may make different things; but where we know the things themselves to be different, we may assume that they have arisen Trom different kinds of matter; or, in other words, that, notwithstanding the existence of some primary universal matter, yet that each thing may be said to involve its own peculiar matter. This, however, may be ascribed either to art, or some such efficient cause ; but to be certain that we assign an adequate reason for such, we should make it our business to search through the entire category of causes.

Now, this is what Aristotle wishes to lay down in lo. two sorts regard of substances such as are physical but generable ; of physical yet all this does not equally apply to such as, though 8^*>stance8. being physical or natural, are yet eternal substances : for these latter do not involve matter, or, at least, such a description of matter as the former, but matter capable merely of local or topical motion, as might be illustrated from the science of astronomy.

And, whilst on this subject, Aristotle tmnks he may jj ^j^^^^ j^ j, remind his readers, that although some things do not that alone in- involve generation or corruption, yet that it is only voivesacon- those that involve both that can be said also to involve "®*^°'*

lii ANALYSIS OP Aristotle's metaphysics. fBOOKYni.

matter, matter; but this is just what has been implied in the

chapter r. statement towards the close of the last chapter. And, moreo7er, this holds good in the case of contraries ; for they, in the two cases, are generated palpably after different modes : for mst-ance, compare the ^neration of a wmte man from a black man, with that of wiiteness from blackness. But, further, the doubt still presents itself as to how, in regard of these contraiies, the matter of each involves iJie princi]^e of contrariety; whether through potentiality, or through a corruption of a certain nabit or form usually worn by the things themselves; as might be illustrated in the case of vinegar and wine.

The last chapter of this book opens with the mention contaij2*a^ of a doubt that has been urged in respect of de&iitions doubt as re- and numbers, why they should be one ; e.^.ia the defi- nWon***^' nition of man as a two-footed animal, why are not these two qualities constitutive of plurality, instead of unity. Now, if people choose to adopt the usual modes of defining and distrnmiiahiiig^things, they will never arrive at a solution of these difficmties. The case, however, will be different if they bear in mind the distinctions that Aristotle has already established as resulting from the difference of energy from capacity, and how matter is equi- pollent with capacity, and energy with form. And this will always be found to be the case where matter is concerned, whether that matter be cognisant by sense or by mind {gla-BTfTrj § i/oi/r^ vXj;). Of course, if a thing does not involve matter, the queslion as to its unity would be absurd ; for the very fact of its immateriality is ample security for its unity.

BOOK VIII.

1. Book viii. ^^^ eighth book, whereon we now enter, may be oon- s'continuation sidered as strictly a coutinualion of book VII. and of book VII. accordingly we find it occupied with discussions about the same subjects as the preceding, namely, as to what potentialities are, and the relation subsisting between energy and potentiality. And as to how it is that Metaphysics, as a science, comes to deal with the subject of potentiality, Aristotle assigns the cause already mentioned, namely, that it depends on the multifarious predication of entity, and from one of tnese significations of it being what subsists, according to potentiality and actuality — koto cvpafitp

„ _ . . Now the subject of potentiality, as respects its vari-

2. Consider- • •!» x* i '^i j *' i*^ i- stior. of poten- ?^s siffnincations, has already come under our notice

tuiix7 in in book IV. chapter xii., and the reader is referred to

book VIII. ^Ijj^ij portion of the Metaphysics as a collateral study

BOOK VTII.] AXALT8IS OF ARISTOTLE'S ME7APHTSICS. Ill

^ith this. In the present snrvey of potentiality Arislotle will omit the consideration of whatsoever is styled so homonymously or equivo- cally ; and this will exclude, amongst others, what is metaphorically stalled Potentiality in Geometry.

Now in any classification of the varions existing potentialities we must bear in mind that they must of*airwjJS*fS be all ranged as nnder one primary potentialit y, which under one pi- may be considered as the original principle of chan<(e Jj"y capacity, in something else, and this in another body, and ^^ 80 on through several.* And we may view potentiality either in reference to nabit, or passivity, or activity, and so forth ; and to potentiality in any of these respects there corresponds an im poten- tiality which may be regarded as a want or negation of those qualities or properties which we denominate as potentialities.

But one broad line of demarcation may be drawn ^: One broad between potentialities in general; namely, so far forth Jjrion^ between as they are either rational or devoid of reason ; and the capacities in former will be found resident in animated beings pos- JJJ"*^' sessed of a rational soul, whereas the latter are merely mechanical, so to say. There are to be discovered in these, however different productive energies, according as the subjects of the poten tialities are rational or irrational; for example, the former may be causative of several contraries, whereas one result merely can be traced to the latter. And again, we are to remember that excellence of condition or execution, the ro fv, is not necessarily involved ir. the notion of potentiality as such ; for although one who carries out any course of action well must have acquired a certain capacity that possesses excellence, yet a man may go through a certain course of action and yet not do so either successfully or properly.

But as the relation between potentiality and energy is nnder examination, Aristotle draws our attention to regard*©? the certain prevalent erroneous notions on this subject ; for relation of example, amongst the Megaric school, as to energy cJpSy"** being a requisite condition for, or rather, as what was chap, iii! identical with capacity ; for example, a builder, if he does not actually build a house, cannot be said to have the capacity of building. But this view of things is quite false, and might be refuted from the instances of the arts ; for, allowing a man to have acquired any art whatsoever, could we say that he had lost it because he was not actually engaged in the production of any artistic results P

But the absurdities of the Megarics ' in this position 6. The absnr- may be made apparent by showing that it reduces them ditiesof the

(1) It vrill be seen what use Aristotle makes of this principle in his Demonstr» tion of God's existence.

(2) The chief of the Megarics was Euclid : their school has been claated airongfl the cnperfect offshoots from Socratioism.

liv ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLlfIS METAFHTSICS. [bOOKVIO,

Megarics akin ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ (^^^ po8ition with the followers of Prota- to those of Pro- goras, who maintained the exclusive subjectivity of our ^MiSon*^^* sensatious, to the denial of their objectivity. Now really

such theories, if persisted iu, will lead to the annihilatioii of anythinff like generation or motion. But the fact is, that these per- sons would never fall into this error if they bore steadily in mind that such an assumption as theirs was the confusion of things that are per- fectly different, and this would have been avoided by carefulness as to

the distinction subsisting between energy and capacity.

of Se Vwd ^^^^ distinction has been abundantly illustrated already,

^vepYcca should and may be further discerned from the origin of the

be a guide in ^gj^ energy — ^its origin from the phenomena of motions this question. . n °«' -mr " *^ i i i i •

especially. Moreover, we may ask ourselves what is

the relation between capacity and actuality P May not a thing, that is endued with a capacity of being, nevertheless not exist at all ? and, on the other hand, may not a thing be endued with the capacity of not being, and yet exist after all? Surely this may be tlie case, but there must ensue between being and non-being, or between non- being and being, some such principle as energy or tlie motion which is included in trie idea of energy, in order to account for the transi- tion or change of either into otner. p „ ^, , In chapter v.,* which is the next following, we have

o, national * .^ a. • • \ j.i_tij ? x* i

capacities ex- somc important prmciples established as to rational

wiained into in potentiahties, compared with those that are devoid of ^ **** ^' reason. Aristotle shows, in regard of those capacities

that are rational and resident in the rational soul, that their aevelop- ment depends upon habit,^ and that habit, of course, presupposes various exercises of antecedent activity ; still all these capacities are worked in subservience to some one dominant principle, call it pro- pension or free-will, whichever you please, for appetite and volition in their very nature involve the capacity of successnilly accomplishing their seversi ends or objects of pursuit. And this in general may be stated as the mode in which capacity passes into actuality: it is through the medium of such principles as propension or free-will, and that, too, on the grounds already mentioned, of *"te energy or motion, involved in the condition of actual existence beiiig the result of capacity ; but propension and free-will, we know, possess in them- selves the principle of originating motion in other things.

So that one advantage that we may recKon on attain- view^s'aSout ^S V ^^ examination into the nature of energy, may energy lead to be said to consist in the definite views which we thereby capadS^* in**^* attain of what capacity really is. And therefore Aris- ehap. vi.' totle shows US the nature of energy, not merely posi-

tively, but also negatively ; not merely what energy is,

(1) In chapter iv. there is an illustration of the nature of possibility and impossi* Mity, by means of unmeaning symbols.

(2) This chapter may be read along with chapter v. part I. of ••' The Analogy" 9 Bishop Butler

^OOE Vin.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLll'S METAPHYSICS. hf

but what it is not. We cannot, however, affirm the subsistence of all thuLgs in a state of energy, save either only analo^cally or rela- tively. But, above all things, we should bear in mind that however energy in its nature is connected with motion, it would be most erroneous to confound it with motion. The difference between motion and energy is this, that the former is merely the act of transition towards a certain end, which end, when it is attained, entitles us to assert the existence of energy. This point is elucidated by Aristotle m chapter vi., in the portion of that chapter which (though the greater part of it) has been called in question on the grouna of its spuriousness.

The next question in regard of potentiality which Aristotle discusses, is, as to where we are to recog- JJajI'^^l^y Bise the existence of potentiality, and where a thing there is capa- cannot be said to involve capacity at all ; for example, ^^^y* *"^ ^^®'«  is earth a man in capacity, or not P Now, once for all it chap.**vii! may be stated on tnis subject, that where there is no hindrance in the nature of the thing itself, and where we can lay oui finger on some extrinsic efficient principle, we may reasonably infer the existence of potentiality. But we can never say determmately that potentialit;i^ exists objectively, save whei'e we can pronounce that a chsmge has been accomplished thereby in something else. And this may be illustrated in the case of compound things : for example, we will not say that earth is a chest in capacity ; but when the earth has been instrumental in working a change, — ^for instance, in contributing to the growth of a tree, — then we say that the wood is a chest in capacity, and we call the chest not earth or earthy, but wooden or made of wood. So that where we can resolve a composite nature into its elementary parts, and through them into its ultimate matter, carrying out the nile just given, we shall be enabled to discover where the capacity exists, or if it exists at all.

Another question which the relation of capacity to n. ispoten- energy suggests is as to which is prior; and as we shall t»aiity prior to see in book XI., where Aristotle makes an application of cSapfviii. the settlement of this question to determine what the Divine Nature is, we shall see, T say, how important a use is made there of what he now demonstrates, namely, that energy is prior to capacity. Its priority Aristotle now establishes, not merely in defi- nition and in siibstance, but also in time, though not invariably in the last. The very nature of energy would show us that its order of development must be anterior to that of capacity, that is, as far as substance is concerned ; for the first capacity is a capacity of ener- gising. This, however, may be different in time ; for the matter of which a man is composed is prior to the man ; and yet this statement after all does not really clash with the principle of the priority ol energy to capacity, for the capacity of the matter to become a rian wouM lie dormant, if "^here did not supervene son e productivr*, po^er

M ANALYSIS OF lilISTOTLE*S METAPHTSIOS. [bOOKYIH

und tliis is the same thing as to say, that not merely is energy prior to capacity, t>ut that, in the present case, if we do not admit this, a man will not exist at all.

This principle, however, Aristotle makes anothef Important UM iniportani use of, in estabUshinff the fact, that in order of this principle to acquire particular habits, there must, in the first of encrSy^'^'^ instance, be an exercise of previous enet^,* and we eh»p. viul know from other parts of the Stagyrite's works, that it is by repeated acts of such an energy, that practical principles are formed, and the foundation laid, as Butler also shows, for there being erected thereupon a superstructure of virtue and personal religion. For example, one who wishes to learn music must actualh play certain pieces of music, whether vocal or instru- mental. And all this shivers into atoms the quibbles of the Sophists, who would fain make out that a man who is not in possession of scientific knowledge, will yet accomplish some of the objects of the science, or master some of its difficulties. We might as well say that a man is fit for a life of persevering virtue, who has never gone tlirough any course of discipline, or possessed himself of virtuous principles of action throu^ uie exercise of habit. \% wi ♦t-.*.-. But we may regard the subject in another point of

IS. what Is the , \ t. ' 1.1 a \ ^ e l

Anal cause of View ; what IS the tinal cause, we may ask, of poten- pofentjauty, tiality P Certainly, actuality. Animals do not actually ^ ^*'*' ^ * exercise the power of vision for the ulterior purpose of their being furnished with a capacity of seeing ; but they have this capacity in order that they may actually use it. Now, does not this likewisa lend its testimony to the truth of the principle of energy being prior to capacity? Besides this, however, do we ever recognise

• he existence of capacity — would we ever be brought to allow its

existence — except there could be previously pointed out to us some iorm that the capacity had arrived at P But what is form but energy under another name P And certainly the end proposed is prior to the means through which it should be accomplished, and yet the end and the energy are the same ; and this we see in the case of teachers, who, if they can succeed in realizing to their pupils what the energy is in a particular case, conceive that they have made them acquainted with the end. Aristotle might have iLustrated this by the case of a drill-master or a dancing-master.

But after all, we must admit the priority of energy of'etorna^rt^'e ^0 Capacity in the strictest sense of the word, if we best proof of choose to examine into the nature of what is eternal ; e ierCT°"'^^' for what is eternal does not, nor cannot, subsist in capacity, but yet its very essence consists in what con- stitutes energy. The notion of potentiality is excluded from the Divine nature, for that would destroy the necessity of God's exist- ence, for it would recognise the possibility of His non-existence.

<il) This previous energy seems parallel with what Coasin tenns Spontaneity,

BookvulJ analysis of abisvotlb's metaphysics. lYli

And all this may be illustrated in the motion of the 15. Hustrated heavenly bodies, which, as those bodies are Divine, the fi^m astro- motion of them is eternal. Most certainly, the motion of °®™y- them has nothing to do with capacity, for then men would be justified in the apprehension they have rrom time to time been shaken by, of a suspension of the laws which rule the celestial phenomena. But this IS quite groundless ; the sun, or moon, or stars, will never halt in their heavenly courses; their periodic journeys will uninterruptedly be renewed, because these bodies, like God Himself, have energy for their essence, and, therefore, we may rest certain and contented that their operations will never be suspended on account of the wearisome- ness engendered, or the system being impaired. Nay, even why need we go beyond our own world in search of this truth, when the phenomena of fire and of earth might have taught us the same truth m the perpetuity of their energy P

This, Aristotle remarks, is an instance of mutual imi- 10. The prin- tation between thin^ heavenly and earthly, but makes cipie of no further observation thereon, for he did not know *y°*^o^is°*- what ice know by revelation from Christ, how that all things external are mere types of something inward and unseen, as all our Lord's miracles show us, and were intended by our Redeemer to show us. Now, what I mean is ttiis, that Nature herself is one mighty symbol of what is spiritual, and that the whole creation groaneth and tra- vaileth together to have this life, struggling within her womb, brought to the birth, and her mystic meaning, that is buried within her, borne forth and carried home to the bosoms of the human race, to be nursed and cherished there !

In the next chapter — chapter ix. — ^Aristotle's object is i;. Energy to show that energy is more excellent than capacity ; more excellent and one chief reason of this is, that capacity presupposes J,^^ capacity, the possibility of change and corruption, wnereas this cannot take place in the case of energy, for it would be sub- versive of our notions of it as well as of its own nature. Corruption, we know, is an alteration into what is worse ; but if we allow the existence of energy in the case of things having an evil tendency,* we may give up the whole point about the superiority of energy, and acknowledge its inferiority to capacity. But this certainly is. This agrees would conflict so much with our notions of what is ^th <>"' no- eternal as quite to. ignore its existence, because we liave ******* ® * already seen how energy constitutes the very essence of the Divine nature. And if we couple energy in any way with what is bad or tends to worse, we shall be guilty 3f detracting from the Divine per- fections, and allowing evil to be mixed up alon^ with them. But this is impossible ; for, although we ma^ recogmse the existence of evil in things themselves, yet, to make it independent of them — ^to

(l).Thi8 then would amount to a recognition of the independent existence of • frtaiciple of evil.

Iviii ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTUfS HETAPHTSICS. [bOOKYUL

give evil an objective existence — is most false, and we must trace it np either to God Himself as its source, or we must regard it as an inde- pendent power — a principle coequal and coeval with Gk^d Himself.

This superiority of energy to capacity is confirmed tioii o?the°*^ from the case of mathematical diagrams, where the above from several properties reside in a dormant, unknown con- Sid ofchapter ^^^^^^> ^^^ ^^ ^nind of the mathematician is brought to ix. bear upon them, and he discovers and makes known by

the mere energy of thought, those various relations which constitute truth, and are inherent in those figures potentially or in capacity.

20. Chap. X. 1^1 chapter x., which is the last one in book VIH^

is concerned Aristotle proceeds to show the relation subsisting tii?o'nruth" between truth and falsehood, as compared with that and falsehood Subsisting between energy and capacity ; and this rela- ca*acu^^"**^ tion is explained as involving a further proof of the capaci y. superiority of energy to capacity. In things involving

capacity, deception is possible — an assertion about their existence may be true or false ; — but in the case of energy this cannot be the fact, because, where actuality is concerned, there is an end of any- tliing like an exercise of mind as to its reality or unreality. With respect, then, to things potential, the same opinion may be at one time true, and at another time false : with respect to things impoten- tial, this cannot be ; but the same assertions are always true and always false. And this depends, not on the things themselves, but according as the mind connects together ideas where they are dis- joined in reality, or disjoins them where they are connected. Now, this proclaims the purely subjective character of truth and falsehood, at least according to Aristotle; but where we are concerned with what is objective, as in energy, there is then no question about it, as in the case of what is potential; for in the former instance the thing is before you, and if you are furnished with the powers of sense, there is no necessity for your calling into play the faculties of the nund in such a way as you do when you predicate truth or false- hood of anything. Now, as I take Aristotle to mean tion points to ^*®re, this is another proof of the superiority of energy the superiority to Capacity, bccausc, whereas capacity may furnish a capacity! ^** matter of doubt, because its reality often depends on the subjectivity of mind, yet, on the other hand, energy possesses an objective existence, and it is outside the mind, independent of its operations of compounding and dividing. There- fore, when a thing actually exists, it does not admit of being the subject of a false opinion ; a false opinion in regard of such amounts to ignorance. If an object of sight was before a man who had not the power of vision, any mental exercise on his part as to its exist- ence would be quite beside the question of its existence. The thing is there, think as you may : you may not knoT it, because you

BOOK IX.] AKALTBIS OF ABi'STOTLF*B METAFHTBIOB. Hi

want the power of sensatiDn to perceive it ; but this is not the case with others, who do not labour under this ignorance, but are supplied with the means that Nature furnishes for this purpose. This brings book YIII. to its close.

BOOKnX.

Book IX. is by no means equal in importance with ]^ ^^^ i^ book YIIL, or, indeed, any of the foregoing; it is occupied with entirely occupied with the consideration of unity — the JJJjJy» ^® "'*^* tA iv — ^which, to the metaphysician, is an interchange- able term with entity — ^the ro liv. The subject of unity has already been brought before our notice in book I v . chapter tl ; and in the commencement of this book we have a sort of summary of the defiui* tiona given there, with this difference, however, that here no atten- tion is paid to anything save essential or absolute unity ; whereas in book rv. this sort, as well as unity according to accident, are taken into consideration. Now, unity is predicated of what ^ gj is continuous and indivisible, especially so in regard ofanfty^f^ap?? of its motion ; but the strictest notion of unity is com- prehended in its being a measure in quantity ; and this we see in the fact of the measurement of various magnitudes and dimensions by means of number — ^their measurement, for instance, in length, breadth, depth, weight, velocity, and so forth. Now, the measure in general requisition is such a one as is uniform and indivisible ; ana such, unity already has been defined to be. It is in itself simple, and in its case we look in vain for the possibility of addition to, or subtraction from it, as a measure; so that, all points considered, unity^that is, number — is the most precise standard of measure we could fix upon. Now, this may be seen in astronomy, where there has been a sort of unity adopted as to the measurement of the velocities of the heavenly bodies, and in music, and in grammar.

And as the subject has been mentioned, Aristotle , rorf.fn<^ti

.J A***!!** jJ »• i^ertam con-

sets down certain considerations m regard of measure, sideiations in

and amongst others mentions a metaphorical or derived 'eg&rd of signification of the word in the phrases that science °^®*""®' • was the measure of the objects of science, and sense the measure of the objects of sensation. The case is just as if another person were measuring us ; we would be able to decide as to how large we in reality were by the extent to which the rule of measurement reached over our persons. But Arintotle would not 4. Disavowal ot wish to be misunderstood in tbis matter ; by all this he the dogma of did not mean to harmonise with the opinion of Prota- ^otagoraa. goras, who held that man was the measure of all thuigs, for it is fideno^^ and not a scientific person — it is sense, and n)t a sentient

«3

Ix ANALYSIS OF ABLSTOTLS-8 METAPHT8IC& [bOOK IXi

I. Is man Um person, that he pronounces as a measme. Not that measure ofaU Aristotle makes the remark here, but one may say that things t ^|j,g dogrna of Protagoras has its spark of truth in it.

But when you come to apply it to things, you see bow silly it is, and Low false, for it would merge all objectivity into pure subjectivity. 1 may add, that the tendency which people have to allow this element of truth in the tenet of Protagoras to exercise its silent influence over their philosophic reasonings, often weakens the argument, for example, that has been urged from experience against miracles.^ 6. Chap. u. Chapter iL opens with the question as to whether

Is unity a sab- unity is a substance or subject; and this Pytha^rean stance r ^^^^ Platonic view of the t6 tp — namely, considenne it

equivalent with ovaia, or substance— Aristotle, as already before^ expresses his dissent from. Now, for the present purpose we may regard the to <v as a term interchangeable with the r6 bw ; and pro- ceeding on this, he illustrates the absurdity of this Pythagoric dogma in the cases of colours, and music, and vocal sounds, and mathe- matical figures. And as to the to %9 and the ro ov beine interchangeable terms, we may assume this from the fact of their following upon the cate^ries in an equal number of ways with each other, and not being found in any of them; thus the rhlvm the case of substance and quality is similarly disposed with the to op.

In chapter iii. Aristotle treats of the modes of the mSes of Opposition between unity and plurality, and thus is led opposition be- to treat of contradiction, contrariety, and so forth. In and^piural^ tracing, however, this opposition, Aristotle points out what he conceives to be tne concomitants of unity ; viz. sameness, similarity, and equality ; and of pluralitjr ; viz. diversity, dissimilarity, and inequality ; and he furnishes a brief notice of the meanings of these several terms.

8. Chap.iv. ^^^ ^^^f ^ ^® shows in chapter iv., difference

bn the greatest presupposes a difference in a greater or smaller degree ; contrariet' ** ^ ^® ultimately come to the greatest possible

con rarie y. difference, and this Anstotle styles contrariety, which he asserts to be evident from induction, and which he accordingly proves in this way, proceeding on the assumption of the greatest difference being in each instance the most perfect difference. Con- trariety thus constitutes the greatest difference, and the greatest contrariety amounts to habit and privation. Though ever^ con- trariety, however, amounts to privation, yet not every pnvation constitutes contrariety, save that one which is perfect; and this depends on the multifarious predication of privation. We have then au examination into the various senses of contrariety, and into the

(DA popular illustration of this principle might be found in one of Sir Valtef Scott's Novels, " The Talisman," where an Oriental is represented as disbelieving in tike existence of ice, because contrary to kit own exptrience, thereby making k,mfii ||m measure of things

BeOKIX.] AKALTSIS OF ARISTOTLB'S METAPHYSICS. Iz!

opposition subsisting in the cases of contradiction, privation, con trariety, and relation, assigning the first place to contradiction. These investigations, however, belong so palpably to the province of the logician, that some have considered them quite out of placo here, and suspected that they have found their way from some logical treatise of Aristotle, into the Metaphysics, and have been inserted in them by some mismaua^ment or otber.^

We nave a continuation of the same subject in chap- b. The question ter v., where Aristotle remarks that one may ask the ^^gP{,y^'JJ question, how unity is opposed to plurality, as well as chap. v. equality, to the great and small ? And the question as to the opposition between equality and the great and the small is discussed to the end of this chapter. Li the beginning of chapter vL we have the question examined as to the opposition between unity and plurality ; and Aristotle starts the surmise, as to whether there may not prevail certain absurd consequences, as the results of this opposition, depending on the opposition between plu- rality and the few. And in the course of this discussion he attacks the Anaxagorean tenet of the subsistence of all thin^ simultane- ously in a condition of infinity, both in multitude and in smalLiess. This was not a correct or philosophic method of speaking for Anax- agoras to adopt ; the innnity he should have amrmed as having reference to smallness and fewness — kqI fiiKpoTrjTi Koi oXiyonyri.

In chapter vii we have the doctrine inculcated of the jo. chap. vii. necessity of media^ arising from contraries, on the sup- on the subject

Eosition of the admissibmty of there being a medium ®^ ™edia. etween contrariety and some things else. And this leads to the showing that media belong to the same genus, as well as being com- pounded of contraries.

The discussions which occupy us to the end of book j| ^he iu- IX. do indeed seem quite irrelevant to the subject in quiries in book hand, and from chapter viiL onwards we are busied with J^^^^^^Jj ^ investi^ions strictly logical, e.gf. as to how things that treatise on differ m species may be found in the same genus, on Metaphysics, account oTIome chiracteristic belonging to them in l^l^^,:"^' common with each other; as, for example, man and horse, though differing in species, belong to the same genus, namely, animal. And this leaos to the question, why difference of species is not to be found in cases where contrariety is ; as, for example, a man and a woman do not differ in species, though it must be acknowledged that contrariety is involved in the distinction of male from female. Aristotle therefore proceeds to show what difierence of species really is, and why some tnings may involve this difference in species, and some things may not. And all this, in chapter x., is jg ^j^^^ ^ brought to bear on the nature of the relation between * * ' * what is corruptible and incorruptible; in this way: contrarirs am (1) Fkit Mr. HaulM't remArks on this book, in kit Analysis.

I

Uii ANitYsis OF Aristotle's metaphysics. [book x.

different in species ; but cormplibles and incomqitiblcs are contrariea ; •nd therefore we are to iwDiiit a generic difference as subsisting fcetTcen what is incormptible and what is corruptible j and this qnit«  OTGrtlirowa the Platouic dognia of forms. This docs not clash with what Aristotle sajs about things, though different in species, belong- iue to the same genus, because this ool; takes place where they belong to the some co-ordinate series of the categories, which cer- tajnlv can never take jilaoe in the case of what is conuptihle, com- pared with what is mcomiptible. This beings boot iX. to its

BOOK X.

J. Book X. Book X. is chiefly n recapitulation of questions that

eiiiefl)f««- already have occupied our attention, and the implied wpiiulstion. object of which is to establish the unity and complete- ness of Metaphysics as a science. One would doubt^ says Aristotle, in the very banning of the first chapter, as to whether we ought to consider Wisdom, that is, Ontology, to constitute one science or many. And all of what follows oouTerges towards the unity of ontnlogicol science, Cor it takes notice of metaphysics as a soienee about apodeik' tic prinoiplea, that is, those principles which lie at the basis of all the sciences. Again, which of the four causes is Ontology principally concerned with ? not with the material causes, for it deals with imma- terial substances ; not with the efficient cause, for it takes notice of what is immovable ; and not so much with the final cause, which has its place in the case of things that are practical rather than specu- lative ; not so much, then, with the final as the formal cause — a fact which is shown in book VI. chiefly.

J What tui)- -^"' ^ recognition by the metaphysician of the ■ixnccB are ihs existence of supra-sensual substances suggests the ques- •ubjoct-mitwr tion, what are Eupra-senanal substances? Are, for ex- n'o "«> ■ ample, fiMTus of this nature, and mathematical entities F and are they to he regarded as the subject-matter of Metaphysics, or not ? Metaphysics certunly ore not conversant about mathematical entities ; for although they are immovable, yet they do not possess a separable subsistence ; and the; are not conversant with objects that foil under the notice of the senses, for these arc subject to corruption. s Thi> del ^'^^ ** ^^^ '""^ time, so far forth as the matter which niiiiHTbyVn- mathematics take co^sonce of is immovable, and so fttsncf to 111* far forth as the question of its immobilitv is overlooked MUei •ciencos. ^^ jj^^ mathematician, as lying beyond his province, so tar Ontoloey is a science speculative of fial matter. It does not, undoubtedly, fall uniier the deparmient of Natural Philosophy t« enter into an examination of such, for it is concerned with what a mov- able, and capable of having motion impressed upon it from cxtriniia

BOOKX.] ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE's METAPHTSICS. Ixiil

sources. About what sort of first principles likewise is the science of Metaphysics conversant P — about those that are primary and uni- versal in the most eminent sense of that term, and denominated generally elements. Again, do entity and unilv, the t6 op and to ev, fall under its notice as the primary ^nera of ioings ?

Farther, must we admit the existence of a some- 4. ig there a thing separable and independent of singuIai'sP Are something that there any substances, beside those cognisant to sense, "^^P^abief which suDsist in a condition of actual separation P This involves the entire question as to the reality of metaphysical science, whose object is to try and discover the existence of sucli) and make it manifest to others. But the absurdity involved in supposing that there is no such supra-sensual substance in existence is apparent from its recog oition merely of the existence of matter. Now matter, ^ Matter pre we kuDw, merely subsists in capacity, and without the supposes the operation of energy or the formal principle, its existence «3cwtence of would be to us a nonentity; its existence, however, ^^^ ' proves the presence of energy, and ener^ presupposes the subsist- ence of an Eternal Substance. Besides, if we deny the g. other argu- existence of this Eternal Substance, we ignore the nients from the existence of order and design in the Universe; but |i*etenia^^^"' this wiU amount to the practical absurditv of denying the reality of what are matters of fact. Again, are we to recognise any identitv as subsisting between the first principles of mortals and immortals r certainly not, as has been abunaantly discussed in book II., chapter iv. Again, what position are we to assign to entity and unity in the category of first principles P and are we to recognise the subsistence of a something beside entirety P — the t6 trvvoXov, Farther, are we to assign any limit to first principles, or not P

In chapter iii Aristotle shows that the subject- 7. chap. iii. matter of Metaphysics is strictly and properly entity as the subject- such; and he lays down what already he has demon- Seuphysics. strated, namely, that the unity of metaphysical science is not destroyed by the multiplicity of the subjects which it em- braces, consequent upon the many subdivisions ot entity. And this he illustrates, as heretofore, by the case of medical science ; and, in general, we may take it for granted that all the various details of any science are kept within the limits of unity, by being examined and cultivated in reference to one certain genus, as well as one definite purpose. And all this is confirmed from the instances of the sciences of Geometry, Natural Philosophy, and Dialectics.

But, though there is a wide divergence in the subject- matter of Mathematics and Metapnysics, yet in some compares Ma- poiuts they intersect each other ; for the mathematician thematies and makes use of those apodeiktic principles which fall Jj!^*SeJ'^*'* under the notice of the ontologist likewise. After all, boweyer, his use of them is peculiar to himself, and he leaves to the

Ixiv ^5ALT8I8 OF AB1BT0TLK*S HBTAPHTSICS. [tOOKZ.

metaphysioian to speculate into the prinoiples of these. And fnrthei wo are to bear in mind, that althougn in some respects the snbject- niatter of Mathematics and Metaphysics is the same, because they both contemplate what is immoval)le, yet that the former scienoe merely views a certain portion of that which the latter investigates into in its entirety.

The mention, however, of these apodeiktic principles ^tion^oflhe*' s^iggests the consideration of those few fundamental HyatanuDfthe axioms that lie at the bottom of all reasoning, and, Hceptica in therefore, all systems of science. And this suggests the chapter v. reconsideration, in chapter v. of this book, of those who ventured to deny the validity of these fundamental axioms^ reoonjtideration, I say ; for the subject has been already treated of in book III. In book X., however, we have the same topic brought before us, and are furnished with a second, and somewhat more elaborate, refutation of the sceptical philosophies ^ of Protagoras and Heraolitus. The course that Aristotle adopts, in his refuUktion of these systems, in book X., is pretty much the same as he has fol- lowed in book III. He enlarges on the absurdity involved in the denial of such a simple principle — ^nay, such a flat truism — as thai the same thin^ may and may not be at one and the same time, or that contradictions may be both true. It subverts our notions of the difference between negation and affirmation; and, accordingly, one capital mode of refutation may be derived from the necessity that the sceptic finds himself under, of assigning some meaning or other to that, the existence or non-existence of which he affirms to be the same. Now, when this meaning has been signalised by some name, the folly of the sceptic will be made apparent even to himself; as is shown more fully m book III. chapter iv. And all this Anstotle deems would be sufficient to convict Heraclitus himself of his incon- sistency : but there is another adversary, to whose system the same will be anta^nistic, and that is Protagoras ; as he proceeds to show

MOKZ.] ANALYSIS OF ABIdTOTLS's MBTAFHTeZG& IxV

notice in book in., as embodied in the assertion of the truth of thi apparent ; whicb assertion has been already refuted there.

But as to the truth of the apparent, we may lay it jj origin of down as certain that the origin of this opinion, namely, the dogma of from the tenets of certain Natural Philosophers, who all JJ® t^"'** »' appeared to have arrived at the same scientific inferences ® appar*" • in regard of the generation of nothing out of nothin£^, — ^that this origin is tantamount to a refutation of the paradox itself. And the sensational origin of the paradox is likewise a refutation of it ; for to affirm the reauty of what is apparent to the senses, is to take no account of the possibility of the senses themselves being injured^ or otherwise incapacitated n'om deciding about truth ; for example, just as if one were to place the fingers under his eye, and make objects item double, whic^ were single in point of fact. Here, at least, would be an instance where uie apparent — ^the to ffHibfoiitvov-^'sngk not true.

But pray why permit the sceptic to pronotince dog- 12. Scepticism matically as regards phenomena which he himself allows excludes to be fleeting and uncertain, and on which, as such, he ®^ ™* founds his system ? This characteristic, of fiux and motion, in itself, must render impossible the attainment of truth at all, and therefore, why has the sceptic any ri^ht to contend for the truth of his scepti> ism P But apply this sceptical pliilosophy to the affairs 13 poetical of common life, and see how completely it fails there— recitation of how entirely discordant it is with everything that it *^® '^ 'S^*' finds there. When life and death are concerned, and ^^ *p ' • when the doctor prescribes a particular sort of food, we take that food according to his prescription, and we do not raise any subtle Questions as to whether it is the food that it seems to be, or whether tnis is impossible, consequent upon the flux and motion of things. And if thiuffs are in this continual state of change as regards the sensations that make themselves apparent to us, why do the same sensations always appear the same under the same circumstances P why do not they appear to us the same as they do to the sick P Why, because we are not sick. Do we continue, then, during such times, in a state in which our organs of sense are unimpaired by disease P The sceptic must say. Yes ; but this is giving up the whole point, for it is an admission that we continue the same for a certain period of time, or, in other words, that things are not in that t^ate of flux which he contends they are.

This constitutes the Aristotelian mode of attacking . the Philosophy of the Sceptics, and he considers that ot'jSS!S\^% their whole system is shivered into fraj^ments by this overtiirow of method of refutation, which is the more ingenious, as it t^© sceptical is based on the principles of the sceptics themselves. ^ **'**^ ^' The overthrow, not so much of the speculative difficulties as of the practical absurdities involved in the STstem of the sceptic, to whick

llYl ANALTSIS OF ABI8T07LB*B METAFHTSIGS. BOOK Z.

ArisbOtle has given such prominence, is called the argoment from Common Sense, and is the one, as is well known, which became such a favourite with the school of the Scotch metaphysicians ^ in modem times. All the sceptics, however, we must Dear in mind, are not to be refuted by one and the same argument, and what will prevail with one class will fail with another. For, according to Aristotle, amongst the sceptics themselves we discover the existence of different classes, and some are much easier refuted than others, for some adopt their system from what they fancy rational grounds, and therefore such may be foiled with the arms of reason ; but others are for ignoring the authority of reason altogether. The sceptics belonging to this latter, whidi may be considered as the most ex- treme school of scepticism, will not allow that there is any reason in things, or any trutn at all: but how absurd, for if so, what reason have they for their theory ? and if all things are false, how can they demand of men to recognise the existence of truth in their own philosophy P

15. Chap. vii. In chapter viL Aristotle again reverts to the topic favour 5 the ^^ ^^® unity of metaphysical science, notwithstanding unity of the diversity and manifold nature of its subject-matter. Metaphysics. And precisely the same line of argument is adopted as on a former occasion, when precisely the same topic comes under our notice. The other sciences have their own appropriate subject- matter, and why should not the science of the metaphysician have the same ? Now persons need not think that metapnysical science is unnecessary, nor that rt speculates merely about what is examined into by the other sciences, for it is this very circumstance that in right earnest establishes the reality of the science of the ontologist ; for all the other sciences merely take up a fragment of entity and examine it, whereas, the science of Metaphysics speculates into entity, as such, so far forth as it is entity, that is, simply and univer- sally considered.

16. Aristotle's ^"^^ ^^"^^ ^® again meet with Aristotle's favourite favourite argu- argument for the existence of such a science as Meta* SlstOTce^of physics, drawn from the existence of what is eternal such a science &na Separable, and immovable. All other sciences have as Meta- their respective subject-matter. Here is a something p ysics. ^jjg^^ gyj. |jg proved from an induction of all the sciences, not to be taken notice of by any; therefore we must have a distinct science to take notice of this, and this distinct science is that of the

17. This like- metaphysician. And this very subject it is which testi- J^.s^ow'its fies to the fact of the dignity of Metaphysics as a

^* ^\ ^ science,' for this separable and supra-sensual substance, what is it, as Aristotle will show in book XI., but the Divinity

(1) It is hardly a correct use of the term Metaphysics, to predicate itcf the system tf the Scotch philosophers. (1) Fidt book Y. chaps, i. and ii.

BOOK X. J ANALT8IB OF ABISTOTLE^S KETAPHTSICS. Izvii

under anotlier name ; therefore that science ought to command our homage and reverence, the province of which is to take notice of the nature of God. Here is another place in the Metaphysics where Aristotle had another opportunity ol enlarging upon the subject of Theology, and showing its proper place in, as well as connexion with, the science of Metaphysics. But here, as elsewhere, he neglects to follow up the subject, an omission that is taken notice of in the analysis of that part of book XI. where Aristotle unfolds his notions of God's Being and Attributes. The same point is likewise noticed in the analysis ol book V.

In chapter viii., we again are brought into contact jg ^j^ ^y with a subject already examined into, namely, as to on the science there being a science of the accident; andtne same ®'*J«  statement is made here as elsewhere, of there being no **^ *° ' sudi science, and the grounds put forward in both places for this are the same. There is the same practical argument drawn from ex- perience, to show that there is no science of the accident ; and the same is shown from the nature of the accident itself, as well as the cause of its subsistence. Now the nature of the accident, we know, is what subsists neither always nor as for the most part, but science is conversant about that which subsists always and for the most part. And farther, we must bear in mind that the cause of what is acoi* dental, is not the same with the cause of what is absolute, otherwise we must adopt a system of universal necessity. Wherefore, on these grounds, in this metaphysical treatise, where entity, as such, is under consideration, this is one of the aspects of it which, with certain others of the same kind, are entirely left out of view by the Stagyrite.

And it is worth while, Aristotle thinks, to notice the 19. The nature connexion between accident and causality noticed in of chance, end what we call chance. But chance does not invalidate **' ^^*P' ^^ the existence of thiogs that are produced according to free-wiU as some final cause. To say, however, that all causes operated merelv according to accident, would be to make them indei^te, which would contradict the fourfold division of them, recognised bv all (dasses of philosophers, and, besides, it would involve Sie additional absurdity of making the accidental prior to the essentiid. But, even assume the phenomena before our eyes as the results of chance, yet this will not in reality annihilate the existence of Mind, or even of a settled constitution and course of Nature.

Thus we see that book X. merely comprises what ^o. Two specu- already has been brought before us at large in books lations peculiar n. and ni. ; there are, however, two subjects treated *® ^'^^ X. of in this book, which are peculiarly its own, namely, the nature of motion, chiefly in its relation to energy and potentiality, and, also, that of the Infinite, or t6 airapov.

Now as to motion, we may assume that there are as 21. The subject many species of motion as of entity, because motion ia of motioa

Izriii AKALTSIS OF ABISiarLS's MKTAFHTSIOS. ^boOK X

treated of in not a tiling that is indepeLdent of eniities themseWcA. ebap. ix. The ciiigf snbdivisiofii oi entity, howcTer, where motion

18 plainly discoverable, is that one which subsists according to capa- city ad[id actuality. Bat now take the case of a brazen statae, and ask yourself, where has the motion come &om that has moulded the hfrass into the form of the statue, and in what does it reside ? Does the capacity of the brass constitute this motion, or the energy pre- supposed in the productive powers of the art of the statuary r The tepiv to this seems to be as follows: That the motion does not resiae in the capacity, nor in the enei^, and yet that it is that which secures the transition of what subsists in capacity into a condition of actuality; in short, motion," as Aristotle defines it, "is the entelecheia ^ of that wluch is endued with capacitj^, so far forth as it is such." The whole of this chapter is occupied with an elucidation of this principle from practical instances ; for example, house-building. He vindicates the view which he has thus taken of motion, reassert- ing that it constitutes an energy and yet an imperfect one ; that we must account for its indefiniteness from the fact of its being doubtful as to whether it ought to be classed under capacity or energy ; and that all this enhances the difficulty of the matter in hand, though at the same time Aristotle finds no reason to be dissatisfied with the views he has just now put forward.

22. Chap. X. on In the tenth chapter, Aristotle comes to treat of that " the Infinite." ^^ch had already before his time given rise to so much speculation, namely, the Infinite — ^the ro airtipov. In the first place, we are furnished with a sort of negative description of it ; for as to a

SMsitive definition of the Infinite, that would be out of the question.' \ however, it is what is possessed of a separable subsistence, it is not what is cognisant to our senses ; and this we might expect, for on the supposition of its constituting neither magnitude nor pluraHty, and that the substance of it is the infinite and not what is accidental, in such a case it will be indivisible ; for if we allow it to be divisible, it will, as a consequence, involve either magnitude or plurality. «- « X , But, besides the indivisibility of the Infinite, we may t'hi fnC7e.' also regard it as devoid of pad;s, for this would presun- pose its analysation into similar parts. As, for example, a part of the air is air ; but this, in the case of the Infinite, would be absurd, for the notion we have of it is of what is essentially uncom- pounded. But that the Infinite should subsist in energy, for this reason is impossible, for what part will we particularize as the sub- ject of this energy P for take whatever portion of the Infinite you ^ ish, and it will — it must — be infinite likewise. And, further, it is im- possible for it to subsist in a condition of actuality or entelecheia, for

(1) 'EvTcX^x'ta is best translated by the word "actuality."

(2) Vide Cousin in his Psychology, on Locke s theory of the Infinite; Sir William Hamilton on Cousin, in his first Dissertation ; and Mr. Calderwood on Sir William HamU*o<%'a theory; and note, p. 805 of the Translmtion.

BOOKS.] ANALYSIS OV ARlSTOTLE*S HETAPHYSICS.

then it mast needs constitute some quantity or other ; and this vould presuppose its subsistence in accordance with what is accidental

The next thing which Aristotle undertakes to prove 24. The in- in regard of the Infinite is, that it does not reside in finite not to bn objecte that fall under the notice of our senses. And J^JJj^j^g this he proves in two ways : first, from the formal principle of body as what is defined by surfaces ; and, secondly, from physical considerations, namely, from the impossibility of its being a composite nature, or even a simple one. We camiot suppose tne Infinite to constitute a composite nature; for how, as is essential to our notion of what is compound, would the elements of the Infinite, supposing it of this description, be limited in their number- how would we equalise them P And, fiither, we are to bear in mind, that body is that which involves an interval in every direction, but that which is infinite must involve such an interval without anj limitation at aU as to direction; so that if body be infinite, it is infinite in every direction. And as to the unity of the Infinite, it is just as fanciful as the unity which Natuial Philosophies lay down as existing beside the elements.

But further, every body cognisant to our senses is in place somewhere, and there is the same place for the priof of thu whole as for the part ; take the case of the earth, for from the reia- example. Now apply this to the Infinite ; if it is ^S splce?'*^ uniform, it will be then immovable, or it will be always in motion ; but this is impossible, for why should it have a motion in any one direction more than another P upwards, more than downwards P Suppose, however, the Infinite were Ukc a clod on the earth's surface, where will it be moved to, or where will it remain at rest P for this is mereljr a part of the whole, and the place of this clod which is con- genial with the substance of the whole earth will have a place of the same sort with the whole, and therefore the place of part of the Infi- nite will* be infinite as well as that of the Infinite itself; but this is absurd. But even supposing the Infinite to be in place, that it will comprise the entire of the place where it is-^yetliow will thii be the case P — what will be its place of rest or of motion, or will it be moved anywhere P If so, it will never come to a stand-still; or euppose it to be at rest everywhere, in that case it will not be moved.

Jff, on the other hand, we suppose that the Infinite is , _, . not uniform, but dissimilar in its component parts, then finite uniform also will the places which they severally occupy be dis- ?r diasimiiar similar likewise. And the consequence will be that "»***P«rt*' there will not be one body of the entire save in regard of contact. Then these parts will be infinite or fim'te in species ; it is not possible for them to oe all finite, for some of them will be infinite, and some not so, or the entire must be infinite. And this will lead to as infinity of the elements ; but supposing this to be impossible, tht Universe must needs then be finite.

Iix ANALYSIS or abisiotle's metafhtsics. [bookx

And again, it is, in short, impossible for body to be not be inflnUe. infinite, as well as the place for body, if every body that is cognisant to our senses involves gravity or lightness, for it will be impeUed either towards the centre or upwards ; bat it is utterly impossible that any part of the Infinite, whether the half or the whole, should undergo any passive condition whatsoever. For how, pray, wiU you accomplish a division of the Infinite, or how will there 1)6 of the In&iite an upper or lower region, or what is extreme and central F And, besides, what is cognisant to our senses, as just now stated, resides in place; and there are six species of place, not one of which could have any possible relation with what is in&iite. And all the f ore^ing may be confirmed from the fact that the Infinite is not the same in magnitude, and m motion, and in duration, as if it were one deftoite nature. This, I hope, makes somewhat inteUigible Aristotle's vagueness and studied obscurity on this remarluibb •ubject of the Infinite.

28. The nth ^ ^^^ ^^^ remaining chapters of the tenth book and 12th there is not to be found anvthing that can be considered

^'teS'^ith*^?' Mnportant, when compared, with what has gone before, relation of ^ and is about to follow in book XI. They are both motion to occupied with the subject of motion in relation to change. change. There are three changes, either from a subject

into a subject, or mm a non-subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject : the first is neither generation nor corruption, the second amounts to generation, and the third to corruption, r^ow, although every motion constitutes a certain change, yet not eveiy change constitutes motion, for generation and corruption are not motions ; it is only in regard of the change from a subject into a sulject that we can assume change as eq^uivalent with motion. Now these principles are clearing the way tor what follows in book XI., where he traces up all energy and activity primarily to the First

Substance.

The object which Aristotle has in view in chapter xiL,

AccSrdIng to** *^® ^* ^^ ^^ ^» ^ ^ provc, in the case of which which of the of the ten categories motion can be said to have an Categories existence, and in the case of which of them it cannot. subsiS ? *°° And the conclusion that he comes to is this, that since, for reasons which he states, there cannot be said to exist motion belonging to substance or relation, or action and passion, it remains that such should be found only in quality, quantity, and the place where. The chapter concludes with some dennitions sug. gested bv the point under discussion, namely, definitions of conf act, eonsecutiveness, and local contrariety.

100&X1.J ANALYSIS OV ARISTOTLE's MSTAPHTSIOSL ' Ixil

BOOK XI.

We now come to book XI., which is the inore impor- |, ^^y i,^^ taut, as it contains discussions bordering more on xi. more im- Theology than any that have as yet been brought before fhrothcra.*" US. These occur chiefly towards the end, but all that ffoes before it in the opening chapters, as we shall presently see, artt designed by Aristotle to prepare the way for the conclusions whidi he seeks to establish there.

This book opens with an assertion already made by .

Aristotle as to substance, or the ovaia, heins a proper gubstan^, the object of speculation ; for the truth of which lie appeab proper subject to the systems of the ancient schools of philosophy. jJapfi.*^**"*' Qualities and passive states no doubt come in for a book'xi. share of inquiry ; but still it is so in subservience to an investigation mto substance, which they presuppose. But what science is there that takes cognisance of substance in the way in which Metaphysics does P What science is there that investigates the causes and nrst principles of substance, except that of the metaphysi- cian P And the generally received division of substances ^ Division of into eternal, immovable, and those that fall under the dviat proyee notice of our senses, this very division bears its witness the necwaity to the necessity of the existence of such a science as ^meta^yatea. that of Metaphysics ; for though the physical sciences have taken abundant notice ot sensible ^substances, yet where have we any system of philosophy conversant with what is immovable as such, ana with what is eternal as such P There is a verging towards such a science in the systems of mathematicians, as well as in the Ideal Hvpothesis of Plato ; but the degree of development attained in either of these cases falls tax short of what is accomplished by the metaphysician in transcendental science.

Now, substance falling under the notice of our senses, ^ change and which is one of the three subdivisions of substance, is causality; that which admits of undergoing change. And change ^**p- **• presupposes a somethmg that is the subject of the change, and in the present case, that is, the matter vXrj. And this will appear at once when we enumerate the various sorts of change: for we are to bear in mind that there are in existence four modes of changes, either according to substance or quiddity; or, secondly, according to quantity; or, thirdly, according to quality; or, lastly, accordinff to tne place where. Now simple generation and corruption belong to the first, and increase and diminution to the third, and alteratioti to the second, and such a thing as orbital motion to the fourth. Now all things whatsoever that involve matter are susceptible of chanfce;

Ixxii ▲]NALYS2S OF ABISTOTLB^S METAPHTSIOS. [BOOK Xl

for matter itself is one of a tlireefold division of causes into contrariety, privation, and matter.

6. No genera- ^6 ^ure not, however, to suppose that there is a tion of matter generation of matter and form that is of the ra taxora^ chap^^m*' ^^ ^^^ ultimates, so to speak, of objects that fall undei the notice of our senses. Matter, no doubt, admits of change, and this presupposes a something as the cause of that change, as well as sometmng into which a transition is effected ; but this proves no generation of matter or form. Matter manifests itself to our senses under a particular form ; but this is brought about l^ Art, or Nature, or Chance, or Spontaneity. And these mesdy work on what they abeady find in existence, namely, matter, or the vXi;.

6. An apparent Perhaps, indeed, there may be a sense in which form exception to subsists Separately from tne matter which it monlds.

• • "• As in the case of a house, the form of which we in a

certain sense might say did subsist in the mind of the builder pre- viously to the bricks and timbers assuming the shape of a house. But Aristotle, as he shows at the end of this chapter, will not allow that this is aiw admission of the reality of the Ideal system of Plato.

7. Twofold There is a remark in tms chapter worthy of note, in diflference in which Aristotle expresses a twofold difference in causes causes. ^ resfcct of somc being antecedent and some bein^ coincident with their effects. This distinction we know has been brought forward in the modem controversies about the Theory of Causation, as maybe seen by a reference to the Dissertations of^^the late Sir William Hamilton on that particular subject.

Now, what Aristotle has established thus far in these foregohig re- three chapters of book XI. appears to be this, that lates to what is there is a something that exists as the subject of the to follow. various changes that we observe ; and at the same time, that these very changes themselves presuppose some productive and constructive power, which by its emciency gives rise to them. This plainly is laid down with the ulterior purpose of demonstrating the necessity of the existence of a First Cause.

Before proceeding, however, more immediately to p'rinc5)ies^of examine into this subject — I mean, the necessity of the things the existence of a First Cause, some one original and SffSe°nt? primary principle, whereon aU things depend, and from ehap. iv. whencc they flow — ^the question meets us at the

threshold. Are the principles of things the same, or different ? Are the elements of substances and relatives the same P This question we know has already been discussed in book 11. Strictly speaking, they are not the same ; but in one sense, perhaps, they may, and tnat is kot avcCKoyiav — ^analogically. But again, what relation is there between elements and first principles ? Are they the same, or different ? Now we know that one chief merit of the u^reek philosophy, as developed by Plato and Ariy^otle, Tas bringing fortb

BOOK XT.] ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S METAFHTSICS. IxXlli

into a clear light this very relation between an element and first principle, otoi;(«iov and apxrj' An element and a first lo. Elements principle in one respect are the same, and in another threefold, they are diflferent ; they are the same in material things ; J^d?' ^^^ but when one passes on to things that faU under the notice of the mind, they then are different, though even here they agree m being both causes. What gives rise to the difference in the latter case is that there intrudes a something that is not found in things purely material, namely, — a motive principfe. And thus will we be led gradually up to the First Cause ; and, moreover, will this give rise to a fourfold division of causes, whereas that of elements is merely threefold. , There is, however, another distinciion in entities, and it is this: tliat some of them do, whereas oihers of lies separable^ them .do not, involve a separable subsistence ; and it is to and some in- ' the former that we must ascribe the nature of substance, J^J*^*^^®' and which, for this reason, we must regard as causes ; because, how can we conceive such a thing, e.ff. as motion, or oassion, without presupposing substance as a condition of both ? Now, as to universal causes, these, practically speaking, have no existence — each thing has its own particular versai^cauies. cause — there is no universal man to be found in rerum naturd. Peleus, a particular individual, is the father of another particular individual, Achilles. The true principle of causality is to be looked for, not in mere mental abstractions, out in substances as auch — they are the causes of all things, and are the causes as ener- gies ; a principle which will be applied by Aristotle in his attempt to explain the Being and Attributes of God. And on 13. Fourfold examination it will be found that these may be arranged division of under the same four heads of causes which Aristotle *'*"^®*- has already laid down as the divisions whereon all inquiry on setiolo- gical subjects must be based. This fourfold enumeration of causes is no obstacle to the truth of the threefold division of elements or first principles, as already mentioned. The three principles, however, may sometimes be further reduced ; for in some cases the principles of all tlungs may be the same, that is, analogically, for the matter a,nd form, and privation, are often merged into unity, by being all alike ar. index of efficiency or a moving principle somewhere.

But now, having thus been engaged in the examina* ^4 consider- tion of two sorts of substances out of the three ; namely, ation of the two substances of a physical nature, as they have been J^J^p"^*"*"*" described already ; the third also now remains for consi- ^ deration, viz. the immovable one— the waLa aKivrjros, which Aristotl«  accordingly proceeds to examine in this and the following chapter.

In the first place, then, it is requisite that this Im- 15. The eter- movable Substance should constitute one that is Eternal, nity otihi% 9» well from the nature of motion * itself, as of sub- 8^^***^®' (1) Fide a previous note in the Analysis, at p. xi(yyL

f

IXXir ANALTSIS OF A&ISIOTLB's XETAPHTSICa. [bOOK XL

stance ; that is, primary substance. For primaiy substances, if not admitted as lying beyond the possibilities of being corrupted, ^dll be sufficient to ensure the corruptibility of all things else beside. And as to motion, we know that it cannot admit of being generated or corrupted, for it is what always existed ; and it is so with duration likewise. And as the continuity of motion, that is, circular motion, is what we must acknowled^ so must we admit the continuity of time ; in fact, as Dr. Clarke in modem times argued, and as Aristotle now implies, time and space ^ are in tbemselTcs infinite, and are to be viewed as the attributes of an Infinite Being. 16 The pri- Further, must these substances not merely be eternal mary substance as being primary, but must be immaterial as bein^ immaterial eternal, and on their eternity and immateriality depend .. ewise. ^j^g connexion of their essence in the energy. And in

general we may assume that the eternity or immateriality of these primary substances would be of no practical importance to us, save on the distinct understanding of their subsistence in a condition of

f)re-existent enei^y. This principle was quite over- ooked by the old theoffonists as well as the physicists

the ancient c i.* -4 • au • *. t i •

Theology. of antiquity, m their systems : for example, m gene- rating the Universe out of Niglit, as Theologians of those ages did, or in the simultaneous subsistence of all things together, which some of the natural philosophers maintained. This is a serious eiTor, and it may be remarked that the extravagances deducible from tiiese systems are a silent piece of homage to Uie truth of the philo* sophy which Aristotle at present is seeking to establish. Now ail these philosophers and theologians gave quite an inadequate view of things — it was impossible for them to account for the phenomenon of motion except they recognised the previous existence of energy. Matter can never be the instrument in producing its of tiwVheory of ^^^ motion, and it was this difficulty which led to the the perpetuity origin of the theory of the perpetuity of energy, such as of motion. y^Qs advocated by Plato and Leucippus, for these philo- sophers advocated the eternity of motion ; but independent of the utter incompleteness of such an account of things, precisely the same objection lies against their theory as that of the theogonists jnst alluded to; namely, that we cannot consistently perceive in what it advances as the original of things, any efficiency or anything that will produce motion in the first instance. So that, after all, the realiiy of a pre-existent energy is recognised in these systems, as is also made to appear by a reference to the philosophy of Anaxagoras, who identifies mind and energy together, as well as to that of Empedocles in his assertion of such principles as harmony and discord.

10. How this Advancing forwards, then, on these principles, what bears on the remains to be proved in regard of these primary sub* (1) Vidi Stewart's Outlines of Moral PhUoaophy, Part II. chap. u. article I.

BOOK XI.] ANALIBIB OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS. IxXT

stances as a oasis wliereon to build the truth of God's question of existence, what remains, then, is pretty obvious. These ^^'^ «»i«*- primary substances, we have seen, involve an eternal *"**' motion — a motion that is circular, and between that which receives this motion and that which imparts it we must recognise the intei> mediate existence of that which, though the source of motion, is itself immovable ; and this constitutes what already has been implied in the mention of the primary substances, and that is, the eternity of OM substance whose energy constitutes its essence. And as to the energy of this first substance, that can hardly be called in question, for we must bear in mind that a perpetuity of motion presupposes an eternal cause of that motion.

Having thus established the existence of this First j^ ^^^^^ ^^^ Substance, the source of all the motion in the Universe, of actions are though at the same time itself being immovable, Aris- ^qI^^^^^ totle next examines into the sort of action to be found in this Substance — that is, of course, so far as this subject is disco- verable to the weakness of our faculties ; for, after all, we can only look at the Divine Nature through the distorted medium of our own subjectivity.* And this is strongly illustrated in the views which Aristotle puts forward about the mode of operation pursued by the Deity.

As to the mode of God*s operation, Aristotle iden- 21. The mode tifies it with that of the intellect or ap j>ctite in man ; of God's God, the first imparter of motion, moves that which ope^^^o"- receives the motion as a thing that may be compared to an object of human volition, or of the human understanding. A thing appears fair ; it excites a corresponding desire within us, and we strive to attain it just because it is what appears fair. A truth is placed before the understanding ; it evokes or calls forth a corresponding intel- lectual effort to grasp this truth, and the mind rests satisfied with the accomplishing of this end as the successful pursuit of its object. And to apply this to the matter in hand, Aristotle would thus seem to characterise the Divine energy as a manifestation of volition and of mental activity on the highest and most stupendous scale that we can form any conception of. And, certainly, there is ^^ ^^^ ^^^.^ one element which can be disengaged from this analysis of Aristotle's of God's Nature, which emphatically is one which must analysis of command the approbation of even Christian philoso- Nature?"^ phers, and therefore is the more remarkable as one to oe found in the theories of a Pagan writer. This element alluded to is the recognition by Aristotle of God as the independent source of his own operations, within and by Himself — a truth faintly though Intelligibly mirrored to us in the freedom of the will, and the creative

(1) This tendency it noticed by Cicero in the first book of the De Natorft. The •tudent of Ecclesiastical History it taUj aware cf its pernicious operation oti Theology.

/2

txXYl ANALYSIS OF ARTSTOTLE's HBTAPHTBIGS. j^BOOE XL

energies of the human mind; and a truth, moreover, so glorious that the Holy Scriptures of Gkjd teem with frequent avowals of it!

28. The final .-^^ ^^\^ of itself teaches us the final cause of the cause of God's Divine activity, and what it is that it proposes for itself energy. j^^ ^|jjg j|.g djgpiay of energy. It is love that draws

forth the one, and a yearning after what is lovely that leads to a display of the latter. In us frail mortals, though the will, when not perverted, strains after what is good as an object of desire, yet it may or may not attain such, however it may love it ; and the same holds good of the mind in its apperception of truth. In the case, how- ever, of God, the will and its object are not separate, and therefore, when we say that Qod pursues the work of creation as an object that is loved — f»yci di <as «p«»fi€voy-— we mean, in other words, that the essential quality of the Divine nature is love, or, as the Evangelist St. John has it, that " Qod is love."

Now this miglit appear a somewhat fanciful inter- oft^fore^ pretation of what we found in the text, but when what going analysis follows is annexed, the analysis will not seem so unjusti- foUo^s*" ^^** liable on the ground of its exaggeration ; for thereby will we find Aristotle laying it down that Gbd's existence is what must be most excellent and happy, and therefore, as such, his aim must be the promotion of general felicity in all parts of Creation, and the actuating principle in his Divine perfections must be love, and Vindicated ^^^^^"S ^^^c but lovc. Perhaps, however, it will be the by a passage safest course to give the reader Aristotle's own words from the literally translated. ** The mode of Glod*s existence,"

Metaphysics. ^^^ Aristotle,* " must be such a one as is most excellent, and an analogy of which we have in our own short career. God exists for ever in this condition of excellence, whereas, indeed, for us this is impossible. His pleasure consists in the exercise of his essen- tial energy, and hence wakefulness and perception are what with God are most agreeable. Now essential perception is the perception of that which is most excellent, and the mind perceives itself by parti- cipation of its own object of perception ; but indeed, it is a sort of contact of both, that in the Divine Mind creates a regular identity between these two,^ so that with God both are the same. And in possession of this prerogative, He subsists in the exercise of energy ; and contemplation of his own perfections is what to Gbd must oe most agreeaole and best. And this condition of existence, after so excellent a manner, is what is so astonishing to us when we examine God's Nature ; and the more we do so, the more wonderful that Nature appears to us. And the mode of God's existence is essential energy^ and as such is a life that is most excellent and everlasting, so

(!) In chap. vii. of b#»ot XI.

(2) This is not quite a literal tianslation of Aristotle's words In the passage th«£ Ip being quoted.

BOOK XI.] ANALYSIS OF AB1ST0TLB*5 METAPUT8ICS. IxXTli

that we must allow God Almighty to be possessed of such a life aa is eternal and uninterrupted."

Now, in these words, wliich are to be found towards the close of book XI. chapter vii., may be said to be tion the sum *" contained the most lucid statement of Aristotle's and substance notions of the Divine Nature of the Being and Attri- Sot^V^fGod. bates of God ; and the bearing of this passage on the question of his Theology is most important, and is briefly noticed again in the remarks which follow alter the actual analysis of the Metaphysics has been brought to its close.

And here Ajistotle mentions an erroneous view preva- 27. Error in lent on this point amqjigst the Pythagoreans and Speu- Theology of the sippus, which he but just notices, and the discussion of ^ ^eorems. which, as we shall see, he resumes in the last Book of the Meta- physics. The Pythagoreans thought that what was excellent, and what was most glorious, could not be discovered in the dawn of Creation, but was a thing of subsequent growth in the way of natural development; and in opposition to this false opinion, which has reappeared on several occasions since the age of Pythagoras, and especially in modern times,^ Aristotle contends for the existence of perfection as what is original, and to be regarded as a paramount principle in Creation.

This remarkable chapter concludes with a further 23. Further delineation of the Divine Nature as that which is sketch of the devoid of parts, for magnitude cannot in any way in- 5.^" °^ volve this Divine Nature; for God imparts motion throughout infinite duration, and nothing finite— as magnitude is— can be possessed of an infinite capacity. And, likewise, is God devoid of passions, and unalterable — airaBrfs koi dvaXKoicnTov — for all such notions as are involved in passion or alteration are quite outside the sphere, so to say, of the Divine existence. Now, this representation added to that which recognises the necessary existence of (jod, which is given in the early parts of the chapter, completes the Aristotelian picture of the Divine Attributes. The ^g summ Stagyrite, theretore, beholds in God a Being whose view of Aria? essence is love, manifested in eternal energy ; and the totie's notion* final canse of the exercise of his Divine perfections is ^ the happiness which He wishes to diffuse amongst all his creatures ; and this happiness itself doth He participate in from all eternity. Besides, His existence excludes everything like the notion of poten- tiality, which would presuppose the possibility of non-existence ; and, therefore, God's existence is a necessary existence. Further, also, He is devoid of parts, and without passions or alterations, possessed of

(1) This maybe teen in those treatises which place the modem discoveries l«  Geology by the side of Revelation, professedly with a friendly aim, but leally ia trder to bxing die latter into disrepute.

IxxtU analysis of Aristotle's xetaphtbics. [book xl

uninterrupted and eternal life, and exercising his fnnetions tbrongh* out infinite duration.

30. Chap. Tiii. -^'^^ ^^^™ ^^^^ Aristotle passes on, in chapter yiil. The unity or to the Subject, as to whether we are to recognise the pr?n?ary^8ub- ""^^7 o^ Plurality of such primary substances ; and, in stance proved determining for their plurality, he does not infringe experiment- upon the doctrine already established in the last chapter

• ^* of the existence of one First Cause of all. For, although

in this' chapter he puts forward these many primary substances, yet they are endued with motion — albeit, eternal ;* and this motion they have received, in the first instance, from that which, though the source of all motion in the Universe, is itself, notwithstanding, un- moved ; but this, with Aristotle, is God Himself. And here, too, we see another example of Aristotle's eclectic spirit in his reference to the works of others, and his custom of extracting therefrom what- ever may be real and serviceable to truth. As to the Ideal hypothesb, however, or the Pythagorean system of numbers, he leaves them out of the way ; for, after aU, they have no bearing on the present dubject ; but rather, in the theories of astronomers, does Aristotle expect to discover the object of his pursuit.

31. Reference ^^> accordingly, searches into the works of astro- to the writings nomers; such as Eudoxus and Calippus, in order to Uii8*8ubje°t ascertain the generally received notions of scientific

men, as to the number of the orbital motions of the heavenly bodies; and for this reason, because corresponding to these several motions, there are so many substances belonging to the stars — first, second, and so on, according to the arrangement adopted by astronomers. For Aristotle's idea was, that the nature of the stars constituted a certain eternal substance; and, though he thus re- cognises a number of eternal substances, yet he places one above them all, from whence, as from a fountain, the others derive their motion.

This sketch, which is given us in this eighth 82. Value of chapter, of the systems of Eudoxus and Calippus is

this reference. . , ^ /• r^ -j. -n i. a au j'i'^ t

interesting, so far as it illustrates the condition of astronomical science about the time of Aristotle ; and what we have here is likely to be an extract from the Stagy rite's own work on astronomy, in which he undertakes to amplify and improve the labours of Eudoxus ; and the loss of which must be regarded with serious regret by all those interested in the learning of tne ancients. Having ascertained the number of the motions of the heavenly bodies, and, therefore, of the bodies themselves, to amount to fifty and five, or, exclusive of those of the sun and moon, forty-seven, he somewhat too dogmatically pronounces about the completeness of this enume* ration, and concludes with an assertion of what he had already proved in the De Coelo; namely, the existence of one heaven- CD EeveUtion has taught us of the eternal generation of the S in frcm the Fathtt

BOOK XI.] ANALTSI8 OF ABI&TOTL£*S METAPHTSIC& IxiLl

th ovpavos. The connexion between tin's assertion and Ariiotle'a theological system will be briefly considered in the remarks to be found at the end of this Analysis ; to which, therefore, the reader is referred.

In thus investing the heaven and the stars with the 33 conflnne attribute of Divinity, Aristotle conceives himself called his assertions upon to furnish some confirmation of his opinions on {JaSti"^^*"* this point ; and he appeals to the authority of antiquity, and to tradition, to bear him out in supporting his theory. Perhaps, after all, this was merely a piece of flattery to the popular supersti- tion ; for Aristotle, more than any other of the Greek philosopliers, viewed with contempt tliose long-cherished mythological norioua which had been bequeathed to his countrymen, from an age too dark and remote for the lamp of history to shoot its ravs into. The passage, however, is a most remarkable one, in whicfi the Stagyrite seeks to disencumber his opinions of any ^jj- Repel? the novelty that they might at first sight appear to assume ; JaSra, anSTthe and runs somewhat as follows : — " It has been tradi- passage quoted tionally reported, as from the very earliest ages, and d° ne**°** *^" " has been left to posterity in the form of a myth, both that these celestial substances are gods, and that Divinity embraces the entire system of Nature. Th©r« have been made, however, to these, certain fabulous additions, for the purpose of winning the belief of the multitude, and thus securing their obedience to the laws, and their co-operation towards advancing the general welfare of the state. These additions have been to the effect that these ^ods were of the same form as men, and even that some of them were m appear- ance similar to certain others amongst the rest of the animal creation. The wise course, however, would be for the philosopher to disengage from these traditions the false element and to embrace that which is true; and the truth lies in that portion of this ancient doctrine which recognises the existence of these primary celestial substances, and regards them as gods."

This brings to a close the proposed examination into 35, jhe sequel the existence and nature of tne First Cause ; and inas- to his theory of much as, in the unfolding of his theory on this point, q ®<j"**^"" ®^ Aristotle has ascended up to the Absolute and Etem^ Mind, through the su^ectivity of the human mind, and also had demonstrated that the Divine Nature is what in itself must be essen- tially ^ood, two questions apparently remain for discussion ; the first involving certain subjects of doubt as regai^ds the Mind itself, which are investigated in chapter ix., and the second as to whether the Univcise involves in its entire system this very excellence — ^this rS ayaB6py which we found to be inherent in the Divinity.

The question discussed in regard of mind is as to gg Questions what the essence of mind consists in, whether we must relating to the ■Anune its essence as being manifested in the capacity mind; chap. i« 

IXXX ANALYSIS OF iiBI&TOTLE*S MZTAPHTSTCS. [bOOK XL

of perceiving, or in the actual perception itself — t6 vottp or rj tforja-is. Now, it is unportant to decide this question — for the settlement ol which the student is referred to chapter ix.; for the dignity of mind Aristotle conceives depends very much upon correct views as to its nature : the great danger to be avoided is the exaltation of the objects of perception above the ^eat percipient faculty itself. Such will only tend to drag down mmd from the eminence tbat it ought always to occupy in our estimation.

37. The nature ^^^ ^^^^ q^ucstion is, as to the nature of the Good oftheToiYu- in its CDnnexjLun with the system of the Universe 06v; chap. x. — ^ subjcct that is also discussed in chapters iv. and V. book XIII. The inquiry which is mentioned in this tenth chapter is, as to whether tiie nature of the entire of Creation consti- tutes what is good and excellent. How are we to account for the existence of what is good ? — how are we to give a solution of the orderly system of the Universe ? Is not the point in question best illustrated by the case of an army, where the discipline and order that prevail there, and give rise to its excellent condition, are the result of the vigilance and strict command exercised by the general : the general, certainlj, does not preside over the army on account of the subordination that is found there ; but, oice versd. The application of this to the matter in hand is obvious ; and by it we see Aristotle recognising what is good as a paramount principle in Creation.

And this, too, exposes the absurdities of any system wCTe^ed t?^" that would ignore the existence of what is good; and it deny the exist- is easy to scc why it was that they were led to adopt ence of good, such an hypothesis. They were for generating all things

from contraries; and would thus assume the active influence at work therein of a principle of what is bad (rot) <l>avKov) ; whereas had they thought as Aristotk did, and admitted the existence of matter (vAi;), they would have recognis4;d that as the prime source Df evil. It was quite absurd for them to msist on such principles as these, because it was in reality a denial of what was matter of fa^t, of what was plainly in existence before their very eyes, and that was the operation of a certain power, which aimed at the promotion of what IS good as such, and succeeded likewise in the attainment of this very purpose.

39 Aristotie'a ^^^y then, constitutes Aristotle's solution of the account of the Origin of cvil, and is put forward by its author as the ^•jjrigin of ][jgst rcfntation of such theories as those of Empedocles,

for example, and his school, in their recognition of the prncdples of harmony and discord. The inconsistency of this system —its utter insufficiency to account for the actual difficulty it proposes to solve — has been already exposed by the Stacynte in ms Review of the Greek Philosophy, and again in book II. chapter iv. 40. Funda- Against such systems as these, which would ascribe

mental error of ^g phenomenon of generation to contrariety, the funda^

BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OP ARISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. Ixxxi

mental difficulty still remains as to how we can discover ascriWnK gene- >ny principle of efficiency in the Universe. Contraries ration to con- are mutually impassive, and whatever may be the results ^"^^ ^* of the conflfict of two of them, such, certainly, cannot be equivalent with motion. Motion must be communicated horn some ir dependent 3«)urce. Grant the phenomenon of generation; but what is the cause of generation ? And such is the mrce of thw difficulty, that it pre- sented itself to the minds of the ancient philosophers, as we have already seen ; and they were thus compelled, by actual reason, to recognise some gradation in their first principles, and the existence of one as more dominant than the other. In general, 41^ ThegencnJ however, they fell into the absurdity of advancing the objection existence of a something contrary to what was primary; J^Jj"^ *^*' and this inconsistency is avoided by Aristo tle, who has ^* * fust proved ^e^eparate subs^tfiace^ot' a^TJotain Tirst Cau gej^ara-i mount tcTevery ollltiP pOweror principle in theDmverse^ Livaf then, are we to look for this, even in the systems of the Snpi naturalists : where, for example, will we discover the principle causality in the Ideal hypothesis of Plato, or in the numbers Pythagoras ? Such is not to be found there ; and this, too, amid all their needless multiplication of first principles. And, further. Nature herself seeks to break loose from the bondage 42. Nature pro- fixed upon her by such speculations ; and things them- tests against a selves cry out against the increase of their rulers : and J'^ifcatioiTof " thus we find, not merely in the system of human primary government, but also in the wide kingdoms of Creation, entities. the one principle loudly proclaimed, of there being one sovereign influence that presides over all, and that the dominion of many is not what is advantageous either in the physical or social arrangements of the world ; and this truth is conveyed to us in the weU-known line from the Iliad : " The government of many is not a good thing ; let OS have one chief ruler amongst us."

BOOK XII.

We now enter upon an analysis of book XII., which, Th^^i-. however, does not contain speculations of equal interest book xu. and importance with what has gone before. The chief point of interest, however, in it relates to a refutation of the Ideal nypothesis — more elaborate and more enlarged than that found in book I. The first chapter of this book opens with a statement that the nature of the substance of those objects that fall under the notice of our senses has been declared, but that the inquiry proposed in the Metaphysics is, as to whether, beside these sensible objects, Vhere Ls in existence a certain Immovable and Eternal Substance or

Ixxxii ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLB'S MBTAPHTSIOS. [bOOK ZU

not. This point has been under inyestisation in the closing chap«  ters of book XI., and the existence of such having been estab* lished as a matter of fact, he now proceeds to examine into the statements put forward by other speculators in relation to tliis Immovable Substance.

Now there are two leading opinions, Aristotle con- opinions re- ceives, as regards this Substance ; for the existence of specting two sorts of substauces are put forward, namely, mathe-

s'ubsumce? matical entities, such as numbers, and lines and ideas ; and the difference is, that some identify both of these together, whereas others constitute them as two distinct genera — namely, ideas and mathematical numbers. The first point of in- quiry will be respecting these mathematical entities ; as to whether they exist at all or not ; and if they do, as to the mode of their subsistence. Next, the inquiry will extend itself to the subject of ideas, and as to whether numbers constitute substauces and first principles.

Now the inquiry in regard of mathematical entities po8ed*inquiry ^^ as to whether they subsist in objects that are cogni- as regards sant by the senses, or are in a state of actual separation SiUUea^*^*^*' from sensibles; or, supposing that they are found in neither way, qnerCi do they exist at all ; or if they do, they must subsist after some different mode from either of these.

Now as to the non-inherence of mathematical entities inherence of ^^ objects that fall under the notice of our senses, mathematical Aristotle considers this to be proved from the nou- sens^ybies" divisibility of body and its non-separability from sen- sibles. It would, moreover, presuppose separable sur- faces, and so forth ; and this multiplication of surfaces, &c., may be regarded as an obstruction towards a settlement of the question. The same reasoning may be applied to numbers as well as to mathematical entities. But a practical refutation of this entire theory may be found in astronomy, optics, and harmonics ; at least, in doubts that might be raised m connexion with these sciences ; for we might as well, in the case of these, speak of the existence of other sensible objects, and other powers of sensation, independent of those about which these systems respectively are conversant. And besides all this, even supposing this theory about the separate sub- sistence of mathematical entities to be true, the very contrary to what is usually supposed to take place will in reality happen ; for it would be requisite that they should be prior to sensibles, when in point of fact tliey are subsequent to them. And again, there is the difficulty as to the mode in which these mathematical magnitudes would be one, and if they do not happen to be one, there will ensue dissolution in the case of many of them. To be sure, in a certain sense they may be prior; for instance, in definition ; but it does not follow that things prior in definition should be also prior in substance.

BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE's METAPHYSICS. ISZXiil

In chcpter iii. we have an assertion made in the outset, of the existence of demonstrations and definitions respecSng the in the case of sensible ma^tudes, and this would seem separability of to militate against the separability of mathematical maJusS***^*" entities. Certainly this position cannot be established entities. by those who regard these mathematical entities from the point of view from which they are nsnally beheld. And thit reasoning is again confirmed by a reference to harmonics and optics, for they do not take cognisance of different objects from those that fall witnin the province of our visual or vocal organs. It must, then, be admitted, that if any separation takes place, it is one that is purely niental, as is proved by a reference to the sciences of the geometrician and the arithmetician.

In the conclusion of this chapter Aristotle exposes g ,^^ Arfstip- the error of supposing that the mathematical sciences pic error in are in no way conversant with what is good and with what reg«jd of is fair. But an immediate refutation of this false view "** ®™* *^ in regard of mathematics may be found in this one fact, that it is with the most important species of the fair — ^the to /coXov— namely, of order and svmmetry, or proportion and definition, that aU these sciences, in the most eminent aegree, frame their demonstrations. So that, from what is contained in both of these chapters, Aristotle is of opinion that we have no reason for contending for the inherence of mathematical entities in sensibles ; and if, moreover, they do not involve a separable subsistence, it is plain that thev do not exist at all, or if they do, it must be after some such mode, and, therefore, perhaps the plain truth is, they do not exist at all.

Alter the demolition of these mathematical entities, Aristotle next proceeds to attack the Ideal hypothesis of and v.*iSe ui Plato, which already has been brought before our notice attack on the in book I., yet not with the same completeness or fiaiish j.^jjj,*^®®'^ °' as here, though, indeed, most of the arguments found in book Xn. can be pointed out likewise in book I. We are not, how- ever, to consider tiiem as unworthv of attention because remarks of a similar import have already found their place in other parts of the Metaphysics; for, as Mr. Maurice observes, "Aristotle's repetitions of himself, or the reports of his difPerent pupils, generally clear awar many difficulties." It is to be also remembered, as Aristotle himseu states, that in his criticism upon the Ideal theory, he in no wise connects the nature of ideas and of numbers together, as was done by certain speculators who wished to blend the systems of Plato and Pythagoras together.

In the first place, then, as to the original of the Ideal theory, Aristotle considers it to have been a £• ^?*l°"i!!S.i

,.•" • J. Ji. TT 1'j.' i» J.1- reaction against

mere reaction against the Heraclitics, for the purpose Heraciitism.

of securing the permanence of what those sceptics

thought to sweep away in their theory of flux. Ail sensible objects

IxZziT ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE*S METAFBTSK^ [BOOK XIL

are in a state of continual flux, says the follower of Heraclitus ; then says the Flatonist, if we are to have such a thing as scientific or even prudential knowledge of anything at all, there must exist certain dif- ferent natures, endued with qualities of permai.ence, independent of those that fall under the notice of our senses ; fc r it is quite plain that there cannot subsist a science of things that are ever m a condition resembling the waters of a river, flowing onwards. So far for the relation of the system of Heraclitus to t£it of Plato. A'm.»««4i„.»«> There was, however, another philosopher who midit

9.Tne influence , 'jii 'j *^iii i« i«°

of the Socratic DC said to have exercised a more palpable and inimediate on tije ^deaiis- influence upon the rise and growth of Idealism, and ticp oBop y. ^jj^^ philosopher was Socrates. The inquiries which Socrates pursued in regard of the moral virtues gave an impulse to Idealism, because, in consequence of those inquiries, he was led into investigations about universal definition; aud this was the fure- runner of a more complete examination into the ver^ nature of things —the TO ri eori — which he already had partially pierced into in his ethical speculations. Strictly speaking, indeed, Aristotle considers that Socrates was not the first pmlosopher who busied himself in this department of knowledge, for that already Democritus had done so, though, to be sure, to a small extent ; and the Pythagoreans, who connected the formal or substantive principle of things with num- bers ; yet Socrates it was, undoubtealy, wno, by bringing forward plainly before men the t6 ri ivri., was the actuating cause in the production of Idealism.

10. This Now, the Platonists tlius borrowed their system from '

influence was Socrates ; and in order to conceal their obligations in the KSonists ^^* ^*^' *^®^ imparted a separate subsistence to of some of the the univcrsals of the Socratics, which Socrates himself ■J««"fditte8of had omitted to do, and they additionally invested them their system, ^j^^ ^|^ appellation of ideas ; and yet really this was a source of absurdity in their svstem, for they thereby were forced to acknowledge the existence of ideas in the case of all universals.

And this mode of procedure was just as if a man were of thu?'*' ° ^ complain of the intricacies of numeration in the case

of a small sum, but when that sum was increased to one many degrees higher, should boast of his ability to calculate the entire consequent upon this disappearance of anterior difficulties ! These ideas or universals of the Platonists, in point of fact, were more numerous than singulars — such as fall under the notice of the senses ; and in endeavouring to give an account of certain pheno- mena^ and at the same time inveighing against the obstacles they were obliged to encounter, they have regularly abandoned the real subjects of inquiry, and passed on from these into regions of specu«  lation where the perplexities they came in contact with were far more complicated, but by themselves considered as tblqxq easy ol •olutioiL

BOOK XII.] ANALYSIS OF ARI8T0TLE*S IJSTAFHTSIOS. IZXXV

Thus the Ideal hypothesis would seem to prove too much,' for the ideas transcend the actual phenomena in theory provei multitude ; so that, wliat are we to say ot the surplus P too much. Must there not in such a case be ideas where there can be dii^covered nothing as corresponding with them in the nature of things, in the sphere of actuality P But there is not a ^ ^ -i • fiingle mode advanced by the Idealists as one according ^int*. * *" to which the ideas subsist that can after all be shown hj them to be such in reality, and thus this hypothesis may be said signally to fail in its efforts to prop up its system. And more than this ; the very arguments which the Flatonists would advauce in defence of their theory will be found on inspection, in point of fact, to he quite destructive of its pretensions to truth.

The utmost length to which we can go is to admit jj how far we the existence of iaeas or forms in the case of those may admit the things that may be classified severally under systems of ^stem of the science as their objects ; this confessedly is a method of * °"" * dealinff with the question that harmonises with the rational principles dedacu)le from the sciences. But, in short, the prin- h. The idealist ciples the Idealists go upon cjuite overturn what they overturns hu themselves woidd desire the existence of, even in prefer- ®^"* t*»eory. enoe to that of the forms ; and what they say in regard of the forms as participants of things, is only an assertion of the same absurdities unaer the disguise of a Cerent phraseology.

But why, as he proceeds to show in chapter v., should 15. xotai in- this Ideal hypothesis command our assent, when it is lufflciencv of palpably insufficient to account for the actual pheno- {Jcste fS the*** mena it professes to furnish a solution of. Has it not ends for which been advanced by Plato, as what points to adequate it^ advanced; causes for the production of things Natural and Supra- ^ ^' ^' natural P but what, in this way, do forms contribute either to the generation or corruption of things cognisant to our senses, or to the etemal elements that may be msengaged therefrom P In the Ideal theory, we cannot put our finger upon a single efficient or alterative principle, nor can its advocates show what service it is that thej propose conferring upon the interests of science in general by this nypothesis about forms. They certainly cannot estabush their asser- tion of these ideas constituting the substance of things ; for if such were true, they woidd be inherent in things ; neither is it true to say that they in any way are related to Sie existence — the ease — of things ; f Dr if so, they would be discovered resident in their parti- cipants. Thus the Ideal hypothesis would seem to inyolve causality ; but it is a mere shadow of it, and the reasons advanced for the su[)- port of such are capable of an easy refutation — treasons advocated originally by Anaxagoras, and subsequently to his time by EadoxuB.

0) Ritter gives us an analysis of Aristotle's refutation of the XdeiJ theory, if T«l« III. of lus History of PhilosopLy, Monisot's translation.

kxxvi ANALYSIS OP aEISTOTLB's METAPHYSICS. [bOOK XIL

16. Further But, after all, the Idealists pat forth a]^:iiraents to inconsistendes prove their theory, which are entirely insufficient foi ayttemoi^ ^ that puTpose ; nor, indeed, can any of the nsnal methods Plato. advanced for the establishment of their hypothesis be demonstrated as competent for such an end. And, moreover, any one who chose to apply himself to the subject would be able to collect toffether many mipossibilities in reference to an opinion such as that acmered to by the Flatonists, and quite sufficient to overrule its claims upon the acquiescence of the philosophic world. For instance, to speak of ideas as the models or paradigms of things is quite absurd and silly. And ajgain, how are the ideas substances of tiling, if they at the same tmie are allowed by the Flatonists to subsist separately therefrom, as is admitted by Flato himself, in the

17. Aristotle's I*™^^^- .^^^ ^^6 grand objection against the Ideal grand objection hypothesis, and one which the advocates of it can never id*aS\h*^* reply to, is that it entirely ignores the efficient grin-

eory. ^jp^g^ fQj. ^|jj^^ ^g qoite fail to discern anything m it

like causality ; and what renders the perception of this fundamental fallacy in their system the more difficult is, that the Flatonists them- selves have brought forward their doctrine as the wisest solution that has yet been offered of the theory of causation. This last para- graph may be regarded as containmg the sum and substance of Aristotle's entire attack on the Idealism of Flato, and he now passes on to the philosophy of Fythagoras, having completed his survey of that of Flato in chapter v.

The speculations which follow in chapter vi. are not occu^^ed'with ^^^® ®^ interesting and instructive as those which have discussions gone before ; for the obscurity is sufficiently dense, respecting mdced, with which Aristotle discusses the question, as num era. ^ whether we are to consider numbers as separable

substances, and the primary causes of things. For example, we are favoured with inquiries sucn as these, — as to there being a difference in species bitween what is primary and consecutive in number, as to the effect of this upon monads, m making them incommensurable or incomparable one with another, as to the different modes of numeration, and the error of confounding ideal and mathematical number together, as well as denying the monadic nature of number in general, which last dogma was peculiar to the Fythagoreans, and formed a difficulty peculiar to their philosophy.

Id. chapter vii. we have a discussion of the question, on the subject ^ *^ whether monads are capable of comparison, or of monads in commensuratiou, one with another ; and it would be other**"'** ^"^^ needless to set down the discussion, which may be examined by a reference to the chapter itself in the Metaphysics ; for it is not what admits of being put in any other form more simple, or intelligible, than that which it wears in thai place.

BOOK XII. J ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE S METAPHYSICS. IxXXt!^

In chapter viii. we liave another curious examination 20 cj,a», vui into the difference between a number and a monad; a isieve^ difference that must subsist either according to quantity afirainst the or according to quality. Aristotle, also, inquires as to ^ a«onc»' whether number be mute or infinite, and remarks upon the diffl* culties of fixing any limit thereto. He also enumerates certain intri- cate deductions consequent upon the system of the Pythagoreans ; ftud he then boldly challenges them to prove, if they can, their Theory of Unity as the substance of thin^.

In chapter ix. we have the same sort of mvestigations still earned on; for instance, as to whether number is 21. chap. ix. compounded of unity and plurality. And this question fSIther* is connected with that of the finity or infinity of number, speculations examined into in chapter viii. Having brought these numbers^ discussions to a close, Aristotle sums up his remarks on these schools of philosophy at the close of chapter ix. ; and thev are well worthy of study in the original. He adauces the discordancy prevalent amongst the earliest advocates of these theories as the plainest indication of their fallacy, and of the confusion which really lurked at the bottom of their systems. There was a constant current of vacillation ebbing and flowing throughout their entire philosophy ; what one school embraced the other discarded; and thus, in reality, was truth sacrificed to the interests of party. Those philosophers, for instance, of this Supranatural school, schools ofThe who admitted the existence of mathematical number, Supranaturai- merely did so from a horror of the Ideal theory ; and \^^^ accounted thus unconsciously discarded the element of truth found therein. On the other hand, those who were desirous of maintaining the tenets of the Idealists as well as of the Pythagoreans, perceiving no mode whereby they could account for the subsistence of mathe- matical independent of formal number, have identified both together as regards their formal principles ; but, indeed, in point of fact, they have entirely abolished mathematical number from their theories, which, however peculiar to themselves, are of a wholly unmathe- matical tendency. After all, Plato is the only philo- sopher who argues either correctly or consistently on consistent? °°* these subjects; and the inconsistencies and falsehood discoverable throughout the entire philosophy of the Pythagoreans may be considered generally as a positive proof against its truth The foundation of this school is improperly laid, — their assumptions in the first instance are false; and, as Epicharmus lays down correctly enough, "We can never fairly make good any assertions wber» our arguments are drawn from principles not fairly esta- blished." This brings the Aristotelian review of the Pythagorio philosophy to its conclusion.

The end of this book is taken up with a sort of 24. conciuiion •ummary of what has gone before, in reference to the ofbookxii.

IxxXViii ANALYSIS OF ABISTOTLE*S METAPHYSICS. [bOOK XIII

contains a Platonists and Fytha^reans. Aristotle remarks, as a •ummary re- sort of apologj for his examination of these systems, PiatoniVSnd *^** ^^^I properly belonged to metaphysics, and, there- Pythagoric fore, he nas thus at some lenMh been induced to dwell systems. upon them, to the exclusion of a consideration of mere

objects of sense; for these fall outside the province of the meta- physician, and within that of the physicist or natund philosopher. The great line, too, of demarcation to be drawn across the Supra- natum philosophy, is one which subdivides it into two leaoing sections ; one of which contends for the ideas as constituting what is supra-sensual, and the other for the numbers as sucL AnstotJe, accordingly, offers some few remarks in this and the next chapter, as regarous the Idealistic hvpothesis, and as regards the advocates of number; that is, not formal number, which he nas already examined, but purely mathematical number, "niis discussion is reserved for the last book of the Metaphysics.

BOOK XIII.

We come now to book XIII. (al. XIV.), which bringa book XIII. *^c Metaphysics to its close ; and though some of the

speculations therein are devoid of interest, yet the chapters on the existence of good in the world are well worthy of our careful study ; for they dimise much light around the rest of the speculations of the Stagyrite, especially the character of his theolo- 2. Chap. i. on gical System, properly so called. Chapter i, of this contrariety book is taken up with an examination of the relation cipie^"* P'*°" subsisting between ccHitrariety and causation; and the

student is referred to the text itself for information on this topic, which is treated of with such obscurity as to make Taylor believe that Aristotle was not expressing here his own genuine senti- ments. Such as they are, however, they may be better understood by a reference to the commentaries of Syrianus, to be found in Brandis, and a translation of which is given in Taylor.

„, .. Chapter iL opens with the discussion of a very impor

tegaidmg ' taut question, as to whether we can predicate composi- things eternal, tion of things that are eternal, or whether the consider- polite^nature?. ^^^^^ ^^ thiugs eternal as composite natures would not,

in point of reality, ignore their existence altogether. Ana, further, for the decision of tms question he appeals to a prin- ciple abready established as to the essential nature of the Eternal 4. Our know- Substance consisting in energy. This leads him to an ledge of "non- examination into our knowledge of the "non-ens," sug-

• "*•" gested by a quotation from the writings of Parmenides;

•nd (rem this he passes on to inquire how entity can constitute

{

lOOK XIII.] ANALYSIS OF 4BI9T0TLE*R XETAFRrSIOS. Izxxis

plurality, or how relatives are pkraL In fact, in general, it may be stated that this inqniry in regard of plurality extends itself to the other categories. Ana the cMpter concludes with the inyestigation of the grounds, if any, for the subsistence of niunbers, whether ideal or mathematical.

In chapter iiL we have a sort of sketch of the 5. chap. iii. several systems prevalent amongst the advocates for regardbig numbers as the substance of things. Some, for in- '**"°^'«"* stance, identify ideas with numbers ; soma again, identify numbers with things ; and, again, some identify matnematical natures with number; and we also are presented with a brief review of these systems, which takes up the entire of this chapter. In e. chap. w. aa doapter iv., which contains a portion of what obviously regards the to belongs to chapter iii., we have a most remarkable sub- *'y°*°'* ject of inquiry touched upon; namely, how we are to account for the existence of what plainly meets us on every side, viz. the Good — the TO dyaOov. Various systems have been put forth on this vital question ; but they may be reduced to two, namely, those on the one hand who maintain the antecedence of the rb dyaOhv as an efficient principle ; and on the other, those who would make it out to he nothing else than a mere result in the way of natural and necessary development. This, undoubtedly, is the s&tement to be found in the fourth chapter of this book ; and the student will be reminded of the identity of this controversy with that which has been perpetuated from the age of Aristotle downwards to our own. Aris- totle adduces the authority of the Magi, and of the iippSts hi$ Sages, the Sophoi,' of antiquity to support the theory of theory about the antecedence of the good, and of its being a para- byViefereiKe mount principle of Creation. And in support of the to antiquity, same, he appeals to the systems of the ancient poets, who likewise agreed with mQ Magi, as is evidenced in their assigning the sovereignty amongst their first principles, not to such negations as Chaos or Night, but to Jupiter, whom they recognised as a source of positive dominion. We have also in this chapter an examination mto the relation between the rh ayaB6v and the r6 tv. And that the former does not, nor cannot, constitute the latter is illustrated by an appeal to the Ideal Theory.

In chapter v. we have a discussion as to the conse- g ^ ^ ^^ quences of a non-classification of the Good — the gpecting the t» t6 oya^oi^— amongst first principles, and it chiefly turns i^a06vMA on the fallacy of supposing the less perfect to be antece- "' ^""^ ^^^* dent to what is more perfect. Also, Aristotle inquires as to the mode after which numbers consist from first principles, whether by mixture, or composition, or as a thing springs from seed. This leads to a denial of the substantive character of numbers, and an asser-

( 1 ) This vas the designation for scientific men previous to the age of Pythagoras, r%» was the first to be styled a '* philosopher." Vide Diog. Laertius, Intioduenon.

9

Xe ANILTSIB OF ARISTOTLE'S METAPHT8ICS. [BOOK XUL

tion of the Tagoeness prevalent as to the mode of their causality.

9. Chap. yi. ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ chapter, which is the last, contiaues a experimental discussion of the Same topic, and tests the validity of faHacy'o?the ***® theories about numbers as causes, by examining Pythagoric somc of the instances that have been brought forward system of |jy the supporters of this system, aud exposing the ab«  num ra. surdity of the same. Chapters v. and vL are well worthy of attention ; as they touch upon certain departments of speculation of the most vital importance, and the iulerest in which continues unabated to the present day.

10. Aim of the Having thus brought this Analysis to its termination, foregoing the hope Is expressed that it may prove of assistance to Analysis. students desirous of becoming acquainted with the metaphysical system of Aristotle. The plan pursued has been to endeavour to show the thread of connexion that runs tiirougli the Metaphysics, to explain the doctrines from time to time laid down there, and in general to discover as far as possible the drift and tendency of the entire Treatise. And all this seems more attainable by Bekker's arrangement of the several books, which has been followed, than that which has been proposed by Dr Gillies, probably in imitation of Petiti,^ and censured by Taylor,* with every possible show of reason.

11. Transcend- From the Analysis it maj be seen that the aim of the entaiismofthe Stagyritc is eminently transcendental, and the whole Metaphysics, ^^j.^ jg based on the supposition of the existence of a something that is capable of and actually involves a separable subsistence, independent of and superior to those objects that fall under the notice of our senses. And it is through the prin- ciple of causation that we are enabled to ascend upwards to this supra-sensual substance ; and, therefore, we may observe the con- stant struggle of Aristotle, jn his metaphvsical system, to dissipate the obscurity that hung around the principle of efficiency in the philo- sophic world. This is quite apparent in his review of the Greek ))hilosophy, in his elucidation oi the relation between matter and form and between energy and capacity, and in his mode of refuting

12. Does this *^'® IdesX Hypothesis of Plato. Still, however, his asser- amount to tion of the necessity of the existence of a certain supra* an a^ertion sensual substancc may fall very far short of a demon- existence t stration of God's existence ; and the examination of this

point, of how far Aristotle had advanced in the develop- ment of his theological system, may form not an unsuitable conclusion to the foregoing interpretation of his Ontology. IS. incon- '^ow, it has appeared from several portions of thii

•latency of Analysis,' that whenever he has ventured to do so, the Aristotle in his mention of questions strictly theological is made by

(1) The proposed arrangement is given by Blakesley.

(2) In his Introduction to his translation of the Metaphysics.

(3) For instance, book I. chap. L* book V. chap. ii.. and elsewhere.

BOOK XI!I.] ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S HETAPHl&ICS. xd

Aristotle with the utmost coldness, and that nowhere imperfect in the whole Treatise does he manifest ttiat interest treatment of for such suhjects which we should expect to find Theology, in a writer who really thought— as the Stagyrite did — that the pro- Tinces of Theology and Metaphysics intersected each other, nay, occupied common ground. And tnis apathy for religious speculation is, perhaps, the more inconsistent in Aristotle, because he not merely in the very outset of the Treatise acknowledges that Theology is an interchangeable term with Metaphysics, but that it is the former that imparts such dignity tc the latter, and that sheds such lustre around it as a science; so that the same complaint lies against the Meta- physics as against the Ethics, namely, the absence of the religious element from both.

As to the absence of the religious element from the ethical system of Aristotle, the student is referred absence of the to a Preface to " Selections from the Greek Text of the religious Nicomachean Ethics," written by Dr. Fitzgerald, the AnXdeU^"' present Bishop of Cork, at a time when he tilled the Ethics, chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Nothing can be more eloquent than this short dissertation on the advantages to be derived from a study of Aristotle's ethical writings ; and whilst the merits of his moral system are ably pointed out, at the same time are exposed its defects, as the work of a mind not impregnated with " the truth as it is in Jesus." The perusal of this treatise is recommended as a guide towards the formation of a correct judgment on the point in question, as well as " Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion," Essay I. sections 3, 4, 5, 6.^

The absence of the religious element, however cul- pable in the Ethics, is in tJie Metaphysics an omission J^mUie^**^"^* the more flagrant, because, though Aristotle might Metaphysics have answered such an objection in the case of nis 2°J*'j-.t- * Ethics by saying that the object there was merely the enumeration of those practical duties that rest on man's social and individual nature, to the exclusion of anything in itself supra-mun- dane, yet no such apology is open for him in the case of his Meta- physics. Here he had the most ample opportunity for developing liis theological system ; he must have felt how he was called upon to do so from the relations which he confessed as subsisting between Metaphysics and Theology, to such an extent as that the latter in its importance quite overshadows the former. We look in vain, how- ever, for anything like an adequate treatment of this subject, and the meagre outlines, therefore, which he has furnished us in this depart* ment,are the only data that we have to go upon in the formation of our opinions as to what Aristotle's precise noiions on the Nature ol God were, viewed in relation to the character of His Divine govern- ment over men as titeir supreme and moral Ruler.

(1) By Hi« present Archbithop of Dublin.

KCii ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S IISTAFHTSICS. [bOOK XIII:

16. How far ^ ^ AiistoUe's notions about the Nature of God,

Aristotle'! the foregoing Analysis showa us what may be learned theology goes, qjj ^^^^ y^^g^ . jj^*. jjj^ Tlieology seems to stop here, and

there is no further amplification of the fact of Gkni's existence into the various relations in which that fact stands to man himself, and into the various duties of love, and gratitude, and obedience, which necessarily are suggested to a religious or even thinking mind on the mention of it. And on aotount of Aristotle's sflcnca as regards the moral government of God, and his Divine Providence over the world, iH connexion vnih his First (Jause, has he been stigmatized with the brand of .Atheism.

In the controversies, however, concerning the Stagy- omUsion In the ^^^^'^ Theology, this very circumstance has been over- controversy looked ; and admirers of the genius of Aristotle, from a foSe'saSeism. J^i^owledge of his works, have been unable to restrain their indignation at the accusations of Atheism, — from |)ersons perhaps who have never studied his writfiigs,-*>that have been hurled trom all quarters upon the head of this remarkable man. The rancour shown on either side would obviously have been mode- rated had both parties perceived the lurking ambiguity of the word Atheism, and a strict definition of that term might perhaps be the means of creating a perfect coincidence of opinion on the subject.

Now, bearing this in mind, let us try and see how the case stands. As far as the Metaphysics are concerned, let us try to discover whether there may not be one sense in which Aristotle is, and another in wiiioh he is not, an atheist ; and whether the latter accep- tation may not be the one espoused by the advocated, and the former by the enemies, of the Stagyrite's philosophy.

Now, from the foregoing Analysis, as already stated, totie'soceount ^^ V^^^ Aristotle's assertion of a supra-sensual sub- of Ood free stance ; (he makes the existence of this substance H^.tOrSli^^f an argument for the necessity of there being such a

imputation of . o -irii • \l"Li- i* j«j.l'

atheUmr science as Metaphysics;) but bv his distin^shing

Physics from Metaphysics, and^ oesignating the chief division of the latter as Theology, he obviously makes his description of this substance to constitute his Theology, that is, his account of God. The question, then, among theologians, is, or rather ought to be, as to whether we are to accept such an account from Aristotle of God's Nature, and at the same time to consider this account as suffi- cient to release the Stagyrite from the imputation of being an atheist.

A istoti • From the very start., indeed, in the Metaphysics, we

First Cause? ' <^an discover the transcendental tendency of Aristotle's

philosophy ; we can observe how in his searching foi

causes, in their utmost generalisation, he does so in subservience tc

(t) The student should abore all eonsult the FabricU Delectus, chap. 8, iU.

» •

aOQK XIII.] ANALYSIS 07 AKISTOTLE's HETAPUTSICS. XcUk

the interests of Ontolo|nr ; we can see how he embraces such causes as are competent to solve the phenomena of design, and regularity, and excellence. We perceive nim, too, ascending from these causes upwards to a First Cause, and this First Cause we find him arraying in many of the distinctive attributes ascribed by us to God.

Let us further, however, examine as to what de- „ ^ ^ Telopment this notion of God's existence receives at Sin^S^thfa Aristotle's hands, and whether he builds thereupon First Cause the reality of God's providence over us as our Creator ^*Divinr**°* and moral Governor ; and we will discover that such a providence? search will be made in vain, and that there is no trace- able connexion between his notion of a First Cause, and our depen- dence upon that First Cause, as his creatures, and the subjects of his dominion. Now, all that can be found is merely a demonstra* tion— -partly a priori, and partly a posteriori^of the existence of a First Cause, together with a short delineation of the nature of that cause, and its mode of operation. The truth seems to be this, that Aristotle, even as a theologian, did not reallv /eel himself called upon to go any further than he had done ; and, accordingly, in the non-formation of a system of moral and providential government upon the fact of God's existence, the Stagyrite displays no conscioiisuess of his being guilty of a sad omissiou. And the cause of 21. Thenaion all this arose from the peculiar constitution of his mind, of his not which, impatient of bemg curbed by received opinions, ****^* *®* would have appeared following in the beaten track of other inquirers, ,. if he had attempted anything further beyond the mere statement of God's existence as the logical conclusion from premises already established. And this is exemplified in the fact, that Aristotle's treatment of Theology was characterised by a violent swing from the system of his master, rlato — a remark, indeed, that is applicable to hit entire philosophy. Aristotle viewed Theology physicsuly, in contra- distinction to Plato, who viewed Physics theologically ; and there- fore it is, that so broad a line may be drawn between the Academy and the Peripatetics; between the warm aspirations of the one after an ideal perfection, compared with the icy ratiocinations of the others.

Thus we may, from this, understand how it has come 22. why Ans- to pass, that Aristotle should have been recognised as totie has been an atheist. Does not he, one of his defenders would say, ^^.^^ acknowledge the existence of a first intelligent Cause P * . " * Does not ne, moreover, array this First Cause in many of the Divine attributes P How, then, can he be regarded as an atheist f Simply, the assailant would reply, because he omits to enlar^ upon the idea of God, and elucidate B.\s , relation to us here ic the world, as the Lord of this earth, and the supreme Buler of the UniTerae.

Xciv ANALYSIS Olf ABISTOTLBTS METAPHYSICS. [bOOK Xltl.

The sum comes to this, then, us has been alreadj a?he^*dete*r- ohserved, that the wisest course far for the assailants minabie by a and defenders of Aristotle to pursue on the question of the word **^ Theology, would be to settle beforehand what they

Athdst. mean by the word Atheist ; and thereby both parties will

discover that in a certain sense Aristotle is, and in a cer- tain sense that he is not, an atheist. If we mean by an atheist one who denies the existence of a perfect intelligence subsisting of itself, and eternal therefore in its essence, and the cause of a*! things else, Aristotle can hardly be called an atheist in this sense. If, on the other hand, we mean by an atheist one who ignores the reality of God's moral government, one who strips God of those attributes that vital and practical religion rest upon, one who robs the fact of God's existence of its vivifying element for us in producing holiness, — ^if, in short, we mean by an atheist one who, thou^ he may allow the bare existence of a First Cause, yet invests that First Cause with none of those Divine characteristics that adorn it as a proper object of wor- ship, and one to be propitiated by prayer, in sucA an acceptation of the term most indiibitably must Aristotle be acknowledged an atheist.

24. This N^^ ^^^ ^*y ^® considered a fair statement of the question question of the Stagyrite's theology; but whatever viewed here in yiews one may be inclined to adopt, the study of the

reference to the -»*■ x i • ••' • j« i.i x j xi_ r x* i?

Metaphysics. Metaphysics is mdispensable towards the tormation of a sound judgment on this question. And it is in reference to the Metaphysics chiefly that the controversy about his atheism has been handled in the foregoing, and hardly any account has been taken of other parts of his works which might be noticed as confirmations of what has been laid down above. All dogmatism has been avoided, the subject has been discussed without cringing under the prejudices of either party in the controversy, and no more is needful to be said beyond addressing a few words of caution to all disputants on such a question.

25. Certain All pcrsons, then, who engage in such a controversy, cautions set should be cautious of the injustice of affixing the stain corSuct of r*^ °^ Atheism to the memory of one living before the time controversy of that God became flesh and dwelt amongst us," because, this descrip- forsooth, we oannofc find him forming an eaually ade- quate idea of the Nature of God with ourselves, upon

whom has rolled such a flood of light as to the Divine perfection, " by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and nath brought life and immortality to light thro\igh the Gospel." Again, we snoidd remember that a Pagan's belief m the immortality of the soid is beside the question of his atheism, because a lieathen might have maintained the truth of God's existence without a simultaneous assertion of the reality of a future state of

BOOK XIH.] ANALYSIS OP ARIBTOTLE'S METAPHTSIC8. XCV

rewards and punislimeiits. Further, the doctrine of the etemiiy ol the world,* with Aristotle at least, does not clash with a belief in the existence of God ; nay, however paradoxical such an insertion may appear, this dogma mi^ht be urged as one of the arguments in favour of the Theism of Aristotle. Again, we shcdd not overlook the utter incompatibility of a system of atheism with a system of incorporealism ; and therefore, in all disputes of this kind, we should be careful to settle beforehand how far the ancient writer whose atheism is under examination may be proved to acknowledge the reality of an incorporeal substance. And lastlv, we should endeavour perfectly to understand in what sense it is that the ancient author, whose tueological opinions we are trying to ascertain, employs the word " Qto^t* whether as a term to designate one dominative principle in the Universe, or as a mere generic name designed as an appellation for whatsoever is supra-sensual or transcendental in its nature.

It may likewise be of service to the student to read ^ ^, , . the Logics of Aiistotle along with his Metaphysics: aot should Te **^*'* but that they are two distinct sciences in themselves, studied with This assertion, however, is not acquiesced in by aU, for ^p^y^c^" it is controverted by Bacon and Batter ; though; on the other hand, its trutn is affirmed by Kant, and Thompson, and Mansel, and, above aU, by Aristotle himself, who takes the earliest opportunity, in the Metaphysics, to apprise his readers how that the subject that he is there introducing to their notice, is one which has been as well neglected by other speculators as hitherto unexplored by himself. Many of the terms recurring in the Metaphysics are explained in the Contraries, the Topics, and tne IVeatise on Literpretation, e. g, ovaia, XJyoy, Kivrja-is, dnixpaa-is, KaTd(l>a(rig, and SO fortn. Again, the subject of Demonstration {BfUvva-is) is treated of in the fist book of the Posterior Analytics, as well as that of Media, and of First Principles (dpxai). And in book ii. of this same Treatise we have an examins^ tion into the nature and grounds of scientific knowledge. Instances of reference of this kind, however, have been pointed out, from time to time, in sufficient abundance, in the notes of the translation ; and the student is here merely reminded of the importance of prosecuting this comparison for himself. The only available Translation of the Logical Treatises is that by Mr. Owen, in Bohn's Classical Library— a translation that deserves to be mentioned for its accuracy and tho deamess with which the work is put before an English reader by means of the margmal notes.

All that remams now is to point out, extrinsic to 27. collateral Aristotle's works, some collateral studies with the subjects 01 Metaphysics. There may, therefore, be mentioned, as MetJiJ**^^ useful for such a purpose. Archbishop Whately's * *^ ^*'*^"* Logic, book ii. chap, v.; book iv. chaps, i. and ii.; together with the

(I) The student is referred to Dr. Clarke on "The Being and Attr.butea of God,* iu the proof of his third Proposition, ; SI London coition. «/»«.

CCvi ANALT8I8 Of ARIBTOTLirS MElAPHYSICb. [bOOKXIIL

Ajppendix of Ambiguous Terms, e.g. Capable, Possible^ Impossible, Necessary, Truth, Cause, and Experience : Sir William Hwnilton's Dissertations — 1. on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned— 4. on Logic — 6. on Idealism ; and his Essay on the Study of Matiiematics : Dr. Hampden's (Bishop of Hereforct) Lectures on Scholastic Philo- sophy, Lectures i. and li. : Kanf s Critique * of Pure Reason, Tran- scendental Dialectic, book ii. chap, iii.; Transcendental Doctrine o! Method, chap, iii.: Cudworth's Intellectual System, book i.: Dr. Whewejl's Pnilosophy of the Inductive Sciences, book L; bookiiL chaps, ii. iii. iv.; book vi. chap, v.; book ix. chap, vi ; Hansel's Prole- gomena, chaps. V. and ix.; Thompson's Laws of Thought, part iv.; and Tennemann's History of Philosophy, translated in Bohn s Philo- logical Library, a book that no student should be without. 18. Work! ^ ^ works more immediately conversant with Aris-

more imme- totle, I would suggcst the article Aristotle in Smith's « aILS"* I^ictionary of Greek Biography, Blakesley's Life of

• Aristotle, Thomas Stanley m his History of rhilosophy,

part vi.. Bitter's Philosophy, vol. iii. chaps, i. ii. (Morrison s Translation), and Buhle, in the dissertations prefixed to his edition of the " Organon."* As to commentators, I have been chiefly indebted to Thomas Aquinas and Augustinus Niphus, and most especially to a selection from the ancient commentators, made by Brandis m his

" Scholia in Aristotelem." As to works antagonistic to sistk^tol^ Aristotle, the student, if such be within his reach, may

consult "Patricii Discussiones Peripatetic®, vols. iii. and cv. Petri Gassendi Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversus Aristoteleos ;** and also a curious little book of Peter Bamus, Aristotelicn Ani- madversiones," in which he attacks the Metaphysics by name ; also the " Enchiridion Metaphysicum " of Henricus More.'

In genera^ however, as a companion to the studj of rice's Analysis. ^^ Metaphysics must be mentioned Mr. Maunce's

Analysis of them in the " Cyclopaedia Metropolitana," an analysis to which I must acknowledge myself deeply indebted ; and I taie this opportuniir^ of recommending it — ^though but a very short treatise — ^to sdl siudents desirous of mastering the difiiculties and piercing into the spirit of the ontological system of Aristotle.

(1) Translated in "Bohn's Philosophical Library."

(2) This edition of Aristotle's works by Buhle was never completed, consequent on the loss of the requisite materials in the burpin«{ of Moscow. This may be lamented as one of the greatest losses classical learning sould have sustained ; and in no portion of Aristotle's works would Buhle's labouro have been more acceptabls and useful than in the Metaphysics.

(3) Also the 15th book of Eusebius' £vang. Prsepar.

END OP THE ANALYSIS.

TBF

METAPHYSICS^ OE AEISTOTLE.

BOOK L

CHAPTER I.

All men by nature are actuated with the desire i. Man's n»> of knowledge,^ and an indication of this is the S^J^Sjj^i toTe of the senses ; for even, irrespective of » proof thereof, their utility, are they loved for their own sakes;' and pre-

^ This term demens Alezandrinus (Strom. L) cozunders as equiTaleut with soprRnatiual ; but others, as significant merely of the accidental position of the present treatise after the Physics It is said to have been nnt nsed by Andronicus of Bhodes, who, out of the materials employed IB Compiling the Physics, set down after them, and designated as " rSt fi§rd tA fmruidf'* whatever he found unsulted for Insertion there. Clemens, however, is supported in his view by an anonymous Greek commentator, whom Patridus has translated into Latin, and styles Philoponus ; his words are as follow, — Meri r& tpvoriKii hriy4ypairrcu ^ irpar/fMrtia od Hard riftt t^iy rov wpdyfjutros &AA& Kord Hiv rd^iv rris avayyi&atets bta\dfifiavti ydp ircp2 <pv(rtK£v dpx^^'

• This, probably, is what Cicero means when he says, in the De

OfficiiB, I. 4, — " In primisque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio." The assertion, however, that all men desire know- ledge, has been objected to, on the ground that in some this desire is wholly absent ; but this absence merely amounts to a suppression of the natural desire from various causes ; e.g, want of leisure for intel- lectual pursuits, constitutional laziness, voluptuous habits. This natural craving for knowledge leads to a concentration of individual abilities on particular studies, and thus to a subdivision of intellectual labour. Aristotle omits to notice here the connexion between this desire and our social capacities, whish ensures the mutual communication between mankind of their mental and scientific discoveries. Vide Stewart's Outlines of Moral Philosophy, part IL sect. iiL

• Aristotle thus assigns two reasons for our love of the senses,-^

their utility, and their being sources of knowledge; or, as Thomaf Aquinas expresses it, ** in quantum sunt utiles ac cognoscitiv].'*

S

>

rd

2 THE H£TAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE* BOOK L

eminently above the rest, the sense of sight For not only for practical purposes, but also when not intent on doing anything, we choose the power of vision in preference,^ so to say, to all the rest of the senses. And a cause of this is the following, — ^that this one of the senses particularly enables us to apprehend^ whatever knowledge it is the inlet of^ and that it makes many distinctive^ qualities manifest.

• Aristotle's reasoning amounts to this. Man loves knowledge, and

loves the senses, therefore, for their own sakes ; that is, so far forth as they are the inlets of knowledge, and, consequently, the sense of sight for the cause he assigns. The elevation of this sense above the others was in accordance with the notions of the old philosophers, and of the scholastics ; and this superiority was grounded on the immediateness of the perceptions afforded by the organ of vision, compared with the others which came in through a medium. This notion is discarded by the modems. All the senses, as such, are equally the sources ot knowledge, as is most satisfactorily proved by Brown, and with much originality too, in his Philosophy of the Human Mind, voL IL chaps. 29, 80.^

• Md\i(rra rifias iroifi yvospl(fip. This I take it to be the sense of these

words. Taylor renders them thus, — " it, especially, of the rest makes us to know something;" but in this translation the force of rl is quite lost ; whereas it is preserved in Bessarion's interpretation, who for the Greek rl has the Latin *' quicquam." Taylor evidently did not consult the Cardinal's version. There is another sense which the words could possibly bear, namely, — 'Hhat the sense of sight is particularly instru- mental in furnishing us with whatever knowledge we have;" and this would make Aristotle, as stated in the foregoing note, fall into the vulgar error of the old philosophers, — ^that all knowledge originally capaein through the organ of vision. This, indeed, seems to have been the sense put upon these words by the scholastics, as appears from the objections that were made against Aristotle's assertion by his commentators in the laddie Ages ; namely, that, as Augustine Niphus puts the objection, our tactual organs and the remaining senses were, in an equal degree, sources of information.

If I were to suggest an emendation of the text as it stands in Bekker, following some MSS., I should leave out the particle rl alto- gether, and render the passage thus, — " it, the sense of sight, enables us to acquire the greatest amount of knowledge." And this would be sup- ported by the old Latin version, which Thomas Aquinas has preserved, and which renders the words, simply, '^maxime facit cognoscere." Aquinas, however, does not seem to tiiink that fidKiara refers to the quantity of the knowledge afforded, but its quality; he renders it by the word " perfectissime," and styles the sense of sight as ** spirituaHor," compared with the other senses. Vide foregoing note.

^ Much distinctive information flows in through the inlet of the sense of sight. On the value of this sense, compared with the others, vide Brown, in his remarks on the organ of vision, Philosophy of the Human Mind, voL IL

OHil.*] SENSE, MEMORY, FORESIGHT. S

By nature then, indeed, are animals formed en- 2. DUferent a» dowed with sense ; but in some oi them memory^ gJ^J in'tSe^ is not innate from sense, and in others it is. brute creation, And for this reason are these possessed of more ^enntmder^lt foresight, as well as a greater aptitude for disci- development, pline, than those which are wanting in this faculty of memory. Those furnished with foresight, indeed, are yet without the capability of receiving instruction, whatever amongst them are unable to understand the sounds they hear; as, for in- stance, bees, and other similar tribes of animals; but those are capable of receiving instruction as many as, in addition to memory, are provided with this sense also.

The rest, indeed, subsist then through impres- 3^ comparison sions' and the operations of memory, but share bet^n men experience in a slight degree ; whereas the human "'

race exists by means of art also and the powers of reasoning.

Now, experience accrues to men from memory; 4. The diflerenTNy for repeated acts of memory about the same Sanknoi-**^* thing done constitute the force of a single ex- ledge, and thcb

.^ , . J. i_ J.T.* order of deve-

penence : and experience seems to be a thing lopment. almost similar to science and art.

• Tliat memory is a distinct faculty in man, much less in brutes, ifl

denied by Brown; but that what we term memory in the human Species is found in brutes, is shown by Locke in the instance of birds, after a few attempts, learning to warble particular airs of music.

• ^atfrofflous. Taylor translates this word " phantasy," which conveys

little or no meaning at all, and is conceived in defiance of <pavraala being in the plural number. It is not, however, quite so easy to deter- inine the meaning of this word in the philosophic wor^s of the ancients. In the present case, Aristotle seems to mean those ideas that are conveyed into the minds of animals by means of their repre- sentative power. This word occurs frequently in the writings of Sextua Empiricus, — in the Pyrrhonian Institutes, and in his treatise, Contra Mathematicos : but in the Latin version we have it translated merely " phantasia." Quinctilian, in his interpretation of the word <papraffia^ uses the following language, — '* per quas imagines rerum absentum ita repraesentantur animo ut eas cemere oculis ac praesentes habere videamur.*' Quinctilian thus improves on Cicero's translation, who renders it by " visum ** in various places, and by " visionem " in the Lucullus. Plutarch's exposition of the word, in the De Placitis, is curious: he derives ^vracia from ^tas-, because, as light proves ita own existence, and that of the things it illustrates, so <f>avraarla brings itself to light, and is constructive of itself. Thomas Aquinas, in his Com- mentary, defiues <pavr curia thus : "quae est motus j^tus a sensu secunduot actum;" whxoh reminds ug of Hobb^s* definition of sensation itself.

ii2

4 TH9 MBTAFHTSIOB OF ABI8T0TLE. [BOOK U

f . The gentn- But sdenee and art result unto men by means IcteneeffoMT** ^^ experience; for experience, indeed, as Polus ezpeiieiiee. saith, and corrcctlj so/ has produced art, but inexperience, chance. But an art comes into being when, out of many conceptions of experience, one universal opinion is evolved with respect to similar cases. For, indeed, to entertain the opinion that this particular remedy has been of service to Callias, while labouring under this particular disease, as well as to Socrates, and so individually to many, this is an inference of experience; but that it has been con- ducive to the health of all, — such as have been defined according to one species, — ^while labouring under this disease, as, for instance, to the phlegmatic, or the choleric, or those sick of a burning fever, this belongs to the province of art 6. The compa. As regards, indeed, practical purposes,^ there- with exTO? fore, experience seems in no wise to differ from rience.in regard art; nay, cvcu WO scc the experienced com- of practice. passing their objects more effectually than those who possess a theory^ without the experience. But a cause of this is the following — ^that experience, indeed, is a knowledge of singulars, whereas art, of universals ; but all things in the doing, and all generations, are concerned about the singular : for he whose profession it is to practise medicine, does not restore man to health save by accident, but Callias, or Socrates, or any of the rest so designated, to whom it happens to be a man. If, therefore, any one without the experience is furnished with the principle, and is acquainted with the universal, but is ignorant of the singular that is involved therein, he will frequently fall into error in the case of his medical treatment ; for that which is capable of cure is rather the singular.

But, nevertheless, we are of opinion that, at least, knowledge

^ This assertion is put into the mouth of Polus in the Qoorgias of Plato. Vide Bipont Ei. vol IV. p. 7.

^ np6s fi^v ovK r6 irp(krr€iv : in these words, as Alexander Aphrodisi- onsis remarks, Aristotle demonstrates that knowledge is a thing more boQourable than action, in order to show that wisdom, being involved iu knowledge, and not in practice, is likewise itself, on that account, more worthy of respect.

• The word A J70S, which I have here translated " theory," occurs fre-

quently throughout the Metaphysics, and in various senses ; aach aa iha

• 'priucipi« of a thing," ** a definitioQ," a seatence," &c.

OH. I J AJIT COMPARED WITH EXPERIENCE. 5

and understanding appertain to art rather than j, t^^ tuperi experience; and wen^ckon artists more wise than ontyofartoTci the experienced, inasmuch as wisdom is the con- reicardofkiioir- ccmitant of all philosophers rather in propoition *****•• to their knowle(%e.

But this i& BO because some, indeed, are aware 3^ Threefold of the cause, and some are not. For the expe- proof of thU; rienced, indeed, know that a thing is so, but they knowiedge^of dp not know wherefore it is so; but others — I **'*»®' mean the scientific — are acquainted with the wherefore and the cause. Therefore, also, we reckon the chief artificers in each case to be entitled to more dignity, and to the repu- tation of superior knowledge, and to be more wise than the handicraftsmen, because the former are acquainted with the causes of the things that are being constructed ; whereas the latter produce things, as certain inanimate things do, indeed ; yet these perform their functions unconsciously, — as the fire when it bums. Things indeed, therefore, that are inanimate, by a certain constitution of nature, p^orm each of these their functions, but the handicraftsmen through habit ; inas- much aa it is not according as men are practical that they are more wise, but according as they possess the reason of a thing, and understand causes.

And, upon the whole, a proof of a person's ggcondiy in having knowledge is even the ability to teach ;^ the abUity to and for this reason we consider art, rather than ^^^' experience, to be a science ; for artists can, whereas the handi- craftsmen cannot, convey instruction.

And further, we regard none of the senses to ^.j^j^i ^^ be wisdom, although, at least, these are the cause fenie, in most decisive sources of knowledge about singu- ^n*toicience, lars : but they make no affirmation of the where- »ay» nothing oi

/.. jrxi-' r 11- the wherefore.

fore m regard of anythmg, — as, for example, why fire is hot, but only the fact that it is hot.

Therefore, 2 indeed, is it natural for the person 9. speculative who first discovers any art whatsoever, beyond rather than

^ This is what Socrates means in the Alcibiades Primua, when he says, ffSii ripa c25cs (rotpdv trutvv aHiwdrovma Toii^ircu &AAov ao^v &rcp 9ibr6t ; Bipont Ed. vol. V. p. 35.

• Aristotle here shows the paths through which men must travel

into this wisdom,** or first philosoply; and for this purpose adducei

6 THE METAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLS. [boOK I.

active art is the ordinary power of the senses, to be the ob«  }ecuont!. which j^ct of human admiration, not only on account is answered. Qf something of the things that have been dis- covered being useful, but as one that is wise and superior to the rest of men. But when more arts are being discovered— both some, indeed, in relation to things that are necessary, and others for pastime— we invariably regard such more wise than those,^ on account of their sciences not being for bai'e utility. Whence all things of such a sort having been already procured, those sciences have been invented which were pur- sued neither for purposes of pleasure nor necessity, and first in those places where the inhabitants enjoyed leisure : where- fore, in the neighbourhood of Egypt tiie mathematical arts were first established ; for there leisure was spared unto the sacerdotal caste. It has then, indeed, been declared in the £thics^ what is the difference between an art and a science, and the rest of the things of the same description. 10. That wis- ^^^) ^* present, the reason of our producing this dom is a science treatise is the fact, that all consider what is termed firmedrand*^* wisdom to be couvcrsaut about first causes and stated as the principles : so that — as has been said on a former

object of the "^ .^ . i . j , ,

present trear occasiou — the experienced seem to be more wise

• • • ®- than those possessing any sense whatsoever, and

the artificer than the experienced, and the master-artist than the handicraftsman, and the speculative rather than those that are productive. That, indeed, wisdom, therefore, is a science conversant about certain causes and first principles is obvious.

the example of the Egyptian priests, who were enabled to construct the speculative sciences of geometry and mathematics by having enjoyed leiaure from the laborious employments of life. They were thus allowed an opportunity of contemplating the heavenly pheno- mena, and, from such observations of experience, of deducing the abstract sciences! The student will do well to consult Alexander's Commentary on the passage, and the more elaborate explanation of Asclepius, taken from Ammonius.

^ That is, that those who knew the reason of things were more wise than the artificers.

^ The objection which Aristotle imagines is tacitly implied in the foregoing remarks amounts to this, — ^that such are tantamount to destroying the distinction between art, science, and wisdom. Arisljotle, however, repels the imputation that he is using these words in the same sense by a reference to his Ethics, bookVl. chap. iii.,whero distinction! between them are carefully drawn.

511. II.] THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF METAPHYSICS.

CHAPTKP. II.1

Now, siDce we are engaged in investigating this i. wisdom science, the foUowing must form a subject for J^S^tSd** our consideration ; namely, about what kind of univeraai causes, and what kind of first principles, is this *^"^'* science — I mean wisdom-— conversant. If, doubtless, one would receive the opinions which we entertain concerning the wise man, perhaps from this our proposed inquiry would be evident the more.

Now, in the first place, indeed, we go on the 2. Threefold supposition that the wise man, especially, is ac- J"^ 'JJ"^*^ l. quainted with all things scientifically, as far as nitionofwise this is possible, not, however, having a scientific ™*°* knowledge of them singly. In the next place, a person who is capable of knowing things that are difficult, and not easy for a man to understand, such a one we deem wise (for perception by the senses is common to all« wherefore it is a thing that is easy, and by no means wise). Further, one who is more accurate, and more competent to give in- struction in the causes of things, we regard more wise about every science. And of the sciences, also, that which secondly, from is deEorable for its own account, and for the sake the definition of knowledge, we consider to be wisdom in pre- ° ^" °°** ference to that which is eligible on account of its probable results, and that which is more qualified for preeminence we regard as wisdom, rather than that which is subordinate, — for that the wise man ought not to be dictated to, but should dictate unto others; and that this person ought not to be swayed in his opinions by another, but one less wise by this man. Respecting this wisdom and wise men^ do we enter- tain such and so many suppositions.

^ Aristotle haying shown, in the first chapter, that the science tinder investigation — which he here calls wisdom, though elsewhere by a different denomination — is conversant about causes, proceeds now to lay down what sort these causes are, their nature, and number.

'^ The remarks of Alexander Aphrodisiensis upon Aristotle's analysii of the wise man, and of the science denominated wisdom, are wortk » reference by the student Vide Braudis' Scholia, pp. 525 sqq.

8 THB METAPHYSICS OF ARICTOTLE. f^fiOOK Z,

Thi di from ^^^ ^^ these characteristics the scientific know^ the appiica- ledge of all things most needs be found in him detiniSoif*" Tuost especially who possesses the universal the present scieucc ;^ for this person, in a manner, knows all science. things that are subjects of it. But, also, the most

difficult nearly for men to know are the things that are especially universal, for they are most remote from the senses. But the most accurate of the sciences are those respecting things that .are primary, in the most eminent sense of the word; for those from fewer principles are more accu* rate than those said to be from addition, as arithmetic than geometry.^ But, also, that science, without doubt, is more adapted towards giving instruction, at least, which speculates about causes; for those do afibrd instruction who assign the causes in regard of each individual thing. Now, imder- standing and scientific knowledge, for their own sakes, most especially reside in the science of that which is most par- ticularly fitted for being scientifically known. For he who selects scientific knowledge, for its own sake, will especially choose that which is preeminently science; but such is that which is the science of that which is particularly fitting as an object of scientific knowledge, and particularly fitting as objects of scientific knowledge are first principles and causes ; for on account of these, and by means of these, are the other objects of knowledge capable of being made known : but not these by means of those things that are subordinate to them. Most fit for preeminence likewise amongst the sciences, and fit for preeminence ^ in preference to that which is subservient, is the science which communicates the knowledge of that on account of which each thing is to be done; but this con-

1 During the first age of Greek philosophy it was styled <ro<l>laf or

• ' wisdom," and its cultivators, <ro<l>oi, or '* wise men ; " and the term

philosopher was first applied to Pythagoras. This change, no doubt, he* tokened a corresponding change in men's mode of thought; for thereby an element hitherto imdiscovered was brought into notice, — ^namely, the relation of our emotions to scientific investigations.

^ There is the same reasoning adopted by Aristotle in the Posteriof Analytics, book L chap. ii.

^ There is a passage in Bacon's works which recognises thii subordination amongst the sciences ; viz. " cum moralis philo'to* phia ancLllsa tantum vices erga theologiam suppleat." De Aul l VIL4

00. tl.] ONTOLOGY A SPEaULATTTB SCIENCE. 9

stitutes the good in each particular, but, in general, thti which is the best in every nature.

From all, therefore, that has been stated, ^ ^^^^.^ the sought-for appellation lights upon the same f^om the fore- science; for it is necessary that this be a science dom'is'a**^^ speculative of first principles and of causes, for tcienee of the good, also, viewed as a final cause, is one from *'*"*®** amongst our classified list of causes.

But that the science under investigation is not 4 ^^ ♦ «- i it science employed in producing,^ is evident from a science wis- the case of those who formed systems of philo- ^^tive^but" pe- Bophy in the earliest ages. For from wonder men, cuiative- proof both now and at the first, began to philoso- * *'*** ' phize, having felt astonishment originally at the things which were more obvious, indeed, amongst those that were doubtful ; then, by degrees, in this way having advanced onwards, and, in process of time, having started difi&culties about more im- portant subjects, — as, for example, respecting the passive conditions of the moon, and those brought to pass about the sun and stars, and respecting the generation of the universe. But he that labours imder perplexity and wonder thinks that he is involved in ignorance.^ Therefore, also, the philosopher — that is, the lover of wisdom — ^is somehow a lover of fables,^ for the &ble is made up of the things that are marvellous. Wherefore, i^ for the avoidance of ignorance, men from time to time have been induced to form system^ of philosophy, it is manifest that they went in pursuit of

' Ariftotla shows that the science under investigation is speculative, not active, from the fact that the earliest philosophy sprang from wonder, — ^that wonder flows from ignorance, — ^that the removal of ignor- ance amounts to knowledge, — ^that this was accomplished by speculation' and not practice ; and that therefore wisdom, the source of the highest knowledge, was speculative and not active. Compare Alexander Aphrodisiensis on the passage, and also Thomas Aquinas in his remarks on the Prooemium of Aristotle.

' The ancient Theogonists made Iris the daughter of Thaumas — thus harmonizing with Aristotle's expression here. — Aaclqnut,

• Consult Asclepius, from Ammonius, on the passage. Pliny calls

philosophy it>i\ofivBla. Philosophy necessarily, at the first, partook largely of the nature of the fabulous, on account of its being therewith deeply tinged through the influence of poetry. This is manifest from the works of Qreek antiquity in the instances of Linus, Musseus, and Orpheus. The subject is discussed by Cudworth; and, more at large, iv •everal of the notes of his commentator, Mosheim.

10 THE MBTAPHT8I0B OF ABISTOTLB. [boOK !•

•oiontifio knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not on account of any utility that it might possess. But the Proof trom ex- event itself also bears witness to the truth of this perience, statement ; for on the supposition of almost all

those things being in existence that are requisite towards both ease and the management of life^ prudence of such a sort as this began to be in requisition. Therefore is it evident that we seek scientific knowledge from no other actual ground of utility save what springs fi^m itsel£ 8. ThtR «cieno« But as wc Say a free man exists who is such roost uberai. f^^ his owu sake, and not for the sake of another, 1/ 60, also, this alone of the sciences is free^ for this alone subsists for its own sake.

6. Not human Wherefore, also, the acquisition of this science in it» origin, j^qj jjg justly r^arded as not human, for, in

many instances, human nature is servile.^ Proof of thi« So that, according to Simonides, the Deity only from the poeti. g^ould eujoy this prerogative ; yet that it is un- worthy for a man* not to investigate the knowledge that is in conformity with his own condition. But if, in reality, the puets make any such assertion, and if the Godhead is in its nature constituted so as to envy, in this respect it is especially natural that it should happen, and that all those that are over-subtle should be unfortunate :^ but neither does the Divine essence admit of being affected by envy, but — according to the proverb — ^the bards utter many falsehoods.

7. This science Nor ought wc to considcr any other science most honour- jj^^j^ entitled to houour than such as that under

' Men often are the slaves of their nature on account of their super- abundaut bodily necessities. — Asclepius,

• The old copies left out ovk before ffjreiv, which robbed the sentence

of its point, as Aug. Niphus shows. Aristotle's object, in bringing forward Simonides, is to show that this wisdom, on account of the very elevated speculations it contains, seems a thing of Divine growth, as being inconsist-ent, in regard of its origin, with the frail faculties and condition of man.

• Hvarvxeis. Their superior qualifications would excite the rancour of

the Deity, on the supposition of the truth of the poetic idea of the Divine as a nature essentially envious. Herodotus was of the same opinion, that the character of the Divinity being envious, there resulted mis- fortime, sent by the invidious Deity upon those amongst the human race that shonr above their fellows. Plato says somewhere, in disproot •f this, 'PSoyos tan t^w Beiov x<^fHW-

CR. II. J ONTOLOGY A DIVINE SCIENCE. 11

Investigation %t present. For that which is most divine is also most worthy of honour. But such will be so in only two ways; for that which the Deity would especially possess ia a divine one amongst the sciences ; and if there is any sucii science, this woiild be the case with the science of things divine. But this science, such as we have described it, alone is possessed of both of these characteristics ; for to all specu- lators doth the Deity appear as a cause, and a certain first i/ principle ;^ and such a science as this, either God alone, or he principally, would possess. Therefore, indeed, may all sciences else be more requisite than this one ; but none is more excellent.

It is, indeed, necessary, in a manner, to esta- 8. This scienct blish the order^ of this science, in its develop- o?der°comrar** ment, in a direction contrary to the speculations to the early that have been carried on from the beginning. P*»i^o*op*»y- For, indeed — as we have remarked — all men commence their inquiries from wonder whether a thing be so, — as in the case of the spontaneous movements of jugglers* figures to those who have not as yet speculated into their cause; or respecting the solstices, or the incommensurability of the diameter;^ for it seems to be a thing astonishing to all, if any quantity of those that are the smallest is not capable of being measured. But it is necessary to draw our inquiry to a close in a direction the contrary to this, and towards what is better, according to the proverb.* As also happens in the case of these, when they succeed in learning those points ; for

^ This is a remarkable passage to occur in the writings of Aristotle, about whose deism or atheism so much has been said and written.

' That whereas the old philosophy originated from wonder, — that is, ignorance, — and attained unto a sort of knowledge, yet that when men reached this knowledge, knowledge, as such, became the great actuating g motive in speculation. This present science under investigation, how* ^ ever, would set out from an opposite point in this progress, because it started from the consideration of that which is the highest object o| speculative knowledge.

3 "Or the incommensurability of the diameter," — that is, as I take it^ of the diagonal of a square with its side : vide note, book II. chap, ii^ on this geometric principle.

• " According to the proverb." The proverb alluded to by Aristotle

is probably the Greek one, "Stvr^pwp h-fiuvSvan"** originating, in all like* lihood, with the custom of repeating wacrifices in cases where, in the first instance, they were vnfavourable. Indeed, we have a sirrilar siiyiD|| fcmongst ourselves, — * Second thoughts artj beat.**

12 THR MKTAPHYAIOfl OF ARIBTOTLE. [bOOK t

nothing wDuld a geometrician so wonder at, as if the diametet of a squara should be commensurable with its side. What, therefore, is the nature of the science uider investigation has been declared; as, also, what the aim should be which the present inquiry and the entire treatise should striTe and attain.

CHAPTER III.1

1. Fourfold ^^^ since it is manifest that one ought to enumeration of be in posscssiou of a scieucc of primary causes

(for then we say that we know each individual thing when we think that we are acquainted with the first cause) ; and since causes are denominated under four different heads,^ the first of which we assert to be the substance and the essence of a thing (for the inquiry of the wherefore, in the first instance of a thing, is referred to the last reason,' but the first wherefore of a thing is a cause and first principle) ; and the second cause we affirm to be the matter and the subject ; and the third is the source of the first principle of motion ; and the fourth, the cause that is in opposition to this, — ^namely, both the final cause and the good ; for such is an end of every genei'ation ;

2. The labours Therefore, although there has been a suffi- ofhispredecei- oicut amouut of Speculation concerning these sdenceofBtir in OUT treatise on Physics, let us, however^ oiogy. bring forward those who before our time have approached to an examination of entities, and have formed systems of philosophy respecting truth. For it is obvious that they also affirm that there are in existence certain first prin-

' ^ ristotle now proceedB to examine into the labours of his prede* cessors in the depcurtment of Sdtiologj ; and the course he pursues is first to enumerate the opinions thereupon of the early schools of philo- sophy, and of individual speculators; and next, to set down arguments for or against these theories, and show how far they are true, and how far fiilse.

' This fourfold enumeration of causes is taken from the Physics, books I. and II. We have the same division laid down in the Posterior Analytics, book II. chap.' xi.

s "The last reason." This refers to the method cf demonstration Adopted by the mathematicians in their problems. Vide the remarkf of Asdepius upon the passage in Brandis' Scholia, p. 531.

OH IILJ TH12 ancients PURE iklATEKf A LISTS. 15

oiples and causes ; therefore will it, at ai y rate, bo of service to our present treatise should we take a review of these phi- losophers ; for either we shall thereby discover a certain dif- ferent description of cause, or we shall, in prefeience, repose our confidence in those that have been already enumerated.

Now, the majority of those who first formed ^ xheir first systems of philosophy consider those that subsist principle a ma- in a form of matter to be alone ^ the principles of **"*^ **'**®* all things ; for wherefirom all entities arise, and wherefrom they are generated, as firom an original, and whereto they are cor- rupted, — ultimately the substance, indeed, remaining perma- nent, but in its passive states undergoing a change, — this they assert to be an element, and this a first principle of all things.

And for this reason they are of opinion that nothing is either produced or destroyed,^ inas- d'oginar"Du' much as such a constitution of nature is always fJ^xSpJ.*^ in a state of conservation ; as we say, that Socrates neither is absolutely brought into being when he may become handsome or musical, nor that he is destroyed when he may throw aside these habits on account of the fact of the subject, — namely, Socrates himself remaining perma- nent ; 80 neither is it the case with anything else that it is either generated or corrupted anew. For it is necessary that there should be a certain Nature — either one or more than one — from which the other entities are produced, that re- maining in a state of conservation. The plurality, indeed, and the species of such a fiibt principle, all do not affirm to be the same.

But Thales,^ indeed, — the founder of this kind 5 Material of philosophy, — affirms the nature just mentioned <»"«e held by

• Aristotle's object — the igh, indeed, it is not very clearly set forth in

the Metaphysics, consequent upon the obscure arrangement which he follows — seems to be to show that his predecessors, with a few excep- tions, merely busied themselves with a material cause, to the exclusion of any other.

-* This dogma has been most fully illustrated Vy Cudworth in " The Intellectual System/' in several places of that gigantic treatise. Through his elaborate examination of this very dogma, he ultimately establishes — ar fancies he does — the monotheism of antiquity. In Harrison's edition of Cudworth there is an able dissertation on this ancient dogma from ^le pen of Mosheim, his learned and careful commentator.

' T hales — son of Examius imd Cleobule — was bom, according to

14 THE METiLIHTSIGS OF ARISTOT;.]!!. [bOOK k

Th«ie»of Ml- to be water, (wherefore, also, he declared the !!!fr«««« «* earth to be superimposed upon water.) probably

Theonguiof ,.. ,. ^.•'^i. ^t_ -iuxxi

thu opinion, denying ms opinion from observing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that even actual heat is therefrom generated, and that animal life is sustained by this (but that wherefrom a thing is produced, this is a first prin- ciple of all things) ; and doubtless for this reason, likewise, holding such a theory, both from the &ct of the seeds (f all things possessing a moist nature, and of water being a fii*st principle of their nature to things that are humid. r>. Thaies in- But there are some who suppose those who siSiyby^hETpre. l^vcd in the most ancient^ times, and far previous decessoTs. to the present generation, and who first formed schemes of theology, to have also entertained opinions after this manner concerning Nature; for these philosophers con- stituted both Oceanus and Tethys as the parents of gene^ ration, and water ^ as the object of adjuration amongst the gods,— called Styx by the poets themselves; for most entitled to respect is that which is most ancient, — now an object of adjuration is a thing most entitled to respect. Whether, therefore, there is this certain early and ancient opinion con- cerning Nature, in all likelihood would be an obscure point to decide. Thaies, indeed, is said to have declared his senti- ments in this manner concerning the first cause; for no one

Apollodorus, B.a 640. There is a difference of opinion as to his native country. Diogenes Laertius considers him a Phcenician; to which Clement assents, on the authority of Leander, Strom. I. Plutarch makes him a Milesian, which is the opinion generally received.

^ An enumeration of these opinions of the early philosophers is given by Cicero in the De Naturft, book I. — ^manifestly a translation from this portion of Aristotle's works. Cicero's treatment of this subject, however, is awkward and confused, and proves that he was but super- ficially informed in the deep researches of Aristotle thereupon. It is manifestly from this portion of the works of the Stagyrite that all sub- sequent authors appear to have derived their speculations on ajtiology. This is quite perceptible in the case of the early apologists for Chris- tianity; e.g, Eusebius in his Demonstration, and Clemens Alexaudrinus in the Stromata and Adhortatio ad Gentes.

2 What Aristotle means by these words he puis into the form of an enthymeme. — What is an object of adjuration ii heaven must needs be a thing the most ancient — but water is such ; therefore water has been assigned by the philosophers as the first principle of things. Upon this, consult Aristotle, De Ccelo, II. 13 ; Cicero, De NaturA, 1. 10 • lOd Plutarch, De Placitis, I. 8.

same

CH. III.| TO WIT, THALES, ANAXIMENES, ETC. IS

would deign to place Hippo ^ along with these, on account ol the meanness of his intellect.

But Anaximenes and Diogenes ^ placed air ^ Material before water, and especially as a cause of simple cause held also bodies; whereas, Hippasus of Metapontum, and JXdmogenes?' Heraclitus^ of Ephesus, fire ; but Empedocles in- and Empedo-

. J ^ n v J' i.1 X • • jj'x* X cles, and Others.

troduced four bodies, — that is, one m addition to those three already mentioned, — adding earth as a fourth ; for that these ever continued permanent ; and further, that they are not produced, save that, either in plurality or in paucity, they are compounded together, or dissolved into one and from one component element.

But Anaxagoras of Clazomense* — in age,^ in- g. The deed, being prior to this speculator, but in his works principle,

' Hippo, who was a great naturalist, was a native of Rhegium, an i follower of Pythagoras. He was sumamed &Otos, or the Atheist. There are two other contemporary Pythagoreans mentioned here by Aristotle, — namely, Hippasus of Mejbapon turn, and Alcmaeon of Crotona. Vide Tenneman's Histoi*y of Philosophy, Sect. 95, translated in ** Bohn'a Philological Library ; " also Clemens, Adhortatio ad Oentes.

^ Anaximenes flourished about 557 years B.o. He was a pupil of Anaximander, or, as some think, of Parmenides; he was the son of Eurystratus, a Milesian. Vide Plutarch, de Placitis, I. 3. Sextus Empiri- cus, Inst. Pyrrh. III. 30. Diogenes of ApoUonia flourished about 472 years B. c. ; he was an admirer of the philosophy of Anaximenes. Diogenes united the systems of Anaximenes and Anaxftgoras, and was a con- temporary at Athens with Archelaus, — the proximate cause of the rise of the Socratic schooL Cicero, De Naturft, lib. I.; Eusebius, Prsep. Evang. lib. XV; Diogenes Laertius, lib. IX. ^

^ Heraclitus of ^^esus is thought to have belonged to the loniaD school, and flourishedv^bout 500 years B.C. He was inclined towards scepticism; and is believed to have been a disciple of Xenophanes. Vide, for Empedocles, note further on.

• Anaxagoras, who belonged to the Ionic school, was a disciple of

Hermotimus, afterwards mentioned by Aristotle, and flourished about the year 500 B. c. at Clazomense, where he was bom. He settled, how- ever, at Athens, and was the friend there of Pericles. He was famous for his doctrine of a voOs, or " mens," which he invested with the attri* bute of the Infinite, and with creative energies. Aristotle, however, further on endeavours to strip him of his fame in this respect, by saying that he employed the mental principle in his cosmogony merely &s a machine.

^ Aristotle remarks of Anaxagoras that he was subsequent in his works to Empedocles, though prior in age, because the latter generates the universe from finite principles, whereas the former from the infinite. Now the position of Empedocles, Aristotle conceives to be the le^ult ji more moiern and improved observation.

16 THB METAPHTSIOB OF iBIBTOTLE. (^BOOS V

though roem- & ibsequent to him — ^maintains that first principles ISSit^purfor" ^6 infinite. For he asserts that almost all things ward by Anaxar being b omogeneouB — as water or fire— in this way ^**"*' are product and destroyed by concretion and

dissolution merely ; bat that, in other respects, no entities were either brought into existence, or caused to cease to exist, but continued as things that are eywlasting.

From these things, indeed, therefore^ one would suppose that the only cause with these philosophers was that said to exist in a form of matter.*^

9. Cdnsidera. ^^^ ^ thesc Speculators advanced in this way, tionofthceffi- the thiuiT itself guided them, and constrained «ientc«.e. ^^^^ to investigate further; for though every possible corruption and generation is from something sul>- sisting, as one or more, yet why does this happen, and what is the cause of this, — for undoubtedly the subject, at least, itself is in no wise instrumental in making itself undergo a change? Now, I say, for example, that neither the wood nor the brass is the cause of either of these bodies under- going a change ; neither does the wood, indeed, produce a bed, and the brass a statue; but there is something else that is a cause of change. But the investigation of this is the in- vestigation of a different principle, that is, the second cause, — as we have stated, — the principle of the origin of motion. 10 I ored b Thosc, indeed, therefore, who from the earliest theeariy?pecu- times have altogether adopted such a method as ParmeSdSL* *^^ ^^^ afl&rm the subject to be one, have created no difi&culty for themselves; but some of these, at least, who say that it is one, as if overpowered by this investigation, assert that the one is immoveable, and the entire of nature, not only according to generation and cor- ruption, — for this is an ancient dogma, and one which all acknowledge, — but also according to every other change, whatever ; and this a tenet peculiar to themselves. Of those, indeed, therefore, who affirm the universe to be one merely, to none has it occurred to see clearly into a cause of such a kind, unless, perhaps, to Parmenides,^ and to him so far as

• Aristotle having now considered the treatment of the material

cause in the hands of the early philosophers, next proceeds to review

Ihe same subject in the case of the efficient cause. ' Parmenides was a native of Elea — a pupil of Xenoph

anes, or as somt

C?H,1II.] THE EFFICIENT OAUBIL 17

that he lays down not one merely, but, somehow, even two Ciiuses to exist. And for those, truly, who make them mere numerous is it allowable rather to assert the existence o! such a cause as the efficient cause, — I mean those who make causes to be the hot and the cold or fire and earth : for they employ the fire as possessing a motive nature, but water and earth, and such like, as something that is contrary to this.

But after these philosophers, and after the n. unconaci- assertion of principles of this sort, — as if on the ousiy broached grounds of their insufficiency to generate the ^* ®™' nature of entities, — again constrained by actual truth, as we Have said, they investigated the principle next following, in the way of a consequence. For of the excellent arid beautiful order of some things, and of the production of others of the entities, it is not natural to assign, perhaps, either earth or anything of this kind as a cause ; nor is it natural that they should think that it is; nor was it seemly, on the other hand, attribute so important a part to chance and fortune.

Now, whosoever affirmed mind, as in animals ^ ^ ^

80 also in nature, to be the cause of the system cause put for- of the world, and of the entire harmony of it, go'l^sl'lr^a"*' the same appeared, as it were, of sober tempera- others say. by ment, in comparison with the vain theorists of ®'°*°'"""'* the earlier ages. Indeed, then, we know that Anaxagbras openly adopted these principles. Hermotimus of Clazomense, however, has the credit assigned him of having put forward a similar theory of causation at an earlier period.

Those, indeed, therefore, who have entertained these opinions have laid down as a first principle of entities, at the same time the cause of their orderly arrangement, with such a one as that of the origin of motion in things.

Bay, of Anaximandor. He removed to Athena about the year 460 b. c, along with Zeno. Parmenides was the gteat patron of the idealistic philosophy. He explained his system in his poetry; which, however, liajs not come down to ub, except in a few fragments collected by H. Stephdns. Compare Sextus Empiricus, ji his Booka Contra Mathem. VIL 6 sqq.j Plutarch, De Pladtis, I. 24,

18 THE XBTAIHTSICS Of /LB|8T0TLE. [BOOKi.

CHAPTER IV,

I. Rflsognition SoMB one, however, might indulge in the sur- ifemMSeby ^^ ^^^ Hesiod^ was the first to broach such Hetiod— as a description of cause as the above ; and that this thSk-and w t^© <»s© ^th whatsoever other speculator, if Parmenides. ajjy^ that may have placed love or desire as a first principle in entities ; as, for instance, also Parmenides : for this philosopher, likewise, in drawing up his scheme of the generation of the universe, says, —

« The fint thing of all the gocU, indeed^ plann'd he Love."

But Hesiod's words are, —

" First) indeed, of all was Chaos ; ' but next in order. Earth with her spacious bosom. Then Love, who is pre-eminent amongst all tlio Immortals;"

just as if it were necessary that in entities there should sub- sist some cause which will impart motion, and hold bodies in union together. How, iudeed, then, in regard of these, one ought to distribute them, as to their order of priority, can be decided afterwards.

^ Aristotle has suggested to others the opinion that the existence of an eS&cient cause is recognised in the writings of Hesiod. It is quite in this spirit that Cudworth strives to make the old Theogonies systems of pure theology. It may, however, be remarked that '* the good " mentioned in the theories of these oosmogoni*^ upon which is grounded this particular view of the Hesiodio writings, may, in reality, prove nothing towards settling the question how far an efficient cause was discovered by the ancients. For " the good" may be regarded in the light of a cause in two ways; either as physically producing good things, or producing them for som(> purpose — and then it is a final cause, in the latter ueuse it is not certainly found in the writings of the early Physicints; and in the former, it is nothing more than a material cause, and appears to be the point of view from which the ancients regarded the nature of the good.

• There is a current, but erroneous, translation of the words quoted in

the above from Hesiod, which Cudworth adopts, in his over-anxiety to establish his favourite hypothesis in regard of the religious element, which he affirms to be mixed up in the entire philosophy of the ancients. Cudworth makes " chaos ** to be produced, and presupposes a superior producing cause, and grounds his assertion on this pasnaga from Hesiod, but upon a mistranslation of it. It merely states tue existence of chaos — " chaos waoL*

Oir. IV.] OONSn>EBED AS TWOFOLD. 19

But, also, smw things contrary^ to those that j. The efficient are good appeared inherent in Nature, and not cause twofold, only order and the beautiful, but also disorder *° ^ y* and what is base; and since the evil things were more nume- rous than the good, and the worthless than the &ir, accord- ingly, some one else introduced harmony and discord, as a cause peverally of each of these. For if any one would follow the subject up, and form his opinion according to the ^ulty of thought, and not according to the obscure assertions of Empedocles,^ he will find harmony, indeed, to be a cause of the things that are good, and discord of those that are evil. Wherefore, if any should say that Empedocles both, in a cei-tain sense, affirms, and that he was the first to affirm, that the evil and the good are first principles, perhaps he would make such an assertion correctly, if the cause of all things that are good be the good itself, and of those that are evil the evil.

These persons, indeed, therefore, as we have 3, xheimper- Baid, even thus far have adopted into their sys- f^ct treatment tems two causes, as we have defined them in an efficient'^ ° our Physics,— I mean the material cause, and the *'*"*®* ^

piinciple of the origin of motion ; that is, the efficient cause : obscurely, no doubt, and by no means clearly, but, in a manner, like the conduct of those who are unexercised in battles ; for these latter, also, advancing forwards against their adversaries, strike frequently skilful blows : but neither do those combatants act thus from a scientific system, nor do these early speculators appear like men who undei-stand that they are making the asser- tions which they actually are; for in no respect, almost, do they appear to employ these first principles, save to a small extent,

^ Aristotle now brings a new element into these eetiological dis- cussions, namely, contrariety; and sets forth Empedocles as the great patron of this school. Tenets borrowed from this philosophy have disappeared and reappeared again, in some mure subtle disguise, from that period downwards to the present age of philosophy.

3 Empedocles, who flourished about the year 442 or 460 B.O., was a native of Agrigentum, and the son of Meton. He was a pupil of Pythagoras or Anaxagoras, or, as others say, of Parmenides ; Plutarch, De Placitis, I. 3; Stanley, part YIII. Clemens Alezandrinus, at well as Diogenes Laertius, mentions the ascription of miraculous powers to Empedocles : Clemens Stromst. lib. vi, and Diogenes Ijaert. book YIIL Aristotle treats of the systc u of Empedocles in the fourtb bock of the Phyaicik

ei

20 THE METAPHTBI08 OF ABI8T0TLB. [bOCK 1

4. Shown in ^^^ Anaxagoras, also, employs mind as a

the case of machine^ for the production of the orderly sy»-

naxagoras. ^^^ ^^ ^^^ world ; and when he finds himself in

perplexity as to the cause of its being necessarily so, he then di-ags it in by force to his assistance; but, in the other instances, he assigns, as a cause of the things that are being produced, everything else in preference to mind

6. And in the ^^^ Empedoclcs, to an extent further than f ise of Empe- this last-uamed philosopher, employs his causes,

^**' however, neither adequately, nor does he dis-

cover in them that which confessedly is involved in them. Frequently, at least, in his system the harmony indeed sepa- rates, and the discord unites things together. For when the universe may be dissolved into its component elements, by reason of discord, then fire is commingled into one and each of the rest of the elements ; but when all things, by reason of harmony, may unite into one, it is necessary that the parts from each undergo separation again.

^Impedocles then, indeed, — in contradistinction p'edociesinhu to^he early speculators, — first introduced this theory. causc, having divided it, not having constituted,

as single, the first principle of motion, but first principles thereof which are difierent and opposite. But, moreover, the reputed elements, in form of matter, he was the first to assert the existence of as being four in number ; he did not, doubtless, employ at least four, but regarded them as if there were only two ; fire by itself, and those things that are opposed to this, as one nature, — namely, both earth, and air, and water. But one may acquire this information by drawing the specu- lation itself from his poetry. This philosopher, indeed, therefore, as we have stated, enumerated his first principles in this way, and affirmed them to be so many in numbe^

7. ohscure But Leucippus, and his companion JJemo- ffitioiogy— Leu- critus,^ assert that the full and the empty are

• ** Employs mind as a machine ;" compare the note, supra. The

Laurentian MS. has the following words, which are omitted in Bekker^s text : — "As is done by the poete in their tragedies, when they bring the gods upon the stage to assist them in difficult circumstances; for instance, take the case of the Hippolytus, where we have Diana appear- ing to Theseus."

^ Aristotle now proceed r to an isxamination of tbe philosophers who €r8t put forward causes of a mora recondite natui^e than any of the '

SH. i7.J ITS TREATMENT BT ANAZAOORAS, ETC. 21

elements ; termiug, for instance, the one, indeed, cippus and d». an entity, and the other a nonentity; and of ™°*'"*"** these, the full and solid they call an entity, and the empty and the attenuated, a nonentity. Wherefore, they say that entity, in no respect less than nonentity, has , an existence, because neither has the vacuum a being more than corporeity, and that these are the causes of entities as material causes.

And as they who make the substance, which is g. Their agree, the subject, one, generate all things else by means ™ent with the

sarlv specula-

of the passive conditions of this substance, assign- tors in point of ing the rare and the dense as first principles of o^*curity. these affections, in the same manner these also affirm that dif- ferences are causes of the other things. They, indeed, say that these are three, even figure, and order, and position; for they affirm that entity differs merely in rhythm, and diathege, and trope ;^ out of these the rhythm is figure, and the diathege order, and the trope position. For, indeed, the letter A diflFers from the letter N in figure, and AN from NA in order, and Z from N in position. But respecting motion, whence or how it exists in entities, in like manner, with the rest of the early speculators, have these carelessly neglected such inquiries.

Respecting, tiien, two causes of the four, according to the statements we have just made, so far has it appeared that an inquiry has been prosecuted by our predecessors.

foregoing, which were but obviouB in the ordinary course of Nature. The great patrons of this school he sets down as Democritus and Leucippus.

LeucippuB, who JSourished about the year 600 b. c, is believed to have been a disciple of Parmenides, whose system he opposed. His birth- place is thought to have been MUetus. He, and not Democritus, was the author of the Atomic theory.

Democritus was bom about the year 490 B.C., and was a native of Abdera in Thrace. He was a disciple of Leucippus, and brought for- ward his master's opinions, with certain amplifications of his own. Aristotle examines both the systems of Leucippus and Democritus, in book I. of the De Generat et Corrupt., in the first and third books of the De C03I0, and in the eighth book of the Physics. The eai-ly part of the Commentaiy of Simplicius upon the Physics may be consulted Cudworth discusses the relation which the system of Leucippus bears to the Atomic theory, in the first volume of the Litellectual System; Kd Harrison.

' These words are idiomatic to the language of Abdera, the nativ< place of Democritus. — AsdepiMn,

92 THE METAFBT8ICS OF ARISTOTLS [fiOOK I.

CHAPTER V.i

I The num- ^^^ amoDgst theso, and prior to them, those

bers of the Py- Called Pythagoreans, applying themselves to the tha^oieani. gtudy of the mathematical sciences, first advanced these views ; and having been nurtured therein, they consi- dered the first principles of these to be the first principles oi all entities. But sinoe^ among these, numbers by nature are the first, and in numbers they fisincied they beheld many resemblances for entities and things that are being pro- duced, rather than in fire^ and earth, and water; because, to give an instance, such a particular property of numbers is justice, and such soul and mind; and another different one is opportunity; and it is the case, so to speak, in like manner with each of the other things ;^

2. Pytha^oric Morcovcr, also, in numbers discerning the pas- inrs^ubsunce ^^® Conditions and reasons of harmonies, since in conformity' it was apparent that, indeed, other things in their v?ews about uaturc wcrc in all points assimilated unto num- nurabers. bers, and that the numbers were the first of the

entire of Nature, hence they supposed the elements of numbefs to be the elements of all entities, and the whole heaven to be an harmony and number. And as many phenomena as they could demonstrate to be conformable, both in their numbers and harmonies, with the passive conditions and pai-ts of the heaven, and with its entire arrangement, these they collected and adapted to their philosophy : and if there was any interval loft anywhere, they supplied the deficiency, in order that there

^ As to the tenets of the Pythagoreans, noticed by Aristotle in this portion of the Metaphysics, Alexander and Asclepius have long dissert- ations, from which Brandis has made apparently judicious selections. The chief source of information, as regards the speculations of this school, must be drawn from the Life of Pythagoras by Jamblichus, and another, by Porphyry, from the (Jolden Verses of Hierocles, Bentley's Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris, and Stanley in hia History of Philosophy. As to the information to be drawn from the L?crian Timaeus, and from Ocellus Lucanus, we must bear in mind the alleged spuriousness ^f their writings.

^ The learned Brucker has a dis&artation on the numbers of Pytha- goras, entitled, *' Convenientia Pxihagorv sumerorum cum ideia Platonifi."

OH. y.] SYSTEM OF THB PYTHAGOREANS. 23

might be a chain of oonnexion running through their entire system.^ Now, I say, as an illustration, since the decade .seems to be a thing that is perfect, and to have comprised the entire nature of numbers, hence they also assert that the bodies that are borne through the heaven are truly ten in number; and whereas nine only are apparent, on this account they constitute the confronting earth tenth. But respecting these theorists, we have arrived at more accurate decisions in other parts of our works.

But the reason why we have gone in review through these philosophers is this, in order that oir thePythag> we may receive also from them what they have J^tncipiil^*' already laid down as being first principles, and in what manner they &.11 in with the causes just enumerated. Undoubtedly do these appear to consider number to be a first principle, and, as it were, a material cause of entities, and as both their passive conditions and habits, and that the even and the odd are elements of number; and of these, that the one is finite and the other infinite, and that unity, doubtless, is com- posed of both of these, for that it is both even and odd, and that number is composed of unity, and that, as has been stated, the entire heaven is composed of numbers. 4 Another Py-

But others of these very philosophers affirm thagoric opi- that first principles are ten in number, denomi- Sudng contra- nated in accordance with the following co-ordinate ^^^y therein, series, namely : —

Bound.

Infinity.

Rest

Motion.

Odd.

Even.

Straight.

Crooked.

Unity.

Plurality.

Light.

Darkness.

Right.

Left.

Good.

Bad.

Male.

Female.

Sqnare.

Oblong.

In the same manner seems Alcmseon of Crotona 5. a third to have formed his opinion; and this philosopher S^Sm^'om'"* certainly, either from those just named, or they and »kin to the from this person, have derived this their theory ; ^^^^' ' for Alcmoeon had reached the age of manhood when Pytha- goras was an old man ; but he enumerated his sentiments in

• As to the physical theories of the Pythagoreans, involved in theii

systems of astronomy, the curious student, if desirous, may learn much from the i*emarks of Alexander, and especially of Asclepius, upon this section of the Metaphysics. Vid£ Brando's Scholia, p. 540 sqq.

24 TH i METAPHTSIC8 OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK 1.

a manner similar with the Pythagoreans. For he affirms that the greater portion of things human may be reduced to two classes, calling them contrarieties; not distinguished as these had distinguished them, but such as were of any casual sort whatever, as for example : —

White. Black.

Sweet. Bitter.

Good. Bad.

Small. Great.

This philosopher, indeed, then, has indefinitely thrown out his opinions about the rest ; but the Pythagoreans have declared both how numerous, and which these contrarieties are.

6. The reduc- From both of these, therefore, it is postdble to lion of these acquire thus much information, — that contraries

speculations to ^«, . ., « .... i.v

a certain genus are first principles of entities ; but how numerous, of cause. ^^^^ which these are, may be ascertained only

from other speculators. How, indeed, in respect of the causes enumerated, it is possible to draw up a compendious appli- cation of their principles has not, in distinct terms, been clearly declared by them; but they seem to arrange the elements as in a form of matter : for of these, as inherent, they say that the substance consists, and has been moulded.

Of the ancients, therefore, indeed, — even of those who assert the elements of Nature to be many, — it is sufficient from these statements to examine into their intention.

7. The theory But there are some who have declared their MoSepMUy** <5pi^i<5^8 about the universe as though it were irrelevant to one Nature;* but all have not put forward their vestSStfo^wand theories in the same manner, either in regard partly not so. of that which is Constituted in an orderly way, or of that which is in accordance with the course of Nature. With, indeed, then, the present investigation of causes does this theory regarding them by no means adapt itself. For they do not, — as some of the physiologers who supposed entity to be one, — nevertheless, generate them from unity as from matter; but these, who say that entity and unity are the same, assert their production to take place after a dif- ferent manner; for those, indeed, have added motion, at

^ Aristo'.le now enters upon a consideration of the Eleatic school, ^hich ke has already examined more systematically in his treatise De Xenophane. The tenets of the Eleatics are examined by Sextug Empiricus, in his remarks on Xenopnaues in the fii'st book of ths Pyrrh. Instit.

OU. VlJ ELEATIO PHIL060PHT. 25

least, in tl.eii generation of the universe; but these say that it is immoval le.

Of a truth, however, so for at least the theory of this ichool is akin to our present investigation ; for Parmenides, indeed, appears to adopt a system of unity in accordance with reason : whereas Melissus, a theory of it according to matter. Wherefore, also, indeed, one says that the universe is finite, and the other that it is infinite. Xenophanes, The originator first of these, however, having introduced this »' **"• ^y*^""* system of unity, (for Parmer)ides is said to have been his pupil,) made nothing plain, neither did he seem to have appre- hended the nature of either of these ; but looking wistfully upon the whole heaven, he affirms that unity is God.

These, indeed, therefore, as we have stated, g. how the must be omitted in regard of our present investi- t^eo^y <>' Pa^-

,. 1 , o ii_ i_' 1 1 • menides bears

gation/ — two of them entirely, — even as bemg a on the point in little too uncivilized; namely, Xenophanes and Q^^^o^* Melissus.2 Parmenides, however, appears to express himself, in some passages, with more circumspection; for, with the exception of entity — considering nonentity to have no ex- istence — he thinks entity to be necessarily one, and nothing else. Concerning which philosopher, we have spoken with more clearness in our Physics. Yet, compelled to follow the phenomena, and supposing unity to subsist according to reason, but plurality according to sense, he again lays down two causes, and two first principles, — heat and cold; as, for

^ If the student is anxious to have clear ideas as regards the bearing of the Eleatic philosophy upon the inquiry undertaken by Aristotle, and in respect of Aristotle's criticisms upon the systems of Parmenides and Melissus, separately as well as compared with each other, he will consult the commentaiy of Thomas Aquinas, who certainly, with vast ability, strives to disentangle the intricacies of the exposition of the Stagyrite.

^ Melissus flourished about B. c. 414 ; he was a native of Samoa, and a distinguished naval commander. He adopted his system from Par- menides and Xenophanes : Plutarch, I. 24. Aristotle notices hia By stem more at large in his Physics, book I. chaps. 2, 3, 4 ; book III. chap. 9. Simpliciu8 on this passage is worth consulting.

Xenophanes was a native of Colophon, and flourished about the year B. c. 536. He was contemporary with Epicharmus the poet. Clemeiu Alexandrinus, in the first book of the Stromata, assigns to him th«  •;redit of being the founder of the Eleatic school. After him came hi» disciple Parmenides, next to him Zeno, tl en Leucippus, and after hiis Uemocritus.

36 THE METAFHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK L

example, in other words, he means fire aiid earth; but of these he arranges the one under the category of entity, that is, the hot, and the other under that of nonentity, viz. the cold.

9. sumraary of From the statements, indeed, therefore, that

• ^* *?' d*?***" ^^^® been made, and from those who have already

devoted themselves to rational speculations, and are wise men, we have derived these views; from the earliest philosophers have we appropriated, indeed, both the corporeal first principle, (for water and fire, and such like, are bodies,) and from some of these one such, and from others many corporeal principles ; both, however, agreeing in classing them as foi^ms of matter. But from certain amongst these early speculators, — who at the same time establish both this cause, and along with this that of the origin of motion, — we have appropriated even this very efficient cause ; from some, indeed, as a single principle, but from others, as one that is twofold. Up to the period of the Italic sects,^ and independent of them, the rest of the investigators have spoken with more moderation re- garding these first principles, except, as we have said, in the case of those who happen to have employed two causes ; and one of these, the second cause — ^namely, the origin of motion — some, indeed, make single, and others twofold.

10. The bearing But the Pythagoreans, in the same manner, ofthePy^A- iiave spoken of two first principles; but thus on the present much have they added, — which, also, is peculiar Inquiry. ^^ themsclves,^ — namely, that they do not regard the finite, and the infinite, and the one, to be certain dif- ferent natures; as, for instance, fire, or earth, or any other such thing: but that the infinite itself, and the one itself constitute the substance of those things of which they are predicated. Wherefore, also, they affirmed that number is

^ The commentators on this passage — for example Alexander — contend that the force of the word ai<xp< is* that it is used by Aristotle to denote those whose opinions may be classed exclusively of the Italics, that is, of the Pythagoreans ; for Pythagoras opened a school in Taren- tum. Mexp* <io6s ^^^* they say, refer to time; for that Empedocles was not before Pythagoras, and yet his tenets are ranked 4y rois /xexpi ruv

• lTa\cov. I confess, however, that the word x»pis following fxexpi quite

«ecures all this, without forcing any unusual signification upon fi4xfi ; and therefore I agree with Averroes in translating it as I do, and making it to refer to time. The word fitrpi^Ttpov some of the MSS read fiovifx<&T*pou, or fiovax^rtpovy or fidKaucdimpoVf or, lastly, •lopoxoiTiptt:'^ which they explain by the word o-Korcii/bTcpof.

€H. VI.] PLATO'S THEORY OP IDEAS. 27

the substance of all things. Respecting, then, these points^ likewise, in tliis manner have they declared theiikgpjjHOfis ; and respecting quiddity they began, indeed, to make asser- tions and to frame definitions ; but they treated of mattera with great simplicity. For they both framed their definitions superficially, and in whatever first an alleged definition should be inherent, this they considered to be the substance of the thing; as if any one should think that twofold is the same thing with the duad, since the twofold first is inherent in the two; yet perhaps the being in what is twofold is not the same thing as being in a duad ; but if not, unity will be plurality, which also was the result with them.

From our predecessors, indeed, therefore, and from the rest^ it is possible for us to acquire thus much information.

CHAPTER VI.

After the schools of philosophy enumerated, i. wato's ideal supervenes the system of Plato ;^ in most points Surce'onu^*^* treading on the heels of these Pythagoreans : but adoption, also having peculiar tenets of its own, differing from the phi- losophy of the Italics. For from a young man having ai the first been associated with Cratylus,^ and being conversant with the opinions of Heraclitus, — that all sensible objects are in a state of continual flux, and that scientific knowledge concerning them had no existence, — he, indeed, subsequently in this way came to entertain these suppositions. But while

^ Plato was a native of Athens, being bom there 430 years befor«  Christ. He belonged to the family of Solon. He was the great literary opponent of Aristotle. Indeed, from Aristotle we learn much about the Platonic system. It has been dilated upon by many; but perhaps more fiilly by Clemens Alexandrinus, in the first and second books oi the Stromata, than by any other writer. There is an Essay thereupon by Sam. Parker, an author of the s^Tenteenth century, and one by Gfeddes, in the eighteenth. Far before these is Sleiermacher s Ix bro- duction to the Platonic Dialogues, who seems to have caught some of the Platonic spirit. This last has been translated.

' Of Cratylus little is known. According to Diogenes Laertiufr, after the death of Socrates, Plato attached himself to Cratylus, a follower of Heraclitus ; this, however, does not harmonize with what is stated ia the text.

28 THE HBTAPHrsiOB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOE !•

Socrates^ was engaged about the formation of systems of Ethics, indeed, and that he broached no theory as regards the entire of Nature, seeing that he was searching, doubtless. In morals for the universal, and that he was* the first to apply his understanding to the subject of definitions, Plato, having applauded him^ on account of this his investigation of uni* yersals, was led to entertain thus much of his supposition, — as that this took place in regard of other things, and not in regard of certain of the objects that are cognisant by the senses; for it is impossible, in his opinion, that there should be a common definition of any of the sensible natures, seeing that they are continually in a state of undergoing a change. This philosopher, indeed, therefore, termed such things amongst entities, ideas ; and asserted that all things are styled sensible according as they were different from these, or as they subsisted in accordance with these : for his theory was this, — that, according to participation, the most of things synonymous are homonymous with the forms. Employing, however, the import of the term participation, he changed the name merely ; for the Pythagoreans, indeed, affirm that entities subsist by an imitation of numbers: but Plato, by a participation of them, changing the name. At all events, as to participation at least, or imitation, what it may be, in the case of forms, they both in common omitted to investigate. 2. Platonic ^^^» Dioreovcr, besides sensibles and forms, he

opinion con- affirms that mathematical entities are things of MiaSca! suti. ^ an intermediate nature ; differing, on the one hand, stances. froim scusibles in being eternal and immovable;

• Socrates was bom at Athens, b.o. 470, and gave such an impulse to

philosophy as to be the instrument of producing its subsequent forms of development in Greece. His history being sufficiently well known, does not require any remarks here. Much thereupon may be learned by consulting the chapters of Grote which illustrate this period of Greek history. Socrates committed none of his opinions to writing ; but they have been recorded by Xenophon in the Memorabilia, and by Plato in the Apology.

^ Upon the sources of the Platonic philosophy, its connexion with Socraticism, the meaning of its idioms, the validity or the invalidity of Aristotle's attack upon it — for information upon these points, the student should consult the Commentary of Thomas Aquinas upon the tenth section. There is one remarkable expression of Aquinas, in that portion of his remarks on niatheui<*i/ical entities, where he distinctly objects to the existence of universais separate from singulars — '^iiui versalia oraoter singularia."

OH. VI.] PLATO OOMFARfilS W^llH PTTHAOORAS. 29

but, on the other, from forms, in the fact that the most of such are similar, but that every form itself constituted one thing merely.

But since the forms are causes of other things, 3 piatonic the elements of all these he supposed to be ele- theory, "de ments of entities. Therefore, indeed, he regarded p^is^ compared ^e great and the little to be first principles as J^^J* ^^^^ °^ matter, but unity as substance ; for from these, ^ ^

by participation of unity, that the forms are numbers. That, doubtless, unity at least is as substance, and that not any other entity is denominated so, Plato affirmed, similarly with the Pythagorics; and the dogma, that numbers are causes to other things of their substance, he in like mannei asserted with them.

But, in place of the infinite considered as one, 4. Twofold dif- the having made a duad, and the having made PythagoraranS the infinite, out of the great and the small, this Plato- was peculiar to him: and, moreover, Plato affirmed the existence of numbers independent of sensibles ; whereas the Pythagoreans say that numbers constitute the things them- selves, and they do not set down mathematical entities a^ intermediate between these.

The principle of his having made unity, there- cause of this fore, and numbers, as different from things, and difference. not as the Pythagoreans, who regarded them the same, as well as the introduction of forms, ensued on account of his logical * investigations; for his predecesiiors took no share in dia- lectical science. But the constituting, a duad, as a different nature from the one, arose from the fact that the numbers, liith the exception of those that are first, are suitably gene- ratea from this as from a certain express image.

And yet it happens in a contrary way ; for it The error of would not be reasonable that it should take ^^^to therein. place thus: for, indeed, at present, from matter they make many things, whereas form generates only once. And from one matter there appears to be produced one table ; but he who introduces form, though being one, makes many tables

' The logical system of Plato, which intertwines itself very closely with his ethics, was held in a(imiratiou till supplanted by that ol Aristotle. Its outlines may be gathered from the CratyluB, the Pa):m» aides, the Sophist, and the ii ico/uruch.

I

so THB MlSTAPHTSICS OB ARISTOTLE. [BOOK L

f Q like manner, also, the male stands in relation to the female ^ for the one is impregnated from a single copulation, whereas the male impregnates many. These, however, are imitations of those first principles. Plato, indeed, therefore, respecting these objects of investigation, laid down distinctions in this way.

5 Plato's ^^* ^* ^ manifest, from the things that have

duction of his been stated, that Plato only employed two causes ; genui^'llf cSuse, T^^^^J^ both the formal cause and the material cause : for, according to him, forms are the causes of what anything is to the rest of the entities, and unity to the forms; and that there is a certain cause which subsists according to matter, which is that subject through which the forms have a subsistence that are resident in sensibles, and through which unity is said to be in the forms, because the actual duad constitutes the great and the small. Further, the cause of " the well and the ill " he ascribed severally to the several elements ; which particular point we affirm certain philosophers — such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras — to have investigated more elaborately than the early speculators.

CHAPTER VII.

1 Reca ituia- CONCISELY, indeed, therefore, and by way ol xion of the fore- Summary,^ we have recounted both who they are menubrought *^^ ^^^® declared their opinions, and in what to bdar on this manner they happen to have spoken concerning •iquury. ^^^^ ^^^ principles and truth. Nevertheless,

however, we have received thus much information from them, — that no one of those who have declared their sentiments, concerning a first principle and a cause, has made any asser- tion beyond those definitions that have been set down in our Physics ; but notwithstanding that all of them have unfolded their views with obscurity, indeed, yet in a manner they appear as persons engaged in cursorily treating those foui causes enumerated above and elsewhere.

• Aristotle again shows that the early speculators had not advanced

beyond the causes mentioned in th^ Physics; and that even l^eir trea^ meut of tlies? was superficial and obaoiue.

Ce. 7II.1 BUMMARY OF THE FOREOOIKO 31

For, indeed, some speculators speak of the , Early phuo- first principle sus matter, whether they may sup- aophen *m the

• *.., . • J. j3 iL xT. material cause.

pose one principle or more to exist, and whetner they consider it as body, and whether as a thing that is incorporeal : as, for instance, Plato, indeed, in his mention of the great and the small ; and the Italics, in their theory of the infinite; and Empedocles, in that of fire, and earth, and water, and air ; and Anaxagoras, in his system of the infinity of homogeneous things. Now, truly, all these touched upon a cause of this kind : and, further, as many as affirmed the existence, as a first principle, of air, or fire, or water, or a substance of greater density than fire, but of greater rarity than air ; for certain philosophers have also declared a thing of this sort to be the first element. All these, indeed, there- fore, adopted this cause merely in a superficial way.

But certain others introduce the second cause ; s. Early theo- namely, the origin of the principle of motion : Jjlnt^^callie I?d as, for instance, as many as make a first principle the formal of harmony and discord, or mind or love. But *'*"**' of the essence^ and the substance — that is, of the formal cause — not one, indeed, has rendered a clear account : most especially do those make assertions respecting it who adopt the hypothesis of forms, and the things inherent in forms; for neither do they suppose that forms, and the things inhe- rent in forms, subsist as matter to sensibles ; nor, as though from thence were derived the principle of motion; (for, in preference, they assert them to be causes of immobility, and of things being in a state of rest;) but, in regard of the essence, to each of the other things do forms supply this, ^ud unity imparts it to the forms.

But the final cause of actions, and changes, and motions, in a certain manner, they assert to nlons re'spJct. be a cause : yet in this way they do not assert it *"^ ***® ^"*^ to be a cause ; nor do they speak of it in a way conformably to what it naturally is. For they, indeed, who assign mind or harmony as such, have laid down these causes as, doubtless, a something that is good ;^ they do not, however,

^ Aristotle seems to think that the essence, or the formal cause, had for its author Plato ; and that Plato probably was indebted for his di»> eovery to the philosophy of Pythagoras and Parmenides.

• Asto viewing '* the good" iu the light of a final caufie, we hav« 

82 VHE METAPHTSI08 OF ABISTOTLIL [BOOK 1

affirm that from these, as final causes, anythiug amongst entities either is in existence, or is being produced, but that, as it wore, from these the Emotions of these things were derived So, also, in like manner, they who say that either unity or entity is such a nature of this kind, affirm it to be a cause of substance, indeed; yet they do not, for a certainty, affirm that anything either exists or is produced from this as a final cause. Wherefore, it happens unto them, in a manner, both to affirm, and not to affirm, that the good is a cause of this sort ; for they do not make the assertion absolutely, but by accident.

5. Aristotle's That, therefore, our distinctions have been laid division of down correctlv respecting causes, both as to how

causes vmdi- it*. , ,i i n

cated from the numerous and what sort they are, do even all foregoing. thcsc early philosophers appear to us to bear witness, in not being able to fix upon any other cause. And, in addition to the testimony of these speculators, it is evident that first principles must be investigated, either all in this way, or in some such mode as has been adopted by these philosophers. Now, how each of these has declared his opinions, and how the case stands, in regard of the possible doubts respecting first principles, let us, after this, proceed to pass through a review of such points.

CHAPTER VIII.1

1. Faults of the -^.8 many, indeed, therefore, as set down the early theories universe as both one and a certain single nature,

on SBtiolotry.

First and ' as matter, and this such as is corporeal and in- second, volving magnitude, it is obvious that they labour under manifold errors. For they have established the ele- ments of bodies merely, but not of incorporeals, when even there are in existence, I mean, things that are incorporeaL And in endeavouring to assign causes of generation and cor-

already commented in a previous note. Consult the remarks of Thomas Aquinas upon this section.

' Aristotle having already enumerated the opinions of the early

1>hilosuphera in this department of aetiology, now proceeds to lay down >i8 own opinions thereupon; first, in regard of the naturaligts, and secondly, of the BupnmaturaliBta.

Cte. VIII.l FATJLTS OF THE EARLY ^TIOLOOIBTS. 33

ruption, ana drawing up, concerning all bodies in. .nature, systeras of physiology, th^_take^:^ay. the cause of motion. Further, the not positing also the substance as a cause of anything, nor as such the formal principle, or the very essence of a thing, this was erroneous.

And, in addition to the foregoing, the assertion 2. Third error that anything whatsoever might readily be a thJ^eTof aeti- fii-st principle of simple bodies, except earth, oiogy. but at the same time not examining into their mode of gene- ration one from another, how they are produced, — now I mean 'fire and water, and earth and air, for partly by concretion, and partly by separation, are things produced from one another, — this was an error of theirs. But this, in regard of the being prior and posterior, will involve the greatest difference; for, indeed, earth would appear to be a thing most elementary of all, from which, as a first prin- ciple, elements are produced by concretion : but a thing of tliis kind would be most minute in its parts, and a thing most refined amongst bodies. Wherefore, as many as esta- blish fire as a first principle would make assertions particularly in consonance with this theory. But each philosopher also acknowledges something of this sort to be an element of other things, — I mean an element of bodies.

No one, at least of subsequent speculator, „ , , ^

f xu u -X i.1. • X u 8- Faults of the

even of those who assert the universe to be one, sjrstem of a has thought fit to maintain earth to be an ele- ""^^® materia]

111 /. 1 . t* ^ cause.

ment, doubtless, on account 01 the size of the component ptirticles, but each of the three elements haiJ obtained a certain umpire; for, indeed, some assert' fire to be this, but others, water, and some, air. Although why, pray , do they not assert this of earth, as the majority of~meu daf for they say that earth constitutes all things. But Hesiod, also, says that earth was the first produced amongst bodies : thus it has happened that the supposition is an ancient an J vulgar one. According, indeed, therefore, to this account, A one affirms to be this either any one thing belonging to these save fire, or if one lays down, as such, a thing denser than air, indeed, but more refined than water, he would not make such an assertion as this coireotly. But if that which is subsequent in generation be prior in Nature, and if that which has been digested and compounded together bo & thing

H THB METAFHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. ]^BOOK I.

that is subsequent iu its production, there would take place that which is the contrary of these, — ^water, for instance, would be a thing prior to air, and earth, to water. With regard to those who are for establishing one such cause as we have declared, let these remarks be sufficient.

4. Threefold But the samc assertion may be made even if Sinst Empe- ^^J ^^^ posites thesc corporeal principles as being docies in his many in number ; as, for example, Empedodes, raut^ofmatch' ^^^ ^V^ ^^^^ ^^^^ bodics, elementarily, consti- riai causes. tute matter. For, likewise, to this philosopher partly, indeed, the same consequences, but partly those that are peculiar to his own system, must needs happen. For, also, we see, in the case of things that are being produced one from another, that the fire and earth do not sdways con- tinue as of the same body. But we have spoken on these subjects in our Physics. And respecting the cause of things that are being moved, whether we must assign one or two such, we should be inclined to think that we have not ex- pressed ourselves either correctly or altogether irrationally. And, in short, must the principle of alteration be overturned by those who make assertions in this way ; for not from heat will arise cold, nor from cold, heat. For what change the contraries themselves would undergo, and what would be the one nature which should become fire and water, that very philosopher (I mean Kmpedodes) does not declare.

5. The system But if any one should suppose that Anaxa- examtneT^^" goras meutious two elements, he would form his shown to be opinion most especially in accordance with a and ^rtfy * theory which, although that philosopher himself ^ong. did uot enunciate distinctly, yet, indeed, would, as a necessary consequence, follow in the footsteps of those who introduced this dogma. For, otherwise, would even the assertion be absurd, — that all things from the beginning have been in a state of mixture ; both on account of its happening that all things prior /to this should pre-exist in an unmixed state, and on account of its not being consonant to Nature, that anything at random should be mingled with anything at random too ; and, in addition to these rea9ons, we may add, that, according to this doctrine, their passive states and acci- dents would be separated from substances, (for to the same things belong mixtm^ and sepai*ation.) If any one, how*

CH. thlJ emfrbocles and anaxagoras. 35

ever, follows up the subjeci, arranging into clauses together those stfitements which he wishes to make, he would, in all probability, utter assertions that would assume an air oi novelty. For when there was nothing in existence that has been sepamted, it is obvious that no true assertion could be put forward in regard of that substance; now, I say, for instance, that it would not necessarily be a thing either white, or black, or darkish, or any other colour, but a thing necessarily colourless, for otherwise it would possess some one of these colours. In like manner would it be with that which is insipid, according to this same mode of reasoning : nor eould it be so with anything else of those things that are similar; for neither is it possible that it could possess any actual thing of a certain quality or quantity, or that any- thing else be so. For therein would be inherent something of those termed partial forms ; yet this is impossible when all things have been in his system mingled together, for already it would subsist in a state of separation : but, with the exception of mind, he affirms all things to be mingled, and that mind only is unmixed and pure. Now, from these statements it is consequential with him that he should de- nominate, as the first principles, both unity (for this is simple and unmixed) and another thing, as if it were an entity such as we are for establishing — viz., the indefinite prior to its having been defined, and to partaking of a certain form. Therefore, the assertion is made neither correctly nor clearly, notwithstanding that he intends something similar with both- those who subsequently make statements to this effect, and more in hasmony with the present phenomena. For these, however, happen only to be femiliar with the theories apper- taining to generation, and corruption, and motion • for, also, with regard tp such a substance, they investigate almost only both the first principles and the causes.

But as mamy^ as frame their speculation re- e. Theory of specting all entities, but of entities have set {Jj^^j*"*" down some, indeed, as being cognisant by sense, and others as not being sensibles, it is manifest that they institute for themselves an inquicy concerning both kinds^

^ Aristotle kaving considered the system of the naturalists in the previouB section, now proceeds to examine that c£ the sopranaturalist^ such as F^rthagoras and Plato.

p 2.

S6 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [booK 1

Wherefore, one might be induced, in preference, to linger upon an investigation respecting these, as to what they say, well or not well, in regard of the examination of those specu- lations now proposed by us.

7. Pythagoras, Those, indeed, called Pythagoreans^ in a far

• • '*,*5^®""®"^ more outlandish manner employ their first prin-

and QiiTcrciicc ±. v x

with the mate- ciplcs and elements than the physiologists. But naiists. ^^Q cause is, because they have not derived them

from sensibles; for those natures that are mathematical amongst entities are without motion, except those pertaining t# astrology. They, however, discuss and treat of all points concerning Nature ; for they both generate the heaven, and respecting the parts thereof, and the passive conditions and the operations thereof, they closely observe that which takes place ; and upon these they lavish their first principles and causes, as if acknowledging to the rest of the natural philo- sophers that whatsoever thing is such as is cognisant by the senses, that this constitutes entity, and such as that which is called heaven comprises. But the causes and the first prin- ciples — as we have said— they affirm are sufficient both to secure a transition even to a higher order of entities?, and that they are more sufficient than those that are in harmony with physical theories. „ „ ^. From what mode, however, there will be

8 Two objec- ,

tions against motiou, merely on the supposition of the ex- phUosop^r"*' istence of the subjects of finite and infinite, and odd and even, they in no wise declare ; or how it may be possible, without motion and change, that there should be generation and corruption, or the operations of those bodies that are whirled along the heaven.

But further, whether one grants to them that from these results magnitude, or whether this should require to be demonstrated, nevertheless, in a certain manner, some bodies will be light, indeed, and some involving weight; for the things from which they adopt for themselves their theories, and make assertions, they in no respect affirm in regard of seusibles in preference to mathematical bodies. Therefore, concerning fire or earth, or the other bodies of such a kind,

' As to the agreement and diflfcrence of the Pytba,'::^oric philosophy with t?ie materi.iHstic Byatem, consult the Commentary of TLomii AqiiinaH upon tbis tjection.

te. txj] ATTACK ON PYTHAGORAB. 31

they have declared nothing whatsoever, inasmuch as affirming, in my opini on, nothing that is peculia?:~l;p tl^?.D(i coiwwiiin^ iehsi ble natu res.

"BuTfurther, how must we receive as causes the 9, ^ third ob- passive conditions of number, and the number jectjon against

Pvtnaiioras

itself as the cause of entities which subsist in sag^^ested lYom the heaven, and of things that are being pro- ^^**®' duced there both from the beginning and at present, and at the same time allow that there is no other number save this number from which the order of the universe consists ? For since, indeed, in this portion of the creation (according to these philosophers) there may be in existence opinion and opportunity, but a little above, or a little below, injustice an(i separation, or mixture; and since they may adduce a demon- stration that each one of these is number, and it happens, from this mode of reasoning in this place, that there subsists already a multitude of constituted magnitudes, from the fact of these affections following each of these places respectively^ on the supposition of the foregoing we may ask whether, therefore, is this owing to the same number as that which is in the heaven, and which we ought to receive because that each of these exists, or, besides this, is there another number 1 For Plato says, indeed, that there is a different number : he, however, also thinks both these, and the causes of these, to be numbers, but numbers that are, indeed, intelligible causes ; whereas those are merely sensible, according to Plato. Re- specting then, indeed, the Pythagoreans,^ let us leave off our present discussions ; for it is sufficient thus far to have touched upon their system.

CHAPTER IX.2

But they who put forward ideas as causes, in 1. Piato-s their early investigations, indeed, to acquire the InJSives its a"

^ I have ventured thus to depart from the usual arrangement^ which makes ohapter IX. begin with these words.

• Aristotle now proceeds to examine into another system of tha

Bupranaturalists, — namely, that of Plato : first, in respect of his theory rt;c:arding the substance of things; and secondly, respecting the first principles of things.

iS THE METAFHTSICS OT ABI8T0TLE. [BOOK t

vocates in an causes of these entities, in the first place have incdnaistency. adduced Other things equal in number to these ; ^ as if one, desiring to have reckoned certain things, when these were less numerous, would consider this impossible, but, by creating a greater numbw, should succeed in counting them ; for almost equal, or not less numerous, are the forms than those things respecting which, in investigating their causes, they have advanced from these to those : for, according to each individual thing, there is a certain homonymous form, and, in addition to the substances, also, of other things, there is the unity involved in the notion of plurality, both in the case of these and of things that are eternal. 2. Aristotle'* Moreover,^ in the wa^_m_wMoh it is demgn-

?a1n8?the pSJ ®*^^®^ *^^* there are roros^liSordin^ tonic theory of of these Ttoth ttlB~stibsi8tence of forms becom e aprorent}" for, inde§d, _fi^m some there is no necessity, in ^ensfequence of the reasoning, that a syHo- gism arise : but from other things, also, — not of such as we should expect to find forms, — of these are there forms gene- rated. For according to the rational principles deducible from the sciences will there be forms of all things, of as many as there are sciences ; and in accordance with the argument for ideas founded on the notion of unity involved in plurality, will there also be forms or ideas <»f n^ations : and according to the ability to understand something of what has been destroyed of things liable to decay will there also be forms, for of these there is a certain phantasm.

But further, as regards the most accurate of the argu- ments for the ideal theory, some of them, indeed, frame i^fiaa of things relative, pf which^iUiej do^jnat-48^ aQ.^£fiafi£lJJ^al..!.geE^ whereas othen^ 4iq^eak of .thfir&^b^fi^m third man.

• Aristotle first complains of the inconsistency of Plato ; for he con-

tends that, in proposing to assign the causes of sensibles, he diould have kept the phenomena of sensihles before his eyes, and not have devised, as he has done, a theory applicable to anything else save sensibles.

^ Aristotle here details his objections against the ideal system of Plato, which he strives to overthrow by turning the reasoning of Flato against himself. This same subject is handled by Aristotle in an able and somewhaJi similar attack ^of his upon the idaa^ theory, in book XIL shap. !▼•

tH. IX.J BEFUTATION OV THE IDEAL THE JBT. 39

And, upon the whole, the theories respecting ^ ^xixthtx a^ forms overturn the things which tliey who affirm surdities irf- the existence of forms would wish should have pliitrairthMry a subsistence in preference to the subsistence of of ideas, the ideas; for it happens that the diiad ib not the first, but that the number is, and that the relative is, before the essen- tial: aiS alTWose consequences ensue, as many as certain, j wEo have followed up the opinions respecting forms — have set in contrariety to first principles. Further, also, according ' to the supposition in virtue of which we speak of the ex- istence of the ideas, not only will there be forms of sub- stances, but of many other things also ; for, also, there is the one conception not only respecting substances, but also in the case of other substances; and there are sciences not only of substance, but of different things also, and innumerable other things of this sort occur: but according to neces- sity, and the opinions respecting forms, it follows, on the supposition that forms are things capable of participation, that there should be ideas of substances only: for not uc- cordmg toaccident are they participated in, but things must participate in this respect in each idea, so far forth as each idea is not predicated about the subject. Now, I mean, for example, that if anything participates in the twofold itself, this also is a participant in what is eternal, but accofding^ to,_accid(gpt, for it is accidental for the^twiQ&ld to be §teruaL Therefore, the forms will Ue substance.

For the same things, both here and there, signify sub- stance; or what will be the meaning of the assertion of the existence of a something that is Independent of senslbles, drawn from the argument founded on unity. Involved in the notion of plurality; and If there be the same form of the ideas, and of things that are participants of them, there will be something In common? for, by no means, In the case of perishable duads — and, indeed, most duads, but such as are eternal — Is the duad said to be rather one and the same, than In the case of this and one of some particular thing. But if there be not the same form there would be an homo-' nymy; and It wiU_ifi^j[ust l ike aa If one should call both Oalllas and a piece of woi^dH' man, disceminjg nb Community 'wEatever between theiu.*^ '

40 THK HBTAPH7ST0S Or ARISTOTIiB. [BC>0K i;

1. The ideally- § 1. But most of all would one feel perplexed pothesisuseiesa ^g ^q what at alP the forms contribute, either to

for the purpose .i i

if is brought those things that are eternal amongst sensibles, piato fon^ or to things that are being produced and being corrupted. For neither are they to them a cause of any matioa. ..or ,.Qhange_,^haifixer. But, truly, neither are they of any assistance, towards the science of other things (for neither are those the substance of these, Tor'in such a case they would be in these), nor do they contribute towards the existence of other things, inasmuch as they are not in- herent in things that are their participants, at least; for so, indeed, they would perhaps be supposed as causes, just as if the white were mixed with the white it might be called the cause of a white body. But, indeed, this theory is very easily overthrown, which Anaxagoras, indeed, first, and Eudoxus subsequently, and certain others, advanced ; for it would be easy to collect together, also, many impossibilities in reference to such an opinion: but, truly, neither do other things sub- sist from forms in accordance with any mode of existence of those that are wont to be mentioned.

2. Three proofs But the assertion that these forms are exem- that forms are plars, and that the rest of entities participate in or modeis of ' them, is to spcak vain words, and to utter poetic created things, metaphors. For in what respect, may I ask does that which operates look towards the ideas as a model ^ for it is possible that anything whatever that is similar both should exist and be produced, and yet that it be not made like in reference to that to which it is similar. Wherefore, also, on the supposition of the existence and non-existence of Socrates, just such another one as Socrates is would be pro- duced. And, in like manner, is it evident that this would follow, even though Socrates were eternal; and, besides, there will be many exemplars of the same thing; wherefore, also, the forms — for instance, of man, such as animal ami biped, and at the sama time, also, ideal man — will have a subsistence. Further, not only of things sensible are forms the exemplars, but also of forms themselves; as, for ex- ample, the genus as a genus will be an exemplar of species;

• Aristotle low proceeds to prove the utter irrelevancy of ideas as

aocountiog for sensible phenomena. F?c2e Thomaa Aquinaa upon thii fection.

OH, IX.] PLA1X)'S BYSTEM OP FORM& 41

wherefore, ai exempLir and an image will be the same thing.

Further, it ^ ould seem impossible for the sub- 3. Fonns can-j stance to be separate from that of which it is "^ratdy fam J the substance; therefore, in what way can the things. I ideas, when they are substances of things, exist eepamtelj' ft»om them?

But in the Phsedo an assertion is made to this effect, — that the forms are causes of existence and of production. On the supposition, however, of the existence of forms, nevertheless, those things that are participants will not be produced, if there be not in existence that which is likely to be the origin of motion; and many other things are produced, such as i house and a ring, of which we do not say that there are forms. Wherefore, it is evident that it is possible, also, for other things both to exist and be produced from such causes, likewise, on account of which, also, arise those entities men- tioned just now.

§ 2. Moreover, if forms are numbers,^ how will i. six reasons they be causes'? whether is it because entities theorrorforma are different numbers, — as, for instance, this par- as numbers ; — ticular man is this particular number, indeed, ^"^^^^^°"- and Socrates another, and Callias another, different from both, — in what respect are those, therefore, the causes of these? for neither will it make any difference whether those may be eternal, and these not so. But if it is because the things here are proportions or ratios of numbers, — as, for instance, a symphony, — it is obvious that there will be a certain one thing, at least, amongst those of which there are ratios or proportions. Now, if this is one thing — say matter — it is paJpable that the actual numbers, also, will be certain proportions of one thing with another; but I say, for example, if Callias is a proportion in numbers of fire, and earth, and water, and air, to certain other subjects will belong the same man likewise ; and if the idea constitute a number, the ideal

' Aristotle still continues his attack upon the Platonic philosophy ; as yet confining himself to Plato*s theory concerning the substances oi things, to the exclusion of that concerning the principles of things, which he considers in the next section. At present he confines hia censures to Plato's assertion of ideas being numbers, and to his cthei theories respecting mathematical magnitudes.

42 TUE METAPHYmCb OF ABaSTOTLE. [bOOK X.

man, also, — whether the idea may be a oertam number of not, — nevertheless, will be a ratio in numbers of certain jthinga without being himself a number; nor will there be a certain particular number on accoimt of these things.

Further, out of many numbflra. one number

2. n3cona re*- t, i ;' if^" ■* 'a i" "^ « 

Bon, and an ob- results^^lxut JtTOm ^O^S hoW IS One fofm proo

Kweredf"*** duced? And iT^rms are not produced from fdm^but firom the units that are in numbers — as, for instance, in the myriad — ^how is it with the subsistence of the monads) for if they are of the same species, many absurdities will ensue; but if they are not of the same spe- cies, neither will they be the same with one another, nor all the rest the same with all : for wherein will they differ, since they are impassive? for such statements as these are neither rational nor consonant with the imderstanding. And, more- over, it is necessary to establish a certain other description of number, regarding which arithmetic is conversant, and all such things as are termed media by some ; and how, or from what principles, will these arise? or why will they be media between the things here and these) 3. Remaining Further, tho mouads which are in eoich dugd^ reasons. |^g ^jp^^^ some .pricHT duad, although such is im;

possi ble. Further, why is there an aggregated number, as oncfttlttig] and further, in addition to the things that have been stated, if the monads are different, they ouglit to declare their opinions in this same way as those do, even as many as affirm the elements to be fourfold or twofold ; for, also, each one of these mentions not what is common as an element — for example, body — but fire and earth, whether body is any- thing that is common or not But now, an assertion is made just as if the one were in existence as homogeneous fire or water; but if this be the case, numbers will not be sub- stances ; it is, however, evident, that if unity itself be anything, and if this be a first principle, that unity is expressed in many ways, for that it should be otherwise is impossible.

♦ Two objec- ^^^^ *^®y ^^^ ^®^ ^^ ^^^"^^ substances to first tions against a principles Set down lengths, indeed, as consisting

nion°rM*pSting ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ *°^ ^^® short, from Something

mathematical small and large, and a superficies as from what

is broad and narrow, and a body from what is

deep and low. In what way, however, will the superficies

CH. IZ.] PLATO (JN FIRST PRINCIPLES. 43

involve a line, or the solid a line and surfaor, for the wide and th3 narrow are a different genus from deep and low? As, therefore, neither number is inherent in these, because the much and the few are different from these, so it is manifest that neither will anything else of those superior natures be inherent in those that are inferior. But, truly, neither is the wide a genus of the deep ; for body would be a certain surface in this case. Further, may I ask from what will points be compounded) This genus, indeed, then, did Plato also oppose, as being a geometric dogma; but he used to call it the first principle of a line : and this he often set down, (I mean the existence of indivisible lines,) although of neces- sity there must be some limit to these; wherefore, from whatever principle a line is, therefrom also is a point.

§ 3. And upon the whole,^ seeing that wisdom i. piato's investigates into the cause, in respect of things *^o^ of fi"' that are manifest, this consideration, indeed, futedfn^six have we omitted ; for we say nothing regarding ^*y*' the cause of the origin of the principle of change: but, thinking to mention the substance of these, we say that there are different substances; but in what manner those may be substances of these we ineffectually describe, for as to such being accomplished by participation — as also we have stated on a former occasion — there is no advantage gained in saying t tdST \Sfeither, ^yv^fe.. 9^^ ideas such causes as we see to be a cause to th e sciences, on account of which both every mind and every nature operate; nor that cause which we affirm to\ be one of the first principles do forms in anywise toru;h upon ; | but to men, in the present age, mathematics have become the philosophy ; although they say that persons ought to culti- vate these sciences for the sake of other sciences.

But, further, one may suppose the subject-substance to be BS matter that is more mathematical, and rather to be con- verted into a predicable, and to constitute a difference of substance and of matter, — as, for instance, the great and the small, — just as, also, the natural philosophers mention the rare and the dense, saying that there are these primary differences of the subject, for these are a certain excess and defect.

^ Aristotle now proceeds to argue against Plato in his theory con* coming the first principles of things : first, "quoad principla easendl;" and secondly, "quoad principla cuguoscmdi**

14 th;s metaphysics op arigtotle. [£r:30K u

And respecting motion, if, indeed, these will constitute motion, it is evident that the forms will be moved; buc i< they are not, whence has motion ori^ginated ] for thereby the entii 3 investigation about Kature has been^abblisKed.

And what seems to be easy— njainely, fEe demonstration that all things are one— does not tarn out to be so; for, according to the interpretation, all things lo not become one, but a certain thing itself is one, if any one would grant that all things are sa: and neither would he allow this, unless one would admit the existence of a universal as a genus; but tbis, in some cases, is impossible.

But neither have those things that are after the numbers any grounds in reason, — ^namely, both lengths, and surfaces, and solids ; nor is it so in regard of the mode of how they are, or shall be, or whether . they involve any capacity ; for these cannot possibly be either forms (for numbers they are not), or media (for those are mathematical), or things that are corruptible : but these, again, appear as this certain other fourth genus different from those other three.

But, upon the whole, the investigation of the elements of entities, seeing that they are expressed multifariously, it is impossible for any persons to discover a solution of who have not divided them; and, especially, if they investigate in this manner from what sort of elements they are compounded. For action, or passion, or the wide, it is not, doubtless, possible to receive from some things of which these consist ; but, if this were the case, it would be possible to receive them as subsisting from substances only. Wherefore, either to investi- gate or to think that you possess the elements of all entities is not true.

2. Plato's But how can any one learn the elements of all

theonr of ideas things? for it is evident that it is not possible principiesofthe that he should be previously a person having JellonrigSSst prior knowledge thereof. For, as to one learning it. geometry, it is, indeed, possible to see beforehand

other things ; but of such things as the science consists of, and concerning which he is about to receive instruction, he can have no prior knowledge, so, also, is it in the case of other things. Wherefore, if there is a certain science of all things, as some affirm, nothing could this person know beforehand, tvery system of learning, however, subsists, or is attainabJeij

rH. IX.] aristoiue's appfat. to antiquity. 49

by means of previous knowledge, either of all things, or of certain particular things: and either by demonstration is this accomplished, or by definitions ; for those things whereof the definition consists it is requisite to understand beforehand, and that they be known. In like manner is it the case with knowledge by induction. But, truly, if also it happens that there is in our possession a congenital knowledge of things, it is astonishing how we, in possession of the most excellent of the sciences, are unconscious of such a treasure.

Further, how will any one know from what particulars all things consist, and how will this be manifest? for this also involves perplexity; for one would feel a doubt, just ns also concerning some syllable: for certain affirm that SMA is composed of S and M and A, but others eay that it possesses a different sound from its components, and none of those that are known.

Moreover, those things of which there is perception by sense, how could any one know if he were not furnished with the capacity of perceiving by sense? although one ought, if these are the elements of all things whereof they consist just as the compound sounds arise from their own proper elements.

That, therefore, all seem^ to seek the causes s.Aristotie's ca- mentioned in our Physics, and, besides these, ^^.f^l}^ fJVT^i

•/' • 1 t ' n again dcfenaea

that we have no other to adduce, is likewise from by a reference the foregoing statements evident. But the early ^°^"^^^i""y- philosophers, I admit, have treated of these causes. — ob- scurely, however ; and, indeed, in a certain manner, all such four causes have been enumerated by speculators of an age prior to ours : and, in a certain manner, by no means has this been the case; for the eai'liest system of philosophy ^ concerning all things was like unto one articulating with

^ In the French edition of Aristotle's works, publi=?hed by Didot, tbero is another chapter, namely chapter X, made to commence at these words.

^ I have ventured to differ from Taylor in his translation of this passage, on the authority of the old Latin versions, which, I admit, in the case of Aristotle's works, is not a very firm foundation to build npou. Taylor's translation, however, I conceive to be unsupported by the Greek in Bekker's text. He regards the iroivrv <pi\oao<pia in the context as equivalent to ontology, and k« t' upxds, to ontology at ita tirst commencement.

16 VHB MBTAPHTSIGS OF ABI8T0TLB, [boOK r

a stammer, inasmucb as it was new as regards first priAcipIe^ and a thing the first in its kind. For Empedocles says that a bone exists from form by the principle of composition ; but this is the essence and the substance of that thing. But, truly, if this be admitted, in like manner, also, is it necessary that of both flesh, and everything else of the other things, there should subsist this principle of concretion, or that it should not subsist as a principle of anything at all ; for on accoimt of this are both flesh and bone, and each of the other things, in existence, and not on account of the matter, which he says is fire, and earth, and water, and air. But, also, with any other, indeed, who would make these assertions, he would of necessity concur; but he has not expressed him- self with clearness respecting them. The case regarding such points, therefore, has been made evident on a former occa- sion; but as many doubts as any one might indulge in respecting these same, we will a second time enumerate ; for perhaps we shall thereby acquire a &cility for having our- diffioidties resolved in reference to subsequent questions oi. doubt

BOOK I. THE LESS.*

CHAPTER I.

Sfeotlation s^pecting truth is partly difficult i. speenhitiv«  and partly easy. And a proof is the following, JJI^y *eSir** that, in the pursuit of truth, neither is any one philosopher, in a way worthy of the dignity of the subject, able to attain this ; nor can all investigators fail in reaching it, but that each says something to the point concerning Nature : and individually that, indeed, they add nothing or but little, to this speculation respecting truth, but fron all these collected together that there ensues something oi magnitude. Wherefore, if, indeed, it so seems to be the case, as we happen to say in the proverb, "Who will miss the door?" in this way, truly, would the speculation of truth be easy.

' This book, as to the title of which all are not af^reed, has given rise to some diBcassion amongst the commentators. Alexander Aphro* disiensis and Asclepius seem to think that it is, as set down in the Metaphysics, quite out of place; and Augustine Niphus appears to reganl it as a fragment of some larger work, — ** propter exiguitatem." That it is out of place here has been inferred from the fact of the conclu- sion of the first book and the beginning of this being wholly devoid of connexion, whereas it is quite the reverse with the first and third books compared with each other. It has been conjectured that it belongs in some way or other to the Physics; chiefly from the words which occur at the end, — "first must we investigate what Nature (^iVis) is." But notwithstanding, as Thomas Aquinas reminds us, this book is not entirely without reference to what has gone before. The science under investigation in the first book is the science of sciences, and makes universal truth the subject-matter of inquiry, which brings Aristotle, in this, to the consideration of truth in general. Forasmuch, however, as the term truth is employed in the same sense as theoretic philosophy, the latter is compared with practical philosophy. But, iudeed, a further proof of its connexion with the foregoing may bo found in the fact that dpxcti^ or first principles, are the theme of dis- cussion in both cases. Though, certainly, we must admit that the discussion about the infinite progression of causes, with Aristotle, should find its place in the physical rather than the metaphysical por- tion of his writings. Alexander. Asclepius, Nipbus, and Thomaa Aquinas, are well worth being ronnulted on this question.

48 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. jBOOK I.

I, Pa/*i) diffi- ^^* for philosophers to have a certain whole, cixit, and a and not to be able to have each some portion,

eaase thereof. • j« . ji_ !•«» i. <» -a i t i

indicates the dimcmty of it: and perhaps, also, from the fact that the difficulty arises in two ways, the cause of this may not be so much in things themselves as in us ; for as the eyes of bats are to the light that follows the dawn of day, so also is the mind of our soul to those things which, above all, are naturally the most splendid.

3 Union of ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^® ^^ j^®^ *^ rctum thauks to

nienforthe thosc whose opiuious oue may have fellowship fruthr*^^ °^ with, but also to those, moreover, who have enun- ciated their sentiments more superficially; for even these, likewise, contribute something, for they have pre- viously exercised our speculative habit.^ For if there had not been a Timotheus, we would not have had much melody ; and unless there had been a Phrynis, there would not have been such a person as Timotheus. But, in the same manner, also, it is in the case of those who have declared their senti- ments concerning truth ; for, indeed, from some of them we have inherited certain opinions: but others have been the causes of these becoming opinions of theirs. 4.The appiicabi- But it is corrcct, also, that philosophy should lity of ^*^e^re- be styled a science, speculative of truth.^ For to the present of Speculative science the end is truth, but of Investigation, practical scicnce, a work ; for even though they may examine how a thing is, practical men do not investi- gate into the cause of that thing in itself, but in relation tc something else, and as connected with the present time : bu* we do not know the truth without the knowledge of cause. But, especially, is each thing that amongst other things according to which, also, there subsists in other things that which is synonymous, — ^as, for example, fire is a thing most

• "Our habit." Alexander interprets the word e^« by ^tivafits (ca-

pacity) ; for which, vide his commentary on the passai^e. What Aris- totle is aiming at, and illustrates from the case of Timotheus, is to show how previous discoveries in science bear on subsequent ones, and the procjressive character of truth. This point is beautifully put by Dr. Whewell in nis " Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences."

^ Aristotle having considered the speculation of truth in general proceeds to show how this consideration bears on the present inquiry His reasoning rests on the assumption of the words "truth," and " theoretic philosophy,*' being interchangeable terms.

OH. n.] THS PURSUIT OF TRUTH 4J

hot; for also in the rest of entities is this a cause of their heat Wherefore, also, most true is that which is a cause to posterior natures of their being true. Wherefore, is it neoee- sary that the fi rst princip legjDfJhiBies> a.lw)|jp existinj^jBhould klwft^ be most tr ue;^for not sometimes are they teue, neit&FIs anything the cause of being to those, but those are the cau3es of being in other things. Wherefore, as each thigg is disposed in. re^rd^gf existence, so, also, ia W.m. aigucd ^ truth.

CHAPTER II.1

But, truly, that there is, at least, some first 2. no infinity principle, and that the causes of entities are not »f «******r . ,

r« ./ '.,, . • ^ • Lx x» J either material,

mfimte, either m a progress m a straight forward efficient, final, direction, or according to form, is evident. For ^ 'oraiai. neither, as of matter, is it possible that this particular entity proceed from this to infinity ; for instance, flesh, indeed, from earth, and earth from air, and air from fire, and this without ever coming to a stand-stilL Nor can there an infinite pro-;; gression take place with the origin of the principle of motion ; as, for instance, that man should have been moved by the air, and this by the sim, and the sun by discord; and of thib that there should be no end. Nor, in like manner, can this infinite progression take place with the final cause, — that walking, for instance, should be gone through for the sake of health, and this for the sake of enjoyment, and this enjoyment for the sake of something else; and, similarly, that one thing invariably should subsist on account of another. And, in like manner, is it the case with the formal cause. For of media, to which externally there is somethiug last and first, it is neces- sary that what is firat should be a cause of those things which are subsequent to it. For if we must declare what is the cause of three things, we will assert that it is the first of the three; for, doubtless, it is not the last, at least, for that is not, at any rate, at the exti'emity of anything as a cause : but, truly, neither is it the middle, for this is the cause of one thing only. But it makes no diitierence whether one or many media be

' This is au important chapter, and aeemn to have suggested to modem philoBophers their phraseology, as well as mode of aiguing, in ret^ard of the d priori demonstration of the existence of Qod* ■*

S

so THIS Ml^APHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK 1

aaaumed, noc whether they aire tbii^ infinite or finite; but in this waj all the portions of things infinite, and of the. Infinite in general, are similarly media up to the extremity; so that if l^ere is nothing that is the first, there is, in short, no cause. 2. No progrea- ^^^ neither, truly, is it possible, as regards a tioji of causes progression downwsmls, to proceed 0-1 to infinity, dpwnwaids. j^ ^^^^^ ^j^^ which is in a progression upwards

inyolTes. a. first principle ; as, for example, that from fire, indeed, water should be produced, but from this earth, and so invariably that a certain different genus be produced. For, in a twofold manner,^ is one thing produced from another, — ^not as this particular thing is said to take place after that ; for example, the Olympic games from the Isthmsean, — eithsi as a man is produced from a boy imdergoing a change, oi' air from water.

5 Twofold dif- ^^ indeed, then, we say that a man is pro- fereocebe- duced from a boy as a thing that has been tween these. ^^^^^ ^^^^^ which is in a proccss of formation, or

that which has been finished from that which is being finished, or tends towards perfection, for always is there a certain medium ; as production is a medium between existence and non-existence, so also is the thing that is being produced between entity and nonentity: and a person receiving in- struction is one becoming scientifically learned. And this is the meaning of what is affirmed,— that from a person learning is produced one that is scientifically learned; and just as watei is generated from air on aocoimt of the air having undergone corruption. Wherefore, in the former instance, the things adduced, indeed, do not revert into one another, nor is a child produced from a man ; for that which is being pro- duced does not arise from the act of generation, but is sub- sequent to generation : for so, also, the day is generated from the dawn, because it is posterior to this ; wherefore, neither is the dawn generated from the day : but the other instances revert into each other.

4. According to I^ bulh these cascs, however, it is impossible STtherewf^n** *^ pursu6 the progress on to infinity ; for, in the finity of causes, ouc case, of those that are media there must

' In a twofold manner, vXlKott koi irpoy^arosiScM : that is, when one fystem of matter is produced from another, and when that is a traa* Mtiun from what ia immature to what is finiahed.

{jB. II.] nunmrist phuobession »f gadbas. 51

ne eds be m en d, and, in the other case, the things adduced revert into one another, for the Sesf niction' 6i one is the geneiution~of the other. But at the same time, also, it is impossible, that what is first, seeing that it is eternal, should be subject to corruption; for since generation is not infinite in an ascending progression, that nature must needs not be eternal from which anything has been produced as from that which is primary, and has been subject to corrup- tion ; but this is impossible.

Further, the final cause is an end; but a thing 5. ko infinite of this sort is that which does not subsist on ?J"*""*51?^?

« , 1 1 J J 1 t • i *"* case 01 tne

account of another, but other things on account fin&iorfonmd of that. Wherefore, if that which is last be a ^••• thing of this sort, there will not be a progression to infinity; but if there is no such thing — I mean tiiat which is last-» the final cause, will have no existence. But they who intro- duce thJH infinite prngrftRwinn fnrgftt fffrft^ ^hfiy dflHtrpy fhft

na^nrtt nf thft gQ^vj Although uo ouc would imdcrtake entering on any course of action not intending to go on to a termination of his undertaking; nor would there be design in such things: for one who is possessed of mind always does a thing for some purpose or other, (for this is a termination for it,) for the end proposed is a termination. But, indeed, neither can the formal cause admit of being referred to another definition more copious iu reason. For the prior iefinition is invariably more the definition of a thing; but the subsequent is not so. But to thj^t.,.of, which tfaerais-no firat, neither has that which is next jr, wdftr any PTist^nffff,

Tg-m^hSl^the^Jesfr^^^^^ ThU theory

ipake assertions in this way; for it is not even of infinite pro- pCBSBIe'to iinderstand anything before we come S^rturattie*^* to individual things; and scientific knowledge possibiutyof has no existencje in this case : for things infinite, "^^ *' in this manner, how is it possible to apprehend? for the in- finite here is not a thing similar to infinity in the case of a line, which, as regards its divisions, indeed, does not come to a stand-still, but is indivisible ; nor is it possible for one to apprehend these divisions, except he imposes some limit to their divisibility. Wherefore, he will not reckon the divisions or sections who goes through the infinite in detail. Bu^ ako, as regards the matter, — so fiir as it is such, in what ic

b2 '^KS XETAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE [bOO&I

being moved,^ — ^it is necessary to understand it thus far; and for nothing that is infinite is there any possibility of ex- istence: but, if this is not the case, not infinite, at any rate, is that by which we may know the infinite. But, doubtless^ if theja)ecie8^j^.^c^^^ infinite Jn Tlfffiaber, neither^n

BuchLa.6?Sfi.. wglJllLiiy^^ be pos-

sible: for then we think we know when we may make known the causes : but the infinite according to addition, it is not in finite duration possible to exhaust.

CHAPTER 111.2

^ .\ But lectures on philosophic subiects fall out

of habit on our according to our habits; for as we have been IpSSms!^* accustomed, so we deem it right a thing should be expressed; and whatever things are besides these do not appear similar : but, from the fact of our not being habituated thereto, they seem more imknown and strange, for the habitual is more known. And how great force the habitual possesses, the laws make manifest, in which fabulous^ and puerile things have greater force from usage than the reality of our knowledge concerning them. 2. Different de- But somc pcrsous, indeed, do not admit those f?®'"^*^*^*"* making assertions, unless one speaks with mathe-

slon m different .. *? • • i. x xi. j . i.

kinds of matical precision ; but others do not approve of

science. -vrhat is said, unless they express themselves by

means of an exemplar; and others think it right to adduce a poet as a witness. And some require all things to be ex- pressed with accuracy; whereas accuracy is troublesome to others, either on account of their not being able to carry on

^ " In what is being moved.*' Some read, Kiyovfittniy : meaning, that matter is not infinite in the sense of things that might be said to be infinite in energy.

^ The subject now treated of is also discussed in his Ethics. His reasoning here has been adopted by all subsequent philosophers: f.g. Bishop Butler; vide Preface to his Sermons, and part II. chap, ii of the Analogy.

' This is illustrated in the fiable of the earth being the mother of tlie human race, which was recognised in the Athenian and Spartan laws. We, accordingly, find Plato recommending the recognition of thia myth in the legislative system of a people, since thereby would b«  ••cured among^ ihem patriotism and a love of country.

CH. III.J BEUREISS OF S0IEKTIF70 AGCURAOT. 59

a train of reasoning, or on account of their considering such as mere quibbling about verbal niceties, — for the precise iu- volves some such thing. Wherefore, as in the case of con- tracts, so also in that of philosophic discourses,^ precision seems to be a thing to some p^rsoiis that is illiberaL

Wherefore, it is necessary that one should have been instructed what way we must admit each turaUst^Inot and all points of inquiry, as it would be absurd expected to em

. * •/ » ploy in&tn6inft~

at the same time to seek for scientific knowledge tuai accuracy and the mode of attaining such knowledge: but ^^^^s^^^- it is not easy to acquire either of these. Now, mathenmtical accuracy of language ^ is not to be required in all things, but in tEose tKings that do not involve any connexion wijh tnat^T Wherefore, such is not the natural mode of dis- covering truth;* for perhaps the whole of Nature involves matter : therefore, first must we investigate what Nature is.* For in this way, also, will it be evident about what only natural science is conversant, and whether it is the province of one science, or of many, to speculate into causes and first principles.

• M Twv xAywv, I have translated these words " discourses," following

the Latin ** orationibus." The term which Aristotle already has used^ in the beginning of the sentence, is dxpodirus, which I have rendered lectures." This term has given rise to the distinction of the Aristote- lian writings into acroatic and exoteric.

' As to the different sorts of accuracy requisite for the treatment of different departments of human knowledge, the student is referred to Ethics, I. iii, and to Post Analyt. I. 13, 24.

' That is, the mode of discovering truth adopted by the natural philosopher.

^ " What Nature is." These words have led commentators to form the surmise that this is a fragmentary portion of some physical treatise. It is worthy of remark, too, that this book is said not to have been written by Aristotle at all, but by one styled Pasicles, a native of Bhodes, who is said to have been a hearer of Aristotle, and a ■on of BoiUBus or Boethuii^ a brother of EudiBixiua.

BOOK II*

CHAPTER I.

1. Dmibt-its ^^^ ^^ advancement of the science under in* niationto yestigation it is necessary for ns, first, to take

scientific truth. ^, i» xi. • . i» \. • i

a reyiew of those points respectmg which one ought to doubt in the first instance ; but these are whatsoever suQects some speculators have entertained opinions of after a drfferent mode, and whatever beyond these may happen to have been overlooked. For it will contribute towards one*s object, who wishes to acquire a &cility in the gaining of knowledge, to doubt judiciously, for a subsequent acquitdtion^ in the way of knowledge is the solution of previous doubts ; but when one is ignorant if the bond of a thing, it is not possible for such to loose it. But the perplexity of the intellect makes manifest this assertion respecting the matter in hand ; for so far forth as the dianoetic fiiculty doubts, so &r does it undergo something similar to persons loaded with chains; for it is impossible, in both cases, to advance further. Wherefore, it is necessary, in the first instance, to speculate into all the difficulties involved in the present subject, both on account of thiese things, and also from the &ct, that they who carry on an investigation, without doubting first, are similar to persons ignorant where Hiey ought to wfdk; and, in addition to these things, neither can such know whether he has discovered the object of his speculation or not; for the end is not manifest to this specukitor : but to one who has previously doubted, in a judicious waj, it is manifest But^

^ This book, if we allow what is commonly called Book I. the Lcbb to be as a separate one and as book IL, wonld, in this case, stand third in order, which it does in some of the MSS. In this book, howeyerj Aristotle proceeds, according to the hint dropped at the end of the first book, to lay before his readers, after the mode usually adopted by dis- putants in the sehools, the doubts suggested to a thinking mind, tm connected with the subject-matter of ontological or metaphysical science.

^ This idea, according to Asclepius, is taken by Ariiiotle from Plato^ who pithily illustrates it by the case of fire being the result of the rub> bing together of two sticks.

l] doubt in relation to trutb 5d

further, there is a necessity that a person s^^ould be better qualified for forming a judgment who has heard all the reasons, as it were, of adversaries and opposing disputants.

Now, the first source of perplexity is concern- ing those things which we have expressed doubts of causes, u a of in our Preface; namely, whether to speculate iogy"to*bc*n>^ into causes^ be the province of one or many g««rded as one sden^sesl and whether it be the province of this °'°**°^^* soienoe to discover merely the primary principles of substance, or also to speculate concerning the first principles from which all dedve their demonstrations 9 as, for instance, whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing, at the same time, or not, and concerning the other things of such a kindl And, if it is the province of this science to be con- versant about substance, whether one may be about all, or whether there be many such in existence? and, if many, whe- ther all are akin to each other, or it may be proper to style some of them sciences of ^wisdom," and others of them, aomething else?

And this very thing is amongst the necessary , q^^^.^„^ ^ points of investigation, whether it should be to the different affilrmed that sensible substances exist only, ^^'.^^^tiS^^^^^^^ or whether others also subsist in addition to and their accu these 1 and wheth OT there is a genus singly, or *!!!!U a a«mber o f ge^W^^^niwotmr^ tETopinion of 'tbwu whe4atroduceDoth forms and mathematical entities afi things intermediate between these and sensibles? Con- )^ oeming these, therefore, — as we have said, — an examination must be made; and also concerning substances, whether the speculation extend only to them, or to the essential accidents of these substances? But, in addition to these points, we might inquire in regard of sameness^ and diversity, and similarity and dissimilarity, and identity and contrariety, and concerning priority and subsequence, and all the rest of such things, concerning as many as the Dialetticians endeavour to

' This subject is considered more at lai^ in book IIL ' Aristotle had already discussed these pomts, one would suppose, with sufficient copiousness in the Topics : whj, then, do these inquiries intrude into the regions of ontology ? The commentators reply, Uiat in his Logic he traats of these merely specalatlTeY* ivi6^»s, but here, as a metaphyaiciao ought, really, dXifiumu

56 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLH. [bOOKR.

examine, instituting tbeir inquiries from matters merely of opinion, — we might, I say, investigate whose province it is to speculate into all of these. Further, may one investigate whatsoever things are essential accidents in these very things, both not only what each of them is, but also whether, in truth, one be contrary to one 9

And whether genera are first principles and regtSTofSnt elements, or those things into which, as being ^^a^hlt^ inherent, each thing is (Svided, and if the genera they are ; how are SO, whether they are such things as are imd"L*to thS' predicated last or the first concerning individuals! iwjdeofsnb- ag^ for example, whether animal or man be a fiist principle, and be so rather than a singular ^ But most especially must we investigate and examine, with pains, as to whether besides matter there is any absolute cause or not, and whether this is separate or not, and whether it be one, or such causes may be many in number? And whether there is anything beside entirety,^ (but I mean by entirety when anything has been predicated of matter,) or nothing, or whether this is the case with some things, indeed, but not so with others, and what sort of entities such are? Moreover, whether first principles are limited in number or in species, both those that subsist in formal causes and those that are in the subject? and whether of things cor- ruptible and incorruptible the principles be the same or different ? and whether all are incorruptible, or whether of corruptible things there are corruptible principles ? More- over, also, the most difficult of all, and involving the greatest perplexity, is the inquiry, whether unity and entity, as the Pythagoreans and Plato used to affirm, be not anything else but the substance of entities ; or this be not the case, but that there be some other subject, as Empedocles says harmony is, and a certain other philosopher, fire, and another, water or air ? And whether first principles are universal or are as the singulars of things ? and whether they subsist in capacity or in energy ? Further, whether they subsist otherwise than according to motion? for also these speculations would fiimish much perplexity. But, in addition to these points, there remains the inquiry, whether numbers and dimensions,

^ This subject of the rb trwoXov is treated of in bock VI. mor«  hiUy; for example, vide chapter iii

OH. fl.] QU^TIOKS Pl>ELIHINART TO ONTOL;>GT. 5"

and figures and points, be certain substances or not t and, if they are substances, whether they are capable of being separated from sensibles or be inherent in them? for, con- oeming all of these questions, not only is it difficult success- fully to attain unto the truth, but neither is a judicious doubting easy for the reasoning faculties.^

CHAPTER II.« 

In the first place, indeed, therefore, let us i.ThequeatCwi institute an inquiry concerning the first asser- di8cu88ed,-i8 tions which we have made ; namely, whether to science of Speculate concerning all kinds of causes be the regardid*Mone province of one or many sciences ? ^ For how science or Irould it be the province of a single science to °^*°^ take cognisance of existing first principles when they are not contrary to each other 1 But, further, in the case of many of the entities all do not exist in all * of them. For in what way is it possible for the principle of motion to be found in things incapable of motion ; or that the nature of the good should, if everything which may be essentially good, and by reason of its own nature, is an end, and so a cause, inasmuch k& on account of that other things are both produced and exist ? But the end and the final cause are an end of any action. And all things in the act of doing are attended with motion ; therefore, in things incapable of motion it would not be possible that this should exist as the first principle, or that there be therein any essential good. Wherefore, also, in mathematics nothing is demonstrated through this cause ; nor is there any demonstration for the reason that a thing IB better or worse : but neither does any mathematician make

• Or T^ \6yu might be translated, " on rational grounds."

, ' Aristotle having enumerated the doubts which suggest themselves, now proceeds to enter upon an examination of each separately; which he does, in general, by laying down the reasons on both sides, as well for the affirmative as for the negative of each question.

• Mr. Maurice remarks, in his Introduction to Moral and Metac

|>hysical Science, on this passage, that " this question involves the ver;f subject of the whole treatise."

^ All are not agreed about the text. I have translated it as it standi in Bekker* irScrai, of course, refers to ipx*^*

58 THE mSTAPHTSIGB OF ARISTOTLE. [BO)Ka

mention at all of any such thing whatsoever. Therefore, for this reason, certain of the Sophists, as, for example, AristippuSi regarded these sciences with disdain ; for in the other arts^ even the mechanical ones themselves, as in those of carpentry ^nd shoe-making, he said that wherefore a thing is better or worse could be declared in every respect, but that the mathematical sciences ^ make no account concerning things good and evil. But, truly, if there are, at least, many sciences of causes, and different sciences of a different first principle, which of these must be said to be the one under investigation ; or whom of those that are in possession of them shall we pronounce scientifically informed, particularly in the matter under inquiry — for in the same subject is it possible that all the modes of causes exist ; as, for example, of a house, the 3rigin of the principle of motion is from art and the builder, and the final cause is the work, but the matter in earth and stones, and the form is the definition ? / 2. ontoiflgy. as From the distinctions, therefore, laid down by

• 8<^nceofthe ug originally, as to which of the sciences we

sbteiicd'^i' ^ ought to denominate wisdom, is involved a ^^^* reason for further styling each thus. For as

fiir as a science is most qualified for the pre-eminence and for superiority over the rest, and so fai as it is just that, as servants, the rest of the sciences should not contradict, so lar «uch is a science of the end and of the good, for the rest of things are. on account of this ; but as far as wisdom has been defined a science of first causes, and of that which is es- pecially capable of being scientifically known, so &r such would be a science of substance. For seeing that persons may acquire the same knowledge by many methods, we say that he rather understands a thing who makes known by its being what that thing is than by its not-being ; and of these themselves one in preference to another, and particularly he who knows what a thing is, and not he who knows the quantity or the quality of a thing, or what it is by natuie

' The mathematical Bcienoes stood in higher estimation amongst the Platonists than the Peripatetics. As to the sneer of Aristippus, in which Aristotle almost appears silently to join, an answer might, in one way be given in the Talue which Plotinus attaches to mathematics fof familiarizing mankind with that part of their nature not included in thi notion of body; or^ to use his o?ni words, irp6s ffw*$uru6v rris dawfjuiroi

Uv^Im*-

n.] AVODSIKTl? PRtNOIPLBI. M

fitted far in the way of action or of passion. Fortheri in the case of ether things, the understanding eaoh of those fiubjecta . concerning which there are demonstrations^ ^fiLl^JRk Jtji^ / to Jiave an ex istepee when we may understand what a tibing/ ^Ji^ 6 is^ for instance, what the squaring of a right-lined figure is :| that it is the finding of a mean proportional.^ In like manner | ^^' r«(^^t is it in the case of the rest. But with regard to generations, and actions, and every kind of change, we are in a way of understanding each when we undei-staud the first principle of motion ; and this is different and in opposition to the end. Wherefore, it would appear to belong to the department of a different science ' to investigate each of these causes.

But, truly, also, with regard to demonstrative s. The qneftioa/ first principles, whether they belong to one science 2jSt'mo«S?i or more is a question open to doubt. But 1 tic principles—.' term demonstrative even those common opinions and whether ' / from which all derive their demonstrations ; for {Jjy faii^undwrt instance, that everything must needs be either ontoiogicai | an afiirroation or negation, and that it is im- "**""' possible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, and whatsoever other such propositions there are. It is^I «ay, a question open tb doubt, whether there be one science of these i tti d'^BuB i Biaao e o r k dilS pr!^.' ptig r «nd ifnot'bne,' whether it is necessary to denominate as such the science under investi- gation) Therefore it would not then appear reasonable, indeed, that it should be the province of one science ; for why, in preference, should the perception concerning these peculiarly belong to geometry rather than to any o^er science what- soever ? If, therefiMre, in like mann^, truly it belongs to any whatsoever, but it does not admit <^ befonging to all the sciences, as neither is it the peculiarity of the rest, so neither is it the province of that science which makes known the substances to investigate concerning these. But, at the same time, also, in what way will it be die science of these ? For what each of these happens to be we also now know ; the rest

' For instance, if you wanted to mace a rectangle into a square, you should find a mean between two of its conterminous sides; and the square of that would be the required one, on the principle that ths rectangle under the extremes is equal to the square of the mean.

' Alexar ler, instead of the usual x-eading, would insert oCk befon

4fy

'kr

f

A ,

THi? MBTAPHTBI09 OP ABIBTOTLE. [BOOK

of the arts, therefore, employ fhem as things known. B if there be a demonstrative science concerning them, it w: be necessary that there be a certain subject-genus, and th; some of these, Indeed, should be passive properties and othe axioms : for concerning all things it is impossible that the should be a demonstration ; for demonstration must needs 1 composed of certain principles, and be conversant respectir some thing, and the demonstration of some things. Wher fore, it happens that there is one pai*ticular genus of a thm£^ that are' being demonstrated, for all the demonstrau^ soigfl otw e mpl oy aidpms. But, truly, if there be a science < substance different from the one concerning these, which < them is by nature fitted to be more sovereign and prior, f( especially and universally the principles of all things are tt vasioms 1 And if this is not the part of the philosophe whose else will it be to speculate into the truth ai^d fiilsehoo regarding these 9

4. The ques- And,upon the whole, whether of all substancei

of*8ubstwSSf ^3 there one science or more 1 if, indeed, then ducussed. fore, there is not one science of such, what soi of substance must we consider as the subject-matter of th: science of ontology? But that there should be one science ( all substances is not reasonable ; for there would be ou demonstrative science concerning all things that are essentia accidents, if every demonstrative science, in respect of a certai subject, speculates into essential accidents from genen opinions. Respecting, then, the same genus it is th province of the same science to investigate the essentia nccidents from these same general opinions: for an exam; nation respecting the wherefore belongs to one science, an to one respecting those elements whereof a thing consisti whether both investigations belong to the same or a differeo science % Wherefore, the like will take place in regard ( accidents, whether these will investigate them or one of those But, further, might we examine whether the speculation i confined only to substances, or is also concerning the acci

^ Substanoes would be classed by the Peripatetic and Platoni schools as being those that are cognisant bjc the mindiand immoveabli and that fall under the notice of tbClsenses, and ha^e motion impreiiae upon them; that is, oii<riau, vinfrai icat cuclunroi, and oCa.v aiadrj Tai ko^ J

»•«.;• ^

^;t;»?^^"v.

> »

< ^

CH. IL]

DOUBTS IN REaARD OF SUBSTi jiTCEfl.

6i

dents ^ in these 1 but I say, for example, if a solid oe a cortain substance, and lines, and surfaces, whether it be the province of the same science to take cognisance of theso things, and of the accidents of each genus about which th«  mathematical sciences demonstrate, or if it be the province of a different one 1 For if, indeed, of the same, there would be a certain demonstrative science, and that the science of substance ; but of the essence or formal cause there does not appear to be a demonstration : but, if of a different science, what will be 'the science that speculates about the accidents of substance 1 for this would be altogether difficult to render an account of. Furthery. nlgo, wh e t h op muflti we sa y thai ^thega-' a|]B sensible substances onlj^ or> also,, besides these^ others ? im3'"Whether do the genera of these substances happen to subsist singly, or are they more numerous, as, for instance, they who speak both of forms and media between forms,^ and things sensible, concerning which, they say, are con- yersant the mathematical sciences ?

As to the assertion, then, indeed, that we have 5. Denial of tbe made,^ namely, that forms are causes, and sub- Joms separable stances absolutely subsisting, it has been declared ^o? 8en»ii»ies. in the earliest of our disquisitions concerning these : but as these inquiries in many ways are clogged with difficulties, it would be no less absurd the assertion that there are, indeed, certain natures besides those which are in the heavens, and that these are the same w4th things sensible, except that the former are, indeed, eternal, and the latter, corruptible. For they speak of the existence of ideal man, and ideal horse, and ideal health, but say nothing else in regard of these ; acting, in a way, similar to those who affirm the existence of the gods, no doubt, but in the shape cf men -^ for neither

• As to a Bcience of the t6 (rvfi^t^riK65, vide book V. chap. ii.

• As regards the system of the Platonists in this point of forms, or

rh ^71, Aristotle has already delivered his opinions in the first book, and resumes his consideration of this portion of their philosophy in book XII. chap iv.

• x4yofitv : in using the first person, Aristotle seems to identify him-

self, though perhaps he would n3t be brought to acknowledge this, with the Platonic school. He was, it is needless to say, a pupil oi Plato's, though he soon burst away from his master.

* This has been a tendency in man always; one great aim in the lati

>f Moses is to counteract this tendency. The folly of anthropQ;. morphism is wittily exposed in Cicero's De Nat. Deor. lib. I. cc. 27 bqc^

C^>

[ I'

'.-f

A.-*^

(i THB MBTAFHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOKII

did theie latter oonatitute aught save eternal men, nox do the f(»iner make species anything else but eternal seosibles.

6. The inquiry, ^^*» ^^"^^^J^j 1^ ^^ addition, also, to forms and .-Are there ' seusibles any will set down things intermediate SSdu^tw^u he will be involved in many doubts. For it is forms and sen- evident that, in like manner, there will be lines, rabi?f£Ma'^*^ and each of the other genera^ besides also them iSton.nL«I;; ^^^ are senslWe. Wherefore, since astrology is Bteted and ex- one of these, there will also be a certam heaven plained. besides the sensible heaven, and a certain other

sun and moon ; and so with the rest, in like manner, of the bodies that are situated in the heavens. Although, how need one place confidence in such statements as these ? for neither is it reasonable that this ideal heaven should be in- capable of motion ; but, also, that it should be capable of motion is altogether impossible. In like manner, also, is it the case concerning the objects whereof optical science treats, and that of harmonics in mathematics ; for, also, it is impos- sible that these should have a subsistence different from sensibles throu^ the same causes : for if things sensible and senses have an intermediate subsistence, it is manifest, also, that there will be animals which will be media between them and things corruptible. But one would doubt, also, con- cerning what sort of entities it is necessary for these sciences to investigate. For if geodesy will differ from geometry in this only, that one is conversant about things which we perceive by the senses, but the other, about things that are not cognisant by sense, it is manifest that besides the medici*- nal science, and besides each of the rest, there will be a certain science intermediate between the healing art itself and this particular art of medicine. Although, indeed, how is this possible ? for, also, would there be, in such a case, certain salubrious qualities in addition to those that are sensible, and to the salubrious itself : but, at the same time, neither IS this true that geodesy^ is conversant about sensible

' Geodesy, like the pure mathematical sciences, originated, in Egypt, from local circumstances. It was the growth of a necesaity annually experienced of having fresh surveys of land, and effaced land-marks restored* in consequence of the inundation of the river Nile. Thus it hsd to deal with rd a&r^irri.

CH..U,] XATHSICATIOAL MEDIA. 65

magpitudes and those that are corruptible ; for it would fiUl into decay when they were in proceas of being destroyed. But, truly, neither will astronomy be conversant about sen- sible magnitude nor about yon heaven. ITor neither are the lines that &11 under the cognisance of the senses the same as the geometrician describes them ; for nought of the things that are perceived by the senses is in this way strictly strtught or round, for the circle touches the rule not in a point,, but as Protagoras ^ was accustomed to say in his refu- tation of the geometricians. Neither are the motions and the evolutions of the heaven similar to those about which astrology has formed its systems ; nor have the symbols ^ the same natiire with the stars.

But there are some persons who say that these 7. objections reputed media between forms and sensibles are S?i"*liiif p®" not, mdeed, separable from sensibles, at least, but being mathe- inherent in them: and to enumerate all the S^herenttosen- impck^ibilities attendant upon these statements ■i^i«>- would reqnire a more copious discourse y but even it will be sufficient to speculate thus much on this point. For neither is it reasonable that this should be so in the case of these merely ; but it is evident that it would be possible, also, for forms to subsist in sensibles : for both of these are results of the same process of reasoning. But, further, must there needs

• This alludes to a practice of Protagoras, who used to give an illus-

tration of the principle stated in the text by actually applying the rule to the circle in the presence of the geometricians, and then laugh at them, in hhs derision of their science. This quite accords with the usual conduct of the sect to which Protaf^oras attached himself ; namely, that of the Sophists, who appeared at the time of the transition of the early Greek philosophy into that which begun with Socrates, and reached maturity under Plato and Aristotle. The Sophists, however men of learning at the first, gradually degenerated into mere pretenders to knowledge, whose aim was merely to extort money; and the effect of their system would, if generally adopted, have been to destroy the distinction between truth and falsehood. Fortunately, however, a dawn of purer radiance was soon to break over Greece, and to dissipate these mists and clouds of darkness. As to the original import of the term

• Sophist,' see Grote's History of Greece, vol. viii. pp. 474 sqq.

' When astronomy became entangled in the thorns of superstition, we know how the astronomic charts became crowded with cabalistic signs, for the lormation of horoscopes, and other vain subtleties of un- tutored reason; which signs soon displaced the sober qroibols of math* acatio.

a

THE MBTAPHJSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK tt

be two solids in the same place ; and these mathematioal entities muse needs not be things incapable of motion, seeing that they, at least, subsist in sensibles that are being moved . and, in short, on what account will any one lay down their having a subsistence, indeed/ and a subsistence in sensibles? for the same absurdities with the things that have been pre- viously spoken will ensue ; for there wul be a certain heaven in addition to the heaven we see, except that it will not be separate, but in the same place, which is still more absurd.

CHAPTER III.*

i.The question, ^^^» respecting these points much doubt —Are genera therefore prevails ; namely, how it is necessary by discuwedTn*" forming one's opinion thereupon to attain unto afve'ancTthe" *^® truth : and, likewise, respecting first prin- neKstive, by a ciples, whether it is requisite to consider the th^ngs^Jationai, genera as elements and first principles, or, in natural, and * preference, those things from which, as inherent,

• ^' **■ each first thing consists? as, for example, the

elements and first principles of voice appear to be those things from which all voices are composed primarily, but not the voice in common ; and we say that those things are elements of figures the demonstrations of which are inherent in the demonstrations either of all or of the greater part of other things But, further, both some in affirming that there are many elements of bodies, and others that there is one ^, of which they are composed, and from which they consist, assert these to be the first principles; as, for example, Empedocles asserts that fire and water, and the elements sub- sisting along with these, are those from which, as being inherent, entities derive their existence : bnt he does not speak of these as the genera of entities. And, in addition to these statements, we may subjoin the remark, that if any one wishes to contemplate the nature of the rest of things — as, for

• Aristotle still continues his discussion of the enumerated doubts ;

and in the order that he states them in the beginning of this book. ' * This dogma of one original element, or material principle, is steadilj opposed by Aristotle throughout the Metaphysics

CB. IllJ ARB GENERA nBST PBINOIFLESf M

example, a bed, of what parts it consists, and how those parts are put together — in that case he is acquainted with the nature of it. From these reasons, therefore, it would appear that first principles would not be the genera of entities. But so fiur forth as we obtain a knowledge of each thing by means of the definitions, and so far as first principles are the genera of definitions, it is necessary, also, that first principles be the genera of things capable of definition. And, likewise, if to acquire the science of the forms according to which entities are denominated is to acquire the science of entities themselves, in this case the genera of the forms are first principles. But those, also, who affirm that the elements of entities are unity or entity,^ or the great and the little, appear to employ these as genera. But neither, truly, in both cases is it possible, at least, to affirm, also, that they are first principles. For; indeed, of substance there is one reason or formal principle ; difierent, however, will be the definition through the genera, and that which declares the entities whereof, as inherent; a thing consists. If, also, most especially, in addition to these things, the genera are first principles, whether is it necessary to regard the first of the genera to be principles, or the lowest that are predicated of individuals ) for this, also, is involved in doubt. For if, indeed, it is requisite that universals are first principles in a more eminent degree, it is evident that the topmost genera will be first principles; for these are pre- dicated of all things. Therefore, the first principles of entities will be as numerous as the first genera ; so that unity and entity will be first principles and substances : for these especially are predicated of all entities. But it is not possible that there should be one genus of entities, or that unity or entity should be such ; for it is necessary, indeed, that the differences of each genus both exist, and that each should be one : but it is impossible either for the species to be predi- cated about the proper difierences of the genus, or for the genus to subsist, independent of the species of itself. Where- fore, if unity or entity be a genus, neither will entity or unity constitute any difference. But, doubtless, unless there oe genera there will not be first principles, since genera are

^ This tenet Aristotle examines in book I., and towards the close of the next chapter. He glances at this system in several parto of the Hetai^hyncs, e.g. in book IX. chap. iL *

t6 T?E METAPHT&1CS OF ARISTOTLB. [BOOI; IL

first principles. Further, also, media that are comprehended along with the differences will be genera as &r as to indi- viduals; but now this appears to be the case with some, and not with others. And further, in addition to these things, we may add that the differences are rather first principles than the genera ; but if these, also, are first prin- ciples, first principles become infinite, so to speak : and this is especially the case if one should constitute the first genus a first principle.

2. Reasons to But truly, if, also, the one rather be that which fo™t*8 *ecie8 ^ principal, and if one be a thing that is indivi- may be prinei- siblc, and everything that is indivisible is so, P^®*- eitheracoording to quantity oraccordingtospecies,

and if that which is according to species have a prior sub- sistence, and the genera are more divisible into species, one would be predicated last, for man is not a genus of certain particular men. Further, of those things wherein the prior and subsequent are inherent, it is not possible that what is predicated of them would be anything different from these ; for instance, if a duad be the first of numbers there will not be any number different from the species of numbers : and, in like manner, rather will there be figures in addition to the species of figures. But if this is not the case in regard of these, hardly, at least, will there be genera of other things in addition to the species, for of these there seem especially to be genera. But in individuals there is not one thing that is prior, and another that is subsequent Further, Tvhere one thing is better and another worse, that which is better always is prior; so that none of these could be a genus. From these statements, indeed, therefore, it ap- pears that those things that are predicated of individuals are first principles, rather than the genera. But, again, how, on the other hand, it is necessary to regard these as first priu«  ciples, it would not be easy to express. For it is requisite that there should be a first principle and a cause exclusive of the things of which there is a first principle, and that it should be capable of subsisting in a condition of separation therefrom ; but, as to the existence of some such thing besides the singular,^ why should one make a supposition to this

^ Aristotle almost seems to thmk it to have been the business of hiui life to oppose the ideal hypothesiB of Plato.

GB-ITJ AKTTniNG SEPAR.\BLE FBOU SINGULARS? 6T

effect, except that it is predicated uniyersally, and of all things f But if, indeed, this is done on this account, in such a case univeirsals are to be set down as first principles in a more eminent degree, so that the first genera would be principles.

CHAPTER IV.»

But a doubt closely connected with the fore- j j, 4,,^^^ ^y, going is one which of all is both the most thUig separate difi&cult and the most requisite to examine into, ""*^" "* concerning which our treatise, at present, is immediately occupied. For if there is not anything besides singulars, and if singulars are infinite, how is it possible to be in possession of a science of things that are infinite ? for, as far as there is something that is one and the same, and as &r as there is something that is universal, so far do we attain a knowledge of all things. But, doubtless, if this be necessary, and if there must needs be something in addition to singulars, it would be requisite that there be genera in addition to singulars, whether they are the lowest or the highest ; but that this is impossible we have ourselves just now expressed a doubt.

. But, further,^ if most especially there is some- 2. la theie any- thing besides the entire when anything has been thing separable predicated concerning matter, whether, if there ^mpounled of be a certain form, must there needs be somethinsc n»a"" »"?

1 . jj... i J i. • jj'x* form f— this

umversal m addition to some, and not m addition question dis- to other things, or is there nothing universal *'"■■«<*• besides singulars ? If, then, there is nothing universal besides singulars, there would not be anything that is cognisable by the mind ;' but all things would fall beneath the notice of the

' This is a very important chapter, not merely because it giveg Aristotle's opinions on a subject where he may be seen in direct oppo- riiion to his master, Plato, but also because we are fiivoured in it with A glimpse into Aristotle's transcendentalism.

' The mode pursued by Aristotle, in the discussion of this question, !b to show the validity of the affirmatlye^ drawn from the absuxdities of the negative of it

' The reasoning contained in this and the following sentence throws A good deal of Ught upon the theological system of Aristotle; how inseparably connected it is with Psychology and Physics, at least, im the philosophy of the Stagyrite.

f2

68 TBI METAPHTBIUB OF ABI8T0TLE. [bOOK II.

senses, and there would not be a scientifio knowledge oi anything, unless one would assert the exercise of the sensea to be science. Further, would there be nothing eternal or immovable ; for all things sensible are in a process of cor- ruption, and are in motion. But, truly, if there is, at least, nothing that is eternal, neither is it a thing possible that there should be generation ; for there must needs be some- thing, namely, that which i& being produced, and wherefroni It is produced : and of these the last must be ingenerable if both the progress of successive productions is to stop at all) and if generation from non-entity should be a thing that is impossible. But, moreover, on the supposition of such things being in existence as generation and motion, there must needs be a limit likewise, for neither is any motion infinite ; but of every motion is there an end : but that cannot be produced which it is impossible could have been produced ; but that which has been produced must needs exist when first it has been produced.^ But, further, if matter be an existence from the &ct of its being ingenerable, still it is much more reasonable that substance should have a subsistence when that is generated so as to have a being ; for if neither sub- stance nor matter shall have an existence, neither will there be anything at all in existence :^ but, if this be impossible, there must needs be something in addition to the entire^ namely, the form and species ; yet, if, on the other hand, any one will establish this dogma, a doubt presents itself, both in the case of what things one should make this assertion, and in the case of what one should not. For that this is not possible, in the case of all, is evident; for we would not posite existence of any particular house in addition to certain houses. • rp, ««« But, in addition to the foregoini; points, we

«. The question u' • xu • • i. xiT mi xi. u

fei to the unity may subjom the inquiry, whether will there be Bub8t^e7iuad ®^® substaucc of all things, for instance, of men? principles ex- Now, this is absurd, for all things are not one amine . ^^ which the substauco is one, but are many and

difiEerent ; this, however, also, is an unreasonable statement And, at the same time, also, how would matter become each

1 This point is disciiiBed and reasoned upon similarly in the sixth book of the Physios, diap. y. ^ Such a supposition then would end in « system of nihilisin.

CH. If.] IfOBTAL AND IMMORTAL KATUBES. 69

of these I and how is the entire both of these f But, further, respecting first principles we would also entertain this par- ticular doubt For if, indeed, they are one in species, nought will there be that is one in number ; nor will actual unity or entity have any existence ; and how would scien- tific knowledge be in existence, unless there was a certain one in all things )

But, truly, if they are one in number, each of the first principles also will be one ; and not, as in the case of sensibles, one principle of one thing, and another of another ; as, for ini^iuice, of this syllable when it is the same in species, the first principles, also, are the same in species, for these, likewise, are dififerent in number : and if this be not the case, but if the first principles of entities are one in number, there will not be in existence anything else besides the elements ; for to speak of one in number, or of the singular, makes no dif- ference, for so we speak of the singular as one in number, and of the universal as that which is common to these. Just, therefore, does the case stand as if the elements of voice should be limited in number, all the letters necessarily must be in number as many as the elements, since neither two, nor more than two, of them would be the same.

§ 1. But a doubt ^ of no less difiiculty has been i. An the prin- overlooked, both by modern investigators and JJlJjfbJfg^^J'd by our predecessors, namely, as to whether the incorraptibies first principles of things corruptible and of things *^® '""** incorruptible be the same or difierent 9 For if^ indeed, they are the same, how is it the case that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible, and from what cause does this difference arise )

Those of the Hesiodic school, and all as many j Enoneous as are theologians, fixed their thoughts only upon vW of the the probable, as it appeared to themselves ; but this ^int. they have treated us with disdain. For, seeing that they make the first principles gods, and to have been produced from gods, whatsoever did not taste of the nectar ind ambrosia they say are mortal; palpably speaking of these denominations as expressive of things that are known to

^ The question now discussed is most important, as bearing directly on the inquiry, — ^What was the theology of Aristotle^ or had he any such system at all?

70 THE MKTAPHTSIC8 OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOK lU

themselves. Respecting, Lowever, the actual adducing of these causes, they have spoken beyond our comprehension. For i^ indeed, the immortals partake of these for the sake of pleasure, the nectar and ambrosia are, in no respect, the causes of their existence ; and if these are the causes of their existence, how would they be eternal when thus requiring sustenance ) But, respecting those &bulous systems of philo- sophy, it is not wordi one*d while considering them with seriousness.

But from those who make assertions by de«  thereof of*the moustratiou, it is necessary to ascertain in our Physicists inquiries, why, forsooth, if entities are from the consistent in Same sourcc, somc of them are in their nature ^pedoc^es. ctemall and why others of these entities are subject to decay ? But, inasmuch as they neither mention a cause of this, and as it is not reasonable that the case should be so, it is manifest that the first principles of these would not be the same, nor would there be the same causes of them. For, also, one whom any person would suppose to speak particularly consistent with himself, namely, Empedodes,' has, likewise, experienced the same difficulty. For he, indeed, is for establishing discord — which is a first principle in his system — as a certain cause of corruption. Nevertheless, this would seem, however, also, to produce entities that are beyond the one -^ for from this are produced all the other works of creation, except the Deity. The following, at least, are the words of Empedocles : —

• • From which are all things, as many as were, and are, and shall be

after; And trees therefrom have blossomed, and men and women. And beasts and birds, and water-fed fishes, And even the long-lived gods."

And the subsistence of all things independent of these is manifest; for, imless discord were inherent in things, all things would have been one, as he says : for when they

^ Asdepius endeayours to exculpate Empedocles from the charges of Arifltotle, by protesting against the literal interpretation of the language of that sage ; contending that it is purely symbolical, and in nowise destructive of eternal entities.

' I have followed the text of the French edition. Bekker read^ ^l auTov rov kv&s.

IH. IV.J ABB THB 0AU8B8 Ot THE8B THB flAHEt 71

would ba^e come together, then last in the conglomeration would stand discord.

Wherefore, also, it happens to him, in his 4. This proved system, that the Deity, who is supremely happy, (u^oVgoJl should be less prudent than the rest of beings, for he does not know all the elements, for he is not in possession of discord; but the knowledge of the like is through the like.^

"For, indeed, Bays he, by earth we see earth, and by water, water, And ether divine by ether, and through fire the ruinous fire^ And by concord, concord, and by gloomy discord, discord."

But, to return to the point from whence our dis- s. The insuf . bourse digressed. This, at all events, is evident, Empedociean that it happens, according to the theory of dogma. Empedocles, that discord is no more the cause of corruption than of existence ; and, in like manner, that neither is harmony a cause of existence more than of corruption, for while collecting things into unity it is a cause of corruption to other things. And, at the same time, also, he mentions no cause of the actual transmutation, save that the thing is thus constituted by nature to take place. Mark his words : —

" But when mighty discord^ was nourished in the members, And rose up to the honours of deified Time, who, holding The sway over them alternately, had, in the end, Surpassed the ample objects of Qod's adjuration."

As if, indeed, it were a thing necessary that a change should take place ; but he does not bring to light any necessary cause. But, nevertheless, thus much, at least, he only asserts consistently, for he does not constitute some entities corruptible and others incorruptible, but all corruptr ible, except the elements. But the source of perplexity now

• This was a favourite dogma in the theories of sensation put forward

by the old philosophers. It is acquiesced in by Plato in the Timacus. Its source hns given rise to some questioning ; it has been generally traced up to the Pythagoreans. Sextus Empiricus examines this point JQ the first of his books, " Contra Mathematicos," chap. xiii.

' I have thus differed from Taylor, who translates the word rcAti- <rfi4voiOj ** perfect,*' dfioifiaios atplvf ^* being with them vicissitudinary," and ropcXfjAarcu, ** preceded." Now, as to this last translation, I cannot conceive what led Taylor into such an error, if it was not his incorrect rendering of the old Latin version. Such a renderiog of the word, how« 

• yer, robs the passage of its entire meaning.

72 TBB METAJ^TSIGS OF ABlBTOTLE. [BOOK tL

mentioned it this : why, if entities spring from the same source, some of tliem are incorruptible and some of them are not so ? That, therefore, the first principles of things would not be the same, let this much suffice to have been spoken.

6. The position "^^^» ^^ *^® ^^ principles of things be different, that principle* one matter of doubt, indeed, is, whether these are different, ^j^ ^^jj y^^ incorruptible or corruptible? For

if, indeed, they are corruptible, it is manifest that it ia requisite that these, also, should spring from certain entities ; for all things perish into those from whence they derive their being. Wherefore, it happens that to principles there are other first principles that are prior ; but this is impossible, both on the supposition of the progression being stationary, at some stage of its progress, and on the supposition of its going on to infinity. And, moreover, how will things perishable subsist if the first principles will be destroyed? but if these principles are imperishable, why, indeed, from these that are things imperishable will arise those that are perishable, but from the others those that are imperishable ? for this is not reasonable, but either is impossible, or requires for its establishment much rational 'support. And, further, neither has any one attempted to enumerate difierent ones ; but speculators assign the same first principles of all things — the first subject of doubt, however, they entertain slightly,* regarding it as something trifling.

§ 2. But, also, the most difficult point of all ^ to

whe*ther"VntiSr ^^^^^^^ ^^^^j ^^^ *^® most uecessary for the dis- and unity are covcry of truth, is, whether entity and unity are SwStn*" substances of entities, and whether each of them reference to the not being anything else, this is unity and that is

Platonisuaud ... i. xu ** -x • x • x- x

Physicists. entity ; or whether it is uecessary to investigate what, at length, unity and entity are, as if another nature were the subject to these? For some, truly, in tliat way, and some in this, suppose their nature to be dis- posed. For Plato, indeed, and the Pythagoreans do not regard entity as anything different from unity, but that this

^ The word dirorpdryownv is a metaphor derived from dogs mangling axid destroying f'-Kl, if interrupted in devouring it.

' This subject has been ab'eady examined in book I., and is discusaed in other parts of the Metaphysioai

OB. IV.J 7SST1TT AND UNITY VIEWED AS FRINOIPLEB. T9

is their nature that it should be the same th*ng for the substance to be one, and to be a certain entity. But amongst natural philosophers, Empedocles, for instance, as if con- ducting the inquiry to that which is more known, says that unity is entity. For he would seem to affirm that this is harmony^ — at least, this is a cause in his system of unity being found in all things. But others say that fire, and some that air, is this unity and entity from whence that entities both arise and are produced. So, in like manner, is it the case, also, with those who lay down the existence of more elements than these ; for it is, hkewise, necessary for these to reckon unity and entity such things as whate-ver, at least, they affirm first principles to be. But it happens, unless one will set down the existence of unity and entity as a certain substance, that not any of the rest of the universals will have any subsistence, for these are uniyersal pre-eminently above all. But, if unity itself be not some particular thing, nor entity itself much less will there be any of the other things that will have a subsistence, except those denominated singulars. But, further, on the supposition of unity not being a substance, it is evident that neither would number have a subsistence, as a certain nature that has been separated from entities, for number constitutes the monad ; but the monad is the same as some certain imit. But, truly, if, at least, actual unity and actual entity be a certain particular thing, it is necessary that tlie substance of that thing be entity and unity ; for it is not any different thing that is universally predicated about them, but these very same things.

But, doubtless, if actual entity and actual 2,ThePhyiicist unity, at least, shall have any existence, much inerea»esthe doubt will arise how there wiU subsist anything qSSo„7i„'d" different from these. Now, I mean how there wiU learcs it mue- be more entities in existence than one. For any- '°**^* thing different from entity has no existence. Wherefore, according to the theory of Parmenides, it must needs happen that all entities are one, and that this one constitutes entity. But in both cases there is a difficulty; for even on the supposition whether unity, doubtless, be not substance, or whether any actual unity have a subsistence, it is impossible for number to be substance : but if, indeed, then, it has not t

^ Vide book IX. chap, ii

m TEIB XETAPHT8I0S OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK H.

imbsistence, it hB.th been previously stated why ; bac if it has. the same doubt presents itself respecting entity also : for from what will there be another one besides the one itself, for must not that necessarily be not one, for all entities are either one or many, each of which is one ? Further, if unity itself be indivisible, according, indeed, to the axiom of Zeno,' nothing woidd there be having a subsistence. For that which neither when added nor subtracted makes anything greater or less, he affirms this not to belong to the category of entities, because entity is manifestly magnitude ; and if it ia magnitude it is corporeal, for this, in every way, is entity. But the addition of such things, in one way, will make what is greater, and, in another, will not make anything so at fdl. As a surkce and a line make that which is greater ; but a point and a monad, by no means, have this effect. But since this philosopher speculates clumsily,^ and it happens that there is something that is indivisible, wherefore, even in this way, also, hath one for him a certain reply as follows, — an addition of this sort will not make a thing greater, but will make it more ; yet how, forsooth, from one, or more than one, of this kind will arise magnitude, for this is even like saying, that a line is made up of points 1 But, doubtless, if any one makes a supposition in this way, so that, as some say, from actual unity, and a something else that is not one, is com- posed number, not the less should it form a subject for investigation, why, and how, what is produced will one time be number, and another time, magnitude, if what is not one be inequality and the same nature. For neither is it mani- fest how from one and this nature, nor how from a certain number and this nature, magnitudes would arise.

^ The Zeno mentioned here by Aristotle was the famous Eleatio philosopher of that name, and the friend of Parmenides. There waa another Zeno, the founder of the school of the Stoics.

a ifMpriKeis. Taylor translates this word "importunately;" but on what authority I am unable to discover. The word literally applies to bodies, e.g. we say, irKoioy <popTut6ut to mean a ship of burden ; and th«m it is metaphoricaUy transferred to persons, as meaning coaree or booiiihi iod awkward.

OB. v.] ABS NUMBERS FIRST FBINCIPLB8? 75

CHAPTER V.»

But a doubt connected with these is, whether i. The questior numbers and bodies, and surfaces and points, nSmb«?imd^ are certain substances or not ? For if they are flgures.&c. tub- not, it eludes our comprehension what being ■'^*'**' is, and what the substances of entities are. For passive pro- perties, and motions, and relations, and dispositions, and ratios, do not appear to signify a substance of anything; for all these are predicated respecting a certain subject, and no one of them can be said to be this or that particular thing. But things which would seem particularly to signify sub- stance, namely, water, and earth, and fire, from which compounded bodies consist, the heats and colds of these and such like qualities are affections, not substances; but all the while the body, which undergoes these passive conditions, alone sustains them as a certain entity, and as being a certain substance. But, truly, both body is less substance than a superficies, and this latter than a line, and this than the monad and the point, for by these is body defined. And these, indeed, seem capable of existence with- out body; but the existence of body, without these, seems Impossible.

Wlierefore, the majority of speculators and our j. Appeal, on predecessors considered substance and entity to this subject, to be body, and the other things to be passive *"*^^'***y- properties of this;^ so that, also, the first principles — those of bodies — are the first principles of entities. Subsequent investigators, however, and they, too, persons that appeared endowed with more wisdom than these, supposed such to be numbers. As, therefore, we have said, unless these are substance, there is, upon the whole, no substance in existence, nor no entity, for the accidents, at least, in these it would notj truly, be worthy to call entities.

^ Aristotle now proceeds to examine this fundamental dogma with the Pythagoreans, which he has ah-eady discussed, partially, in book I., and resumes the consideration of in book XII. of the Metaphysics.

> This assertion is exemplified by what Aristotle has laid down in hia review of the Greek philosophy in booli I« 

76 THK METAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLR. [BOOK U.

8. Retumet tiM ^"* ^^> doubtless, this is acknowledged, that diseassionof dimensions and points are substance, rather this inquiry. ^^^^ bodies themselves, yet we do not perceive to what sort of bodies these would belong (for that they be inherent in things that fall under cognisance of the senses, this is impossible^ ; in this case, then, there would not be any substance m existence. Further, however, it appears that all these entities are divisions of body, one indeed, into breadth, and another into depth, and a third into length. But, in addition to these things, in like manner, there is in the solid every kind of figure whatsoever; so that^ if neither mercury is in the stone, nor the half of a cube in the cube, in such a way as has been defined, neither, in this case, would one surface exist iu body : for if this would be the case with anything whatsoever, it would be with that which would separate the half. Now, there is the same mode of reasoning in the case of a line, and a point, and a monad ; wherefore, if body especially be substance, and if these are substance rather than this, and these have no existence, nor do certain substances exist, there eludes our comprehension what entity is, and what is the substance of entities. For, in addition to the statements that have been made, those irrational consequences relating to generation and corruption, also, take place. For, indeed, substance — when not previously existing it comes into existence now,^ or when it which for- merly had an existence afterwards ceases to exist — the sub- stance, I say, appears to undergo these affections, namely, production and corruption ; but points, and lines, and sur&ces, cannot possibly arise or be destroyed, though sometimes these have a subsistence, and sometimes they have not. For when bodies mutually touch or intersect each other, at the same time that they touch they become one, and at the same time that they intersect they become two. So that points, lines, and sur&ices, when bodies are compounded together, have no subsistence, but then have been reduced to corruption : but when bodies are divided, these rise into existence, though pre- viously they had no existence. For a point, truly, that is indivisible is not capable of being divided into two ; and, if

^ The student would do well to consult Mosheim's Dissertation on "A Creation out of Nothing;" to be found amongst his commentarieH •n Cudvorth.

OB. ?l] QUE9nON8 RnPBOTMO tfllcBf PBINCIPLB8. 77

they are produoed and destroyed, they are produced from something. But, in a similar way, is it the case respecting the present time, which is contained in duration; for neither does this admit of being generated and destroyed, but^ never- theless, inyariably seems to be a thing that is different, not that it is^ however, any particular substance. In like manner, also, it is evident that it is the case both respecting points, and lines, and sur&ces, for the reasoning is the same ; for all these, in like manner, are either bounds or divisions.

CHAPTER VI. 1

But, upon the whole, would one feel perplexity , . ^. why also it is necessary to investigate into cer- other principiei tain other entities besides sensibles and media, for ^thematkaT* example, such as we posite as forms ? For if it is entiuei and on this account, because mathematical entities, •*"•***••' indeed, differ from those that are here in a certain other respect, yet, in regard of there being many of them of the same species, there is no difference in this. Wherefore, the first principles of these will not be limited in numberi as neither of all the lines which are here are the first prin- ciples limited in number, but in species, unless one takes the principle of this particular syllable, or of this particular voice, and the first principles of these will be limited in number. In like manner, also, is it the case with things that are intermediate; for there, likewise, things of the same species are infinite. Wherefore, unless, in addition to sensi- bles and mathematical entitities, there are certain others, such as some call the forms, there will not be a substance one in number and species ; nor will there be certain first prin- ciples of entities so many in number, but in species. If, then, this is necessary, the subsistence of forms, on this account, is necessary also. Hot even although they who make such' assertions do not propound their theories with distinctness,

^ This brings us to the dose of the examination of the doubts that had been started in the commencement of this book. Some of them are discussed with almost studied obscurity. They, however, strongly illustrate the state of ontological science in Aristotle's time, who maj be called its progenitor.

78 THB METAPHTSrCS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Ili

yet it is this which they aim at ; and they must needs affirm this, that each of the forms is a certain substance, and that not one of them subsists according to accident But, doubt- less, if we posite the existence of the forms and of the first principles as one in number, but not in species, we have declared the impossibilities which must need come to pass. «. The mode of Ooutlguous, slso, to this inquiry is the question ^he subsistence whether elements subsist in potentiality,^ or in o p ncpes. g^jjj^ other manner? For if, indeed, in some other manner, there will be something else that is prior to first principles ; for potentiality is prior to that cause : but it is not necessary that everything that is potential should be disposed in that way. But if elements are ex- istent in potentiality, it is admissible that none of the entities should have a subsistence ; for it is possible for that to exist which not as yet has any existence : for, indeed, that which has no existence is being produced, but nothing of things that are impotential is produced.

8. Shall we pre- -^^ these doubts, then, is it necessary to dicate reality moot respecting first principles; and there re- ofsingiu^'st^' mains, also, the inquiry whether universak exist, or, as we say, singulars? For if, indeed, uni- versals exist, they will not be substances ; for nought of those things that are general signify this particular thing, but a thing of such a sort ; but the substance is this particular thing. But if it will be possible to exhibit this particular thing, and that which thereof may in common be predicated, in such a case many animals wHl Socrates himself be, and man and animal if each signify this certain particular thing, and that which is one. If, indeed, therefore, first principles are universal, these consequences take place ; but if they are not universal, but are as singulars, they will not be objects of scientific knowledge ; for the sciences are conversant about all things that are universal. Wherefore, will there be different first principles prior to principles, namely, those that are predicated universally, in case there is likely to be a science of them.

^ The subject of potentiality, or capaci^ in general, ib examined into more at large by Aristotle in book YIII.

BOOK IIP

CHAPTER I.

Therb is a certain science which makes, as the ^^^ olject of its speculation, entity, as far forth as it is universal mU entity, and the things which are essentially in- J5d%*ot?S3tk berent in this. But this is the same with none euiar science of those which are called particular sciences ; for ® '* none of the rest of the sciences examines univensally concern- ing entity so far forth as it is entity : but, cutting away a certain portion of it, they investigate what is accidental in r^ard of this ; as, for example, the mathematical sciences. But, whereas we are in search of first principles and the top- most causes, it is evident that they must needs be absolutely of a certain nature. If, therefore, they, also, who investigate the elements of entities were accustomed to investigate these first principles, it is necessary, likewise, that the elements of entity should not have a subsistence according to accident, but so far forth as they are entities. Wherefore, also, must we ascertain the first causes of entity, so far as it is entity.

CHAPTER II.

Now, entity is spoken of in various senses, i.gigniflcations indeed, but in reference to one,^ and to one of entity or the certain nature, and not equivocally; but, in like manner, also, as everything conducive to health is termed

^ Some make this book to be book IV., instead of book III. Aris- totle now proceeds to lay before his readers what is to form the subject- matter of his treatise on Metaphysics, namely, entity, as such, or unity, with the ontologist an interchangeable term. The foregoing book was disputative, whereas this is explanatory. In the one he merely starts difficulties, whereas in the other he does not enumerate the doubt without deciding it one way or the other.

> The aim of Aristotle seems to be to show that the unity of meta- physical science is not destroyed by the multiplicity of subjects wfaidi f|dl under hs proyince.

^0 THI IfETAPHYSICS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK III

BO in reference it health, partly, indeed, in its preserv- ii^ that state, and partly in giving rise to it, and partly in being an indication of health, and partly in being receptive of it; and, in like manner, as the medicinal is styled so ic reference to the art of medicine; for, indeed, a thing is called medicinal partly in reference to its possessing the medicinal power, partly in its being by nature adapted for the possession of such, and partly in its being the work of the medicinal art : and we sliall receive the predication of other things in a similar manner with these. Thus, however, is entity,^ also, spoken of in various ways indeed ; but every entity in re- ference to one first cause : for some things, because they are substances, are styled entities; but others, because they are affections of substance; but others, because they are a way to substance, either as corruptions, or privations, or qualities, or things formative or generative, of substance, or of those which are spoken of in reference to substance, or the negations of any of these or of substance. Wherefore, also, the non- entity we pronounce to be non-entity.

«. Metaphysics -^ ^^^^^ there is one science of all things onegenenli pertaining to health, in like manner, also, is science. ^j^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^j^^^ things. For it is

the province of one science to speculate concerning not only those things spoken of according to one, but also those spoken of in reference to a single nature. For these, also, in a certain manner, are spoken of in accordance with one. It is evident, therefore, that it is the province of a single science to speculate concerning entities, so far forth BJS they are entities. But in every respect is the science of ontology strictly a science of that which is first or elemental, both on which the other things depend and through which they are denominated. If, then, this is substance, the Philo- sopher or Metaphysician must needs be in possession of the first principles and causes of substances. Now, of every genus there is both one sense of each and one science; as, for instance, grammatical science is one, and speculates into all vocal sounds. Wherefore, to speculate into, also, the number of the species of entity, and the species of the species, belongs to a science one in kind.

^ The lubject of entity is fully discussed in the next book, chap, vil

.OH. ILJ UNITT of 0NT0L06T AS A SCIBNCS. f\

' I( therefore, entity and unity are the same 3. seienee of tbing, and one nature,^ from the fact of their ®°'*^^®*^ following each other as first principle and cause, unity, or the yet they are not manifested by a single defini- ^ •*'• tion; there is, however, no difference, should we even Biake our suppositions in regard of them after a similar manner, nay, even rather is it for the advantage of the present inquiry. For it is the same thing, one man and the entity jnan and man; and »not anything different does it make manifest, according to a repetition of the expression, to say man is, and man and one man : but it is evident that there is no separation of being either in the case of production or corruption. But in like manner, also, is it the case with unity. Wherefore, it is manifest that addition in these implies the same thing, and that nothing different is unity from entity And, further, the substance of each thing is one not according to accident ; and in like manner, also, is it the case with any entity whatsoever. Therefore, as numerous as are the species of unity,^ so numerous, also, are those of entity, into the nature of which it is the province of the same science in kind to investigate : now I speak, for instance, of sameness and similarity, and of the other things of this sort, and of those that are in opposition to these. And almost all contraries are reduced to this first principle. These points, however, have formed the subject-matter of our inquiries in our treatise styled, "A Selection of Contraries."

. And so many portions of philosophy are there as 4 -^^j^y j^ j, ^jj^^ there are, at least, substances. Wherefore, is it ontology has to necessary that there should be a certain first phi- gallon! m;ga^-" losophy, and one next in order belonging to these ; {jj^j^ng;^ ^Uf^ for xmity and entity are things straightway involv- opposites and ing genera ; wherefore, also, the sciences will follow <^o"*^^^^*- upon these. For the Philosopher or Metaphysician is as one that is styled a Mathematician, for his science also has parts ; and there is a certain first and second science, and another next in order, in mathematics. But whereas it is the province of one science to investigate things that are in opposition, and

I This position, as to the identity in signification of entity and unity •-wrA 6v, t6 I*', — is questioned by many.

^ The subject of unity is examined into in book IX.

Q

62 THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLEL [bOOK III.

4nnce plurality is opposed to unity,^ it is also the province of one science to speculate into negation and priyation, on account of both kinds of inquiry being possible in the case of unity, of which there is the negation or the priyation, either absolutely affirmed that such does not reside therein, or in a certain genus thereof. In this case, indeed, therefore, the difference is present in unity with the exception of that which is inherent in negation, (for negation is the absence of that) And in privation, also, is there a certain subject nature of which the privation is predicated. Now, plurality is opposed to unity; wherefore, also, the things that are in opposition to those that have been mentioned — namely, both diversity, and dissimilarity, and inequality, and as many other qualities as are denominated either according to the same, or according to plurality and unity — ^it is the province of the science of metaphysics that we have alluded to, to examine into ; among the number of which, also, a certain one is contrariety ; for contrariety is a certain difference, but difference is diversity, e n,^.. .. * Wherefore, since unity is spoken of in various

5. Thisunityof 9 xi. i i_ n • i_ 1

ontology not ways,'^ theso, also, shall in many ways be spoken thfdWe?sSyin ^^i ^^*» nevertheless, it is the province of one meaning of its sciencc to make known all such ; for even though subject-matter. ^^j^.y |jg spokcu of in many ways, on that

account it is not the province of a different science to in- vestigate them : if, however, neither the definitions are capable of being reduced in accordance with one, nor in reference to one, then is it the province of a different science. But since all such are referred to what is first — as, for example ; as many things as are styled one are spoken of in reference to the first one — in the same manner may the assertion be made, that this science is concerning sameness and diversity, and the rest of the contraries. Wherefore, in dividing how many modes each is expressed by, in this way must reference be made to what is first or original in each category, in order to ascertain how it is expressed in reference to that. For things will be denominated partly by reason of having those primaries, and partly that they are causes of them, and partly according to other such modes. Tliero- fore, is it evident, as has been stated in the doubts, that it if

• Vide book IX. chap. vi.

• Vide book IV. chap, vi., and book IX. chap. L

CH. II.] SUBJECTS OF INQVIBT IN ( NTOLOOT. ^3

the prorince of one science to institute an inquiry concerning these and concerning substance. But this was one of those mquiries that have been mentioned in the doubts.

And it is the part of the philosopher to be ^ xhe fore- able to speculate about all the foregoing sub- going subjectf, jects of inquiry. For, if it be not the province J^?|!^J^ ^j^ of the philosopher, who shall there be that will ®"*®"y!*V ^ be likely to examine whether he be the same Srom^i^ ana- person, Socrates, and Socrates sitting; or whether ^gy of number, one be contrary to one, or what a contrary is, or in how many ways it is denominated? In like manner, also, is it in the case of the rest of such points for investiga- tion. Since, therefore, these of themselves are affections ci unity, so &r forth as it is unity, and of entity, so far forth as it is entity, but not so far forth as they are numbers, or lines, or fire, it is evident that it is ^e province of that science of ontology to make known both what these are, and the accidents that are inherent in them. And not in this respect do they err who examine concerning these, as not philosophising, but because substance, about which they understand nothing, is a thing prior in existence. Since, as there are peculiar affections of number, as far as it is number, (for instance, oddness, evenness, commensurability, equality, excess, defect,) and as these both absolutely and relatively to one another are inherent in numbers, and since in a similajr way there are other peculiar qualities, in what is solid and inca- pable of motion, and in what is being moved, both that which is without weight, and that which has weight, so, also, in entity, so &r forth as it is entity, are there certain peculiar properties ; and these are they about the truth of which it is the province of the philosopher or ontologist to inquire.

Now, a proof of this is the following:^ for j secondly, dialecticians and sophists assume, indeed, the fromarefexence same figure as the philosopher, (for sophistical ^ ^^^ *^'* is only apparent wisdom, and dialecticians dispute about all thmgs ;) to all, however, is entity common. But they dispute concerning these, evidently, firom the cause of these being proper subjects of inquiry for philosophy. For, in-

^ Ariitotle seems to think tliat for the sophist or dialeoticiMi t«  abim the title of philosopher was a mere piece of assmnptlon ; an^ buUed, to disouBS at all subjects of ontology. See note, p. ^

• 2

84 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ^^BOOKHL

>deed, sophistry and dialectics are employed about the samt genus as philosophy is ; but philosophy differs from the one in the mode of power, and from the other in the choice of life.^ And again, dialectic science is merely tentative of the knowledge of those things that philosophy has already tictually reached ; but sophistic science is only apparent, and

8 Thirdly ftom ^^* '^^ ^ *^^ Same is further proved from

the reduction of the fact that a different co-ordination of ccm- Snity"^' ^ traries is privation, and all things are referred to entity and nonentity, and to unity and plurality: as, for instance, rest in its nature partakes of unity, and motion of plurality. But that entities and substance are compounded of contraries almost all men acknowledge — all, at least, assert the first principles to be contraries : according to some, indeed, these principles being odd and even ; and according to others, hot and cold ; and according to others, finite and infinite ; and others, harmony and discord. But all the rest of such are referred appar- ently to unity and plurality ; for let this reduction be received by us as is done in the first book of our work " Concerning the Good." 2 Now, there it appears that first principles, both altogether and as is acknowledged by others, fall under these genera. 9. Converse From these statements, therefore, is it also

Sen?"o?theTi ©^^i^©^* *^* *© investigate entity, so far forth 5v, is the sub- as it is entity, is the province of one science. raVoiog^^'^ For all things are either contraries or com-

' T^ TpoKtp ^uydfi€0)s : by these words Aristotle means tliat though there is a demonstrative or apodeiktic power contained in common in the science of the dialectician and ontologist, yet that the latter sways this power over truth, and so as to retam truth under his authority; whereas the former does not extend its influence beyond mere proba- bility. Upoaipefffi rod ^lov ; in this lies the difference between sophistry and metaphysics, that the latter is cultivated by one who can hare recourse to stores of real knowledge, whereas the former is a mere fantastic or apparent system of science.

^ This is the title of a treatise of Aristotle which has, unfortunately, been lost; though perhaps, indeed, some might contend that there is merely a reference made to book II. of this treatise, where he speaks upon a subject pretty much akin to the one mentioned in the text. There is discoverable in the Metaphysics the name of another of the Peripatetic writings which has not come down to us, namely, the ixXvyii T»y ivoaniwv, already noticed, p, 81.

in. XQ.] OtfTOLOGT AND AFODEIKTIO PBIKOiPLES. 35

poded from contraries: but the first principles, also, of contraries are unity and plurality ; and these are belonging to the department of one science, whether the predication be made according to one or not, as, perhaps, the truth is. But, nevertheless, even though unity be spoken of in many ways, to the first will the rest be reduced, and the contraries in like manner. And for this reason, even though entity and unity be not universal and the same, in the case of all things, or separable, as, perhaps, they are not, yet some things, no doubi^ are referred to unity, but others to that next in order; and for this reason it is not the business of the geometer to in- vestigate into what the contrary is, or the perfect, or unity, or entity, or identity, or diversity, save only from hypothesis. That» therefore, it is the province of one lo. Recapituia- science to investigate entity, so far forth as it is ^^°"' entity, and the things therein existing, so &r forth as they constitute entity, is evident; and that the same science is speculative not only of substances, but also of things that are inherent in substances, and of the particulars enumerated, l)ofch concerning priority and subsequence, and genus and species^ and whole and part, and the rest of each, this is evident also.

CHAPTER III.

But we must determine whether it is the |, whether on province of one science,^ or a different one, to spe- to^oH^ takes

• * , . . ^1 11 J • cognisance of

culato concerning axioms, as they are called, m apodeiktic first mathematics; and concerning substance? Doubt- Jubgt^^JeJ?"*^ less, it is manifest that it is belonging to one, and that the science of the philosopher, and the investigation of such inquirer is respecting these ; for in all entities are they inherent, but not in any genus separate distinctly from the rest. And all investigators employ them, indeed, because they belong to entity, so far forth as it is entity; each genus, however, constitutes entity. And thus far do they employ

> Thifl, it may be remembered, was a question put forward by Aria- toUe in tiie early portions of his treatise; and he now enters more at larga into a discussion of the point. As to the relation between 6ubstmc«  and ontology, he defers the discussion of this subject to books YL and VIL ;

^6 THB METAPHYSICS OV ABISTOTLB. [BOOK UL

them as is sufficient for their purpose, but that is as far fM they comprise the genus about which they brin^ forward their demonstrations. Wherefore, since it is eyment that they are inherent in all things, as ^ as they are entities, (for this is held by these in common,) the speculation of them belongs to the philosohper, whose business it is to make known the truth concerning entity,^ so &r forth as it is entity, and concerning these. Therefore, no one of those who are partial inqmrers attempts to say aught concerning these, whether they are true or not, neither, for instance, the geometer nor the arithmetician.

2. An apparent Some of the natural philosophers, however, areaUxceptiOT ^^ doiug SO, act reasonably; for they alone are to the forego- accustomed to think that it is their province

^* to examine concerning the whole of nature,

and concerning entity. But since there is something of a higher order than the physical,^ (for nature is merely one certain genus of entity,) the investigation in regard of these should belong to the universal, and to that which is specu- lative of the first substance. Now, I admit there is a certain wisdom, namely, even the physical ; but it is not the first. As many things, however, as certain of those who speak con- cerning the truth of axioms attempt to lay down, in what way they ought to be admitted, they do this from ignorance of analytics;^ for they ought to approJEush such a subject who are instructed therein beforehand : but whilst hearers they should not be investigators. That, therefore, it is the part of the philosopher, and of the inquirer concerning substance in its entirety, so &r forth as it is such by nature, to examine, also, in regard of syllogistic principles, is evident.

3. Respecting But it is becoming that one especially fum- S??/*LE:^*'^" ishing information about each genus should be

pie of demon- "xxj. ii»xu j.»»i

•tration, what competent to spcak of the very surest pnnciples K and'Sn what of the thing ; and, therefore, the same holds true basis it rests, of a pcrsou that is engaged in the investiga-

^ As is shown in book V.

' These words prore that Aristotle was aware of the importance of transcendental knowledge.

^ That is, most likely, of Aristotle's own treatise on the subject ; for in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, and third chapter, we have a discussion on apodeiktio principles, and the same mode of reasoning pursued as here.

OIL in.] . THB nB8T PRIRaiLB OF DEMONSTRATION. 87

lion of entities, so &r forth as they are entities — I mean, that he should be able to adduce the most firm principles of alL^ Now, this is the philosopher ; and the most firm first principle of all is that concerning which there can be no possibility of deception, for such must needs be that which is most known; for those points respecting which men do not impart knowledge are all exposed to deception in; and it must needs, likewise, be a thing independent of hypothesis. For a principle which one must be in possession of who under- stands any entity whatsoever, this is not an hypothesis ; but Ivhat one must make known, in the manifestation of anything whatsoever, he must also needs come forward furnished with thia That, therefore, indeed, such is the most firm first prin- ^ple of all is evident. Now, what this principle is we shall after this declare. For the same thing to be present and not be present at the same time in the same subject, and according to the same, is impossible, (and whatsoever things we have further defined, let these be so defined in respect of their logical diffi- culties.) This, however, is the most firm of all first principles ; for it involves the distinction Bpoken of above. For it is impos- sible to suppose that anything whatsoever is the same, and is not the same, as certain think that Heraclitus ^ asserts ; for it is not necessary, as far as concerns what one asserts to exist, to suppose that these also do exist. But if it is not ad- missible that contraries at the same time should subsist in the same subject, (now the usual definitions have been additionally tnade by us to this proposition,) and if an opinion contrary to an opinion be that of contradiction, it is evident that it is impossible for the same inquirer to suppose that at the same time the same thing should be and not be ; for one labouring under deception in regard of this would entertain contrary opinions at the same time. Wherefore, all who employ de- monstration reduce the matter to this last opinion ; for by nature this, also, is the fii-st principle of all the rest of the axioms.

^ By a reference to the doubts enumerated in book 11., we shall that Aristotle has already laid out for himself the inquiry now pursued. • ' Aaclepius defends Heraclitus, and maintains that Aristotle con* aide rod Heraclitus not to have made these statements at all; or that, if he did, it was merely symbolically, or yvija^offriKtis: by way of IBQntal exercise or recreation; just as Zeuu the Eleatic is said, in thia spirit merely, to have denied the exiatence of motion.

58 THE METAFHT8IG8 OF ABISTOirLB. [bOOK m.

CHAPTER IV.^

1. Th« axioms- Now^ there are certain philosophers who, as thMJ^ho deny ^® ^^^® intimated, themselves both aflBrm that this funda- it is possiblo that the same thing may and may KmoSJJrT not be, and that they really think so. This prin- tion. ciple, however, do many of the investigators of Nature employ. But we just now have assumed it as a thing impossible, in the case of an entity, that it should be and not be at the same time ; and by means of this have we demon- strated that this is the most firm of all first principles. Now, some also demand a demonstration of this, from ignorance ; for it is ignorance the not knowing what things one ought to seek a demonstration of, and of what things he ought not. For, indeed, upon the whole, it is impossible that there should be a demonstration of all things ; for one would go on in this case to infinity, so that there would not be any demonstration at all in this way. If, however, there be some things of which we should not seek a demonstration, what they in pre- ference require such a first principle to be they have not the

2. This anomaly ability to affirm. But it is possible to demonstrate confirmed. concerning this, by refutation, that it is impossible, if only he would affirm anything who doubts ; but if he makes no assertion, it would be ridiculous the seeking an argu- ment against him who had not a reason to put forward about anything, so ^ as he had no such reason ; for an adversary of this sort, as far now as he is such, would be like unto a plant. Now, I say, demonstration by refutation differs from demon- stration simply or properly so called, because he that employs demonstration would seem to require what is the principle in the beginning; but, on the supposition of the existence of another cause of such a kind, it would be a refutation^ and not a demonstration.

s. Seven argu- Now, a Commencement of a discussion in fho^*whf Jay regard of all such points is, not the demand- that eontradic- ing the declaration that either a thing exists ftrst'argument. or doth uot cxist, (for this, ouc would imagine,

1 This dogma, by many thus supposed as originating with the Horaclitice, Aristotle now proceeds to discuss in the most ample man* ner. In ranking it as a tenet of the school of the physicists, or natural philosophers, he points at Ueraclitua, or probably to the followers of Democritus and Protagoras.

0&, lY.J CONTRADICTIONS NOT AROUMKKT. 82^

perhaps, was the asking the principle assumed originally,) but the demanding the signification, at least, of a thing, both as for oneself and for another. For this also amounts to a necessity, if he is to say anything at all ; for if he does not, there would be no possibility of a rational discussion with Buoh a one, neither for himself relatively to himself, nor to another. If any one, however, would grant this, there will be a demonstration in existence ; for now will there actually be in existence something that has been determined. But the csause is not the person demonstrating, but the person sus- taining ^ the argument ; for, by overturning the discussion, he yet sustains the discussion. And further,^ he that ac- quiesces in this, hath acquiesced in the truth of something independent of demonstration ; so that not everything would be so and not so.

In the first place, indeed, therefore, it is evi- ^ Deductions dent that this very assertion is true, because therefrom; nist, the name signifies the existence or the non- off th'fn/irjig- existence of this particular thing; so that not nwcant with the everything would be so, and not so in this parti- ^'^^^ <> ^ « • cular way. Further, if man signifies one thing, let this be ^ two-footed animal. Now, I say, that this signifies one thing; if this be man, whatever is a man, this, namely, the being a two-footed animal, is the being in man : but there is no dif- ference should any one assert that more is thereby signified, provided only they have been reduced under proper defini- tions ; for grant that upon each definition a difierent name may have been imposed. Now, I say, for example, if he would not assert that man signifies one, but many things, of one of which there is a single definition, namely, two- footed animal, yet, also, are there many others, but defined according to number ; for its own proper denomination might be set down according to each of the definitions. But if it^ proper denomination should not be thus set down, but one would say that such signified an infinity of things, it is pal- pable that there would not be a definition of it at all; for the signifying not any one thing Is the signifying nothing. And

^ That ifl, in the endeavour made by such to overtum the contra- ^lotion, the very statements which he makes, by the mere foTce of trutl^ fKivluci him to a refutation of himself.

• This clause is inserted in Didot'a edition.

90 THB METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ffiOOK. IT1.

when the denominations are devoid of meaning, there is an end to mutual discussion, and, also, in reality, to discussion on the part of a man with himself. For it is not possible that a person should imderstand anything that is not capable of understanding one thing: but, if it were possible, one name would be imposed on this thing. Let it, doubtless, be granted, as has been stated in the commencement, that a name significant of something be significant of one thing also.

5. Secondly, ^^ ^ i^ot, therefore, possible that being in man that the being, Bignifies the Same particular thins as the not beinst

and the not . » .^ . ^. .« , ,® i i? i. j. •

being, of man, m man, if man IS significant not merely of what la lame'either predicated of ouc, but even one thing itself; for nominausr or this WO do not require that the one should signify "*^* that which is predicated of one: since, if the

case stands in this way, at least, the musical, and the white, and the man, would signify one thing; so that all things would be one, for they would be synonymous;. and it will not be possible that the same thing be and not be, save by equivocation; just as if we would call any one a man whom others would call a not-man. The subject of doubt, how- ever, is not this, if it is possible that the same thing at the fiame time should be and not be the man nominally, but really. But if the name man, and the name not-man, do not signify anything different, it is evident that the not being man will not difier from the being man. Wherefore, the being man will be the not being man, for they will be one thing; for this sig- nifies that they are one — as a tunic and a cloak — ^if there is one definition of each. And if they shall be one, the being man and the not being man signify one thing: but it hap heen demonstrated that they signify a difierent thing.

6. This con- There is a necessity, therefore, of this con- clusion con- sequence, if there be a particle of truth in the

firmed in the ^ ^. .i . •••/?.• • • i

case of *' nou assertion, that man m signification is equipol-

• "'•" lent with being a two-footed animal; for this was

what the expression man was assumed to signify. Now, if there exists a necessity that this be the case, it is not pos- sible for this very thing not to be a two-footed animal then, for this doth the phrase, " the being a necessity," signify, namely, the impossibility of its not being man. Accordingly, it is not possible to be true to say at the same time that the same iking is both a man and is not a man. But there

€!H.rV.] ABSOLUTE EXISTENOB THEREBY IGNORED. 01

prevails the same mode of reasoning in the case of the not being man also ; for the being of a man and the not being of a man signify a different thing, if, troly, both the being white and the being man are different; for mnch more is there opposition in this case to justify the difference of signi* fication. But if, also, one would say that the white signifies one and the same thing with the being man, again will we make the same assertion, as has been declared on a former oc- casion, namely, that all things will be one, and not merely things in opposition. But, if this be not possible, that which has been declared will happen, if the question asked be answered. I£ however, when a simple question is put, . .

v« • ^« 1 ^xL J.' X ^' An unfair

one subjom negations also, the question actu- mode of treat, ally put is not replied to : for nothing hinders S!£^i^* the same thing being both man and white, and other things ten thousand in multitude; but, nevertheless, if the question be asked, if it is true to a£G[rm man to be this^ or not to be so, the reply should be, that it signifies one thing, and no addition should be made that it is both white and large. For, also, it is impossible to go through accidents when, at least, they are infinite ; either, therefore, let one go through all or none. In like manner, therefore, if, also, ten thousand times over they are the same thing, namely, man and not man, the reply to the question, if man is, should not be that at the same time also not man is, unless the reply likewise states, in addition, the rest of whatsoever things are accidents, as many as are so^ and as many as are not ; if this, however, be not done by the person asked the question, there is nothing under discussion at all.

But, in general, they who make this assertion g s«»ndaiju- overtum substance^ and essence, or the formal mentagaimt cause and very nature of a thing; for they must that contraSS. themselves needs afl&rm all things to be accidents, tion« are true

/» 'iii tney do away

and that the essence of man or animal, whatsoever the to -n Jiv it be, has no existence. For if there will exist the •'*^**

^ Aristotle's line of argument against this dogma is to show thttt i^ quite destroys our notions of substance, and form, and definition, and essence ; that, if we admit its reality, we must deny the possibility of anything like absolute predication, which, joined to the abeurdil^ of viewing all things as accidents, seems to oyertum any arguments the ■ceptica can bring forward.

n THB METAFBTSIOB OF ABISTOTLS. [bOOK IIL

esaential nature of anything whatsoever, such as is that "firhich is to he man this will not he to he not man, or not to be man, although these are negations of this ; for it was one thing which it signified, and this was the suhstance of a certain thing. But the signification of the suhstance of a thing is, that not anything else is the being of that thing: but if the being whatsoever man is will be found in this, being either whatsoever is not man, or whatsoever not is man, is a thing impossible ; for it will be a something dif- ferent. Wherefore, it will be necessary for them to say that a formal and substantial definition of this kind, and one invariably suited unto the subject, will be one of a nonentity : but all things, as we have supposed, are according to acci- dent ; for in this lies the distinction between substance and accident, for the white is an accident in man, because he is white, but not anything whatsoever that is white. 9. Therefore But, if all things are spoken of according

Iristenof of * ^ accident, there will be no primary universal, anything, save if an accident always signifies a predication accident. about a certain subject.^ There is a necessity,

then, of going on in a progression to infinity. But this is impossible, (for more than two of such are not connected^ together,) for accident is not a thing that is accidental to that which is an accident, unless that both are accidental 'n the same subject. Now, I say this, for example, in the Instance of the white being musical, and the latter being white, because both are accidents in man; but not on this account is Socrates musical, because it happens that both are accidents in a certain other subject. Since accidents, there- fore, are spoken of some in this way and some in that, as

' Of course, every accident involves some subject or other, wherein it resides, and whereof it is predicated. This constitutes the very notion of an accident. Vide book V. chaps, ii. iii.

• There is a difference of opinion amongst the commentators as to

the meaning of this passage. Alexander makes out that Aristotle's meaning is to lay down that no more than two accidents can be simul- taneously predicated of a subject; e.g. Hippocrates is the most skilful doctor. Ammonius, on the other hand, adopts quite a diflferent view, and says that what the Stagyrite intends to affirm is, that no more than two definitions are to be found in a proposition, and he refers to the explanation of the word Bpos, in the Prior Analytics, book I. chap. L Vide note, p. 251, in Mr. Owen s Translation of Aristotle's Organon, •* Bohn's Classical Library.*'

ea, 17.] THIS DENIAL AMOI/NTS TO PABTHEUlf. 09

many as are so expressed, as the white in Socrates, it is not possible should be infinite in an ascending series of productions in the case of man; as, for example, that in Socrates the white there should be some other different accident, for any one thing is not produced from all : nor, truly, in the white will be foimd any different accident ; as, for instance, the musical : for, also, in no wise rather is this an accident in that, than that in this. And, at the same time, the distinction has been made that some things are accidents after this manner, but others, as the musical in Socrates. But as to as many things as are accidental in this way, such are accidents not in such a way as an accident in what is accidental; but this is the case with whatsoever is accidental in l\at other way. Wherefore, all things will not be spoken of according to accident; something, then, will there be significant, also, as of substance; and if this be so, it has been demonstrated that it is impossible that at the same time contradictions should be predicated of the same subject.

Further, if all contradictions are true at the lo. Ari«totie'g same time concerning the same thing, it is mani- v^"^thS^thU fest that all things will be one. For the same theory wou'd thing will it be, both a trireme, and a wall, and a ti^nS i^i^** man, if it is possible to affirm or deny anything theism. of everything, as there is a necessity for those to do who assert the opinion of Protagoras. For if, also, to any one a man seems not to be a trireme, it is evident that he will not be a trireme : wherefore, also, he is, if the contradiction be true. And, doubtless, comes to pass a saying of Anaxagoras : ^ at the same time subsist together all things," so that, in reality, nothing is one. The indefinite, therefore, they seem to speak o^ and, thinking that they mention entity, they talk about nonentity; for an entity in capacity, and not in actuality, constitutes the indefinite. But, doubtless, must we say to the authors of this hypothesis, that of everything either an affirmation or a negation must be predicated ; for it would be

^ Aristotle alludes to the "Homoeomsry" of Anaxagoras, according to which no one body differed from another in its elementary compoair tion; and that what constituted the apparent diversity was the predo- minance of any one element over the rest; all of which he affirmed w«re contained equally in one substance as in another. Vide Cudworth, tU. III. p. 84 ; and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 79, translated ill " Bohn's PhUological Library." t

94 THB MBTAPHTSIOS OF ARI&TOTLI. [bOOK IIL

absurd if in each thing there will be inherent the negation of itself, but that the negation of what is difierent, and which is not inherent therein, will have no existence. Now, I say, for example, if it is true to assert of a man that he is not % man, it is manifest also that he is not a trireme ; if, indeed, therefore, there is truth in the affirmation, there is a necessity that also there be truth in the negation : but if there is not truth in the affirmation, the negation, at least, of a trireme will more appertain to him than the negation of himself. If, therefore, that also be true, there will also be truth in the negation of the trireme ; and if in the negation of this, in the affirmation also. And these consequences happen to those who make such a statement, even to the effect that it is not necessary to employ either affirmation or negation. For, if it is true that the same individual is man and not man, it is evident that such a one will be neither man nor not man ; for of those two qualities there are two negations. But if that is one which is composed of both, this one would also be in opposition. 1. Fourth ar- Further, indeed, respecting all things it is so ; gument, drawn ^^(j ^ thing will be wWtc and not white, and entity

fromthe nature - » , , .. ... , ' .. ,,•'

3f affirmation and nonentity, and it will be so respecting the

£i the^caw^of '^^ ^^ *^® assertions and negations in a similar the same sub- manner ; or this will not be the case, but only ^^^' so regarding some, and not regarding others.

And if, doubtless, it were not so respecting all, these would be indisputable ; but if it be true concerning all, again, no doubt^ in the case of whatsoever there is an assertion there will also be a negation ; and in the case of whatsoever there is a negation there will likewise be an assertion ; or in the case of whatsoever there is an assertion there will also be a negation ; or of whatsoever, indeed, there is an assertion there is also a negation : but of whatsoever things there is a negation, of all such there will not be an assertion. And if this be so, there would be something indubitably a non- entity, and this will be a firm opinion ; and if to be a non- entity be something both firm and known, more firm would be the opposite assertion. And if, in like manner, also, it is necessary that in the case of whatsoever things one employs a negation he should employ an affirmaton also, it would be true, undoubtedly, by dividing, to say either that a thing, for instance, is white^ and again that it is not white, or that

CH. IV.j AND SUBVERTS TH8 NATURE OF TRUTH. 91

this would not be true. And if, indeed, it is not true, by dividing, to say so,^ he does not a&nn these things, and there is nothing in existence ; but how can one speak of non- entities, or understand anything respecting them, or thus move forward in the paths of knowledge 1 And all things would be one, as it has been said heretofore, and both man, and god, and trireme, and the contradictions of them, will be the same. But if, in like manner, this be so in the case of each thing, in no wise will one thing differ from another ; for if there will be a difference, this will be true, and a peculiarity of this. In like manner, also, if it is possible that he who makes the division should speak the truth, there happens that which has been declared. And to this reason we may subjoin the following : that all would speak the truth, and all would speak falsely, and one would acknowledge him- self to be speaking what is false. At the same time, however, it is evident that the investigation with such a person is con- cerning nothing ; for he affirms nothing. For neither in this manner nor in that is the assertion made with such a one, but in this manner and not in this manner. And again, at least, with respect to these points he makes a negation of both, because the assertion is made that they are neither so in this manner nor not in this manner, but both in this manner and not in this manner ; for, if this were not the case, there would now be in existence something that has been defined. Further, if when an assertion be true the negation be &lse,and if when the latter itself be true the affirmation be false, it would not be possible at the same time to assert and deny the same thing with truth. But, perhaps, persons will say that this is what has been laid down from the commencement Further, does one who supposes that in a ,„ „,^^

^ xi>- -i.!. • S J.U X "J. • 12. Fifth argu-

manner a thmg either is so and so, or that it is ment, drawn not so, labour under a misapprehension? but he ofTmh!"**^" who thinks that it is both, does he speak truth, or can he verify his assertion? for if he affirms truth, what is the assertion, save that such is the nature of entities i and if he does not affirm the truth, but rather he speaks truth who makes a supposition in that way, entities, in such a case, would, in a certain manner, be now disposed thus ; and would

' This reasoning must lead one to an assertion of «i^iHa«n^ wkick Aristotle regarrls as a contradiction in terms.

96 THE MSTAPHTSIC3 OF ABI8T0TLB. [bOOK ni

this be true and not so at the same time, and jet, in reality not true? But if, in like manner, all both speak falsehooc and speak truth, it is not possible for such either to utter or to declare anything, for at the same time he says the same things and not the same things. But if he makes no s* op- position, but in the same way thinks and does not think, in what way will he be disposed differently fix)m plants ? ^ U. Sixth arffu- Whence, also, it is especially manifest that no

TO ?hi M^mp. '^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ *^® ^®* ^^ ^® sceptics, or of those tion that one making this statement, is so affected. For why,

better ttSiwi- ^^J I ^sk, docs he Walk towards Megara,^ but other. not remain still, thinking that he is actually

walking! nor straightway, at dawn, does he proceed to a well or a precipice ? if he may chance to meet with such, he, however, appears cautious, as not considering the falling into it to be not good and to be good in the same sense. It is evident, accordingly, that the one he considers preferable, but the other as not preferable. And, if this be the case, both the one he must needs consider a man and the other not a man; and the one thing sweet, and the other uut sweet. For not as of equal importance doth he investi- gate and regard all things, inasmuch as he thinks it better to drink water and to visit a certain person, and then seeks, in point of feet, for those very things. Although he ought to seek for all things with equal zest, if, in like manner, it were the same thing — I mean to say, both man and not man. But, as has been declared, there is no one who does not appear cautious in regard of the one set of things and not so in regard of the other. Wherefore, as it appears all men suppose that the case is absolutely so, if not concerning all things, at least, concerning what is better and worse. Now, if they do so not from scientific knowledge, but from opinion, much more must attention be paid to truth ; just as also the health of one that is diseased must be looked after more than that of a person that is sound : for he that in- dulges in theory or surmise, compared with one possessed ol scientific knowledge, is not healthfiilly disposed towards truth.

• This is Didot's reading. The Leipsic edition has ray vetpvicdrtav.

^ Aristotle has shown that the position of his opponents is specu* Iktiyely false and he now illustrates its practical absurdities; which, oj oourse, are arguments against it.

OU v.] ITS PBAOTIGAL ABBUBPITnS& 97

Further, although as much as possible all j^ stvmih u- things should especially be so and not so, yet, at poMnt, lest- any rate, the more and the less are inherent in the ^imof mora nature of entities: for one would not say that two andie8s,To/ia\-

■1 . , ••11 J ^OV Hai IJTTOr.

and three were similarly even, nor does a person in the same manner assert an untruth who thinks four five, as he who thinks it a thousand. If, therefore, he be not deceived, in the same manner, it is evident that the other ia less deceived in this way, so that he affirms what is more true. If, therefore, that which is more true be more imme- diate to the truth, there would be something true, at least, to which what is more contiguous will be more true. And even if nothing should be true, yet now, at any rate, is there something that is more firm and more true than another ; and so in this way would we be liberated from that intemperate theory aUuded to, and one which forbids the definition of anything mentally.

CHAPTER v.*

Now, from the same opinion originates also j The origin the theory of Protagoras ; and in like manner of the hypo- is there a necessity that both of them should ^^Sl^^'^^^*" be or not be capable of verification. For if all things that seem so are true, and if all things that are a|^)arent are true, then must all things, at the same time, be true and false. For many entertain contrary opinions to one another ; and those who do not happen to think the same with th^nselves they regard as victims to delusion ; so that the same thing must needs be and not be. And, if this be the case, it is necessary that all things that seem so should be true; for opposite sentiments do they hold with one another who speak falsehood and who speak truth. If, then, things be so, all will speak truth : that from the same opinion, then, both of these theories originate is evident.

• Aristotle still continues his attack on these sceptics ; and haying

shown that the chief objection to this dogma lies in this, that if it be true contradictories must be true likewise, which is a logical impossi- bility, he now overthrows, on the same ground, the Protagorean hypo* thecia of the apparent being true.

F

•98 THB METAFHYSIOtS OF ARISTOTLE. \BOOX m

. There does not, however, exist the same method

modes of man- of Conducting^ our controversy as regards all tiro?ersy%*itS ^^^^ philosophers, for some qf them require per- different adver- suasiou, and somo compulsiou. For as many, JnuSe^origin o^f indeed, as have formed opinions in this way from •?^r^*^*'^*™ doubt, the ignorance of these is remediable, for the refutation is directed towards not the theoiy, but the understanding; and as many as speak for ailment's sake, refutation is a cure also of these, both of that discourse which consists in voice,^ and of that which consists in names. But unto those persons who labour under doubt in this way has the opinion itself originated from sensibles ; the opinion, I mean, that contradictions and things contrary subsist together, inasmuch as they see contraries arising frx)m the same thing. If, therefore, it is not possible that nonentity should come into existence, in a similar way, according to them, must the thing have pre-existed, namely, as both con- traries at once ; as also Anaxagoras ^ says and Democritus, that everything was mingled in everything ; for, also, this latter philosopher maintained that vacuity and fulness are similarly resident in any part whatsoever, although the one of these is entity and the other nonentity. s.Their dogmas Respecting, indeed, therefore, those who form as regards con- their Opinions from these data we will say

tranes partly . i . • . . . i ^ . i "^

true, and partly that lu a Certain manner they speak correctly, false. ^j^^j that in a certain sense they are involved in

ignorance. For entity is spoken of in a twofold point of view ; so that it is in a way admissible that something should arise from that which has no being, and that it is in a way not admissible that it should be so ; and that the same thing at the same time should be an entity and a nonentity, but not according to the same entity ; for in capacity, no doubt, is it admissible at the same time for the same thing to be contraries, but in actuality not so.

^ This is a wise course to pursue in the conduct of any philosophic disputation, and illustrates the thoroughly practical tendency of Aristotle's mind.

^ 4u T}7 <l>a)v^ \6yov. Aristotle means such a discourse as is explana- toi-y ; and he therefore adds the words, r6v 4v ovofxdtriVf because every explanation is composed of terms; an expression here synonymouf with words.

' See the note on Anaza^ras in the preceding chapter

y.] BBNBATIONAL OBiaiN OF SCEFTIOISIL M

And, further, shall we deem them to suppose the existence of a certain other substance of entities in which is inherent •neither motion, nor corruption, nor generation at alL

Aad^ in like manner, also, has the truth 4. Their aster- respecting the things apparent reached some ofThelppSSS speculators from sensibles.^ For they do not the r6 ^aiwoti*- consider it fitting that the true should be de- '"'^' cided by plurality or fewness ; but the same thing seems sweet to some on tasting it, and to others bitter. Where- fore, if all persons were sick, or all beside themselves,^ but two or three were sound in health, or in possession of their mind, it would happen that these latter would appear to be ill and labouring under an aberration of intellect, but that the rest would not seem so. Further, to many of the rest of the animal creation ^ do contraries appear to be the same thing as well as to us ; and to each very person with himself things do not always, according to sense, appear to be the same : which description of these, therefore, is true or false is obscure ; for nothing the more is this true than that, but l)oth in like manner are affected as regards truth. Wherefore, Democritus says, at least, that, positively, either nothing is tine, or that, if it be so, that to us it is wrapped^ in obscurity.

But, upon the whole, on account of their sup- 5. The sensa- posing prudence, no doubt, to be sense,'^ and that JjJJJ^ ^^^^ °' this sense constitutes an alteration, these persons exemplified 'in affirm that the apparent, according to sense, is Em^doSS **' necessarily true ; for from these sceptics both and others.

' Aristotle considers Protagoras as falling into his opinion from imperfect observation.

' Brown notices an illustration of Diderot's which seems borrowed from this passage. Vide Philosophy of the Himian Mind, yoL I. chap..

• ••

XYUL

• Asdepios, fanciful enough, gives this as a reason why quails digest

hellebore, and others of the featheiy tribe hemlock. It is a common remark, too, that animals have the most exquisite discernment in the discrimination of noxious or poisonous herbage in their pastures from what is salutary.

^ This sentence forcibly reminds one of words to tibe same import that are to be found almost in the opening of The Essay on the Himian Understanding," whore Locke explains to us the design of his treatise.

• Aristotle ingeniously accounts on this principle for the adoption of

the Protagorean hypothssis by Empedocles and others. For those who eonsider ekvOritrts and ^6irnffa to be the same, m the Emp^dodeans did^

100 THE MBTAPHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLB. fBOOKnt.

Empedooles and Democritns, and each of the other philoso- phersi, so to speak, have become entangled in opinions of this sort For Empedocles, also, asserts that those changing their habit change their prudence ; witness his words :•—

" For for the present counsel varies in men." And in other passages he says, that

" As far as diverse men become, so far Is present, also, in them always diverse thought.**

And Parmenides evinces the same mode of thinking ; for instance, in the words : —

" For as each has a tempering of graceful limbs. So present in man is mind. For the same thing With whatever thinks is the nature of limbs in men, Both every and all, for more than this is mind."

And the apothegm of Anaxagoras, also, is remembered amongst certain of his associates ; namely, that entities are such to them as they may have supposed them. Now, they say that even Homer seems to have been in possession of this opinion, because he made Hector, alter he was deranged from the wound, to lie in a delirious state ; as if even those of imsoimd mind were capable of exercising thought, indeed, but not the same thoughts as with those of sound mind. It is evident, therefore, if both be exertions of prudence, that also entities subsist in this way, and not in tins way, at the same time.

Wherefore, also, most difficult is that which lepsy the result, cnsues from this theory ; for if they who par- Sg'obMrvafion tioularly pcrccived as true that which it is merely to ob- admissible should be true, (but these are they jects of sense. ^^^ especially seek after it and love it;) if

these persons hold such opinions, and manifest such tenets respecting truth, how is it not becoming those to despair who attempt to philosophise ? for the pursuit of things eluding their grasp would constitute the investigation of truth. But a cause of this opinion of theirs is the following : that from time to time they have examined into the truth, concerning entities, no doubt, but the entities they have sup- posed to be sensibles merely. Now, in these is inherent

eonstitute the senses the criterion of truth ; and the dogma of the truth of the apparent follows from this in the way of an easy con* sequence.

COL y.] ATTACK OH EQBBACSJTUS. 101

much of tie nature of the indefinite and that of entity, whicll subsists in such a manner as we have declared. Wherefore^ they speak naturally ; but they do not speak things that are true. For so is it more in hsumony for them to speak after this manner than as Ef icharmus^ in his reply to Xeuc^hanes.

But, moreover, seeing the whole of this visible 7. secondly, nature in motion, but respecting what is being JJJ™ ^{J^ °®' changed seeing nothing verified, — ^regarding, at change. least, what is being changed altogether and everywhere, — they considered that verification was not a thing that is possible : for from this hypothesis blossomed that most extreme opinion of those philosophers mentioned just now ; namely, that of those speculators who professed to adopt the philosophy of Heraclitus, and such as Oratylus^ held, who at last was of opinion that one ought to speak of nothing, but moved merely his finger; and who rebuked Heraclitus for saying that it is not possible to enter the same river twice : for be himself was of opinion that you could not do so once.

In reply, however, to this theory we will also g -,. „ say, that there is some foundation in reason for tic dogma^^not their supposing with these, that that which fjfe^nnfth^s undergoes a change, when it does change, may argued againVt not be considered as existing. This, however, ^ ^^® ^*^* is a circumstance attended with doubtfulness, for the rejecting substance retains something of that which is rejected; and of tiiat which is being produced must there now necessarily exist something : and if, in short, it is \mdergoing corruption, there will subsist a certain entity; and if it is being pro- duced, there must needs be that from which it is produced, and by which it is generated, and that this process goes not on in a progression to infinity. Omitting, however, these argu- Qients, let us make those assertions following; namely, that

^ Epicharmus was a native of Cos, and a pupil of F^hagoras ; he was also called a Megarian and Sicilian, from residence in those places. He was a comedian by profession; and, from the way Aristotle mentions him in the text, he seems to have made some scurrilous and imper- tinent attack upon Xenophanes. Vide Diogenes in the eighth book 01 his "Lives of the Philosophers," and Tenneman's History of Philo- sophy, p. 64, Bohn's edition.

' Cratylus, who is mentioned in the first book as suggesting ths Ideal Theory to Plato, is reported to have been a companion of Hera* elituB. Little or nothing is known about him. Taylor translate! i^7iyBi}(r€y, "r riginabed;" not givinc" quite the force of the word.

k'02 THB HETAPHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLB. [BOOK III

not the same thing is the alteration according to quantity and according to quality ; grant, indeed, that, as far as quan* tity goes, it does not abide the same ; but it is according to form that we know all things. But, further, it is worth while reproving those who think thus, because, although knowing the number of sensibles themselves, and that in the case of the fewer number of sensibles this state of flux and mutation was to be found, they have yet manifested similsir sentiments respecting the whole heaven.^ For the place about us, of what is sensible, continues alone to subsist in a condition of corruption and generation; but this in no wise, so to say, is part of the universe : wherefore, more justly would it be, on account of the greater number of wit- nesses, to have acquitted these, than on account of these, the fewer, to have condemned those. And, further, is it evident that in reply, also, to these we may use the same ai^guments with those that have been originally laid down by us; for that there is some nature immovable has been demonstrated to their satisfaction, and has gained their assent. It happens, however, to those, at least, who say that a thing is and is not at the same time, to affirm all things to be in a state of rest, rather than of motion; for, on this hypothesis, there exists nothing into which anything is changed, for all things are inherent in alL

9. The truth of Regarding, however, the truth that not every- SguSu^^nst, thing that is apparent is true, in the first place, first, in the dif- indeed, it might be replied, that sense, to be sure,

ferencebetween . . ' , -ri* ^ • i x i* n '^i* -j.

a«<r0>i(rir and IS uot deccitful m what &lls withm its own ^awraaia. pecuUar provluce, but that imagination is not the same with sense. It is worthy of consideration and wonder, in the next place, if they really are in doubt of this, whether mag- nitudes are so great, and colours such as they appear to those at a distance, or such as they appear to those that are near? and whether they are such as they appear to persons in health, or such as they appear to persons in sickness? and, in regard of weight, whether things more weighty are such as appear so to the weak, or such as seem so to the strong? and

1 Aristotle's idea of the heaven was, that it was endued with an eternal existence, and that the stars that rolled along its surface were either themselves actually guds, or the spheres where the gods residedi M the soul does in our bodies. Book VIII. e. viii.

OB. v.] THEOBT OF THIB APPABEMt AS TBUB. 109

lastly, in respect of truth, whether things are true such aa appear so to the sleeping, or such as seem so to tho9e who are awake) for that they do not, in reality, think so, at leasts k evident; for ho one, if even he supposes when asleep hy night that he were in Athens, when he is in Libya, goes, when he awakes, to the Odeion.^

And, further, respecting the future, as also lo. secondly, Plato says, doubtlesis, not similarly decisive is d"gS^?rt?cre!* the opinion of the physician and that of the ditto be at- ignorant quack; for example, as to the likelihood ISstimonVor that one will he sound, or that one will not be {{j®^*^*JJg ^ so: smd, farther, in the case of the senses them- different cir- advea, not similarly decisive is the testimony cwmttances. ^ moae In respect of what is foreign, and in respect of wbait is its peculiar province, or of that which is near and of that which is remote from itself. But respecting oolour it is sight and not taste that judges ; and respect- ing juices it is taste but not sight, each of which never at the same time affirms about the same thing that simultaneously a thing is so and not so disposed. But neither in a difierent period have the senses doubted about the passion, at least, to which they are subject, but about that in which the passion is an accident. Now, I say, for example, that the same wine, either from being changed, Or from the bodily organ being changed, might so appear at One time to be sweet, and at another time not sweet ; but the sweet then, at least, when it is sweet is not such, for it never has undergone a change ; but always verification thereof is possible, and of necessity is it that such will be a thing that is sweet All these theories, however, overturn this con- clusion, since, also, if there is not a substance of anything neither is there anything necessarily subsisting ; for it is not admissible for the necessary to be at one time disposed one

' The Odeion is mentioned by Plutarch in his Life of Pericles. It was built by Pericles in imitation of the king of Persia's payilion. H«re the contests for prizes in music were decided. This is a practical argument against his opponents; for the phenomenon of dreaming shows that tiiough things may appear so and so to them, yet that they do not in their conduct, when they awake from such dreams, make it manifest that they consider the real and the apparent as tiie same : tiiey thus acknowledge, though perhaps unwillhigly, one case wheri ike r6 ip€uir6/ityoy is not t6 d\i$04u

lOi THE HBTAPHTBIOS OF ABISrOTLE. [bOOK 171

way, and at another time another : wherefore, if there ia anything of necessity, it will not be disposed both so and not so.

ii.ThinUy.that If, also, UDon the whole, what is sensible exkts asyXmof • nierely, nothing wonld there be subsisting, inas- nmnism, and much as animated beings would have no exists ohaia. ence ; for sense would have no existence. Perhaps,

then, on the supposition of the non-existence of sense, the truth would be, that neither sensibles nor sensations exist, (for of the percipient is sense an affection;) but that it is im- possible that the subjects tiiemselves which produce sense have not any existence, even though sense exist not. For, doubtless, sense itself is not of itself; but there is something else, also, different ^m, and ind6|)endent of, sense, which must needs be prior to sense ; for the moving cause is prior in nature to that which is being moved : and if these asser- tions are made one with another, not a whit the less is the same theory true.

CHAPTER VI.!

1 The absurd- ^^"^ there are some who doubt and are sceptics ityofscepti- both amopgst those who are persuaded of the ^kSoJS^^gSd^ reality of these opinions and those who merely by sceptics afl&rm thcsc theories, for they ask, who is it that erase ves. ju(jgetii \^yccl that is in good health, and him that, upon the whole, is capable of forming his decision cor- rectly about each particular ? Now, doubts of such a sort as this are similar to one's doubting whether we now sleep or are awake. For all such doubts are tantamount to the same; for these persons demand that there should be a reason of all things : for they seek for a first principle, and expect to obtain this by demonstration, whereas, at least, that they are not persuaded of the validity of their position they make manifest in their act& But, as we have said, this is the characteristic property ^ of these philosophers, for they seek

^ Aristotle still continues to overthrow this fundamental principle of the sceptical philosophy; adapting his refiitations to the nature of his adversaries' ground.

' rh irdOos — ^that is, this is their constitutional error ; meaning thai tJie great fault in the philosophy of these theorists was that they

CKTl.] ABOVMENIS AGAINST THIS THBOBT. 105

for a reason of things of which there is no reason; for th«  principle of demonstration is not demonstration. These^ therifore, indeed, would be easily persuaded of this, for it is not difficult to apprehend

They, however, who seek in reason compulsion », if tbet^ merely, seek an impossibility ; for what is contrary ^^^l^ they deem it right to speak, immediately utter- lute ezisteneet ing contrary things. But if all things are not "* *«*»*«*• relatiyes, but some are also themselves by themselves, that ifl^ absolute, in such a case everything apparent would not be true, for the apparent is apparent to some one : therefore, he that says that all things apparent are true, makes all entitieis relatives. Wherefore, also, must the precaution be adopted by those who seek for compulsion in reason, and at die same time, also, think ri^t to subjoin a reason tiiat not «the apparent is true, but that the apparent is true to whom<^ soever it appears so, and when it appears, and how far, and in what manner.

But if they subjoin a reason, to be sure, but do 3. Admitting not in this way subjoin it, it will happen speedily iense fa which unto them that they should speak things that the rd 0aiv6- are contrary. For it is possible for the same '**»"'•'" *'^* thing to appear honey, as far as the sight goes, and not to appear so to the taste; and, as we have two eyes, not the same will a thing appear to each organ of vision if they be dis- similar. Whereas, in reply to those, at least, who, on account of the causes originally enumerated, afi&rm the apparent to be true, and for this reason contend that all things in like manner are false and true ; in reply to these, I say, it may be affirmed that neither the same things appear the same to all men, nor to the same person do the same things invaria- bly appear the same,^ but frequently things contrary at the same time ; for the touch, in the alteration of the fingers, says that there are two objects, but the organ of sight one ;

required a demonstration of everything, forgetting that there were certain ultimate principles which must be assumed as the basis of all reasoning, and, as such, are themselves indemonstrable. This subject is well hancll^d by the metaphysicians in modem days.

^ Any one familiar with the writings of modem sceptics, «.^. Thomas Hope, in his '* Origin and Prospects of Man,*' will remember the use made of this fact, and how it is set up as a pillar to support their lystem.

106 THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK III;

but neither to the same sense, at least, do the same things Beem the same, and according to the same, and in like man^^ ner, also, in the same moment of time : wherefore, this woulci be true. But, perhaps, for this cause it is necessary to say to those who speak not on account of doubt, but for talk's aake^ tbiat this is not absolutely true, but that it is true relatively to this person.

4. The genena And, 88 doubtless it has been formerly af- §rSfthe°rath firmed, it is necessary, also, to make aU thmga of the apparent, relative, both iu reference to opinion and sensej; 80 that nothing either has been produced or will arise except on the supposition of some person previously exercising thought. But if anything has been generated or will arise, it is evident that all things would not be according to opinion. Further, if one thing exists, it exists in relation to one, or in relation to a definite thing ; and if the same thing is both half and equal, such exists in relation to these ; yet. the equal is not in reference to the double. Now, in relation to opinion, if man and the subject of the opinion be the same, man will not be the thinking subject, but the subjeet of opinion. But if each thing will be in relation to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will subsist in re- lation to things infinite in species. That^ indeed, there- fore, most indisputable of all is the opinion, that assertions in opposition are not at the same time true ; and what happens in the way of consequence unto those who say that they are true, and why they say so, let thus much suffice to have been spoken.

j|.Toa»thata But sinco it is impossible that contradiction oontndictionof ^ould be true of the same subject at the same

the same thing .. ... -j .xi. j. 'xi j. •

Is true is to say tmic, it IS evident that neither can contranes pos- roay S"foSd' ^^^J subsist at the same time in the same subject, in the same For, indeed, of contraries one or other is not the subject. Yosa privation. But privation of substance is ne-

gation from some definite genus. If, therefore, it is im- possible at the same time to affirm and deny with truth, it is impossible that also contraries should be inherent in the same subject at the same time; but either both must be in- herent partially, or the one partially and the other simply oi absolutely.

QH, yilJ ko mean between contradiction. 107

CHAPTER VIL*

But, truly, neither is it possible that there is i. No new it any mean between a contradiction; but there coSSiSSk? is a necessity either of asserting or denying proved; first, any one thing whatsoeyer of one. Now, in 5?Si,^*md"* the first place, this is evident to those who de- wwhood, fine what truth and fiJsehood are. For, indeed, the asser- tion that entity does not exist, and that nonentity does, ?s a fidsehood, but that entity exists, and that nonentity does not exist, is truth. Wherefore, the person who affirms that this medium is in existence or is not will speak truth or utter falsehood. But neither is entity nor nonentity said not to exist or to exist.

. Further, either will there be a mean between 2. secondly, contradiction, as that of a darkish colour between J^^Jjyoived black and white, or it will be as that which is in thenotion of neutral between man and horse. If, therefore, ®^ ' ^ ^^' this subsist in this way, there would be no change, (for a fthange takes place from something that is not good into that which is good, or from this latter into what is not good;) but now it is always apparent as taking place, for there is not a diange existing but one into opposites and media. If, how- ever, there is a mean, so also would there be a certain pro- duction into a thing that is white, not from that which ill not white; but this is not perceived as being the case.

Further, everything intelligible and mental the j. Thirdiy,«h)m anderstanding either affirms or denies ; and this is * J| StSuiRiwo manifest from definition when truth is spoken or joined vitii fidsehood ; when, indeed, in this way it is composed, "*^" «»»<«•. as an assertion or negation, truth is spoken ; but when in that way, fiedsehood. Further, must there be in all contradictioiis a mean, save where the assertion is made only for aigument or talk's sake, so that also one will neither utter truth nor not td^er tmth. And, besides entity and nonentity, there will be

1 Aristotle now prooeeda to discuss the second of the propositions h» undertakes to prove to be false, namely, 88 to there being a mean between contradiction. The first question proposed, and the one just decided is, that if we ask, are oontnulictions true, or oan they be so, w# must reply that they cannot. Vide p. 88.

It>8 TBB XETAFHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [svK)KIU

iomethiug iu subsistenoe : wherefore, besides generation and corruption, some change will there be. Moreover, in whatso- ever genera negation introduces tne contrary, in these also will be found this medium ; as, for example, in numbers a number neither odd nor not odd : such, however, is impossible, and from the definition is this evident Further, would we go on in a pro- gression to infinity, and not only will there be sesquialterate entities, but even more than this. For, again, it will be possible to deny this in regard of the assertion and negation of the me- dium of the former contradiction ; and this will be something, &r there will be a certain other substance of this. Moreover, aa to the question if a thing is white when one says that it is not, nothing has he denied than that it is ; but that a thing is not, amounts to a negation.

4. The origin But from the Same source as other paradoxes of paradox. iias this opiuiou reached unto certain speculators ; for when they are unable to solve arguments open to dispute, giving in to reason, they consent to the truth of whatever is brought out by syllogism. Some, therefore, make assertions from some such cause as this, but others on account of re- quiring in their investigations the reason of all things. 6 The im "^^^ principle, howcvcr, in respect of all these,

tsnce of defiiii. is to be derived from definition. But definition SS^on^mani- a^^scs trom their necessarily signifying some- fests the dif- thing ; for the sentence of which the name is a H^ditus^wd sign becomes the definition of a thing. And the Anaxagoras. theory of Heraclitus, affirming all tilings to bo and not to be, appeared to make all things true ; but that of Anaxagoras^ was, thajk there is a certain medium between contradiction; so tlmt all things are £a.lse, for when they are mingled, neither is the mixture good nor not good : where- fore, there is nothing that one can affirm as true.

^ Asclepius has a curious remark on this passage. He compare* Anaxagoras in his theory of ** the mixture of all thmgs in all ** to the Manichaeans. The Manichseans, not being able to solve their perplex* ities as to the existence of evil, assumed the existence of a distinct first principle thereof; and, in like manner, the school of Anaxagoras adopted their dogma, from not being cognisant of the various reso- lutions into different forms assumed by matter, while the matter ia itself, per te, remained the same. Vide Tenneman, ss. 107, 199*

6B. YIII.J BEOAFITULATION. 109

CHAPTER YLIV

Now, these distinctions having been laid down, i. bicae 8o«p. it is evident that the predications made in one tung^to be^ way only, and also those that are made about all, ^^t sonw au it is impossible should be as certain affirm they truef and tome are ; some, indeed, saying that nothing is true ; (for 2?\Jili*iJS*ii nothmg, they say, hinders all things from bemg SLe. ^ in such a way as that the diagonal of a square is oommensu- Table ^ with its side;) but others afi&rming that all things are true. For almost sll these assertions are the same with those of Heraclitus; for this philosopher, in affirming that all things are true and all things false, affirms also separately each of ^ese theories. Wherefore, if those are impossible, it is im- possible, likewise, that these should be so.

But, further, are those palpably contradictions 2. Oeneiai which, likewise, it is not possible should at the S^nfr^' same time be true. Nor, doubtless, is it possible definitiim. that all should be fidse, although, at least, it would the rather seem to be admissible from what has been stated. But, in reply to all such theories, must the question be asked, (as also has been declared in the discussions above,) not if there is JBomething or if there is not, but if something has a significa- tion. Wherefore, from the definition is the discussion to be drawn, by assuming what falsehood or truth signifies. But if the true and the &lse be nothing else than to assert what is true or deny what is Mse, it is impossible that all things be &lse ; for it is necessary that either portion of the contradic- tion be true. Further, if it be necessary either to assert or deny everything, it is impossible for both to be fiJse ; for either part of the contradiction is £edse.

^ In this chapter there is a sort of recapitulatory view given of the aceptical dogma previously under examination.

s Aristotle thus illustrates the system of these sceptics by this prin* dple, which is geometrically false, and must be so, because the side of

a square is to its diagonal as 1 : v^2, between which there is plainly no niunber to be found that will measure both. This principle depends oil A quality of numbers, viz. that if we square two numbers of which one is greater than the other, and yet is not quite the double of the smaller, two other numbers wiU bo the result, one of which will be less than thi quadruple of the other, without being either double or triple cf tt.

ilO THE METAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. (bOOK IIL

I. Reftitation Truly, also, doth the common saying^ happen from common unto ftU such theories, that they overthrow or

stultify themselves. For the person that says that all things are true renders the statement con- trary to this true also : wherefore, he makes his own affir- mation not true ; for the contrary says that it is not true ; but he that says that all things are &lse, even liimself fSalsifies his own position. I^ however, they make an exception, the one making an exception in the case of the contrary that it is not alone true, and the other in the case of his own assertion that it is not false, in no wise the less does it happen unto these sceptics that they require the truth and falsehood of an infinite number of assertions j for lie who says that a true theory is true agrees with the affirmation that it is true ; but this will go on in a progression infinity.

^ Til *-* A It is evident, however, that neither they in the case of who lay dowu that all thmgs are at rest speak rejt and mo- ^^^ ^^^Yi, nor they who say that all things

are in motion. For if, indeed, all things are at rest, the same things will always be true and &lse. Now, this appears to be a thing imdergoing a change. For he who sp^iks once himself was not, and again will not be. It all things, however, are in motion, there will be nothing that is true ; all things, in that case, are false. But it has been demonstrated that this is impossible. Further, must entity needs undergo a change ; for from something into something is the change made. But, doubtless, neither are all things at rest or in motion at any particular time ; but nothing subsists in such a condition of rest or motion eternally : for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first imparter of motion is itself immovable.'

^ This is the line of argument followed in the Thesetetus. The ai*gument from common sense against scepticism adopted by the Scotch school in modem times, however convincing in a practical, is quitt valueless in a speculative point of view.

' rb xp£Toy kwoOv dxivnTor atro. These words mav be considered as e33itaining tke sum and substance of the Aristotelian notion of tiM Divine nature. Vide note, book YIII. chap. viii.

BOOK w:

CHAPTER I.

Too.! is called a principle ^ from whence any- ^ Diibreot Hiing Las had motion imparted to it in the first meuiingt or instance; for example, the principle of length and JgJcipie?"* of .a way : from hence, indeed, is the actual joinciple, but from the contrary a different one ; but, again, Uiat is called a first principle from whence each thing would spring in the most beautiful manner : as, for instance, even in the case of discipline the beginning must be made some- times not from what is first, and the principle of a thing, but from whence one may learn with the greatest facility.' And, again, that is a principle from whence is produced the first of a thing that is inherent ; as, lor example, a keel of a vessel and a foundation of a house : and some suppose the heart of animals to be a thing of this sort ; but others the brain, and others whatever else of this kind lliey may happen with. And, again, that is a principle from whence the first of a thing not inherent is produced, and whence motion and change have first been naturally fitted to commence; as, for example, the child from the father and the mother, and the battle from abuse. And that is a first principle according to the free impulse of which things in motion are moved, and things undergoing a change, are changed, as in cities do-

^ IntheCommentariesof Alexander this book stands fourth. Thomas Aquinas regards it as the fifth book of the Metaph^rsics. According to the plan explained previously, Aristotle having settled the "modus considerandi " in the case of the science of ontology, now proceeds to examine into those things that are inherent in entity, or common to it as such, and which are employed by the other sciences. It is, then, a book of definitions ; and a most useful one it is, and well worthy of the attention of the metaphysician.

' There are seven different senses of the word ipxh given here. 'Vx^ is a prominent term in metaphysics, as we are informed in the fint eha|^ of the first book. Origen entitles a certain physioo-theol igioal (metaphysical) work of his Ilepl Apx^"*

' Vide the Categories* chap, viii

112 THfi HETAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [boOK lY.

minions^ and dynasties, and kingdoms and tyrannies are styled principles. And both the arts, and especially those of them that are architectonic, are called principles. Further, whence a thing is known first, this is called a principle of that thing ; as, for example, the hypotheses are principles of de- moQstration. In as many ways, also, as first principles are styled are causes in like manner denominated ; for all causes are first principles.

t. What is Common to all first principles is the beir g the

common to all original fix)m whence a thing either is, or is U4>x<u a c . pi^Q^^^j^^ QY is known. But of these principles some, indeed, are inherent, and others are extrinsic. Where* fore. Nature constitutes both a first principle, and an element is so likewise, and understanding, and free-will, and sub- stance, and the final cause ; for, in the case of many things, the principle of knowledge and of motion is the good and the Mr,^

CHAPTER 11.

1. Definitions ^^ ^"^ ^^J ^^^ ^ cslled causc ' from which, as of the exprcs- inherent, anything is produced ; as, for example, the brass of a statue, and the silver of a cup, and the genera of these ; but, in another way, the form and exemplar are regarded as causes : and this is the reason of the formal cause and the genera of these ; as, for instance, in the diapason^ the cause is the ratio of two to one; and, in general, number and the parts, those that are in the ratio, belong to this order of cause. But, further, that constitutes a cause fix)m whence is the first principle of change or of rest ; as, for instance, the designing cause and

^ This word is used in the Epistles of St. Paul in reference to an order in the celestial hiei-archy. Vide Eph. L 21 ; CoL il 10.

• Some MSS. read Kcucdy,

' Aristotle now considers the meaning of the term cause, ana next in order after that of apxv '• because he says that the significations of both are equivalent in regard of their number. What is laid down in this chapter we find in the second book of the Physics, chap, iii., whero Aristotle is likewise discussing the subject of aetiology.

• Diapason, ^ Bih muroiv : this is a phrase taken from music, as the

filling up, the ellipsis as follows will show; ri 8t^ ircurvv x^P^^^ avfju^vlof or, in Cither words, the concord of the first and last note, that id, th# •ctaye. Vide Philo Judeeus, voL L p. 13, Bobn's edition.

OB. n.] PRINOIFLB AND CAUSE DEFINED. 113

the father of a child; and, generally speaking, the forming of that which is heing formed, and that capable of effecting a change of that which is undergoing a change. Further, a eause is as the end ; this, however, is the final cause, as, for instance, health of walking. For why does one walk? we say, that he may have good health; and, saying so, we think that we have assigned the cause. And as many opera- tions, doubtless, as take place between any other source of motion and the end are regarded as causes; for example, of health, tenuity, or purging, or medicines, or instruments, for all these are on account of the end ; but they differ from one another in respect of being, some as instruments, and others as things done. Causes, indeed, therefore, are enumerated almost somehow after this manner.

And seeing that causes are thus multifariously 2. Results denominated, it happens that many of them are from these de. causes of the same thing, not according to acci- dent; for instance, of the statue both the statuary art and the brass, not according to anything that is different, but so far forth as it is a statue ; this, however, does not take place in the same manner, but the brass is as matter, and the ai*t as the origin of motion, or the efficient cause. And 4ome things are reciprocally^ causes of one another; as, for sample, labour of a good habit of body, and this latter, again, of labour : yet not in the same manner, but the one is as the end, and the other as the principle of motion. Fur- ther, the same thing sometimes is the cause of things that are contrary; for that which when present is the cause of this particular thing, this when absent we sometimes denominate the cause of the contrary : for example, the absence of the pilot is the cause of the capsizing of the boat, the presence of whom is the cause of its preservation. Both, however, as well the presence as the absence of the pilot, are as efficient causes, that is, causes imparting motion.

Now, all the causes just enumerated fall under g causes re- four modes the most evident. For, indeed, the duced into four elements of syllables, and the matter of things ™** *"' oonstruc^d by art, and the fire and earth, and all finch

^ This is an important distinction, and might be illustrated further fai the case of the growth of our active principles as well as morsl sentiments.

I

114 THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.

bodies, and the parts of a whole, and the hypotheses of the conclusion, are causes, as that whereof other things are produced. But of these some are as the subject ; as, for instance, the parts : but others, as the formal cause ; for ex- ample, both the whole, and the composition, and the form. But the seed, and the physician, and the deliberator, and, in short, the maker, all are the causes of the principle of change or of stability. But the rest, as the end and the good,^ are causes of other things; for the final cause aims at being the best, and an end to the other things : let there be, however, no actual difference in saying a thing is good or appears good.

4. Modes of These causes, indeed, therefore, are so many

causes further in suecics, but the modcs of causes are, doubt-

explaiued. i ^ . i j.i. v v

less, many m number; these, however, become less numerous by being reduced under heads. For causes are called so in many ways ; and of those things of the same species, antecedently and subsequently, one thing is the cause of another; as, for example, of health the physician and the artisan, and of the diapason ^ the double and number, and always those things that comprise anything whatsoever of singulars. But, moreover, cause is denominated as the accident and the genera of these ; as, for instance, of a statue, in one sense, Polycletus is the cause, and, in another, the statuary, because it is accidental with the statuary to be Polycletus : and the things embracing the accidental are causes; for instance, man is a cause of a statue, or also, in general, animal, because Polycletus is a man, and man is an animal. But also of the accidents one is more remote, and another more contiguous than others ; for example, just as if the white and the musical should be termed a cause of the statue, but not merely Polycletus, or man. But besides all things, both those that are denominated appropriately or strictly, and those ac- cording to accident, some causes are denominated as things

^ As regards the r6 kyaJ96u viewed as a cause, Aristotle has alread;^ examined the subject in the first book. The Stagyrite ranks it as a final cause; and thus most wonderfully betmys his consciousness of the tie that binds moral and physical causes together. Vide Ethics, L i. sqq. ; and Niebuhr e Lectures on Roman History, Lect. LXIL

' For the meaning of this word, vide p. 112.

OB. m.] THR TF.RM ELEMENT EXPLAINED. 113

endued with a capacity, but others as things energizing; ar» the cause of the house being built is the builder, or the builder considered as in the act of building. In like mannei with what has been stated will be mentioned, also, the causes in the case of which there are causes ; as, for example, of this statue, as far forth as it is a statue, or, in general, of an image, or of this brass, so far forth as it is brass, or, in short, matter; and in the case of the accidents it is so in like manner. Further, also, these and those shall be predicated as connected together ; as, for example, not Polycletus nor a statuary, but Polycletus a statuary. But, however, all these, at least, are six in number, yet are expressed in a twofold manner. For either as a singular are they denominated, oi as the genus thereof, or as the accident, or as genus of the accident, or as these connected together or simply expressed ; further, all of them as energizing, or according to capacity. But thus far is there a dififereuce, that causes energizing and singulars,^ and those of which they are the causes, subsist at the same time and at the same time cease to be ; as, for example, the person healing with that person that is being restored to health, and this person the builder with that which is being built. Not invariably, liowever, is this the case with regard to causes in capacity ; for not at the tame time sink into decay the house and the builder.

CHAPTER III.

An element 2 is called that from which, as an i. Different inherent first principle and indivisible in species, J^"tem eie-**' something is compounded into a different spe- ment, or crot- cies ; as, for instance, the elements of vo-ice are ***•*"• those things of which the voice is composed, and into which it is ultimately divided : those elements, however, no longer

• The Leipsic edition inserts here the words aurd re 4<rri : they are

omitted in some MSS., for they only perplex the sentence.

' In assignmg a different signification to the word " element " from that usually given to dpxht or first principle, Aristotle differed from Tb&les, and, no doubt, from other philosophers of antiquity. Tide Phitarch, De Placitis, lib. I. c 2 ; and Thomas Stanley, in his "History of PhiloBophy," who awards the cr«dit of this distinction to Plato^ part y. chap. yii. on Plato's Inventions.

l2

116 THE HETAFHTBICS OF ABISTOTLE. [bOOE IT.

are diyided into other voices different from them in species ; but, even though they be divided, the parts would be of the same species ; as, for example, the portion of water is water, but a portion of the syllable is not a syllable. In like manner, also, do the old philosophers,^ who enumerate the elements of bodies, say that they are those entities into which bodies are ultimately divided ; but those no longer are divisible into others different in species; and whether such may be one or many, these they yet call elements. Simi- larly, also, are denominated the elements both of diagrams an(^ in general, those of demonstrations; for the primary demonstrations, and those that are inherent in many more demonstrations, themselves are styled elements of demon- strations : but of such kind are the first syllogisms, which are composed of three terms by means of the one middle. 2. Derived And, by a transference of the meaning, they

meaning of heuco Call an element that which being one and vroixeiov, gijagji may be useful for many purposes ; where- fore, also, what is small, and simple, and indivisible, is styled an element. Hence it has come to pass that those things which are most especially universal are elements, because each of them is one and simple, and is inherent in many things, or in all, or in as many as possible ; and to some speculators it seems that the one and the point are first principles. Since, therefore, those things called genera are universal and indivisible, (for there is one definition of them,) certain persons call the genera elements ; and that, too, in preference to difference, for the genus is more universaL For in whatsoever the difference resides, the genus also follows ; but in what the genus resides does not, in every way, constitute the difference. Common, however, to all is the characteristic that the being of the element of each body is the first inherent quality in each.

^ We have a discussion akin to this in the third hook of Arietotle'i tixiatiiijid ** On the Heaven," chap, iii

OH. IV.] NATURE DEFINED. 117

CHAPTER IV.

Natubb^ is called, in one way, the production j Diffg^nt n^. of things that are by Nature ; as, for instance, if ceptations of one putting forth his Voice should articulate the ^otSiit!^"' letter U : and in another, as that from which, as being inherent, that which is being naturally produced is primarily formed. Moreover, Nature^ is the origin of the earliest motion in each of the things in itself subsisting by Kature, so far as it is this very thing. Now, those things are said to be produced by Nature as many as involve growth through another body, by means of contact and growth along with, or growth beside, just as embryos. But the being connascent differa from contact j for in the latter there must needs be nothing else besides the touch : but in things that are connate there is some one thing that is the same in both, which, instead of involving contact, causes them to be con- nascent, and causes them to be one according to what is con- tinuous and involving quantity, but not according to quality. Moreover, is that styled Nature from which, as its primary matter, there cither is or arises anything of the things that subsist by Nature, being without regular motion,^ and un- changeable from the power which belongs to itself; for instance, of a statue, or of brazen vessels, the brass is called the nature, and of wooden vessels the wood : but in like manner is it in the case of the rest. For each thing is from these, the pri- muiy matter remaining in a state of conservation ; for in this way, also, do they affirm the elements of those things that are by Nature to constitute Nature; some saying that this is fire, but others, earth, and others, air, and others, water : but others asserting some other such thing, and others, some of these, but others, all of them.

' The distinctions laid down concerning the term Nature in this chapter are most important. It is this very word ipikris which stands for explanation in the opening chapter of the work "De Placitii Philosophorum/' generally ascribed to Plutarch Chssronensis.

' If the reader is curious to IcArn further the notions of the Peri- patetics respecting Nature, he will consult the second book of Aria* totle's Physical Auscultations.

• Two dilFerent readings are f nnd L& the MSS., namely, dplvfutn 09

tod dpi/BfjuoTw,

118 THE HETAFHTBICS OP ARfflTOTLE. [BOOK IT.

t. Empedocies' ' In another way, however, Nature is styled the NSSeaSwJiiTii Buhstance of things that exist by Nature ; for in- ^^*)* stance, those who affirm that Nature is the earli« 

est synthesis, as Empedocles says that

• • Nature is there of no one of entities,

But merely mizturs and of things mixed, A change, and thus by men is Nature styled."

Wherefore, as many things, also, as by Nature exist or are produced, that being in existence already from which it is natural that they should arise, or should have their being, not as yet do we say that such is in possession of Nature, unless they have the species and the form. By Nature, then^ subsists that which is composed from both of these, as, for instance, animals and their parts. Nature, however, consti- tutes the primary matter, and this in a twofold sense, — either the primaiy in reference to a thing itself, or, upon the whole, the first ; for example, of brazen works the first in reference to these is the brass ; and water, perhaps, in general, if the primary matter of all things that are capable of being liquified be water. And Nature constitutes both species and substance ; and this is the end of production. But now, metaphoricallj speaking and generally, every substance is called Nature for this reason, because Nature, also, is a certain substance, a. Nature in the Doubtlcss, from the things that have been ijrecise sense of stated, the earliest nature, and that termed so with precision, is the substance, — I mean of those things possessing the principle of motion in themselves, so far forth as themselves are such. For matter, in respect of its being susceptible of this, is styled Nature ; and generations and the act of production are termed so in consequence cf their mo- tions being from this. And the first principle of motion, ia those things that by Nature subsist, is Nature, inherent as a first principle in a manner either potentially or \ctually

08. v.] THB TEBM. MEOKSSABT. 119

CHAPTER V.

Nboe3Sary^ is defined that without which, to a co-operating cause, it is not admissible for ineaningsof a thing to exist; as, for instance, respiration V^""'****^ and nourishment are necesstiy conditions for an animal : for without these it is impossible that an animal can ^st. And that is necessary without which it is not possible for what is good either to subsist, or to arise, or to cast aside any evil, or that any evil should be exterminated ; for instance, the drinking a certain medicine is a necessary precaution against sickness, and the sailing to iEgina,^ against the loss of one's property. Further, the compulsory and compulsion are styled necessary ; but this is that which constitutes an obstruction, and is capable of offering an hindrance to impulse and free-will.^ For what is compulsory is styled necessary : wherefore, also, is it a thing that is sad ; as also Evenus* hau it:—

" For everything necessary is a thing doleful."

^nd force, or compulsion, involves a certain necessity, as also Sophocles ^ says : —

<' But force compels me to do these things."

And necessity seems to be a something that is inevitable, (correctly so,) for it is contrary to the motion that results ac-

' This is another very important word, and one which resoimds in the metaphysical controversies that have prevailed in the world. Aris- totle gives five acceptations of apayKutos : in the third of which he glances at its connexion with ethics.

• Sailing to iBgina." The allusion most likely in these words is to

the fact that the citizens of Athens, with their property and effects, IV ere obliged, b. o. 480, to retire to ^gina, amongst other places, for fear of an expected invasion from the East. There is another reading beside fii) &irojBaX^, and that is Xva ^trikafiij : and, in this case, I would take it that Aristotle alludes to the favourable circumstances under which one could carry on trade, for instance, in iSgina, whose commercial advan* tagas were so well known, or even support oneself there, compared w th Athens, where a man was exposed to so much expense.

' Aristotle now gives the signification of the word wayKaios in its ethical aspect.

• It does not appear who this Evenus was. Asclepius merely says hi

V^SAA sophist.

• Thie passage is taken from the Eleotra.

120 THE METAPHTBIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.

cording to free-will, and according to the power of reasoning. Further, that which does not admit of being otherwise than it is, we say is in this way disposed as a necessary thing. And, according to this acceptation of the word^ what is necessary, and all the other things that are so, are also, in a manner, styled necessary ; for the violent, or compulsory, is called necessary, either in regard of action or passion, at such times as when a person cannot make any move according to impulse, on ac- count of some constraining cause ; so that this is a necessary impulse on account of which the thing could not be other- wise. And in the case of the co-operating causes of the prin«  ciple of vitality, and the good, it is so in like manner ; for when it is not admissible, on the one hand, to obtain, indeed, the good, and on the other, to live and to exist without cer- tain things, these things then are necessary, and this cause constitutes a cei*tain necessity.

2 Theprinci- Further, does demonstration belong to those pie of necessity things that are necessary,^ because it is not pos- iSonlt/auSi.^^ Bible that the things that are being demonstrated should be otherwise, if the thing be absolutely demonstrated ; but causes of this are things primary, which it is impossible should subsist otherwise than they do ; out of which is formed the syllogism. Of some things, truly, is there a different cause from themselves of their being necessary, but of others there is no such cause; but on account of these are other things that are from necessity. Wherefore, what is primary and what is absolute, or simple, are strictly neces- sary ; for it is not possible that this can be disposed in many ways : therefore, neither can it subsist in different ways at different times; for on such a supposition would it now be disposed in many ways. If, therefore, there are certain things that are eternal and immovable, there is in them nothing compulsory or contrary to Nature.

' This is a quality ioherent in demonstrative truth, which has given rme to the controversy as to the justice of our being called to account for our vnteUecttuU assent even in matters of religion. Vide Bp. Butler^i Analogy, part II. chap, vi; Locke's Essay, book IV. chaps, xvii xviii

CB.YL] UNITY DRFINKD. 121

CHAPTER VI.

Onb^ is called that which subsists as such i. on^tu, according to accident in one way, and in another, ^tingiiished that which subsists essentially. A thing is called aeeident"^md one according to accident; for instance, Coriscua i^^^mem- and what is musical, and the musical Coriscus : 'ng* of •• one for it is one and the same thing to say, Coriscus ^^ "* ***' and what is musical, as to say, Coriscus the musician; also, to say the musical and the just is one with saying the just musician Coriscus. For all these are called one according to accident; the just, indeed, and the musical, because thay are accidents in one substance; but what is musical and Coriscus, because either is an accident in the other. Like- wise, also, in a certain sense, the musical Coriscus is one with -Coriscus, because either of the parts of those that are in this sentence is an accident in tiie other; as, for example, what is musical in Coriscus and the musical Coriscus in just Coriscus, because one portion of either is an accident in the same one. For there is no difference whether what is musical is an accident in Coriscus, or Coriscus the just in the musical Coriscus. In like manner, however, will one be denominated according to accident, though it should be pre- dicated of the genus, or of some universal names; as, for instance, if man were said to be the same with a musical man: for that it should be so either because the musical is an accident in the man being one substance, or because both are accidents in any one of those which are singulars, as in Coriscus; nevertheless, both are not inherent in the same manner, but the one, perhaps, as genus and in the sub- stance, and the other, as a habit or passion of the substance. Therefore, as many things as are expressed according to accident are styled one after this manner.

But of things denominated one essentially, 2. Definition*^ some are styled so on account of their being con- LcorSLg'to"'

1 We have dow laid before us the various significations that ty ha& The rd %v we must bear in mind is in metaphysics a synonyme with the T^ ov, and therefore equally with it, as Aristotle has already shown, thf •ubjeci-matter about which ontology is conversant. Vide books lU bap. iL and IX. chap. L

122 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT

iifferent modes tlouous; as, for instance, a bundle^ held together of continuity. |jy ^ string and a piece of wood by glue ; and

a line, even though it be curved, yet, if it be continuous, is called one ; as 'also each of the parts of the body : for in- stance, a leg and an arm. Now, of these very things those are more one which by nature are continuous than those that are continuous by art. But that is called continuous of which the motion is one essentially, and also which it is not possible should be otherwise. And motiou is one when it is indivisible, and indivisible according to time ; those things, however, are essentially continuous as many as are not one by contact; for if you were to place sticks touching one another, you would not say that these are one, either ona piece of wood, or one body, or anything else that is continu- ous. And, indeed, in general, things that are continuous are called one, even though they may have a curve, and still rather things that have not a curve ; thus the leg and thigh are more one than the leg and foot together, because it is pos- sible that the motion of the leg and foot be not one. And the straight line is one rather than the curved line. But the curved, and that which has an angle, we call both one and not one, because it is admissible that both the motion of the whole should not be at the same time, and yet that at the same time should be the motion of a part f but part and the whole of a straight line are always at the same time in motion together, and no such portion as involves magnitude partly remains at rest and partly is in motion, as of a line that is curved. . „^, Further, in another way a thing is called one

a. Things one . x r xu w t. u - • • • ac

where the uiti- in respect 01 the subject bemg m species indif-

thelamef ^ " ^®^®^* ^^ destitute of a difference. But things that are indifferent are those of which the form, according to sense, is indivisible, and the subject is either the first or the last in respect of the end. For both wine is called one and water one, so far forth as either is indi- visible according to the form ; and all fluids are styled one, as

' ^ This word, which is sometimes erroneously written <l>dKfX\oi instead of tpiKeXos, means the same as the Latin " fasciculus," and in found in Herodotus, Melp. iv. 62.

^ I have followed Taylor's most clear and admirable translation of these words.

CH. Vl] ESSENTIAL UKITT. ]23

•

oil, wine, and things that are soluble, because the ultimate subject of all these is the same ; for all these are, in reality, water and air. But those things are styled one, also, of which the genus is one, differing by opposite differences. And all these are called one because one genus is the subject of the differences ; for instance, horse, man, dog, is a certain one because all of them are animals ; and, doubtless, they are one in some similar manner as the matter is one. These things, however, sometimes in this way are styled one, and some- times the superior genus is regarded one, which is deno- minated the same, if those higher up than these be the ultimate species of the genus ; as, for example, the isosceles, to be sure, and the equilateral, are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles.

Further, are those things styled one the defi- 4 Things one nition of whatsoever of which, denominating the in respect of

« .1 • • J- • •! 1 /• J definition;

essence of them, is indivisible, as far as regards another definition signifying the being of the thing, for every actual definition is essentially indivisible. For so, also, both that which has undergone increase and diminution is one because the definition is one, as in the case of surfaces pos- sessing length and breadth the definition of the species is one. In general, however, are those things one of which and of percep- the perception is indivisible ; I mean, that which **°°* perceives what the essence or formal principle is, and which cannot be separated either in time, or place, or definition ; these most especially, I say, are one ; and of these as many as are substances.

For, universally, whatever things do not in- 5. Further. volve division, so far forth as they have it not, senses^ofji;, or so far are they styled one; for example, if man, to its primary as far as he is a man, has not a division, he is »i8nific»^»o»- one man ; and if an animal, as far as it is an animal, is indv visible, animal is one: but if magnitude, as far as magnitude is concerned, is indivisible, magnitude is one. The most things, no doubt, then, are styled one because some one different thing they either effect, or suffer, or possess, or because of their being relative to some one thing; but those things primarily denominated one are those of which the substance is one : one, however, either iu continuity, or species^ *yt

124 TlfB HETAPHTSIGS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOKIV.

definition; for also we reckon as plural^ or many, either those things that are not continuous, or those of which the form is not one, or of which the definition is not one. But, further, is it the case^ that we say sometimes that anything wliat- Boever is one, provided only it involves quantity and con- tinuity; and we sometimes say that it is not one, if it be not a certain whole, that is, if it does not possess one form; for instance, we would not say that in like manner a shoe is one, when looking at the portions of that shoe any way whatsoever put together, although there may be continuity involved therein : but if it be in such a position of its parts as to be in reahty a shoe, and to have a certain form, it would already then be one. Wherefore, also, of lines the circular is particularly one because it is entire and perfect.

6 The c«8en- ^^ *^® ^^^' howcvcr, the Very essence consists tiai quaiit> of in this, that it is the principle of a certain teated! *""*' number; for the first measure is the principle of each genus thereof; for that whereby, as primary, we make a thing known, this is the first measure of each genus: therefore, the first principle of that which may be known constitutes, in regard of each genus, the one. But the one is not the same in all the genera ; for here it is diesis,^ and there a vowel, or a mute; but of gravity there is a different one, and of motion another. Everywhere, how- ever, is unity indivisible, either in form or in quantity. That, indeed, therefore, which is indivisible according to quantity, and so far forth as it is a quantity, (I mean, what is in every direction indivisible, and is without position,) this is called an unit or monad ; but that which is in every direction indi- visible, and involves a position, is a point ; and that which is divisible in one direction is a line, and that capable of a twofold division, a surface ; but that which in every way and

^ I have omitted translating the word ^irc/, which is found in some Greek MSS., and thereby added conE^erably to the perspicuity of the sentence.

• The term SUcris occurs in other parts of Aristotle's works, e.g. in

the Generation of Animals, book I. cap. xv., and in the Posterior Analytics, lib. I. cap. xxiii : in the former place it is employed as a term in physics, in the latter, as one in music, something the same as our demi-semi-quaver. It is explained in Mr. Owen's translation of th«  Analytics, p. 298, in " Bohn's Classical library."

0H.Y2L] LOGICAL UNITT. 128

in three directions is divisible according to quantity is a body. And, conversely, that which is divisible in a twofold xespect is a sur&ce, and that in a single direction, a line, and that divisible everywhere in three directions is a body, but that divisible nowhere according to quantity, a point and a monad; the one, without position, a monad, and the other, with position, a point.

And, moreover, some things are one according . ,, , to number, but others accordmg to species, and according to a others according to genus, and others according ^^^^a^ divfaior to analogy. Those things are one in number of which the matter is one, but in species of which the defi- nition is one, but in genus of which there is the same figure of predication ; but according to analogy are things one as many as are disposed as one thing in relation to another. The subsequent, however, invariably follows the things that are prior; as, for instance, whatsoever things are one in number are also one in species, but whatsoever things are one in species are not all one in number; but all things are ^ne in genus, whatsoever are likewise so in species; but whatsoever are one in genus are not all one in species, but are so in analogy ; and whatsoever things are one analogically are not all so in genus.

It is manifest, however, also, that plurality g Different .will be spoken of in an opposite manner to senses of piu- the one, partly from the fact of its being not ' ^^' continuous, and partly from having its matter divisible according to species either as the first matter or the ultimate matter, but partly from possessing many of those reasons or definitions which declare the essence of a thing, or its very nature.

CHAPTER VII.

Entity^ is denominated partly as that which j Different subsists according to accident, and partly that senses of "eni which subsists essentially; an enity subsists ^'^ "*** ****

1 Entity, about which metaphysics is most concerned, is now defined by Aristotle. This term is examined into by an old Cambridge scholar, HenricuB More, in a treatise of his entitled, Enchiridion JMieta*^ physicum." Eeferenoe, too, may be made o- ^his subject ia YcA.!^

12? THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ["BOOK IV,

aocording to accident as when we say that a just man is musical, and that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man ; speaking in a similar manner as when we say that the musical man builds because it is an accident to the builder to be a musician, or for the musician to be a builder : for the affirming that this particular thing is that signifies that this thing is an accident in that. So, also, in the case of the instances that have been mentioned ; when v/e say that the man is a musician, and that the musician is a man, or that one who is white is the musician, or that the latter is white, we say this because both of these are accidents in the same subject ; but we say that because they are accidents in entity : but that the musician is a man we say because the being a musician is an accident to this person. So, also, is it said that what is white is a man because^ that is a man to which the being white is an accident. Things, indeed, therefore, said to subsist according to accident are expressed in this way, either because both are inherent in the same entity, or because they are inherent in that entity, or because they are the same with that in which the accidents are inherent, and of which the thing itself is predicated.

Entities, also, are said to subsist essentially f«," found in whatsoever signify the figures of predication ; for tencategories; ^ often as they are predicated, so often do ^ ' they signify essence. Since, therefore, of the

tnings that are predicated some signify what a thing is, or quiddity, and others quality, and others quantity, and others relation, and others action or passion, and some the place where, and others the time when, to each of these the being or essence signifies the same thing. For there is n© difierence in the expression, the man is in a healthy state, from this, namely, the man is healthy, or, the man is walking or is cutting, from the expression, man walks or cuts. And in like manner, also, is it in the case of the rest, and in Further, the words "to be" and " it is " signify that

truth as op. ^ ^j^ |g tj^g^ l3^^ ^YiQ words " not to be, that

of Cudwoirth's Intellectual System, p. 152, I^amson's Ed., where there are some rem&rks of Mosheim on the same point. More, in his analysia of the rd tv, diffeis widely from Aristotle. ^ I have followed Taylor, whose translation makes the text clear.

OH. Vin.] EKMTY DEFn:ED. 12?

U 18 not true, but false / in like manner is it the posed to fabe- ease both in respect to aflfirmation and negation ; "^^' as, for example, he who says that Socrates is musical says sb because this is tnie ; or he who says that Socrates is not white says so because it is true ; he, however, who says that the diameter is not incommensurable says so because this is fiJse. Further, *' to be " and " being " signify that ^ ^^u ^ which is expressed partly as potentially,^ and in capacity and partly as actually, of those things that have been •*'*^*"*y- enumerated. For we say, also, that seeing is both seeing in potentiality expressly, and in actuality; and similarly we say that he is endued with scientific knowledge who both has ihe ability to employ scientific knowledge and does actually employ it, and that a thing is in a condition of rest both in which rest is at present inherent, and which involves the capability of remaining in a state of quiescence. But in like manner, also, is it in the case of substances ; for we speak of the existence of Mercury^ in the stone, and the half of the line ; and we call that corn which not yet has reached a state of maturity. When, however, a thing is potential, and when it is not as yet potential, must be defined elsewhere.

CHAPTER VIII.

As regards substance,* both simple bodies, as, . j. for instance, earth, and fire, and water, and such of oi<ria. or sub- like, are called substances; and, in general, JJShed?"'"*' bodies are styled so ; and animals consisting of these, and those beings that are of the nature of demons,^ and

• Vide books III. chap. viii. and VIII. chap. x.

• We have an examination into this subject in book Till.

' '* Mercury in the stone ;" that is, a stone with an image of Mercuiy impressed upon it. Vide book VIII. chap, viii

^ obffia : this is another very important expression in the vocabulary of the ontologist. Taylor translates this word "essence;** but I have differed from him, and rendered it by the term "substance.** Locke tuses the phrase in this sense. Vide Essay on the Human Understand- ing, book II. chap. 23.

• The recognition of existences beyond the sphere of what is purely

mundane, involved in the mention of the word ZaifMv, is seldom to bn found in Aristotle*8 works. This passage, therefore, is the mctt nmnrkable on that account. Vide Cudworth, vol. II. p. 79.

128 THE JIETAPHY6ICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOR IV.

the parts of these. Now, all these are denominated substancei because they are not predicated of a subject, whereas other things are predicated of these. But in another way is that styled substance whatever may be the cause of being, and may be inherent in such as are not predicated of a subject ; for example, soul in an animal. Further, as many parts as are inherent in such things that both define and signify " the what ** a certain thing is, on the removal of which the whole is taken away, — as, for example, if superficies be taken away body also is destroyed, as some say ; and superficies is destroyed by taking away a line ; and, in general, number seems to certain to be a thing of this kind : for that if it is removed away nothing can subsist, and that it defines all things, — such parts we may consider substances. Further, the essence of which the formal cause is the definition, this, also, is styled the substance of each thing.

2. Reduction Now, substancc happens in two ways to be of these to two. gtyied substaucc, both as the ultimate subject which no longer is predicated of anything else, and as that which may be this certain particular thing, and may be separ- able ; but such is the form and the species of each thing.

CHAPTER IX.1

1. Different BuT the Same are styled partly according

fh^'Siarae^f *<> accidcut, ss the white and the musical are •'same peraeci- the samc becausc they are accidents in the same '^' subject, and man and musician are the same

because either is an accident in the other; I mean, that naan is musical because the musical is an accident in man: and this is the same with either, and either of these the same with this ; for also with the man that is musical both man and musical are styled the same, and that is regarded the same with those. Wherefore, also, all these are not predi- cated universally ; for it is not true to say that every man is the same thing with what is musical : for universaJs are absolute existences, but accidents are not absolute existences, but are simply predicated of singulars. For it seems the

1 Aristotle now examines into our notions of identity and diversity; a subject the theme of much discussion amongst thA xnodcms.

On.Z.] IDENTITT AND DITERSmT. IS^^

Bame thlug to be Socrates and Socrates the musical, for the expression Socrates is not af&hned of all; wherefore, not every Socrates is predicated as every man is. And some things in this way are called the same. Some and of "same things, however, are called the same essentially p^ •«•'* in the same way as unity also; for those things likewise of which the matter is one either in species, or in number, or in genus, are called the same, and those of which the sub- stance is one are called the same. Wherefore, it is evident that sameness is a certain unity of the being of either many things, or when one employs anything as many, as when one affirms the same thing to be the same with itself, for he employs that thing as two.

But diverse are those things called of which 2. <vnien either the species are numerous, or the matter, or tilings are said the definition of the substance; and, in general, ^ ^*"' is the diverse denominated in a manner opposite to the same. And those things are styled different whatsoever are diverse ; being, however, in some respect the same, not merely in number, but either in species, or genus, or analogy. Further, things are considered different of which the ^^ff^„J^^ genus is diverse, and the things that are con- similar, and trary, and whatsoever involve diversity in the ^"^™""- substance. Similar are those things styled both which everywhere undergo the same affection and undergo more of the same affections than of the diverse, and of which the quality is one, and in as many of the contraries as a change is possible, that which possesses more of these, or the more important amongst these, is similar to that thing. Things that are dissimilar, however, are denominated in an opposite way to those that are similar.

CHAPTER X.

Things that are opposite^ are called contra- 1. opposition diction, and contraries, and relations, and priva- defined in the

• As to the nature and different sorts of opposition, Aristotle explains

himself more fully in his logical treatises, e.g. chap. viL in his work •* On Interpretation." For further information on the same subject, the student may consult Whately's Logic, book II. chap. y. ; Morell'f liAndbook of Lo(^o, p. 29 ; Derey's Logic, p. 94, Bohn'i edition.

13^ THE MBTAFHT8IGS OF ABISTOTI^E [bCOK IV.

«tie of lontra* tion, and habit, and those things from which 4lption: ultimate things arise, and those into which they

are resolved : as, for instance, the generations and corrup- tions of bodies, and whatsoever things it is not admissible at the same time should be present in that which is receptive of both, these are said to be opposite either themselves or those whereof they are compounded. For black and white at the same time are not inherent in the same subject. Wherefore, those colours of which they are compounded are and of con- opposite to these. Those things are called con- trariety, traries, both those which cannot be present in the same subject at the same time, of things that differ in genus ; and those things are called contraries which involve the greatest amount of difference, of those that ai*e in the same genus, and things that widely differ in the same recipient, and which widely differ of those under the same capacity, an<} those of which there is the greatest difference, either simply, or according to genus, or according to species. And other things are styled contraries ; some as having such things in possession, and others as being recipients of such, and some in being effective,^ or in being capable of undergoing passive conditions, or in being agents, or being passive, or being rejections, or affinities, or habits, or privations, of these and of things of this sort. Since imity and entity, however, are spoken of in many ways, there is a necessity of the other things also following as many as are expressed according to these. Wherefore, also, will there be a distribu- tion of the same, and the diverse, and the contrary ; so that there must needs be something diverse in each category. 2. ^vhat di- ^^^ diverse in species are those things called versity in ape- as many OS being of the same genus are not ces means. subalternate, and as many as being in the same genus involve a difference, and as many as in the substance are related in the way of contrariety. And contraries are diverse in the species of one another, either all or those which are denominated primarily, and are those of whatever in the

^ The word translated " effective " is icoirtriKd.. The same word is tpplied to the " prima philosophia," as a qualifying epithet, by Arli- totle in the first book, where we find it rendered in the old Latin versions by "activa." It occurs in the sixth book of the Topics. ch»p. z., ViA is translfttxl effective " by Mr. Owen.

CE.ZL1. OPPOSITION DEFINED. a31

ultimate species of the genus the definitions are diverse ; as, for instance, man and horse, which are individuals in the genus, but the definitions of them are diverse. And those are contraries as many as being in the same substance involve a difference. Those things, however, are in species the same which are expressed in an opposite way to these.

CHAPTER XI.i Prior and subsequent are things called. , ^,- ^

a • XI. i» _x • xi? • X ^' Dlflferent

Some, as m the case of a certam thmg exist- senses of ing as first, and as a first principle, in each K^epJ^,*'5ther genus ; for prior is that which is nearer a certain a? » fi"t prin- first principle, defined either simply and by *'*^*®' nature, or relatively, or according to place, or by certain things: as, for instance, some things are prior in place from the fact of being nearer either by nature to a certain definite place as to the mean or the extreme, or by some ordinary relation in this way ; and that which is more remote from this definite locality is subsequent. Other or in reference things prior and subsequent, however, are so in *® duration ; accordance with time; for some things, indeed, are considered prior as they are more remote from the present moment : for instance, in the case of things that have taken place in time past; for the Trojan annals are prior to the Medean because they are further removed from the present time ; and other things are prior in regard of being nearer the present time, as in the case of things to come : for the Nemean games ^ are prior to the Pythian because it is an event nearer the present, using the present as a first principle and a thing that is first. Some things, also, according to motion are prior and subsequent; for that which is more immc- or motion, and diate to the first moving power is prior : as, for capacity, and example, a boy is prior to a man; and this, also,

^ The subject of priority and subsequence, treated of in this chapter, 18 likewise examined into by Aristotle in chap. xii. of the Categories. There are soma distinctions drawn here which are well worthy of oui ftttention.

• For an account of the Grecian games, the student may consul

Potter's Qreek Antiquities, book II. chaps. 21—25 inclusive.

k2

132 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. ]^BOOK I?

is a certain first principle simply considered. Some things, also, aro prior according to potentiality; for that which is Buper-^minent in potentiality is prior, and that which is more potential is prior : but that nature is of such kind as according to the free-will of which another must needs follow which is also posterior. Wherefore, in the event of that one not imparting motion, the consequence will be that no motion should ensue in the other; and, in the event of that one imparting motion, that motion should ensue in the other; but free-will con- stitutes a first principle. Also, things according to order are styled prior and subsequent; but these are such as according to some one relation defined are distant proportionally : as, for example, in a dance the person standing second^ is prior to one that stands third, and the paranete to the nete^ in a musical instrument; for in the former is the person who presides, and in the latter the medium is a first principle. 2 Priority These things, indeed, therefore, are styled prior

and subiie- in this way ; but in another way is a thing prior ed1n7eference ^^ knowledge as if it were even absolutely prior, to our know- Qf these things, however, that are otherwise, some

ledge of them, :%» 1 j j* x

either f^om are accordmg to reason, and some according to 8eiwe° **' ^^^ sense ; for, certainly, according to reason things that are universal are prior; but according to sense the singulars are prior. And according to the reason, also, the accident is prior to the whole^ as the musical is before a man that is musical; for the entire reason will not be without the part, although it is not possible to be musical when there is not a certain one that is musically gifted.

^ I have followed Taylor in translating the word trapatrrdnfis thus. Alexander Aphrodisiensis reads the text differently; for he renders it In his commentary by trpwroardrnSf which is found in the Asclepian MSS. The word, in fact, means one who stands in a chorus on the right or left hand of another. Strictly speaking, vapourTdrris is a military term ; it was applied to the leader or front rank of either of the wings of an army; and irpwroffrd-nis meant the right hand man in the front* rank of the main body.

^ irapapriTTi : x^P^"^ ^ ^he word understood. The paranete is a term borrowed from music, and signified the string next to the undermost; or, in other words, the one next to the last of five strings. The note, virrri, i, e. vidnfi x^pHt ^ the laat, but with us the highest in the musical scale. The most succinct account of the music of the Greeks is to b€ found in the Dictionary of Antiquities," edited by Dr. Smith; article^ kpfMvla,

CH. Xn.J PRIORITY AM) BUBSEQUENOB. 133

Further, the passive ccnditions of things that are prior are called prior ; as, for instance, straightness is prior to smooth- nefs : for the one is an essential affection of a line, and the other of a superficies.

Some things, therefore, are called prior and s. other subsequent in this way; but others are termed t?may°vtew^^ 80 according to nature and substance, as many npSrtpov and as it is admissible can be in subsistence without ^^•'*"* others^ but others cannot subsist without them; which opinion Plato adopted. But since "the being ^ is in many ways denominated, in the first place the subject is prior through which the substance is prior ; in the next place the things according to potentiality and actuality are otherwise ; for according to potentiality^ are some things prior, and others according to actuality, subsequent ; as, for instance, according to potentiality is the half prior to the whole^ and the part to the whole, and the matter to the sub- stance; but according to actuality^ is this a thing that is subtequent: for when dissolution has taken place things will subsist according to actuality. In a certain manner, it is true, all things that are styled prior and subsequent are expressed according to these; for some according to generation it id admissible may subsist without others, as the whole without the parts : but some according to corruption, as the part is prior to the whole. But it is in like manner with the rest.

CHAPTER XII.*

Potentiality is called the first principle of i. Different motion or change in another thing, or so far ofthe tenn^po- forth as it is another thing; as the building art tentiauty or is a potentiality that does not reside in the thing ^*P^^*y- that is built : but the art of healing, when it constitutes a

' The technical rendering of the word used in the text, r6 ttyat, would be the " esse;" a term sufficiently familiar to the ontologist.

• This subject is discussed at large in book VIII.

• * Thii passage throws much light on what Aristotle meant by the ti;ord liT-ffAcxcta.

• Aristotle now comes to treat of SiSvafuSf which I have translated

iriostly by the word " potentiality." Taylor renders it by " capacity ;" a ierm intelligible enough, but hardly literal. I have, howeyer, ocoa- vonaiiy rende^ it bv caoacitY*

134 THB METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOE T^

potentiality, would reside in the person who is being healed, but not so far forth as he is a person that is being healed Therefore, in general, the first principle of change or of motion is said to be potentiality in another thing, so far forth as it is another, and potentiality is styled such fi*om another thing, or so far forth as it is another; for according to this sense of potentiality is what is passive in any degree passive. Sometimes, then, if it may be possible also that anything whatsoever undergoes passion, wo say that thing involves the potentiality of being passive ; but sometimes we say that this is not the case as regards every passion, but if it be passive in reference to what is better. Further, is potentiality the capacity of accomplishing this |)articular thing well, or doing BO according to free-will ; for sometimes persons who merely have been walking or speaking, but yet who have not done so well, or not as they would choose, we would not say possessed the power or potentiality of speaking or walking : but also, in like manner, is it in the case of passion. Further, as many habits as according to which things are entirely devoid of passion, or unchangeable^ or not capable of being easily altered into a worse state, such are styled potentialities. For things are broken, indeed, and rubbed together,^ and bent, and are, m general, subject to decay, not from the having capacity, but from the not having capacity or potentiality and from deficiency in some point: other things, however, are impassive by such as scarcely, and in a small degree, become affected on account of potentiality, and the pos- session of potentiality, and the being in a certain manner disposed.

rent Now, secing that potentiality is denominated

modes of the in SO many ways, in the first place will also the FesJoSdtr" potential be styled as that which possesses a first with those of principle of motion or of change, (for even what capacity.^' ^ Stationary is something potential in another thing, or so &r forth as it is another,) and in the second place, if anything else of this should possess a capacity of this sort, and in the third place, if it involve such a capacity of iDringing about a change in anything whatsoever, whether into what is worse or into what is better. For, aJsi*,

• ffovrplficrau Taylor translatea thig word '^bnuBed." I have rat

dered it literally.

OH. XII.] POTENTIALITY DEFINED. 135

that which is in a state of decay seems to be a thing capable of falling into decay, otherwise it would not be corrupted if such were impossible ; but already has it a certain disposition of parts, and a cause and first principle of such a passive oondition. Sometimes, however, from the &,ct of pos8(!8sion, ftnd sometimes from the fact of privation, does it seem to be a thing of this sort. And if privation in a manner constitute a habit, all things by the fact of the possession of something would be potentialities; but the entity would be also ex- pressed equivocally. Wherefore, is a thing potential in respect of having a certain habit and first principle, and in reispect of involving the privation of this, if it is admissible that it ahould involve privation. And in the fourth place is a diing potential from the non-possession of a potentiality — or a first principle of this in another, or so &r forth as it is another — which is subject to corruption. But, moreover, are all those things potential either in the mere accident of their being generated or not being generated, or in respect of their being generated in an excellent manner. For, also, in things that are inanimate is there such a capacity inherent ; as, for instance, in musical instruments : for one lyre, they say, can send forth sound, but that another does not possess this capacity, if it be not &.ir sounding.

Impotentiality, however, is a privation of ^ impotenti- pbtentiality, and a certain removal^ of a first aiity as opposed principle of such a sort, as has been mentioned, *®P®^""*^**y* either entirely so, or from being by nature adapted to have Buch, or already to have such when it has been naturally fitted thereto also ; for we would not say that in like manner was it impotential or impossible for a man and an eunuch to beget a child. But, moreover, according to both sorts

«f potentiality is there impotentiality opposed, both to that

merely which is capable of motion, and to that capable of motion in an excellent manner. And things are styled impotential, some in accordance with this kind of im- potentiality, and others in another way; as, for instance, both the possible and the impossible. That, 4. whentHnga indeed, is a thing impossible tlie contrary of "esaidtobe

^ Siptrtt. This word is translated in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, hi reference to this passage, "abolition." It is a technical term ia pwfery, corresponding to the Latin expression ** ictus."

136 THE MBICAPHTSICS OF ABIBtOTL& [bOOK 17.

hnpouibie, at which is necessarily true ; as the oommensurability in geometry, ^f ^}jg diameter is a thing that is impossible^ because such a position in mathematics is &lse; and the oontrary of this is not only true, but also must necessarily be so, namely, the incommensurability of the diameter. Its being commensurable, accordingly, is not merely false, but must be Mae, The contrary, however, to this is the possible, when it is not necessary that the contrary should be &lse ; as, for example, the possibility of a man's sitting : for not necessarily is his being in a posture not of sitting a thing that is false. The possible in one way, therefore, as has been stated, signifies that which is not necessarily false, but in another it signifies the being true, and in another that which it is admissible may be true. Now, this is what in geometry is figuratively styled potentiality. These, indeed, therefore, are things possible — not so according to potentiality. 5. Reduction ^^* ^^ *^® things that are expressed according of these to one to potentiality are enumerated ^ with reference ifeims. ^^ ^^^ original potentiality or capacity; and this

is a principle of change in another, so far foi*th as it is another. For the rest are styled potential, partly in some other of them possessing such potentiality, and partly in its non-possession thereof, and partly in its being thus dis- posed. In like manner, also, is it the case with things that are impotential. Wherefore, the precise definition of the first potentiality* would be a principle capable of bringing about a change in another thing, or so far forth as it is another.

CHAPTER XIII.*

, , Quantity is denominated that which is divi-

••quantity,"ex- gible into things that are inherent, of which plained. either or each thing is adapted by nature to be a

' For an explanation of this familiar principle to geometricians, th«  reader is referred to a note in bopk III. chap. viii. p. 109.

' Aristotle insists on this point again in book VIII. chap. L

^ These words clearly recognise the creative energies of a first oause. Vide Sir Wm. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 585, and elsewhere.

• The subject of quantity is also treated of in the sixth chapter oi

CH.Zni.] QUAKTITT EXPLAINED. 137

certain one thing, and a certain particular thing of this sort. Multitade, then, indeed, is a certain quantity if it maj be numerable, but magnitude if it may be measurable; and multitude is styled that which is divisible in capacity into what ia not continuous, but magnitude into that which is continuous. Now, of magnitude that which is continuous in one direction is length, and that in two directions breadth, and that in three, depth. But of these finite multitude is number, and length is a line, and breadth a superficies, and depth a body.

Moreover, some things are said to be certain j QuaBtity quantities in themselves, or to be essential quan* either essen- titles; but others, quantities according to acci- ^^ ' dent: as a line, to wit, is a certain essential quantity, whereas what is musical is a quantity according to acci- dent. Now, of quantities that are so essentially, some are a certain quantity according to substance ; as, for instance, a line, (for in the definition expressive of what anything is, a certain, quantity is inherent ;) but other quantities are pas- sions and habits of such a substance : as, for example, much and little, and long and short, and broad and narrow, and high and low, and heavy and light, and the rest of such properties. Likewise, both the great and the little, and the greater and less, expressed both in reference to themselves and in relation to one another, are the essential passions of quantity. These names, indeed, are also transfen*ed to other things. Of quantities, however, that are or according to expressed according to accident, some are so accident, expressed as has been declared, because what is musical is quantity, and what is white is so in reject of there being a certain quantity in that subject wherein they are inherent ; and other things are quantities as motion and duration : for these, also, are termed certain quantities, and things con- tinuous in respect of those things being divisible of which these are passive states. Now, I mean not that which is in a state of motion, but that which has had motion imparted to it; for from the fietct of that being quantity, motion is like-

•

the Categories. The reader is referred to this portion of the Meta- physics by Mr. Owen, in his translation of the Organon, in '^Bohh** ClaaBsical Libmry," as one with which Aristotle's remarks ofi quantity ia il&e Categoriet ought to be compared.

13S THE METAFHY8IGS OP ARIHTOTLE. [BOOKIV;

wise quantity, and duration,^ from the fact of this latter being quantity, is regarded as quantity itself also.

CHAPTER XIV.

I Four modes QUALITY^ is styled in one way the difference df quality, of substance ; as, man is a certain quality of gSshed!***"* animal because he is a biped, and horse is a certain quality of animal because he is a quadru-* ped, and a circle is a certain quality of figure because it is without angles : so that the difference constitutes the quality according to the substance. Now, in this one way is quality styled the difference of substance, but in another, as things incapable of motion and mathematical entities, just as num-^ bers are certain qualities ; for example, those that are com- pound, and not only those which subsist in respect of one, but those of which sur&ce and solid are an imitation, (now these are plane,' square, or cube numbers,) and, in general, whatever be«  sides quantity inheres in substance, for the being assumed once is the substance of each thing ; as, for example, the substance of the six is not twice three, or thrice two, but the being taken once, for once six is six. Moreover, as many things as are passive conditions of substances in a state of motion are called qualities, as heat and cold, and whiteness and blackness, and gravity and lightness, and whatever such-like properties there are according to which the bodies of those things that are undergoing a change are said to be altered. Further, are things qualities^ so far as they subsist according to virtue and vice, and, in general, to what is bad and good.

' In connecting motion and duration together, the reader can hardly fail to recur to Locke in his remarks on succession. Locke's th^ry, however, is combated by Brown, and by Victor Cousin in his Examinar ti:in of Locke's Essay, chap. iii.

^ iro7otft which is defined in this chapter, is treated of likewise in thtt Categories, chap. viiL, which the student would do well to consult^ as well as Mr. Owen's notes on that chapter. Taylor reads this paaen^ with an interrogation.

' oi TcoaaKis voffoi ^ ol iroffdKis v&rot voadjcts, I have adopted Tayl^a translation of these words; and, on reference, I find that he luus followed Alexander.

• This was quite the language of the last century, to specify virtue

and vice as the quality of actiona. Vide Smith's Miral Sentimenti^ pp. 461 sqq Bohu's editiQiL

CH. ZY.] ^UALin DEFKRD. 139

So that almost in two ways may quality be ex- s. Reduction pressed ; and in one of these which would he the ^^^^ to two. most strict or appropriate ; for first, indeed, as quality, is the difference of substance. And a certain part of this, also, is the quality contained in numbers; for this is a certain diffe- rence of. substances, yet either not of things that are being moved or not so &r forth as they are being moved. These, however, are passive conditions of things that are in motion, 10 &r forth as they are being moved and are differences of motions. And virtue and vice are a certain portion of such passions; for they make manifest the differences of motion and of energy in accordance with which those things that are in motion are agents and are passive in an excellent or a worthless manner : for that which in this way possesses the power of motion, or of energizing in this way, is good, and that which is moved and energizes in that way, and in a con- trary manner, is worthless. And most especially do what is good and bad signify quality in the case of animated natures, and amongst these particularly does this apply ^ to the case of those that possess free-will.

CHAPTER XV.

With respect to relatives,' they are denomi- ,^ Three modes nated, some of them, as a twofold to a half, and of the relative, a threefold to a third, and, in general, a multiple ^^ **' to a submultiple, and excess to that which is exceeded ; and others of them, as the calorific to that which is heated, and the divisible to the divided, and, in general, the active to the passive ; and others of them, as the measurable to the measure, and the object of scientific knowledge to science, and the sensible to sense.

Now, regarding these relatives, the first of them «• The Hret,

' ° , ® -. . 7 'xi • 1 explained to bo

are expressed according to number, either smiply a relation ao-

^ These words are w«>Tthy of note, in drawing a line of demarcation in the animal economy between those that are possessed and those that are devoid of free-will, woocdp€ffi5. It is this distinction which defines the precise limits of (iod s moral government over his creatures.

' Relatives, ra wpot ri, are now discussed, as well elsewhere, vis. ia the seventh chapter of the Categories, and book IV. of the Topioi| obap. iv.

140 THE UETAPHT8ICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT.

cording to or by definition, in respect of them or in respect number. ^f q^q . ^^ f^j, example, the twofold in respect

i>f one is a definite number, and the multiple is according to number in respect of one, but such as is not defined ; as, for example, this or this particular number; but the sesquialiter, in relation to the subsesquialiter, is according to number in relation to a definite number, ^perpartient, in relation to superpartient, is according to the indefinite in the same man- ner as the multiple is in relation to one. But that which exceeds, in relation to that which is exceeded, is, in shcrt, in- definite according to number; for number is commensurable: but the excess and what is exceeded are denominated accord- ing to a non-commensurable number ; for that which exceeds is such in relation to that which is exceeded, and something further than this : but this is indefinite; for whatsoever chances to be the result is either equal or not equal. These things, therefore, which are relatives, are all denominated accord- ing to number, and are jiassive properties of numbers : and, further, the equal, and similar, and same, according to another manner, are termed thus ; for all these are expressed according to the one. For the same, indeed, are those things of which the substance is one ; but similar are those things of which the quality is one ; and equal are those of which the quantity is one. And the one is the first principle and measure of number ; so that all these are denominated relations according to number, indeed, yet not in the same manner. 3 The d Things active and passive, however, subsist according to ' according to an active and passive potentiality, mnvaxion!" ^ *^^ according to energies that belong to potenti- alities ; as that capable of promoting heat to that which is heated, because of its being endued with poten- tiality: and again, the making warm in relation to that which is made warm; and one who severs in relation to that which is severed — as things energizing — are relatives. But of those things that are relatives according to number, these are not energies, save only in the manner it has been mentioned elsewhere ; but energies according to motion do not subsist in iiumbers. And of those things that are relatives according to potentiality, some are already styled so according to psfiods of duration; as, for example, that which forms in relation to that which has been formed^ and that which ii

fH. XT.] BXLATICN DEFINXD. 14i

likely to form in relation to that which is likely to be formed For so, also, is a father called a father of a son ; for there u something that partly has been active and partly passive. Further, are some things considered relations according to the privation of potentiality; for instance, ju8t as the im- possible, and as many things as are expressed in this way as, for example, the invisible.

Things, therefore, denominated relatives ac- ^ The third wording to number and potentiality are all of as the objective them so called because each derives that which Jj^^^« '^^iec- it is from reference to another, but not because something else is denominated with reference to it; and the measurable, and that which may be scientifically known, and that which is an object of the intellect,^ on account of some- thing else beiug deuomiuated in respect of them, are styled relatives. For, also, being an object of the intellect, signifies tl.at the intellect is exercised about this ; the intellect how- ever, does not subsist in relation to that about which the intellect is conversant, for the same thhig, doubtless, would be said twice. In like manner, also, the power of sight is that of something, and not of him to whom the sight belongs. This, however, is a true statement, but it is in relation to colour, or something else of this kind ; yet in that way the. same thing would be expressed twice : I mean that sight is the sight of him of whom it is the sight.

Things, indeed, therefore, called relatives es- g Q^^er senses sentially are denominated partly in this way, of the word and partly if their genera ai*e of this kind ; as, '*^ " ^^' for instance, the art of healing belongs to those things that are relative, because the science which is the genus of it seems to belong to those that are relatives. We may sub- join, as such, those things according to which, whatever they may be, things that possess them are spoken of as relatives; for example, equality is a relation because of the equal being relative, and similarity is a relation because of the similar being relative. Some things, however, are called e. Relation, i>er relatives according to accident, as man is a rela- «ccw«w.

1 It is the investigation of the nature of this relation that, literally speaking, has conyulsed the metaphyBical world in modem times. It was earnestly sought after by the scholastics, and it has led to thA rite of a system like that >f Kant.

142 THE MBTAXUTBIOS OF jJtiSTOTLE. [boOKIT

tive because it is accidental to bim his being twofold ; aiid this belongs to those things that are relatives; or the white is a r'jlative if it is accidental to the same thing to be two- fold and white.

CHAPTER XVI. . «« ^ . Perfect is denominated that beyond which

1. The perfect, , . . . ^\.^ j. _li- •

T6w\eiov, its it IS not possiblc to assumo anythmg cr any anTfigiuaUv"* ^^® singk portion; as, for instance, the time of each thing is perfect beyond which it is not possible to assume any period of duration which is a portion of this time : and that which according to virtue, and to what belongs to the excellent, doth not involve excess with respect to any genus ; as, for instance, a perfect or finished physician, and a perfect or finished musiciau, are such when they are in no wise deficient as far as regards the species of the excellence that is proper to their professions, so, also, transferring our remarks to the case of evil things, we say a perfect or finished sycophant, and a finished thief, since we also denominate these characters good, as a good thief, and a good sycophant. And virtue is a certain perfection ;^ for each thing is then perfect, and every substance is then perfect, when, in accordance with the species of its proper excellence or virtue, no portion of the natural magnitude is deficient. Further, in whatever things resides an admirable end, these are styled perfect ; for in respect of involving an end are they perfect. Wherefore, since the end is something belonging to extremes, and transferring, also, our remarks to the case of things that are worthless, we say that a thing is perfectly lost and perfectly corrupted when nought of the corruption and of what is bad is deficient, but when it has arrived at the ultimate limit of these. Wherefore, also,

• This is the Aristotelian view of virtue, and a most remarkable one

it is — ^Man, by cultivating principles of virtue, is acting up to the per- fection of his being. Who does not remember, as suggested by this passage, the words of the Apostle in the sixth chapter of the Hebrews, and first verse, where, in recommending an improvement beyond the mere elemex^-al knowledge of Christianity, he exclaims, iwl t^i '^cAetc^rin-a ^ipdutda. See also chap. vii. 11; Col. iii. 14.

GB^ZVn.] FERFECTION AND TEBMINATION. 143

death, metapborically, is called the termination, !>3caii8e both are extremes. The end, however, together with the final 4ause, is a thing that is ultimate.

The things indeed, therefore, denominated 2. summary of essentially perfect are styled in thus much oflhe**"*"?? number of ways, partly in their being no wise deficient according to subsisting in an excellent manner, nor involving excess in each genus, nor there being anything extrinsic belonging to them ; and the other things now are termed essentially perfect in respect either of the doing some such thing, or the having it in possession, or of the adaptation of itself to this,^ or in accordance, at least, with some other mode of expression in relation to things that are primtuily called perfect

CHAPTER XVII.

A TERMINATION is called the last of each thing, | j,, ^ -^ and beyond which, as first, it is not possible to w'toas, or ter- assume anything, and within which, as first, are Ji^^"* **" comprised all things, and that, likewise, which may be a form of magnitude, or of that which is in possession of magnitude, and which is the end of everything. Now, a thing of this kind is that towards which motion and the mode of an action tend, and not from which they originate. Sometimes, however, a termination is both of these ; both that from which motion and action originate, and towards which they tend; also, that for the sake of which other things operate, and the substance of each thing, and the essence or the formal cause of each : for this is a termination of know- lodge, and if of knowledge, also of the thing done. Where- fore, it is evident that even as often as the first principle is predicated so often also is the termination, and still more multifariously ; for the first principle, to be sure, is a certain termination: not every terminaticr, however, is a first principle.

• Aeclepius illuBtrates this by the spear of Achilles, which one

would term a perfect spear, because it was fitted for the grasp ef onv who was the greatest of heroes.

141 THB HBTA?HTSIG8 (W AilSTOTLB. [BOOKXT

CHAPTER XVITI.

1. The phrase " ^^^ according to which " ^ is denominated in TO kar I de- many ways. In one way, indeed, as the species

fined as fonn j xi_ i l u tl xi.* u • i

and matter. and the suDstance of each thmg ; as, for instance, tiiat in accordance with which a man is good, itself is good; and, in another way, as that in which first a thing has been fitted by nature to rise into being, as colour in a superficies.^ Therefore, what has, indeed, in the first instance been mentioned as the according to which " con- stitutes form ; but that mentioned secondarily, as such, is aa the matter of each thing, and the first subject in everything And, in general, " the according to which " will have a sub- sistence as often as the cause ; for according to what a man has come is an expression of the same import as on account of what he has come ; and the inquiry according to what fiilse reasoning, or correct reasoning, may be drawn is the same as an inquiry into what is the cause of the syllogism, or the paralogism, in such cases. Moreover, '^the according to which" is denominated that which subsists according to a position, according to which one stands, or according to which one walks ; for all these signify position and locality.

Wherefore, "that according to itself," or the cations oftlie csscutial, is uecessarily expressed in many ways.

ortheMwmiai. ^^^ ^^ ^^® ^^7 ^^ "that according to itselft" or the essential, the very nature of each thing, or the formal cause ; as, for example, Callias essentially is the very nature also of Callias ; and, secondly, it signifies whatsoever things are inherent in the " what anything is ; " as Callias essentially is an animal ; for in the definition of Callias is to be found animal, for Callias is a certain description of animal : and, thirdly, may we denominate " that according to itself," or the essential, as a thing that has primarily been a recipient in itself, or a certain part of things that belong to itself ; as, for instance, superficies is essentially white, and man

• ** Secundum quid." Mr. Maurice illustrates this word by a passage

from As You Like It : — " In respect that it is of the country it is a good life, but in respect that it is not of the court it is a vile life." — {7huck8f(me.\

^ Vide Locke on the coimexioii between ooIoli and the iirfkof w^liorein it residett.

OH.ZX.'] ESSEKOiS, DIBFOBinOK, HABIT. 145

essentially is an animal , for the soul is a certain portion of the man in which vitality is primarily inherent. Fourthly, does it signify that of which there is not any one other cause; for of man there are many causes, such as animal, biped ; but, nevertheless, man is man essentially. Fifthly, we consider that according to itself,*' or the essential, as many things as are inherent in some one particular thing alone, and as &r forth as it is alone. Wherefore, whatever has a separate has fldso an essential subsistence.

CHAPTER XIX.

' Disposition is styled an arrangement of that i. The tem which has parts either according to place or to **«*'««'«• potentiality, or according to species ; for it is necessary that there be a certain position, as also the name disposition makes manifest.

CHAPTER XX.

Now habit ^ is denominated, in one way, US a certain energy of the possessor and the lenTef^of the possessed, just as it were a certain action or JJ^j*^'*»*^' motion ; for when the one accomplishes, and the other is accomplished, the act of accomplishing is a mean between them, so also between one having in possession a garment, and the garment had in possession, habit is a mean. Therefore, indeed, is it evident that it is not admissible that this should involve another habit; for the thing would go on to infinity if it be the case that one habit should involve the habit of that which is possessed. And in another way is habit styled a disposition according to which that which iis disposed is disposed well or ill ; and this either according to itself, that is, essentially, or in relation to another : as, for example, health is a certain habit, for it is a disposition of

1 Habit is not viewed in its ethical aspect here ; that is, in reference to the provision natural to the human species, whereby active principles are acquired by the process so admirably analysed by Bishop Butlet. fiabit here is considered merely in a grammatical sense, as a participle of the verb habeo." Vide p. 45 in Buhn's edition of the Or^ai<m.

146 THB METAFHTSICa OF ABI8TOTLB. |^BOOK IT.

this sort Further, is a thing called habit in a case where it may be a portion of such a disposition. Wherefore^ also, ia the virtue or excellency of the parts a certain habit ^

CHAPTER XXI.

Passion^ is denominated in one way, quali^ r'a^o^ defined, according to which, a thing admits of alterar tionj as white and black, and sweet and bitter, and gravity and lightness, and whatsoever other such things there are : and in another way now are energies and alter- ations called passions of these; still more than these are noxious alterations and motions, passions, and particularly those motions that along with being noxious or injurious are painful likewise. Further, the crushing burdens of misfortunes, and of things that are fraught with sufferings are called passions.

CHAPTER XXII.

1. Different PRiVATiON^ Is denominated, in one way, in

modes of pri- casc a thing does not involve any of the things

Ifc^^n regSd that by nature are adapted for being possessed,

®JS? *P*iJ."**J even though itself may not by nature be adapted

of the subject. ^ ,, ° . c %^ '^ r i

for the possession of such ; as, for example, a plant in this sense is said to be deprived of eyes. And in another way is that termed privation if a thing be by nature fit for possession of a thing, either itself ^* the genus, and yet may not have possession of that thing ; v^ in one sense is a blind man deprived of sight, and a mole in another : the latter, indeed, according to the genus, and the former according to itself, or essentially. Further, is that privation if a thing be by nature adapted to possess a quality ; and when it is so stdapted by nature to possess it,

^ Any one who has studied the ethical system of Aristotle is familiar with this sentiment.

2 Vide Categories, chap, viil

• Vide chap. z. of the Categories on the subject of opposition, and

•Ibo note, p. 129.

(n.zxin.] PASSION, vRVfATioVf pcflssassioir* 147

yet possesses it not, for blindness is a certain privation ; but for an animal to be blind is not in acoordanee with every age, but with that only in which it is fitted by nature to have sight, and yet may not have it at all. And in like manner may privation be found in " the what," and according to **what," and for "what," and so £str forth as it may be adapted by nature for the possession of such, and yet may not possess them.

Further, the violent removal of each thing is ^ ^^^^ ^^ styled a privation. And as often, also, as are privation in re- expressed negations from A, so often, Hkewise, are ^'n/'"***" expressed privations; for the unequal is denomi- nated thus from the fact of the non-possession of equality when by nature it is fitted for it, but the invisible, both from being entirely without colour and in consequence of having it defectively; and an animal is called "apous," or without feet, both from its being without feet entirely, and in consequence of having them attended with some defect. Further, do we call a thing privation when that thing has anything small; as, for instance, any fruit with a small kernel : and this amounts to the being, in a manner, disposed defectively. And, again, we say privation exists where a thing cannot be effected with facility, or in a proper manner; as, for example, that which cannot be severed is so not only in respect of the incapacity of being severed, but also in respect of the incapacity of being severed easily or properly. Moreover, privation is found in the non-possession of a thing in every way ; for a person blind is not called such from being one-eyed, but from being deprived of the power of Vision in both eyes. Wherefore, not every man is good or (Bvil, or just or unjust ; but also there are ^des of character intermediate between these.

CHAPTER XXIII;

Possession^ is denominated in many ways ; i. Four senM* in one way as the action of a thing according Jji^the^old to the nature of that thing, or according to the Sx^t^, or pctMt impulse of it. Wherefore, both a fever is said

1 Vide chapter xy. of the Categories.

l2

sion.

1 48 THB MKTAFHYSICS OF A^I&TOTLE. [bOOK J^^

to poaseas a man, and tyrants are said to possess states, and those that are clothed a garment. And in another way we term possession as that in whatever anything is inherent, M being receptive; as, for instance, the brass possesses the form of a statue, and the body possesses disease. And in another way we term possession as a thing that embraces the thin^ that are comprised; for wherein anything is com- prised, by this it is said to be possessed : as, for instance, we say that the vessel possesses moisture, and the city inhabit- ants, and the ship sailors; and so, also, the whole possesses the parts. And, further, that which hinders, in accordance with its own force, anything from motion or action is said to possess this very thing; as, for example, both the pillars possess the superincumbent weights, and just as the poets make Atlas^ to possess the heaven, so that it should otherwise fall upon the earth ; as, also, certain of the physiologists * affirm. And in this way, likewise, is the connecting said to possess the things which it connects, as if they would otherwise have severally been separated according to their own proper force. And the being in anything is expressed in a similar manner with, and as a consequence upon, possession.

CHAPTER XXIV.

1. The phrase, "Thb being from anything" is said in one way TO elvai u to be that from which a thing is as from matter; edTfirst! fafus and this in a twofold respect, either according to proper sense. ^^^ £^^ geuus, or according to the last species : as, for instance, all liquids, in a way, are from water, and the statue is from brass. And in another way we consider "the

' For example, Hesiod in the Theogony, at line 517, "ArXas S* oipav6y cvphy ix^i, &C. The origin of this fable is variously given ; perhaps the best account is« that Atlas was observed to frequent the tops of mountains, in order to observe the heavenly bodies, and thus indulge in his favourite studies of astronomy, and that from his fami- liarity with the celestial, men volunteered to assign to him this near connexion with the terrestrial globe.

' " Certain of the physiologists." Asclepius puts forward Anaxagoraa as one of these. A similar apprehension is mentioned on the part of the physicists by Aristotle, book YIIL chap. viiL; but Empedocles is the person alluded to there.

OB.ZZT.] PBOOESBIOV, PART. l49

being from anything*' as that which springs from the first moving cause; thus^ from what doth the battle arise? from invectiye, because such is a first principle of the battle. In another sense, however, is this defined as that frx)m what is composite, (I mean from matter and form,) as the parts from the whole, and the verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the house ; foJ: form is an end to be sure, but that which possesses an end is finished. And in some respects it is as the species from a part; for instance, man is from biped, and % flyllable from a letter: for these^ are from those otherwise than the statue from the brass, for fix>m the matter cognisant k> the senses is the composite substance; but also form con- aists from the matter of the form. Some things are styled in this way as '* that from anything," and others, if they ■absist according to any part of these modes : as frx)m the &ther and mother the child, and from earth the plants, beoause they spring from some part of them.

And, lastly, is this styled as that which sub- 2. secondly, in sists after anything in time, as night is said to its derived be from day, and a storm from a caJm, because the one follows after the other. But of these some are so called in respect of possessing the power of mutual change, as also those particulars just now enumerated; but others only in respect of their being successive in time : as from the equinox is made a voyage, because it is made alter the equinox, and the Thargelia^ are from the Dionysia, because tiiey are celebrated after the Dionysia.

CHAPTER XXV.

A PART is said to be in one way that into | p^,^ ^^^^ which any quantity whatsoever may be divisible; of/i^pov.apart, for always that which is subtracted from quan- ^^^^ *** '

1 rouTo is the Greek, that is, cTSm, which I have taken to refer to the two examples given.

^ Thargelia was a festival at Athens in honour of the sun, or, as others say, of the Delian Apollo, Phoebus, and Diana. It was called 80 from Uie firstfruits, 0apyij\M, which were carried about as one of the ceremonies of the solemn occasion. The Dionysia, or Ox^a, were celebrated in honour of Bacchus. For a full account of these festivals reference may be made to Potter's Greek Antiquities, book IL chap.

UO TBI MBTAPHTblUB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IT^

fcitj, so &r forth as it is quantity, is called a portion of tbat thing; thus, of three is the two in a manner called a part: and in another way that which measures it is called the part of things of this sort merely. Wherefore, two, in one way, is a part of three, as is stated, and in another 10 not 80. Moreover, those things into which the species of animal may be divided without quantity, these ako are called parts of this species. Wherefore, they say that species ar^ parts of the genus. We further caU those things parts into whatsoever anything is divided, or those things whereof the whole is made up, or the species, or that which involves the species, even as the brass is a part of the brazen sphere, or of the brazen cube, (but this is the matter wherein the form resides,) and an angle also is a part. Moreover, those things that are contained in the definition which manifests each thing, these also are parts of the whole. Wherefore, the genus is called a part also of the species, and in other respects the species is reg^ed a part of the genus.

CHAPTER XXVi.

1. Different A WHOLE is Styled, first, that from which is

te^^whoie^* a^8e°* ^0 part of those things whereof the whole hkott explain- by nature is said to consist ; and secondly, that ^^' which contains the things contained,^ so that they

form one certain thing. And this is the case in a twofold way; for it is so either in such a manner that each may be one, or that one thing may arise from these. For the universal, indeed, and that which is predicated in general as being a certain whole, are universal in such a way as that the predication of each contains many things, and that all are- one as each predicated thing is; for example, man, horse, god, is individually one thing, because all are animals. And the continuous and the finite may we regard as a whole when there may be produced one thing from many things that are inherent, especially when this is the case in potentiality, but if not in energy.

• Some copies, e.g, the Leipsic edition, insert 4y ko2 before rh xt/n*

•X^fitva I the sense is not altered. I have followed the Paris edition <^ Didot.

OaXXVIL] ENTIRKTT^ HUTILAUCN. 151

Now, of these very things rather are those , _, .

wholes which suhsist by nature than such as moce further are made by art; as also we say, in regard of the ui^iJ^^^f"^ one, that entirety is a certain unity. Further, seeing that quantity has a first principle, and a mean, and an extreme, of whatsoever quantities position does not cause a difference *'air' is predicated; but of whatsoever it does, a ^' whole ** is predicated ; and as many things as admit of both, both "whole" and " all" are predicated. There are those things, however, whose nature abides the same in the act of trans- position ; but not so with the form, as wax and a garment : for both whole and all are they styled, for they possess both. But water, and whatsoever things are moist, and number, are called "all," no doubt; yet number is not styled a whole, and water a whole, unless metaphorically. All those, however, are predicated thus of which the entire is predicated; as in the case of the one, in the case of these I say all things are predicated; as in the case of things divided we say all. this is number, and all these monads.

CHAPTER XXVII.*

But the mutilated is styled, amongst quan- ^ ^^ titles, not every indiscriminate quantity, but it mutilated, must needs be itself divisible and a whole. For ed^n'^espw?"'* two things are not mutilated when either one the whole is being subtracted, (for both the mutilation and ^°'*"^ * ^^^' what remains nowhere are equal,) nor, in general, is ary number mutilated, for also must its substance needs remain : thus, if a goblet be mutilated, still must the goblet exist ; but a number is no longer the same when a part is taken away. And, in addition to these, if also things may be of dissimilar parts, neither can all these be considered mutilated; for number is that which also contains dissimilar parts: as, for example, a duad, a triad. But, in short, none of those things of which the position does not make a difference is mutilated, as water or fire ; but such must needs be muti- lated which have a substantial position. Further, things

1 Some of the remarks in this chapter might guide us in questionf i«lating to the subject of pergonal identity. Vi^ chap. ix.

152 THE METAPHTSICS 07 ABIStOTLE. [BOOX IV.

eontinuous must needs be mutilated ; for harmony oonsiBtkig from things of dissimilar parts, indeed, also possesses position ; but it does not become mutilated.

2 The part "^^^^ ^^ addition to these, neither are thos9

thatdeterminet things mutilated, whatsoever are wholes, by the fa nSlSy"5Mt privation of any part whatsoever mdifferently. of the whole For it is not necessary that either the princip^ erenty. parts of the substance,orthose that are taken away anywhere whatsoever, ^ould make what remains mutilated ; as, for instance, if a goblet be bored it is not mutilated, but if its handle, or if any of its extremities, be, it is mutilated r and a man is not mutilated if he have fledi or spleen, but if he have an extremity taken away, and not every such indifferently; but should it be that which does not possess the power of reproduction when entirely taken away. Wherefore, bald persons are not mutilated.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

1 Genus defin- ^ENus is Styled 80 partly when there may be ed as the gene- a coutinuous generation of things that possess the^sara^spL^' *^® ^amc spccics; as, for instance, there is said cie< and of to be a gcuus of men, because as long as the generation of them may be continuous there would exist such. And it is that also from which things derive their being as the first disposing cause towards existence; for so are the EUenes styled the genus, and the lonians: the former as springing from Hellen, and the latter from lon,^ as the first generator. And rather are those things a genus that are from the generator than from the matter. For they are said to be the genus, also, that are from the female, as those from Pyrrha. Further, are they termed as the surfiice is called the genus of suoei^cial figures, and the solid of such as are soHd; for, as regards

• Hellen was supposed to have been the son of Deucalion and Pyrrha ;

bis two sons, ^olus and Doras, gave their names to the two great sub* divisions of the Greeks, the .^k)lians and the Dorians, and his grand* son, Ion, to the lonians. As to the origin of the Greek nation, tht student may consult Niebuhr on Ancient History, Lectures XXL XXIL XXIII; Qrote, vol. I. pp. 110, sqq., vol. II. pp. 315, sqq.

.] afENUS, FALSEHOOD. US

taoh of the figures, tli3 one is such a sar&ce, but the Gth^ is such a solid, and this is the subject in the differences^ which, of course, is the genus.^ Further, do we regard genus as that which first is inherent in definitions, which is predi* eated in the case of the essence of a thing the differences of which are called qualities. The genus, therefore, indeed, is denominated in thus many ways; partly according to the continuous generation of the same species, and partly accord* ing to the original moving power of the same species, and partly as matter; for that to which the difference and the quality belong; this constitutes the subject which we style matter. • And things are called diverse in genus of ^ ^^enthinw which the first subject is diverse, and in the case an said to be of which one is not resolved into another, nor ^5?®*^ both into the same, (as the form and the matter are something different in the genus,) and whatsoever things are denominated according to a different form of the predica- tion of entity; for some entities signify quiddity, and soma a certain quality of a thing, and some have a signification in accordance with our former division;^ for neither are these resolvable either into one another or into any one thing.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The false ^ is denominated in one way as i. The term a false thing; and, in regard of this, partly in &i8e, ^.Wot, the fact of its not being composed, or in the e^uiTiSentwitb impossibility of its being in a state of com- f*i^ position; as the expression of the diameter being commen- surable, or of your being in a sitting posture; for of these the former is, indeed, always, but the latter sometimes false : fo£ thus are these not in being. For things are false as many as are in being, uo doubt, but yet are fitted by nature, to appear either not such as they are, or what they are not; as, for example, a rough painting and dreams; for these^

• I havd added these words from Taylor, to complete the Bense.

' In the division of the ten predicaments — the famous or « thai it found in the Categories, chap. iv. ' Vide chap. iii. of the Sophistical EleocM.

I5i THE METAPaY»lCS OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOS

truly, are something, but not those things of which they cause an imagination or impression. Things, indeed, there* fore, are thus termed false either in respect of themselves not being, or in respect of the impression that is conveyed from them being that of a nonentity ; and a false discourse is a discourse about nonentities, so far forth as it is false. 2 What laisity Wherefore, every £ilse definition, or discourse, indeflnition is employed about something that is different amounuto. ^^ ^^^^ ^£ which it would be a true dis- course; as the discourse about a circle is a &lse one when transferred to a triangle. Now, the discourse, or definition of everything is partly as one — namely, that explanatory of the essence; and it is partly as many, since, somehow, a thing itself, and this thin^, viewed as passive, may be regarded the same as Socrates and Socrates the musical. And a false discourse is a discourse simply about nothing.

• Wherefore, Antisthenes^ entertained a silly

on the subjer? Opinion when he thought that nothing could be

nition** **^' pre<iica*®<l> unkss one, in regard of one thing, . ' by a proper definition or discourse ; the result

of which statements was, that there can be no contradiction in existence, and almost no way of making a Mae assertion. It is possible, however, to express each thing not only in a discourse proper to itself, but also in that which belongs to a different thing, — falsely, no doubt, and altogether so : not- withstanding, then, is it possible to express the same, in a manner, also with truth ; as, for instance, eight are twofold, from the definition of the duad. Some things, indeed, there-? fore, are denominated in this way false.

But a false man is called one who is ready and of the woni"'* disposed to admit false assertions of such a sort, false as appUed not ou account of anything that is different, but

to a mail* «/ ^ '

on account of their being false, and who, in the case of others, is the cause of the adoption of such false asser- tions ; as also we say that those things are false as many as create a false impression.^

' Antisthenes flourished about 896 B.O. He was the founder of the Qynics, and is too well known to require our dwelling longer on hii history. Vide Tonneman's Philosophy, pp. 91, 92, Bohn'a edition.

^ itxunaaiay. Vide note, p. &

rai. 2XX.J AOCIBBNT. 15(f

Wherefore, the reasoning in the Hippias of Plato ^ ^j^ ^^^^^ is sophistical, so &r as it endeavours to establish teracts a pw* that the same man is false and true. For one ^^^ *^* that is capable of deceiving he receives as false, and this person is one that is knowing and prudent ; further, a man who is voluntarily worthless he pronounced a better man. Now, this falsehood he gathers by induction; for one that is lame voluntarily is superior to one that is so involun- tarily, considering the voluntary lameness as an imitation of lamenesa Since, if were he lame voluntarily he would, per- haps, be a worse individual, as this also would be the case as regards moral deportment

CHAPTER XXX.1 An accident, however, is denominated as that , « , -

«<i.«i .. .■»» ii*i*i^«l« Meanings Of

which IS inherent m something, and which it is the word acci- true to affirm is so, yet not either necessarily, or JJ^^xX^ned' for the most part ; as, for example, if any one in and illustrated. <liggii^ A furrow for a plant ^ould discover a treasure. This, then, would be an accident to the person engaged in digging the trench, namely, the discovery of the treasure ; for neither does the one necessarily follow from the other, nor after it ; nor, should one be occupied in planting, does he^ for the most part, find a treasure. And the case is the same should any one who is musical be white : since, however, this takes place neither of necessity nor as for the most part, we pronounce this an accident. Wherefore, since there is something which has a subsistence, and a subsistence in something, and some of these both in a certain place and, at a certain time, whatsoever would be so, indeed, but would involve no allusion as to why it was this particular thing, either now or here, such will be an accident : nor, doubtless, IS there any definite cause of what is accidental; but the cause of this is the casual or ordinary,^ and this is the inde-

' The Bignification of the accidental is also examined into in the Posterior Analytics, book I. chaps, iv. and vi, and in the Topics, book IV. chap. i.

^ The Leipsic edition has a full stop after rd rvx6y. I have fcUowed Didot; and Taylor appears to have used the vame text.

156 THE METAPHTSICS OP ABISTOTLB. [BOCIS T

finite. Thus, it has been accidental to a certain indiyidual, his arriving at ^gina, if he has not left home for this pur- pose that he should go thither, but has been driven there by a storm, or captured by pirates. The accidental, doubtless, has been genei*ated, and will have a subsistence, not, how«  ever, so fiur forth as itself is concerned, but as &r as some* thing else is; for the storm was the cause of his going to tht port he was not sailing for, and this was iBgina. And in another way is a thing called an accident; for example, in the way whatsoever things are inherent in each thing essen- tially, and yet are not contained in the substance of that thing, as in a triangle to have angles equal to two right angles. And accidents of this sort it is admissible should be eternal, yet this is not the case with any of those othars. The reason, however, of this may be found elsewhere.

BOOK \V

CHAPTER I.

1. The chief Thb first principles and causes of entities are

«itl"nhl'!If.f under investigation ; and it is evident that the

metaphysics, , , . o j ai j /» x •

as a science. mvcstigatiou regards the causes and nrst pnu- SSJs' "^Sns/'rA ciples of entities, so fer forth as they are entities. 6v, as such.' For there is a certain cause of health, and of a good habit of body, and of mathematical entities ; likewise are there first principles, and elements, and causes; and in general, also, every science which is an intellectual one, or in any degree even partaking of the faculty of thought,^ is con- versant about causes and first principles, which we either more accurate or more simple, as the case may be. All o.* these, however, being descriptive of one particular subject,

^ Aristotle in this book, which stands sixth in some copies, proceeds to expand farther the fundamental notion of metaphysics as a science of entity. It harmonizes with physics, so far forth as both are ■peculatiYe ; and under ontology must be ranked theology, as being ha its nature eminently speculative or theoretic.

• iidpoias. See note, p. 244 of the Orgacon, ^'Bohn's Classical Library.^

IBH. X.] FHTSIGS AND MflTAl*UYSIOS. ISl

ftnd a particular genus, are engaged about this; but not con«  oeming being or entity simply considered, nor so &r forth 88 it is entity : nor do they make any account of the sub- stance of a thing, but from this one particular subject, partly from Beme mc^ng this manifest, and partly assuming an hypothesis as to substance or qidddity; they, accordingly, demonstrate the things that are essentially inherent in the genus about which they subsist, either more necessarily or more feebly. Wherefore, it is evident that there is not a demonstration of substance, nor of 'Hhe what" a thing is, that IS, of quiddity, by means of an induction of such a kind ; but there is some other mode of manifestation. In like manner, also, these sciences say nothing as to whether the genus about which they are engaged is or is not, on ac<iount of its belonging to the same faculty of thought or underBtauding» and of its making manifest the nature of a thing, and whether it is this particular thing.

But since, also, physical science* happens to YorUori be conversant about a certain genus of entity, proof of this (for about' such a sort of substance is it con- JSenwf*^*^*^ versant in which is contained in itself the first principle of motion and of rest,) it is evident that it is neither practical, nor productive, that is, effective ; for the first principle of things that are productive resides in the producer or efficient cause, whether that principle be mind, or art, or a certain capacity, but the first principle of things that are practical is free-will in the agent; for the same thing is an object of action and of free-wUl. Wherefore, if every dmnoetic &culty be either practical, or productive, or speculative, the physical dianoetic energy would be some speculative science ; but speculative about such an entity as it is possible should have motion imparted to it, and about such a substance as, existing according to reason, for the most part has not a separable subsistence merely. It is requisite, and from the however, as regards the essence or formal cause, modeofdefi. and the definition how things are so, that this J/clT* *" ^^^' should not escape our notice, as without this knowledge, at least, the present investigation would be the

• In the Physics Aristotle defines what ^(ktu is, and disouisea thi

aabjeot of motion most fully and ably. Vide Physics, books I., III^ and VIIL

l^S THE HBTAFHY8ICS 01* ARISTOTLK. [boOK T.

accomplishing of nothing. But cf things that are defined, and to which the inquiry what they are belongs^ some subsist in such a manner as the flat-nose,* and some as the hollow. And these differ, since flat-nose is conceived along with matter, for, in truth, a flat-nose is a hollow-nose; but hol- lowness or ooncavity is without sensible matter. If, there- fore, all physical or natural things are predicated in the same way as flat-nose — as, for instance, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone^ in short, animal, leaf, root, bark; in short, plant (for the definition of none of these subsists without motion, but such invariably involves matter) — it is plain how it is necessary in physical inquiries to investigate the nature of a thing, and to define it, and why, also, it is the part of the natural philosopher to institute an inquiry concerning a certain soul, namely, such a soul as is not unconnected with matter; that therefore the physical dianoetic energy is speculative is and from the G'vident from these statements. But also the case of mathe- mathematical dianoetic energy is speculative also ; ™** *'•• whether it is conversant, however, about entities

that are immovable, and capable of a separate subsistence, is a point that at present is obscure : but that certain mathe- matical systems investigate certain entities, so &r as they are immovable, and so far as they have a separable subsistence, is clear.

s Then c - Now, if there is something that is eternal and si'ty of 8uch a Immovable, and that involves a separate subsist-

iogy°proved!***" ^^^^f ^* ^^ evident that it is the province of the speculative,^ that is, of the ontological, science to investigate such. It is not, certainly, the province of physical science, at any rate, (for physical science is conversant about certain movable natures,) nor of the mathematical, but of a science prior to both of these, that is, the science of meta- physics.^ For physical science, I admit, is conversant about things that are inseparable, to be sure, but ni)t immovable;

^ In adducing here this illustration of ffifxdr-ns "pugnoBedness," so frequently found in this and other parts of his works, Aristotle is preparing the way for demonstrating the necessity of some such science being in existence of that of ontology. Vide Mr. Id aurice's analysis of the Metaphysics, in his " History of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy."

' These are remarkable wor^ and point out the connecting line between ontology and theology.

• I have supplied these words my tilf to complete the sense.

l] speoulative bouexoe threefold. Id4

and of mathematical science some are couversant about enti- ties that are immovable, it is true, ye!;, perhaps^ not sepa- rable, but subsisting as in matter. But Metaphysics^ or the First Philosophy, is conversant about entities irhich both have a separate subsistence and are immovable ; and it is necessary that causes should be eternal, all without exception, but particularly these : for these are the causes of the things that are manifest or phenomenal amongst those that are divine.

Wherefore, according to this view of things, ^ Threefold there would be three speculative philosophies; division of namely, the mathematical, the physical, the !^^f ^^ theological. For it is not obscure that if what is divine^ exists anywhere, it resides in such a nature as this ; and it is requisite that that should be the most honourable science which is conversant about a genus of things which is most entitled to pur respect. The speculative sciences, ac- cordingly, are more eligible than the rest of the sciences ; and of such as are speculative, this science of metaphysics, now imder investigation, is more eligible than all the others*

For one would feel a doubt as to whether at ^ jjointioiiDf all the first philosophy, or ontology, is universal, a'doubt as re- or conversant about a certain genus and one g^" **"*®' nature. For neither is there the same method of conducting our inquiries in the mathematical sciences ; but geometry, in fact, and astronomy, are oonvei'sant about ^ certain peculiar nature : yet, in reply to this, I would say that pure mathematics universally ^ is common to all the branches of that science, and thus that the first philosophy universally is common to all the sciences. If, then, there is not some different substance besides those that consist by nature, the physical would be the first science; but if there is a certain immovable substance, this will be prior, and the subject of the first philosophy, and in this way will subsist uni- versally, because it is the first of the sciences; and it would be the province of this science of metaphysics^ or ontology, to

• «tirep r6 0€7oy vmtpxoi This air of hesitation, here and elsewhere,

in the mention of what is divine, has roused the suspicioTis of tliA Christian world as to the theological system of Aristotle; and has U4 many to brand him with the imputation of atheism.

' I have adopted Taylor's |Mraphrastic rendering of these word%

ifiO THE XETAPllxmO» OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK ▼.

institute an inquiry respecting entity, tso far forth as it la entity, and respecting quiddity, or the nature of a thing, and respecting those things that universally are inherent in it, so &r forth as it is entity.

CHAPTER II.1

1. No science SixcE, howcver, entity, simply so called, is

• • ?of th***** b ^®^<>'^i'^*®<l i^ many ways, of which one wa&

divUioiitof" ' that which subsists according to accident, and vvaSia^^V,^ another that which is as a thing that is true,* and the non-being of which is as a thing that is false, and besides these, since these are figures of predi* cation ; as, for example, quiddity, and quality, and quantity^ and the place where, and the time when, and whatever else there is that is significant in this way: further, besides all these, is there that which subsists in potentiality, and that which subsists in energy : since, however, 1 say entity is deno- minated in many ways; in the first instance, as far as regardis that subsisting according to accident, must we declare that respecting this there exists no speculation.*

2. Practical And a proof of this statement is the following ; irS^ho^ for in no science is there any attention paid to this, building; neither in practical, nor productive, nor speculiu- tive science. For neither does one who builds a house make at the same time as many things as are accidental to the house when it is built, for these are infinite ; there is no hindrance, for example, but that the house, when it has been con- structed should prove to some persons agreeable, but to others injurious, and to others serviceable, and, as I may say, different firom all entities, of none of which the building art is snd a specula- productivc. And, in the same manner, neither tive proof of it docs the geometrician speculate into things which

om geometry. .^ ^j^.^ ^^^ ^^^ accidental to figures, nor whether

there is any difference between a wooden triangle and a triangle having angles equal to two right angles.

I Aristotle here shows that though there is no possibility of ther0 f)eing a science of accidents, yet that there may exist one conversant about the substances wherein these accidents inhere. . « Twfe book VIII. chap. X.

• Th3 T»asoning that follows is w^l woiihy of attention.

CE. II.J NO SCIENCE CF ACOIDBNT 161

And this coincidence takes place rationally; s. Thijyiew for the accidental subsists us it were in name JftSj JmS!*"* merely. Wherefore, aflber a certain mode, Plato dental confina. judiciously arranged nonentity about the art J^S^ofSie of the Sophist. For the arguments of the sophist. Sophists are employed about the accident, as I may say, most especially of all things; for they ask, for instance, whether a musician and a grammarian are a different person or the same 1 and whether the musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same ? and whether everything which may exist, yet not always, has been generated ? wherefore, whether in case A man is musical he has been made grammatical? and whether in case he is grammatical he has been made musical 1 and as many other arguments, no doubt, as there are of this kind ; for accident appeara to be a something that hovers on the confines of nonentity.^ Now, this is evident also from such arguments as the foregoing; for of those things that subsist in a different way from accidents there is generation and cor- ruption: but this is not the case with those things that subsist according to accident.

Nevertheless, however, must we further dis- 4. The nature cuss concerning accident, as far as is possible, what Se aSsWen/ is its nature, and on account of what cause it may account exists; for at the same time, perhaps, will it be eSstwice of a evident on account of what reason also there is •cience of it. not a science of it. Since, therefore, there are in entities some things that are always disposed in a similar manner, and from necessity, — a necessity that is not denominated according to what is violent, but that which we have spoken of in the case of its not being admissible for a thing to be otherwise than it. is, — and since other things, though ^hese are not of necessity, to be sure, nor always, yet are in existence for the most part, . this is the first principle, and this the cause of the subsistence of accident.

For whatever may be neither always, nor for 5. illustrations the most part, this we pronounce to be an acci- ddlnus^^^ontt dent;2 as, for instance, in the dog-days, that is, natur<j. ,

• The accident has been already discussed in the fourth book; not,,

however, Jn its present aspect. The description of it given in the oon text is ciCtious : <paiyfrai r6 trvfi$f$riKhi iyyin ri rod iiij ovros,

' Ft<2«book II. chap. ii.

i62 THB USt^FBYSiaB OF ARI8TOTLE. [bOOK T.

when the sun is in Canis, if there should preyail storm and oold, we say that this is accidental; we should not, howerer, 9peak in this manner should stifling heat and warmth be generated, hecause the latter iuTariably, or at least for the most part, is prevalent at such a season of the year, whereae the former is not. An'd that a man is white is an accident; for neither is he always so, nor for the most part: but that man is an animal is not according to accident. And for «  builder to have been instrumental in producing good health is an accident, because a builder is not fitted by nature to accomplish this, but a physician is; but it would be an aoci- •dent for the builder, his being a physician. And a cook, aiming at fumie^ing pleasure, would probably make some- thing calculated to promote health, but not in accordance with, or by virtue of, the art of cooking. Wherefore, we tBj that this would be accidental, and that in a certain respect the cook makes something that is salubrious, but, simply eom sidered, that he does not so.

6. Why the ac- ^^^ ^^ ^^^® things are there other poten- cident must tialities ^ that sometimes are productive, but of

• "*** others there is no definite art or potentiality;

for of those things that are, or are generated according to acci^ dent, the cause also is according to accident. Wherefore, since all things are not from necessity and always either are entities or are in generation, but since most things have a subsistence for the most part, it is necessary tliat there be in existence something which subsists according to accident, and that it should be such as is a white musician, who exists neither always, nor for the most part. Since sometimes, however, such is produced, there will be a subsistence according to acci* dent, and if not, all things will subsist from necessity. Where- fore, matter will be the contingent cause' of what is accidental, difierently from that which has a subsistence, for the most part.

7. The exist- We must, howcver, assume this as a begin- enceoftheac- ning of the inquiry, whether there is nothing

1 As to the dififerent sorts of potentialities, or capacities, and their modes of operation, the student is referred to the eighth book, whers the Bubj<Kit is elaborately handled.

' Thk is the germ of Aristotle's reasoning, to show from the natura of the T^ ffvfifitfiriKts the necessity of the existence of what is traa* •cendental, and of metaphysics as a sciei ce of it.

OB.in.] TO DiaffT AOCmElfT IS FATALISX. 148

lAAA subsists neither always, nor for the most ^{deot t tettM part, ot whether this is impossible 1 Accordingly, p»*nt. hi addition to these things is there something which in one way or other has a casual subsistence, and a subsistence according to accident. Shall we, however, admit that ^lat which has a subsistence for the most part, and that which has a perpetual subsistence, is not inherent in the natuire of anything, or are there certain entities that are eternal ) Con- eeanmtg these points, indeed, we will afterwards examine.

That, however, there is not a science of the ^ Thatth la aecidental is manifest ; for, certainly, every science no icieiice of is a science either of that which subsists always, ftlfflj^ed"**** or of l^at which subsists as for the most part. For, otherwise, how should one learn anything or instruct another 1 for it is necessary that the object of the science be defined, either by that subsisting always, or that having a subsistence for the most part, as that mead is usdful, for the most part, for one that is sick of fever. What, however, is beyond this it will not be allowable to affirm; namely, as to the time when it may not be useful: as, for instance, during new-moon, for either always, or for the most part, is the mead serviceable during new-moon, also; and what is dif- ferent firom these is accidental What, in truth.

aecideirtal is. and from what cause it arises, and that thereig BO science of it in existence, has been declared.

CHAPTER III.

Now, that there are first principles, and causes , ^^ ^ ^^^ that are generable and corruptible, without any- accidentaUeads thing rising into existence and falling into decay, iecewSy ™ *' is evident. For if this were not the case all things would subsist from necessity, if of that which is being produced. and corrupted there must needs be a certain cause which does not submst according to accident. For whether will this particular thing take place or not? if, at least, this be produced it will, but if not, by no means will it take place ; but this latter wiU take {^ace if something else is acooni' plished.

164' THE METAFHTfllOS OP ARI8T0TIJS. [BOOK V.

2. This argu- And SO It is manifest^ that when time is irSVbyex- Bubstracted from finite duration you will in* ampies. variably come to the present moment. Where- fore, this person will die either by disease or violence if he, at least, go forth out of the city, and this will take place if he should be thirsty, and this will happen if something else happens; and so wiU he come to that which now is, or to something of those things that have been : as, for instance, if he may have felt thirst ; and this will happen if he eats things that are pimgent to the taste ; and this, assuredly, is the case or is not : wherefore, he shall necessarily either die or shall not die. In like manner, also, if any one pass over in his inquiry to the things that have been done, the reasoning is the same ; for already does this subsist in something : but I speak of that which has been done. Accoixiingly, all things that are likely to be in future will subsist from necessity : as, for instance, the death of one that is living; for already has something been accomplished which shows a tendency towards dissolu- tion ; I mean, the existence of things that are contrary in the same body : but if the death of this person is to be brought about by disease or violence, not as yet has this taken place, but should this particular thing be effected.

3. Under what It is evident, then, that this reduction ad- ciass of cause yances towards a certain principle, and this

must wc TaQic

that of the TO principle no longer extends to anything else. ryM/3€/3»i«6.. Therefore, will this be the principle of what is casual, and there will be nothing as a cause of its generation. But into what sort of first principle, and what sort of cause such a reduction may be made, whether as into matter,^ or as into the final cause, or as into the power that imparts motion that is the efficient cause, is particularly worthy of consideration.

J CHAPTER IV.3

^{T. The "ens" THEREFORE, indeed, respecting the entity viewed in reia- ^hi^h subsists according to accident, let the dis-

' 9ri\oy Sti. The Leipsic edition has ^tiXopSti, that i«, ** palpably." ' That is, the material cause.

' Aristotle here cautions his readers a^inst supposing that he viewfi Iht inbject-matter of metaphysics, the raSy, as a synonyme with truth,

en. IV. J ENTITT IN BVLAHON TO TRUTff. 165

ousBion be dismissed, for the subject has been tion to trntb determined with sufficient accuracy. Now, that *°* fai«ehood. which subsists as true is entity, and that which subsists as &lse is nonentity, since they are employed about ^ composi- tion and division, and entirety about a portion of con- tradiction; for that which is true iuyolves an affirmation in the case of composition, and a negation in the case of division; but that which is false involves the contradiction of this division.

But how it is possible to understand what 2. solution of subsists at the same time, or has a separate * difficulty. subsistence, this is another question. Now, I mean, that things which subsist together, and that which subsists apart^ are disposed in such a way as not to subsist in a consequent order, but so as to become one certain thing ; for not in things themselves are the false and the true, — as that which is good is true, but that which is bad is false, — but m the understatiding ; and the truth and fidsehood concerning things that are simple, and concerning essence, are not in the understanding either. As many points, then, as it is requisite to examine into as regards entity subsisting in this way, and regarding nonentity, must be investigated on a subsequent ^ occasion.

Since, however, composition and division are 3. ^hy an in- in the intellect but not in the things themselves, <iu»fy about and that which is an entity after this manner is dif- l&^t is omit- fereut from those things that are properly termed ^^• entities, (for either the nature of a thing, or its being of a certain quality or quantity, or something else of the kind, doth the intellect conjoin or separate,) — ^that which, as an entity, subsists as an accident, and that which is as it were what is true — ^the consideration of these must be omitted.

or the rd fi^ty OS one with falsehood. This piece of Platonism is rejected by the Stagyrite, on the ground that it presupposes that to be a composite which he has sought to demonstrate an incomposite and pure nature. Vide book YIII. chap. x. The Leipsic edition has only three chapters in book V. It is the Paris edition, published by Didot, that adopts the arrangement I have followed.

I Aristotle has viewed this aspect of entity in his definition cf that term in book IV., and he glances at the same subject in book YIII chap. X. For the word vtpl some MSS. read vapd. « This is done in book VIII. chap x.

166 THE METAPHTBICS C^ ARI6T0TLB. [bOOK ▼!»

For the cause of the one, is indeBnite, but of the othev a oer? tain affection of the undei-stauding; and both are oonversant about ^ the remaining genua of entity, and do not render manifest any nature that is of an higher order than entity* Wherefore, let these points be omitted, to be sure; but w«  pAust examine the causes and the first principles of entity itself 80 &r forth as it is entity. And it is evident, in what va have laid down concerning the multi&rioos predication cf everything, that entity is denominated in many ways.

BOOK VLt

CHAPTER I.

. Tbe first Entity is denominated in many ways, as

division of the we havc previously made the division in the case

the°To T "IJt.', of those statements relating to its multifiuious

shown to be of predications:^ for one signification of entity is

thesame import *; , i i. j.i» • >? .jj'. j ir^*

with substance, " the what a thmg 18, or quiddity, and this uiaia. certain particular thing; and another is quality

or quantity, or each of the rest of the things that are so pre- dicated. Now, seeing that entity is spoken of in thus many ways, it is evident that the first entity amongst these is quiddity, or **the what a thing is," which signifies sub- stance. For when we say that this particular thing is of a certain quality, we term it either good or bad ; but not as of three cubits, or that it is a man : when, however, we say what a thing is, we term it not white or warm, or of three cubits; but a man or a god. But the other entities are deno-

1 Other MSS. read irofxl

' Aristotle having put out of the way certain senses in which the expression **ens*' is received by certain philosophers, now proceeds to institute a mure direci examination into the subject-matter of meta* physics, by an aoaiysis of the r6 htf into its component significations.

' Vide book IV. chap. viL Taylor makes irtpl roO irohXdK'xs refer to the subject in creneral of multifiBrious predication. In this case Aris* iotle refers to the Categories, chaps, ii. iii iv.

OH. L] 8UBDIVISI0:rS OF ISXTITT. l^

minated so in regard of belouging to entity that, is really Bueh; some, to wit^ as being qiiantities, and some qualities, and some passions, and others, some other things 43f the sort. Wherefore, one might feel perplexed as to wbiBther walking,' and health, and editing, were each of them an entity or a nonentity. And, in like manner, alsp, is it the case with any whatsoever of the other things of this kind respecting which similar doubts are entert^ed ; for none of them ia adapted by nature either to subsist essentially or is capable of being separated from substance, but rather (if I may express myself so) this is to be said of any amongst the entities which is walking, and sitting, and being in sound health. And these rather than those appear to be entities, because they have .some definite subject, and this is substance, and the singular which appears in the category of this kind ; for that which is good, or the sitting posture, is not expressed without this^ also. It is evident, therefore, that each of those also subsists on account of this.' Wherefore, that which is primarily entity, and not any particular entity, but entity simply or absolutely, will constitute substance.

Tlierefore, that which is first is denominated i^i „ wh • - many ways; nevertheless, first of all is substance, stands foremost both in reason, and knowledge, and time, and Segoris.*** nature. For no one of the rest of the categories is capable of a separate subsistence, but this alone ; and in definition is this first : for in the definition of everything there is a necessity that the definition of substance be inherent. And then we think we know each particular thing, especially, when we know what man is, or fire is, rather than when we know the quality, or the quantity, or the situation of a thing ; since we then come to know each of these things ftrhen we know what the quantity of them is, or the quality.

And unquestionably, also, was that originally, s. oUia, as a and at the present time, and always,^ a subject of "^^^it" "*'

• Aristotle shows that these are not substances, but mere qualities

fbemselTes, presupposing certain ultimate subjects wherein they reside M such. Vide Mr. Maurice's *' Analysis of the Metaphysics."

' A¥tvro&rov, i.e, "& definite subject." ' 8td TttUTTfj/, i,e. ovfflayf suDsiance."

• This observation may be verified in the case of ParmenideSy Anas

igoras, Empedodes, the Platonists, and the Stoics.

16S THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VIi

riaims shown investigation, and invariably of doubt ; namely, fromusa«e. ^^^f. gj^tity is^ that is, what substance is: for some say that this is one, but others, that it is more than one ; and some maintain that things which are finite are this entity, but others, things that are infinite. Wherefore, also, especially, and primarily, and exclusively, as I may say, we must investigate concerning that which subsists as entity after this manner, as to what it is.

CHAPTER II.1

I. Opinions Now, substance seems to subsist, no doubt, iu

??JII!l*-K *v bodies most palpably. Wherefore, we say that

stance, wbetner , ,, . , * -^j r , ■• i ^ p.-i

natural or ooth animals, and plants, and the parts ot tnem, Bupranaturai. ^^ substances; and we say the same of natural or physical bodies, as fire, and water, and earth, and every- thing of this sort ; and as many as are either parts of these or are composed of these, either partly or entirely, as both the heaven and its {)art8, stars, and moon, and sun. Whether, however, these are the only substances, or whether there are others besides, or whether no one of these, but certain dif- ferent ones, are substances 1 this must be examined into. But to some^ the boundaries of bodies (as superficies, and line, and point, and monad) seem to be substances, and that, too, rather than body and solidity. Further, with the exception of things that are sensible, some are not of opinion that there is anything in existence of the kind, but others, that there are many such, and that especially those entities have a subsistence which are eternal ; as Plato considered both forms and mathematical entities as two substances, and, as a third, the substance of sensible bodies. But Speusippus,^ starting

• This chapter contains an examination into the primary one of the

categories. Vide Categories, chaps. iL iii

^ Aristotle here gives us a condensed view concerning the theories •KtpX jilHrlOf which already had been discussed at large in book I. He glances at the systems of Plato, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Speusippua.

' Speusippus was a pupil of Plato, and succeeded his master ; he was the earliest adherent to what was called the first academy. The successor to Speusippus was Xeuocrates, who held similar opinions to those ascribed to Speusippus in the text. Tenneman, p. Ill, Bohn*t edition.

OB. III.] OPINIONS ABOUT SUBSTANCE. 169

from one, says that there are many substances and first prin- ciples of each substance; one of numbers, but another ol magnitudes, then another of soul ; and in this way extends, therefore, the classes of substance. And some affirm that forms and numbers have the same nature, but that other things that are connected therewith, as lines and sur&ces, belong to a second class of substances as far as to the sub- stance of the heaven and to sensibles.

Accordingly, respecting these we must consider what it is that is said well or not well, and what lAqniries^re. substances exist, and whether there are certain 8j^8 »ub. ones besides sensibles,^ or are not, and how these subsist? also, whether there is any separable suostance, and why there is, and after what mode of sui)sistence ; or whether there is no substance besides sensibles 1 This, I say, must form the subject of our investigation, having first delineated substance in a sketch of what it is.

CHAPTER III.

Now, substance is denominated, if not multi- , Matter is fariously, yet, at least, in four ways particularly; subetancere-. for both the essence or the formal cause, and the prinfarysuiH universal, and the genus, seem to be substance in i«®** each thing; and fourth of these is the subject. But the subject is that of which other things are predicated, while itself is no longer predicated of any other tbang. Wherefore, concerning this point we must come to a determination in the first instance ; for substance appears especially to be the primary subject. Now, in some such manner is matter deiio «  minated substa nce, but in another way form, and in a third, that which results from, or is a compound of, these ; now, I mean by matter, brass, for instance, but by form the figure of the idea, and by that which is composed of these the statue in its entirety. Wherefore, if form be prior to

• Such philosophers as Hippo, sumamed the Atheist, and, in after-

times, the followers of Epicurus, maintained the existence merely of what was cognisant by the seuMes. Plato, Speusippus, and Xenocrates, in their speculations, developed an element exclusively transcendentaiL Vide Tenneman, Ssdct. 128; Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosu* phers, Introduction, p. 1 0, sqq . jTAnslated in Bohn's daasical Library,*

170 THE i:etaphysics of aeistotia [book Yl

Blatter, and rather than it is entity or being, also for the game reason will be prior that which is a compound of botbu Now therefore, by way of a rough delineation has it been declared what substance is at all; namely, that it is not that which is predicated of the subject, but is that of which other things are predicated. It must needs, however, be spokeu of not in this manner solely, for such is not sufficient ; for this account of it is obscure.

2. ThiB proved -^^^ further, matter becomes substance : for firom the fact if matter is not sul)stance, what else is escapes

that the rarioua i . t* u xi. xi-»

qualities of our Comprehension ; for when other things are '""'^'^ p^^P- removed away, nothing appears remaining. For ■tanee whernn Other things are the passive conditions ^ of bodies, they inhere. ^^^ ^^^ productions, and potentialities ; but length, and breadth, And depth, are certain quantities, but not sub- stances: for quantity is not substance, but rather that wherein these very qualities are inherent primarily — that is substance. But, unquestionably, if we take away length, and depth, and breadth, we see nothing left except whatsoever is bounded by these. Wherefore, to persons conducting the inquiry in this way, matter must needs appear only as substance ; and I caH matter that which essentially is termed neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor anything else of those things whereby entity is defined. For there is something of which each of these is pre* dicated from which " the being " is different, as well as from each of the categories ; for the other things are predicated of substance, but this of matter. Wherefore, that which is ulti- mate essentially is neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor quality, nor any other such thing. Neither, therefore, are negations so ; for these also will have a subsistence according to accident. In consequence of these things, no doubt, therefore, it happens with speculators that matter is regarded as substance, s. others would This, howevcr, is impossible ; for both s capa- thatVhich'u"'^ bility of Separation in its subsistence, and the eomposedof subsisting as this particular thing, seem to tonnftob?^8ub- inhere especially in substance. Wherefore, form, stance. and that which is composed of both, would appear

to be substance rather than matter. Indeed, then, as regards the substance which is composed of both (I mean composed

' This argument has already been noticed by Ariatotle, in his Review of Qreek Philosophy in book. L

COr IV.J 8UBBTAKGB AS THE FQBMAL CicVSB. IH

of matter and form), the consideration of this must bo omitted, for it is posterior aid manifest ; but somehow matter also is plain. But respecting the third substance must there be an inquiry made, for this is most perplexing. Now, certain substances of sensibles are acknowledged to exist; wherefore, in the case of these, let us» in the first place, insti- fcute an examination.

CHAPTER IV. 1

But since in the beginning of this book we i. Ariatotki' have made a division in how many ways we {SJuuyinto define substance, and of these a certain one ^«r«tdgRni- seems to be the essence or the very nature of stance, u the a thing, we must make an inquiry respecting this, '^'^^^ «^»'«*' for advantageous is the transition to what is more known.' For in this way is instruction imparted to all by means of advancing through those things that are less known to Nature to things that are more known ; and this is something accomplished, as in practical things the having made from those tfdngs that are good to each, things that are good to each generally f so, from things that are more known to oneself, the having made things that are known to himself, to be known to Nature, as well as things that are known to individuals, and such as are first, and are often but little known, and often involve little or nothing of entity. Nevertheless, however, from things badly known, to be sure, yet known to oneself, must we en- deavour to attain a knowledge of things generally known, making a transition, as has been stated, by the way of these very things.

And, in the first place, let us speak thereof ». Logioai eon- some things logically, because the very nature of J^SSttle" everything is that which is denominated as ▼< hy eZvou, for subsisting essentially or absolutely. For your sl^^wi^h^* essence does not consist in being in one that is '^® ««** *»^**

^ These remarks on the r6 ri ^p thai are most important. In th^ Posterior Analytics, book II. chap, zi., this term occurs. Mr. Owen, m his translation, renders it by "essence," i,e. the formal cause. It is translated by Mr. Lewis, in his " History of Philosophy," " the very nature of a thing.** I have adopted both together.

' This is a favourite principle with Aristotle.

' Alexander illustrates this remark by the case of a legislator pro pounding such laws as would most contribute towards the public weai

172 THB MBTAPHT8I0S OF ARUXFOTLB. [bOOE VI

musical, for not according to yourself are you musical ; your essence, then, subsists according to yourself. For, truly, not eyerything that is essentially present to a thing is the very nature of that thing ; for that is not the case with that which is so essentially present, as a white surface, since the being of a sur&ce is not the same thing with the being of what is white. But, doubtless, neither is that which is composed of both, namely, the being of a white surface, the same as the essence of superficies. Should the question be asked why it is not, our reply is, because superficies is contained in the definition of white surface. In whatever definition, then, expressive of this, this will not be found inherent, this will be the reason of the essence or very nature of each thing. Wherefore, if the being of a white surface is the being of a smooth sur&ce, the being white and smooth is one and the same thing.

3. Aristotle dis. But siucc, also, in accordaucc with the rest of queSioM** *^® Categories there are natures that are compo- touching the TO site, (for there is a certain subject to each as to nameiyr* ' quality and quantity, and the time when, and whether there the place where, and motion.) we must examine

UUIV DO S&lCl CO ^

be a definition, if there is a definition of the very nature or the^^fo™!""' *"' essence of each of them,i and, also, whether the cause of each essonco of a thing is inherent in these 1 as, for

of the catego- ■* • /• • , i i* i_ 'x •

lies, and example, if m man the essence of white man is

^**w'a»^* ^° inherent. Now, let his name be garment, what discoverable then is the being of a garment 1 but, doubtless, therein! neither does this belong to those things that are

expressed absolutely ; or, shall we say that a thing which is not essential is predicated in two ways, and that of this the one is from addition, but the other is not so 1 And in regard of this being added to another thing, it is denominated as that which is defined ; for instance, if one defining the being white should assume the definition of white man, another thing is so denominated because something else is not added to it ; for example, if a garment signifies a white man, but some one should define the garment as white, in this case a white man is, doubtless, soinething that is white, yet his essence or very nature does not consist in being white, but in being a garment. Is there, then, in short, in existence ^ Vide concluding paragraphs of shape, iv. and r.

OH. lY.] QUXSnoms about the E88BN0E. 173

such a thing as the essence or very nature of entities or not ? for whatsoever is the very nature of a thing is the essence of that thing. But when one thing is predicated of another, it is not this certain particular thing ; as, for instance, a white man is not this certain particular thing, if the being this particular thing belong to substances only. Wherefore, the very nature of a thing appertains to those things the dis- course respecting which is a definition. But not every discursus which signifies the same thing as the name is a definition, (for, in this case, all discourses would be definitions,) for the name will be the same with any discourse whatsoever. Wherefore, also, the term Iliad will be a definition ; but if it may be one of some primary thing, a discourse is then a definition. And things of this kind are such as are spoken of not in respect of the predication of one thing of another.

The veiy nature of a thing will not, accord- 4^ something ingly, be found in any of those things that are decisive on this not the species of a genus, but in these only ; for ^^^^' these seem to be predicated not according to participation and passion, nor as an accident : but, no doubt, there will be a discourse of each thing, and it will signify something of the other things, if it be a name ; I mean, that this particular thing is inherent in this, or instead of the simple assertion is there one that is more accurate ; but it will not be a definition, nor the essence or very nature of a thing.

Or also shall we say that definition, as well as 5 Another »o- the essence of a thing, is expressed in many lution pro- ways) for also the inquiry what the nature of ^°' ' a thing is, in one way signifies substance, and the being this particular thing, but in another each of the categories, quantity, quality, and whatever things else there are of this sort. For as the inquiry what a thing is also belongs to all things, though not after a similar manner, but to one thing primarily, and to others in a consequent order, so also the nature of a thing inheres in the substance simply, but ii^ other things in a sort of a way ; for also as to the quality of a thing we could ask the question what it is : where- fore, likewise, quality belongs to those things to which the inquiry what they are appertains, but not simply considered ; but just as in the case of nonentity certain speculatoi's say that it is nonentity, logically speaking, not simply, h\x%

174 THB IIETAPHTSIOB OF AEUSTCTLE. [BOOK Tt.

that is nonentity, so also is it with lespect to quality. It is necessary, therefore, to examine also how cue should speak lit everything not, certainly, at any rate, more than how tach thing subsists or is disposed. ^ _ Wherefore, now, also, since what is spoken is

6. Theconclu- 'r i. j.t_ x i» xl*

sion from this manifest, the very nature or essence of a thmg •toted'***" ^^^^ *^> ^^ ^^® manner, be inherent primarily and simply in substance, and afterwards in other things; as in the inquiry what a thing is, the essence or very nature of that thing will not be inherent simply, but with the addition of quality or quantity will the essence be inherent. For it is requisite to speak of the existence of these entities either equivocally or with addition and ablation, as, also, that which is not the object of scientific knowledge is a thing that may be scientifically known ; since this is correct, at least, neither to speak of these equivocally, nor in like manner, but just in such a way as what is medicinal is pro- iicated in reference to one and the same thing, without, however, being one and the same thing, and yet, indeed, is not equivo(^y predicated either ; for no medicinal body IS t^med a work and an apparatus either equivocally or according to one, but in relation to one thing. 7. This conciu- Therefore, in whatsoever way one chooses, tion vindicated, indeed, to express ^ these things makes no dif- ference. This, however, is evident, that definition, primarily and absolutely considered, and that the essence or very nature of a thing, belong to substances. Notwithstanding, they belong to other things, also, in a similar manner, except not primarily. For there is no necessity, even though we should admit that a name has the same signification with a certain discourse, that a discourse about that which the name signifies should be a definition of this ; but this will take place if the name may have the same signification with a discourse, at least a certain discourse. And this takes place if it be of one thing not by continuity, as the Iliad, or whatever things else are one by connexion, but if it is as multifariously expressed as one thing is. Unity, however, is predicated in as many ways as entity ; and entity signifies partly this particular thing, and partly quantity, and partly quality.

> The question as regards the r6 n ^v ^Ivau has been thus settled ; snd here we have a summary view of Aristotle's decision thereupon.

OB. ▼.] CERTAIN BOUBTB VXFRESSBO. 175

Wherefore, also, of white man will therie be a certain discoorae and definition ; and in another way will there be the same, both of that which is white and of substance.

CHAPTER V.i

This statement, however, involves a doubt — in i. Thefongo. case any one denies definition to be a discourse {SIo'wmTwo* subsisting £rom addition — of what the definition nwtten of will be of those things that are not simple, but *®"^^' connected together ; for from addition it is necessary Ix) make them manifest. Now, I say, for instance, there is nose and hol- lo wness, and flatness of nose — I mean, that which is called from both of these in respect of this being inherent in that ; and neither the hollowness nor the flatness of nose is^ according to accident, at least, a passion of nose, but subsists essentially; nor do they subsist as the white in Callias^ or man, because Oallias is white, to whom it is an accident to be man : but they subsist as the male in animal, and the equal in quantity, and in the same way as all those things that are said to be essentially inherent. But these are those in whatsoever is inherent either the definition or the name of which this is an afiection^ and which it is not possible to manifest separately, as it is possible to make manifest the white without man, not 80, however, the female without animal. Wherefore, the very nature and definition of these are either of nothing, or, if there is a definition of these, it is in a manner otherwise from what we have declared.

And there is also another matter of doubt about 2. second sub- these. For if, in truth, a flat^nose and a hollow- Ject of doubt. nose are the same, the same thing will be the flat and the hollow ; but if not, on account of its being impossible to use the word flat even without the thing of which it is an essen- tial afiection, and if flatness of nose will be a hollowness in the nose, the speaking of flat-nose either is a thing not possible, or the same thing will be said twice over ; as thus, nose ia hoUow-noBe ; for the nose, that is, the flat-nose^ will be a hollow-

1 AriBtoUe is viewing the rd 6v from a logical point of view, which will account for this book being ao much ocoupibd with the subjeci of definition.

176 THR METAPHTSICB OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK VL

nose. Wherefore, the inherence in things of this sort of what is the essence or formal principle would be absurd ; and if it were not absurd there would be a progression ad infinitum; for in a nose, a flat-nose, will there further be inherent some- thing else that is essential. It i& evident, therefore, that of Bubetance only' is there definition ; for if it were also of the rest of the categories, it must needs be from addition, as in the definition of quality and unevenness; for it is not framed without number, nor is the definition of female framed with- out animal Now, definitions formed from addition I call those in whatever the same things happen to be said twice, as in these.

8. Aristotie'a And, if this be true, neither will there be defi- ■*P^y* nition of those things that are conjoined together

as of an odd number : it escapes their notice, however, that not accurately are the definitions of these things expressed by them. But if there are definitions of these things also, doubtless in a difierent way do they subsist ; or, as has been affirmed, definition must be spoken of as subsisting in many ways, and so with the essence, or the very nature of a thing, likewise. Wherefore, in one way there wiU not be a definition of any of these, nor will essence be inherent in any one of these, save in substances ; and in another way they will be inherent. That, therefore, indeed, definition is a discursus or description of the very nature or essence of a thing, and that the essence or formal principle belongs either to substances only, or especially both primarily and simply, is manifest

CHAPTER VI.

I. The qiies- Let US uow condder whether the essence or IjS'ersen^e^ind v^iy nature of a thing, and each individual thmg, each thing are the same, or different 1 For this will be of JsseiTre isl'be advantage in reference to the inquiry concerning the same r substance; for both each particular thing does not seem to be different from its own substance, and the

\ It is important to observe that Aristotle withholds definition from all the categories save substance, and makes this a ground for the existence of a certain ultimate subject-matter, ar that wherein the tcveral qualities in bodies might inhere. Videvp. 67,170.

OE. ▼!.] A ^EmON ABOUT ESSBKCS.^ 177

easenoe, or very nature of each thing, is said to be the sub- Btanoe of that thing. Therefore in the case, no doubt, of tilings that are predicated according to accident, these would seem to be different, as that a white man is a thing different from the being of white man. For if they were the same, both the being of man, and the being of white man, would be the same ; for man and white man, as they say, are the same thing. Wherefore, also, the being of a white man, and the being of man, would be the same. Or is there no necessity for whatever things that are according to accident to be the same, as those things that have an essential subsistence? for not, in ^e manner, do the extremes become the same. But, perhaps, at least, it would seem to happen that the extremes should become the same according to accident; as, for instance, the being of white, and the being of a musician ; but this does not seem to be the case.

And as regards things that are predicated « xhatthe absolutely there always is a necessity that they are the same in be the same, as must take place if there are Jhfng8*predi- oertain substances belonging to which there are cated abto- not different substances, nor different antecedent ^^^^^' xiatures, such as some a^rm ideas to be. For if the actual good be a different thing from the being good, and animal from the being animal, and entity from the essence of entity, there will exist both different substances, and natures, and ideas, besides those mentioned; and those substances will be prior if there be in existence the essence of substance. And if they are, indeed, unconnected one with another, of such there will not be a scientific knowledge, and they will not be entities. Now, I mean by the phrase " un- connected," if neither in the actual good is inherent the being good, nor if the existence of good pertains to this; for the scientific knowledge of each thing subsists when we know the essence or very nature of each thing: and in the case of what is good, and of other things, the same takes place. Wherefore, if the being good be not good, neither will the being in entity constitute entity, nor that in unity be unity. In like manner, also, all or not one of the essences will have an existence. Wherefore, if neither it be so with the being in entity, neither will it be so with anything else. Further, in whatever is not inherent the being good is not good.

iTjS T^M nmsAimsuxk of abisiohiB. [BooKn

4, Dedoeiioft Accordinglj, it is necessary that the good and ftom this. ^g being of good ^ be one, also the fid: and tht being fiiir; in &ct, whatsoever things are not predicated ol another, but have an absolute sul)si8tence, and are thiagi which are primary. For, also, this is sufficient if it takas place, even though forms may have no existence ; but rather, perhaps, if forms do subsist. But, at the same time, it is evident that also if ideas are such things as some say they are^ the subject of them will not be substance ; for it is neoeaeazy that these be substances, I admit: but it is not neoessaiy that they be predicated of a subject, for in this will they be inherent by participation. And, doubtless, from these argu- ments it is evident that each particular itself, and the essence, not according to accident are one and the same thing, and that to have a scientific knowledge, at any rate, of anything is to know scientifically the very nature or essence of that thing. Wherefore, according to this exposition, it is requisite that both be a certain one thing. 4. That they But that a thing predicated according to aooi- ^JL^iJ^i^ dent,2 as the musical or white, should be the same

saine in tn6 '

case of what is as the vcry nature of a thing itself on account of c^ding^toacoi. ^^^ twofold Signification of that in which it is an dent. accident and tiie accident itself, this is not a true

assertion; so that in a certain respect a thing itself is the same^ and in a certain respect is not the same, with the very nature of that thing. For the being of man is not the same with that of a white man; but so fiar as the essence of man ii passive to whiteness it is the same. Now, it would appeae absurd, also, if any would impose the name on each thing of the essences; for there will be another essence besides also tliat : as besides the essence of horse there will be a dififerent essence of horse. Although what hinders certain essenees even from being now directly the same as the things of which they are the very natures, if the very nature of a thing be substance 1 But, truly, not only are they one, but also the definition of them is the same, as is also evident from the statements that have been made ; for to be one and one are

' It is not quite obvious what difference Aristotle had in his mmi3( between the phrases rd tlyat dyaOu and r6 elmi dyaOSu,

• I have adopted Tftylor's reading of the text, anf given his tniae»

MoL of it

til]' distinotions about oexebation; 179

Bot aocoiding to accident. Further, if they be different they will go on in a progression ad injiatiium; for the one will be the CBBence of being one, but the other the one itself. Wherefore, also, in the case of those will there be the same definition* ThaXf therefore, in the case of the first existences, and o. things predicated essentially, the being of each thing, and th«t very thing itself are one and the same thing ifc evident.

As regards, however, the refutations of the ^^ iof^sts in reference to this position, it is palpable fdutions oftk* that they are decided by the same solution; for JSJldth/rcbj. example, these sophists inquire whether Socrates and the being Socrates are the same ? For there is no differ- ence in the things either from which one would ask the question, or firom which he should light upon an answer in bis attempted solution of it. How, then, the essence or very nature is the same, and how it is not the same, with each particular thing, has been declared.

CHAPTER VII.

Now, of things that are being produced,^ some i. certain dii- are produced by Nature, and others by Art, and *^^**®P* *° '•" others firom Chance. All things, however, that are Son exempli^ produced are produced by means of something, of^th?n*^*nSu- and from something, and become something. But »!, and aitifi- I mean that they become something according to *'***» *^'^*^"*i' each category; for they are generated either as quiddity, or quantity, or quality, or the place where. But generations — the physical or natural ones, I mean — are those, imquestionably, of which the generation is from Nature, and that from whidi they are generated is that which we denominate matter ; but^ that by means of which they are generated belongs to some one. of those things which have a subsistence by Nature ; and that which is some particular thing is man or plant, or some one of the things of that sort which we affirm to be especially sub-

' Ariitotle prooeads to discusB the sabject of generation, in order to ettabliBh afresh the point he has already laid down ; and that is, that there subsists no form separate from any thing, but that there resides bi eaeh thing; essential to it, such a producing power as along with the 8xi| generates that thing. He now exemplifies this in the case of the three enumerated modes of generations.

n2

180 SHI MBTAFHT8IGB OV ABISTOTLB. [^OOktt

Stances. Now, all things which are produced either by NatQM or Art involve matter, for it is possible for each of them both to be and not to be; this capability, however, ia ths matter in each. And, in general, Nature^ is even that £kt>m which a thing proceeds, and that according to which entitiet are generated is Nature likewise : for that which is being produced has a nature; as, for example, a plant or animal, and that by means of which a thing is generated is Nature herself, which is predicated according to the species, and is of the same species ; but this is inherent in another, for man begets man. In this way, therefore, are produced the things that are generated through Nature: and the rest of the generations are denominated productions or operations. All operations, however, ai-e either from art, or from potentiality, or the understanding. But of these some are produced, also^ from chance and from fortime in a similar way, as in the case of those things that are produced by Nature ; for th«re also are produced some things that are the same both from seed and without seed. Respecting, indeed, these,* then, we will subsequently institute an examination. From Art, however, are generated those things of whatsoever there is a form in the soul. But I mean by form the essence or very nature of each thing, and the first substance. For, also, of contraries in a certain manner is there the same form ; for thus the substance of privation is the substance that is the one opposed, as health of disease ; for by the absence of health is disease made apparent, and health constitutes the principle in the soul and in the science.

2. Exempiifica- Th© salubrious, howevcr, is produced when the

• »2.n'.^oO'Ojthe physician reasons thus: since this is done for

pie^in"ach of* the sake of health, it is necessary, if this will be these. salubrious, that this particular condition should

exist; for example, evenness, and, if this take place, that the result be heat. And so he always reasons, until he conducts you to that which he himself can accomplish last. Accord- ingly, now the motion which begins from these is called the operation that tends towards becoming healthy. Wherefore, it happens that in a certain manner from health is generated

• The term ^6(ns has ah-eady been explained in book IV» ; and thi

distinctions there laid down are well worthy of attention.

ko

' Vide chap. IX.

til] fre-existenoe involved in generation. 181

healthy and a house is constructed from a house; namely, tiiat which involves matter arises, or is generated, from that which does not involve a connexion with matter: for the medicinal and the house-huilding arts are the form, the one of health, and the other of a house. Now, I mean by substance not involving any connexion with matter, the essence or very nature or formal cause of a thing. Of gene- rations, however, and of motions one is termed thought and another operation ; that is termed conception or thought which arises from the first principle and the form, but that is operation which takes its rise from the thought or conception of what is ultimate. In like manner, also, is produced each of the rest of those things that are media; now, I say, for instance, if health is to be restored there must needs be a reduction to equality secured. What, then, is this reduction into a state of equality? It is this par- ticular result. But this particular result will take place if heat shall have been promoted. And what is this f It is this particular effect Now, this effect is inherent iu capacity, but the former already lies in the power of the physician. Now, that which brings about the result, and whence the motion of restoring health derives its beginning, if it springs from art, such is the form that is in the soul ; but if it arises from chance, it arises from that evidently which, for once, is the principle of bringing about the change to one that acts from art : as also, perhaps, in the case of restoring health, the first principle originates from the com- munication of heat ; and this result it accomplishes by means of friction. Accordingly, heat is either a part of health, (I mean, such heat as inheres in the body,) or there follows it directly aome such thing as is a part of health, or this is accomplished indirectly, that is, by means of many media. This last, how' ever, is that which produces the result, and in this way is part of health, as stones are parts of a house, and something else a part of other things.

Wherefore, as it is said, it is impossible ^ that 'in^J^t^^'®;:^. there be a prodution of anything if nothing may supposes a pre-exist That certainly, therefore, a portion SeSl?^^"'

• > ThiB is the great dogma Aristotle is endeayouring to establish, in

order to erect tiiereupon a eyfitem of ontological science, — dHtwroi

182 THB MRTAFHTSIOS OF ABI8I0TLB. (BOOKn.

will exist necessarily is evident; for matter is that part, for this is inherent, and is itself produced. But then, as «uch, is it to be classed amongst those things that are ooa- tained in the definition. And in both ways we denominate the brazen circles what they are, speaking of both the matter that it is brass, and the form that it is such a figure, and this is the genus into which it is first posited. But a braiea circle involves matter in its definition. «. A miscon- But that from which, as from matter, some mSht\ri8e' things are formed is styled, when it is so formed, from this dog- not that from which they are formed, but k ma obviated. ^^^^ something else that is of thU ; as, for example, a statue is called not a stone, but of stone or stony* And a man who is in a state of convalescence is not denomi- nated that from which he recovers back his health ; and a cause of this is the following, that that arises from privatiQar and the subject which we call matter : as both a man and a person that is indisposed become healthy. Rather, however, is health said to arise from privation — as one in healtii from one that is indisposed — than from man. Wherefore^ a sick person is not denominated as one that is sound in health ; but this is affirmed of man, and a man who is in sound health. And in regard of those things of which the privation is obscure and nameless, as in the case of the brass, whatever be the figure, or in the bricks and timbers of a house^ those things seem to arise from these : as, in the instance above adduced, one that is in health from a person that is indisposed. Wherefore, as neither that which is produced is called by the name of that from which it is formed, in the case of the instance above adduced, so neither in this instance is the statue called wood, but derivatively is classified as wooden, not wood, and as brazen, but not brass, and stony, but not stone ; and a house also is spoken of as made of bricks, but not as bricks : since, if one carefully examines, he would not say absolutely that either is the statue produced from wood, or a house from bricks, on account of its being necessary that whatever ^ is produced from anything should be changed front that from which it is produced, but should not continue as it was before. Therefore, on account of this, indeed, the thipg is expressed in this manner.

> This is the sense put upon the&a words by Taylor.

OB. Tm.]^ KO GBNERATION Of VORX. 48S

CHAPTER VIII.

SoTOB, however, that which is produced is pro- 1. No frenen. auced* both by something (now, I mean that JISTep'J^ whence also originates the first principle of gene- «<«•»• ration, that is, its efficient cause) and from something, (but kt this be not privation, but matter, for already has it been defined in what manner we have denominated this,) also must there be that which is produced ; and this is either a sphere or a circle, or whatever else of the other things that may chance to present itself; as neither the efficient cause produces the subject, (I mean, the brass,) so neither does it make the sphere, unless by accident, because a bi*azen sphere is a sphere ; but it does not produce the sphere itself. For the production of a certain thing of this kind is the produc- tion of this particular thing fi*om the eiitire subject. Now, I say, that to make the brass roupd is not to make the round or the sphere, but something different, such as this form in another thing. For, if the artist produces it, he would produce this fi*om sometl^ng else; for this would be the subject : as, for example, to make a brazen sphere ; and this the artist makes in this manner because from this particular thing which is brass he forms this which is a sphere. If, iherefore, also, he produces this very thing, it is evident that tn like manner he will produce another; and the productions -will go on in a process ad infinitum, ' It is palpable, then, that neither form (or by . « ^ ^. ,

• .^* . 1^ t> .. *• But that

Whatever name we must needs term form, as it what i» com- subsists in that which is cognisable to sense) is JlSter^and

S reduced, nor is there a generation thereof, nor form is gen«- i this the essence or very nature of a thing ; "****' for this is that which is produced in another subject either from Art, or from Nature, or potentiality, and the efficient cause it is which produces the existence of a brazen sphere ; for it produces it from brass and a sphere : for into this par- ticular thing, which is the form, doth the efficient cause mould the brass, and this constitutes a brazen sphere. And if, in

■ ^ What Aristotle aims to establish is this, that it is not strictly true to say that naked form is generated, but that matter, in combination With a certain invariable form, is. This dogma may be regarded M a neoeasary flequence to the reasoning that has gone before.

184 THB MSTAFHTSICS OV ABI8TOTLE. [bOOK ft

fihort, of the being or existence of sphere there exists a generation, it will be a something that is a generation fix>m a certain thing : for it will be necessary that what is prodnoed always be divisible, and that this should be this particular thing, and that should be something else : now, I mean that this should be matter, and that form. Therefore, if a sphere be a figure equal firom the centre to all points of its periphery, of this one part will be that in which that which produces will be inherent, and the other part that which resides in this part; but the whole is that which has been produced or generated : as, for instance, the brazen sphere. It is evident, therefore, from the statements that have been made, that what is denominated as form or as substance is not generated, but that the union ^ which is said to take place according to this is generated, and that in everything which is being produced matter is inherent, and that one part is matter, but the other form.

Whether, then, is there any sphere besides ratfft^\hings thcsc Components, or is there a house besides not the causes the bricks ; or shall we say that if this were eitbe^p^ ^ ' the case neither would this particular thing ^wiU:^^^ ever have been produced, save that it ^ signifies a particular thing of this sort % This, however, also, is not defined ; but it produces and generates such a particular kind of thing from this particular thing, and, when it has been generated, it is this particular thing with such a quality* And the whole of this particular thing is Callias or Socrates, just as this is a brazen sphere, and man and animal are, in genelral, as the brazen sphere. It is evident, therefore, that the cause of forms, (as some have been accustomed to denominate forms,) if there are certain natures of this sort in existence besides singulars, in no wise is useful towards both generations and substances ; nor would essen- tial substances have a subsistence on account of these, at least, or, per wodtiw It is, accordingly, evident that in the case of ^Kwpiaru, some things, also, the generator is such as that

1 avvoZo^ is the word translated " union ; ** it corresponds with tha Latin *'concursuB:" it was s term in astronomy employed to desigOAte what we call conjunction between two stars.

' I have followed the text in the Leipsic edition. Didot reads if differently; he omits the Srt after (i\Aa, and putfi a stop after oi^ «^ /«•

IZ.] A QUESTION ABOUT AEKEBATION. 188

which is being produced or generated, not, I admit, the actual thing itself, at least ; not so numerically, but specificallj, as may be obseryed to take place in natuml phenomena ; for man generates man, unless something abnormal or contrary to nature be produced, as when a horse begets a mule. And with these is it in like manner ; for that which would be common to a horse and an ass, namely, the most proximate genus, would not have a name imposed upon it, but both, perhaps, would be as a mule. Wherefore, it is plain that it is in no wise necessary to provide a form as an exemplar or model,^ (for in these, that is, in things sensible, especially, investigators from time to time have searched for them, for these same in an eminent degree are substances ;) but for the generator it sufficeth to have produced, and to be the cause of the subsistence of form in matter. And the entire now of such a form in these things, such as flesh and bones, is Callias and Socrates, and different, no doubt, is a thing on account of the matter thereof ; for matter in each thing is dif- ferent, but in form it is the same, for the form is indivisible.

CHAPTER IX.

Some one, however, may doubt, perhaps, why ^ .^^ ^^^^ some things are produced by both art and from things are pro- chance, as health, but other things are not pro- and^hwlw.*'* duced in this way, as a house. Now, a cause of an* »ome ar«  this is the following, — that the matter of these, which is the first principle of generation, consists in the ac- complishing and the production of something of those things that are artificially formed, in which there is inherent a certain portion of the thing, which matter is partly of such a kind as is capable of being moved by itself, and partly is not so ; and of this one part is it possible to move in this par^ ticular way, but the other it is not possible ; for many things involve the capacity of being moved by themselves, but not in this way : for instance, to leap. As regards those things, therefore, of which the matter is of such a kind, as stones, it is impossible for them to be moved in this way, unless b;f

. ^ This same reasoning is put forward in book I. chap. viL, and in book XIL chap. iv.

tS6 THE HSTAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [^OOK JL

isometfaing else, — ^yet in this way, assuredly,^ — and it is w with fire. On account of this some things will not be with- out that which is in possession of art ; whereas other things will be, fur they will be moved by those things which do not possess art, no doubt, but are themselves capable of beii^ moved either by other things which do not possess art, ot possess it partially. But it is evident, from the statements that have been made, that also all things, in a certain manner^ are generated from things that are equivocal, as those that have a subsistence from Nature, or from au equivocal portion,—- fi3r example, a house from a house, — or by reason of intellect ; for art is form, either from a part or from that which posp flesses a certain part, if it be not produced according td accident For the cause of the production is an essential first j^ortion.

8. niustrations ^^^ *^® ^®** (which is involved in motion) has .of the forego- generated heat in the body, and this is, unques* ■ tionably, health, or a part of health, or there fol-

lows it a certain part of health, or health itself. Wherefore^ also, it is said to be a producer, because that produces health on which heat follows, and to which it is au accident Where- fore, as in the syllogisms substance is the first principle of all things, (for from the tiature of a thing are syllogisms,) so, also, in this instance, are generations. And, in like manner, also, with these are those things that are by Nature con<< stituted. For the seed produces as things that are con- structed from art ; for it involves form in capacity, and that from which the seed originates is, in a manner, equivocal J for it is not necessary to investigate all things in this way^ as man is from man ; for woman also is from man : wherefore,^ mule does not originate from mule, save unless there be an injury from mutilation. Thus as many things, however, as are being produced from chance — just as in that instance— are those the matter of which is capable, also, of being moved by itself with that motion which the seed effects ; but those things the matter of which does not possess this capability, it is impossible can be produced in any other way except from themselves by generation.

' The MSS. differ as to the punctuation of this passage ; some hav«  a stop after /ueWoi, making it a question, and vcd koI rh irvp, the reply«  I have followed Taylor and Didut. . '

.OH.Z.] A. QUESTION AS REGARDS DEFINITION. 187

Not only, however, does this reasoning con« s. Whatpiovei .ceming substance maxiifest the non-production of JJttion*o?fonn lorm, but, in like manner, oonoeming all that ftomthenaton are primary natures there is involved the same S';?£lS;?o^ reasoning in common, as of quantity, quality, and "* mtot tii* ,the rest of the categories. For as the brazen ^ ^^ **° **' sphere is what is produced, but not the sphere or the brasSi ftnd as it is so in the case of brass, if it is what is produced,

ffor always it is necessary that there pre-exist matter and brm,) so, also, must it be in the case of ** the what smything is," or quiddity, and in the case of quality, and quantity, and similarly of the rest of the categories ; for there quality is not produced, but such a sort or qutdity of wood, neither quantity, but such a measure or quantity of wood, or au animal of such a kind. But from these statements may we acquire what is a peculiarity of substance, namely, that there is a necessity that there should always pre-exist a different sub- stance, (I mean, one subsisting in a state of actuality,) which produces : as, for instance, an animal must pre-exist if an animal is produced ; but this is not necessarily the case with quality or quantity, unless in potentiality merely.

CHAPTER X.»

But since definition is a sentence or expla- ]. igtheden- hation, and every sentence or explanation has "iJiJVI***" parts, and as a sentence is similarly related to the m that'of^the thing itself, as the part of the sentence to the part ^*»®*® ' of the thing itself, the doubt now suggests itself whether it is necessary that the definition of the parts should be inherent in the definition of the whole, or not ? In the case of some things they appear to be as things that are inherent^ but in the case of others it is not so. For thus the defini- tion of a circle does not involve that of its segments ; but the

' I have fbllowed the Paris edition of Bidet. Taylor seems to have read the passage in the same way.

• This chapter is most important; and though it would seem

obscure, yet its apparent unintelligibility may be cleared away by bewv ing in mind that Aristotle's entire reasoning turns on the distmctioa between logical and material definition.

IBS THE HETAPHTSICS OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK VL

definition of a syllable involves that of the letters of speecti : notwithstanding that the circle, also, is divided into segments^ as, likewise, is the syllable into letters or elements of speech. But, further, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute be a part of the right angle, and the finger of an animal, the acute would be a thing that is prior to a right angle^ and the finger to man.

s. The aflinn- Now, thoso do not scem to be prior ; for in Btive of this the definition they are denominated from them, M regiu^s"^" and also are they prior in their being capable some rues, and of subsistence without One another: or shall we other* the ne- Say that part is denominated in many ways, of gative is true, ^jjich One mode is the measurement accord- ing to quantity? Let, however, the mode of the subsist- ence of this be omitted ; but into those things of which substance is composed, as from parts, we must institute an investigation. If, therefore, the one be matter, but the other form, and the third that which is composed of these, and if substance be both matter and form, and that which consists from these, it is the case that also matter is termed in one respect a part of something, but it is the case that such is not so in another respect ; but this is true as regards those things of which the definition of form consists : as, for instance, of hollo wness, indeed, the flesh is not a portion, for this is matter from which hollowness is pro- duced J but it is a certain portion of flatness of nose, and of the entire statue, no doubt, is the brass a part, but of that which is denominated as the form of the statue it is not so ; for by form must we predicate, and so far forth as everything involves form : never, however, is the material to be essenti- ally predicated.

s. What it is Wherefore, the definition of a circle does that givesrise not iuvolvc that of its Segments ; but that of ence uiustrat- a Syllable docs involve the definition of the

• ^- elements of speech, for the elements of the defi-

nition are parts of form, and are not the matter thereof : but the segments of a circle thus are parts — as matter — in which the circle is ingenerated ; they are, I admit, nearer to form than the brass when roundness is ingenerated in the brass. Put it will be the case that neither all the elements of the syllable will be contained in the definition of syllable ; as, fot

OB. Z.] DISCUSSION OF THIS QUESnoIT. 189

instance, these waxen letters,' or those which are in the air, for now, also, are these a part of the syllable as sensible matter. For, also, it does not follow that because a line if divided into halves is corrupted, or^ a man when divided into bones, and nerves, and flesh, that therefrom they are in such a manner, on this account, composed as though they were parts of the substance, but that they are composed from them as from matter. And they are parts of the entire, to be sure ; but they are not any longer parts of form, and of that about which the definition is concerned only. Wherefore, neither are they found in definitions. Of some definitions, indeed, therefore, will there be inherent the definition of parts of this kind, and of others it is necessary that it be not inherent, unless such be the definition of that which is taken together ; ^ for, on this account, from these as from first prin- ciples do some things consist, into which they are corrupted, and others do not consist from these. Whatever things, in- deed, therefore, are assumed together are form and matter ; as a flat nose or a brazen circle : those are corrupted into these, and matter constitutes a portion of them j but as many things as are not assumed along with matter, but involve no connexion with matter, as the definitions of form merely, these, however, are not corrupted either entirely, or by no means ^ in this way, at least. Wherefore, things that fall not under these are the first principles and parts of those^ but of the form are these neither parts nor first principles. And, on this account, a statue of clay is corrupted into clay^ and a sphere of brass into brass, and Callias into flesh and bones j and, further, a circle is corrupted into its segments, for there is something which is assumed along with matter ; for equivocally is the circle predicated, both that which is predicated simply, and those that are singulars on account of there not being a proper name for singulars.

' This illustration makes the reasoning of this chapter quite plain. A syllable composed of letters of wax can be defined only materially ; whereas, viewing it as made up of certain elements of speech, logical or formal definition is only in such a case applicable.

• This passage is differently punctuated in the Paris and Leipsie

editions. I have followed the former; and Taylor seems to have used a similar text.

' a-wfi\nixfA(vov, %.e. an entirety composed of matter and form.

• 0^701 is the reading I have followed; ihe Leipeic edition, trndsk <(<w'

190 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK Tt

A more ex Therefore, indeed, also, has the truth now been piicit Aoiution declared, yet, nevertheless, let us express our- tto?;' fiJItTas selves more clearly ^ on resuming the subject As reprds the many things, therefore, as are parts of the defi- parts or of ^ ^ nitiou, and into which the definition is divided^ their gubse- these are prior, either all or some of them. But the definition of a right angle is not divided into ^e definition of an acute; but that of an acute angle is divided into the definition cf a right angle : for a person who defines an acute employs a right angle, for the acute is lesf than the right. In like manner, also, is it the case with a circle and semicircle, for the semicircle is defined by the circle, and the finger by the whole, for such a part of a maa is a finger. Wherefore, whatsoever parts involve such a rela- tion as matter, and into which, as into matter, the whole is divided, are things subsequent ; but as many as belong to the relation of definition and of substance, which subsists according to the definition, are things that are prior, either all or some of them.

5 Tiiustration Now, since the soul of animals (for this is the of thu from substauco of that which is animated) oonstitut-es the soul, &c. ^YiQ substance according to definition, and their form and the very nature or essence of such a body, if, at least, the part of each thing be properly defined, it will not be properly defined without mention uf its appropriate function ; and this, in the present case, will not subsist with- out sense. Wherefore, the parts of this, that is, of soul, are prior, either all or some of them, to the entire animal, and, doubtless, similarly is it with an individual thing. But the body and its parts are subsequent to this substance; and the substance is not divided into these as into matter^ but the entire is. To the entire, therefore, these are, in a wanner, prior, but, in a manner, are not prior; for neithw are they capable of subsisting in a state of separation ; for neither does finger belong to an animal when disposed ia every way, but equivocally so termed is a dead finger. Now, some things perish along with the whole, and these are prin- cipal parts wherein, as first, are inherent the definition and

^ ^ Clearness, as already stated, in this matter depends on the die* tinction between matter and form, and how definition in one case ia framed in reference to the parts of a thing, anl in the other is net aa

OILX.] ' SOLUTION OF IT. 191

the substance : as, for instance, the heart or brain, if mich bt the principal part, for it makes no difference which of these is of such a kind. But man and horse, and those that are so^ are found in singulars. And an universal substance does not subsist ; but there will be a certa.n entirety composed from this reason or formal principle, and this matter as an universal : but as regards a singular consisting from ultimate matter, this is Socrates, in the present instance, and the case is similar with other things. Therefore, also, is defi«  nition a portion both of the form (but by form I mean the essence or very natiLre of a thing) and of the universal that is composed from form and matter itself.

But the parts of definition are only the parts ^ g^^ ^^j of form ; but a definition is of that which is regards the ' universal : for the being of a circle and a circle, tSng defined and the being of a soul and a soul, are the same entering the de^ thing. And of that which is entire now, as of this cu'de, — of any of the singulars, either sensible or intel«  ligible, — (now, I mean by the intelligible, for example, th^ mathematical, but by the sensible such as are made of brass and wood,) of these, however, I say there is no definition, save that they are known by the interv^tion^ of the intellect or sense. And when they are removed away from actuality it is not evident whether they exist at all or do not exist, yet they are always expressed and made known by universal tiefinition. But the matter is unknown in itself. Now^ matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible ; that which is sensible is such as brass and wood, and such as is movable ; but intelligible matter is that which is inherent in things that are sensible : but not so fex forth as they are sensible as mathematical entities. How, indeed, therefore, ^is is so respecting the whole and part, and respecting the prior an4 subsequent, has been declared.

But as to whether a right angle, and a circle, 7. This soiu- Wid an animal, are prior to the parts into which tion adapted m. |hey are divided, and of which they are composed? queL'on^^ > my reply to this question, when any one puts it, ^^^y mooted.

' These remind us of words uttered by Locke in regard of the acquisition of ideas of qualities through the instrumentality of per* •eption rather than diseuastoa Ofi d^niticMi. Vide Essay, &c book til. chap. iv.

192 THB MSTAFHT8ICS OF ARreTOTLA ^BOOKVfc

must necessarily be, that not simply or absolutely are the parts predioated. For if, also, soul is an animal, or that which IS animated, every animal ^ is each animal's own soul ; and if the circle constitute the being of a circle, and the right angle^ the being of the right angle, and the substance, also, the sub* stance of the right angle, what particular thing, and belonging to what, as a substance, each of these is, we must state on a subsequent occasion ; for instance, of those parts that are con- tained in the definition, and of a certain right angle ; for both the angle of brass which subsists in conjunction with matter is a right angle, and that, also, contained within lines — I mean, singular lines. But a right angle that involves no connexion with matter is subsequent to those parts that are contained in the definition, and prior to those parts that are contained in the singular. But this is not to be affirmed of part absolutely. And if soul be something that is different, and does not con- stitute an animal, in this case must we both assert some parts to be prior, and other parts we must assert to be not prior, just as has been declared.

CHAPTER XI.« 

I. What sort But it is a matter of doubt, naturally, what ie fom^or^lhef ^^^ quality of the parts of form, and what sort ofvrhatiscom- the parts are not, but what kind the parts are, Song^fth which belong to a composite nature. Although, form, viewed in in casc this is uot evident, it is not possible to entirety, ^ggjjg gj^j^ thing. For of that which is imiversal and of form is there the definition ; as to which, therefore, of the parts are related as matter, and which are not so, if these be not iraanifest, neither will be manifest the definition of the thing. As many things, indeed, therefore, as appear to be ingenerated in the form of different things, as a circle in brass, and stone, and wood, these, then, seem to be manifest, because neither the brass nor the stone is anything of the substance

• This is Taylor*8 sense, which differs from that of the Latin VersiozL

' In this chapter, I take it, Aristotle wants to show the difficulty of framing logical in contradistinction to material definitions, from the &ot that we cannot always distinguish what is formal from what ii material in the thing to be defined.

XL] A QUESTIOK ABOtTT FOBIC 193

of the circle coiisequent upon its separation from them. But as many things as are not perceived to be separated there is no hindrance to their being similarly disposed with these, as if all circles were seen composed of brass ; for, nevertheless, would the brass be in no wise a part of form, but it would be difficult in thought to abstract this : as, for instance, the form of man always appears in flesh and bones, and in such like parts — are these, then, also, parts of form, and of the definition, or are they not so, but matter merely ? But, on account of its not being ingenerated in another also, we find it im- possible to separate it. And, since this seems to be admis- sible, — yet as to the time when, this is obscure, — certain philosophers now are involved in doubt, in the case both of a circle and in the case of a triangle, as if it were not fitting for lines, and that which is contained within lines, also to be defined by continuity ; but that all should be predicated in a similar manner with the flesh or bones of a man, and the brass and stone of a statue, and they refer all things to numbers : and the definition of a line, they say, is that of the duad. Of those, likewise, who assert the existence of ideas, some make the actual line the duad, but others, the form of the line ; for, in regard of some things, they say that form, and that of which the form is compounded, are the same : as, for instance, a duad and the form of the duad. But in the case of a line it is not so.

Therehappens, therefore, to be one form of many ^ ^^ ideal- things of which the species appears to be different, istic solution which consequence also ensued in their system jJnsuredT*"* unto the Pytiiagoreans ; and it is possible, as a result from this position, to make one actual form of all things, and that other things be not forms at all, although on this supposition will all things be one. That, therefore, those things involve a certain doubt, (I mean, those questions that have been started respecting definitions, and from what cause it is that they are thus attended with difficulty,) this has been declared.

Wherefore, both to reduce all things in this s. summary way, and to abstract matter, would be super- JueTtionM*r«. fiuous ; for in the case of some things, perhaps, gards the this is in this, or these things are so disposed. P"'»ofform. And the comparison that is made in th^ case of an animal,

O

194 THE MBTAPHTSIGS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK JL

which the junior Socrates ^ was accustomed to employ, is not a good one, for it forcibly withdraws one away firom the truths and makes us suppose as possible that man should subsist without parts, as a circle without brass. But this latter instance is not similar to the former, for animal, perhaps, is something that is cognisant by sense, and which cannot be defined without motion; wherefore, neither can it be defined without the parts somehow disposed. For not altogether is the hand a part of a man, but that which is able to accom- plish the proper function of a hand ; wherefore, when it is animated it is a part, but when it is not animated it is not a part. Eespecting, however, mathematical entities, why are not definitions parts of the definitions of such ) for example, why are not semicii'cles parts of the definition of a circle ? for these are not sensibles; or, shall we say that this makes no difierence, for they will be the matter of certain things, and of those that are not sensible, and of everything that is not the very nature or essence of a thing ? These, then, will not be the parts of universal circle, but of singulars, as has been stated previously, for matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible. And it is evident, also, that the soul is the first substance, and that body is matter, but man or animal is the compound of both as universal. If the soul, however, be the form of such, Socrates and Coriscus are two-fold ,* for some regard Socrates as soul, but others as an entirety: but if they be considered as this soul regarded simply, this body also will involve the relation of the uni- versal and of the singular.

4 other i Whether, however, beside the matter of such

q'uiries as re- sort of substances, there is any other substance, funce!"**^ and whether it is necessary to search for any different substance of these — as, for instance, numbers, or some such thing — must afterwards be examined into.2 For, on account of this, let us also endeavour to frame some distinctions respecting sensible substances, since, in a

• As to the younger Socrates, he was not any relation, at least it

does not appear so, of Socrates, who, in reference to this, his namesake^ was termed the elder Socrates. He is supposed to have heen a pupil of Plato, and is represented by Plato in his writings, e.g. in the Tlo\tTtKi's, conversing with the elder Socrates. Some imagine that hfl Wap a brother of Theaetetus.

> FtflSe book XIL chap. vL

OB. XI.] BEOAPrrtJLATION. 195

certain manner, the investigation regarding sensible substance is a work of the physical and second philosophy ;^ for not only is it necessary for the natural philosopher to afford in- formation respecting matter, but also respecting tnat sub- stance which subsists according to the definition, even still more. In the case, however^ of definitions, in what manner are those parts which are assumed in the definition, and why definition is one reason, — for it is evident that the thing is one, and that the thing is in a cei*tain way one definite particular, which involves parts,— this must subsequently ^ be inquired into.

What, therefore, is the essence of a thing, and 5. Recapituia- how this subsists in itself, that is, absolutely, has quesSoisIn been declared respecting everything universally, regard of defi- and why the definition of the essence of some "*'*®"' things possesses the parts of that which is defined ; but, in other things, why this is not the case, and why that in the definition, indeed, of substance the parts so constituted as matter are not inherent, this, likewise, has been declared. For they are not parts of that substance, but of the entire together ; and of this there is at least, in a manner, a defini- tion, and there is not so. For as involving a connexion with matter there is not a definition (for it is a thing that is indefinite), but according to the first substance there is; as, for instance, the definition of man is the definition of his soul. For the substance constitutes form, that is, such as is indwelling, from which and from matter the entire sub- stance is denominated; as, for example, hollo wness or concavity : for firom this and nose a flat nose, and flatness, are composed, for therein twice will the nose be inherent. In the substance, however, in its entirety, as in a flat nose, or Callias, is matter also inherent. And that the essence or very nature of a thing, and a singular in the case of some things, are the same — as in tlve Ciise of primary substances ; for instance, a curvature, and the essence of a curvature, if it is primary — that these, 1 say, are the same, this has been declared. Now, I mean by primary, or first, that which is not expressed in respect of one thing being inherent in

• The "prima philosophia '* is, of course, hyper-physicaL Ab to the

Assertion in the text, vide Physics, book II. chap. ii. ' Aristotle 3xamine8 into tiiis point in the oext chapter.

o2

i96 THB METAFHTSICS Op ARISTOTLS. [bOOKTI

another, and in a subject as matter. But as many things as subsist as matter, or as things involving a connexion with matter, these are not the same, except that they are one according to accident, as Socrates and the musical for these are the same according to accident.

CHAPTER XII.

I. Another Let US uow, howevcr, first discuss the subject

gords'defi"-"^ SO far forth as there has been no statement tion discussed, made conccming definition in the Analytics;^ for the doubt that has been expressed in those inquiries is of advantage to our present dissertations respecting substanca Now, this doubt which I allude to is as follows: "why, pray, a thing that is capable of definition, of which the reason, we say, is a definition, is one thing, as the definition of man is a two-footed animal 1 for let this stand as a definition of him." Now, why is this one thing, but not many, animal and two- footed? for also, in the case of man and white, they are many things when they are not inherent, either in the other ; but when the one is inherent in the other, and when the subject — viz. man — undergoes any passive condition, they are one, fbr then a white man becomes and is one thing. Here, however, either does not partake of the other, for genus does not appear to participate in the diflferences ; for in such a case would the same thing at the same time participate in contra- ries, for differences are contraries wherein the genus differs. And if the genus does participate in the differences, the same reasoning holds good, even though the differences be many in number ; for instance, having the capability of walking, biped, without wings. For why are these things one, but not many 1 for they are not one because they are inherent,^ for so, indeed, will there be one of all. But it is requisite that, at any rate, as many things as are contained in definition should be one, for definition is a certain single principle or

• In this chapter certain points pertaining to definition are discussed ;

Buch as had been omitted by Aristotle in the second book of the Pos- terior Analytics, where the same subject is examined into.

^ These words are supplied in Didot's, but are not found in ihd Loipsic edition.

CH. XII.] OUESTION ABOUT DEPINTFION. 197

reason, and belongs to substance.^ Wherefore, of one par- ticular thing this must needs be a definition, for also sub- stance signifies one certain particular thing, as we say.

And it is necessary, finl^ to examine respecting 2. in rebpect of those definitions which subsist according to divi- genus and dir- sions. For there is nothing else involved in defi- ®'®"*'®' nition unless the genus that is denominated first, and the difierences, but the other things are genera, both that which is first, and the diflFerences comprehended along with this; as, for instance, the first genus is animal, and that next in order to this is two-footed animal; and, again, two-footed animal without wings; and, in like manner, will it be the case if thi definition be expressed by means of many distinctive quali- ties. In general, however, there is no difference whether it subsists by many such, or by few, or by two of them : yet if a thing be defined by two distinctive qualities, the one will be difference, and the other genus, as, for instance, of two-footed animal, animal is the genus, and the other, two- footed is the difference. If, therefore, genus, simply con- sidered, is not anything different from the species, as it were, of that genus, or if, indeed, it is, yet it is as matter, — for voice is genus and matter, but the differences produce the forms and elements out of this, — it is evident, in such a case, that a definition is a sentence or discursus composed from dif- ferences. But, therefore, is it necessary, likewise, ^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ tliat the difference of the difference should, at oftheditrer- least, be divided; as, for example, a difference be- difflJeSL* longing to animal, such as having the support of feet: again, it is requisite to know the difference of the animal that possesses the differential quality of being sup- ported on feet, as fer forth as it is such — I mean, such as has the support of feet. Wherefore, it is not proper to say that of an animal which has the support of feet, one sort we find with wings and another without them, if one is to express himself correctly; but on account of the impossibility of making a proper division of the distinctive qualities will one do this : but it is correct to say so if one kind has cloven, and aLother has feet that are not cloven ; for these are the differ- ences of foot, for a cloven foot is a certain quali^ y of foot. Ani

1 Some MSS. reed aicria.

\db TlIE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK TL

BO always does one desire to go on making divisions of dis- tinctive qualities, until we come to things that do not involve any difference. But then will there be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the number of animals with feet supporting them will be equal to the/ dififerences.

3. The unity of ^^^' ^^ *^®^ things are so, it is evident the definition that the ultimate difference will be the substance b?thl'numl2r of the thing,! and the definition of it, if it is not of specified dif- necessary to say oftentimes the same things in the case of definitions, for it would be super- fluous. But this, at least, happens sometimes ; for when one calls an animal that has feet supporting it a biped, he has said no more than this, viz. that an animal having the support of feet has two feet. And if he make a division of this by an appropriate difference, he will say the same thing frequently, and in an equal number of times with the differences. If, indeed, therefore, a difference of a differ- ence may be produced, one which is the ultimate difference will constitute form and substance ; if, however, the division be made according to accident, as if one should make a division, in the case of the classes of that which has the support of feet, of one into white, and another into black, so many differences or distinctive qualities will there be as there may be divisions of them. Wherefore, it is evident that definition is a sentence that is composed from the things that are differences, and from the last of these that is drawn up in accordance with a correct classification, at least. And this would be plain, if one should transpose the arrangement of the terms of definitions of this kind ; as, for example, that of a man, saying, — instead of the ordinary definition, — animal biped having the support of feet ; for superfluous would be the distinctive quality of having the support of feet, on the supposition of the thing defined being denominated, a biped. An arrangement of terms, however, does not exist in sub- stance; for how is it necessary to understand the one as subsequent, but the other as prior? Respecting, then, definitions that subsist according to divisions ^ of the dis-

^ The unity of definition Aristotle rests on the determination of It by the ultimate difforeuce.

• Asclepius mentions that this chapter was mainly directed agaimt

OH. XIII.] ABE UN1VEB8ALS SUttSTANOEBl 199

tinctive qualities of the things defined wliat sort they are, let thus muoh^ in the first instance, be affirmed.

CHAPTER XIII.1

But since our present investigation is concern- i. Connexion lug substance, let us once more take a review of JriS^he fo™' the matter. Now, substance is said to subsist going. as the subject and the essence or very nature of a thing, and that which is composed from these is termed substance, and that which is universal. Respecting, indeed, then, two of them have we declared our opinions already ; for also we have done so in the case of the essence or very nature of a thing, and the subject, observing that in two ways it is a subject, either as being this certain particular thing, as an animal is the subject of its passive states, or it is as matter in a condition of actuality. But to some speculators doth the universal in an eminent degree appear to be a cause, and the universal appears to be a first principle also. Where- fore, likewise, as regards this point must we institute an inquiry.

For it seems to be a thing impossible that 2. Are univer- •substance should be anything whatsoever of sals substances! those things that are denominated imiversal, for primary substance, to be sure, in everything is that which does not belong to another thing ; that which is universal, however, is common, for that is said to be universal which by nature is fitted to be inherent in many things : of what, then, will this be a substance 1 for either it will be a substance of all things or of nothing ; but of all things it is not even possible that it should be a substance : and if it be the substance of one thing, other things also will be this; for those things of

the Platonists by Aristotle, who considered that they had treated the subject here discusHed superficially and unmethodically.

• Aristotle comes to be engaged in the speculations pursued in this

chapter, from the fact that me^physics being coucem&d about the rd tv, and the rd Kvpiojs hy being, as he has shown, equivalent with ottrUi, and outrla being subdivided into subject, form, the composite of both, And the universal ; and three of these being already discussed, he now comee to consider some points connected with the fourth, the 1*^ 4JiBo\oy.

800 THB fltETAFHTSIOB OF ABI8T0TLB. [lOOK Yt

which the substance is one, and the eauLuce or yery nature one, will themselves likewise be one^ Further, is that deno- minated substance which is not predicated of a subject; the universal, however, is invariably predicated of a certain sub- ject. But then shall we say that it is not possible, certainly, that it should subsist in such a way as the essence or very nature of a thing, but that it be inherent in this : for ex- ample, animal in man and horse. Therefore, is it evident that there will be a certain definition of it But there is no difference either if there is not a definition of all those things that are contained in the substance ; for this, nevertheless, will be a substance of something, as man is the substance of man, wherein man is inherent. Wherefore, the same conse- quence will again ensue, for substance will be substance of man ;^ as, for instance, animal is substance in that species in which it is inherent as a peculiar property.

t -^T^^ further, the thing would be both im- a'substance"^ possible and absurd, that this particular thing poses such"^ ^^^ substance, if they are composed from certain things, should not consist of substances, or of anything of the sort, but from quality. For that which is not substance and quality will be prior both to substance and this particular thing ; an assertion that is impossible : for neither in definition, nor in time, nor in generation, is it possible, likewise, that the passive properties of a thing should be prior to the substance of it, for they will involve a subsistence separable from it. Moreover, in Socrates, who is a substance, will substance be inherent ; wherefore, will Socrates be a substance in two substances. And in general the result following ensues — if man is substance, and as many things as are thus expressed — that none of those things con* tained in definition is substance of anything, and that it has not a subsistence separable from them, nor does it subsist in another : now, I mean, for example, that there is not any animal besides those certain particular ones, or anything else of those things that are contained in the definitions. Now, from these considerations, also, it is evident to persona examining into the subject, that nothing of those things that have an universal subsistence is substance, and that nothing

' The punctuacioQ adopted in the Leipaic edition is most confuaecj I have followed Didot'a text in preference.

OH. Zm.J THIS QUESTION DISCUSSED. 201

of those thiiigs that are predicated in common signifies thii certain particular thing, but a thing of such a quality.

And i£ this be not admitted, many other con- 4. Further ar- sequences also will ensue,* and, amongst the ^^"/univer- rest, the consequence that there will be a third sals being sub- man. Further, also, it is evident that the case ***"*'®*- stands thus, from the following remark, for it is impossible that substance should be compounded &om substances which are inherent in such a manner as to subsist in actuality ; for two things thus would subsist in actuality, yet they never would be one thing in actuality. But if they may be two things in potentiality, they will be one ; as the two-fold i«  compounded of two halves, at least, in potentiality, for actu- ality in the case of others separates them. Wherefore, if the substance be one thing, it will not be compounded from substances that are inherent, and subsisting according to that mode which Democritus mentions correctly ; for it is impos- sible, he says, that from two atoms should be generated one, or two from one, for he makes magnitudes that are indivi- sible to be substances. Therefore, is it plain that also in the case of number this will take place in a similar manner^ if number be a composition of monads, as is said by some speculators, for either the duad is not one, or it is not the monad that is involved in this actuality.

But the result which ensues contains a matter 5 ^ ^o^^,t of doubt; for if neither from the universals is it suggested by possible that any substance be compounded, on ' re"o°»n?- account of an animaFs signifying a thing of such a sort^ but not this certain particular thing, neither is it possible that there subsists any substance from substances, in actuality — I mean, that no composite nature can thus subsist ; now, on such a supposition, every substance would be a thing that is un- com pounded. Wherefore, neither would there be a definition of any substance. But, assuredly, it seems, at least, to all speculators, and has been laid down originally, that definition is conversant about substance, either solely or prncipally : but now the conclusion drawn is this, that neither is there definition of this, that is, of substance, nor will there be a definition of any one thing in such a case ; or, shall we say

• Sy nanus sides with the Platonists against Aristotle, and endear ourf

to show the inconsistency of the Stagyrite's reasoning hereupon.

SOS THE MBTAPUTSIOB OF AfilSTOTLK. [bOCK TI.

that in a certain manner there will be, and in a certain manner there will not be, a definition of substance ) What, however, that is which is afiirmed will be more manifest from the sequel.^

CHAPTER XIV.

This do a Now, from thesc very circumstances is evident

touching uni- the rcsult which ensues, to those both who say

poBM^he^fei- *^* ideas are as well substances as separable

iBcy of the Bubstauccs,^ and who at the same time constitute

e theory. ^^^.^ ^^^ ^^ ^^ genus and the diflFerences. For if

forms and animal exist in man and in horse, there is, imdoubt- edly, one and the same, or a different animal in number, for by definition it is evident that there is one and the same; for the same definition does he assign who says that they are inherent in each. I^ therefore, there is some man — an actual thing subsisting essentially — that is this certain particular individual thing, and one which has a separate subsistence, it is necessary, also, that those things from which they are composed, as, for example, animal and biped, should signify this certain particular individual thing, and should involve a separable subsistence, and be substances. Wherefore, also,

2. Illustrated ^^ ^^ ^® *^® ^^^^ ^i^ auimaL If, therefore, in the case of animal will be the same and one thing in horse

• °"^ and man, as yourself in yourself, how will it be

one in things that subsist separately % and why will not this animal subsist, likewise, apart from itself 1 If, in the next place, it will participate in the properties of two-footed and many-footed, something which is impossible ensues ; for con- traries, at the same time, will be inherent in this, which is one thing, and this certain particular thing. And if this is not the case, what is the mode of subsistence when one affirms that an animal is two-footed, or adapted for walking t Perchance, however, they are composites, and are in contact with one another, or have been mingled together. But all such suppositions as to the mode of ftubsistence in this case are absurd. Shall we say, however, that in each thing there

\ Vide the chapter following.

' Some MSS. have the word Sjm here after oia-(as.

H.XVJ ITS BBABINa ON IDBALISH. 203

subsists something that is different 1 Therefore, to speak the word, those things will be infinite of which the substance is animal ; for not according to accident is man from animal : moreover, many things will animal itself be, for animal which is contained in each individual is substance, for it is not pre- dicated of anything else. And if this be not admitted, from that will man subsist, and that will be a genus of man. And, further, all things from which man consists will be ideas ; therefore, idea will not be an idea of one thing, but a sub- stance of another, for this is impossible ; for, in such a case, each of those things that are contained in animals will be an animal itself. Further, will it subsist from this certain par- ticular thing 1 and how will it subsist from this actual cmimal 1 or how is it possible that animal should subsist — which is substance — as this very thing beside animal itself?

Further, also, in the case of sensibles, both 3. These proofs these consequences ensue, and consequences still confirmed, more absurd than these ; if, therefore, it is impossible that this can be the case, it is evident that there is not an idea pf them after such a mode as some would afi&rm.

CHAPTER XV.i

But since both entirety and the formal cause 1. poms are are a different substance, — now, I say that the in^enerabie. former is substance in this way as the formal cause that is comprehended along with matter, and that the latter is the formal cause in general, — in regard of as many things, then, as are so denominated, of these, truly, is there corrup- tion, for of these also is there generation ; with form, how- ever, there is not a disruption of parts in such a way as for dissolution to ensue, for neither exists there generation in this case; for the being of a house is not generated, but the being of this particular house : but forms subsist without any connexion with generation and corruption, and do not

1 What Aristotle labours to show in this chapter is this, that the cTSos not subsisting apart from the v\fi, whose form it determines, but merely in conjunction with it, cauuut be said to be generated. The proper mode of speaking is to say that the whole substance consisting ttf matter and form is generated.

JO^ THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOKVI

subsist in a state of dependence upon either ; for it has been demonstrated that no one generates cr produces these. And 2. Singulars, ^^ ^^^ accouut, also, of Sensible substances — I toSr^^^' *°^*' niean, such as are singulars — there is neither definition nor demonstration, because they inyolve matter the nature of which is such as to admit of the possi- bility both of being and not being ; wherefore, all the singulars of such are things subject to decay or corruption. If, ther^ fore, also, demonstration be of those things that are neces- sary, as well as that which is a scientific definition, and if it does not admit of being the case, as neither with scientific knowledge that at one time it should be scientific know- ledge, and at another time should be ignorance, (but a thing of this kind is opinion,) so neither is it to be admitted that demonstration nor definition should subsist after this mode ; but such is an opinion, in regard of that which admits of being disposed otherwise. It is evident, therefore, that there would not be either definition or demonstration of those things that may subsist differently ; for, also, things that are subject to corruption or decay are obscure to those even that are in possession of scientific knowledge, when they pass away from under the notice of sense ; and though the same reasons or principles be preserved in the soul, still will there not further exist thereof either definition or demonstra- tion. Wherefore, as regards things relating to .definition, when one defines any of the singulars it is right that he should not be ignorant that always is it possible to overturn this definition, for a thing of this sort does not admit of definition. 8. Ideas are in- Neither, therefore, is it possible for any idea definable. ^^ \^q defined ; for the idea ranks amongst singu-

lars, as they say, and has, likewise, a separable subsistence. And it is necessary, also, that definition consist from names ; but the person who is framing the definition will not create a name or nominative term, for it will be a thing unknown. The things, however, that are posited or acknowledged are common to all. It is necessary, then, that these also subsist in other things ; for instance, even just as if one should define yourself, he would say that you are an animal which is attenuated or white, or something else that will be inherent ♦. Reply to an also in another. If any one, however, would say njectioa ^i^Q^^ there is no hindrance to all things being

CB, XY.] IDEAS INDEFINABLE. 205

separatdly inherent in many, but that all collectively bebng to this alone, wo must, in the first place, say that also they would belong to both ; namely, animal biped to animal and biped. And this must needs ensue, likewise, in the case of tlungs that are everlasting ; since, at any rate, they are prior existences, and are parts of that which is a composite. But, assuredly, also, are they separable, if the thing — man — be separable ; for either nothing will be separable, or both will be 80. If, indeed, then, nothing may possess the capacity of a separate subsistence, there will not exist genus besides species ; but if both are separable, there will exist the dif- ference likewise. In the next place, because they are prior existences in respect of being, these, also, on the contraiy, will not be exposed to decay. And then, if ideas spring from ideas, (for more uncompounded are those things from which other composites arise,) it will be necessary that those things from which the idea consists should be predicated, further, of many ; for instance, take the case of animal and biped. But if this be not admitted, how shall a knowledge of these be attained ? for there will be a certain idea which it will be impossible to predicate in the case of more things than one. This does not, however, seem to be the case ; but every idea appears to be participable.

As, therefore, it has been declared, it is over- . . ,^^„ ..

1 1 J t- 1 ... .11 5. Ideas inde-

looked by these persons that it is impossible to finable proved frame any definitions or distinctions in the case ^fTteroa"?.*"'* of things that are eternal, and eminently in the case of as many things as are single ; for instance, the sun^ and moon : for not only do persons err in the addition of things of this sort, in the event of which being taken away still the sun will continue as that body which revolves round the earth, or which is hid by night. For if the sun were to stand still in his orbit, or were to become apparent by night, in such a case no longer will he be the sun ; but the thing would be absurd if he were not, for the sun signifies a certain substance. Further, such persons take for granted whatsoever points admit of being affirmed of another thing, •ust as if something else should become a thing of this sort,

1 There is no article in the original before ?un, but there is befor«  moon; the words are, fjKtos kqI t) (reX-nvvj. I lave in my -translatioij, therefore, ventured to t.rar»<»no«M» thip arf.iola.

S06 THB METAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOKTI

it is eviden that it will be the sun. The definition, then, ia common; bat the sun was classed amongst singulars in snch a way as Cleon or Socrates, whereas, why does no one of these bring forward a definition of idea? for it would become mani- fest, to those who would attempt to prove the existence of such, that what is now stated is true.

CHAPTER XVU

I. capaddcB of It is evident^ also, that, likewise, the majority substance mi8- of thosc things which sccm substances are capa«  stances^'hem- cities and parts of animals, for none of these selves. involves a separate subsistence ; but when they

may be separated, then, also, are they all of them as matter — I mean, such as both earth, and fire, and air ; for none of these is one thing, but each, as it were, a heap of immatured things before they be digested, and some one thing produced JBrom their being blended together. But particularly would one suppose the parts of animated beings, and those of the soul, to be both of them contiguous to an existence in this manner, as well in actuality as also in capacity, in respect of having the first principles of motion from something in their joints or flexures. Wherefore, some animals continue to retain life after being divided : but, nevertheless, will all of them subsist in capacity when they may be one thing, and that which is continuous by nature, but not by force, or by connascence, that is, growth in conjunction with something else; for a thing' of this kind is mutilation.

Since, however, unity is denominated ^ as also supposing the entity is, and since the substance of unity is tobethe^s^ub?" single, and those things of which there is cne stances of substancc in number are one in number, it is things. evident that neither unity nor entity can possibly

be the substance of things, as neither can the being of an

' We are now warned agwnst the needless multiplication of sub- stances. We should, however, to avoid error, bear in mind that the substance is matter developing itself to our observation under a certain form, but that the qualities reside in this compound Kara Hvyofxtp, •.& |K>tentially. These qualities are not, therefore, substances.

' Vide book XL chap, iv.

CH. XVI.] CAPACITY NOT SIBSTANCB. 20T

element or first principle be . the substance of things. But we are actually engaged in the inquiry, what, therefore, the first principle is, in order to conduct our investigation to that which is more known. The substance, then, indeed, of these is rather entity and unity, than both the first principle, and the element, and the cause ; but by no means are these substances either, if there be not anything else which is in common with substance; for in nothing is the substance inherent but in itself, and in that which is in possession of itself of which it is the substance. Further, unity would not subsist in many places at the same time ; that which is common, however, does subsist in many places at the same time : wherefore, it is evident that nothing of those things that are universals can possess a subsistence separate from singulars. But they who affirm the existence of forms,^ 3. The Platonic speak partly correct in assigning them a separable '73 ^'howfM *' subsistence, if they be substances, but speak true, and how partly incorrect, because they assert unity to be ^*' '^^*®' a form in the case of many things. And the cause of this position with these Platonists is the following : that they have no rational account to render as to what are substances of this kind — I mean, such as are incorruptible, and have a subsistence independent of singulars and sensibles ; therefore do they constitute them as the same in the species with things that are corruptible (for we know these), namely, ideal man and ideal horse, adding to sensibles the thing signified by the term ideal ; ^ although, indeed, if we had not beheld the stars, yet this would be no hindrance, I presume, to the existence of eternal substances, in addition to those which we had already attained a knowledge of. Wherefore, also, though even now we may not have it in our power to see what eternal substances are, yet, perhaps, it will be necessary that there be some eternal substances in existence, at any rate.* That, indeed, therefore, neither any of those reputed universals is substance, nor that there is any substance com- posed of substances, is evident.

' Vide book I. chap, vii., and also book XII. chap. iv.

« That is, T^ avTo.

' This is another of those passajres that Christian writers woidd adduce to show Aristotle'^ coldness, at least, in his method of handling ft&jtiiinfi inrolvin^ a reli^iuu» interest.

J08 THE UETAPHTS:OS OF ABISTOTIE. [BOOK Vl

CHAPTER XVII.

I. Summary ^^^ ^^^ *^^ ^^^* ^^* ^^ * thing We OUght

View of what to define substance let us again declare, just aa if having made another commencement ; for, perhaps, from these statements will be evident the circfum- stances also concerning that substance which is separated from sensible substances. Since, therefore, substance is a certain first principle and cause, j&'om this starting point must we pass onwards in our investigation.

But the inquiry why a thing subsists is invari- gi^ouJS on"' ahly carried on in this way ; namely, why one the assumption thiuff is inherent in a certain other: for the inves-

tnat substance

is a cause as to tigatiou why a musical man is a musical man, •uifsista^"*^ indeed, is to engage in the inquiry that has been mentioned, namely, why, or on what accoimt a man is musical 1 or it is to engage in the inquiry of something else. Therefore, in sooth, the investigation why this thing is the thing which it is, is no investigation at all ; for it is necessary that the wherefore,^ and the existence of a thing, should inhere as manifest entities. Now, I say, for instance, the moon undergoes an eclipse : and of the inquiry why a thing is that thing which it is, there is one principle and one cause in the case of all things, as on what account a man is a man, or a musician a musician, except some one say that each thing is indivisible in regard to itself; but this would be to constitute unity : but this is both common in the case of all things, and is a thing that is concise. One, however, might inquire why man is that kind of an animal that he is. This, then, is evident, that such a one does not investigate why he who is a man is a man. Accordingly, he engages in the inquiry why a certain thing subsists, as what is common in the case of something; but that it does so subsist ought to be evident ; for, if it be not thus, he inquires after nothing : as, to take an instance, why does it thunder ? why, because sound is produced in the clouds : for so one thing as the cause of another is that which is under investi- gation. And on what account do these things, as bricks and

• r6 Sr. : other MSS. read rb tv ri, which diminishes the f irco and

moaning of the passage.

OH. XV 1L] what SUBSTAN3B IS, RECONSIDERED. 209

Btones, constitute a house ; it is evident, then, that he inves- tigates the cai3e ; but this is the eseence or very nature of a thing, (that is, if one is to express himself logically,) which, in the case of some things, is that for the sake of which a thing subsists, that is, the final cause ; as, perhaps, in the case of a house or a bed : but in the case of other things it is [Something that has imparted motion in the first instance ; for this also is a cause. But a cause of tlxis kind is such a cause as is sought for in the case of a thing that is being produced and destroyed ; but the other cause also is sought for in the case of a thing already in existence. The subject of investigation, however, is in an eminent degree latent — I mean, such a one as is involved in the things that are mu- tually not predicated of one another ; as, for instance, in the inquiry what man is, on account of its being asserted that ho is simply so and so ; but not from any definition being framed to the effect that he is this or that. It is requisite, however, if they conduct the inquiry correctly, to investigate such ; but if not, it will be the case that nothing will be under investigation, and something under investigation in common. But since it is requisite to have in possession the being of a thing, and that it should subsist, it is evident that the inquiry is about matter, why it subsists : as, for instance, these particulars constitute a house — whyl because these subsist as that which is the being of a house.

Thus, too, is it in the inquiry why man is 3. And on the

. r . .• 1 . i . 1 ,1 - V J • • same ground

this particular thing, or why this body is m ^e may deci.ie, possession of this particular quality, the like J^f^ ^ajJi^uj^r^ inquiry is made. Wherefore, the cause of the thing, matter is under investigation : but this is the form by which anything subsists, and this is substance. It is evident, there- fore, that, in the case of simple substances, there is not any investigation in existence, nor any disciplinary teaching ; but there is a different mode of investigation of things of this sort. Since, however, that which is compounded of some- thing, and compounded in such a way as that the whole is one thing, but not as a heap, but as a syllable, yet a syllable is not the elements of speech, nor the same thing with the letters B and A ; nor is flesh the same with fire and earth : for when a dissolution of these takes place, flesh and syllable no longer exist, as in the instance of the flesh and t\e syllable ;

9

210 THE MBTAFnTSIGS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK VL

but the elements subsist, that is, the fire and earth continue to subsist. The syllable in this case is something besides not only the elements of speech, namely, the vowel and the mute, but also something else ; and the flesh not only is fire and earth, or the warm and the cold, but also something else. If, therefore, it is requisite that abo flesh be either an elem^nt^ or that which is compoimded from elements — if it is an element — again will there be the same reasoning, for from this, — even from fire and earth, — will consist the flesh ; and, further, from something else something diflerent,^ so that the progression will go on to infinity : but if it be compounded from an element^ it is evident that it will not consist of one, but many, or it will be that very thing itself. Wherefore, again, in the case of this, as in the case of the flesh or syllable, we shall put forward the same reasoning. Now, it would seem that there is something of this sort, and that it is not an element ; and the cause, at least, of this thing being flesh, but that a syllable. In like manner, also, is it concerning other things. But the substance of each thing constitutes this, in truth; for this is the first cause of being or substance. Since, however, some things are not substances of things, — but this is the case with as many substances as according to nature are consti- tuted as well as by nature, — ^to some, also, would this nature appear to be substance, or it is not an clement, but a first principle. Now, an element^ is that whereunto as inherent in a thing, as matter, a compound is divided, as, for instance, of the syllable A B, A and B are the elements.

1 "Something dififereni.*' [ have supplied these wordi injiAlf to ■ociplete the senae. s Y¥i€ book IV. :h^». IL

BOOK VIL'

CHAPTER I.

From tbe statements that have been now made i a i^ . it 18 necessary to draw our inference, and, coJlect- as to what «n ing together a summary of the foregoing, to *"*^***"*'®*' impose upon our remarks some termination or conclusion. It has, therefore, been stated that the causes, and the first principles, and the elements of substances, are the subjects under investigation in the present Treatise. Now, as to substances, some are acknowledged to have a subsistence by all philosophers ; respecting othera, however, certain spe- culators have put forth from time to time certain peculiar opinions of their own. Physical or natural substances are acknowledged to have a subsistence; for example, fire, earth, water, air, and the rest of simple bodies : in the next place, plants, and the parts of these ; animals, also, and their parts ; and lastly, the heaven and the parts of the heaven : but those certain philosophers, who hold peculiar sentiments respecting substances, affirm that both forms and mathema- tical entities or species are substances. But, unquestionably, from the foregoing reasonings the consequence ensues of there Doing other substances — I mean, the essence or very nature of a thing, and the subject. Further, in other respects we may assume that the genus is substance in preference to the species, and the universal to the singulars. With the uni- versal, however, and tha genus, the ideas, also, are connected, for they seem to be substances according with the same process of reasoning.

Since, however, the essence or very nature of 2 why Ansto- a thing appears to be substance, and the reason the^cussions or principle of this is definition, on this account found in book we have settled various points respecting defini- ^^*

' In book VII., which is according to others book VIII., we have a sort of application of the logical principles in regard of substance^ arrived at in book VI., to the case of substance regarded as what ia cognisant by the senses.

p2

212 THE METAPHYblCS OF ARIS^luTLB, [bOOK riL

tlou, and respecting that which is essential. But since definition is a sentence, and since a sentence has parts, we found it requisite also to examine concerning a part, what sort are the parts of substance, and what sort they are not, and whether these ought to be the same with the parts of the definition likewise 1 Further, then, neither is the uni- vei'sal ^ nor the genus substance. But concerning ideas and mathematical entities w© will subsequently ^ institute an inquiry; for, beside ^ the substances of things cognisant by the 3 The in ui ^cuscs, Certain speculators assert these to have a ill book VII. subsistence. At present, however, let us treat of those substances that are acknowledged to have a subsistence ; but these are sensible substances, or the substances of those things that fall beneath the notice of the senses.

4. Substances Now, all Sensible substances involve matter.* cognisant by But substaucc may be considered as those inat^teraJtheir things that may be classed amongst subjects subject. Ij^ qjjq sense as matter, but in another as the

definition; now, I mean by matter that which is not this certain particular thing in energy, but in capacity is this certain particular thing; and in a different sense definition and form are subjects. That which is this certain particular thing is separable from the formal principle of it, and third is that which is composed of these, of which alone there are generation and corruption, and which is a thing that simply has a separable subsistence; for of those substances which Subsist according to a formal principle some are capable of a separate subsistence, but some are^not so. But that matter is a substance is evident, for in all opposite changes is tliere something which is the subject of the changes; as, for instance, in place, that which is now here, but again is elsewhere ; and according to increase, that which is at the ])rcsent moment of such a size, and the next less or larger ; and according to alteration, a person who is now healthy, and

• Vide book VI. chap. xiiL * In book XII.

^ Some MSS. read irepl instead of irapd.

• In objects that are cognised by our senses, what we perceive in

matter moulded into such and such a form; and this presupposei •^ *»Mut.nce in which the thing resides, which it would be a contradic iuCtiA )a tonus to say could fall beneath the comprehension of sense.

te. 11.] SUBSTANCE C03MSED BY SENSE. 213

at another time indisposed : and in like manner, also, accord- ing to substance, a thing which now subsists in a state of generation is again, however, in a state of corruption, and that which is at the present time a subject, as this certain particular thing, yet is at some future period a subject as according to privation. And, doubtless, the rest of the changes follow upon this; yet this does not follow one or two of the other changes : for there is no necessity, should even anything involve local or topical matter, that this also involve matter, both such as is generable and corruptible. What, then, is the difference between simple production, and that which is not simple production, has been declared in our Treatise on Physical Phenomena.

CHAPTER II.

But since the subsistence of substance as a sub- i. what sen ject and as matter is admitted by philosophers, and ig^^ewed^S"*^* this is that which subsists in capacity, it remains energy; the that we should state what that substance is amongst Socritua on ^ sensibles which subsists as energy. Democritus, *^" voint. therefore, assuredly seems to be a person who considered that, in regard of this, there are three differences ; for he was oif opinion that the subject-body and the matter were one and the same thing, but that the difference lay either in the rysmos,^ which is figure, or in the trope, which is position, or in the diathege, which is order.

But there appear nlany existing differences; 2. substance, !]» as, for example, some things are termed sub- ^^^*jhe sub- stance from the composition of matter: as, to jectofmany give an instance, whatsoever things are formed by ^»^'^"***'®'- mixture, such as mead, which is a mixture of honey and water; and others are termed so from a wooden fastening, as a chest ;^ and others from a string, such as a bundle; and others from glue, as a book ; and others from many of these ; and others, again, are said to subsist from position, as a threshold and the lintel of a door : for these differ from

' This has been already noticed by Aristotle, in book L chap. iv. ' y6fji^ I have translated ** wooden fastening,'* on the auUiorlty ci liddell and Scott. Taylor readers it by the word ** naiL"

SI 4 THE KETAPHTSICB OF ABIST0TL1E. [BOOK VH,

circumstances of position in a certain respect ; other things^ however, derive their being from time, as ^ dinner and break- fast, and some from place, as the winds. And some things are styled dififerences from the passive properties of sensibles; as, for example, hardness and softness, and thickness and thinness, and dryness and moistness : and some are so termed from certain of these qualities, and others from all of them; and, in general, some from excess, but others from defect. Wherefore, it is evident that the fact of a thing's sub- sistence is denominated in thus many ways, for a threshold is a threshold because it is situated thus, and its subsistence signifies that it has this position in this way ; and the sub- sistence of ice signifies the fact of its congelation in this form. And the subsistence of some things will be defined by even all of these circumstances; and this because some things consist from the mixture of some things, but others ftx)ra their temperament, and some from their connexion, and some from their condensation, and some from their employ- ment of other difTerential qualities, as either the hand or foot. Therefore, must we take into consideration the genera of differences, for these will be the first principles of sub- sistence ; as, for example, those things which have their sub- sistence in the more and the less, or the dense and the rare, and the other properties of this kind; for all these belong to excess and defect. If anything, however, has its subsistence in figure, or smoothness and roughness, all things will subsist in what is right-lined and curved. Now, to some things their subsistence will consist in their being mingled, and, in an opposite way, their non-subsistetlce will consist in not being mingled.

8. Certain de- It is, therefore, evident from these foregoing b^ Ariatou?^ Statements, that if substance is a cause of tha from the fore- Subsistence of each thing, that in these must be going points, sought the solutiou of the question what the cause of the subsistence of each of these is. Substance, in-

^ ^fTvvov Ka\ dpitnov, I have differed from Taylor, who translates these words "supper and dinner." A^^wov — Zitirivtiv — was regarded as the principal meal ; and the Homeric use of the word &pi<rToy was to designate the morning meal, II. 24 ; 124 — and this harmonizes with its being a deriyatiye from ^pi, our " early." I know, howerer, that &purro In after times was made to signify the midday meal, or praudium, of ttts Romans.

CH. n ] BNEBQT IN SUBSTANCE. 215

deed, then, is not any of these, or a thing that is oonnected together ; nevertheless, it subsists analogically in each thing. And as in substances whatsoever is predicated of matter is actual energy, this also in an eminent degree is the case with the other definitions; as, for example, if it be neces- sary to define a threshold, we will say that it is a piece of wood or stone situated in this way, and if a house, that it is bricks and timbers disposed in such or such a way ; or, shall we further say that likewise the final cause exists in the case of some things ? And if we are called on to define a lump of ice, we would reply, that it is water congealed or condensed in this form ; and if symphony is to be defined, that it is a particular sort of mixture of the sharp and the fiat ; and we must prooeed in the same manner with other things also.

It is evident, therefore, from these statements, 4. Different that there is of different matter a different J3J^*®i5^*5®",'a energy,^ and a different definition; for of some different things composition is the energy and form, ***®'8y- and of other things mixture, and of others something else of those particulars enumerated above. Wherefore, of persons engaged in defining things, those, on the one hand, who say what a house is, that it is stones, bricks, timbers, speak of the house in respect of potentiality or capacity, for these are matter; but those who say, in addition, that it is a receptacle preservative of goods and bodies, or that it is some other such thing, speak of the house in regard of its energy ; and those who put both of these together, speak of the third substance — I mean, the substance composed of these, that is, of potentiality and energy.^ For the defini- tion that subsists by means of differences seems to be that of form and energy, but that which consists from things

• To show what Aristotle meana by energy or activity, iv4py§ia, we

iBtiBt bear in mind what has been already laid down touching the relation of matter and form; it is a sort of mediating princix)le between both, for where capacity exists there must be likewise some operating power to move such capacities into action. Now, this is precisely what takes place in the case before us. Matter, which is the capacity, is moulded into its several shapes by form, which is the energy. The thing may be well illustrated by the relation subsisting between yoli< tion and muscular action.

' As to the relation between capsjcity and enei^, we must refer tc book VIIL, where the subject is ducusBed at lar^

216 TBJR METAPHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [dOOK TH,

that are inherent appears to he the definition of matter rather. In Uke manner, also, does this consequence result unto the definitions which Archjtas^ admitted, for they are compounded of hoth together ; as, for example, what is a lull { stillness in a mass of air ; the air in this case is matter, hut the stillness is energy and substance : what is a calm t smoothness of sea; the subject in this case, as matter, is the sea, but the energy and form are smoothness. Now, it is evident, from what has been stated, what sensible substance is, and how it subsists ; for the one thing is as matter, hut the other as form when it is^ energy : but the third is that which is composed of these.

CHAPTER I1I.8 1. Does the j^ is requisite, however, that we should not be

name signify . ^ ?i . ^' '^

the composite Ignorant that sometimes it escapes our notice theeSSr^^Md whether the name signifies the composite sub- fonnf stance, or energy, or form; as, for example, a

house, whether it is a sign of that which is common to all houses, — viz. that it is a shelter composed of bricks, and rafters, and stones, disposed in this way, — or whether it is a sign of energy and form, because it is a shelter 1 in the instance of a line, also, whether the name signifies that it is a duad in length, or, because of its being the duad, is a sign of energy and form? * And, in the ciise of animal, whether it is soul contained in body, or soul simply, for soul is the substance and energy belonging to a certain body] And animal, also, would be

^ Archytas was a native of Tarentum, living about the same time with Plato. He was one of the most celebrated of the Pythagoric school^ and the first philosopher amongst them whose literary labours were committed to writing. Archytas was famous for his mechanical know led^^'e and inventions, and his name is immortalized in the poetry of Horace, 2Sth Ode, book I. Vide Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 65: Bohn'e edition.

^ Srav : some copies read Kai.

• The inquiry started in this chapter relates to whether we are to

regard the name of a thing as being imposed upon it in reference to its being a compound, and from the operation of active power on CJipacity, or in reference merely to the active power itself, the «I5o$ ico) iripyna ?

• 1 hAve filled up the eUipais here to complete the sense.

OH. ni.] IMPOBT OP THE NAUE OF A THING. 217

involved in both, not as what is predicated by one dt finitioD, but as in relation to one thing.

These, however, differ in relation to something ^ xws inquiry, else; but they in no wise contribute to the aiweiias advancement of the present investigation about gamrsort^^irre- substance,— I mean that substance which is cogni- levant to onto- saiit by sense ; for the essence or very nature of a °^^' thing is inherent in the form and energy. For soul, I admit, and the being of a soul, are the same thing; but the being of a man, and the being man, are not the same thing; unless, likewise, the soul will be styled a man : and so the being of man will be the same, no doubt, in one respect, but not the same in another, with man. But the syllable does not appear to persons engaged in such investigations as consisting of the elements of speech and of composition, nor does a house seem to constitute both bricks and composition : and this supposition is made correctly, for the composition and the mixture of anything consist not from those things to which composition or mixture belongs. In like manner, also, it is not the case with anything else; as, for example, a threshold subsists from position, not position from a threshold, but the latter rather from the former ; nor is a man animal and biped, but must needs be something which subsists besides these, if these are matter, and which is neither an element, nor from an element, but the substance; and the thing which they cake away they denominate matter : i^ then, this is a cause of existence, and if this is substance, they would term^ this actual substance. Now, it is necessary that this be either a thing eternal, or subject to decay without being reduced to decay, and be generated without going through a process of generation. But it has been demonstrated, and made appa- rent elsewhere, that no one produces form, nor generates it, but that this particular thing is produced, and that what is composed of these is generated. But whether there are sub- stances of things comptible capable of having a separate subsistence is in no wise evident as yet, save that thus much is plain, that it is not admissible with some things at any rate, such as cannot possibly subsist even beside certain par- ticulars, say a house or a utensil. Therefore, perhaps, indeed,

' I have followed Didot's text in omittingr the particle oil, which th« 

Leif sic editiou retaiiw

218 THB METAPHT8IC8 OF ARISTOTLE. (BOOK TH

neither suoh are substances — I mean sensibles — ^nor are these very things substances in any respect, nor anything else that does not consist naturally; for one may consider Nature as alone the substance in things that are liable to decay. %, Rcftitatioii Wherefore, the doubt which the followers of cf Antisthenes, Autisthenes/ and persons similarly uneducated, fin^i^^ onhe indulged in, namely, that the nature of a thing 'uid<ut^*' **' cai^^iot be defined, involves some opportunity of ^ ^* a solution at present ; for what they say is, that

definition is a long sentence : but, certainly, as to the quality of a thing, what it is, though we cannot fi^me any definition, yet we can even give instruction of some kind or other on such point ; as, take the case of silver, you may not be able to tell what it is, to be sure, yet you may say that it can be assimilated in its appearance to tin. Wherefore, it belongs, in &,ct, to a substance of which it is admissible that there be a definition and formal principle ; as, for example, of that which is a composite nature, whether it be cognisant to the sense or the intellect But there cannot be such of those things from which these consist primarily, if the definitive reason has any signification in regard of anything, and it is necessary that the one be as matter, but the other as form.

4, This reason- N^w, it is likewise evident, on the supposition tag corrects that numbers are in a manner substances,^ why

ScSoSs as^o i* ^s *^^*' *^®y subsist after this mode, and not the subsistence as Certain philosophers say, because they are a num ers. multitude Or aggregation of monads. For defi- nition, also, is a certain number, (for both it is divisible and resolvable into indivisible elements; for formal principles are not infinite,) and number is a thing of this kind. And just as when any of those things whereof number consists has been either subtracted from number or added to it, no longer is there the same number, but a different one, even though ever so little be subtracted or added, so, in like manner, neither will

^ The position of Antifitbenes amounts to an exaggerated statement of the truth, because there are some things that are incapable of defi- nition as far as we are concerned ; for example, the divine or angelio nature.

' Aristotle already, in the first book, has been occupied in an exami- nation into the Pythagorean syatem about number, and resitmei thii subject in book XIL chap, vi

OH. IT.] SUBSTANCES AND THEIR OOlfPONENT MATTER. 219

definition, nor the essence or very nature of a thing, be anj longer the same, when there is a subtraction or addition of anything. And it is necessary, further, as regards number, that there should be something through which it is one, which in the present case they cannot assign — I mean something through which it is one — if number is one thing. ^ For either it is not one thing, but is, as it were, a heap, or, if it is, it must be stated what that is which makes it to be one out of many thinga Definition, also, is one thing, and similarly neither in regard of this which is compounded out of many things can they make assertions in this way.^ And this result naturally takes place, for it is a consequence from the same reasoning ; and the substance in this way is one thing, but not in such a way as some would make out who say, for instance, that it is a certain monad, or point, but that each is actuality, and a cer- tain nature. And as number involves neither the more and the less, so neither does that substance which subsists according to form ; but, if this be the case, it is that which is connected with matter. Respecting, indeed, then, generation and cor- ruption, in regard of the aforesaid substances, in what manner it is admissible, and how it is impossible that they should take place, and regarding the reduction of definition into number, let the foregoing distinctions be set down thus far.

CHAPTER IV.8

As regards material substance, however, it is i. Each mate- necessary that it should not escape our notice SJiJ^s^J^** that, even though all things are fi:om the same peculiar matter primary nature, or the same things as those that "^^ °******' L prSmry, and though the sam^ matter bo as a first priu-

^ I have rendered the words in the text as literally as I can.

' I have followed Taylor's explanation of this passage. The puno* tnation in the Leipsio edition is different.

' Aristotle has already completed his observations as regards matter and form, and has shown, in respect of generation and corruption, that they are alone admissible in the case of what is a composite from both matter and form ; and he now shows, seemingly in opposition to those who were searching up and down in the nature of things for soma primary element, how, even on the assumption of such bemg in exist> •nee, every material object has its own appropriate matter.

220 THE META^'HYSrrS OF ARISTOTLB. [iKX^K Tit

ciple, for things that are generated, nevertheless, there is a certain peculiar^ matter of everything; for instance, the first matter of phlegm is the sweet, or the oily, and of bile, the bitter, or something else of this sort: but, perhaps, these, also, are from the same thing. And there are produced many substances of the same thing when one thing is the substance of another, as phlegm is from the fat and the sweet, if what is fat or oily be from what is sweet, and it is the case jthat it is from bile on account of the resolution of the component qualities into bile, as into their primary matter. For in a twofold way does one thing proceed from another, namely, either because it will be in the way of progression,* or of analysation into its first principle.

2. Different Now, on the Supposition of the existence of one

things may be matter, it is possible for different things to be fhe sSne °™ generated by reason of the cause which imparts wh"re thl* motion, as both a chest and a bed are formed thing is diffe- from wood : of some things, however, the matter matter fs^Jften ^^ neccssarily different, when the things themselves different. are different ; as, for example, a saw can never be

made of wood, nor does it belong to the cause imparting motion to accomplish this, for it can never produce a saw of wool or of wood. But if, then, it is possible to make the same thing of different matter, it is evident that art and the first principle, as one that originates the motion in a thing, are the same ; for if matter were different from that which imparts motion, the thing made or generated would also be different. When, therefore, one may investigate what the cause of a thing is — since causes are denominated in many ways ^ — it is necessary to mention all the contingent causes : as, for example, what is the cause of man as matter, that is, the material cause: is it the menstrual blood? and what is the cause, as that which imparts motion, or, in other words, the efficient cause : is it not the seed, then 1 and what is the cause as form, or the formal cause : is it not the essence, or very nature of the thing? and what is the final cause of his

• olK€7a : this word might be translated " domestic."

• The Latin version renders this, " ex eo quod progredietur."

^ Aristotle means, of course, his fourfold enumeration of causea, found in the Physics, in the Posterior Analytics, and in more placet tiian one in the Metaf hyaiofl.

COEL IV.] RELAT ON BETWEEN THESE TWO. 221

fiTistence : is it not the end thereof? But, perhapn, both of these are the same. And it is requisite, also, to mention the most immediate or proximate causes. What is the matter of man ? not fire or earth, but that which is matter peculiar or domestic to the natm^e of man.

Certainly, then, respecting physical and gener- g ^,,g ^^^^^^^ able substances, it is necessary to advance for- ingthusap- wards in our investigations in this manner, if JtJmce^thaUs one will advance correctly : since, in such a case, physical and

R6P6rat)i6 Q06S

both these causes, and causes of such a descrip- not appiy'to tion, are in existence, and if it be requisite to ^SclTthough have a knowledge of causes. Concerning physi- physical is ye: cal or natural substances, however, but such as ^^*^^ ' are everlasting, there is another mode of reasoning ; for some of them, perhaps, do not involve matter, or do not invv^Ivr matter of this kind, but only that which is movable in place. And, therefore, as many as possess a natural subsistcitucr, but are not substance,^ these do not involve matter, but the Subject to them constitutes substance ; as, for instance, what cause is there of an eclipse? say, what material cause is there? for no si'ch can be assigned, save that the moon is that whiicb is passive ; and what is the cause of this phenomenon, as that which imparts motion and destroys light, that is, the efficient cause, the earth 1 The final cause, however, does not, perhaps, exist in this case : and the formal cause is definition ; yet this is obscure, unless the definition be along with the cause : as, what is an eclipse 1 it is a privation of light. And if this addition be made, that this privation of light is occasioned by the earth intervening in the midst, this will be a definition in conjunction with the cause. But, in thiB case of sleep, it is obscure what is the first thing that is passive. Shall we say that it is the animal in its entirety? yes : but in what part does this passive condition arise 1 and what organ is it that first undergoes this passive change 1 is it the heart,^ or something else? then, there is the inquiry, by

• ovaia : it is better, perhaps, to read tliis oua-Zt^, and trau^late the

words thus : " but have not a subsistence substantiiilly."

^ This was the opinion of Plato, according to Alexander ; at least, we iind this assertion in the Commentaries on this book of the Meta* physics attributed to Alexander: but Brandjs looks with suspicion oil all such as being the work of Alexander, beginning from book Y.

222 THE METAFHTBICS OF ABISTOTLE. [kOOK Ytt

reason of what agency does this passive condition ensue) and^ in the next place, what is this passive condition — I mean, the condition that belongs to that particular organ, and does not belong to the whole body ? shall we say that it is such and such a kind of immobility 9 be it so : but this is such because there is something to undergo an affection in the first instance.

CHAPTER V.i

1. The material And since some things are unconnected both wifeiScetothe ^*^ generation and corruption, and some are not generation of 80 ; as, for example, points — if they really subsist oontraries. — ^^^ |j^ general, specics and forms ; (for it is not

whiteness that is generated, but the white wood :) or, if also eveiything which is generated is generated from something, in such a case all contraries would not be generated from one another; but in a different way would white man be from black man, and whiteness from blackness: nor of eveiything is there matter ; but of as many things as there is generation and mutual change ; and as many things as are without altera- tion, or are not, of these there is not matter. It involves, however, a subject of doubt, how matter — I mean, that which belongs to each thing — stands in relation to contraries ; for instance, if the body be healthy in capacity, and if the oppo- site thing to health be disease, whether shall we say that both subsist in capacity ? Whether shall we, also, say that water in capacity is both wine and vinegar 1 Or shall we say that the body is matter of health according to its habit, and according to form; but that it is the matter of disease, according to privation,, and according to corruption, such as is contrary to Nature ? „ ^ ,^ And another certain doubt is there, also, why

2. Another • • x xi. xx j» • . ' .•'

•ubject for winc 18 not the matter of vinegar, nor vinegar m

point! "**®°^^*' capacity, although vinegar is produced from this ;*

and, in respect of one tiiat is aUve, we may doubt

^^ Aristotle is led to the inquiry in this chapter from the investi- gations already pursued in regard of BivOfiis,

• The difficulty comes to this — ^must we not regard water, for in« 

■tance, as endued with the twofold potentiality of wine and vinegar, ai ft mibjert having a capacity for contraries?

OH. VI.J THE GENERATION OP CONTRARIES. 223

whether such is in potentiality a dead body, or is not; but the corruptions subsist according to accident : the actual matter^ however, of an animal, subsists according to corruption, as the capacity and matter of a dead body, and the water, also, of vinegar; for from these are they generated, as night from day. And as many things, therefore, as in this way undergo changes into one another, ought to revert back into matter ; as, for instance, if from a dead body an animated one should be generated, it is requisite that the dead body should first be resolved into matter, in order that in this way an animated body might afterwards be generated from it; and, in like manner, vinegar must be resolved into water, then will wine in this way be produced.

CHAPTER VI.1

But bearing upon the doubt mentioned above, i. how are we both respecting definitions and respecting num- {J^^ilfy of?©- bers, is . the question, what is the cause of finition in con- there being one ? for of all such things as have ?he piur^uy of many parts, and of which the whole is not, as it ^hatisdeflnedf were, a heap, but is something else, namely, an entirety, beside the parts, there is a certain cause, since also in bodies — in some indeed — contact is the cause of their being one, and in others viscosity or some other such passive qimlity. Now, definition is one discursus or sentence, not by a bond of con< nexion, as the Iliad, but in respect of being of one thing. What^ then, is it which makes man to be one thing, and why is he one thing, but not many things; as, for example, both animal and biped, and in the most eminent degree also, if, as some say, any animal in itself, and biped in itself, have a subsistence 1 For why is not man those very things, and why will men subsist, not according to participation of one man,2 ^j^^ tj^g participation of two things, both animal and biped ? And, in general, therefore, man will not be one thing, but many things, namely, animal and biped. It is, therefore,

^ Firom hifl solution of the question as to the existence in a subject of a capacity for contraries, Aiistotle now decides a point connected with the unity of external objects in relation to the percipient.

• This is the reading in Didot's edition, and Is more clear than that

is the IieipHic text.

224 THE HETAPHTBIOB OF ARIffrOTLB. [BOOK Til.

evident that to persons treating the subject in such a way ai they have been accustomed to frame their definitions and assertions, it is not possible to adduce a reason of this and solve the matter in doubt.

2 The real so- "^^^ ^^ ^^® ^^^^ stands as WO Say, namely,

lutionofihia that One thing, indeed, is matter, but another

the difference " ^o^*"^* — ^^ud, again, that one thing subsists in ear

between capa- pacitv, but another in eners^y, — no longer would

city and energy. 5i_ i.i. j • i.- \' u

the matter under investigation seem a sub- ject of doubt, for this doubt is the same as if the round brass were the definition of a garment. For this name would be a sign of the definition ; wherefore, the object of investiga- tion is what the cause is that the circular and the brass are one. No longer, however, does the doubt appear to remain, because the ope is matter, but the other form. What, then, is the cause of this, namely, that what subsists in capacity should subsist in energy beside the producing cause — I mean, in the case of whatsoever things there is generation 1 for there is no other cause of the sphere that subsists in capacity subsisting as a sphere in energy, but this was the essence in each thing. And as regards matter, there is one kind that is intelligible, and another that is cognisant by the senses ; and as regards vdefiuition, one sort, indeed, is invariably matter, and another is energy, as a circle is a plain figure. As many things, how- ever, as do not involve matter, either intelligible or sensible, forthwith is it possible that each of these be one certain par- ticular thing, as tliat which is a certain particular thing is this particular thing as well as quality and quantity ; where- fore, also, there does not inhere in definitions either entity or unity, and the essence or very nature of a thing is forthwith a certain unity, as also a certain entity ; wherefore, also, there is not any difierent cause for any of these being one, or of there being a certain entity in them, for immediately doth each constitute a certain entity and a certain unity ; yet they are not inherent in entity or unity as in the genus ^ of these, nor have they a subsistence as though they were separable from singulars.

3. An attempt- And, ou accouut of this aforesaid doubt, some u fr(°m"h2 °^ philosophers maintain that participation, to wit, •kenomenon of is the cause j and what the cause of the participa- ' y€p§i : other MSS. r«ad y€v(<r€u

CH.VI.] THIS SUBJECT FUBTHEB DISOUSSID. 225

tiou ifl, and what the participation itself is, they paTtieii4.ti<m, are in doubt ; but some assign the intercourse M^^«f«»- of the soul as the cause, just as Ljcophron,^ who says that science is the union of the act of scientific knowledge and of the soul : but others affirm that the principle of vitality consists in the composition or conjunction of soul with body. Indeed, the same reasoning holds good as regards all things ; for also the being in sound health will be either the union, or conjunction, or composition of soul with health. And for the brass to be a triangle will be a composition of brass and of triangle, and for a thing to be white will be a composition of superficies and whiteness; and a cause of their speaking in this way is because they are searching for the uniting principle and dif- ference of capacity and actuality. But, as has been said, both the ultimate matter and the form are the same ; and the one subsists in capacity, but the other in actuality. Wherefore, the investigation of what is the cause of unity is similar to the inquiry into the cause of a thing being one ; for everything is one particular thing subsisting both partly in capacity and partly in energy, in a certain respect, as one thing. Wherefore, there is no other cause, except there be something that can be shown to subsist as a cause imparting motion from potentiality into energy. Now, whatever things do not involve matter, all of these are simply some certain particular thing.

• Lycophron. It does not appear who this Lycophron was ; the

oommentators merely say of him that he was a sophist, pr&bably a contemporary of Aristotle. He certainly was not the graat poet cf Ihatname.

BOOK VIIL*

CHAPTER L

1. Hpw meta- 'CONCERNING substoDce, then — I mean, oonoem- l^lSnc^o? ^^8 ^^*^ which is primarily entity, and to which ail the "ens,'* is the rest of the categories of entity are referred — capacity, dy- WO have declared our sentiments. For according •^M*v. to the definition of substance ai'e denominated the other entities, viz. both quantity, and quality, and the rest of the things that are predicated in this way; for all such will involve the definition of subistance, as we have as- serted in our earliest dissertations.^ But since entity is denominated partly as quiddity, or quality, or quantity, but partly according to capacity and actuality, and according to work, let us frame certain distinctions and definitions as regards both capacity and actuality; and, in the first in- stance, as regards that capacity, or potentiality, which is spoken of as such with especial precision : not, to be sure, that this is of service towards the advancement of our present design, for potentiality and actuality extend further than things merely predicated according to motion. But when we have spoken our opinions concerning this in our definitions, as regards energy, we shall make matters plain concerning the other points likewise.

2. Several That, indeed, therefore, potentiality is predi-

SSity" OT^?i^°' *^*®^ ^^ many ways, and that the possession of city, enume- potentiality is expressed in many ways, has been rated. settled by us elsewhere.^ But as many of these

as are styled potentialities equivocally may be omitted; for

' In the eighth book — ninth according to some — Aristotle considers the subject of capacity and energy with more minuteness. It is well worthy of study, not merely for the distinctions which are found drawn ill it, but also for the admirable classification of capacities, or poten- tialities, which it contains.

^ Vide book VI. chap. i.

• In the fourth bool^ — his book of metaphysical definitions, — where

the term diiyams, in its various significations^ is folly explained. Vid4 chap. xii. of that book.

OH. l] ontology treats about poientiality. 227

8ome capacities, or potentialities, are deuominated capacities by reason of a certain similarity (as in geometry we speak of potentiality in this way), and things that are potential and impotential we call such in regard of their being, in a certain respect, endued with such a capacity, or not being so. As many potentialities, however, as are referred to the same form or species are all certain first principles, and are pre- dicated in reference to one primary potentiality,^ which is a first principle of change in another body, so far forth as it is another. For there is a capacity, on the one hand, of being passive, which, in the actual subject of passion, constitutes a first principle of a passive state through the intervention of another body, so fiir forth as it is another. There is, on the other handj the habit of impassivity, such as tends towards a condition which is worse, and the habit of corruption, which arises from the instrumentality of another body, so far fortii as it is another — I mean, a first principle capable of bringing about a change. For in all these definitions is inherent the definition of the primary potentiality just mentioned. Auc" again, these potentialities are styled either those of action merely, or passion, or subsistence in an excellent manner. Wherefore, also, in the definitions of these are inherent, in a manner, the definitions of the former potentialities.

It is, therefore, evident that there is, in a 3. inferences certain respect, one potentiality of action and fh?s^"num?ra- passion, — for a thing that is potential is such in tion of poten- I'egard of itself having the potentiality of passive- *^"*®*- ness, and in regard of another thing having it by reason of this, — and, in another respect, there is a different potenti- ality. For one kind of potentiality resides in the patient ; for, on account of its having a certain first principle, and on account of matter,^ also, being a certain first principle, the subject of the passion is passive, and one thing uudergces a change by reason of another; for that which is fat is combustible also: but that which yields in this manner

• These words are worthy of attention ; for by thus making every

capacity in its action relative to the operation of a certain other capa* city, we ultimately arrive at the primary capacity ; and this, according to principles already established, presupposes a something beyond capacity, an activity, the absolute iydtfjuot the first cause.

^ t\ffy ' some copies read, S\vy»

q2

S28 TBB XB1.UPHT8IC& ^/f ARISTOTLE. |^BOOK VIIL

is a thing that is bruised ; and in like manner, also^ is it with other things. But another kind of potentiality resides in the agent, as the hot, and the capacity of house-building, are involved severally, tiie former in that which is capable of making a thing warm, and the latter in a person who va qualified to build a house. Wherefore, as &r forth as a thing is naturally connected with itself it in no wise under- goes a passive state itself by reason of its own agency, for it is one thing, and not anything else.

4. What impo- -^"^ impoteutiality, and that which is impo;- tentiaiity is, teutial (uow, such is Contrary to potentiality), is udy»a/A«a. privatiou. Wherefore, every potentiality belongs to the same, and subsists according U> the same subject with im- potentiality. Privation,^ however, is predicated in many ways ; for privation is to be found where a thing does not possess something else, and, though 6tted by nature for the possession of such, may yet not have it either entirely or when it is fitted by nature : and we say either, after this manner, that it is privation, for instance, altogether so, or yet even in some certain respect or other. And, in the case of some things, if being by nature adapted to possess a thing, they may not yet have such by reason of violence, we say that these are subjects of privation in this respect.

CHAPTER II.

I As to poten- SiKCE, however, such first principles of poten- tialities, some tiality are inherent partly in things that are JJJ'n^f con!" inanimate, and partly in things that are animato nected'with and Contained in soul, and in that portion of the "**®"* soul which possesses reason, it is evident that

also of potentialities some will be devoid of reason, whereas others will be accompanied with reason. Wherefore, all the arts, even such as are constructive,' as well as the sciences, are potentialities ; for they constitute first principles which are causes of clmnge in another subject, so far forth as it is another. And all those potentialities, indeed, that ara

' The term privation, artprio'is, has been already defined in book lY shap. xxiu ' Some copies read, km iroivriKa* MariiMai,

CSLIL] RATIONAL AND tBILVTIONAL OAFAOlTIEg. 229

accompanied, or involve any connexion with reason, are pro- ductive of contraries ; each of those, however, that is devoid of reason is alone productive of one result : as, for instance, that which is hot is productive of the promotion of heat merely, and the medicinal art of disease and health.

And a cause of this is the following, that 2. Difference scientific knowledge is reason, and the same {"ve^^wenTof reason makes manifest the result produced and these two its privation, though not after the same manner; teiSiamy ^' and in one way is this reason that which creates counted for. this knowledge for both,^ yet in another it affords greatef knowledge of the thing in existence than of its privation. Wherefore, it is requisite that such sciences as these should involve a knowledge of contraries ; but that of the one it should be thus essentially, and of the other not essentially - for also reason is a knowledge of the one essentially, but oi the other, aft^er a certain manner, according to accident, for by negation and ablation it makes manifest the contraiy ; for primary privation is that which is contrary, and this is an ablation of the other. Since, however, contraries are not inherent in the same thing — now, science is a capacity in respect of the possession of reason,^ and the soul also pos- sesses a first principle of motion — hence the healthy or salubrious produces health only, and that which is capable of promoting heat — warmth, and of promoting cold — chilli- ness ; but the scientific person produces l)oth. For of both, no doubt, has reason a knowledge, but not in the same manner ; and this reason subsists in a soul which possesses a first principle of motion. Wherefore, soul will move both from the same first principle, having effected coherence towards the same thing; wherefore, the things which are potential, or endowed with capacity according to reason, produce contraries to the productions of that which is poten- tial without reason, for. one first principle is comprised in reason. But it is evident that also upon the ^ ^her^ I power of action and^ passion in an excellent notneceuarUy

• I have followed Taylor^s paraphrastic rendering of this passage.

' What Aristotle means is this, — ^that science presupposes in man a scientific capacity, and that this is to be found in the rational soul, which contains within itself the efficient cause of man*s pursuit a5M knowledge.

230 THE ITETAPHTSICS OF ARTSTOTLK. JIlOOKVlll

ioToived in the manner there follows the power merely of action i6^,tf ^^ ^^ passion : but in this latter the former ia

not invariablj to be found ; for he that acts well must needs also be an agent, but where a person only is an agent it is not necessary, also^ that he should act well.

CHAPTER IILi

1. False notions BuT there are some who say — ^for instance^ whoo*iM^fr^° those of the Megaric school — ^that where there energy being a is energy, there only is there potentiality, or d?uo"fbr po? capacity, but that where there is no energy, there tentiaiity. ig no potentiality ; for example, that the person who does not actually build has not the capacity of buildings but that he has the capacity of building when he actually builds, and that it is in like manner, also, with other thingsi Now, the absurdities which ensue with these speculators it is not difficult to discover. For it is evident that neither will he be a builder if he does not actually build ; for the being of a builder consists in the possession of the capacity of building; and in like manner, lUso, it is the case with the rest of the arts. If, therefore, it is impossible for one to possess arts of this kind, if he has not at any time received instruc-' tion in them, and acquired them, and not to be in the posses- sion of them, unless at some time or other he lose them, (for one may do so either through forg^fulness, or a certain affection, or time ; for as to the thing itself, that, at any rate^ has not fallen into decay, for it -is in existence always ;) this being the case when there may be a cessation of operation on the part of such a one, he will not have in possession the art, and how will he again forthwith proceed to build in resuming the art which he had lost 1

^ Aristotle, by what goes before, is led to attack the Megarian philo* Bopbers, who confounded everything with " being," and, therefore, po- tentiality with energy. The rallying point of the Megarics. was the school established at Megara by Euclid, a native of ihe place ; and Aristotle, no doubt, has his eye fixed principally on Euclid, for the latter was a most vehement opponent of the dogmatism of the Peri*

Eitetics. Vide Tenneman, p. 98, translated in " Bohn's Philological ibrary."

OB. ni.] THB MBOABTA^ THEOBT DF OAPAOITT 231

And in like manner will it be the case, also, s.thisMegari* with things that are inanimate ; * for there f^fTheS^^^or will be neither cold, nor hot, nor sweet, nor, in Proiagmas re- short, anythmg cognisable by sense, when such p^l^^ is not an object of sensation. Wherefore, it will ivity of our happen with these philosophers that they should '*""* °"** put forward the same theory with Protagoras. But, unques* tionably, neither will a man possess any sense imless he per-» ceives or energizes. If, therefore, that animal is blind which does not possess the power of vision, though naturally adapted to see, and when it is naturally adapted to see, and, further, as it is thus naturally adapted, in such a case the same individuals oftentimes during the same day will be blind, and in like manner deaf Further, if that which is impoten- tial be that which has been deprived of capacity, that which has not been generated, to be generated will be a thing that is impossible ; but one who says that what is devoid of a capacity of being generated, either actually exists, or will do so, shall affirm what is &lse j for this would signify what is impo- tentiaL Wherefore, these assertions overturn both the ex- istence of motion ^ and of generation ; for that which stands will always stand, and that which sits will always remain in a sitting posture ; for a man wiU not rise up if he be sitting down, for it will be impossible for that to rise up which would not possess the capability, at least, of rising up.

I^ therefore, it may not be possible to afi&rm 3 ^^^^^ ^^^^ these things, it is evident that potentiality and neous views energy are something different from each other; JhTlifferenw those theories, however, make potentiality and 2^?®^"'**^*^^ energy to be the same : and thus it is not a from each small thing which they are seeking to over- ®'^®'* turn. Wherefore, it happens that a thing admits of being, and yet may not be, and that a thing admits of not being, and yet may be. In like manner, also, is it with the rest of the categories: that which is endued with the capacity of

' Protagoras founded his scepticism on the pure relativity of our sensations, and Bishop Berkeley endeavoured to build the reality of God's existence on the same foundation. What a different philosophy resulted from the same suggesting cause to the mind of the impious and daring sceptic, and to that of the humble and confiding Christian !

' And, iherefore, such theories, when pushed forward to their legi^ mate conviquences, must end in atheism.

232 THB MUTAPHT8ICB OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK TIH.

walking yet may not walk, and that which does not walk may yet be able to walk. This, however, is a thing that is potential, in which, when the energy is present of that of which it is said to have the capacity, there will not be in existence anything that is devoid of potentiality. Now, I mean, {or instance, if one is able to sit, and it so happens that such a one sits, if the sitting posture will have an exist- ence in the case of such a one, nothing impossible or impo- tential will ensue. And if anything may be moved, or may impart motion, or remain at rest, or impede a body in its course, or be in existence, or be generated, or not be in existence, or not be generated, the case will be similar.

4 Theoririn ^^^ *^® name, energy,* which is combined of the name with actuality, and tends towards other things, olf S SStSre. ^^^ proceeded forth from motions principally ; for motion in an eminent sense appears to constitute the energy of a thing. Wherefore, also, to nonentities they do not attribute the having motion imparted to them, but certain other categories : as, for instance, things which are nonentities are intelligible and desirable objects, but are not in motion. And this is the case because nonentities in energy will, how- ever, subsist in energy ; for of nonentities some are nonentities in capacity, but yet have no existence because they do not exist actually.

CHAPTER IV.2

1. Potentiality Now, if the potential be that which it has oondit^orto"^ been declared to be, upon which energy is conse- energy. qucutial, it is evident that it is not possible that

it be true to say that this particular thing is endued with a capability of being, but yet will not exist ; so that, on this sup- position, what things impotential are would elude our search. Now, I say, for instance, this is just as if any one afi&rm it to

• Because, if we view energy as it were in a state of rest after the

end to which it tends has been brought about, this presupposes that it has accomplished this transition through the intervention of motion; or regarding energy in this very state of transition towards an end, — CIS TO t4\o5, — we must regard it as motion itself.

' Aristotle now considers the converse of the proposition ascribed Uf the Megarics in the last chapter.

OIL IV.] THE OONYEBSB OF THIS THEORY. 233

be possible that the diameter of a square be commensurate with its side, although this commensurability will never be established; not reckoning that it is a thing that is impossible, because nothing hinders anything that is potential, in regard of existence and of generation,^ from not being, nor being likely to exist. But that follows necessarily from the points laid down, if, also, we should suppose a thing may be, or may be generated, which is not in existence, I admit, but yet is a thing that is endued with the capacity of being; because there will be in such a supposition as this nothing that is impossible : but, at any rate, it will be admitted that this result will ensue ; for, allowing the commensurability of the diameter, the inference must follow that even are equal to odd numbers, which is an impossibility.^ For what is false is not the same also with that which is impotential; for that you now are in a standing position is £alse, to be sure, but is not a thing that is impossible.^

And at the same time, also, is it evident that, ^ niustration upon the supposition of the existence of A, B of this bv must needs exist likewise; and if A exist sb ^taSoisf a thing that is potential in regard of being, it follows that also B must needs be a thing that is potential in regard of being; for if there be no necessity for its being a thing potential in regard of being, nothing hinders that which is a thing possible to be from not being at all. Now, let A be a thing that is possible to be. Therefore, since A is a thing possible to be, if A be admitted as existing, nothing impossible to be would actually ensue. However, B, at any rate, must necessarily exist ; but this was impossible. Grant, therefore, that it is impossible. If, then, it were impossible for B ^ to exist necessanly, it is necessary that it should be impossible for A to exist But then A was possible, there- fore will B be BO likewise. If, then, A be possible, B also

"* The commentatorB say that Aristotle here glances at Plato for an opinion of his as regards the generation, and, therefore, the corruptibility of the celestial spheres. This would directly clash with the notions oi the Stagyrite ; mde De Coelo, book L chap. z.

' This is Taylor^s paraphrastic rendering of the text Vide note, p. 109.

' This distinction between these two significations of the word f^tv^os is most worthy of our attention.

• The Leipsic edition has A here inftead of B, which quite destroyi

the link in this chain of reasoniiifr

234 THB 1IETAPHY8I0S OF ARISTOTLE. [fiOOK Ylll.

will be possible, if they subsist in such a way as that in con* sequence of the existence of A, B necessarily exiits also. J^ therefore, on the supposition that the things signified by A B subsist in this manner, it may not be a thing possible for this to take place in reference to B in this way, neither will A B subsist in the manner that has been laid down ; and if^ on the supposition of the possibility of the existence of A, it is necessary that B also i^ould exist as a thing that is pos* Bible to be, supposing, then, A to exist, it is necessary also that B exist. For that it is possible from necessity for B to exist, if it be possible for A to exist, signifies as follows, that if A exists, and when it exists, and as far as it is a thing that is possible to oxist^ that then, and in this way also, that is necessary in r^ard of the existence of B.

CHAPTER V.

1. The mode of And whereas of all existing potentialities some of different**" *^^ Congenital, as those of the senses, but others capacities into are developed from habit,^ as the ability of actu ity. playing on a flute, and some from discipline, as

capacity in the arts, it is necessary that those that are developed from habit and reason should be acquired by re* peated exercises of previous activity, but that those which are not of this description, and such as are concerned with passivity, should not necessarily be acquired in this way. Since, however, that which is endued with potentiality is able to efifect something, both the term " sometimes " and the term << somehow " must one add in the definition, and as many things else as are consequential to this. And some things that subsist according to reason do not possess the potentiality of imparting motion, and their potentialities are accompanied with reason ; whereas, as regards other things that are irra- tional, and their potentialities irrational, those, also, it is necessary should subsist in an animated creature, but these in both — now this being the case — ^in respect of potentialities of such a description as this, it is requisite, when, as far as they are endued with capacity in this way, the passive and

' The contents of this chapter are most remarkable, and might bt plaoed side by side with Butler's Analogy, Part I. c. 5.

GH. v.] TRAK8ITI0N OP OAPACITT INTO ACTION. 23d

the productive approximate towards each other, that one set of them should be active and the other passive ; but it is not necessary that this should take place with those — I mean, with rational — potentialities. For, as regards all of these, each one is productive of one thing ; whereas those are pro«  ductive of contraries : wherefore, this will at the same time produce contraries — a thing, however, that is impossible. It is necessary, then, that there be something g The t else which may be predominant, and this I call tion of capacity propension, or free-will; for whatsoever is the bioujht about object of a particular propension, this will that through pro- propension authoritatively or rightfully accom- SSilM'am^ plisli,^ when, as far as it is endued with capacity, ^j*j^"* P'*"' it may subsist, and approximate unto the passive. Wherefore, that which is endued with capacity according to reason must altogether compass its object, when it feels an appetite after that unto which it has a capability of attain- ing, and so far as it has this capability. Now, the power to do or accomplish anything subsists when that which is passive is present, and is so disposed. And if this be not the case, there will he no power to accomplish it; for, in the event of none of those things that are extrinsic offering any obstruction, there is no fdrther necessity for adding these words, ** nothing extrinsic offering obstruction," into the definition, for it involves potentiality, as it belongs to a capacity of action ; yet it is not so altogether, but when things are disposed in some such manner as that in their case will also external impediments be removed; for these are taken away — I mean, some of those distinctive terms that are contained in the definition. Wherefore, neither will an appetite accomplish two things, or contrary things, even though at the same time it may feel disposed or be actuated by an inordinate desire to accomplish them ; for it does not involve power over their attainment in this way at the same time, nor is there present the power of the simultaneous accomplishment of such, since those objects of pursuit over which appetite has control it will accomplish in this manner.

• Wliat Aristotle here says of propension, Butler affirms of tha moral faculty ; in short, this necessity of subordination, as well as the fact of its operation, with the Bishop is the experimental proof of the existence of conscience. Vide Sermons, L — ^JIL

SS6 THB IIETAPHTSIOS OF iAISTOTLE. [lOOK Till

CHAPTER YU

1. Advantage BuT slnco WO have spoken conoeniing poten«  tion?nto*the"*^ tiality, suoh as subsists according to motion, let nature of ao- US frame some definitions and distinctions re- tiTity, *i.<P7«ia. ga^j.^ijjg energy, both as to what energy or

activity is, and what sort of a thing it is. For the nature of that which is potential, or endued with capacity, likewise, at the same time will be apparent to those who make a division in this matter, because we not only say that this is a thing endued with potentiality or capacity which is fitted by nature to impart motion to something else, or to have motion imparted to itself by something else, either viewed simply or in a certain manner, but we also assert this as being the case after a difierent moda Wherefore, in our investigations we shall also treat of these pointa t. What energy '^^® existence of the thing, however, as the is not, and energy, does not subsist in such a way as when ^ * * ** we speak of a thing in potentiality; now, we mean by a thing subsisting in potentiality, for instance, mercury in the wood, and the half in the whole, because it can be taken away from the whole : and we term that a scientific person in capacity, even though not actually en- gaged in speculation, provided only such may be endued with a capacity for speculative pursuits; and we mean by a thing's subsisting in energy, — now, by an induc- tion of singulars is the assertion evident which we wish to make, and it is not expedient that we should seek after a definition for everything; but it is sufficient to perceive at a glance that which is ajialogous, — now, I say, by a thing's subsisting in energy we mean that it should be as a person engaged in building stands in relation to that which is fit for being built, and the wakeful to the sleeper, and one who sees to one whose eyes are closed, but who nevertheless pos- sesses the power of vision, and as that which involves a separable subsistence from matter to matter, and as that which has been wrought by art to that which is unwrought. After

1 One advantage gained firom the treatment of Ivipytia by Aristotle is to be looked for in the application of these principles of metaphjaica to moral philosophy.

OH.yi.] THE NATUBB OF RNEROT. 28?

this mode,^ then, is energy compared with capacity or poten* tiaiity. By one portion, however, of this difference let energy be distinguished, and that which is endued with potentiality by the other.

All things, however, are not said to subsist in ^ Diflfejcnt energy in a similar way; but either analogically modes of the as this thing in this, or relatively to this ; and Sergy!^"" **' that thing in this particular thing, or ^relatively analogically or to this particular thing. For some things ^ ^*^* are as motion in respect of potentiality; but other things are as substance in respect of a certain matter. But the infinite and the void, and such-like things, are said to subsist both in 2)otentiality and energy after another manner different from many entities; as, for example, that which sees, and that which walks, and that which is seen. For sometimes do these things admit of being verified, and simply verified; for the one is an object to be seen, because it is seen, but the other because it is endued with a potenti- ality of being seen ; the infinite,* however, does not subsist in potentiality after such a mode as it is likely to be in energy when it involves a separable subsistence: but it does in knowledge, for infinite divisibility is the cause which these persons assign for the subsistence in potentiality amoxmting to this energy; not, however, in respect of its being made to involve a separate subsistenco.^

But since none of those doings of which 4. Energy must there is a termination constitutes an end, but !» distinguish- only some of those that are performed in regard * °°^°^° ^"* of the end, — ^as the actual end of inducing emaciation is emaciation, and when these happen to induce or promote a state of emaciation they are in this way in motion, not being inherent as the things on account of which the motion subsists, — now, on such a supposition, these things do not constitute the method of doing a thing, or, at any rate, such

' These words are supplied by the Translator to keep before the reader Aristotle's point under discussion.

' Vide book X. chap. z.

' All of what follows, almost to the close of the chapter, is omitted by Taylor. I have found it in Bekker, in the Leipsio edition, and In Didot's Paris edition. Its chief aim is to show the connexion between motion and energy.

S38 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VUk

% method as is perfect, that is, involves au end. For thej do not constitute an end, but in that — I mean, the motion- are inherent the end and the method of doing a thing; as^ for example, a man sees, but also he exercises thought, and employs his understanding, and has employed his under- standing, but he does not receive instructioD, and has received instruction, neither is he in a sound state of health, and has he been restored to health ; he may live properly, and has lived properly; but also he enjoys the felicity of a regular life, and has enjoyed this felicity; and if this be not the case, he ought at some time or other to inteimit, as when he may induce emaciation ; he does not, however, pro- duce this state at present, but he lives, and has lived. 5. Motion falls Therefore, is it proper to denominate some of short of energy, these aforesaid conditions as motions, and some of them as energies or activities; for eveiy motion is im- perfect : as, for instance, emaciation, learning, walkings build- ing; and these are motions, even imperfect ones at least For a person does not walk at the same time that he has walked, nor does a builder construct a house at the same time that he has built one, nor is a thing generated simul- taneously with its having been generated in time past, or is motion imparted simultaneously with the communication of motion in time past, but it is a different thing as regards the communication and the reception of motion. Now, a person — to give an illustration — has seen and sees the same thing at the same time, and exercises his understanding, and has exercised his understanding simultaneously in regard of the same thing : a thing of this kind, indeed, do I denominate energy and activity; but I call that motion.^ Therefore, as to the subsistence of a thing in energy — both what it is and what sort of a thing it is — from these and such-like statements let this point be evident to us.

• Tftylor has ^ese words, and ends the chapter with them*

CH. VII. J WHEN HAVE WB A SUBSTANCE IN CAPAOITT 1 239

CHAPTER VII.1

And \vhen it is that each thing subsists in potentiality, and when it does not, this point thing is said to must now be determined by us; for a thing does JSiiy^onn"" not subsist in potentiality at any time whatso- capacity, mut. ever indiflferently, — thus, for instance, earth, is *"*®^' it, pray, man in potentiality, or is it not ? but is this the case rather when seed already is generated, (nor even the case some- bow, perhaps, then;) just, then, as neither by the medicinal art everything would be indifferently reduced to a sound state, nor from chance, but there is something which is 6ndued with a capacity of health, and this is that which subsists in a healthy condition potentially. But the defini- tion of that which by reason of an exercise of intellect is in a state of generation in a condition of actuality, from such a cause as exists potentially, such a definition may be discovered when the process of generation is accomplished by one in the exercise of volition, and in a case where no impediment is offered by external obstructions. Now, this takes place in the instance adduced in the case of a person being reduced to a sound state of health, when there is no obstruction offered by those things that reside in himself.

And the case is similar with a house also in potentiality, if tliere is no hindrance to its construction as a house from ob- stacles discoverable in the builder of that house or the matter of it ; and if there is not that which it is requisite should be added, or subtracted, or changed, this constitutes a house in potentiality. And this is the case, likewise, with the rest of those things of which there is a first principle of generation that is extrinsic, and in regard of as many things, doubtless, as are contained in the thing itself in possession of them, what* ever will subsist by means of this, in the absence of ext/ernal impediments offering any hindrance; for example, the seed does not as yet subsist in potentiality, for it is necessary that it also accomplish a change in another body. But when now, by means of its own first principle, it may subsist as a thing

• The subject of this chapter will be better understood by corn-

Daring what Aristotle says on the subject of capacity in book iy«  i^ap xii

240 THE HETAFHTStCS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOR Vm

of this kind, it is now this thing in potentiality; and that requires a different first principle, just as earth is not yet a statue in capacity or potentiality, for when it is beuig changed it will become brass.

But what we are speaking of seems to be not a som^rite^* thls particular thing, but a thing composed of lutln ^Mc?5^t *^ ^^ *^* material, just as a chest is not wood, but wooden, nor is the wood earth, but earthy. Again, if earth, after this manner, is not anything else, but ig termed derivatively, or a thing that is composed from that material, in such a case that which subsists invariably in capacity simply is that which is subsequent, just as the chest is neither earthy nor earth, but wooden. For this amounts to the subsistence of the chest in capacity, and this is the matter of the chest, simply cpnsidered as of that which is viewed simply ; but of this particular chest is this particular piece of wood the matter.

If, however, there is something primary that is where we can not any longer denominated according to some-

prtaraiy matter. *^i°g ^^9 ^ * thing composed from that material, this is primary matter; fear example, if earth is of air, and air is not fire, but composed of fire, in this case fire is the primary matter of earth, as this certain particular thing and substance. For in this respect is the universal different from the subject in regard of being the one this certain parti" cular thing contrasted with the other which is not; for, to give an example, man, and body, and soul, are each the subject of passive conditions, — the passive condition, however, is the being musical and white. But when the musical is ingenerated as a capacity, that thing is not styled a musical capacity, but a thing that is musical, and man is not termed whiteness, but a thing that is white, nor walking, or motion, but a thing which walks or is moved, just as a thing that is composed of something else. Now, as regards, then, as many tilings as are denominated in tMs manner, that which is last is subr stance; but in respect of as many things as are not styled in this way, but of which a certain species and this certain particular thing are predicated, that which is last is matter, and a material substance. And therefore it happens correctly that what is composed of the material of something else ii not predicated according to it» matter and its passive oop^

CH. VIII.] E>ERGY PRIOR TO OAFAOITT. 241

ditions, for both of these are indefinite. When, therefore, a thing must be styled as that which subsists m capacity, and when it does not subsist thus, has been declared.

Nature is a

CHAPTER VIII.

Since, however, it has been determined in how many ways that which has a priority of subsist- p*otentiiartyin ence is predicated, it is evident that energy, or fens?o?the activity, is prior to potentiality. Now, I mean by word poten- potehtiality not merely a definite potentiality, ^^^^^' which is styled an alterative first principle in another body, so far forth as it is another, but, in general, every first principle which is the originator of motion or of rest. For Nature,- also, may bo ranked in the same genus with potentiality ; for she is a first principle which is fit to be the cause of motion, not, however, in another body, but in itself, so far forth as it is itself.

Therefore, prior to every principle of this sort ^ p^^^^ ^^ . is energy, or activity, both in definition and in energy to capa- substance; but it is, also, in a certain respect ^011.^°*^^"^ prior in duration, and in a certain respect it is not so. That, indeed, therefore, it is prior in definition is evident, for that which is potential in regard of its possibility of ener- gizing, or assuming a state of activity, such is a thing that is primarily endued with capacity or potentiality ; for example, I speak of one that is skilled in building — now, I mean one that has a capacity of building, and I speak of one that is able to see, and I mean one that possesses the capacity of seeing, and of a thing that may be seen, as that which involves the capacity of being seen : and the same reasoning, also, holds good as regards other things. Wherefore, the definition and knowledge of energy must needs pre-exist the definition and knowledge of potentiality.

But energy,'^ likewise, is in time prior to ^ Anciinthw capacity after this mode: namely, the priority order of its

^ As to a more complete consideration of Nature, in this point of view, the student is referred to the Physics, book II. chap. i. The text is read differently in the Leipsic edition; but the words found there, and not translated above, are quite spurious.

• The important conclusion to which this principle of the piiority ol

eneffl^y to capacity conducts ua, has been already taken notice of, p. 227'

242 THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK VIIF.

development in of that which actively accomplishes the same fs'energy prior thiug in species, but Dot in number. Now, I to capacity. mean to say this, that, in the case of this parti cular man existing at present according to energy, and in the case of the corn, and the horse, and the person who sees, prior in time are the matter, and the seed, and that which is able to see, which in potentiality constitute nian, and corny and one who sees, but are not as yet these in energy. Prior, however, to these in time are those different things that subsist in energy, and from which these have been generated,* for always from an entity in capacity arises, or is generated, an entity in energy by means of an entity in energy — ^as man is generated from man, a musician by means of a musician— on the condition of something that is primary in its nature always imparting motion: the moving power at present, however, subsists in energy, or activity. But it lias been declared, in our disquisitions concerning substance, that everything that is generated is generated^ from some- thing, and by something, and that this is the same in species. Wherefore, also, it seems to be impossible that a builder be a person not likely to have built anything, or a harpist to be one who has not harped anything; for one who learns to play upon the harp learns to play upon the harp by actimlly playing upon the harp : it is also the case, in like manner, with other artists.

Whence arose the argument, by refutation,' of the Sophists* o°n the Sophists, that one who is not in possession of this subject re- scientific knowledge will accomplish the mastery of that about which such scientific knowledge is conversant, for the learner of a science is not in possession of it. But, in reply to thi>', we may observe, that from the fact that something of that which is being produced, or generated, has been produced, and that, in general, something of that which is being moved has been moved — now, this is evident, according to what has been proved in our disquisitions concerning motion^

• Vide book VI. chap, vii., and book VII. chap. v.

^ ^Keyxos : as to this word, the student is referred for an explanation of it to a note on the first chapter of " The Sophistical Elonchi,** in Mr. Owen's Translation of the Logical Treatises of Aristotle, vol. 11 p. 540, "Bohn's Classical Library."

' Aristotle alludes to the concludiug book of his Physical Ausculta

OH. VIU.] IN DEFINITION, TIMB, AND BUBSTi^NGE. 243

— ^the learner, also, in this case, must needs possess some- thing, perhaps, of scientific knowledge. But then, also, by this it is, at any rat«, evident that energy in this way, likewise, is prior to potentiality in regard of generation and time.

But, unquestionably, it is also prior in sub- 5 Energy prici stance, at least, in the first place, indeed, then, to capacity in because those things that are subsequent in gene- *^ *^*»<^®- ration are prior in form and substance ; as a man to a child, and a human being to seed : for now the one possesses the form, but the other does not. And, in the second place, this is so because everything that is being produced advances towards a first principle and an end ; for the final cause is a firat principle, and the generation or production is on account of the end. But energy is an end, and on account of this is potentiality assumed ; for not in order that they may have the power of vision do animals see : but they have the power of vision^ that they may see.

In like manner, also, persons are in possession g. illustrations of the building art, or capacity, that they may of this in art. actually build, and of the speculative art that they may devise systems of speculation ; they do not, however, devise specu- lative systems that they may have the speculative capacity, unless those who do so for the sake of meditation : yet these by no means speculate absolutely ; but they either speculate in this manner, or the fact is so that they have not in any wise an occasion to speculate. Moreover, matter subsists in potentiality because it may advance onwards to form; but when, at least, it subsists in energy, then doth it subsist in form. In like manner, also, is it the case with other things, and those of which the end is motion. Wherefore, as those engaged in teaching by showing, in the way of example, one energizing— say their pupil — think that they have adduced the end, it is so with Nature in like manner. For, if this be not the case, a circumstance, like the Mercury of Passo,^ will

tions, where subjects connected with motion are fully discussed, as well as to the third book of the same Treatise.

^ This remark may be applied to our particular propensions. The latter are not the consequences of our inclinations towards certain objects; but our inclinations towards these objects naturally and neces^ sarily flow from those particular propensions.

^ This Passo was a statuary, ipfioy\v<f>ost and had, amongst many othei'B, made an image of Hermes on a stone ; «nd the doubt, as implied

b2

244 THE METAFHTBICS OF ARISTOTLE. f^BOOX Tin

take place ; for scientific knowledge would be obscure a& to whether it might be internal or external, as was the case with l^asso*s Hermes likewise, for an end is the work, and tha work constitutes the energy. Wherefore, the name energy is denominated according to the work, and converges towards actuality.

^ ^^ And since of some things that which is ulti-

objection t"*° mate is the use — as, for example, of the power statement^"* of vision the act of vision, and besides this no other work is produced diflferent from the power of vision — ^yet in certain things is there something else generated; for example, from the art of housebuilding a house is produced in addition to the act of building, notwithstand- ing that energy, nevertheless, will be the end of potentiality, in both instances, to be sure, though it is more the end of it in the latter than in the former. For building is contained in that which is being built, and is generated and exists at the same time with the house. Of as many things, therefore, as there is something different (namely, that which is being produced) from their use, of these doth there subsist the energy in that which is being constructed, just as both the building resides in that which is being built, and the weaving in that which is being woven ; in like manner, also, is it the case with other things, and, in general, doth motion subsist in tliat to which motion is being imparted. Of as many things, however, as there is not some different work beside the energy, in these is energy inherent; as, for instance, the act, or power, of seeing resides in the pei*son who sees, and theory in the theoriser, and vitality, or life, in the soul : therefore, also, is happiness resident in the soul, for it also constitutes a certain sort of vitality. Wherefore, is it evident, that substance and form are each of them a certain energy. And therefore, according to this reasoning, it is evident that in substance energy is prior to potentiality. And, as we have stated, one

in the text, was, a3 to whether it was inside or outside the stone. People said that it could not be outside, for the stone itself was smooth, and presented no apparent inequalities ; and that, on the other hand, it was hard to think the image could be within the stone, for the lattev would have manifested one or more joinings, being, perhaps, so to say, •et or embedded in the midst of other stones, whereas there was an itter absence of superficial roughness. Such is the account given by 'hi commentators ty£ the allusion inade in this passage by Aristotle.

CH. VTTI.] ETERNAL EXISTENCES PROVE THIS. 243

energy invariably is antecedent to another in time, up to that which is primarily and eternally the moving cause.'

But. assuredly, also, in a more strict and important sense is energy prior to capacity ; ene^Jy "o^capa- for the things that are eternal are in sub- city proved Btance prior to things that are perishable, yet priority of the nothing subsisting: in potentiality is everlasting. coSSptibie!^^ And a reason of this is the following : — every potentiality is at the same time a potentiality of its contra- diction ; for that which is not endued with the capacity of existing will not subsist in anything : but everything that is endued with capacity admits of not energizing. Accord- ingly, that thing the existence of which is potential admits of both being and not being : the same thing, then, is that which is potential, or endued with a capacity of both being and not being. But that thing the non-existence of which is potential admits of not being, and that 'which admits of not being is subject to decay, either simply, or it is not this very thing the admissibility of whose non-existence is affirmed, either according to place, or according to quantity, or accord- ing to quality ; but simply is a thing exposed to corruptiosi according to substance.

None, then, of those things that are simply incorruptible is an entity in potentiality, simply etenmf does considered; but in a certain respect there is no c°*aJ-{**^®* '" hindrance to this being so ; for instance, accord- though, In a ing to quality, or the place where. All things, ^'Jy»i« «ense. it then, subsist in energy : nor, even on the suppo- sition of things being -from necessity, are these things, how- ever, primary, for unless these were so there would be nothing so. Nor, therefore, again, supposing there is any eternal motion, does such a motion subsist in capacity ;^ nor, supposing that there is anything that is being eternally moved, such a thing that is being moved does not subsist according to capacity, unless so far as it proceeds from a cer-

• rrjs TOW &c2 KivowTos irpdarras ivdpyttas. These words might be

regarded as a sort of defiDition of the Divine nature with Aristotle, if the term aKlvrirov were added to qualify the " primum movens.*' Vide book III. chap. 8, and book XI. chap. 7.

2 " Does not subsist in capacity." I have supplied these words t«  •omplete the sense.

246 THE METAPHTB1C8 OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK YIIL

tain quarter, or towards a certain direction. There is no hindrance^ however, to the siibsieteuce of the matter of this.

Wlierefore, the sun and stars, and the entire of this ta the°" firmament, perpetually energize. No apprehen- bodies*^^ sion, alfio, is there lest at any time they may

come to a stand-still,^ which dread overwhelms some of the Natural Philosophers. For neither are the heavenly bodies wearied in this operation of revolving, (for their motion does not happen to subsist in regard of the ca- pacity of the contradiction of those,)— as, for example, is the case with things subject to decay — so as to render the con- tinuity of the motion a laborious operation ; for substance, which is matter and potentiality, and does not subsist in energy, is the cause of this.

11. What is There is, however, an imitation ^ between things corruptible incorruptible and those that are in a state of

models itself « ^ • j. x-l in i»xi-

after the incor- change ; for instance, earth and fire : for these, ruptibie. ^Iso, invariably energize, seeing that they involve

motion essentially and in themselves. But all the rest of the potentialities about which we have discoursed, (from the distinctions and definitions that have been framed,) it is evident are conversant about contradiction ; for that which is endued with the capacity of imparting motion in this par- ticular way can also do so in another way, and not in this way — I meaUj as many things, at any rate, as subsist as po- tentialities according to a rational principle. Potentialities, however, that are devoid of reason, in respect of presence and absence, will as the same be conversant about contradiction.

12. The fore- I^» then, there are certain natures of such a going exposes sort, or substauccs of such a description, as those

an absurdity in ,. li. v j* v

the ideal speculatora who have been engaged m such

theory. theories affirm ideas to be, something would

there be which would be skilled in scientific knowledge in a grdtiter degree than science itself, and something would be

' Aristotle invested the stars with divinity, and therefore maintained their imperishableness. Plato, on the other hand, contended that from their being generated they were liable to decay, though it was not at all probable that they would ever smk into corruption. Empedocles ia alluded to in the text, as appears from the Latin version.

• Tho instance given by the commentators is that of fire, which,

being coi-ruptible, invariably assumes the same motion with the moon, —an incorruptible substance, ».e. according to the Aristotelian Physics,

OH. UL.] SNEBGT SUPERIOR TO OAPAGITT. 247

much more moved than motion itself ; for the former rathe? are energies, hut the latter are potentialities of the former. That, therefore, energy is a thing prior both to potentiality, and every alterative first principle, is evident.

CHAPTER IX.

But that also energy ^ is both superior and i. Energy i» mere excellent than potentiality, however ex- Scenence*thMi cellent, is evident from these statements. For capacity. as many things as are denominated according to the being potential, as far as these are concerned, it is the same thing the being what is potential in regard of contraries ; for instance, that which is said to be endued with a capacity of health and sickness is the same thing, and that, too, at the same time, for there is the same capacity, or potentiality, of being in a sound state of health and being indisposed, and of being at rest and in motion, and of building and of demolishing what is built, and of being built and falling into ruin.

The capacity, then, of accomplishing contra- g. how enerey ries exists at the same time ; but the actual may be inferior subsistence of these contraries at the same time *° ^'^P^^'^^y- is a thing that is impossible : and it is a thing that is im- possible that contrary 2 energies be also present at the same time; for instance, in the case of being healthy and being indisposed. Wherefore, either of these must needs be that which is good, and it must in like manner be possible that this be the case with both or neither. Energy, accordingly, is the more excellent of the two. There is, however, a necessity that, as regards that which is bad, the end and energy should be worse than the potentiality ; for that which is endued with capacity, as regards both the contraries, is the same thing.

1 What Aristotle lays down in this chapter will be the more apparent by referring back to the explanatory notes already given on the word iv4py€ia. Vide note, p. 215.

• I have supplied the word " contrary ;*' the rest of the sentence ii

regarded as spurious, and put within brackets in the Leipsic edition.

218 THE METAFHTSICa OF ARI£rrOTLB. [bOOK ViIX.

..•II, « It is evident, then, that what is evil is not aDv-

I. Bnl nas no _ , . - , ^ i .1 • -1 -1 1 <•

Independent thing independent of the things themselves;^ for ew!*™** ^^^' that which is evil is by the constitution of Nature subsequent to that which we term potentiality. Accordingly, neither in those things which subsist from a first principle, and those that are everlasting existences, is there anything that is either evil or anything in the shape of impeifectiou, or aught that has been actually reduced to decay ; for a tendency towards decay or corruption belongs to things that are eviL

4. The snperi- But mathematical figures are also discovered •hown'from*^ as Subsisting in energy; for persons discover mathematical such ^ in the act of division ; and if such examples. j^^^ ^ieen divided in twain,* these mathematiail figures would have been apparent: but now are they in- herent potentially. Why, let me ask, has a triangle angles equal to two right angles? because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, therefore, the line about the side be produced, to one who merely glances at the figure the thing is at once obvious. Why, too, in a semicircle, is the angle universally a right angle ? because, if there are three equal right lines, or even two at the base, and one right line raised thereupon from the central point, the thing will be obvious to any one at a glance, provided he. be a pei*son that has some knowledge of mathematics. Where- fore, it is evident that mathematical diagrams, subsisting as they do in potentiality, are discovered when they are being reduced to energy; and the cause of this is the following, —

• ' Aristotle thus might have taught the Manichasans a better founda- tion to rest their philosophy upon than they actually did.

^ Hiaipovvrts : that is, they bring their mental energies to bear on the subject, and, by making divisions in lines and angles, they demonstrate and make apparent certain properties of figures which are involved in these diagrams potentially prior tc proof, and subsequent to it are discovered subsisting in energy. This I take to be the meaning of the passage.

• On first meeting with this passage, I fancied that Aristotle was

all uding to the fact that in the cleavage of crystals we find that they aro subjected, as regards the resulting forms of them, to the most rig^d mathematical laws. But, on reflection, I perceive that he had no puch instance in his eye, though most undoubtedly the case of crystals, — in fact, the whole science of mineralogy. — ^would furnish the mosl doiriplete illustrations of the principle laid dovm here.

CH. X.] RELATION OF ACTUALITY 10 CAPACITY. !i49

that understanding constitutes the energy : wherefore from energy springs potentiality ; and, on account of this circum- stance, persons engaged in doing anything are acquainted with that thing, for subsequent in regard of production is energy — I mean, such as subsists according to number.

CHAPTER X.*

Since, however, entity and nonentity are de- ^ Reution of nominated partly in accordance with the figures energ^y and ea- of the categories, and partly in accordance with JJd faisehoodi* the capacity, or the energy of these, or in accord- ance with contraries, but since that which is entity, in the strictest sense of the word, is what is true or false, and this in the case of things consists in composition or division, so that one can verify his assertion who considers that which has been divided to be divided, and that which has been compounded to be compounded; but he speaks falsely who, when either things are or when they are not,^ makes assertions about them in a contrary way to that in which they actually subsist: seeing, then, that this is the case, the thing is termed true or fidse ; for it is fitting that w& should take into consideration what this is which is termed true or false. For it is not on account of a true supposition, on our parts, of your being white that you are in reality white, but, on account of your being white, we who make this assertion as to your whiteness can verify our assertion.

If, therefore, some things are invariably g. in the case compounded, and involve an impossibility of of compound being divided, but if other things are per- * "*^*' petually in a state of division, and are not endued with a capacity of being put together again, and if some things are the recipients of contraries, in such a case actual existence is the being compounded and the being one thing, but non-

^ Aristotle has already noticed the relation suhsisting between truth and being, and falsehood and non-being; and he proceeds in this cliapter to make some application of it to the case of Zvvafits and

^ it^ iffrlu ^ ovK Iffrlv. These words, in some copies, are printed with the sentence following. I have adopted Taylor's arrangement*.

250 THE METAPHTSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [bOOK^IU

8xistence, the not being compounded, but the being mort than one thing. Respecting, then, admissible or contingent natures, the same opinion becomes false and true; and thif is the case with the same definition, or discursus : and they involve the possibility of true assertions being made of them ia one instance, but false assertions in another. Regarding, however, things that are devoid of a potentiality of being disposed otherwise than they are, a thing in this case is not generated so as at one time to be true, but at another false ; but these things are invariably true and in the ^^^ falsc. And, therefore, in regard of incora- case of incom- posite natures, what, let me ask, is the being po8ite natures. ^^ ^^^ ^^^jj^g^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^^ie truc and the false

in respect of these 1 for it is not a thing that is compounded so that it actually involves existence when it may be in a state of composition, but does not involve existence when it may subsist in a stato of division, — as a piece of white wood, or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with its side, — neither will the true and the false, in like manner, be still inherent, also, in those things — I mean, incomposite natures. Or, shall we say that, as neither that which is true in regard of these, so neither is their actual existence the same ; but the one is that which is true, while the other is that which is false? Contact and assertion give us that which is true, for not the same thing is afl&rmation with assertion;* not, however, to pass into contact amounts to ignorance, for deception about the nature of anything has no existence, save by accident. In like manner, also, is it in the case of substances that are uncompounded ; for deception in regard of them is not a thing that is possible, s. Application And all such substances subsist in energy, tothe'^^rincMf ^^* ^^ potentiality; for if they subsisted in that truth is potentiality they would be generated, and in more ^\rtth^ process of time would be corrupted ; but in the energy than present instance the actual entity is not gene- capaciy. rated, nor is it reduced into corruption, for it

would be generated from something. And as regards what-

' ^fxUrts : some of the copies must have aW^curis, from the reference made by the commentators to Aristotle's treatise " On Interpretation," chap, ix., where the subject under discussion is negation and afi&rm«  bion. ^(TiSf however, simply means, " assertion "

CE. X.J AKIN TO THAT OF TRUTH TO PALSBHOOD. ^^51

soeyer things, therefore, that amount to the existence of any certain particular thing, and its subsistence in energy or activity, as regards these, I say, there is no possibility of labouring under deception, but either one understands ^em or he does not. But the inquiry as to the nature of any- thing is being instituted by us in respect of these natures, as to whether there are things of this sort at aU, or not ; and the fact is, the existence of a thing is as that which is true, and its non-existence as that which is false ; in one way, if it is that which is compounded, it is true, whereas, in the other, if it is not a composite nature, it is false : and in another way, if we suppose it to exist in this way, it is true, but if not in this way, it is not true. Now, that which is true amounts to the intellectual apprehension of these,^ but that which is &lse does not exist, nor does it amount to deception, but ignorance; not, however, such as may be assimilated unto blindness, for blindness is just as if one, in short, did not possess the capacity of intellectually apprehending any sub- ject. And it is also evident that, respecting things that are immovable, there is no deception as to the time when of their existence, supposing that one consider them as things that are immovable ; for instance, the triangle — unless viewed as that which is subject to mutation — a mathematician will not consider as being at one time in possession of angles equal to two right angles, but at another not so, for it would undergo a certain mutation ; yet he might consider one thing in this point of view, but not another: for example, that there be no even number, first, or that some are so, but that other numbers are not so. In regard, however, of one thing in number we cannot expect that he should entertain this opinion, for no longer would he do so as regards certain things, yet not as regards others ; but he will speak truth or fiUsehood so far as he makes assertions of it as a thing that is invariably disposed in this way.

^ Aristotlo's words are, t6 8^ a\riOh rh voftv avrd : how brief, yet how expressive I

BOOK IX/

CHAPTER T. I TT * *!- That unity is denominated in many ways hat

L Unity, or the , • i j i j • j« • • "^ •/

r^ gv. denomi- been previously declared m our divisions on its tomot?on?per-* Di^Hifarious predications ; ^ and whereas it is ception, and denominated in many ways, there are summarily e ition. arranged four modes of things that are styled one, primarily and essentially, but not according to accident For both that which is continuous, either simply considered, or especially what is so by nature, at least, and not by con- tact, or by a bond of connexion, such is one thing ; and that in a more eminent degree is one thing, and prior to these of which the motion is more indivisible, and simple, rather. Moreover, is unity a thing of this sort ; and in a more eminent degree is that which is a whole one thing, and that which possesses a certain form and species: but particularly we look for unity if a thing of this sort subsists by the constitu* tion of Nature, and not by violent or abnormal means ; in like manner as whatever things are joined together by glue, or by a nail, or by a chain, are one thing, but contains in itself the cause of its own continuity. And it is a thing of this kind in respect of its motion being one and indivisible in place and time ; so that it is evident if anything by the constitution of Nature involves a principle of the earliest motion — I mean, such a principle as is primary — that it is the first magnitude ; as, for example, I speak of the circular motion of a body,* for this is the earliest motion. Therefore,

• In book IX. — according to others, book X. — ^Aristotle having already

examined fully into the subject of the t^ Svf comes now to ti*eat of the rd 6v, which, with the ontologist, are interchangeable terms. The points investigated in this book wear a decidedly logical aspect ; and it has been thought that there has been some error or confusion in this portion of the Metaphysics.

2 The term ey has already been defined by Aristotle, in book IV. 3hap. vi.

• <l)opa5 : I have translated this word " body." It primarily refers to

^b^ actual motion of a body, and then to the body itself which is

CH. I.] Nature of unity. 25Z

in this way are some things one either as what is con- tinuous or entire ; others, however, are one of which the definition may be one. And things of this sort are such aa those of which the intellectual apprehension is one, and such as those of which it is indivisible, and of which there is an indivisible apprehension of what is indivisible in form or number. In number, therefore, is the singular indivisible; but in form that is indivisible which resides in what is an object of knowledge, and in scientific knowledge itself: wherefore, that would be one thing primarily which is tlie cause of the subsistence of unity in substances. Therefore, no doubt, is unity denominated in such many ways, as both that which is continuous by the constitution of Nature, and is an entirety and a singular, and that which is universal. Now, all these are one in respect of the indivisibility-^f the motion of some of them, but of the intellectual perception or the definition of others.

It is requisite, however, to understand that "^^ ,.

should not assume that the same assertions should tinctions in in- be made alike in the inquiries both as to what ^TSnlty^^'^** sort, of things are styled one, and what is the nature of the existence of unity, and what is the definition of it ; for unity is predicated in thus many ways, and each of those things will be one in which any one of these modes will be inherent. The being or existence of unity, however, some- times will be in accordance with one of these, and sometimes with another which also is nearer to the name, but those are one in regard of capacity ; just as, also, if it may be expedient to discuss the subject relating to element and cause, it would be necessary, in the treatment of these matters, both to frame distinctions and to assign the definition of the name. For fire,^ in one sense, is an element, — and perhaps, also, with the Infinite ^ in itself this is the case, or it is something else of the sort, — and, in another sense, it is not so ; for the essence of element is not the same thing with the essence of fire and of element ; but so far fortli as fire is a certain thing and

parried along. The subject here glanced at is treated of at large by Aristotle in the eighth book of the Physics, where the perpetuity ol !iatural motion is investigated.

' The Leipsic edition puts a stop after o 'oix^lovy — omitted in the text I have followed.

^ The subject of the Infinite is examined into in book X. chap. x.

254 THE HETAPHTSICS OF A.RIBTOTLB. [bOOK IZ.

a certain nat are, so far is it an element ; but the name signi- fies that this particular quality is an accident in this, because there is something subsisting from this as from a thing that is primarily inherent. So, also, is it in the case of cause and unity, and all things of this sort. Wherefore, also, the essence or existence of one consists in being indivisible ; namely, in being this certain particular thing, and incapable of a separate subsistence either in place or form, or in the faculty of thought, or in that which is entire, and has been made the subject of definition.

g Unity, as a ^^* especially doth the nature or essence of measure,' found unity consist in being the fii-st measure of every n quant ty. g^nus, and the principal portions of quantity;^ for from this quarter, likewise, hath it proceeded to other things, for measure is that whereby quantity is known. But quantity, so far forth as it is quantity, is known either by unity or by number ; for every number is known by unity. Wherefore, every quantity, so far forth as it is quantity, is discoverable by unity; and that by which as primary it is known, this itself is one. Wherefore, unity is a first principle of number, so far forth as it is number. And hence, also, in the case of other things, that is denomi- nated a measure whereby as primary each thing is known ; and the measure of everything is one in length, in breadth, in depth, in gravity, in velocity. For gravity and velocity are what is common in the case of contraries, for in a twofold sense may each of them be taken ; as, for instance, gravity is both that which involves any momentum whatsoever, and that which possesses a supei-abuudance of momentum : and velocity is both that which involves any motion whatever, and an excess of motion ; for likewise is there a certain velocity even of that which is slnw, and there is a certain gravity of that which is rather light. . -, , Now, a measure and first principle in all of

4. Measure de- .' . i i • i • • j*

rivabie from these 18 a sort 01 Unity, and a thmg that is mdi- gar'd^/other" visible; siuce — to give an instance — in lines, also, quantities, c.^. thcv cmplov that which measures a foot as a

lines &c • *' ^ *^ ,

• " thing that is indivisible : for everywhere, or id

• If we do not allow the truth of this view of unity, it is implied, in

what Aristotle lays d^wn that even the notion of quantity would bt Inconceivable.

ni. l] ijnitt viewed as a measure. 255

every instance^ do investigators search for measure as a certain unity, and as a thing that is indivisible ; and this constitutes what is simple, either in the quality or in the quantity. Wheresoever, indeed, therefore, there does not appear to be anything subtracted or added, this is the most accurate measure. Wherefore, the measure of number^ is the most precise of all measures, for the monad they have posited as in every way indivisible ; but, in the case of other things, they imitate a measure of this sort : for from a stadium and a talent, and that which is invariably greater, would anything that has been both added and taken away rather escape our notice, than from that which is less. Wherefore, that from which, considered as primary, a thing does not admit of subsisting according to sense, this all men constitute as a measure, both of things moist and dry, and of gmvity and magnitude; and they imagine that they then know the quantity of a thing when they happen to know it by means of this measure. And, therefore, also, motion do ^nd in regard they measure by a simple motion, and one which of motion. is the most rapid; for this involves the very smallest possible duration.^ Wherefore, in astronomy a unity of this kind is a first principle and a measure — for their hypothesis is, that the motion of the heavens is equable, and that it is of the utmost velocity ; and, in accordance with this, astronomers adjust the other motions — ^and in music diesis is adopted as a measure, because it constitutes the least perceptible sound ;3 and in the case of vocal sounds it is an element of speech that is such. And all these things in this way are a certain one, not in such a manner as that the one is a thing common to tl^em, but in such a way as has been declared. A measure is not, however, invariably one in , ^

I , . , . ., /. 5" Certain con-

uumber, but sometimes more than one ; as, for siderations set iiistance, two dieses such as are not understood ?°!L1o'»?i*°^

' to measure.

according to hearing, but are contained in the

definitions ; and the vocal sounds by which we measure are

more numerous, and the diameter of the square, likewise, is

And hence it is that the mathematicel sciences are characterised fcr so much of certainty and precision.

^ Vide Locke's Essay, book I. chap. xiv.

' The woM ^Utris has been already explained, in a note, p. 124, as a term in music, meaning something the same as our demi-semi-quayer. It occurs in the Posterior Audytics, book I. chap. xxiiL

256 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IX.

measured by two things, and this is the case with the side and with all magnitudes. Thus, therefore, is unity a measure of all things, because we thereby know those things of which substance consists, by making a division of it either according to quantity or according to form ; and on this account is unity indivisible, because the original of everything is that which is indivisible. But each thing is not indivisible in the same manner as a foot and the monad ; but the latter is indivisible in every respect, and the former has a tendency towards things that art) indivisible according to sense, as just now has been remarked ; for, perhaps, everything continuous is divisible. The measure, however, is always a thing of a kindred nature ; for of magnitudes is magnitude the measure : and, in regard of an individual thing, length is a measure of length, breadth of breadth, of vocal sounds voice is a measure, weight a measure of weight, a monad of monads. For in this way must we receive this assertion, but not to the effect that number is a measure of numbers. Although this ought to be the case, if measure, in like manner, in this case is to be kindred with what is measured ; * but he who entertains this opinion does not think similarly of this instance, but just as if one would suppose that monads are a measure of monads, but not a monad ; number, however, is a multitude of monads.

6 Transferred ^"^ scicuce wc pronouucc to be the measure meaning of the of things and sense,^ likewise, for this very reason, word measure, jje^a^ge ^g attain unto some knowledge through

the instrumentality of these, since rather are they measured than are they standards of measure. But it happens unto us just as if another were measuring us we should know how large we were by reason of the cubital measure being extended over us thus far. Protagoras, however, says that man is the measure of all things; just as if he should say that one who possesses scientific knowledge, or who goes through an act of perception by sense, is a measure, and that this is so with these because the one possesses sense, but the other scientific knowledge, which we affirm to be measures of those things

• I have added these words to complete the sense.

' The remarks foUowmg draw our attention to what Bacon would sail the "idola tribus." Vide Nov. Org. lib. I. aph. 41 -46; and Da A.iLgm. lib. V. chap. iv.

cu.li.] 18 unnr bubstanoe? 257

that are subjects to either one or the other. Doubtlefs, such persons, in their assertion of nothing that is extraordinary appear to say something pertinent to the matter in hand

That therefore, indeed, the being or essence of 7. Recapituia- anity subsists in an eminent degree, according ^^°^ to the name which they determine upon, as a certain measure — ^and the most impoilaut measure— of quantity, and, in the next place, of quality, this is evident. Now, a measure of this sort will be of one kind, if it may be indivisible as far as r^ards quantity, but of another, if it be so as regards quality. Wherefore, unity is indivisible either simply or so tJEu: forth as it is unity.

CHAPTER II.

But as regards Substance and Nature ^ we , _. ^. must institute an inquiry how they are dispoBed, L^b t^e in like manner as in the doubts ^ mooted in the Jf?thtog"^* earlier portions of this work we have taken a review of what unity is, and how one ought to take up his opinions respecting the same, — ^whether as though this imity were to be considered as a certain substance (as both the Pythagorics^ affirm in the first instance, and Plato subse- quently), or rather, whether some nature is subjected to it, and in what manner this ought to be more intelligibly discoursed of, and whether rather is it the case that we should look at unity from the point of view that some of the natural philosophers do? for of those a certain one says that unity is harmony, but another air, and a third the Infinite. Now, if it is not possible for any of the imi- versals to be substance,^ as has been declared in our disquisi- tions concerning substance, and in those concerning entity,

• ov<r(a and <f>v<rts are terms that already have been explained— 01)0-^0,

in books IV. and V 11., and m the opening chapters of the Categories ; piitru in book IV., and in the first book of the Physics.

' The doubts cocjiected with ontology are stated and examined into in book II.

' ArifltoUe thus reprehends all efforts on the part of those philo- ■ophers who sought to discover either unity in matter — that is, somt jirimary element— or unity in an idealistic sense.

• Tlui question is discussed in book YI. chap. xiii.

'25% THB mtTAPHTiilCS OF ARISTOTLE. [DOCK IX

nor that this very thing be substance so as to be enduei with the papacity of subsisting as a certain one thing separatf from plurality, (for a thing of this kind is what is common, but alone may be ranked as a category, it is evident, if tht foregoing be true, that neither is unity itself a substance, for entity and unity, in an eminent degree above other things, are predicated universally of all things. Wherefore, neither are genera certain natures and substances capable of a separable subsistence from other things, nor does unity admit of being a genus, on account of the same causes, through , which neither does unity or substance admit of being a genua And, further, in like manner it is expedient that the ^ase stand in regard of all things. Now, unity and entity are predicated in an equal number of ways : wherefore, since in quantities there is a certain unity and a certain nature, and since, in like manner, both of these reside in quantities, it is plain that likewise, in general, we must investigate what unity is, as well as what entity is also; as if it were not sufficient to determine that this very thing is the nature of it. s. Illustrated ^^*» Unquestionably, in colours, at least, there is by the case of the One colour, — for example, whiti), — afterwards CO ours ; ^j^^ ^.^^ appear to be produced from this and black ;

but black is a privation of white, as darkness also is of light, but this is a privation of light. Wherefore, if entities were colours, entities would constitute a certain number — ^but of what 1 let me ask — without doubt, manifestly of colours ; and unity would be a certain one thing, as, for example, white. and of music ^^^ ^^ ^^^® manner, also, if entities were me- and Tocai lodics there would be a number of dieses,^ how- tounds. ever; but the substance of them would not be

number, and unity would be something the substance of which would not be unity, but diesis. In like manner, also, in the case of the elements of sounds, if all entities wero sounds they would constitute the number of the elemental and unity would be a vocal element; and if entities were right-lined figures they would constitute the number of figures, and unity would be a triangle : and the same reason- ing stands good, likewise, in the case of the other genera of things. Wherefore, if also in passive properties, and in qualities, and in quantities, and in motion, there subsist ^ The Leipsic edition reads this in the Bingular.

OB. m.] UNITY AS OPPOSED TO PLURALITY. 259

numbers, and a certain one thing in all these, unity would be both a number of certain things, and it would constitute a certain entity ; ^ but by no means would this be the sub- stance of that thing: and as regards substances the case must needs be the same ; for in like manner is it in the case of all things. That, therefore, unity in eveiy genus is a sort of nature, and that this very thing — namely, unity— is ^ not the nature of anything, is evident ; but as in colours there is one colour to be sought for as unity itself, so, also, in sub- stances is one substance to be sought for as unity itself.

But that somehow unity and entity are ^ unity and squivalent in their meaning is evident from the entity equipoi- fact that unity follows upon the categories in an {JJ^* "* °^®*"" equal number of ways with entity, and yet does not subsist in any of them ; as, for example, neither m quiddity nor in quality, but it subsists in like manner as entity. And from this &ct it follows that there is not any- thing different from man additionally predicated in the pre- ' dication of one man, as neither is entity^ anything inde- pendent of quiddity, or quality, or quantity, and that tho being of unity is the same thing as the being of some indi^ vidual thing.

CHAPTER III.

Unity, however, and plurality are opposed in j opposition many ways ; in one of whioh modes the unity between unity and the multitude are opposed as what is in- "°*^ P^^'*^**y- divisible and what is divisible : for that which has been divided, or is actually divisible, is styled a certain multitude ; but what is indivisible, or that which has not been di- vided, is styled one. Since, therefore, the oppositions are fourfold,^ and one of these is expressed according to priva- tion, there would subsist what is contrary, and neither would they be denominated as contradictions, nor as things predi-

^ Some copies read Iv instead of 6y, ' This sentence is not quite intelligible.

• T^ «Tvoi, that is, the " esse."

• This subject was examined into by Aristotle in a Treatise Tltpi

kydeov, mentioned in book XXL of the Metaphysics. Vide note in chap li. of that book, p. 84.

82

260 THB nXAFHTBIOB OF ABISTOTLB |^BOOK IS

cated relatively. But unity is predicated from its contraiy, and thereby made evident, — y'lz. that whioh is indivi»ble from that which is divisible, — from the fact that multitude, and thai which is divisible, are rather cognisable by sense than that which is indivisible. Wherefore, in the definition the multi- tude is prior to that which is indivisible by reason of per- ception by sense.

s. coneomi- There also belong to unity — as we have likewise

taatt of unity, described iu our division of oontraries ' — same- 8imUarit7,and uoss, and similarity, and equality; but to multi- equaiity. ^^^^ beloug diversity, and dissimilarity, and in^

equality. Seeing, however, that sameness is predicated in many ways, after one mode also — ^namely, according to numbei>— subsists that which we denominate occasionidly as this, and after another mode if a thing be one both in definition and in number ; for instance, you are the same with yourself both in form and matter. Further, are those things said to be the same to the primary substance of whioh there may belong one definition ; as, for instance, equal right lines are the same, and equal and equal-angled quadrangular figures, notwithstanding that they are many in number ; but in these the equality is unity. And things are said to be similar if they be not the same simply considered, nor without a difierence in regard of subject-substance, but yet may be the same as regards form ; for example, the greater square is similar to a less : and so it is with unequal right lines, for these are similar, no doubt, but not the same absolutely. And some things are called similar if they possess the same form wherein reside the more and less, as properties ingenerated, while the things themselves are neither greater nor less. And other things are so styled if there belong to them the same plEissive condition, and such as is one in species; as, for instance, that which is exceedingly white, and what is so in a less degree, they say that such are similar because the form of them is one. And other things are so called if they possess more of sameness than of diversity, either considered simply, or provided they be more obvious to perception as possessing such ; for instance, tin is

• For the subject of contraries, vide the Categories, chap, x.; Topka,

book IL chap. vii. Aristotle is thought to have written a distinct treatise on contraries, entitled *£kAo7^ rwv hatvrlwp, mentioned in th«  Metaphysics, book IU. chap. iL

CB. in.J C0K00MITAI7TB OF UNITY AND PLURALITY. 261:

more similar to silver than to gold, and gold is similar to fire^ 80 &r forth as it is ruddy and brilliant.

Wherefore, it is evident that both diversity s. Concomi- and dissimilarity are denominated in many Syl^unm^" waya; and that which is another thing is ex- larity.diversity: pressed in opposition to that which is the same. •"* difference. Wherefore, everything in relation to everything is either the same or different ; but that is said to take plaoQ if the matter and the definition be not one : wherefore, you and your neighbour are different But a third signification of the foregoing is when things subsist as in mathematical entities. Therefore, indeed, on this account, everything of those, as many as are denominated unity and entity, are so deno- minated in reference to everything as different or the same. For neither is there any contradiction of sameness. Where- fore, the assertion is not made in the case of nonentities, but of all entities, — the "not-same," however, is predicated of entities, — for sameness and diversity being constituted by nature an entity and one thing, are either one or not one. That, then, which is diversity, and that which is sameness, are in this way opposed. Difference, however, and diversity are something else ; for it is not requisite that a thing which is diverse, and that in reference to, or because of which, a thing is diverse, should be a diverse thing by reason of something common ;^ for everything whatsoever, in regard of its being an entity, is either diverse or the same. That, however, which is different from something is different by something, or in some respect, so that it is necessary that something wherein they differ should be the same, and this something which is thus the same is either genus or species; for everything that is different differs either in genus or in species ; those things differ in genus of which neither the matter is common nor their generation into one another — for instance, take the case of those things of at many as there is another figure of predication — ^but things are different in species of whish the genus may be the same, and that is called a genus in respect of which both of the things that are different are styled the same according to substance. But contraries are things different, and con* tranety is a certain difference.

' Taylor supplies this word.

269 THE METAPHTSIOB OF JJU8I0TL1. [BOOK H,

4 coof rma- ^^^ ^^^ ^® ^^^ made this foregoiiig snppo- iton of the sition coirectlj is evident from induction ; for aU ta3l]Sl'^ those things that are different their di£forenoe ii even apparent: and not merely so vrhen thej are diverse ; but some things are diverse in genus, bat others are diverse which belong to the same coordination of predication. Wherefore, also, those same things that an contained in the same genus are also involved in the same species. Now, it has been determined in the case of other things what sort of entities are the same or different in the genus.

CHAPTER IV.i

1. Contrariety BuT since it is admissible that things which JS2?tSt*dift?. are different should differ one from another «nce. more and less, there is, likewise, a certain greatest

difference ; and I mean by this contrariety : and that thei» does exist this greatest difference is evident from induc- tion. For some things that are different in genus do not possess a way one towards another, but are distant to a con- siderable extent, and are not things that may be comparea together. To those things, however, that differ in species belong generations that take their rise frt)m contraries as from extremes, but the last interval is the greatest Where- fore, also, is this the case with that which lies between the con- 2 Deductions traries. But, surely, this which is the greatest therefrom. jq gach genus, at any rate, is that which is perfect ; for greatest is that of which there is no excess, or superabun- dancy, and finished is that beyond' which there is no possi- bility of assuming anything, for the perfect difference involves an end : in like manner as other things are called perfect, or finished in respect of their involving an end. But to the end there is nothing extrinsic; for it is the ultimate thing in everything, and comprises those things of which it is the end. Wherefore, nothing is extrinsic to the end, nor does the perfect require anything of the sort That therefore,

^ The logical questions discussed in this and the following bhapten would appear somewhat out of place. Perhaps the subject of tiis opposition between unity and plurality suggested them to Aristotle^ mind.

cm. IV. J CONTRABIETT THK GREATEST DIFFERENCE. 265

indeed, contrariety constitutes a perfect difference is evident from these statements. And whereas contraries^ are denomi- nated in many ways, subsistence in a perfect manner will follow in such a way as that the subsistence also of contraries would be inherent in them. Now, seeing that these things are so, it is plain that there is no possibility of one thing involving many contraries; for neither could there be anything more ultimate, or final, than the extreme, nor of one interval would there be more than two extremes. And, in general, if con- trariety be a difference, yet difference is the difference be- tween two things : wherefore, also, this will be the case with the perfect difference.

It is necessary, however, that the rest of the s. The troth of definitions also of the contraries be correct; an dcflnitions for likewise doth the perfect difference evince dei>endent on the greatest amount of difference : for of things ftJSJe?ta*ac- that differ in genus and in species there is no cordancewith possibility of assuming anything that is more *^® *°"^«°»°8- external; for it has been demonstrated that, respecting things extrinsic to the genus, there subsists not a difference, and of these this is the greatest difference : and those things that belong to the same genus, and involve the greatest difference, are contraries, for the greatest difference of these is the perfect difierence. And those things that involve the greatest amount of difference in the same recipient are con- traries, for there is the same matter for the contraries ; and things that rank under the same potentiality, and involve the greatest difference, are also contraries; for also the science is one concerning one genus of those things in which the perfect difference is the greatest

The first or chief contrariety, however, consists ^ ^^ ^. ,

• 1- i_»x J • X' J. "^ \ 'J.- ^' The chief

in habit and privation ; yet not every privation contrariety (for privation 2 is predicated in many ways), but JjJJoiJ"** ^"" whatsoever such as may be perfect. And the other contraries will be denominated according to these, some, on the one hand, in respect of possession, and others from action, or from being fit subjects for action ; and, on the other hand, some in respect of their being recipients, and rejections of these, or of other contraries.

^ Vide note on oontrariei, chap, iii

' The term orhri<ru is defined in book IV. chap, zxiii

264 THB METAFHYSICS OF ABISTOTLK. [BCOIL A

B. Contrariety Now, if they are opposed — I mean, contr» Is not contra- diction and privation, and contrariety and rela- ®*®^ tions — and if of these contradiction is the

first, and of contradiction there is nothing intermediate but if of contraries this is admissible, it is evident that contradiction is not the same thing with contrariety, and that privation constitates a certain contradiction; for pri- vation belongs either to what is entirely devoid of a capacity of possessing, or to that which, even though adapted by nature for possession, may yet not actually possess either entirely or in a certain definite manner ; for we now express this in many ways, just as the dibtinctions have been drawn by us elsewhere. Wherefore, privation is a certain contradiction, or a defined impotentiality, or one which is conjoined along with what is receptive. Wherefore, of contradiction there is not anything that is intermediate; but of a certain privation there is, for everything is either equal or not equal ; but not everything is equal or unequal, but only if it be contained in that whidi is receptive of equality. 6. Contrariety ^i i^ow, there are generations in matter from is privation, contraries, and these are produced either from form

but not everv

privation is and tlio habit of the species, or from a certain contrariety. pnvatiou of the spccies and of the form, it is evi- dent that every contrariety would constitute a certain priva- tion, but not every privation, perhaps, would constitute con- trariety. And a cause of this is the following : that whatever is a subject of the privation admits of being a subject of privation in many ways ; for those things from the extremities of which changes are generated, these are contraries. ^ ^^ , And this is evident, likewise, from induction;

7. Tne fore- « .•x«i ••••

going view con- for cvery coutranety involves a privation of hiduSioS™ either of the contraries. Not similarly, however^ is it the case with all things; for inequality us a privation of equality, but dissimilarity of similarity, and vice of virtue.^ But there is the same difiference as has been

• To make evil a mere negation of good is to be expected in a Pagan,

whose mind was in the dark as to those various sources of evil whicfe our Redeemer has put us on our guard against. Vide Dean Trench's " Notes on the Parables/' where, in his exposition of the '* Parable of thd Tares/' the influence of the Devil, viewed as a pergonal influence over frail humanity, is most beautifully extracted from the iFymbol ol •Ihetaret."

U9. T.] OPPOSITION OF ORBATNBSS TO 8MALLX£SS. 260

stated; for one thing is a subject of privation if it may happen to be deprived of anything, but another if it may be so at any time, or in any subject; as, for example, would be the case at a certain age either in that which is the principal age, or altogether so, Wherefore, of some contraries is there a medium, and there is a man who iH neither good nor evil ; but of others there is not a medium, but a number must needs be either odd or even : further, do some things involve a definite subject, but others do not. Wherefore^ it is evident that invariably either of the con- traries is denominated according to privation : it is sufficient, however, if there are in existence the primaries atid the genera of contraries ; as, for instance, unity and plurality are styled such, for the rest are referred or reduced to these.

CHAPTER V.i

But since one thing is contrary to one thing, i. Question la a person would feel perplexed as to how unity J*«jni j' the and plurality are opposed, and how the equal is fition betwe^ opposed to the great and the small. For there SS^ms^m is the question whether invariably we speak of weu as equality a thing in the way of opposition— for example, "*•* «"»»»"»<»•• whether it is white or black, and whether it is white or not white— but we do not say whether such is a man or a thing that is white, unless hypothetically, and in such an inquiry, as, for instance, whether Cleon came or Socrates? but there is no necessity for this inquiry being found in any geuus ; but this, likewise, has proceeded from thence. For things in opposition do not admit of subsisting alone at the same time ; which aforesaid mode of speaking of a thing one employs in the present instance, — I mean, in the inquiry, which of the two came first? for if both could do so at the same time, the question would be ridiculous. And if this were possible in this way also, in like manner would the person who

^ In this chapter A ristotle, by the mention of the opposition between unity and plurality, is led into discussions purely logicaL The subject of opposition is Inreated of in the seventh and following chapters df Aristotle's Treatise '* On Interpretation,*' and by Archbii^op Whately Ib book n. chap. y. of his Log! u Vide note, p. 129.

266 THB mSTAPHTEIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IX

makes the inquiry fall into opposition, viz. into unity, ot plurality; as, for example, whether both came, or either of the two \ If, therefore, in things that are opposed the question whether a thing " is so and so " is to be found invariably— now, we speak of a thing as to whether it is greater, or less^ or equal — what opposition is there of equality in respect of these, for neither is it contrary to either only, nor to bcthi for why should it be contrary to the greater more than to the less ? Further, is the equal contrary to that which is unequal; wherefore, it will be contrary to more than ona If, however, inequality signifies the same thing with both of these at the same time, it would be in opposition to both, and the doubt renders assistance to those who say that inequality constitutes the duad; it happens, however, that one is contrary to two, which is impossible. ' Moreover, equality seems to be a medium between the great and the small; but no contrariety seems to be either of the nature of a medium, nor from the definition is it a thing possible that it should ; for it would not be perfect if it were a mean between anything: yet it rather invariably involves some- thing that is a medium with respect to itself. 9 Qn«.«.fh.n* It thercfore remains that equality be opposed

2. Something , • i.« xr il • i

as regards this either as negation or as privation. Now, certainly, opposition. .|. jg ^^^ possible that it should be in opposition to either; for why should it be opposed to the large more than to the small? in such,then,there would subsist a privative negation of both. Wherefore, also, the question " whether " is predicated in respect of both, but not in respect of either; as we do not say whether a thing is greater or equal, or whether it is equal or less; but the question of whether" invariably subsists in reference to three things. It does not, however, constitute privation from necessity; for it does not follow that everything is equal which is not greater or less : but that takes place in the case of the things in which those — I mean, the greater or less— *are naturally^ inherent. Now equality is that which ia neither great nor small, but that which by nature is adapted for becoming great or little; and as privative negation is it opposed to both. Wherefore, also, it is a thing that is a

' The discussions in this book of the Metaphysics are illostratlye ol the subtlety of the verbal distinctions of the Aristotelians, and, as loiiie Tfould say, of their inanity also.

aa.Ti.j oPFosiTiOM of ujcttt to plurality. 261

medium ; and that which is neither evil nor good is in opposi* Hon tQ both, but without a name : for in many ways is each denominated, and that which is receptive is not one thing, but rather that which is neither wiiite nor black. Neither, however, is this styled one thing; but colours are somehow defined in respect of which this negation is affirmed priva- tively; for it is requisite tfalt this be either a negation of white and black, or that it^ a thing devoid of colour, or something else of the sort

Wherefore, those persons do not correctly 3. Repels the reprehend our remark on this point who are of reS^by hS m'-" opinion that all things are expressed similarly:^ count of this wherefore, there will be between a shoe and a «>pp«>"^«° hand something that is a medium which will be neither shoe nor hand ; since, also, that which is neither good nor bad will be a medium between what is good and what is bad ; as if there were likely to be something intermediate between nW things. It is not, however, necessary that this result should 'ensue; for this co-negation of things that are opposed be- longs to those things of which there is a certain medium, and between which a certain interval has been fitted by nature to exist; but as regards these there is not a difierence in existence, for in another genus are those things to be classed of which there are co-negations : wherefore, the subject ol them is not one.

CHAPTER VI.

And, in like manner, also, concerning unity ^ Question in and plurality a person might express the follow- regard of the ing doubt For if plurality be opposed to unity, "S^^^lilln^ absolutely or simply considered, there ensue cer- unity and piu- tain consequences that are impossible ; for unity ' **^' will be a thing that is few in number, or will amount to few Uiings, for plurality is likewise opposed to the few. Further, are two things many, since the twofold is manifold; and fO also is two denominated twofold. Wherefore, unity is a ting that is few in number; for relatively to what are two

• Notwithstanding all his verbal niceties, Aristotle will not allow

^t they are mere distinctions without a difference.

308 THE KETAPHTSIOS OF ABIBTOTLI. [dOOK IX

Uiings styled many, unless in reference to unity and fewness! fox nothing else appears to be less. Further, must this be admitted, if as what in length are the long and the short, so in multi- tude are the much and the few; and wh;:teyer may be much is also many, and the many is also much : unless there is some difference, then, in a thing that is continuous and easily defined, fewness will be a certain multitude Wherefore, wiU unity be a certain multitude if, also, it be that which is few. And this must needs be so if two things are many.

2.Propowd«o. ^^^ perhaps, plurality ^ is styled somehow lutionofthis also as the much, yet as being a thing that question. j^ different, as water, which is much, but not

many. But in respect of as many things as are divisible therein subsists the many, or plumlity, in one way, if the multitude inyolves superabundancy either absolutely or rela- tively to something — and, in like manner, it is the caBe with fewness, if the multitude should involve deficiency — ^but, in another way, plurality subsists as number, which also alone is opposed to unity. For in this way do we denominate unity, or plurality, just as if one should say unit and units^ or a white thing and white things, and things that have been measured in respect of measure, and that which is capable of being measured. So, also, things which are manifold are de- nominated many; for each number is many because it is one,^ and because each is measurable by one, and as being that which is opposed to unity, not to fewness. So, indeed, then, two things are many, likewise ; yet they are not so as a mul- titude involving superabundancy either relatively or absolutely, but primarily. And two things are simply what are few ; for it is the first multitude which involves deficiency, and two is the first multitude in number.^

3. Error of Wherefore, Anaxagoras did not correctly with-

Anaxacoras on draw his asscut from the current opinion when

• • ^ ^ ^' he laid down that all things had a subsistence at

the same time,^ and were infinite both in multitude and

^ Vide book XII. chap. iz.

' Some copies have tva and some Ms, I have followed the former reading.

^ These words are added to complete the sense.

• On this dogma, vide book III. chap. iv. ; Cudworth, vol. IIL p. 84 :

and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, «ect. 107, translated in '*Bohn'i Philolog' jal Library."

CB. VLJ this OFl*OBmON BZAMINSD. 269

Binallness; but he ought to have said, instead of this expres* sioD, that things were infinite both in smallness and paucity , for paucity or fewness does not constitute infinity, since few- ness does not subsist on account of unity, as some philosophers would make out, but through duality.

Unity, therefore, and plurality, such as are to be found in numbers, are opposed in the way a tion beuf<^? measure is opposed to that which is measurable; "[J^JJi^*^ and these things are opposed as those that are ^ ^' relative to something — I mean, as many things of those that are relative as do not involve an essential subsistence. Now, a distinction has been drawn by us elsewhere,^ to the effect that relatives are predicated in a twofold way, — ^partly as contraries, and partly as scientific knowledge is related to that which may be made an object of science, because something else is predicated with respect to them. But that the one may be less than a certain thing — as, for example, than two — ^there is no hindrance to this being the case ; for though it be less, it does not follow that it also be what is few in number. Multitude, however, is, as it were, the genus of number, for number constitutes multitude, which is mea- surable by one: and unity and number are, in a manner, opposed, — not as a thing that is contraiy, but, as has been stated, as some of those things that are relatives ; for as far forth as unity is a measure, and number that which may be measured, thus far are they opposed to each other. Where- fore, not everything that may be one constitutes number; as, for example, on the supposition that there is anything that is indivisible.

But though science is denominated in like 5. This opposi- manner in relation to that which may be made **<>« illustrated, an object of scientific knowledge, it is not yet similarly attributed as such ; for science would appear to be a mea- sure, but that which may be an object of science would appear as that which is being measured. ^ It happens, how- ever, that every science is a thing fit to be an object of scientific knowledge; yet everything that is an object of icience is not a science, because, in a certain respect, is science

> The subject of relation is fuTiy examined into in book IX. chap zv«  • This illustration is Tv^rthy if our attention.

270 THE UETiFHTSTtlB OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK IX

measured by that which may be made an object of scientific inquiry.

6. Multitude ^^* neither is multitude contrary to fewness ; not opposed to but the much is opposed to this as a multitude which is excessive is opposed to a multitude that is exceeded. Nor is multitude contrary to unity altogether; but in respect of unity the case stands just as has been stated, namely, that one sort is divisible, but another indi- visible, and again, a third subsists as a relative, just as science subsists with respect to what may be made an object of science, on the supposition that science constituted number, and that unity were a measure.

CHAPTER VII.1

1. The relation -^^^ ^^^^ between contraries there is a possi- between media bility of there being something that is a medium,

and contranes. j #» ,■* • j. •, •

— and of some there is a medium, — it is neces- sary that media should derive their being from contraries; for all media, and the things of which they are media, are contained in the same genus. For we denominate those things media into whatsoever a thing that is undergoing a change must needs be changed in the first instance; foi example, if one should pass from the hypate to the nete,^ if the transition be made in a short space of time, he will pre- viously reach the intermediate sounds; and the case i& the same in colours, — if one will pass from white to black, he will come to the purple and that which is duskish previously to his rc%iching what is black : and in like manner is it with other things. But that a change should take place from one genus to another genus is not possible, except according to accident; as, for instance, in a transition from colour into figure. It is requisite, then, that media, and the things of which they are media, should be contained in the same genus also with themselves.

• The student will do well to compare the statements in this chapter

with those in chap, x., and in book XI. chap. x.

^ These tenns have been already explained in a note, in bock IV rhap. xi. p. 132.

CIL YIl. I RELATION BETWEEN MEDIA AND CONTRABIBS. 271

But, unquestionably, is it the case that all media 2. ah media ire, at any rate, media of certain things that are presuppose op- opposed ; for from these alone is it possible should p****'*®"* arise a change that is essential. Wherefore, it is impossible that there should subsist any medium of things that are not opposed; for otherwise would there be a change, and that not from things that are opposed. But there is no medium of contradiction in things that are opposed, for this consti- tutes coHtradiction, and amounts to antithesis or opposition ; and to an opposition of which, in any respect whatever, one of the membera is present, having no medium ^ between that of which, in any respect, either of the members — ^the yes or the DO — is present, or, in other words, not having any medium at all. But of the rest some are relatives, but others are privation, and some are contraries. But as many things belongiug to those that are relatives as are not contraries do not involve a medium. And a cause of this is the following, inasmuch as they are not contained in the same genus; for what is there that is a medium between science and that which may be made an object of scientific knowledge 1 but there is a medium between the great and the small.

Now, if media are contained in the same genus, as has been demonstmted, and are media be- posed of co^ tween things that are* contrary, it is necessary ii^^e^ljj*^ that these, likewise, be compounded of these con- traries; for either will there be a certain genus of them, or there will not be any such. And if there will be a genus of them in such a way as that there be something antecedent to the contraries, those contrary differences will be antecedent which may make the contraries as species of genus: for from genus and differences subsist species; fox* example, if white and black be contraries, and the one is a segregative colour, but the other a congregative colour, these actual differences — I mean, discretive and syncre- tive colours — will have an antecedent subsistence. Where- fore, these contraries involve a subsistence prior to one another; but, surely, contraries, at any rate, that are dif- ferent are contraries in preference. And the other thingi ftnd the media will arise from genus and differences ; as, for

1 The words which follow ov8iy firra^h are not found in all the MSSL tkA Leii^ic edition adopts them ; not bo, however, Didot'ii

272 THE MKTAPHTSDS OF ARiBTOTLB. [BOoK IZ.

instance, whatever coloiirs are media between white and black, these it is necessary should be denominated as consisting from ffenus, (but colour is a genus,) and from certain differences. They themselves, however, will not constitute primary con- traries ; and if this be not the case, everything will be either white or black. These, then, are other colours ; accordingly, these will be the media between primary contraries : primary differences, however, are those which are segregative and con- gregative. Wherefore, in regard of these primaries (as many as are contraries not in genus), we must investigate the fol- lowing point, — ^from what the media of these consist ; for it is necessary that things contained in the same genus should be compounded either of things incomposite in that genus, or that they should be incomposite natures. Therefore, are contraries uncompounded one of another, so that they are first principles; but the media constitute either all things or aot any at all : and from things contrary something is gene- rated. Wherefore, there wiU ensue a change into this pre- viously to a change into contraries ; for of each thing will where be both less and more: accordingly, will there subsist % medium, and this a medium between contraries. And all the other things that are media are composites then; for that which is a medium is more than one thing and less than another, and is in a manner compounded of those things of which it is said to consist, — ^as greater than one of them and less than the other. And since, as regards contraries, things that have an antecedent existence are not homogeneous, all media would arise from contraries; wherefore, both all things to be found in the scale of existence downwards, and con- traries and media, will consist from primary contraries. 4. Recapituia- That, indeed, therefore, the media are all con- 'ion* tained in the same genus, and that they are

media between contraries, and that these media are all com* poted of contraries, this is evident.

LTIU.] SPECIFIC DIFFSSRBNOK AXD CONTBARIETT. S78

CHAPTER VIII.!

DiVBRSiTT, however, in species is a something i.DiTenity fliat is diverse from a certain thing; and this Jpederapper- must needs subsist in both ; as, for instance, if tains to con- animal were a thing diverse in species, both *'"^"*^- would be animals : it is necessary, then, that in the same genua there be contained those things that are diverse in species. For by genus I mean a thing of sucli a sort as that by which both are styled one and the same thing, not involving a dif- ference according to accident, whether subsisting as matter or after a mode that is different from matter ; for not only is it necessary that a certain thing that is common be inherent in them, (for instance, that both should be animals,) but also that this very thing — namely, animal — should be diverse from both : for example, that the one should be horse but the other man. Wherefore, this common characteristic simul- taneously is found in things that are different in species from one another : therefore, this will be such a particular animal essentially, and that will be an animal essentially different; as that will be a horse and this a man. It is necessary, accordingly, that this difference should amount to a diversity of genus; for I term a difference of genus diversity which makes this very thing to be diverse : therefore, will this con- stitute contrariety.

And the same is evident from induction, like- 2. Proof of this wise ; for all things are distinguished by things ^^^ induction. that are opposite : and it h»xs been demonstrated that con- traries are contained in the same genus, for contrariety amounts to perfect difference, and every difference which is contained in a species is something belonging to a certain thing. Wherefore is this both the same and a genus in both ; wherefore, also, all contraries are contained in the same co- ordination of predication, as many as are different in species and not in genus, and diverse particularly one from another ; for perfect is the difference between them, and they are not generated simultaneously with one another. Difference, then, amounts to contrariety, for this constitutes what it is to be

' The inquirieB in this chapter obviously belong to the province oi Logic

274 *B^ IfSTAPHTSICB Of ABIBTOTLJB. [BOOK UC

divei*se in species ; namely, for things to involye contrariety

\^hen they are contained in the same genus, — ^things, I say,

that are individual. Now, things are the same in species— as

many as do not involve contrariety — when they are individoal

existences ; for in division and in media are contrarieties gene«>

rated, before one comes to those things that are individual.

3 Inference Wherefore, it is evident that respecting that

from the fore- which is said to be a genus, neither the same nor

going. diverse in species is any of those things which are

adapted for being species as of a genus ; for matter is made

manifest by negation, and genus is the matter of that of which

it is termed a genus — not as the genus of the Heracleids,^ but

as that which subsists in Nature. Nor is genus denominated

in relation to those that are not contained in the same genus,

but in relation to those of which there will be a difference

from them in genus ; and things differing in species differ

from those that are in the same genus : for the difference of

that from which it is a difference in species must needs be

couti-ariety, and contrariety belongs to those things that are

aIouo in the same genus.

CHAPTER IX.

But, perhaps, one would raise the question, ries may*beio"g why womau docs uot differ from man in species, Tecies^^^ whcu the female and male are contraries, and when contrariety amounts to difference 1 But neither are female and male diverse in species, although they are the essential differences of animal, and are not as white- ness or blackness, but the male and female are inherent in animal, so far forth as it is animal. Now, the following doubt is almost the same as the foregoing — namely, why it is that oontrariety partly makes things diverse in species, and partly does uot so ; for example, why does it make that which has

• The HcracleidsD were the descendants of Hercules, and lords of

Peloponnesus. Their place in the history of Greece, and the story of their expeditions, and their varied success, need be no more Uian alluded to — they are pretty generally known. The best account of the Heracleid89 is to be found in C. 0. MuUer's History and Antiquities of the Doric Race, voL I. chaps. 3, 11, 12, translated by Messrs. TufiielJ and Lema \ the latter the 4;)reseBt Sir Qeozige Comewall Lewia„ BarL

CD. Ul] OOlffTRABIES BELONG TO THE SAKE 8PE0JES. 271

the support of feet, and that which is furnished with wings so^ but does not make whiteness and blackness 1 Is g. Proposed this the case because some things are the proper solution there- aflfoctions of genus, and other things are less so ; °^* and since the one is form and the other is matter, as many contrarieties as are contained in form create a difference in Bpecies, and as many as reside in form, when assimied together with matter, do not give rise to a specific difference 1

Wherefore, whiteness does iijt give rise to a s, luustrateu ;«i difference of man, nor blackness : nor are these the case of

wniteness cincl

the specific difference of a white man in relation hiackness in a to a black man, nor would one name be assigned ™^' to both ; for man is as matter, but matter does not create a difference : for men are not forms ^ of man. For this reason, although the flesh and bones are diverse from which this man and that are made, yet the entire compound is a thing that is diverse, to be sure, but not different in species, because contrariety does not exist in reason or form, but this entire compound is an individual thing. Now, Callias is form in conjunction 2 with matter; and this, therefore, is the case vith white man, — because Callias is white, therefore man ia white according to accident. Neither, doubtless, do a brazen and wooden circle, nor a brazen triangle and wooden circle, differ in species on account of matter, but because contrariety is present in the form.

But whether shall we say that matter does not 4. Further iiius- render things diverse in species, though being cSe°o" llorse^ somehow diverse itself, or is it the case that it and man com- makes them so partly? for why is this horse p^^^ together. diverse from this man in species, and yet the forms of these Bubsist along with matter ] Is it because contrariety is in- herent in the form ? for there is obviously a contrariety sub- sisting between a white man and a black horse. And this, at any rate, is a specific difference, but not so far forth as the one is white aud the other black ; since even if both were white, nevertheless in species they would be diverse. But the male and female are appropriate affections of animal ; but not ac- cording to substance, but in matter and body. Wherefore,

■ ^ Some copies read etSri, and others eTSct; the Leipsic editi<ni •eads £f A.if. ' I have followed the reading /lerh Sxtjs ; some MSS. have irara;

9^

276 THB METAFBTBIOfl OP AB18T0TUL ^WfK OU

the same seed, in consequence of undergoing the flame p aaflifp condition, is generated either as female or mal& Whftt^ in- doed, therefore, constitutes diyersity in species, and why boom things differ in species, but others do not, has been dedamL

CHAPTER X.

1. Diversitr BuT whereas contraries are diyerse in spedeii^ according to and that which is subject to corruption, and that tains'to^c^n- which is incomiptiblc, are contraries — ^for priTa- trariety. |.Jqjj jg j^ definite impoteiitiality^ — it is requisite that things corruptible be diverse in genus fix)m incorruptible natures.

2. Illustrated Already, indeed, therefore, have we declared comjptSies ^^^ sentiments respecting these universal appel- and incorrup- lations.^ So that it would uot appear to be

• ^^^^** necessary that anything wiiatsoever that is in-

corruptible and corruptible should be diverse in species ; as neither white and black should be so. For it is admis- sible that the same thing at the same time should be both coiTuptible and incorruptible, if there may be in subsist- ence aught of things that are universal, as man would be both white and black ; and the case is similar with the mode of the subsistence of singulars, for the same man would not be white and black at the same time, although what is white is contrary to what is black. Of contraries, however, some according to accident are inherent in certain things; for instance, those that have been just now mentioned, and many others : but in the case of others this is impossible — I mean, those to which both that which is corruptible and that which is incorruptible belong; for nothing is cor- ruptible according to accident : for that which is accidental admits of uot being; but that which is corruptible belongs to those things which subsist of necessity in those things in \vhich it is inherent, or that which is coiTuptible will be one

' Vide book IV. chaps, xii. and xxii

' I presume Aristotle alludes to his investip^ation in the second book, in his treatment of the question ta to whether the first principles of oorruptibles and incorruptibles be the same or different ? vide chap, it; of that book, p. 69.

Ck.\.] OBNERO DirFEBENOB AHD OONTBABIBTT. 271

and the same thing with that which is inoomiptible; if what is corruptible admits of uot being inherent therein. Either, then, substantially, or as inherent in substance, must that which is corruptible subsist in each of the things that are corruptible. But there is the same reasoning, likewise, ap- plical:^ to the case of that which is incorruptible;^ for both belong to things that possess a necessary existence. So fiir forth,%he«for.rBS one rTrimarily corruptible, and the other primarily incorruptible, so £gu* are they in opposition to each other ; so that they must needs be generically diverse. ' It is evident, theref<we, that it is not possible , « _^ _ that there be such forms as some amrm ; for m throws the such a case, as regards man, there will be one *^®*^ theory. who is corruptible, but another who is incorruptible, although forms are said to be the same in species with certain parti- culars, and not equivocal in respect of them: things that are diverse in genus, however, are at a wider interval from one another than those that are diverse in species.

BOOK X,'

CHAPTER I.

That, indeed. Wisdom is a certain science i. Questions la conversant about first principles is evident from lofj'^ready**' the early portions of this work, in which doubts discussed. have been expressed respecting statements that have been put forward by others concerning first principles ; one, how- ever, would feel doubtful as to whether it would be requisite

1 These words are worthy of note, and contain a hint that has been followed up by modem metaphysicians, e. g, Kant.

• Book X. — according to others book XI. — is occupied in discuE«iona

that hav9 already been put forward in the previous portions of the Meta- physics. A glance at the contents will show this. Amongst other 'topics we have another refutation of Scepticism, in which Protagoras SB attacked by name. This subject has been already handled in book III. " Not, however," aa Mr. Maurice remarks, " to be passed over on tiiat account; for Aristotle's repetitions of himself, or the reports of hia diffsreiit pupils, generally clear away many difficulties."

ttS TBS VETAPHTSICS OF ABI810TLB. ][liOOK X. .

to suppose Wisdom or Ontology to constitute one science »r many 1 For if it does constitute one science, there is, at Any rate, one science invariably of contraries; but first prin- ciples are not contraries. I^ however, it does not constitute one science, as of what quality must we posite these many sciences? Fui-ther, to speculate into demonstrative first, principles, is it the province of one or of many sciences ^ for if of one science, why, let me ask, is it the province of this mere than of any other whatsoever 1 but if such speculation belong to many sciences, what sort must we consider these, to be 1 Moreover, whether is there one science of all sub- stances,^ or not 1 for if there is not one science of all, it would be difficult to render an accoimt of what sort of sub- stances there is one science in existence; if, however, there is one science of all substances, it is an ob&cure point how it is admissible that there should be the same science of many sub-j stances. Further, the question arises as to whether demon- stration 2 is conversant about substances only, or also about accidents ? for if demonstration be conversant, at least, about accidents, it is not conversant about substances. But if there is one demonstrative ^ science about accidents, and anothei about substances, what, may I ask, is the character of both, and which of the two constitutes Wisdom or Metaphysics? fof demonstrative wisdom is that which is conversant with acci dents ; that, however, which is conversant with first principles is the wisdom that takes cognisance of substances. 2 'VHiat causes Neither, however, must we consider the scienpe* is ontology con- at present under investigation as a science re- oeme with gpecting the causes that have been already enumerated in our treatise on Physics. Far neither should we act thus in regard of " the final cause ;" for a thing of this kind is that which is good : and this resides in practical things, and in those entities that are in motion ; and this imparts motion in the first instance, for the end is a thing of this sort : but the imparter of motion in the first instance does not inhere in those things that are incapable of motion.

^ Although moBt of the Bubjects treated of in this book have been inveetigateci already, yet the analysis of motion, and the AristcteliMi theory of the Infinite, found therein, are quite new,

^ Vide Posterior Analytics, book II. chap. iii.

' Vide book V. chaps, ii. and iii.

• Vide book I. chaps, i. and ii

tt. I,] WHAT IS THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF OITKJjOQT ! 379

And, in general, one feels doubtful as to . ,^ ^. ,

,^T XI ^ • J • A- X' • 8. What 18 its

whether the science now under investigation is subject-matter oonversant about sensible substances at all,^ or ^jjjj*^®""*'^'* not about these, but about certain other sub- stances ? for if metaphysical science be conversant with sub- stances different from those cognisable to the senseSj it will be conversant either with forms or mathematical entities. As regards forms, then, it is evident that they have no exist- ence. But, nevertheless, one would feel doubtful, even though he should admit the existence of these forms,^ why, forsooth, as in the case of mathematical entities, the same truth does not hold good in regard of other things of which there are forms? Now, I say that they have placed mathematical entities, no doubt, as intermediate between forms and things eognisant by sense, as it were ^ certain third natures beside both forms and those things that are here — I mean, sensibles —but there is no third man, nor a third horse, beside both actual man, and actual horse, and singulars. And if, ou the other hand, these mathematical entities do not subsist in the manner they affirm, about what sort of entities are we to assert that the mathematician is engaged? for, surely, he is not engaged about those things that are here, — that is, about sensibles, — -for none of these constitutes the description of entity which the mathematical sciences investi- gate. Neither, certainly, is the science now under ^^ jg j^ mathe- investigation — I mean, Metaphysics — conversant maticai enti- about mathematical entities,^ for no one of these ^^^^ ^ possesses a separable subsistence. Nor, however, is it a science belonging to substances cognisant by the senses, for these are corruptible. And, in short, one would feel doubtful as to what sort of a science ^ belongs the investigation of the matter of mathematical entities ; for neither does it belong to

^ This, in fact, might be set down as the chief point which Aristotle !■ itriying to settle in this Treatise, and towards which his conclusions Are ever verging. If we examine the connexion between the several books of the Metaphysics we shall perceive this.

^ As to the existence of forms, tA efSiy, this subject is frequently discussed, and made to serve the occasion of an attack upon the Ideal Theory of Plato. We have in books I. chap, ix., and XIL chaps, iv. and v., an elaborate refutation of this hypothesis.

8 Vide book IL

• The subject of mathematical natures is discussed in book XII

fhaps. ii and iii * Vide book V. chap. i.

tiSO THfi METAPHTBI08 OV ABISfOTLB. [BOpS It

physical or natural scieDce, from the &ot that the entire attention of the Natural Philosopher is engaged ahout thoee things that contain in themselves the first principle of motioii and rest : nor, unquestionably, is it the province of a science that institutes an inquiry respecting both demonstratioii and scientific knowledge ; for respecting this very genus it created for itself an investigation. It remains, therefore^ that thii proposed Philosophy of Ontology, or Metaphysics, should make these a subject of its inquiry.

4. Ismetaphy- -^^^t *gai^> OUC WOUld feel doubtful 88 tO

aicai science whether it is requisite to consider the aeieoCQ

conversant j . ,. .. • .v x m a-

about elements, Under investigation m the present Treatise ai TaaToixe*^? oouversaut about first principles — ^I mean, snoil as by some speculators are denominated elements 9 Theae^ however, have been regarded by all philosophers aa things that are inherent in composite natures. But it would rather appear to be a thing that is necessary that the scieooe of ontology, under investigation at present, ought to be' QaQ<t versant with universals; ifbr every rational principle, and every science, are conversant about universals, and not about the extremes^ of things. Wherefore, in this case ontologjr would be conversant about primary genera. 6. The TO ^p -^"^ these would constitute both entity taxi

and the to 'iy unity : for these especially would be suppoeed to

fall under its • n - , ^ j • xi_ 2 • ±.

notice as pri- Comprise all existences, and m the most eminent raary genera, dcgi'ee to be assimilated unto first principlei^ oil account of their being classed in the category of thipga thai derive their primary existence from Nature : for when these have been con*apted, other things also are corrupted at thQ same time along with them ; for everything amounts to entity and unity. As far forth, however, as it is necessary thfti differential qualities participate of. these, if one will ftdsQit the subsistence of these genera, — ^now no difference parti- cipates in the genus, — ^thus far, likewise, would it appear tbs^t we ought not to establish these either as genera or first prin- ciples. But, further, on the supposition that that which is more simple is more a first principle than that which is less simple, but the extremes of those things that descend frpm the genus are more simple than the genera, — for these are individuals, whereas the genera are divided into numoroua ' Vi4^ book II. obap. iii. ^nd book XII. chap, z.

ett.n.j AHttaiwo »hparisl« froii mnoulars? 881

species and such as are different, — hence species would ap- pear to be a first principle more than genera. As far forth, however, as species are liable to corruption in conjunction with their genera, the genera rather would seem to be more similar to first principles ; for that which brings about the destruction of other things in conjunction with itself is a first principle.

These, then, and other such points are some of thobe questions that involve matter of doubt.

CHAPTER II.

Further, may the question be raised as to ^ j. there any. whether it is expedient to admit the existence of thing subsist- something besides^ and independent of singulars, {foniSagSars^ or not ? but the science now under investigation is conversant with these. These are, however, infinite. Those things, at any rate, which have a subsistence independent of and beside singulars are, without doubt, either genera or species ; but the science at present under investigation is not a science conversant about either of these ; for the reacon why this is impossible has been already stated. For in ^neral, likewise, doth the following question involve a doubt — namely, as to whether it is necessary to suppose the existence of any substance separable j&om sensible substances and those which are here,' or whether this is not the case ? but shall we say that these sensible things are entities, and that Wisdom is conversant aboiit these 1 for the fact is we seem to investigate some different science ; and this stands forth as the point pro- posed by us for investigation. Now, what I mean is this, that our aim is to discover whether there is anything that essentially involves a separable subsistence, and which does not reside in any nature belonging to those objects that are cognisant by the senses 1

But, further, allowing that there is beside ^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ sensible substances any different substance, what sort are 'these sort of sensibles are those beside which it is •*°b"^*"'

^ This subject is discussed at intervals throughout the whol«  Treatise; vide, e.g., book V. chap. i.

' This, I take it, means the objects with which we are conversant ixi this transitory scene, where the vast bulk of mankind are engrossed exclusively with things of sense. The phrase, then, is synonymous with r^ «i0'di}7a.

ins THB MMAFUTSICS OF ARISTOTCn [bOOK X,

requisite to establish the subsistence of this substance % for why should one seek to establish its existence beside men rather than horses, or beside these in preference to the rest of the animal creation, or in general to inanimate things like* wise 1 Notwithstanding, the providing of different substanoee eternal in duration, equal in amount to substances that are cognisant by sense and subject to decay, would appear, per- haps, to Ml outside the province of the rational ^ sciences. 8. The absurd- ^^» however, the first principle now under ity of thinking investigation be not separable from bodies, nothingSplbie what Other would one admit as existing in pre- of a separable ferencc to matter? This, however, does not involve a subsistence in energy, indeed, but in capacity. Eather would species and form seem to be a first principle in a stricter sense of the word than this. Now, this is a thing that is subject to corruption : wherefore, in shorty there does not subsist an eternal substance that involves a separable existence as well as an essential subsistence. But such a position as this is absurd ;^ for it appears to be the fact — and such are the subjects of inquiry at the hands nearly of all those that are most accomplished philosophers — that there is in subsistence a certain first principle and substance of this description ; for how, let me ask,^ will there prevail order on the supposition that there is no subsistence of that which is eternal, and which involves a separable existence, and is permanent ?

But, further, admitting that there is a certain 8omething^hat substance, and first principle, naturally of such fs separable, a description as we are at present investigating, frbearlhe and this ouc principle belongs to all things, and {SThiJi'gs^co?- ^^® ^^^ is the principle of those things that arQ Tuptibieasto etcmal, and those that are corruptible, the

those that are i • • u • i. xi.

Incorruptible f question, in sucn a case, arises, why, on the sup- position of the existence of the same first prin-

^ It ia Aristotle's aim in this Treatise to combat such an enoneoiul Tiew as regards the subdivision of the sciences.

2 Could any words give stronger proof of the transcendental element to be found in the Aristotelian philosophy?

3 These words are most remarkable, and the principle they enuncitte has been elucidated in a popular way in the Bridgew&ter Treatiaes— by Chalmers, Whewell, and others — ^published in " Eohn's Scientifio Library."

CH. II.] ARE EXTTTT AND UNITT FIRST PRINOlfLES? 28S

ciple, some things are eternal ^ amongst those that may be ranked under this first principle, but others are not eternal 1 for this constitutes the absurdity. If, however, there i's one first principle of things that are corruptible, and another of those that are eternal,-— if, indeed, the principle, likewise, of those that are corruptible be eternal, — we shall be in\'olved in similar perplexity; for why, on the supposition of the existence of an eternal first principle, are not those things that may be classed as efiects under this first principle eternal likewise? and, on the supposition of the existence of a corruptible first principle, there arises a certain other prin- ciple of this, and again a difierent one of that; and so thiB progression of causes goes on to infinity.

But if, on the other hand, one will seek to - .

.,,.,, . /.ii • 1 .o^* ^^^ entity

establish the existence of both entity and unity j-^ and unity first as those things that appear in the most eminent p""*?'®* ' degree to be immovable first principles, in the first place/ unless each of them signifies this certain particular thing and substance, how will they involve a separate subsistence, and an essential one] But it is respecting those eternal and original first principles of this description that we are engaged in our investigations in the present Treatise. Nevertheless, supposing both of them to signify this certain particular thing, and substance, all the entities will be substances;^ for entity is predicated of all things, and unity, also, of some. That all entities, however, are substances is an assertion that is fisJaa

But, further, how can the position of those be ^ j,^^ ^^ ^ . true who make out that unity is the first prin- that unity con- ciple, and that this constitutes substance, and JfaD^ce.**"^ who from unity and matter generate the first number, and say that it is the substance of these, — how, I say> does thig assertion of theirs admit of being true? for how ia it requisite intellectually to apprehend, as one, the duad and each of the other compound numbers? for on this point they neither say anything, nor would it be easy to make any assertion on the subject. Suppose, however, that any one will seek to establish, as first principles, lines, or the things that are connected consequentially with these — now, I

• This question is discussed in "book II. chap. iv.

• Vide book II. chap, ii ' Some copies read, oWta.

S8i tBA ItfiTAP&TStOS O^ ABIOTOTLl. [bOOKX.

meaD, sur&oes such as are primary — ^yot these are not sub- Btances capable of a separate subsistence, but are sections and divisions; the former of surfisuses, but the latter o£ bodies: but points are sections and divisions of lines; and, further, they are the limits of these very same things, and all these are inherent in others, and there is no one of them that is separable. Further, in what way is it necessary for us to conceive the existence of a substance of unity and of a point f For of every substance is there generation, but of a point there is not, for a point amounts to division.

7. How, then, ia -^^ *^^> likewise, fomishes a subject of doubt ; there a •cience namely, that evcry science should be convert it is not what is Bant about things that are universal,^ and about universal? that which is of such and such a quality, but that substance should not belong to things universal, but rather should constitute this certain particular thing, and that which possesses a separable subsistence. Wherefore, it we admit that science is conversant about first principles, how is it necessary to consider substance as the first prin-> ciple of things ?

„ , , Further, the question may be asked, is there

8. Is there any- xu- v! -j a- i. ..o t u

thing beside anythmg besiQC entirety, or not? now, I mean by IT^Jiilkw^t entirety, matter, and that which subsists in con-» junction with this; for if, in fact, this be not the case, all things, at least, that reside in matter are subject to corruption. If, however, there subsists anything beside entirety, it would constitute the species and the form.^ In the case of what things, therefore, this would subsist, and in the case of what things it would not, it would be difficult to determine ; for in the case of some things is it evident that the form is not a thing that is capable of a separate subsist* ence : as, for example, the form of a house is not separable from the house. And, further, there is the question whether first principles are the same in species, or in number ? for il they are one in number, aU things will constitute these.

> Vide hook XIL Qh%). X. ' 7«<2e book YI. chap. viil.

OH. m.] UNITY OF ONTOLOGT AS ▲ soiviroa. 2BS

CHAPTER IIL

SiNOB the sciencQ of the philosopher^ however,^ i. The unity of is conversant about entity, so fer forth as it is en- ^^^^PI^H tity, and this uniyemUy, and not as i^gards my Z^o& one part, and since entity is multiferiously predi- JU^^^eS* ^ Gated, and not in one way merely — this being the matter. case if entity be predicated equivocally, and not according to anything that is common — ^it does not ML under the province of one science to inquire into it, (for there is not one genus of things of this kind;) but if it be predicated according to anything that is common, it would &11 under the notice of one scienca

Now, it appears that it is predicated after the . „ . , ^. same manner as both what is medicinal and salu- trom the ana. brious; for, likewise, are both of these predicated Jj^®'"^®^" multifariously. And in this way each is predi- cated in respect of the one being somehow referred to medicinal art, but the other to health, and a third to something else ; yet each is referred to the same thing. For a medicinal discourse, and a small knife, are denominated in respect the former of proceeding from medicinal science, but the other because it is serviceable to this art of medicine ; and in like manner it is so with that which is salubrio\is : for a thing is termed thus partly because it is indicative of health, and partly because it is productive of it

And the same mode exists in the case of other g ^^g yj^g. things : in the same way, therefore^ is denominated tration applied entity in its entirety; for each of them is styled *®***®^**^- entity in respect of being a passion, or habit, or disposition, or motion, or something else of this sort, belonging unto entity, so far forth as it is entity. Since, however, there is a reduc- tion of eveiy entity to a cei-tain one thing, and something which is common, so of contrarieties, likewise, each will be 1 educed to the primary diflFerences and contrarieties of entity, whether multitude and unity, or similarity and dissimilarity, are the primary differences of entity, or whether there artt certain other differences of such ; for let these stand over as subjects for future discussion.^ But there is no difference

• Vide book III. chap. ii. for an examination into this point.

' Aristotle probably alludes to some other portion of his writiDgBj € g.hia *EK\oyr. r&v Ivay^iw, which has nut come down tc us.

Y66 ' THS METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [fiOilK X,.

or, what is the whether the reduction of entity be made ta same, the t6 '4,. qj^^[^j ^j. ^q ^^^^.y^ -poT cven if they be not

the same, but something different, they are, at any rate, convertible terms ; for both unity, also, in a manner consti- tutes entity, and entity constitutes unity. 4. The relation Since, howover, it is the province of one and 8c?e^ce"of con- ^^® Same scienco to speculate into all contraries, traries and pri- and sincc cach of thoso is predicated according to vation. privation, — although, as regards some contraries,

at least, of which there is a certain medium, one would feel .perplexed as to how they are predicated according to priva- tion ; as, for example, of the unjust and the just, — this being the case, concerniug all such contraries, I say, is it necessary, therefore, to posite privation as existing, not of the whole definition, but of the ultimate species ; for instance, if one is a just man who, through a certain habit, has been from time to time obedient to the laws, the unjust man will not be alto- gether deprived of the entire definition of just man : but inasmuch as in respect of habitual obedience to the laws he is in some point or degree deficient, in this respect, likewise, will there be inherent in him a privation of this definition. And in the same manner is it the case with other things. . ._ , . . But as the mathematician^ institutes for him-

5. Metaphysics, . . u x i. x-j.-

fi% a science of Sell an inquiry regarding abstract quantities, — tratedhy the^^ ^^^ ^^ conducts his Speculations by removing out caseof mathe- of his Consideration all sensible natures, such as °^* ^^^ ' gravity and hghtness, and hardness, and its con-

trary, and further, also, heat and cold, and other sensible contrarieties, but he merely leaves remaining quantity and continuity — some of which pertain to one, but others are in reference to two, and others to three, dimensions — as well as the passive conditions of these, as far forth as they are quan- tities and continuous ; and this being the case, the mathema- tician does not speculate into them in reference to anything else ; and of some things he examines into their natures and positions, one in respect of another, and into those things that are inherent in these, but of others into their commen- 43urations and incommensurations, and of othera into their ratios )r proportions : but we, nevertheless, have established cne an 1 the same science as being conversant about all sub*

• VuU book III. dasLfi, ii.

6ta.iV.J yjLTHKMATlOS, PHYSICS, AND METx\i HTSIOS. 2S7

Jects of this kind, I mean, the science of the geometrician, — in the same manner, therefore, is it the case in respect 04 entity likewise. For the things that are aoci- and of physics, dental in this, so far forth as it is entity, and *°^ duiectks. the contrarieties of this, as far forth as it is entity, it is not the province of a different science from Philosophy, that is, Ontology, to investigate; for to Physical or Natural Science may one ascribe the speculation of these, not as far forth as they are entities, but rather as far forth as they partake of motion. As to the sciences of the Dialectician, however, and the Sophist, they are sciences of the accidents, I admit, that reside in entities, but not so far forth as they are entities ; nor do they speculate about entity itself, as far forth as it is entity. Wherefore, it remains that the Philosopher, or Metaphysician, should be a person qualified for speculating into the points we have just stated, in so fiir as they relate unto entities.

Since, however, every entity is expressed ac- cording to some one thing, and something that toiogkal °^ °^ is common, which is multifariously predicated,^ ^^rt^i** '®*** and as contraries are expressed in the same manner — for they are referred to the primary contrarieties, and differential qualities of entity — and since it is possible that things of this kind should fall under the notice of one science, hence the doubt expressed in the opening parts of this work respecting first principles would be dissolved in this way. Now, the doubt I allude to is that wherein the matter of perplexity i& involved in the question as to how there will be one science about entities that are many in number, and which are generically different ?

CHAPTER IV.

But since, also, the mathematician employs 1. how far things that are common in a manner peculiar to mathematics himself, it would be the province of the First parts of meu^ Philosophy, that is, of Ontology, to speculate into P^y"^'*- the original principles of these things. For that when from

1 This is precisely the mode of reasoning pursued by Arietotid in 9odk IIL ch»p. ii, already referred to.

888 THB HBTAPHTSIOS OF ABIBTOTIiB. [BOOK &

equals equals are taken away the remaindere are equal ifly indeed, a dogma that is common to all quantitiea Matne* matical science, however, speculates about a certain portion of matter, properly so called, appropriating it to itself; aa, fot instance, about lines, or angles, or numbers, or something else pertaining to other quantities : not, however, as &tr forth as they are entities, but so far forth as each of them is that which is continuous in one, or two, or three dimensions. Philosophy, however, does not institute an inquiry respecting those i)articulars that are contained in a certain portion of matter, as far forth as something amongst them is an accident in each of these, but it contemplates everything of this kind respecting entity, so far forth as it is entity. And in the same manner, also, does the case stand in regard of physical science as with mathematical ; for physical or natural science speculates into the acciderts or first principles of entities, so hx forth as they are in motion, and not so fax forth as they are entities. But we have said that Ontology, or the First Science, is conversant about these in as far as the subjects of them are entities, but not so &r forth as they are anything that is different. Wherefore, we may set down that both this and the science of the mathematician are parts of Wisdom or Metaphysical Science.

CHAPTER V.

1. Certain uiti- Therb is involved, however,^ in entities a cer- Se^at the"bad" ^^^ ^^^ principle about which it is not possible of all demon- to labour under any deception, but it is necessary itration. invariably to do the contrary ; now, I mean to

speak conformably with truth : as, for instance, that it is not admissible that the same thing should be and not be in one and the same period of time ; and the case is so with other things that are opposed to themselves in the same manner. And, respecting points of this kind, demonstration, indeed, has no existence absolutely speaking ; but in respect of this principle it ha^ (for it is not possible to construct a process of

1 Vide book UL chap. liL

OR.T.] TH09E WHO DBNT FUNDAlOBHTAfi AXIOMS. 289

syllogistio reasoning from a more trustworthy principle than this very axiom just mentioned,) and it ougtit to be so, at any rate, if it is possible that there should subsist such a thing as a demonstration in absolute terms.

As regards a person, however, who makes an j. Refutation assertion of opposite statements,^ for the purpose of those who of proving wherefore it is false, must some such such fundL position be assumed, as that although the thing "nentai axioms, will actually be the same with the non-possibility of being the same tiling, and not being so at one and the same time, yet that it will not appear to be the same thing with it; for after this manner only can a demonstration be brought about in regard of one who affirms the admissibility of opposite assertions being verified of the same thing. And, ^^ ^^^ ^ in the next place, those people who are likely to ture of phiio- take their share in mutual discussion ought, in JJp^*';^ ^**'^"'- some degree, to understand themselves; for, in case this be not done, how will there subsist with these persons a community in regard of such mutual discussion ? It is neces- sary, then, that each of the denominations should be known, and that they manifest some one thing, and not many things, but only one ; and if it is equivalent in its significa- tion to many things, one ought to make it evident towards which of these significations the denomination conducts one. Now, as regards a person who affirms that this thing both is and is not, this which he in general affirms to be, he affirms not to be : wherefore, he asserts that the name signifies that which it does not signify; but this is impos- sible. Wherefore, if the assertion that the being of this particular thing involves any signification, it is impossible that contradiction concerning the same thing should be veri- fied. Further, if a name has any meaning, and this be capable of verification, this also must needs be from necessity ; but that which is from necessity it is not admissible at any time' should not be : it is not for this reason^ then, admissible that opposite assertions be true concerning the same thing.

^ This book contains a somewhat more elaborate refutation of Scep- ticism than book III. Vide note, p. 277.

' This principle has been brought forward by Dr. Clarke in hit unsuccessful attempt at an d priori demonstration of the existence of God. Some copies read r6r€ instead of itc^tc*

12

290 THE MRTAPHTfifOS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK X

and of affirma- Further, on the supposition that assertion in no tion compared degree is moFO true than negation, the person ^ ' who makes the affirmation that one is a man will in nowise the rather make a true statement than if ha were to affirm that he is not a man : and a person who affirms a man not to be a horse would appear to speak truth either in a greater or not in a less degree than if he affirms that man is not man. Wherefore, one who affirms, also, that the same is a horse will speak true ; for, in a similar way, it would be possible that opposite assertions should admit of verification. Wherefore, the consequence ensues that the same creature should be man and horse, or something else belonging to the animal kingdom. There does not, therefore, subsist in regai'd of these any demonstration in absolute terms: as relates, however, to the person who is for establishing these foregoing points, demonstration has an existence. 3. Aristotle And quickly would one, likewise, who after

thus exposes ^jjig manner had put the question to Heraclitus ^

tne erroneous

system of the himsclf, forco him to acknowledge that it is never Heraciitics. ^ thing that is possible that opposite assertions should be verified of the same things ; but at present, not com- prehending his own theory in regard of what he says at all, he has embraced this particular opinion we have been just endeavouring to overthrow. And in general, if the statement made by Heraclitus be true, neither would this very position of his be true ; now, I mean the admissibility that at one and the same time the same thing should be and not be. For as also, on the supposition of these assertions having been divided, in no respect the more will affirmation be true than negation, in the same manner, likewise, will it be the case when both are conjoined and connected together — just as if affirmation is regarded as being one certain thing, in no degree the more will negation be true than the entire of the assumption which is made in an affirmation. Moreover, if it is possible to ^ake no affirmation that is true, even would this very position be false — I mean, the assertion that no affirmation is true : if, however, there exists any assertion that is true, that point which is put forward by these Hera- viitics would be decided — I mean, such philosophers as resist

^ Heraclitus and Protagoras are the sceptics whom Aristotle chieflj directs his attack againat.

€H. VI.J ' MAN VIEWED AS A MEASURE OF THINGS. 291

the truth of things of this sort, and, in fact, altogether do away with rational discussion.

CHAPTER VI.

But similar to the statements * that have been i. The Prou- just made is that which has been asserted by gorean dogma

T> i. r Ti • u -J XI- X • that man wai

Protagoras j for, likewise, he said that man is the measure of a measure of all things, — in this way affirming ^^ things. nothing else than that what appeared to every man, that this, also, indubitably is that which it appeared to be : if, how- ever, this is admitted, the same thing will happen to be and not be, and to be both evil and good, and the rest of those things that are expressed in accordance with opposite asser- tions, from the feet that frequently to some pei-sons, indeed, this pai-ticular thing appears to be fair, and the contrary to others, and from that which is apparent to every one consti- tuting a measure.

Now, this doubt would be resolved if persons ^ ^^ . ^^ considered whence the origin of this supposition of this dogma has been derived; for to some speculators, no iiJn-wheJhM doubt, it would appear to have originated from itbefromnatu- the opinion of the Physiologists, or Natural Phi- ' ^ ^ °*°^ ^' losophers, but to others from the circumstance that all men do not possess the same points of knowledge in respect of the same subjects, but that to some this particular thing seems to be sweet, and to others the contrary. For that nothing is generated from nonentity, but everything from entity, is almost a commonly received dogma amongst all Natural Philosophers. Since, therefore, that which is not white is generated from that which is perfectly white, and by no means not white, supposing, now, that what is not white has been generated from that which is not a white entity, that which is being generated as not white would be produced.

^ This error of Protagoras is an inveterate failing in human philo* wophj. It is noticed by Bacon in terms of strong reprehension. Itf e£»cts en theology might be illustrated in the rise of Anthropo- morphism. Vide Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, vol. I. pp. 103 — 107 : translated in Clark's "Foreign ITieological Library;" Cud worthy rcl. I p. 201 ; Bacon, De Augm. lib. V. cap. iv.

292 THE HBTAFHYaiOB OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK X

Wherefore, such would be generated from nonentity, accord- ing to their doctrine, unless that which is not white were the same with that which is white. It would not, however^ be difficult to decide this doubt; for it has been declared, in our treatise on Physics, in what manner from that which is non- entity are generated the things that are being produced, and how it is that they are generated from entity. Notwith- standing the giving heed, in like manner, to both opinions, and to the fanciful statements of persons who doubt iu opposition to themselves, this would be a silly proceeding ; for it is evident that one party amongst these sceptics must needs labour under &Ilacies. And this statement serving the is manifest from observing things that are gene- senseT*"* ®^ rated according to sense ; for at no time does the same thing appear to some, indeed, sweet, and to others the contrary, provided that the organ which has the power of perceiving and deciding the above-enumerated tastes has not undergone any corruption and injury in the case of these others. But, on the understanding of such a state of things as this, we may suppose that some of them are a stand- ard of measure, and suppose that others are not so. And, in like manner, I assert this to be the case as regards both what is good and evil, and what is beautiful and disgraceful, and • other things of the sort ; for to lay down this as a principle, or to affirm the reality of nothing save the apparent, is a course nowise diflTerent from those who place their finger beneath the organ of vision, and thus from the one object make two to appear, and who really believe that there are two objects before them, on account of their appearing such, '^ and again that there is but one in reality ; for to those per- sons who do not move their organ of vision that which is one appears one.

s Thedffic ^^ general,^ however, it v juld be absurd, from

of attaining the appearance of things cnat are here as subject this°matter!" *^ change, and which never permanently con- tinue in the same dispositions, from this to oome to any decision as regards truth; for it is necessary that we should go in pursuit of that which is true from amongst those things that invariably do subsist according to the same

' Seztus Empiricus has laid hold on a priaciple such as this to establish his philosophic srstem.

CH. VI.] REFUTATION OF THIS NOTION. 293

dispositions, and that never are instrumental in bringing about their own change. Now, of this description are those bodies that are regulated acoording to the orderly system of the Universe ; for these do not at one time appear of this particular sort, but at another time of a different kind, but invariably the same, and as participating in no change.

But, further, on the supposition of the exist- 4 j^^^ ^jjcctt ence of motion, and of something that is being refuted trom

3 J.T- • i_ • I- 1 X • • the very nature

moved, — now, everythmg which has motion im- of flux and pressed upon it is put in motion by something, motion. and in the direction of something, — in such a case, that which is being moved ought to be found, moreover, in that from which it will derive its motion, and yet not be found therein, and that it should be moved towards this particular place, and yet should not be generated in this : but how can such be the case 1 for we must bear in mind, that, even according to their own doctrines, that simultaneous verification^ is not possible as regards contradiction. And if, according to quan- tity, things which are here are continuously in a state of flux, and are being moved, — and if one admits this, although it should not be true, — why are they not permanent as regards quality 1 for these speculators in no small degree appear to predicate those things of the same thing, according to their contradictions, from the supposition that quantity does not continue permanently in bodies. Hence with them the same thing is and is not of four cubits in its dimensions. Sub- stance, however, subsists according to quality, for this is of a definite nature; but quantity belongs to one. which is indefinite.

Further, why, let me ask, when the physician ^ . p ... gives a prescription that his patients should take argument this particular food, — why, I say, do they take g^raS.*'^"** it^ for why is this particular piece of food bread rather than it is not bread ? Wherefore, there would be no distinction in eating from not eating. At present, however, as the physician makes a true assertion about this thing, and this food that has been prescribed being in reality in existence, the patient* accordingly take this food — although they ought not, at least, to do so on the supposition that

^ The word thus rendered is (rvpa\ri0§6t(r0au, ' Vide hook IIL chaps, iv. t. and vi

294 THE MEXAFHTSCS OF ABSSn/rVK, IBOOKX,

there is no nature that is firmly permanent in sensibles, l,i4 that icTariably all things are in motion and in a state d $. Argameut Anx. But farther, i^ indeed, we are always J'**"* *»^ undergoing a diange,* and never remaining per- jectirky of oar maneutly the same persons, why is it surprising •ensatumt. j^£ things never appear at any time to be the same as they do to those that are sick f For to these, aiso, on account of their habit being not similarly disposed as when they are in a healthy state, the things that subsist according to the senses do not appear to subsist in a similar manner ; though sensibles themselves participate in no change on account of this, at least, but produce different sensations in the sick, and sensations that are not the same. In the same manner, therefore, is it requisite, perhaps, that consequences be disposed as if the aforesaid change took place. If, however, we do not undergo a change, but continue to be the same, there would be something in existence that is permanent.

Respecting, to be sure, those persons, therefore, McepticM eaiier who entertain from principles of reason the anothCT.'***" doubts enumerated, it would not be easy to advance a refutation when they are not for admitting anything, and no longer demand a reason of those things, for all reasoning, and every demonstration, aiise in this way ; for when they are disposed to admit nothing, they overturn the thing in dispute, and, in general, all rational discussion. Wherefore, with such speculators, of course, there is no such thing at all as rational discussion ; but in regard of those tha,t labour under perplexity, from the doubts that have been handed down, it would be easy to reply, and to unravel the difficulties that create in them the doubt referred to ; now this statement is evident from those that have been made

Wherefore, it is evident from these things that fhercforit'con- i^ ^^cs not admit of being possible that opposite trndiction, nor assertions about the same thing should be veri- mcdla.'^cnn be*'^ ficd at ouc and the same time, nor that con- w^Ii"tho*»ame ' ^^aries should, on account of the denomination of ihini? a: the all contrariety according to privation. This, how- •amotone. qyqj^^ will be evident to those who resolve into

1 Thus AriRtotlo turns the veapons of attack employed by Prot» gf.tm« to inflict wounds on the sceptic himself.

OH. VII.] ONTOLOGY A DISTINCT SOIENOB. 295

their first principles the definitions of contraries. And, in .ke manner, neither is it possible that any of those things that are media should be predicated of one and the same thing ; for, on the supposition of the subject being white, when wo assert that this is neither white nor black we shall make a false assertion, for it happens that this is white, and yet that it is not ; for either of these connected together will be verified concerning this, but this amounts to a contradiction of what is white.

Neither, therefore, is it possible for one who makes an assertion, in accordance with the theory ^ij^e the error of Heraclitus, nor of Anaxagoras, to assert what Jie* "> ^^e is true ; and if this be not admitted, the conse- Anaxa^onu quence will ensue that they predicate contrary SJtiM*^*^ things of the same subject : for when Anaxagoras says that in everything is contained a part of everything, he says that a thing is not more sweet than bitter, or anything else of the other contrarieties, if in everything all things subsist not merely in potentiality, but in energy or activity, and in a state of separation. And, in like manner, neither is it possible that all assertions be false, nor all true,^ as well on account of many other difficulties which would be uttered in consequence of this position, as also because as regards all assertions, supposing that they are false, neither will one who makes this very assertion speak what is true ; but if all assertions are true, the person who says that all are false will not speak &lsely.

CHAPTER VII. But every science investigates into certain first , ^

• 1 J .- i_ i» xi- '• The proper

prmciples and causes respecting each of those province of objects of knowledge that fall under its cogni- JcJnceg"n sance ; as, for example, medicinal science, and that contrast with of the athlete, and each of the rest of the pro- phy^gfcsr*^" ductive or the mathematical sciences ; for each of these having been for itself descriptive of a certain genus,

^ A reference to book IIL will show that thevariotiB sceptical systemi may be reduced to two, where assertions to this effect are put forward Vide book III. ohap. yiiL

21^6 THB 1CBTAPHTBI08 OF ABIBTOTLB. [BOOK X

treats canc6ming thits as a thing existing and asaii eiitity, not, nowever, so far forth as it is an entity : oomersant, however, about this last-named inquiry is there beside these sciences this certain other science of the Ontologist, which is different from them; but each of the aboTe-enumerated sciences, taking for granted the mode in which the nature of a thing subsists in each genus, endeavours to explain the remainder of the points relating to this more feebly or mere accurately. They, however, make an assumption as to quiddity, or the nature of a thing, some of them by means of sense, but others from hypothesis. Wherefore, it is also evident, from an in- duction of this sort, that there subsists no demonstration of substance and quiddity.

Since, however, there exists a certain science ^ ph«o8°fphJ^ which is conversant about Nature, it is manifest » distinct that it will be different from both that which is

thed!^tinc^es8 practical scieuce and that which is productive or of its subject- effective. For of productive science the first inaynotthisbe principle of motiou resides in the producing oi ontology ToS efficient cause, and not in that which is being pro- duced ; and this either is some art, or some other potentiality. And, in like manner, does the case stand with practical science also; the motion does not reside in the thing done, but rather in those who are agents. But the science of the Natural Philosopher is conversant about those bodies that involve in themselves a first principle of motion. That, indeed, therefore, Physical Science must needs be neither practical nor productive, but speculative or contemplative, is evident from these statements ; for there is the necessity of its falling under the classification of some one of these genera. And since, in a manner, it is requsite for each of the sciences to possess a knowledge of the nature of a thing, and to employ this as a first principle, we ought not to forget how a definition of this quiddity should be framed by the phy- sical inquirer, and how th* definition of substance is to be assumed, whether as the iiat-nose, or rather as the hollow; for, as regards these, the formal principle, no doubt, of fiat-nose is denominated along with matter — I mean, such as belongs to the thing itself ; the formal principle, however, of hollow nose is expressed without matter, for flatness of nose ii

^ Vide book Y. chape, i and ii

OIL VIL] the YfiRT NATURE OF OXTOLOGY PROVES THIS. 297

generated in the nose. Wherefore, also, the definition or formal principle of it is inquired into along with this, for the Hat- nose constitutes a hollow-nose. It is evident, therefore, that the definition hoth of flesh, and of the eye, and of the other parts of the hody, is always to be assumed along with matter.

But since there exists a certain science of ^ ^^^^^ ^^ j^ . entity,^ so far foith as it is entity, and so &r ontology, m » forth as it involves a separable subsistence, we Siltfngiul*, must examine whether at all we are to con- it from phyrica, eider this to be the same with Natural or Phy- °'™*' ematics. sical Science, or rather to be different from it. Physical Science, indeed, then, is conversant about those bodies that involve in themselves a first principle of motion ; but the science of the mathematician is itself a certain science that is speculative, I admit, and that, too, in regard of things that are permanent, but which do not involve a subsistence separable from sensibles. Eespecting, then, that which is an entity capable of separate subsistence, and which is immovable, there exists a certain science different from both of these, on the supposition, of course, that there is some substance of this description in existence — now, I speak of a substance separ- able and immovable ; and it is the validity of this very position that we shall attempt to demonstrate.

And if we admit that there subsists any sub- 4^ out of the stance of this sort in entities, here also, in a three specula-

u xu 1. j» J T\' • "j. 'J* tive sciences,

manner, would there be found Divmity residmg, theology the and this would be an original and most dominant "^'*'" dignified, principle. It is evident, therefore, that there are three genera of the speculative sciences — namely, the physical or natural, the mathematical, and the theological. The most excellent, then, is certainly the genus of the speculative or contempla- tive sciences ; and of these very sciences that one which ia mentioned last of the three possesses ^ the greatest amount of excellence, for it is convei*sant about that one amongst entities which is more entitled to respect than the rest Each Bcience, however, is termed more excellent, and more inferior, according to its appropriate object of scientific knowledge.

1 Compare what is said iu chap. IV. of this book. ' This point has been established by Aristotle iu the opening chapton of the Metaphysics. Vide p. 10.

298 THE 1IETAPHT8ICS OF ARISTOTIJB. {BOOK X,

Now, a person might raise the question as t-s the validity of whether at all we ought to seek to establish uni«  metophysicai versally the science of entity, so far forth as it is entity, or not 1 For each of the mathematical sci- ences, no doubt, is conversant about some one definite genus ; the universal science, however, speculates in common respect- ing all things. I? indeed, therefore, we admit physical substances to be the primary substances of entities. Physical or Natural Science would also be the chief one amongst the sciences ; but, on the other hand, if there exists a nature that is different, and a substance that involves a separable subsist- ence, and is immovable, it is necessary, also, that there belong to this a different science, and that this science should be ant-ecedent to physical science, and universal in respect of its antecedence or priority.

CHAPTER VIII.

1. NoBcienceof SiNCE, howevcr, that which is entity simply the accident, considered is denominated in many^ ways, of TO <r«M/3e^»i»cov. ^j^j^jj^ q^q jg ^^^^ which is spokcu of as subsisting

according to accident, in the first instance our examina- tion must be instituted concerning entity in this point of view. That, indeed, therefore, no one of the sciences that kave been handed down from former geneiutions is employed about what is accidental is evident ; for neither does that (elating to house-building or architectural art investigate into what is likely to be accidental with those who will make use rf the house ; for example, as to whether they will dwell there sorrowfully or the contrary : nor is it so with the art of weaving, nor of shoe- making, nor the cooking ai-t. Each of these sciences, however, examines into that which is peculiar to its own department only ; and this is its appropriate end. Neither does it consider a person so far as he is a musician and a grammarian, nor does it assert that he who is a musician, should he become a grammarian, will at the same time be both, though he were not so previously. But that which is not always an entity, this was generated at some time or other ; so that such a person would at the same time become

' Vide book V. chap, ii

eU. VlIl.J NO SOIENOB OT THE AOCIDENT. 299

a musician and a grammarian. This, however, no one of those that are confessedly sciences examines into, with the exception of the science of the Sophist ; for this alone is employed about what is accidental. Wherefore, Plato has not inaptly expressed himself when he affirms that the sophist wastes his time in the consideration of nonentity.

But that it is not a thing that is admissible that , ^ there should be in existence a science of the of the accident accidental, will be manifest to those who attempt there couw not to discern what an accident is at all. Therefore, ^ » science as regards everything, we affirm one thing, indeed, ^"^ * to subsist always and from necessity — now, I mean by neces- sity not that which is denominated according to what is violent, but what we employ in cases pertaining to demon* strations — but another thing we affiim as subsisting for the most part, and another, neither as for the most part, nor always, and from necessity, but as may happen at any time to be casual ; for example, cold might be prevalent when the sun is in Canis : but a thing of this soil would take place neither as always from necessity, nor as for the most part, but might, nevertheless, accidentally occur sometimes. There- fore, does that constitute an accident which is pro<iuced, not always, nor from necessity, nor as for the most part. What, indeed, then, an accident is, has been declared ; but why there is not a science of a thing of this kind is evident : for every science is conversant about that which is an entity always, or as for the most part ; but the accidental is not ranked amongst either of these.

But it is evident that of what subsists accord- 3. The same ing to accident there are not causes and first ?u5I!lff"S.«« 

?.,«,,.,. ,, « the principles ol

pnnciples of such a description as there are of the accidental that which is an entity that involves an essential ^J heS»g"1^i^ subsistence ; for, if this be admitted, all things ^^^^ will be from necessity. For, if on the supposition of this particular thing being a consequence of that particular entity, but this a result from that, and if this sul^ists not from its being casual, but from necessity, from necessity will be like- wise that of which this was the cause, tmtil that which is denominated the last effect; this, however, subsisted accord- ing to accident. So that all things will be from necessity, and the possibility for anything whatsoever casually to occui;

SOO THB METAPHYSICS OF ARI&TOTLE. [dOOK ^

and the existence of contingency, and the being generated, and the not being generated, will altogether be taken away from things that are being generated. For, although a cause may be supposed not to be an entity, but that also which is being generated, the same consequences will ensue ; for every- thing will be generated from necessity. For, to give an in- stance, to-morrow's eclipse ^ will take place if this particular thing may happen, and this will happen if something else does, and this last if something else ensues; and, do'ibtless, in this manner, on the supposition that a portion of duration be taken away from that definite time which may be mea- sured from the present moment until to-morrow, one will ultimately arrive at that which is in being. Wherefore, since this is the case, all things that are subsequent to this will be from necessity : wherefore, will it be the case that all things will be generated from necessity.

As regards, however, that which is entity in pectof wituy^ reality, and not according to accident, one kind, omitted in on- indeed, is that which is contained in the com- prehension of the mtellect,' and is a passive con- dition in this. Wherefore, respecting that which constitutes entity in this way first principles are not investigated ; but respecting that which is an entity external to this, and pos- sessing a separable subsistence, they are; and that which subsists according to accident is not necessary, but indefinite — ^now I mean, what subsists according to what is accidental, as in a less degree ; but the causes of a thing of this sort are inordinate and infinite.

But that on account of which a thing subsists^ fined as? cause that is, the final cause, is classified amongst those i/ien^tedper thiugs that are generated by Nature, or that spring from Intellect. It is chance, however, that generates them when any of these may be generated according to accident; for, in like manner, just as also entity constitutes in one respect that which is essential, but in another that which subsists according to accident, so also is it the

^ This is the mode of reasoning already adopted by Aristotle in book V. Vide p. 164.

^ Aristotle here alludes to a certain signification of the ** ens'* in refer> ^uce to truth and falsehood, which he examines in book Y. chap. ilL and book Vill. chap. z.

CH. IX.] OHAMOB AB A OAUU OF GENERATION. SOl

case with a cause. But chance is a cause according to acci- dent in those things that are being generated in accordance with free-will, for the sake of something. Wherefore, chance and intellect are conversant about the same object,^ for free- will is not devoid of a connexion with intellect. The causes, however, are indefinite from which might be generated that which arises from chance : wherefore, obscure to human cal- culation is chance, even as a cause subsisting according to accident, but, absolutely considered, such is not a cause of anything; and chance is good and evil when what is good or worthless may happen to be the result : but mischance and misfortune are conversant about the magnitude of these. But since nothing that subsists according to accident is ante- cedent to those things that possess an essential subsisteut;e, neither, then, are causes so. If, then, chance, or even spon- taneity,^ be a cause of the firmament, prior as a cause will be Mind and Nature.

CHAPTER IX.»

Now, one thing subsists in energy only, but i. As many another subsists in capacity, and a third in capa- tion"M%°here°" city and energy ; and of these one constitutes an «« of entity. entity, but the other a quantity, and the third something else of the rest of the categories. There is not, however, any motion beside the things themselves; for the change invari- ably takes place in accordance with the categories of entity. Bat in the case of these there is not anything that is com- mon, nor is there a thing of this sort in a single category. Everything, however, subsists in all things in a twofold manner ; as, for instance, this particular thing : for this is the form of it, but that is its privation; and according to quality

^ This is a remarkable sentence. The connexion between the understanding and the will, in regard of the freedom of the latter, is discussed by Cousin in his review of Locke's theory. Vide Cousin s Psychology, chap x. ; Henry's translation : in which are to be found most lucid notes on this important philosophic point. ' The word I have thus translated is rd ahr6iw.rov, ' Aristotle has already touched upon this subject — in book Till. «hap8 ill. and vi. — without noticing, however, the " entelecheia," which IS explained now ; and which must not be confounded — as is ^one Vj Cicero— with ivZiKtx^ia^ a perfectly diiitinct word.

802 THE HETAPHTSIOB OF IBISTOTLE. [BOOK X

one thing is white, but another black; and according to quantity one is perfect, whereas the other imperfect ; and ac- cording to motion this tends upwards and that downwards, or the one is light, but the other heavy. Wherefore, there are as many species of motion and of change as there are of entity. 2. Motion, But On account of there being a division iu

fin7d to'refer^ ®*^^ genus, of the one into potentiality or capa- •nee to energy, city, of the Other, howover, into actuality, I 2?uaiify,*4lT«- Style energy the motion of that which subsists in xex««a. potentiality, so fiir forth as it does subsist in

potentiality. And that we make a true assertion in this point is evident from the following circumstance ; for when a material is fit for being built, so &r forth as it is a thing of this sort, we say that this very thing subsists in energy, so far forth as it is being built; and this constitutes the structure, or the mode of building. In like manner stands the case with disciplinary learning, healing, and rolling, walking, leaping, growing old, advancing towards a state of maturity. It happens,. . however, that a thing is in motion when the actuality itself may exist, and when it is a thing neither antecedent nor subsequent to this. Therefore, ente- lecheia, or actuality, belonging to that which subsists iu capacity, when subsisting in actuality it energizes either as that which it is, or something else, so far forth as it is movable — this constitutes motion. Now, I mean by the expression " so far forth " a subsistence whose mode I would illustrate as follows.

For brass is a statue in capacity ; but, never- V a statue, and thelcss, actuality of the brass, so far forth as it eontraries." °^ ^^ brass, does not constitute motion. For it is not the same thing, the belonging to brass and to a certain capacity ; since if it were the same, absolutely speaking, accoidiu'^ to definition, the entelecheiay or actuality, of the brass would amount to a certain motion : it is not, however, the same. And this statement is evident as regards contraries; for the capacity of being in sound health, and the capacity of being indisposed, are not the same ; for in such a case would the actual conditions of health and sick- ness be the same : but the subject that is capable of being ■made both healthy and diseased, whether it be moisture, or whether it be blood, is one and the same thing. Since^ howevei.

OH. IZ.j MOTION, ENERGY, AND ACTUALITY. 30»

the being of a thing is not the same with the being of a certain capacity, in the same way as neither is colour the same with what is visible, so the enteUcheia,^ or actuality, of that which is potential, so far forth as it is a thing that is potential, constitutes motion.

That, indeed, therefore, motion actually exists, 4. tms connex- and that a thing happens to be moved at the m"tion^n^d name time with its being itself actuality, and energy, &c., that it is a thing that is neither antecedent nor '®*®""®*^' subsequent to this, is evident ; for everything admits of sub- sisting at one time in energy, but at another time not in this state : as, for example, that which is fit for being built, so far forth as it is fit for being built, and the energy ol that which is fit for being built, so far forth as it is fit for being built, constitute the mode or act of building ; for the energy of this amounts either to the mode of building or the house built. But when the house may be finished — that is, when it con- stitutes the energy — it will no longer be a thing that is fit for being built ; but, on the other hand, that which is fit for being built is actually built. It is necessary, then, that the mode or act of building amount to energy : but the mode or act of building amounts, likewise, to a certain motion. And the same reasoning holds good in the case of other motions.

Now, that these assertions have been made - -,, . correctly is evident from the statements which of defining mo- other philosophers have from time to time put by a reJerem^e'* forward in regard to motion ; as also from the to other phUo- fact of its not being an easy matter to frame *°^ ^^^' a definition of it in a different manner from the foregoing : for neither is one able to set it down as being contained in mother genus. And it is evident from what these specu- ktors say on the subject; for some of them, indeed, regard it as equivalent with diversity, and inequality, and nonentity ; and yet not one of these necessarily should have motion impai-ted to it. But neither does there exist change or mutation into these either, nor from things of this kind more than from such as are opposed. But a cause of their setting down motion amongst things of this kind is as follows,—-

• As to the import of this Peripatetic term, vide Suidas (Gaisford's Ed.)

•n th« words iyre^ix^la and Bvyofus : Donaldaon's New Cratylu8| p. 41&

i

SOI THZ MBTAPHTSTCS OF ABI8TOTLB. [BOOK X.

because motion appears with them as something that is inde- finite. Now, the first principles of a different co-ordinate series, from the fact of their being privative, are indefinite ; for not one of these is either this particular thing, or any other of the rest of the categories.

6. AVhat hat ^^* * cause of this view of motion — I mean,

led these spec^ of its appealing to be a thing that is indefinite motion J what — ^Tcsults from the &ct that it is not possible to it indefinite, gg^j j^ down under the category of the poten- tiality of entities, or under that of their energy or activity ; for neither that which involves a capacity of being quantity has motion imparted to it necessarily, nor that which sub- sists as quantity in energy. And motion appears to amount to a certain energy or activity, no doubt,* but an energy or activity which is imperfect : and a cause of this is the fol- lowing — that that which is potential to which the energy belongs is itself imperfect, aud on this account it would be difficult, as regards this, to apprehend what it is ; for it must necessarily be classed either into privation, or into capacity, or into simple energy ; and not one of these does it appear admissible that motion should be considered. Wherefore, it remains that it be what it has been declared to be — namely, both an energy or activity; and yet not such an energy as has been mentioned, for this would be an energy difficult to discern, indeed ; but, nevertheless, one which it is admissible should subsist

7 Moti - '^^^ *^^ motion is to be found in that which aides in a mo- is Capable of being moved is evident; for the tive nature. actuality of this lies under the influence of that which is capable of being moved. And the energy of that which is movable is not different from this ; for it is neces- sary, surely, that there shoiUd subsist actuality in both ; for a thing is movable in respect of its involving a capability of having motion impressed upon it, and that which imparts motion does so from energy or activity, but it thus acts from this energy in regard of that which is adapted for motion. Wherefore, in like manner, there resides one energy in both, just as from one to two is the same interval as from two to one. And in regard of ascent and descent the case 19 the same ; but the essence in this instance is not one. Ana 1 Viile book VIII. chaps, lii. and vL, already referred to

CH. X.J THB INFINITE DEFIN£D. 305

the same remark holds good, in like manner, with the power that imparts motion, and that which has motion impressed upon it thereby.

CHAPTER X.1

But the Infinite either is that which it is j Theinfiaite impossible to pass through, in respect of its not fo ajr««pui», de-' being adapted by nature to be permeated, in the same way as the voice is invisible, or it is that which possessei a passage without an end, or that which is scarcely so, or that which by nature is adapted to have, but has not, a passage or termination. Further, a thing is infinite from subsisting by addition, or subtraction, or both.

It is, indeed, possible, therefore, that the In- g ^j^^ infinite finite should constitute a certain entity that involves a involves a separable subsistence,^ but that it is sfstenwIVut^u cognisant by sense is not possible : for, if it con- not cognisant

Dy the senses

stitutes neither magnitude nor multitude, and if the Infinite be a substance, and not an accident of this, it will be indivisible ; for that which is divisible amounts either to magnitude or multitude : but if it be indivisible it will not be infinite, unless in the same way as the voice is in- visible. They do not, however, say so, nor do we inquire into the subject; but we consider it as a thing without any passage, or, in other words, impermeable. Further, let me ask, how is it possible that what is essentially infinite should exist, unless there should happen to subsist number and

^ The subject of the Infinite, discuBsed in this chapter, is most im- portant. The best modem author on this point is the late Sir William Hamilton, in his review of Cousin's doctrine of the Infinito-absolute. Vide also Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite ; Vera's Inquiry into Speculative Philosophy ; and Professor Ferrier's Institutes of Meta- physics, sect. I. props, xx. xxi. ; sect. III. props. L — ^viii inclusive.

^ I have not followed Taylor in his erroneous rendering of this passage. A carelessness in language, in translating the Greek, might convey the notion that Aristotle in these words was actually denying the separate existence of the Infinite, when nothing could be further from his intention. The Latin version paraphi'ases the passage thus " Separatum sane ipsum quum sit, sensibus percipi impossibile est. It must, however, be acknowledged that upon the whole Aristotle does not express himself on the subject of the Infinite as fully or aa determinately as we might havQ pxpec^d. His de^xutipili of \% \$ almost entirely inade up of negationa.

\

306 THE METAFHTSICS OP AKISTOTLB. [BOOK X.

magnitude, of which two tho Infinite is a passive condition I Moreover, if the Infinite subsists according to accident, il would not constitute an element of entities, as far forth as it is a thing that is infinite, in the same manner as neither is that which is invisible an element of speech although th9 voice is invisible,

•. Nor can the ^^^ *^^* ^* ^^ ^^* possiblc for the Infinite to Infinite sub- subsist in energy ^ is evident, for any part what-

sUt in energy; ^^^^^ ^^ j^^j^ ^^^ .^ ^^^j^q^ ^^ ^6 infinite;

for the being of the infinite and a thing which is infinite are the same, if the Infinite be substance and not that which is predicated of a subject. Wherefore, it is either indivisible, or divisible in a progression ad infinitum, if it be made up of partis that are or may be divisible. That many infinites, however, should be the same thing is impossible ; for as air is a part of air, so infinite is a part of that which is infinite, if it is a sub* stance and a first principle. The infinite, then, is devoid norinactu- of parts and indivisible. But it is impossible ^*^y- that an entity that subsists in actuality should

be infinite, for it must needs constitute quantity. It sub- sists, then, according to accident : but if this be the case, it has been declared that it is not possible that it should be a first principle; but this must be afl&rmed of that to which it happens that number or evenness should be such. The investigation, therefore, is itself universal.

That the Infinite, however, does not subsist in finile^does^iot" things that are cognisant by sense is evident subsist in sen- from the following circumstances : — for, on the frora*itrn^ot Supposition that the definition of body amounts p^su^ nature™ *^ *^^* which is bounded by surfaces, body would not be infinite, either that which is cognisable by sense or by the understanding ; nor will it be number as actually separated and infinite, for number is that which is numerable, or which involves number. That the Infinite, however, cannot subsist in things cognisant to the senses — regarded in a physical point of view — is evident from these following reasons : — for neither is it possible that it should be

^ Aristotle, therefore, whaterer positive notion he had formed of the Infinite, cannot be said to have identified it with the Deity, for th«  •naence of the Divine Nature he laid in energy, ivefrytta. This will b«  m what follows.

X.] THi! IKFIinTE SUBSISTS NOT IN SENSIBLES. 30 ^

A oomposite nature, nor one which is simple. For if you admit that it is a composite nature it will not be a body, if the elements are limited in multitude; for it is requisite that we should equalise the contraries, and that one of them should not be infinite : for if in any degree whatsoever the potentiality of the other body fails, the finite will be cor- rupted by the infinite body. But it is impossible that each of the elements should be infinite, for body is that wliioh in every direction involves an interval ; but that which is in- finite is that which involves an interval without end. Where- fore, if there is in existence an infinite body, it will be infinite in every direction.

Neither, however, can there be in existence ^ Nor a body one infinite simple body, nor — aa certain philo- which is sophers * would lay down — can it subsist as *^™p®' different from, or independent of, the elements from whence they generate these things ; for there is not in existence a body of this description beside the elements, for all those things of which they are compounded are resolved into these. This, however, does not appear to subsist beside the simple bodies — either fire or any otiier of the elements; for without some one of them being intinite it is impossible that the Uni- verse, if it may be finite, should either be or be generated from some one of the elements : ^ as Heraclitus says that all things were originally fire. And there is the same mode of reasoning, also, in the case of unity, the existence of which Natural Philosophers introduce besides the elements; for everything undergoes a change from its contraiy, as from heat into cold.

Further, a body cognisant by the senses is 6. Argument situated in a certain place, and there is the same f^t^ce Jf®the place of the whole as of part — of the earth, for infinite in sen- instance, as of one of its clods. Wherefore, if '^ *' ^"^^

• For example, the Ionic and Eleatic schools were celebrated in anti-

quity for their inculcution, the one of a materialistic, and the other of an idealistic, unity. All the sects, however, did not agree in investing this unity with the attribute of infinity. Zenophanes, for instance, maintained that it was neither finite nor infinite.

^ This dogma is what Aristotle so frequently impugns — namely, that which sought to establish the existence of some one elementary prin- ciple, in the form of matter, as that which would sufficieptly aocoimt for the genesis of eyerytiiing ;— of the rd iray itself >

x2

308 THE METAFHTSICe OF ARI8T0TLI!. {;B00K X

from the reia- the Infinite be of similar^ parts, indeed, it vnii Lndspacef* ^® immovable, or always will be impelled for- wards. But this is impossible; for why, may I ask, should it be moved downwards in preference to upwards, or in any direction whatsoever] for instance, if it were a clod of earth, in what direction will this be moved, or in what place will it remain at resti for the place of the body naturally adapted to this will be infinite. Will it, then, comprise the entire place 1 ^ and how will this be so 1 What, therefore, will be its place of rest and its motion ] or shall we say that it will remain at rest every- where? it will not then be moved; or, shall we say that it will be moved in every direction] it will not then stand stilL If the Universe, however, be of dissimilar parts, places, like- wise, would be dissimilar; and in the first instance, no doubt, the body of the Universe would not be one, save in respect of contact : in the next place, these things will be either finite or infinite in species. That they should be finite is not certainly, then, possible; for some, indeed, will be infinite, and some not so, on the supposition* that the Universe is in- finite — for instance, fire or water: and a thing of this kind will be corruption to contraries. If, however, they are in- finite and simple, both the places will be infinite, and infinite will be the elements; but if this is impossible, and the places be finite in number, the Universe, also, must needs be finite. , ^ ^ ^ And, in general, it is impossible that there can

7. Body cannot , '. «o , ' *^ , /. i_ j. •*

be infinite be an infinite body, and a place for bodies, if KffectioSs ; ©vcry body that is cognisant by the senses in- volves gravity or lightness. For it will have an impulse either towards the centre or upwards; it is impossible, however, that the Infinite— either the whole or the half, or any part whatsoever — should undergo a passive state; for in what way would you make a division of iti* or of the Infinite how will there be one portion tending in a

^ This ia Taylors translation. The word in the original is 6fio€iS4si the Latin version renders it by " uniforme.**

' As to the relation between body and space, vide Cousin on Looke^ chap, il, Henry's translation.

• Vide De Coelo, book I. chap. viL

• Vide Cousin's Psychology, chap, iii., in his analysis of ipaot asd

time.

k

0&. XI.J CORPOREITY NOT INFINITY. 309

direction downwards, and the other in a direction upwards 1 or how will this constitute the extremity, and that the centre 1 Further, every body that fells under the notice of the senses subsists in place;* and there are necessary sub- six species of place: but it is impossible that "1^®"*'^"* these should subsist in a body that is infinite. And, upon the whole, if it is impossible that place should be infinite, it is likewise impossible that body should be so ; for that which subsists in place is somewhere, and this signifies a direction either upwards or downwards, or some one of the rest of the categories; and each of these constitutes a certain limit.

But the Infinite is not the same in magnitude, g. The infinite and motion, and duration, as if it were a certain »<>* the same in single nature; but that which is subsequent is Sonirin^ddu^ denominated according to that which is ante- **°°' cedent : as, for instance, motion is denominated according to, or conformably with, the magnitude in regard of which the motion, or the alteration, or the increase, is brought about ; time, however, is reckoned or computed in consideration of motion.

CHAPTER XI.

Now, that which undergoes a change is changed partly, indeed, according to accident, inwhk;"ma? — as when we say the musician walks, — and tion or change

., , .!•• 'J* ij.i_ 1. J 18 received or

partly when a thmg is said simply to be changed imparted, in respect of something belonging to this under- going a change ; for example, whatsoever things are changed, are changed according to parts : for the body is reduced to a sound state of health because the eye is restored to a healthy oondition.2 Now, there is something which primarily is

• Propositions of this sort require the condition of experience to

evoke ilmm. ; but they stand on a basis purely rational This distinction is the key-stone of the arch of modem metaphysics. Vide Cousin's Psychology ; Chalybaus' History of Philosophy in (Germany : article^ Eant ; Sir William Hamilton on Cousin.

^ Small sayings suggest great ones. Perhaps the reader is reminded, hi meeting with the above, of our Saviour's words : ** The light of the

31C THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Z,

moved in itself or essentially, and this is that which may have motion impressed upon it from itself. And there is also something of the same sort in the case of that which imparts motion likewise ; for one thing imparts motion ac- cording to accident, and another according to a portion, but a third essentially or of itself : and there is something that is the primary source of motion, and there is something that has motion impressed upon it ; further is there the time in which, and there is the place from which, and the direction to- wards which, a thing is moved. But the forms, and passive states, and place into which ,are moved the things that are being moved, themselves are immovable, as science and heat ; but the heat does not constitute motion, yet the process of heating does. The change, however, that does not ensue according to accident does not reside in all things, but in contraries and media, and in contradiction. But a reliance upon this state- ment may be drawn from induction.

Now, that which undergoes a change is changed n'era of changes, either from a subject into a subject, or from that which is not a subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject, or from a non-subject into s^ subject : ^ but I mean by a subject that which is made ma- nifest by afl&rmation. Wherefore, changes must needs be three in number ; for that which is from a non-subject into a non-subject is not properly a change, for it subsists ^ neither between contraries nor between contradiction, because there is not opposition in the case of a transition from a nonJeubject into a non-subject. The change, indeed, therefore, from that which is a non-subject into a subject, according to contradic- tion, amounts to generation ; and such a change, of course, when simply considered, is simple generation, and when it is partial, it is partial generation : but the change from subject into that which is non-subject amounts to corruption, which, when it is simply so, is simple corruption ; but when it is partial, it is partial corruption.

body is the eye : if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light."— St. Matt. vi. 22.

^ These words are not found in the Leipsic edition. I have followed Didct*B text.

^ Aristotle's principle is this, — where there is change there is opposi* tion; where we can discover /acto/SoA^, there also is to be found unidtais.

tSL XI.] ' MOTION ANT CHANGE. 311

If, therefore, nonentity is predicated raulti- s. The relation feriously,* and that according to composition or and\^e"™three division does not admit of being put in motion, changes ex- Bo neither can it be so with thpt according to p^*"*®^* capacity, which is opposed to that which subsists simply ; for a thing that is not white, or not good, nevertheless admits of being moved according to accident : for that which is not white may be a man ; but this cannot by any means be the case with this particular thing which subsists simply : for it ifi impossible that nonentity should be moved ; and, if this be admitted, it is impossible, also, that generation amounts to motion; for nonentity would be produced if it did, for in such a case most especially would it be produced according to accident ; yet, nevertheless, it is true to assert of that which is generated simply that a nonentity has a subsistence. In like manner, also, stands the case with the being in a state of rest And, doubtless, such are the difficulties that attend on this hypothesis, even on the supposition that everything that is being moved is in place ; but what is a nonentity is not in place, for it would be somewhere. Hence neither does cor- ruption constitute motion, for motion or rest is a thing that is contrary to motion, but corruption is contrary to genera- tion. Since, however, every motion amounts to a certain change, and there are three changes, as just now enumerated, and of these the changes that ensue according to generation and corruption are not motions — ^and these are those that sub- sist according to contradiction — it is necessary that the change from subject into subject should alone constitute motion. Subjects, however, are either contraries or media ; and let privation be considered as a thing that is contrary : and it is made manifest by affirmation ; for instance, that which is naked and toothless, and that which is black.

^ Probably by the multifarious predication of the "non-ens" AristotUr wmld mean that of its synonyme rb if^c^Soy. Vide book IV. chap, xxix

31 S THE METAPHYSIOS OF ABISTOTLS. [bOOK X

CHAPTER XII. , „ ,, If, therefore, the categories are divided by

I. No motion , / . vx i x- • i

according to suDstance,' quautj, place, action or passion, rels^ ^latiion.^* ^^'^ tion, quantity, there must needs subsist three motions of quality, quantity, and of place ; but according to substance there does not subsist any motion on account of there being nothing contrary to substance ; nor is there a motion of relation : for it is possible, when either of the relatives has not undergone a change, that a verification should take place in regard of the other, as having undergone no change. Wherefore, the motion of these will subsist according to accident.

2. Why there is Neither is there a motion of that which is not motion in active and passive, or of that which is the effi-

the case of ac- . ^ /» . • j i .- • x

tion or of pas- cicut cause 01 motion, and has motion impressed sion. upon it, because there is not a motion of motion,

nor a generation of generation, nor, in general, a change ol a change. For in two ways is it possible that there be a motion of a motion ; first, either as of a subject — for instance, as man is moved because from white he is changed into black ; wherefore, thus also is it with motion, either a thing is made warm or cold, or undergoes alteration in place or increase : this, however, is impossible ; for the change does not amount to any of the subjects; — or, secondly, there may subsist a motion of motion, in respect of some different subject from change being altered into a different form, as man is changed from sickness into health. Neither, however, is this possible, except according to accident ; for every motion constitutes a change from one thing into another : and, in like manner, the case stands with generation and corruption, except that those changes, I admit, that are wrought from things that are opposed in this or that way are not motions.

3. This point At the samc time, then, is man changed from illustrated. health into disease, and from this very change into a different one. It is, therefore, evident that when a man shall have become indisposed he shall undergo a change mto a disease of some sort or other ; for it is admissible for such to remain in a state of rest : and, further, it is evident

' Vide Categories, cliap. iv.

OH. XII.1 NO MOTION IN ACTION AND PaOSION. 31S

•J

that he will not be changed into that state which is iryari < ably casual, and that will amount to a change from some- thing into something else, so that health will be an opposite motion, but from accident ; as, for instance, one undergoes an alteration from memory into oblivion, because that wherein oblivion is inherent undergoes a change, sometimes into scientific knowledge, and sometimes into health. Further will the progression advance on to infinity, if there will subsist a change of a change,^ cas'^of^action and a generation of a generation. Therefore, or passion,

1 i j^i 1 xi ? ^i_ • would presup-

also, must there be the former on the supposi- pose an infinite tion that there is the latter ; for instance, if the J^^^eVr" ""^ simple act of generation take place at any time, that also which is being generated simply has been produced. Wherefore, not as yet in existence would be that which is being produced simply; but something does exist that is being generated or produced, or which already has been generated. If, therefore, also, this thing once was generated, for what reason was that not yet in existence which is being then gene- rated ] Since, however, as regards things that are infinite there does not subsist anything that is primary, there will not be that which is first generated, and for this cause neither that which is in order consequential. Therefore, that any of these either should be generated, or be moved, or undergo any change, is not possible. Further, contrary motion, and rest, and generation, and corruption, trary motio^n, ' will belong to the same subject. Wherefore, a f^e^^uygc^. thing that is being generated, when it may become that which is being generated, is then undergoing a process of corruption ; for neither is it immediately corrupted as soon as it is generated, nor subsequently to this ; for that must necessarily exist which is undergoing a process of cor- ruption. Further, it is the case that matter and matter as ought to subsist under that which is being gene- t^e subject of rated and undergoing a change.^ Therefore, *^ *°**'

^ Aristotle had abready exposed the absurdity of such a system as an infinite progression of causes, in book I. the Less, chap. iL

^ The necessity of this principle the ancients made to rest on thf dogma that " ex nihilo nil fit." If the student is desirous of knowing intimately the bearing of this dogma on the ancient philosophy, ho will consult Cudworth's Intellectual System, HaiTison*s edition, witll Mosheim's Dissertation on Creation out of Nothing, vol. III. p. 140.

314 TH?B METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK X.

what matter will there subsist in like manner as an alterable body or soul? in this way, also, anything that subsists on being produced constitutes either motion or gencratioa And, further, what is that into which the thing is moved for it is necessary that something amount to the motion o\ this particular thing from this particular thing into that, and yet that it should not be motion at all. How, let me ask, then, is this to take place ? for the generation of discipline does not amount to discipline ; so neither is it true to say that there will subsist a generation of generation. 5. It is accord- Since, however, there is not in existence motion quanti?y"*and* ^^^^^^ ^^ substaucc, or of relation, or of action place that mo- and passion, it remains that there should subsist tion subsists, jjjotion according to quality, and quantity, and place, for to each of these doth there belong contrariety. Now, I mean by motion according to quality not that which is found in substance — ^for difference also constitutes quality — but that which is passive, in accordance with which a thing is said to be passive or to be devoid of passion. « n * ^ « A With regard, however, to that which is im-

6. Rest aenned ii t > ■> i ii«»

in relation to movable, and that which, upon the whole, it is immovable."^ impossible should have motion impressed upon it, and that which with difficulty, in a long portion of duration, or slowly, commences its motion, and that which having been by nature, no doubt, adapted for having motion imparted to it, yet does not possess the capacity or ability of being moved when it is naturally fitted for motion — both as to the place where and the manner how — this id what I term merely a condition of rest amongst those things that are immovable ; for rest is a thing that is contrary to motion.

Wherefore, it would amount to a privation of of locaranc?' *^^^ which is reccptive or capable of motion ; and separate mo- things are Said to be moved according to place at ' °" ' the same time as many as are to be found in one

original locality ; and those things are said to be moved sepa- rately as many as are to be found in a different place, and of contact And things are said to be in contact with each and a medium, other ^ the extremities of which subsist together. And that is a medium into which that is fitted bv nature

• Vide book IV. chap. vi.

CH. XII.] LOCAL CONTRARIETY AND SUCCESSION. 315

first to proceed which is undergoing a change, before it arrives At that into which it is ultimately changed— I mean, what is uninterruptedly undergoing a change according to the constitution of nature.

A thing is contrary ^ in regard of place which . ^ ^ ...

. . , . T • "^j. XI ^ ^ J' J. *• Definitions

m a straight line is at the greatest distance pos- of local con- sible : and a thing is successive between which J'lJ^eSion^ — when it is after its first principle, either in position or form, or some other definite mode of subsistence— and that to which it is consequent there subsists no interven- ing medium of things in the same genus ; for instance, lines are successive to a line, or monads are successive to a monad, or a house to a house. There is no hindrance, however, to there subsisting any other medium between them ; for that which is successive belongs to something in succession, and is something that is subsequent : for one is not successive tc two, nor are the Kalends to the Nones.^ And a thing is coherent which, being successive, is in contact. Since, how- ever, every change takes place in those things that are opposed, and thabc are contraries and contradiction, and since of contr«.i*ction there is nothing that is a medium, it is evident thai *n contraries there subsists a medium. And that which is continuous is that which has as well as of something of the nature of the coherent, or of continuity, that which is in a state of contact. And a thing is called continuous when the extremity of either of the parts by which they are in contact, and in continuity, may be one and the same. Wherefore, it is evident that what is con- tinuous is to be found amongst those things from which, as compounds, there subsists anyone thing naturally adapted for being generated according to contact.

And that what is successive ranks as what is 9. Relation primary is evident likewise ; for everything that ^*^®«» ^^^

^ As to the definition of contrariety in general, compare book IV. chap. z.

3 fi povfiripla tils ScvTcpos. This is the rendering of Taylor, tliough the literal interpretation would be, "the first day of the month is not Bucoessive to the second.** Taylor, <u usual, has his eye fixed on th«  Latin version : perhaps by devrepas he meant the second decade of tha Greek month, which would correspond with the nones in the Roman Calendar. For an account of the Greek year, vide Potter's Antiquitie% ^ok II. chap, xxvi

816 THE METAFHTSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [boCEXI.

eesHior. and is successlve does Dot subsist in a state of con- continuity. tact; but this is the case with what is successive on the supposition that what is continuous' subsists in a state of contact. Even, however, though they should subsist in a state of contact, they yet by no means amount to that which is continuous. Those things, however, in which there is not found contact there does not subsist natural coherence in. Wherefore, a point is not the same thing with a monad ; for, indeed, in points may be found contact : but this is not the case with monads, but these are successive to each other, and between points there may be found a certain medium; whereas we cannot discover any such between monads.

BOOK XL*

CHAPTER I.

t onto- / ^^^ present speculation is concerned about iogyisconcemy substanocj for the first principles and causes of 5r substance?/ s^bstanccs are under investigation. For both ' if the Universe be as one whole, substance con- stitutes the earliest portion ; and if things subsist in a conse- quent order, in this way, likewise, would substance be first, and next quality, then* quantity. But at the same time neither, so to say, are these, simply considered, entities, but qualities and motions, in the same manner even as that which is not whole and that which is not straight. There- fore, we say that these also are in existence ; for instance,^ that such a thing is not white. Further, still no one of the others possesses a separable subsistence.

1 This is a remarkable book — ^book XL, or, according to others, book XII. Some of the principles laid down in it have already been enunciated.-- The chief aim of Aristotle, however, is to endeavour to ascertain the number of the primary substances, vpSnai ova-iai : and this inquiry ii| based on the assumption that over these presides a certain substancei in its eflaciency prior and paramount to them alL

' Vide book VI. chap. L .

CH. n.] OLASSIFIOATION OF BUBSTANCBS. 317

And to the truth of this statement bear wit- 2. tms xm- ness also, in reality, the Philosophers of Anti- ^S^t^^^d quity; for they from time to time have inves- modern pwio- tigated into the first principles, and elements, ®®^^^* and causes of substance. Those, to be sure, that are Philoso- phers, now-a-days, have in preference sought to establish universals as substances ; for the genem are universals — which they say are first principles and substances — ^rather on account of their examining them logically. The Philosophers, how- ever, of old regarded singulars as substances — for example, fire and earth — but not a common body.

Now, substances are three in number; one, indeed, is cognisant by sense, the existence of eit^aswfof which all acknowledge ; and one part of this is substances eternal,^ and the other subject to decay, as plants cessity of such and animals : but of the eternal portion of it, it is mJtaphysi" . necessary that we should admit as elements either one or many. But another substance is immovable : and this, some say, involves a separable subsistence; amongst whom some make a division of it into two ; others, however, rank into one nature forms and mathematical entities: whereas others of these admit mathematical entities only as subsist- ing. The substances that are cognisant by sense belong, £Een7\ of course, to the department of physical science, for they in- \ volve a connexion with motion ; but the immovable substance | belongs to a different science, on the supposition that this / possesses no first principle in common with the others. /

CHAPTER II.

Substance cognisant by the senses, however, 1. change pre- is susceptible of change. Now, on the suppo- Io£?thhi/a«  sition that change takes place from things that the subject of are opposed, or such as are media, and not from ***** c^^^nge- sll things that are opposites — for the voice is not a thing that is white — ^but from that which is contrary, it is nece»- sary that something, also, subsist capable of undergoing an alteration into contrariety ; for contraries do not undergo %

1 Ffcie book YII. chap. L

318 THE HETAPH7SIGS OF ABISTOfLB. [bOOK 21

change. Further/ does this, no doubt, contmue permanent; that which is contrary, however, does not continue perma- nent ; and hence doth there subsist a something third beside contraries — namely, matter. If, therefore,^ changes are foui in number, either according to quiddity, or according to quality, or quantity, or the place where ; and if simple gene- ration, indeed, and corruption be what subsist according to quiddity, and increase and diminution be what subsist ao cording to quantity, and alteration be that according to passion, and motion be that according to place — allowing all this to be the case, the several changes would take place into contrarieties : I mean, such as are involved in singulars. Therefore, it is necessary that matter should undergo a change which can pass into both.

I. chan!?e is a Since entity, however, is twofold, everything -A^sute of ca"™ which uudcrgoes a change is changed from that /city into that which is au entity in capacity into that which I of energy. -^ ^^ entity in energy; as, for example, fiom what is white in capacity, or potentiality, into that which is white in energy : and in like manner, also, does the case stand with increase and diminution. Wherefore, not only accord- ing to accident is it possible that all things be generated from nonentity, but likewise from entity do all things derive their generation — I speak of what is an entity in capacity deriving its generation from a nonentity in energy or activity.

8. iiiustratec -^.nd this is the unit of Anaxagoras;^ (for it is by the tenets of better to maintain this than the tenet of certain Atiaxfrnalfder, Speculators who are of opinion that all thing? and others. subsist simultaneously ;) and it is tantamount to the philosophic dogma of mixture adopted by Empcdocles

' Bekker begins chap. ii. with these words.

• Aristotle's doctrine is this : there are four chans^es ; these changes

are all changes into contraries — contraries themselves undergo no change, but they presuppose something as the subject of the changes, that is, the matter, Sktj, Thus, there are four changes, but three first principles, or doxai — namely, torm, privation, and contraristy. Vide Physics, book V. chap. i.

^ Anaxagoras, according to Aristotle, held this very tenet that he now mentions parenthetically — namely, that irdvra hfiov ^v, or that " all things were one potentially." Some dogma akin to this, I conceive, if nhat he means by the unit of Anaxagoras.

fSH. III.J UNDER CHANGE LIES THE SUBJECT OF IT. 319

and Anaximauder ;^ and resembles the theory of Democritua viz. that all thiugs subsisted in capacity simultaneously, ani) not in energy. Wherefore, in this case they would touch upon matter, that is, the material canne. All things, 4. confirmatioB however, involve matter as many as undergo of the fore- a change; but entities involve different matter from one another:^ and of the things that are eternal as many as are not generable, but movable by an orbital mo- tion, possess matter, yet such matter as is not generable^ but is merely moved from this place towards that.

Now, one might raise the question, from what 5 p^^^ ^^^^ sort of nonentity generation could arise 1 for kind of non- nonentity subsists in a threefold way. If, there- generation fore, there subsists aught in capacity, from this ^'^^^ will generation subsist ; yet, nevertheless, not from anything whatsoever without distinction, but one thing will be gene- rated from another. Neither is it sufiBcient to say that all things subsist simultaneously ; for entities differ in matter : since why would things infinite in number be generated, but not one thing ? for the faculty ^ of the human understanding is one. Wherefore, if likewise matter be one, that would have been generated also in energy the matter even of which would subsist in capacity.

Therefore are there three causes, and three e. RecapUuia- first principles,— two, indeed, amounting to con- *^®"* trariety, — of which one sort constitutes the formal principle and the species, and the second privation; but the third cause is matter.

CHAPTER III.

After these inquiries there remains for us j ^^ genera- | ^ to make our readers aware that neither matter tion of matter nor form is geneialed::*" ' ITSWyTi^k tbos of ®' """•

^ Anaximander floonBhed about 610 B.O., and put forward the ex* Utonce of the Infinite. Vide Physics, book L chaps, iv. and v. ; and Tenneman's History of Philosophy, p. 57, translated in '*Bohn's Philo- logical Library."

• Vide book VII. chap. iv.

• The word in the original is pous,

• Vide book YI. chap, ziii By the phrase r^ l<rxaTa, which occm

92U THE K2TAPHTSI0S OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOE XI

the. extremities of things ; for everything that undergoes any change is changed both by something and into something — by something, of course, I mean that which is the first imparter of motion, and of something, that is, matter, and that into which the thing is changed; this is the form. Therefore, they go on in a progression to infinity, if not only the brass becomes spherical, but also the spherical or the brass is gene- rated : therefore, must we sooner or later come to a stand- still in the series.

2. The mode of After thcsc inquiries we must show how that fh^ifff'""!^ each substance is generated fi:om one synony- sorts of sub- mous with itself ; for those things that are being stance. generated by Nature, as well as other things, are

\ stitutes a first pnncipie wnibh subsists in another subject, whereas Nature constitutes a first principle which subsists in the thing itself; for man begets man : and the remaining causes are the privations of these. Substances likewise are three in number, and one of these is matter; which is this certain particular thing in consequence of its appearance as such ; for as many things as are one by contact, and not by cohesion, constitute matter and a subject: but another of these substances is Nature, which likewise is this certain par- ticular thing, and into Nature is there the transition of a certain habit. Further, the third substance is that which subsists from these, and is ranked as a singular; for example^ Socrates or Callias.

3. Fonn8,if they As regards* some things, therefore, this be^foundin** Certain particular thing involves no subsistence composite sub- independent of a composite substance, as the Btances ; form of a housc, unless art constitutes this form.

Neither is- there any generation and corruption of these, but after a different manner they are, and are not, both the house itself, which is unconnected with matter, and health, and everything that is produced according to art ; but if forms subsist, they subsist in the case of those things that are

in the following eentenoo, Aristotle means what we may trace pheno- mena ultimately to — ^as, for example, all things are resolvable into a certain matter and a certain form. ^ ViiU book YL chap. is. ' Vide book YI chap, viii

OH. IV.J DIVERSITY IN nitST FRI&CIPL£S. 321

generated by Nature. Wherefore, doubtless, not injudiciously affirmed Plato that forms belong to it,' in things those things as many as involve a natural sub- {hSr^sut* sistence, on the supposition of the existence of siBtences from forms different from, or independent of, these; ^**"'®* as, for example, fire, flesh, the head, and so forth. For all these things are matter, and belong to siibstance especially — I mean, such a description of matter as is ultimata

Some causes,^ therefore, that are those that 4, cauaea impart motion subsist as entities that have been either prior to

• . , ^ J 1 .1 1 • 1 their effects or

previously generated, whereas other causes which coincident 'with subsist as the formal principle are simultane- *^®™' ously generated with their results; for when a man is in sound health then also is there present with him sound health, and the form of the brazen sphere subsists simul- taneously with the brazen sphere.

And whether, also, there remains anything 5 rpj,^ separa- Bubsequently to the separation of form from the biiity of form

u» J. i» i» J. ' I* • j.1. from its subject

subject of form, we must examine ; for in the case in some cases is of some forms there is no hindrance to this favJJSc? IthV" taking place ; as if soul were a thing of this de- ideal hypothe- scription : not, to be sure, every soul, but the un- ®*"' derstanding ; for that this should be so with every soul is not, perhaps, a thing that is possible. It is evident, therefore, that there is no necessity that on account of these, at least, ideas should have an existence ; for man begets man, the singular begets a certain individual. And in like manner does the case stand with the arts ; for the medicinal art is the formal principle of health.

CHAPTER IV.

And as regards causes and first principles,' j Have things in a manner are they different according as they different prin- belong to different things, and in a manner this * ^ " is not the case. Supposing one to express himself universallj, %nd according to analogy the causes and first principles of

' This is an erroneous principle in cauBatioii.

• Vide book II. chap. it.

X

332

THK HGTAFHTfilCS OF ABISTOTLE.

[BC

I. A«ih<ti«- all tilings will be the same. For one might i[an"8°L'ir'^ the questiou as to whether the first priaoiplea reiuiYfB itie aud elements of Eubstimces, and of things which •»me! Bubsist as relatives, are different or the same't

and, therefore, iu like matiaer is it the case with each of the oategories. But it would be ab&urd if there were the same principles and elemeats of all things, for from the same things will relatives derive their subsistence aa well as Bub- stanoe. What, thei-efore, will this be ? for besides aubstanoe and the rest of the thiogs that are predicated there is nothing that is in common. Prior, however, ia the element to those things of which it ia aii element ; but, aseui'edly, neither is substance an clement of relatives, nor is any of oriiitthBcue thesc ail element of substance. Further, how ia ■rithuuhinai! it admissible that there should be the same elements of all things 1 for none of the elements can be the same with that which is a composite nature of the elements ; as, for iostauce, neither B nor A. can be the same with BA. Neither, therefore, is it possible that any one element of those natures that are intelligible — aa, for example, unity of entity — can be the element of all ttings; for these are pr^ eent with each of the compound natures likewise. No one of them, therefore, will have a subsistence either as aubatauce or relation ; but it will be a thing expedient,' however, that they

I should subsist in some form or other. The elements, then, of

I all things are not the same. i ahaIoki all ^^' ^*" '"'^ ^y — ■j"^'" ^ '^^ have already ue ihe niinci- affirmed — that iu one way this is the case, and nl™itrf'»n ™ another that it is noti aa, perhaps, in regard of ihingi uii! sensible bodies that which is hot subsiats in one '*°"' way as form, aud after another mode that which

is cold Buhsista as the privation thereof: but matter BubNsta as that which primarily and essentially constitutes both of these in capacity; substances, Lnwever, are both these BqJ Bueh aa consist of those things of which these ore the first prin- ciples. Or, if any one thing is generated from what is hot and from what is cold, as flesh or bone, still that which is produced from thence must needs be different from these. The first principles and elements of these, 1 admit, then, an the same, yet there are different elements of different things^

• I htve addwl tbem wordi to complete tha

1

"I

I

IV.] PR1NCIPLE8, CAUBEB, ASD ELEMENTS. 323

and, without doubt, we cannot say that the case stands in this way with all things; but analogically nre the elements and first priuciples of all things the same : juBt as if one | should Bay_thi(t there are three fitat priEoiplES. iii_eaiatence — namely, form^and privation, and matter, ; each of these, how- | ever, is different acooi-ding aa it is conversant about every genus, as in colour, white, black, surface, light, darkness, air ; and from these emerge forth day and night. _ __. '

Since, however, not only things that are inhe- 4 cmKianUi J I* rent are causes, but also causes of things tLat eietneppcom-jj are external— aa, for example, in the case of what *^^ ■^ "f ' imparts motion — it is evident that a first principle is a dif- ferent thing from an element ; yet both are causes, and into these ia a first principle divided : but what subsists as that 1 whioh imparts motion or rest conatitutea a certain first piin- ciple and substance. . .^^

Wherefore, there are in eiistence three elements, s. Eiemmn I. C^ indeed, according to analogy, but four causes and "i«'fi- \ ^-^ first principles; and a different cause subsists where the subject 1 Tt*< is different, and the first cause constitutes, as it were, that whictk imparts motion, and is different aecording aa the sub- ' ject is different. Thus, health is as form, disease as priva- tion, body as matter ; that whioh imparts motion is the medicinal art Again, a house is as form, this certain sort oi I I confusion^ as privation ; the bricks are aa matter, and that / which imparts motion, or the efficient cause, is the builder's art. And into these, therefore, is a first principle divided.

But since that which impai-ts motion in phy- g camei aical or natural things is a man, and in thinga iiireetniii or springing from the understanding form, or the contrary, in one respect would there be three causes, and in another four ; for the medicinal ajl, constitutes in a manner health, and the building art the form of the house, and man begets man ; further, beside these — as that which is the firat of all thinga — is that whioh imparts motion, or is the efficient cause, to all things.

•B reduced bj Ihi

I

322 TRK METAFHTSIC8 OF ABISTOTUE. [boOK JU.

i. Ate the ei«- ^ things will be the same. For one might raise SSS«*Bnd^ the question as to whether the first principles relatives the and elements of substances, and of things which samet subsist as relatives, are different or the same)

and, therefore, in like manner is it the case with each of the categories. But it would be absurd if there were the same principles and elements of all things, for from the same things will relatives derive their subsistence as well as sub- stance. What, therefore, will this be ? for besides substance and the rest of the things that are predicated there is nothing that is in common. Prior, however,- is the element to those things of which it is an element ; but, assuredly, neither is substance an element of relatives, nor is any of or is it the case these an element of substance. Further, how is with all things t it admissible that there should be the same elements of all things ? for none of the elements can be the same with that which is a composite nature of the elements ; as, for instance, neither B nor A can be the same with BA. Neither, therefore, is it possible that any one element of those natures that are intelligible — as, for example, unity or entity — can be the element of all things ; for these are pre- sent with each of the compound natures likewise. No one of them, therefore, will have a subsistence either as substance or. relation; but it will be a thing expedient,^ however, that they should subsist in some form or other. The elements, then, of all things are not the same. ,.,,,, Or, shall we say — just as we have already

3. Analogically «, j i.u j. • xi.- • j.u j

are the princi- amrmed — that in one way this is the case, and mentVof *au ^^ another that it is not 1 as, perhaps, in regard of things the sensible bodies that which is hot subsists in one

• "^®* way as form, and after another mode that which

is cold subsists as the privation thereof: but matter subsists as that which primarily and essentially constitutes both of these in capacity; substances, however, are both these and buoh as consist of those things of which these are the first prin- ciples. Or, if any one thing is generated from what is hot and from what is cold, as flesh or bone, still that which is produced from thence must needs be different from these. The first principles and elements of these, I admit, then, are the same, yet there are different elemeuts of different things^

• I have added these words to complete the senseb

OB. IV.] PRINCIPLES, CAUSES, AND ELEMENTS. 323

and, without doubt, we cannot say that the case stands in this way with all things ; but analogically are the elements and first principles of all things the same : just as if one

sh ould say that t hpro nrA thrftfl firfff^ pgnfiJ p l f^ R ^n ftyiw^fiTi fiP —

namely^ fi^' ^^4 £rivation^and jnatter, ; each of these, how- ever, is different according as it is conversant about every genus, as in colour, white, black, surfipice, light, darkness, air ; and from these emerge forth day and night

Since, however, not only things that are inhe- 4 causes and/ rent are causes, but also causes of things that eiememy cpmJ are external — as, for example, in the case of what ^~*^~ — *^^®* *7 imparts motion — it is evident that a first principle is a dif- ferent thing from an element ; yet both are causes, and into these is a first principle divided : but what subsists as that ^v^ieh imparts motion or rest constitutes a certain first prin- ciple and substance.

' Wherefore, there are in existence three elements, 5. Elements indeed, according to analogy, but four causes and tt»««foid- fi3t_piioicipIes;,and a diflferent cause subsists where the subject is different, and the first cause constitutes, as it were, that which imparts motion, an^ is difiereni; according as the sul)-| ject is different. Thus, health is as form, disease as priva- tion, body as matter : that which imparts motion is the medicinal art Again, a house is as form, this certain sort of confusion ^ as privation ; the bricks are as matter, and that which imparts motion, or the efficient cause, is the builder's art. And into these, therefore, is a first principle divided.

But since that which imparts motion in phy- g causes sical or natural things is a man, and in things threefold or springing from the understanding form, or the '*^"'^*^*^- contrary, in one respect would there be three causes, and in another four ; for the medicinal art constitutes in a maimer health, and the building art the form of the house, and man begets man ; further, beside these —as that which is the first of all things — is that which imparts motion, or is the efficient cause, to all things.

^ That is, the materials of the house before they are reduced hj tlii DTiilder to the form and shape of a house.

' J

f

"7 .

( I

y *■■ •

!

X%

884

rc-a-iO^ ^>^

[booi

THK METAFUTdlOS OF ARISTOTLE.

I ..

/

I. Substances the principles of all things.

2. The same- ness of the principles of all things illus- trated in the case of energy and capacity.

\

'■\i

CHAPTER V.

And since some things involve a separable^ subsistence, and some do not involve a sepa- rable subsistence, tliaJGormer are substfugioes; and on this account these are the causes of aU things, because the passive states and motions of things do not involve a subsistence independent of substances. In the next place, perhaps, will these constitute soul and body, or understanding, and appetite, and body.

Moreover, in another manner analogicaUy are first principles the same; for example, take the instances of energy and capacity. These, how- ever, are both different according as the subjects of them are different, and they subsist in diffe- rent ways; for in certain bodies the same thing subsists sometimes in energy and sometimes in capacity — as wine, or flesh, or a man. But also do these &I1 under the category of the causes above enumerated; for fQrro..fi2nsti- $Utes an energy, no doubt, if it be that which has a sgpacable subsistence, and which is compounded from both : and this is thJEJ case with^privation, — for instance, darkness, or a creature that is sick ; but matter subsbts in capacity, for this is that which is endued with the capability of becoming both. But after another mode do those things differ in energy and capacity of which the matter is not the same, and of which the form is not the same, but different, — as a cause of man are both the elements fire and earth, as matter; and his proper form, and if there is anything else extrinsic — I mean, such as his father ; and beside these the sun and the oblique circle, which constitute neither matter, nor form, nor priva- tion, nor are of the same species, but are motive natures. 8 Universal / ^^^f further, it is expedient for us to perceive causes practi- /that as regards causes it is possible to enumerate

eSstemje! "** '^ SQjnfi that are universal and some tbat,.ar©,^^ot;

therefore, the original first principles of all things

.'ire that which subsists in energy as this first thing, and

something else which subsists in potentiality. Those, indeed.

^ Aristotle in this chapter is preparing the way for establishing tlM existence of the First Substance

CH. V.J

bAMENEgS IN nBST PBINCIPLEft.

325

therefore^ that are univcrsals have not any subsistence; foi the singular constitutes a first principle of singulars: for man, to be sure, is the principle ^ of universal mnn^^rt thart -ia-nojinizfirsal man ; but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular letter B is the cau8<^ of this syllable BA, and, in short, B of BA absolutely.

In the nfiyt plafifl, t.hf> forms-of substancea are 4.j¥]MMmWer fiiyf prin/^ipiaa ; but thcrc are different causes an d ^?^'"""J ? ^ ' elements of difi^rent things, as has been declared : ma y ^ the-?* thus, of the things that are not contained in the ^*°^^' same genus, such as colours, sounds, substances, quantity, the elements are not the same, except analogically : the causes, likewise, of those things that are contained in the same Bpecies are different, but they are not different in species; but because the matter of singulars is a thing that is dif- ferent, both your matter and form, and that which imparts motion and the species, differ in number from mine, though, according to tho.fornial principle of the universal, they are the same.

Therefore, as to the inquiry, what^a re-_fir8t Howtode- principles or elements of substances, and rela- cide the ques. tious, and qualities, as to whether they are the J^^gMM or* same or different? ^ it is evident that, if they diyerBity ofthe are predicated multi&riously, there are the same tfing?^** ^' principles and elements belonging to everything ; but, if they are divided, ther^ are not the same, but different first principles of everything, unless that, also, in a certain Tespect there are the same principles of all things. Thus, they are the gama analogically^,! admits because there is matter, form^ privation, that which imparts motion: and in that way the causes of substances are as the 'causes of all things, be- cause, on the supposition of ^^ubstanee a being destroyed, all things are destroyed. Further, that which is ^t subsists in actiudity, and in this way are these primaries different, — aa many as are contraries, — seeing that they neither are predi- cated as genera, nor denominated multi£a.riously ; further. likewise, are there different kinds of matter that are styled ^causes. What, therefore, the first principles of sensible s arc^

^ ThiB IB a fiiTourite principle with Aristotle, and one whioli he put! fbrward in opposition to the tenets of others.

• Vide book IL chap. !▼.

e^£^

- . 1* • « I ..

{k* I ♦ » ■ . ,

\ ' '. . . ;

r

X

•« >A «k. **-t«-« 

Si6 THK METAFHTSIOB OF ARISTOTLB. f^BOOK XI

tnd what sort they are, and after what mode they are the 4tBane, and after what mode they are different^ all this has been declared.

r

CHAPTER YU

BcTT siuoe there have appeared three snb- «isb0t«nee'ii«- stanoes — ^two, indeed, that are natural or physical, mnS^^moved ^^^ ^^® which is immovable— regarding thk im- i^om the nature movable substance we must endeavour to esta- ^ime and \y\[t^ that it is necessary that it should constitute a certain eternal substance, one which is im- movable; for the first of entities are substances ; and if we suppose all of them to be corruptible, all things are corrup- tible. It is impossible, however, that in such a case motion should be either generated, or that it should be corrupted, for it was always in existence ; nor is this possible with dura- tion ; for it is not possible that there can be that which is prior and subsequent, on the supposition that time or dura- tion has no existence : and motion, then, in this way is con- tinuous, as also duration ; for duration either is the same as motion,^ or it is a certain passive condition of motion. But there is not any motion that is continuous save that which is local or topical, and to this belongs the motion that is circular; but, doubtless, if there is anything that is fit for being moved, or that is productive, but not anything that energizes^ in this case motion has no existence ; for it is admissible that what involves capacity should not energize.

There would, then, be no advantage gained,' of •ubstancM^ ^^^ ®^®^ ^^ ^® could make substances eternal, of no vahie, un- as those do who constitute as such the forms or nVxionwUh ideas, unless there will be inherent some first tiMfieextst. principle capable of working a change. There- enceo en rgy. ^^^^ neither would this be competent for such,

• The reasoning contained in this chapter is well worthy of attention.

• We are reminded by this passage of Locke on Succession. Vide

Coatin*8 analysis of Locke's doctrine hereupon, in his Psychology, ehap. iii.

> Aristotle is most hostile against all those who do not recognim the priority of energy, as a principle, to all things ; for instance, h«  Uames Hesiod far his theory about Chaos, and on these yery grounds.

CH. VI.] OOD AN imiATBRIAIi XNERGT. S87

nor would there be any other substance different from, or in- dependent 0^ the forms; for, on the supposition that it will not energize, there will be no motion in existence. Further, neither will this be the case if the substance will energize, but if the substance thereof constitutes capacity ; for there will not be in existence a perpetual motion, for it is possible that that which subsists in capacity should not exist It is^ therefore, necessary, that there should be a first principle of this kind whereof the substance constitutes an energy.

Further, therefore, it is necessary that these ^ ^^ ^^^^ substances do not involve a connexion with first substance matter.^ For it is requisite that they should be J^** *™°»* eternal, if, in sooth, there is also, at least, any- thing else that is everlasting. It is, then, in enei^ that they subsist Although this involves a matter of doubt; for it appears to be the case that what energizes should subsist entirely in a state of potentiality: but that everything that is endued with capacity should not altogether energize. Wherefore, we may assume that potentiality is a thing that is antecedent to energy. But, surely, if this be the case, no one of the entities will be in existence; for it is possible that a thing possess a capacity of existence, but that yet it should not be in existence.

If the case, however, stands as the Theologians 4. jj^e neces- affirm — I mean, those who are for generating all "^ty of this things from Night ^— or as the Natural Philo- LusHnvoived sophers, who say that all things subsisted simul- ^ the'*h*8i-* taneously, the same impossibility will ensue, cists and theo- For how, let me ask, will matter be put in ^®«**°"- motion if nothing that subsists in energy will be a cause) fof the matter of a house, at least, will not itself move itself, but the builder's art will ; nor does the menstrual blood move itself, nor earth, but seeds, and human seed. ' — \

"Wherefore, some have recourse to an energy ^ th

that is always in action, as Leucippus and Plato; liatonic dogma for they maintain that motion is always in exist- ^§^2**^*^ ence : but why, and in what way, they do not state, nor how this is the case ; nor do they assign the cause | of this perpetuity of motion. For nothing is put in motioa

^ ThiB is most important as oomiDg from AriBioUe. « Vide nesiod, Theog, 116.

S28 THE MBTAFHTSICIS OV ABISTOTUB. [BOOin

at random ; but it is necessary that there be something always in subsistence : as now, indeed, one thing is by nature moved in this way, and again is moved by force, either by Mind, or something else, after a different manner.

. Then, what sort is the first motion? for this

really assumes inevitably differs as much as possible. But, enSrg?"'^ *' Certainly, neither is it possible for Plato, at least, to call that a first principle which imparts motion to itself, and which he sometimes considers to be a first principle ; for subsequent to, and yet coincident with, the heaven is the soul, as he says.^ Therefore, the supposition of the priority of potentiality to energy is in a manner a correct one, but in a manner is not so. And how this is correct has been declared.

But that energy may be a thing that is ante- ffoingreuon. Cedent to potentiality Anaxagoras testifies, (for iS^/lT^x "Jras *^® understanding subasts in energy,) and Empe Empedocies, ' doclcs, iu his theory about Harmony and Discord; Sate'.*** ^'****" and this is confirmed in the assertion of certain philosophers, as to the existence of perpetual motion, as Leucippus. Wherefore, not in an infinite time did Chaos or Night subsist; but the same things continually ^were in existence as are iu existence at present, either in a evolutionary system, or otherwise, on the supposition that nergy is a thing that is antecedent to potentiality. Supposing a thing, therefore, to be the same continually in a revolu- tionary system, it is necessary that something always should emain energizing in like manner. But if there is likely to ensue generation and corruption, it is necessary that there be something else which continually energizes at one time in one way, and at another in another. It is necessary, then^ that it energizes in this way, no doubt, essentially, or from itself but in a different way according to something else. It must in this case energize either according to something that is different, or according to what is primary or original. It is, therefore, necessary that it energize according to this; for again

^ The inconsistency \rhich Aristotle taxes Plato with is this, — that whereas sometimes he maintains the priority of motion to the orderiy flystem of the world, he, at other times, makes the soul, that with him is the source of motion, to be coincident with it. Cicero comments upon this Platonic riew of the nature of aoul in the first book of the Tusculan Disputations.

Ofi. VII.] OOD*S MODE OF OPERATION ILLtTSTRATED. 329

is that a cause of energy both to this and to that other. Wherefore, that which is primary is superior as a cause ; for that, likewise, was a cause of a thing^s subsisting continually after a similar manner, and something else would be the cause of the subsistence of energy in a different manner ; but of its subsistence always in a different manner manifestly would both be a cause. Therefore are motions, also, in this manner disposed. Why^ therefore, must we go in search of other first principles?

CHAPTER VII.»

But since, also, the case stands thus — ^and, if i. Perpetual \ it be not so, things will spring from Night, ^o'eJifefeSai ^ and from all things simultaneously, and from cause of that nonentity — these aforesaid questions may be de- ™®*^®"- cided, and something always would there be that is being . moved with a motion that is incessant, but this is that which is circular ; and this is evident not merely from reason, but fromi the &ct itself. Wherefore, the fii'st heaven would be eternal. There is, therefore, also something that imparts ^^ motion. Since, however, that which has motion impressed \ upon it, and which imparts motion, subsists as a medium, I there is, therefore, something which, not having motion im- i pressed upon it, yet imparts motion, which is a thing that is ,' eternal, being both substance and energy. But in this way it imparts motion — I mean, that which is desirable and ': that which is intelligible' impar^ motion, whereas they are.-" not moved themselves.

But the originals of these are the same ; for a ^ j^ . thing that is the object of a propension is that operation an- which appears feir ; but a thing which is originally JpSSSons of* selected from volition actually is fair. Now, we mi n d or p w — desire a thing because it appears fair, rather than p®^**°°* that a thing appears &ir because we desire it j for the perception

^ Aristotle having discussed the principles of substances cognisant by the senses, now passes on, in accordance with his transcendental method, to examine into the nature and principles of the supra-sensua!, or, as he terms them, "immobile/* substances.

' This is a most important principle. Themistius, in his commentary on this passage, remarks that, in the case of immateriJL exiBteno«%

• • idem est deaiderabile atque intelligibile."

330 THE HSTAPHYSIGS OF ARISTOTLE. [fiOOK XL

constitutes a first principle : but mind is moved by that which is intelligible, and the other co-ordination constitutes essentially that which is intelligible ; and belonging to this is the first substance ; and of this is that substance which subsists abso- lutely and according to energy. Unity, however, is not the same with <vhat is simple or absolute, for unity signifies measure ; but what is absolute signifies the mode in which a thing itself subsists. But, certainly, both that which is fifiir, and that which is desirable for its own sake, belong to the same co-ordinate series, and that which is first is the most excellent invariably, or amounts to that which is ana- logous to it.

8. The final ^^^ ^^^ ^^® ^"^ cause subsists in things

caufie of the that are immovable the division makes manifest S°by"hrim^" ^or the final cause of anything resides in those movable first things of which the one is in existence and the other is not. Now, that which first imparts ^motion does so as a thing that is loved ;^ and that which has motion impressed upon it imparts motion to other things. If, indeed, therefore, anything is being moved, it is admis- sible, also, that it should subsist in a different manner. Wherefore, if the primary motion constitute energy also, so far forth as the thing is moved, in this way is it likewise possible that it should subsist after a different mode in place though not m substance. Since, however, there is something that imparts motion, itself being immovable, and subsisting in enei-gy, this does not by any means admit of subsisting in a different manner; for the primary motion belongs to the changes, and of this that which is circular; tut this First Mover imparts motion to that. \ ^ . Of necessity, in this case, must this Immovable

4 The exist*

ence of the ' First Mover constitute an entity; and so &r forth

nSisMiy one ^ ^* subsists uecessarily, so fiir forth does it

subsist after an excellent manner;^ and in this

way constitutes a first principle. For what is necessary 'sub-

• TLis remarkable passage the commentators say would be illustratod

by the principles laid down in r^ard of the final cause in a treatise Utpl dyeiOov of Aristotle's, but which has not come down to us.

^ It is, indeed, remarkable to find Aristotle thus connecting the moral attributes of the Deity with what we would call God's natural •(tributes. * Vide book IV. chap y.

OH. VII.] THE PEBFUGTION OF OOD'S EZl8T£5CEi 931

sists in thus many ways : in the first plaoe, by what is accom- plished by violence, because it is contrary to free-will ; and, secondly, as that without which a thing does not subsist in an excellent manner; and, thirdly, as that which could not be otherwise from what it is, but involyes an absolute 8ub«  sistence. From a first principle, then, of this kind — I mean, one that is involved in the assumption of a First Mover- hath depended the Heaven and Nature.

Now, the course of life of this First Mover — ^ Etemai in like manner with our own, for a limited period happiness es- of time — is such, also, as is the most excellent; oSSe Nature for, in the present instance, doth that First Mover continue in the enjoyment of the principle of life for ever : for with uSj certainly, such a thing as this would be impossible ; but not so with the First Mover, since even doth the energy or activity of this First Mover give rise unto pleasure or satisfaction on the part of such ; and on this account vigi- lance, exercise of the senses, and perception in general^ are what is most productive of pleasure or satisfaction; and with hopes and recollections^ is the case the same for these reasons. Now, essential perception is the per- as weu as per- ception of that which is essentially the most frJmThe^r^*^ excellent; and that which is most essential per- logy qf the ception is the perception of that which is most ^"™*° °^'** essential. The mind, however, is cognisant of itself by par- ticipation in that which falls within the province of the miud as its object; for it becomes an object of perception by contact, and by an act of intellectual apprehension. So that, the mind and that which is an object of perception for the] mind are the same; for that which is receptive of impres-' sions from what is an object of perception, and is substance, constitutes mind : and when in possession of these impres- sions it energizes, or subsists in a condition of activity. Wherefore, that ^ seems to belong to the First Mover rather than to the mind of man; and it is a Divine prerogative

^ Because, though these may sometimes be fraught with pain and/. \ alarm, yet they are the o£Espring of a certain psychological eueigy Of\ ^ activity, and, as such, are the objects of affection.

' This principle of mounting up to the Absolute through the sub* \. Jactivity of reason is one acted upon by the MetaphysicianB ol Qermany.

S32 TUB iCETAPHtmOS OF ARISTOTLE. [fiOOK XL

which the mind appears to possess : and contempktion con- stitutes what is most agreeable and excellent. If, therefore, God in this way possesses such an excellent mode of sub- sistence for ever, as we do for a limited period of duration, the Divine Nature is admirable ; and if he possesses it in a more eminent degree, still more admirable will be the Divine Nature.

6. sammary of In this waj, however, is the Deity disposed as q^lSes" o?^ ^ existence, and the principle of life is, at any Jhe DiTine rate, inherent in the Deity ; for the energy or ^***** active exercise of Mind constitues life, and God *

I above delineated — constitutes this energy ; and essential

I energy belongs to God as his best and everlasting life. Now,

lour statement is this, — that the Deity is an animal that is

leverlasting and most excellent in nature ; so that with the

IDeity life and duration are uninterrupted and eternal : for

_/ this constitutes the very essence of God.

7. False Fytha- -^s many philosophers, however, as adopt the goiic soiuaon supposition — such as the Pythagoreans and

of the pheno- c* ^ • xixi.j.*ux j i. i» • •

menon of per- Speusippus — that what IS best and most fair is feetiou. ^^^ ^Q ljg found in the principle ^ of things, from

the £a,ct that though the first principles both of plants and animals are causes, yet that what is fair and perfect resides in created things as results from these — persons, I say, who entertain these sentiments do not form their opinions cor- rectly. For seed arises from other natures that are ante- cedent and perfect, and seed is not the first thing, whereas that which is perfect is ; as, for example, just as if one were to say that a man is antecedent to seed; not the man that is being generated from seed, but another from whom the seed flows. y 8. The Deity That, indeed, there exists a certain Eternal ( devoid of parts Substauce, and a Substance that is Immovable, y *nap""on8. ^^^ possesses actually a subsistence separable \ from sensibles, is evident from the statements that have been \ made above. .But it also has been demonstrated that it is

• The commeDtary of Themistius is worthy of quotation : " Ille, t. e.

DeuB, vero qui a sapientift ne punctum quidem temporis vacat, noa habet delectationem ctcquisitam, sed ipsa delectatio est." This view of Aristotle*! of the Deity is, as far as Revelation informs us, a correct

TMb false principle has reappeared in modern philosophy.

m. Vni.l THE DIVINE ESSENCE DEFINED. S33

not possible for this substance to involve any magnitude, but ' it is devoid of parts and indivisible.^ For it imparts motion throughout infinite duration ; and nothing that is finite iij volves infinite potentiality. Since, however, every magnitu< is either infinite or finite, for this reason such a Substance is the above would not involve a finite magnitude, and thereforejit cannot involve an infinite magnitude, because, in short, there is no infinite magnitude in existence. But, unquestionablj also, it has been demonstrated that such is impassive aiH unalterable, for all other motions are subsequent to thai motion which is local or topical. These statements, there fore, make it evident why it is that the Deity is disposed ai to existence affcer this manner.

CHAPTER VIII.

Now, whether are we to ad mit that there ^ ^^ ^^ ^^ exists onrSutiuUiiiCf uf iLiu deacrtpfion orjnanyl^ unity or piura- aSjnrgDrhewLmajayjsa^^ not to "^Vol"fo..

escape our notice ; but we should call to re- oj first »ub- memErance also the assertions of other Philoso- phers, because, regarding the multitude of these substances, they have not spoken aught which amounts to even anything that is clear in the expression. For, indeed, the opinion ^ in regard of ideas does not involve any peculiar investigation, for the i^ersous who affirm the existence of ideas affirm that these ideas are numbei-s ; and, as regards numbers, at one time they speak of them as of things that are infinite, and at other times as of things that are limited as &r as ti the decade. As to the cause, however, why it is that theit subsists a multitude of numbers^ of this kind, nothing ii expressed by them with demonstrative certainty.

^ It has ever been overlooked in all Bystems of religion, except that oi

Jesus Christ, and that of the Jews, that " Qod is a Spirit, without body,

parts, or passions." Vide Suicer on the words dvdpwroyAp^irai and Bt6t

\ I ' Tlift planjnrsufd hy Arint.ntilft|1nlhJFirr^f of iil^^

ihlto be f.KT^r^*^£p^ft«f firff^ ^ sort o * - i. -m i.

I

mggppft, and t.hpTi « prppf fyggi experienflft^JVnm thfi-ObflfiCVJ tctual phenomena, viz . thejipavftn ly bodies.

• Vide book Xii. cEaps. i and iv.

• Aristotle exposes what he conceives to be the fidladet cl ttif

/\

834 THfl mSTAFHTBIOB OP ABI8T0TLEL [BOOE Tt,

\, TUftimnvov-X This, however, must we declare firom principleg Slne^necea- \^** ^"^ taken for granted, and that have been /presup- determined. For the first pnnciple, and the znotion/^^EA^original existence of entities, is a thing that is immovable both essentially and according to accident, and it imparts motion with an original and eternal and single motion. But since that which is being moved must needs derive its motion from something, and that which first imparts motion is essentially immovable, and an eternal motion derives that motion from what is eternal as a moving cause, and a single motion its motion from what is single, and since we see that beside the simple revolutionary motion of the Universe — which we say derives its motion from the first substance and that which is immovable — there are other motions that are everlasting — ^namely, those of the planets, (for eternal and unstableT^ in its movement is a body that is circular ; but we have furnished demonstrations in regard of these in our Physics ;)— now, I say, since the foregoing is the case, each of these motions must needs derive its motion from that which is both immovable essentially and is an Eternal Substance. For the nature of the stars consists in being a certain eternal substan%e,^ and that which impaHs motion is eternal, and is antecedent to that which has motion impressed upon it ; and that which involves priority of subsistence to a substance must needs also be a substance. It is evident, there- fore, that it is expedient that there should be in existence sub- stances of this kind, such as are both naturally eternal, as well as essentially immovable and devoid of magnitude, and that, too, on account of the cause that has been stated previously. 3. Why a state- That, indeed, therefore, these substances are Sonomy™f*the ^^ existence, and which of these is primary, and number and na^ which of them is secondary, according to the same etanr*motionT" Order with the orbital motions of the stars, is evi- ls necessary, deut. But at present must we discover the multi-

^^V^hagorean system, in book I. chap, viii., and examines the tenets of the same school in book XII. chaps. vL, vii, viii. and ix.

' difrarov — *' never standing stilL** Not merely in his Physics, as the Stagyrite states, but also in his treatise " De Coelo," are the principles in regard of the relations of motion and corporeity discussed.

' This is a well-known tenet of the Peripatetics, who, according to the dogma of their master, believed the stars to be animated witk ftbair several divinities, as the body is by the souL

CB.yiII.J TRANSCENDENTAL SUBSTANCES. 330

tudc of these orbital motions from that department of the philo- sophy of the mathematical sciences which is most appropriately devoted to this purpose — I mean, from astronomy;^ for this science institutes an investigation respecting a substance that is cognisant by sense, no doubt, but such as is eternal : the rest of the mathematical sciences, however, are not concerned about any substance whatever;^ for example, take the case of the science respecting numbers and geometry. That, therefore, there are numerous orbital motions belonging to the stars ^ that are being moved across the arch of heaven is evident to those who have even moderately busied them- 'selves in such inquiries. For more motions than one do each of the planetary stars assume. But as to how many tliese happen to be let us^ likewise, now declare the state» ments which some of the mathematicians make on this subject, for the purpose of understanding the point under investigation, in order that it may be possible to apprehend a certain multitude of these when mentally defined. But as to what remains we must ourselves investigate into some points, but we must make inquiries into others from persons engaged in investigations into these subjects; if, haply, anything beside the statements that alseady have been made may appear to those who are busied in these speculations : and if so, we should bestow affection upon both,^ yet yield our assent only to those who are more accurate.

^ Aristotle now enters upon what may be termed his experimentaTA or d poateriorif proof of the existence of God. He gives ns a sketch of | his doctrine of the spheres, availing himself of the labours of two! famous astronomers, Eudoxus' and Calippus. On the subject of Uie I astronomy of ihe ancients the student is referred to the article/ ' Astronomy/ in the Penny Cyclopaedia, and that in Smith's Dictionary/ of Antiquities ; Pottei's Antiquities, book IL chap. xxvi. ; and Pliny*! Natural History, book II. chaps, vi — xxiv.; Cicero, De Nat. lib. II. cap! xvi. — xxi., and cap. xlL et seq. ; Sextus Empiricus, Contra Astrologosa

' Vide book II. chap. ii.

' "Substantise vero sequentium corpomm motrices necessario multae sunt pro numero corporum quse moventur ab eis : et had quidem per se immobiles sunt, per accidens tamen moventur perinde atque anima; neo tamen immobiles sunt sed et perpetuse." — Themittim,

• <pi\fiy fihv dfju^oripovs. It frequently appears from the MetaphysicB,

as well as from all of Aristotle's writings, that, though very acrimonioui in his remarks on the systems of his predecessors or contemporaries in philosophy, yet that he was ever disposed to search into theil labours, and extract from them whatever waa useful and tru«^

396 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLIB. f^OOK Xk

f4. The artrono- Eudoxus,* in his sjstem^ therefore, laid down mio tyttem of the Orbital motion of the sun and moon to be severally in three spheres; the first of which he maintained was that of the fixed stars ; and the second was that which accords with the circle which passes through the central signs of the Zodiac ; and the third, with that circle which is situated obliquely in the latitude of the Zodiacal signs. Now, that oblique circle through which the moon is carried is situated in a wider latitude than that through which the sun is carried. But of the devious, or erratic, stars he makes a disposition of each in four spheres; and of these, likewise, he considers the first and second to be the same with those of the sun and moon. For the sphere of the fixed stars, according to him, is the same with that first sphere which carries along all the orbs ; and that which has been arranged under this, and possesses a motion corresponding with the circle that passes through the central signs of the Zodiac, he considers a sphere common to all these heavenly bodies. He is of opinion, however, that the poles of the third sphere, which is common to all, are situated in that circle which passes through the central signs of the Zodiac, and that the motion of the fourth sphere is in an orbit declining towards the centre of the third, and that the poles of the third sphere are the proper poles of the other spheres, but that Venus and Mercury have the same poles.

Calippus,' however, sets down the same dis-

of Caiippus?™ position of the spheres with Eudoxus, that is, the

same arrangement of their mutual distances ; but,

with respect to their multitude, he ascribed to the star of

Jupiter, as well as to that of Saturn, the same number with

• Eudoxus was a famous astronomer, who flourished about the year

870 B. c. ; he was a natiye of Cnidos. According to Pliny, he intro> duced into the calendar the year of three hundred and sixty-five days and a half. His works on astronomy have not come down to us, with the exception of one extant in a poetical version from the pen of Aratus.

' Calippus was a native of Cyzicus : he took up his abode in Athens, and whilst there assisted Aristotle in his astronomical researches ; tha latter was engaged in rectifying the system of £udoxus. To Calippus is ascribed the invention of what is called, after him, the Calippic cycle of seventy-six years, whidi commenced B.o. 830. Viie Potter's Antir qiutiei, book XL chap. s^vi.

(. TIT!,] ASTRONOMY IN RELATION TO THEOLOGY. 837

Eudoxus; yet still he thinks that to the luminary of the sun, and to that of the moon, there should further be an- nexed two spheres — that is, supposing one likely to ftirnish a solution of the phenomena. And in regard of the other spheres of the planets, he adds one sphere to each.

It is necessary, however,^ on the supposition g Aristotle's that all, when collected together, are likely to comment upon furnish a solution of the phenomena, that ac- '»»«»« «y«^«»"^- cording to each of the erratic stars there should be different spheres revolving, less by one than those which carry along the planets, and, in regard of position, restore into the same place the first sphere invariably of the star which is rankec in an inferior order; for in this way only is it possible that by the orbital motion ^ of the planets should be produced all the phenomena that may be observed. Since, therefore, as regards the spheres in which the planets are carried along, some of them are made to amount to eight, but others to five* and-twenty, and of these it is not necessary that those merely should have revolving spheres in which a star arranged lowest down is carried, those, accordingly, that impart a revolutionary motion to the spheres of the two first will be six in number, while those to the spheres of the four sub- sequent stars will be eleven : the total amount of all the spheres, however, as well those that carry along the stars, as also those that make them revolve, will be fifty and five. But if one were not to add the motions of the moon which we have mentioned to the sun also, all the spheres will be forty and seven.

Let the number, then, of the spheres amount to ^

so many; wherefore, it is reasonable to suppose Ince'toIst'S:! tnat both the substances and the first principles ^^^y «ettie& I

1 • r • VI J • i 1 J.V. tli^ question sM

which are immovable, and are cognisant by the to the numbel senses, should be so many in number as we have substances. I enumerated; for that there must necessarily be such a number as this, let it be left to those to decide who are endued with greater ability to declare their sentiments

• We have here a fragment of Aristotle's own astronomic systam,

probably taken from his work on astronomy, which has not come down to us.

^ <f>of*dy. This is the word I have translated orbital motion." Taylor renders it simply motion.*

S38 THE MBTAFHTSICS OF ARISTOTLB. [bOOK XI.

9n such points. If, however, it is not possible that there should be any orbital motion which does not contribute towards the orbital motion of a star,^ and, further, if it is requisite to suppose that every nature and every substance ought to be regarded — provided it be devoid of passion, and y^ \ be essential — as having attained the most excellent end, in this case there would not be in existence any other nature independent of these: but it is necessary that this should constitute the total amount of substances ; for whether there should be others, they would impart motion, as being an end of orbital motion.

8 No ceiesHai ^^*' ^^ ^^^ ^*®' ^* ^® impossible that there I rnotions inde- should be Other Orbital motions beside those that thMeSfthe ^^^® ^®^ enumerated; and this supposition it heavenly would be reasonable to arrive at from observing

the bodies that are being moved along the surface of the heavens.^ For on the supposition that everything that is borne along the firmament subsists by the constitution of Nature, on account of that body which is borne along, and that every motion belongs to something that is carried forward, there would not exist any orbital motion on account of itself or of another motion ; but on account of the stars would it exist. For if we admit that orbital motion will subsist on account of motion of the same sort, it will be requisite that this latter, likewise, should subsist on account of other orbital motions. So that, since it is not also possible to go on in a progression to infinity, an end of every orbital motion wiD be some one of those Divine bodies that are borne along the surface of the heaven. That there is That, howovor, there is one heaven^ is evident ; y* iwheavent^' ^^^ ^^ there Were many lieavens — as there are proved. ' men — ^in regard of each will there be such a

^ Vide the remarks of Theoiistius in a note in the beginning of this chapter.

• Aristotle, if he lived in modem times, would have been less

dogmatic in pronouncing his opinions as to the phenomena of the heavens. Every student in astronomy knows well how the extent of the science has widened, how the heavenly bodies themselves have been multiplied, by successive improvements in the instruments of obser- vation. Any increase of power in the Telescope crowds with stan quarters of the celestial arch regarded hitherto as % oid and empty spao^

^ This point is discussed in the De Coelo, book I. chap. is.

tH.yin.] TRADITIONAL AND FABULOUS THEOLOGY. 330

trst principle as is one in species, but in number many, at least. Such things, however, as are many in number . iiivolve a connexion with matter ; for tl ere is one and the | «  same mode of reasoning applicable to th3 case of many^ — I take the instance of a man — yet Socrates is one. But that \ . which ranks as fii-st amongst formal causes does not involve i ^V a connexion with matter, for it subsists in actuality. Accord- | ' ingly, in both reason and number, that which primarily I C imparts motion is immovable, and that which has motion / impressed upon it in this case is always and uninterruptedly / one thing merely; such being true, there is consequently in / existence one solitary heaven. /

Traditions, however, have been handed down lo.Traditionary from our predecessors, and the veiy ancient SiJ'^f**^ V'® philosophers, and left to their posterity in the heayeiuy° form of a Myth, to the effect that these many ^^«*- heavens — supposing them to exist — both are gods, and that the Divinity encompasses the entire of Nature. And the remainder of these traditions,^ in the present day, have been brought forward, clothed in a fabulous garb, for the purpose of winning the assent of the multitude, and enforcing the utility that is urged in &vour of the laws, and of general expediency.

For they speak of these a& subsisting in the ^

form of the human species, and as being Hke in ^;oSS^e!yI appearance to certain of the rest of the animal anthropomor- kingdom.^ And other statements consequential p*^™*

^ It appears from the commentators that there is another reading for this passi^re, viz., ercpos yhp 6 \^os roS Mp^ov Koff 6 Mponros 6 di SiMfwnff cfs.

^ This is a remarkable and well-knowji passage. Its bearing on the theism of Aristotle is examined in the Analysis accompanying this Translation.

^ The tendencies towards investing the Deity with a human shape have at all times, and amongst all nations, displayed themselves in a more gross or subtle form. One of the early heresies in the Christian Chiirch took its rise from them, and was branded with the condemnatory title of Anthropomorphism. The Greeks were essentially an anthropo- morphic nation. As to the assimilation of Qod to the likeness ot animals, that was an error that flourished chiefly in Egypt ; and hence we find the Israelites cautioned against it in the law of Moses, eg, in thi Ricood Commandmeut. Jide Notes, pu 61, 291, 838.

2 2

S40 TBB HETAFHY8ICS OF ARISTOTLE. ^BOOR XI.

apon these, and similar to those that have heen declared, da they put forward.

12. Aristotle's Now, if as regards these traditions any one

theory, there- having Separated this from amongst the others

lupporrof^a. may receive merely the first assertion — namely,

dition. that they -supposed the Fint. -Substances to be

gods— he would consider that this statement had been made

i after a divine manner ; and in accordance with what is to be

j expected in the discovery — ^as frequently as is consistent with

j possibility — as well of every art as of every system of philo-

I Bophy, and in the loss of these, again, he must conclude that

' likewise these opinions of those very ancient philosophers, as

relics,^ have been preserved up to the time of the present

day. This opinion, therefore, of our forefathers, and that

which has been traditionally handed down from the very

earliest speculators, is evident to us thus far, and no more.

CHAPTER IX.2

1. Certain ques- Therb are poiuts, howevcr, respecting Mind tions as regards which involvc Certain subjects of doubt: for it seems, certainly, to constitute the most divine existence amongst phenomena : but after what manner it is disposed, so as that it should be a thing of this sort, is attended with certain difficulties. For whether it be void of the faculty of understanding anything, but is like one who is sleeping, what, may I ask, would there be reverential in such a con- dition of being % Or, supposing that it possesses the fistculty of understanding, and yet that there be something which is dominant over this faculty — ^for in this case that which is its substance is not intelligence, but capacity — should the fore- going be true, we could not say that Mind would be the most excellent substance ; for it is through the faculty of the under- standing that that which is entitled to reverence is inherent in the mind.

^ K^i^vra. I have followed the rendering of the Latin version, quan quasdam reliquias." This is a common laeaning for Xcfirw : e. g. we are told in the Iliad, II. 106, that Atreus, on his deathbed, left (IXfirci/) his sceptre to Thyestes.

^ Anstotle's remarks in this chapter may be compared with what he Bayi in the De Anim^ book I. chap, iii., and book III chaps, vi &qq« 

CH. IX.] C2KTAIN rSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. 341

But, further, whether understanding consti- , «n. * . .u

., ,1 x'j *« nat Is tiM

tute its substance, or wbetner perception does, essence of what, may I ask, does it understand 1 for either JJ^^V " *' ^ it is itself that it understands, or something else. And supposing that it understands something else, either it will invariably be the same, or something different ; whether, then, is there any difference, or no difference at all, between its understanding what is &ir, and understanding what is casual ; or, also, would it be an absurd idea to imagine that it exercises the faculty of cogitation in regard of certain things) It is evident, therefore, that that which under- stands is most divine, and most entitled to reverence, and that it undergoes no change; for change would presuppose a transition into something that is worse : and a thing of this sort would, in the present instance, amount to a certain motion. In the first place, then, of course, sup- or u it ^ v6n- posing that the mind^ were not perception or '**' intelligence, but capacity, it is reasonable to infer that con- tinuity of perception would be a laborious operation for the mind ; and, in the next place, it is evident that there would be in existence something else that is more entitled to reverence tlian Mind,2 — namely, that which is an object of perception to the mind : for both the ^ulty of understanding and actual perception will be present to the mind even in its under- standing that which is most inferior.

So that we must avoid this consequence ; for s. The dignity also would it be better not to see some things than ?li51"* ^t .

, , ^ . pends upon a

to see them : hence, perception would not consti- true view of its \ute that which is most excellent. Accordingly, "*'**'*• may we assume that Mind is cognisant of its own operations, if it really is that which is most superior, and if perception amounts to the perception of a perception.

Now, scientific knowledge invariably appears, ^.

as well as perception by sense and opinion and the nature of the faculty of thought, to be conversant about ^^^^^^""^ something different from itself and to be

• The difficultifs even of approxunating towards anything like

a moderate acquaiiitanoe with our mental constitution is well pointed out ly Brown in Lis Philosophy of the Human Mind.

^ Aristotle thus refutes his adversai-y, £8 he would think, most triumphantly, by a glaring reductio ad abiurdum." The ai^^oienl he uses is worthy of attention.

342 THE HETAFHTSIOS OV ABTSTOTLE. [BOOK XL

conversant about itself only in a secondary or subordi- nate sense. Further, if we suppose that understanding ia different from being an object of perception to the under- standing, according to which of these will subsistence in an excellent way be inherent in Mind? for neither is it the same thing the being inherent in an act of perception by the un- derstanding, and in an object of perception to the understand- ing : or, shall we say that in the case of some things the science constitutes itself that which is the object of the science? 5. Aristotle'! In the casc, I admit, of the productive sciences, r^P'y- the substance and the essence do not involve a

connexion with matter; whereas in the case of the spe- culative sciences the definition or formal principle is the object of the science, as well as is the perception exer- cised by the mind. Inasmuch, then, as the object of the understanding is not a different thing from the understand- ing itself, in the case of as many things as do not involve a connexion with matter they will be the same thing ; and the act of perception by the mind will be identical with the object of perception.^

• , ,. ^, . Moreover, therefore, a doubt remains whether

6. Is the object i • . ^ x« • 'j. j.

of perception a au object of perception IS a composite nature or ture— ai*iftfe"w ^^^> ^^^y if this be the case, the object of percep- tion, as a compound, would imdergo a change* in the parts of the entire; or, shall we say that everything is indivisible which does not involve a connexion with matter, — as the human mind ? Or, are we to take for granted that the perception of compound objects involves a connexion with matter during a certain portion of duration? for an ex- cellent condition of subsistence does not always reside in this particular thing or in that ; but that which is most ex- cellent subsists in a thing, viewed as a certair entirety, being something different from itself. And, therefore, the first and actual perception by mind of Mind itself dotl subsist in this way throughout all eternity.

' The writings of modem MetaphysiciaDS are full of discussions of this sort; e,g. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Stewart, Brown. Incomparably the best work on the subject^ notwithstanding Brown's ill-judged attack, is Dr. Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers.

' I have supplied a portion of this sentence to make it the moce iBtelligible.

OH. X.1 THE GOOD IN THE UNIVERSB. 345

CHAPTER X.»

But we must also consider in what manner the j ^^^ ^^ ^^ nature of the entire creation inyolves what is good to account for and what is most excdlent ; whether there exists of gSS- ^^ something that has been separated in point of ▼« uYa<^ov— in feet, and which actually subsists essentially, or whether we are to assume the existence of order, or maka both of these assumptions together, just as we might illus- trate our meaning by the case of an army.

For the good or excellent condition of an army 2. This ques- depends upon the order that is enforced; and hy^^fot the commander who aims to promote this sub- an amy, ordination, even this person in a more eminent degree may be r^arded as a cause of such an excellent condition : for this officer is not set over the army on account of the order that is found to prevail there, but that order is found to exist on account of the command exercised by this officer. All things, however, are co-ordinated after a certain ^nd of animals mode, but not after a similar mode,— take the classification, for example, of aquatic and winged animals, and of plants. And they are not disposed after such a way as that there should not subsist anything in common to either in relation to the other, although in respect of some point do they involve some resemblance. For, indeed, in regard of one characteristic are all things ranked and of a house, under 00-ordinate series ; but as in a house it is ^*'^^* allowable, least of all, for the free to do anything whatsoever they please, but all things, or most things, have been reduced into a state of orderly arrangement, so to slaves, likewise, and wild beasts, only in a small degree belongs a desire to do what may contribute to the general advantage ; but for the most part their operations are confined to whatsoever chances to fell in their way, for the nature of each of them consti- tutes to them a first principle of this description. But I say^ in this instance, that it is requisite for all to attain unto a condition where distinctions wUl be drawn; and other things

' The reasoning contained in thii chapter is most lenarkabU indeed.

344 THE METAPHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOK XL

Bubsist in this way, of which all participate, for the constitu- tion or preservation of the entire.

But whatever impossibilities or absurdities lies about the ensue to thoso who miake assertions in a different

what^rgood ^^y* ^^^ ^^*^ ^^ ^^ theories those put forward on the subject who express themselves in a more elegant or accomplished manner, and in the case of which of these there prevail the least number of doubts, we must not allow such inquiries to escape our observation. For all philosophers are for producing all things from contraries ; neither, however, is the expression " all things," nor the ex- pression "from contraries," correctly employed by these speculators ; nor do they declare, as r^ards those things in which the contraries are inherent, in what manner they will consist of contraries, for contraries are mutually impassive. 4. How Aris- ^^* by us is this controversy decided ratio- totie settles the nally by the introduction of a certain third quest on. nature.^ Some, however, constitute some one <»^

the contraries as matter, just as those do who make the odd subject for the even, or plurality for unity.^ And this, like- wise, is decided in the same manner ; for the matter which is one is not what is contrary to anything. Further, all things except unity will participate in what is worthless ; for the evil itself constitutes one or other of the elements.

The other speculators assert, however, that mode is' '^the neither what is good and what is evil are first good "a first principles at all, notwithstanding that what is

principle f '^j.. . •xJ/Si.*

good IS m a most eminent degree a first prin- ciple^ in all things. And some, I admit, correctly make this assertion of what is good— I mean, that we must consider it a first principle ; after what mode, however, it is that what is good constitutes a first principle they do not state : whether

1 Aristotle's solution of the existence of Evil consists in tracing it to matter as its prime source ; thus coinciding with what was the funda- mental principle of the Gnostic philosophy in after ages.

• Vide book I. chap. iv.

• The plain prevalence of Qood in our system is. in a speculative

point of view, as difficult to account for as that of Evil. The bearing of this fact on the controversy " De Origine Mali" is well explained by the Archbishop of Dublin in his Lectures on Political Economy. ^ Vide Lect. IV., as well as his Grace's notes and appendix to Archbishof King's Discourse on the same s* 'l^'ect

OH. 1C.J FALSE SOLUTIONS OF THIS PHENOMEKOIT. 340

it is to be regarded as an end, or as a moving cause, or as • formal principle.

Now, Empedocles also forms his opinions absurdly upon this point, for he makes Harmony fitton'on^t^ to constitute what is good ; and this Harmony, J^cj^^ *°* in his system, subsists even as a first principle that imparts motion, for it has the power of congregating entities; and it subsists as matter, for it is a portion of the mixture. Now, even on the supposition that to Harmony has it happened in this same system that it should subsist as matter and a first principle, and as a power that imparts motion, yet the essence of this is not the same with the essence of these ; according to whioli of them, therefore, will Harmony subsist? And that Discord should be a thing that is incorruptible would be absurd likewise ; and yet this very thing constitutes the nature of what is eviL

But Anaxagoras regarded what is good as a » „ first pnnciple, so far as it is a power that imparts goras made motion, for Mind, in his system, imparts motion; p,!SJjJ,'^f ^"* it imparts motion, however, for the sake of some- thing else. Wherefore, that is different from that for the sake of which it subsists, except it subsists as we say it actually does ; for the medicinal art in a manner constitutes health. But it was also an absurdity contained in the Anaxagorean philosophy, the not having produced a contrary to what is good as well as to Mind. But all who assert contraries to be first principles do not employ contraries as such, unless one is disposed to handle the subject in a careless vein.

And why it is that some things* are corruptible, g ^^y system and some things incorruptible, no one declares; that ignores for they produce all entities from the same first clpie»'^"u8?1)e principles. Further, some of these speculators '**■«•• produce entities from what is nonentity;^ but some, that they may not be forced to this, make all thiugs to be one.^ Further, no one lays down a reason why generation will always exist ; and what the cause of generation is nobody declares. And for those who create two first principles wiU

• Vide book II. chap. iv.

' For instance, the Hesiodic sohooL

' That is, Parmenidea, whose qystem has been already examined, la book I. chap. TiiL

S46 THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK XL

it be necessary to have a diflFerent first principle which would be more dominant, as well as for those Philosophers who introduce forms, because there really exists another principle more dominant than these; for why has matter participated, or why does it participate, in these ideas t

9. Aristotle's ^^^ ^^^ others it is necessary that there should ontology free be Something that is contrary to Wisdom, and to lulSit^!' *^ that which is the science most entitled to rever- ence ; but to us this is not necessary, for there is nothing contrary to what is primary. For all the con- traries involve matter, and these subsist in capacity: but contrary ignorance is opposed to what is contrary, yet nothing is contrary to what is primary.

10 Ev n th Further, on the supposition that there do not

logy and phy- czist Other things beside those that are cc^nisant sicsare free jj^ ^jj^ scuscs, there wiU not subsist a first prin- ciple, and order, and generation ;^ and the celestial bodies will have no existence : but there is always a first principle of the principle, just as we find in the systems of Theologians and all Natural Philosophers. ii.where,then Now, admitting that there will be forms or are we to look ' numbers, they will not constitute a cause of any- principie in the thing ;^ and, if they are not a cause of anything, thesi?^^^ neither will they be a cause of motion at any rate. Further, how, let me ask, will mag- nitude and continuity arise from things that are devoid^ of magnitude ? for number will not produce a continuous quan- tity, either as that which imparts motion or as form. But, certainly, there will not be anything, at least, belonging to the contraries which is both productive and motive, for it would admit of non-existence ; but, surely, the energy or producing cause is subsequent to the capacity, and in such a case etem^ entities do not exist — ^but yet they do exist Accordingly, some one of these hypotheses must be rejected; and this has been declared in the above statement that capacity antecedes energy^ — as to how it must be accomplished. Further, in

• This pomt is lucidly explained by Cudworth in the Intellectual

System.

' As he has demonstrated in his ezanunation of Platonism, in book L ' Vide book XIL chaps, iv. and r.

• I have added these words for the sake of the sense. This mani-

festly is the absurdity to which ho would reduce the Platonists. TIm

CH. I.J YALUB OP AFJSTOTLBTS ACCOUNT OP IT. 847

what way numbers may be one, or soul and body, and, in general, form, and the thing itself, no one says anything on this point ; nor is it possible that one should declare his sen- timents thereupon, unless he express himself as we do — namely, to the effect that it is the cause which imparts motion that is the agent of production.

But they who say that mathematical number is jg ^ j^ ^ ^^ the first, and in this way continually suppose the be'found in the existence of Another substance adhering thereto in JfeoryT^^*" succession, and of different first principles belong- ing unto each, these make the substance of the Universe to be adventitious;^ for in no wise does one substance contribute anything towards another, as to whether it exists or does not exist — and besides this they introduce many first principles.

The entities, however, do not choose to submit is. illustration to injudicious government. " The government of ft^* ^HomelSJ* many is not a good thing — let there be one ruler." iu«d, ii. 204.

BOOK XII.*

1. Why refer-

CHAPTER I.

Respecting, indeed, therefore, the substance ^ ^^ ^^^ of things that are cognisant by the senses, it enceismadet«  has been declared what it is, in the mode of in- SJen Kg'iSd quirv adopted bv Natural Philosophers^ in their of supra-sen- theories concerning matter, and subsequently

antecedence of capacity to energy is a false principle, and its absurdity is exposed in book YIII. chap. riii.

^ iirturoSu&Zri — " adyentitious." This is the rendering of Themistius; the word itself is a most felicitous one for Aristotie's purpose at present. It literally is applied to poetry ; e.g. the Catalogue of the shipfl in the second book of the Iliad would be called iicfi<r69ios,

• In book XII.— according to others, book XIII. — we have a dis-

cussion respecting number, mathematical natures, and ideas. The refutation of the Ideal Hypothesis in .this book is more complete than that found in book I.

^ Taylor translates these, words "the mode of inquiry adopted is •ur Physics."

S48 THE METAPHYSICS OF AftlSTC PLE. [bOOE Xlt

in our own Treatise iii regard of matter in a condition of energy or activity.^ Since, however, our present investigation has for its object to ascertain whether beside sensible sub- stances there is in existence a certain Substance that is Im- movable and Eternal, or there is not; and on the supposition of the existence of any such, what it is : in the first place we must take a glance at the assertions made by other speculators, in order that if they happen to make any asser- tion ^ not after a correct manner, we may not become entangled in the same errors, and that if there subsists any dogma in common between ourselves and them, we may not be indignant with it, as a thing peculiarly in opposition to our present design ; for it is a thing that we should remain content with, if one should make some statements with more pro- priety, but others in a way no wise inferior to ourselves. 2 The order of Now, there are two opinions res[)ecting these inquiry deter- subjccts; for Certain Philosophers affirm that ing"to uSr^ mathematical entities ^ are substances : such, for the opinions example, as numbers, and lines, and those things ' that are kindred to these : and, again, that ideas*

are existences of this description. Since, however, some speculators constitute these as two distinct genera — I mean, both the ideas aud the mathematical numbers — and others maintain, in opposition, that there is oue nature of both, and certain other Philosophers say that mathematical entities first, respecting ^^® alone substances, in the first place we must mathemaiicai institute an investigation respecting mathe- en I les ; matical ^ entities, without annexing to them

any other nature — ^as, for instance, might or might not be the case, according to whether' they happen to be ideas or not? and whether these arc first principles and substances of entities or noti but, as regards mathematical entities, attend- ing to this point merely, whether they possess a subsistence or do not, and if they do, after what mode they subsist ? In next, respect- the ucxt place, after these inquiries, we shall, tag the ideas, apart by itself, institvte an investigation con-

• Vide book VIII. chap. vi.

' Compare a note in book XL, at the bet^nning of chap, viii., 01 Ari* lot]e*B cuetom of examining into the literary labours of others.

• That is, the Pythagoreans.

• The Platonists.

• This he does in chaps, ii. and iii. of this book.

CH. II.] IXQUIBIES PURSUED IIT BOJE XII. S43

ceming tbo ideas themselves/ simply considered, and as much for the sake of usage as anything else ; for most of the tenets of what relates to these mquiries have been divulged even by exoteric discourses ^ respecting them. Further, also, in regard «i}f that particular form of investigation, it is necessary that we encounter a more enlarged philosophic discussion, when we come to be engaged in our inquiries as to whether the substances and first principles of entities are numbers and ideas? for after the investigation relating to ideas this one remains as a third subject for inquiry.

But it is requisite, on the supposition of the s. What is the existence of mathematical entities, that these ?3ry'ta regard should reside either in objects that fall under ofmathom»ti. the notice of the senses, as certain afi&rm, or that ^^ e^^^ities* they should involve a subsistence separable from sensibles ; and some make a statement in this way : or, if they are not inherent in either one or the other, they either have no existence at all, or exist in some different manner. Where- fore, the question with us will not be concerning the exist- ence of mathematical entities, but concerning their mode ox existence.

CHAPTER II.3

That, indeed, therefore, it is impossible that j j^f .j^^ these mathematical entities should reside in ticai entities do objects that ai*e cognisant by the senses, and that Jgns^iSes! *" at the same time the reason assigned for this position is a fictitious one, has been declared also in the doubts, where we have proved that it is impossible that there should be two solids in the same place at the same time. And, further, also, it depends on the same course of reasoning, both that other potentialities and natures should

' This inquiry is pursued in chaps, iv. and v.

^ This is one of the passages in the Aristotelian writings where the famous distinction of the Stagyrite's works into acroatic and exoteric is recognised. Vide book I. the Less, chap. iii.

^ In this and two of the following chapters Aristotle discussei a question m regard of mathematical entities which had been alread| mooted in the enumeration of the doubts to be found in boo^ IX.

S50 TH£ MBTAPTTTST08 OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK XII.

reside in sonsibles, and that no one of them should possess a separable subsistence. These things^ then, have been already declared.^

2 Further ^^*» ^^ addition to these statements, it is

proofs of this evident that it is impossible that any body what- SXwuty o"f" soever should be divided ; for it wiU be divided mathematical according to a superficies, and this according to ^ ' a line, and a line according to a point. Where-

fore, supposing that it is impossible to divide a point, it la also impossible to divide a line; and if it is impossible to divide a line, the case is the same with the other mathema- tical quantities likewise. What, therefore, is the difference in allowing either that natures of this desciiption should exist, or that these do not exist at all, but that such natures should be found in sensibles? For the same consequence will ensue ; for, on the supposition of a division of the sensibles, they also will be divided, or they will not be of the nature of

sensibles. But the fact is, neither is it possible noiusepua-' that such naturcs should be actually, at least, ^^'nsibies'^ Separated; for if independent of such as are

cognisant by the senses, there should exist other solids that are actually in a condition of separation there- from, and which are antecedent to those that are cognisant by sense, it is evident that it is also necessary that beside sur- faces there shoidd exist other sur&ces that involve a separable subsistence; and in like manner other points and lines, for this deduction rests upon the same reasoning.

And if these points be admitted, again, in ad- preluTpt^e*^ dition to the surfaces, and Hues, and points o' separate sur- a mathematical solid, there will be different ones thcwe inherent* subsistiug in a Separate condition. For incom- ucaiTour"**^ posite natures are antecedent to those that

are composite. And if antecedent to sensibles there exist bodies which do not fall under the notice of the senses, by the same reasoning those very surfaces which subsist essentially will likewise be antecudent to those sur- faces that are to be found in immovable solids. Wherefore, those surfaceH and lines are different from those which at the same tim6 are inherent in separated solids ; for the latter, indeed, are capable of consubiistence with mathematical

' For insUnoe, in book YIXL

OELIL] mathematical entities XOT in SENSIBLEa 351

solids, but the former are antecedent to mathematical solids. Again, therefore, there will be lines belonging to these sur- faces prior to which there will needs be different lines and points for the same reason. And of those points con- tained in the lines that have an antecedent subsistence to those cognisant by sense there will be ether prior points to which there will no longer belong different ones that have this prior subsistence.

Wherefore, also, such an accumulation ^ as the foregoing would be absurd; for it- happens that pUcatlonof independent of such as fall under the notice of Jg^^JindrMc'e the senses there subsist single solids, no doubt, towards a ded- yet that there are three ranks of sur&ces beside qlSSSon?* those that are cognisant by the senses, and that one of these subsists beside those that are sensible, and that the second resides in mathematical solids, and that the third subsists beside those sensibles that are inherent in these, and that there exists a fourfold classification of lines, and that there are five ranks of points. Wherefore, let me ask, respecting which of these will the mathematical sciences be conversant) for, undoubtedly, they are not conversant re- specting the surfaces, and lines, and points that are resident in an immovable solid; for a science is always conversant about subjects that involve a priority of subsistence.

And the same reasoning holds good respecting numbers also ; for beside each of the points reasoning holds will there exist other monads, and beside each of J^jJum&s*!"* the entities that &11 under the notice of sense ; next in order will subsist those that are objects of perception for the mind : wherefore, there will exist infinite genera of mathematical numbers.

Further, how is it possible that we should decide the questions of controversy which we refuution have taken a review of in the doubts enumerated „JJJJ^ oTSSS above ? For the objects about which Astronomy nomy as a is conversant will in like manner be different ^ science, from those that are cognisant by sense; and this will be the case, too, with those particulars about which Geometry is concerned. But let me ask the question how it is possibJa

^ (r(op€^ts is the word I have translated aocuxnulAtion.** ' Some copies I'ead mpd, others^ wtpi

352 THE METAPHYSIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Xlt

that Heaven, and the parts thereof, subsist, or any other thing whatsoever that involves motion t And the case stands the same in regard of those objects that pertain unto Optics and Harmonics ; for there will exist both voice and a power of vision in addition to the things that fall beneath the notice of our senses, and to singulars. Wherefore, it is evident that there will be in existence both other senses and other objects of the senses ; for why, may I ask, should these exist rather than those '< If, however, these do exist, there will also be in existence other animals, if the truth be that also there are other senses.

7. Another re- Further, are some things described by the unhrersais of* Diathematioiaus as universal in addition to these the mathema- substauccs. Therefore will this also constitute a ticians. certain other separated substance intermediate

between both ideas and media, and which will be neither number, nor points, nor magnitude, nor duration. But if this is impossible, it is evident that it is impossible that those natures, also^ should be separated from sensibles.

Now, the short of the matter is this, that the coiSrning^™* vcry contrary takes place, both to what is in fact mathematical true and habitually supposed to be true, if one contrary to ^ will in this way seek to establish the existence of takes 'pface. mathematical entities as certain natures pos- sessed of a separated subsistence. For it is necessary, from the fact of the subsistence of these in this manner, that they should be antecedent to magnitudes that are cognisant by the senses, when yet in reality they are sub- sequent to them. For an imperfect magnitude is prior in generation, but subsequent in substance, in the same way as what is inanimate is prior to that which is animated. 9 Rovr wii Further, in what way also at all will these ma-

these raathe- thcmatical magnitudes be one,^ and when will this [Sde8*be"'o^e"/" bc the casc 1 for the things, of course, that are here reside in the soul, or a portion of the soul, or in something else that is endowed with reason. And if this be not the case, many things are exposed to dissolution. But now, what is the cause of those things which are divisible

How this applies to the present question will be better understood by consulting, in book lY. chap, vi, what Aristotle consido|:s as the o^racteristics of unity*

OR.n.] THIS 8UBJS0T DIBOUSSED. S5S

and pertaiDing to quantity being one, and remaining in c()u«  junction with one another as such ?

Further, do generations make this evident ; for lo. This diffi. in the first place, no doubt, such make a transition by^'^^enwa-** into what pertains unto length, in the next place, 'i^n.^ into what pertains unto breadth, and lastly, into what relates to depth, and has reached an end. If, therefore, that wliich is subsequent in generation may be antecedent in substance, cor- poreity would be antecedent to a surface and a length, and will be both perfect and an entirety in this way in preference, because it is rendered a thing that is animated ; but how, one may ask, would a line or a surface become animated? fot such an axiom as this would be above the grasp of our senses.

Further, it is true, corporeity constitutes a cer- ^^ ^^^ ^^ tain substance, for already doth it in a manner in- corporeUy can, volve that which is perfect; but how are lines said tfcauinef^a^n- to be substances?^ for neither are they substances not, be sub- in the same manner as species, and a certain ^^^^^^' form — for example, if in such a case we should admit that soul were a thing of this sort, — nor are they substances in the same way as matter — for instance, take the case of body as a thing of this description, — for nothing appears as endued with a capacity of consisting either from lines, or surfaces, or points. But supposing that it were a certain material substance, this woidd appear as one that is endued with ^ capacity of assuming passive states.

In definition, then, granting that mathema- tical natures will be antecedent to sense, yet it on'ty «.f^mathe does not follow that all things whatsoever that maticai entities

, 1 ij 1 . , . in delmition

are prior m definition should be prior also m does not prove substance. For those things that are prior in i^^ubstMce^ substance, indeed, are whatsoever things which, involving a separate subsistence, are transcendent in their essence ; but all those things are prior in definition of which there are definitions compounded of definitions. These, however, are not inherent at the same time. For if there are not in existence passive conditions, independent of the substances to which they belong — as, for example, a some- thing that has motion imparted to it, or which is white — whiteness will be prior to a white man, and will be prior ia

^ Vide book II. cbapa. i. and ii« 

3fir4' THE MElAfHTSICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK ZH^

accordance with the definition, but not in accordance witb the substance ; for it does not admit of a separate subsistence, but it always subsists in conjunction with a thing in ita entirety — now, I mean by entirety a man, for instance, who ia white. Wherefore, it is evident that neither is that prior which subsists by abstraction, nor is that subsequent which subsists by addition, for by addition is a man styled white by reason of whiteness.

18. Recapituia- That, indeed, therefore, neither are mathe- tion as regards matical entities in a greater degree existences inatUiideiitn than bodies, and that they are not antecedent ties. in their essence to those objects that DbJI under

the notice of the senses, but are so merely in point of definition, and that it is not possible that they should be made to involve a separate subsistence in any place, haa been declared with sufficient clearness. Since, however,^ neither in sensibles is it possible for these to subsist, it is evident that either, in short, they have no existence at all, or they subsist after some mode or other; and on this account not simply do they exist, for existence we predicate midtifiariously.

CHAPTER III.

For in the same manner also as universals in . That there mathematics are not conversant about thingil

tion* and "dc- *^^* ^^^® ^®®^ Separated, and in this condition monstration as of separation subsist independent of magnitudes weSagnitudes. and numbers, but are concerned about these— but not so far forth as they are things of such a kind as to involve magnitude, or to be divisible — ^it is evident that there is a possibility of there likewise being in existence both definitions and demonstrations respecting those magni- tude which fall under the notice of our senses ; not, how- ever, so far forth as they are things cognisable by sense, but 80 far forth as thev are universals.

• Didot's e^iition begins chap. i:L with tl.ese words. I liave foUowtd

IHLker.

C&. m.] RELATION BETWEEN THESE TWO. S5S

For in like manner as, also, SO for forth as things „ . ..j jRre in motion merely, there are many formal prin- tiated in thT ciples of them independent of the essence of each of S^motion!"** the things of this sort, and of their accidents, and since there is no necessity, on account of these things, either that there should exist anything that is being moved in a oondition of actual separation from seusibles, or that there shoidd be in things that are such as these any separated nature at all, so, therefore, likewise, in the case of things that are being moved, will there be rational principles and sciences; not, however, so &r forth as they are things that are in motion, but so far forth as they are bodies merely: and, again, so &r forth as they are sur&ces merely, and so far forth as they are lengths merely, and so i&r as they are divisible, and so &r as they are indivisible and things which involve position,^ and so far forth as they are indivisible merely.

Wherefore, since it is absolutely true to affirm, not only that things capable of a separate sub- ^tting°mathe. sistence exist, but also things that are not maticaS nature* capable of this separable subsistence— as, for they are said instance, that things in motion exist — so, as re- ^i5®no?prove gards mathematical entities, it is absolutely true their in-, to affirm that such mathematical entities exist, ginsfbiesf and that, at any rate, they are such as they are asserted to be. And, likewise, as it is absolutely true to affirm, in respect of the rest of the sciences, that there are sciences conversant with this particular thing, and not with that which is accidental to it — for instance, that there is one of what is white, if that which is salubrious should be what is white, but so far forth as it is salubrious — ^yet they are not conversant with that, I say, which is salubrious, but with that to which each science of it belongs, if it is salubrious, that is, in this case, with the salubrious,^ and if so &r forth as such is a man it is conversant with man, so also that this is the case with Geometry. It does not, however, follow, even though sensibles happen to belong to those objects about which Geometry is conversant, and though it may not be

^ I have followed the Paris edition. Bekker reads, tx^^^ tp^w,

• There is a discordance in the MSS. as to the reading of this passage.

I have eudearoured to select the most intelligible one, and have followed

Xaylor.

aa2

356 TB8 VXTAFHT8ICS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK Zn« 

conversant with them so fiir forth as they are sensibleSy that the mathematical sciences will be concerned with objects that fall under the notice of the senses, ^nd thej wiU not, certainly, be conversant with these ^ while there are in existence other separate natures.

But many things are essentially accidental in Jirfeces" &c. things, as far forth as each peculiar quality of be mere acci- guch is inherent in each. Since both as &r as

dents, and not > ^ * i* ^ 3 i* » .t^ •••

things separ- an animal IS female, and so far forth as it is not^maufema^ male, thcsc are its peculiar affections, although tics be conver- there is uot anything that is female, or anything arsuch ?^ ^^^^ *^^* is male, which involves a subsistence separ- able from animals : wherefore, also, the case is the same so far forth as there are lengths merely, and so &t as there are surfaces.

And by so much the more as Geometry is of geometry employed about those things that are prior in nif^y! '^** definition, and which are more simple, by so much the more does it involve the considera- tion of what is accurate ; but the accurate is what is simple. Wherefore, Geometry speculates into things that are without magnitude, rather than into those that are connected with magnitude, and especially are without motion. But if it contemplates motion, especially will it contemplate that motion which is primary or original, for this is most simple, and of this is that motion which is equable. ^ ^, . And there is the same mode of reasoning both

6. This sur- . . « tt • ■ -i

mise coniinned in the case 01 the scienccs of Harmonics and fromTheobjects Gptics ; for neither are the speculations of either of optics and carried on as far forth as the power of vision, or

mechanics. /* r .^ • •• ^ t^ i. i»i»Ai

as far forth as voice is concerned, but as far forth as lines and numbei-s are the objects of inquiry; for these, of course, are the appropriate affections of those : and this is the case with mechanical science in like manner. 7. May not the Wherefore, if any one, admitting the existence matliemat^ar ^^ thosc things which iuvolvc a separate subsist- natures be eucc from accidcuts, makes any inquiry respecting pure y menta ^j^ggg qq fg^j. ft^fth as they are such, he will not

for this reason utter any falsehood; just as neither does he do

^ Thi3 is a better reading which Didot gives, than the oue adopted by Bekker; the latter has *%pA instead of vtpi.

ea. ni.] analogy confirms the FORfiGonra. 351

BO when he describes anything on the earth, and says that that ia the measure of a foot which is not the measure of a foot; for not in the propositions^ doth the felsehood hirk. But thus would esich particular be investigated in the most excellent manner, if any one, having effected, as he thought, a separation, should regard as such that which does not in reality possess a separate subsistence, as is done by the arith- metician and geometrician.

For one, indeed,' and indivisible is man, so Arithmeti £ar forth as he is man; but the arithmetician and geometry bas established an indivisible one; and next ^v^^thafftu. he considers whether there is anything that is an accident in man so far forth as he is indivisible. The geometrician, on the other hand, carries on specu- lations relative to man neither as far forth as he is man, nor as &r forth as he is indivisible, but. as far forth as he is a solid. For what things, even though he were not indivisible anywhere, would be inherent in him is evident, because, even without these, that which is endued with capa- city admits of being inherent in this very man. Wherefore, on this account, geometricians, with correctness, make asser- tions, and discourse concerning entities, and entities have an existence, (for twofold is entity,) the one subsisting in actu- ality and the other materially.

Since, however, that which is good is different ^ j^ j^ ^^^ ^^ from that which is fair — for the one is always in say that mathe- conjunction with the method of doing a thing, « ™n^'^'„*^^°**^ but that which is fair also resides in things that about what is are immovable — those who assert that the ma- ^^ thematical sciences make no afiGj'mation about what is &ir or good make a false' assertion; for they do speak of these,

' This is a &Yourite principle with Aristotle, ov yitp iv rout wpardtrttn rd ^tvS^s. Vide Archbishop Whately's Elements of Logic, book IL chap, il, and Appendix of ambiguous terms — the word Truth."

^ iv irpd^€i — "is evidenced in the way of doing a thing;" this is the force of vpa^is compared with irpSryfui, which is the thing done. For example, Upd^€is ray k'roar6h^v means, not the acts, but the ways o' acting pursued by the Apostles. Archbishop What«^y uses the word in this sense in Appendix III. of his Logic, where ne gives us " A Praxis of Logical Analysis."

' Aristotle is here attacking Arislippus, and men of that class who ■ought to bring mathematical studies into disrepute. Vide book IL dup. ii« 

3d5 THB XETAFHTSIGS OF ABI8T0TLE. [&00K Xn;<

and frame demonstrations of them, in the most eminent sense of the word. For if they do not actually empl($y these names, they do not exhibit even the results and the reasons of these, and therefore they can hardly be said to make any assertion about them. Of what is feir, however, the most important species are order and symmetry, and that which is definite, which the mathematical sciences make manifest in a most eminent degree. And since, at least, these appear to be the causes of many things — ^now, I mean, for example, order, and that which is a definite thing — ^it i» evident that they would assert, also, the existence of a cause of this description, and its subsistence after the same manner as that which is fair subsists in. We will, however, declare our sentiments in regard of these points, in a more intel<* ligible form, elsewhere.^

CHAPTER IV.« 

Respecting, indeed, therefore, mathematical tiVe Ideal natures, that they are entities, and how &r they mine7 *^** ^^ entities, and how, in one respect, they are not antecedent to sense, and how, in another, they are antecedent, let thus much suffice to have been said on this subject. Concerning ideas, however, we must, in the first instance, examine into the actual opinion in regard of the idea which would not in any degree connect it with the nature of numbers, but in accordance with the hypothesis that has prevailed from the earliest age amongst those who originally were the first to affirm the existence of ideas.

The opinion, however, in regard of forms, hap- system a reac- pened to be adopted by those who make assertions

o?Hora!ciitu8* ^^ *^^^ ^^y» ^^ account of their being persuaded,

respecting the reality of this dogma, by the

arguments adduced by Heraclitus, to show that all entities

that &11 imder the notice of the senses are in a state of

^ Possibly Aristotle alludes to some of his mathematical writings, fragments of which havt "^nly come down to us ; or, perhaps, this topie was investigated in his lost Treatise, Ufpl Ayadov.

' In this and the following chapter we have a most elaborate refuta»i tion of the Ideal Hypothesis. I have followed Didot's text. Bekkef V«gins chap. iv. with the words, vtpi Si rw IS^»k

CH.IV.J BQOBATBS KO PATRON 07 IDJSALISM. 35S

contiuual flux. Wherefore, if there are systems of science, and of practical wisdom, conversant about anything, wo affirm that some different natures, in a condition of permanence, must necessarily exist beside those that are cognisant by the senses, for it is plain that a science of those things that are in a state of flux has no existence.

Now, seeing that Socrates^ was engaged in forming systems in regard of the ethical or moral Jrov^CTti in virtues, and was the first to institute an investi- wience intro- gatiou in regard of the universal definition of socntes^aud these— for, to be sure, Democritus to a small ex- Jjjj.^ ^®* ^ tent merely busied himself iu physical inquiries, and defined afber what mode that which is hot, and that which is cold, subsisted, but the Pythagoreans, previously to his time, brought forward^ definitions in respect of some few things, the formal principles of which these philosophers con- nected with numbers, as, for example, take the instance what opportunity constitutes, or justice, or marriage — Socrates, notwithstanding, I say, from time to time investigated into quiddity or what a thing is, and this, too, on rational grounds. For his aim was to form syllogisms, and we know that quid- dity is a first principle of syllogisms. For dialectical strength not as yet had at that time any existence ; so that they were able, even without the possession of quiddity or the substance of a thing, to institute inquiries into those things that are contraries, even though we should suppose that there would be the same science of contraries. For there are two im- provements in science which one might justly ascribe to Socrates ; now, I allude to his employment of inductive argu- ments, and his definition of the universal : for both of these belong to a science that is conversant about a first principle.

Socrates,^ however, did not, it is true, consti- 4. Yet not tute universals as thines involving a separable Socrates, but

o o ST otiiers were tnv

subsistence, nor did be regard the definitions as authors of the such ; the other philoBophei*s, however, invested ^*®^ Theoo-. them with a separate subsistence, and, in addition, they denominated things of this sort as the ideas of entities.

• A repetition of this and other parts of iliese two chapters may b« 

found in book I. chap. iz.

' I haye followed the Paris edition. Bekker reads, iv^m-oy,

^ Aristotle will not allow the advocates of the Ideal Theory to claim

Bocrates as a patroo of their system.

S60 THB XETAPHTSrCS CF ABI8T0TLE. [BOOK XII.

t tie Wherefore, it occurred to them, almost for the m-gnes against camo rcason, that there exist ideas of all things Theo?Mhatit ^^^ich are predicated tmiversally; and this proves too assumption is just as if one desirous of reckoning there are more ^ particular sum, whou, in &ct, the component forms than parts were fewer in number, should consider it an impossibility to do so, but when he had made them more numerous should succeed in counting them. For more numerous, so to say, are forms than singulars that fidl under the notice of sense: from an investigation into the causes of which did these speculators advance from sensibles to ideas ; for a form is a thing that is of the same import with a sensible singular, and it subsists independent of sub- stances ; ^ and forms are there in the case of many other things — namely, both in these particular things and in those that are eternal.

6. The hypo- Further, in the modes in which it is demon- thesis fain in strated that forms exist, according to none of eiiistence^of ^ these is it apparent that they really do exist; for these forms. f^Qjj^ some of them it is not necessary that a syllogism should arise, but from certain others : and in the case of things where they do not suppose that there are forms in existence, of these are there generated forms. For, according to the rational principles that may be adduced from the other sciences, there will subsist forms of all things of whatsoever there are sciences; and according to the notion of the unity that is involved in plurality will there subsist forms also of negations, and according to the perception of something belonging to what has been corrupted will there be forms of things subject to corruption, for of these is there a certain impression on the mind.

7 The best ^^^' further, with respect to the most accurate

airgumenrs of of the arguments that have been brought forward are dtstJuctive ^^ favour of the Ideal Theory, certain speculators, of their own no doubt, make ideas to belong to relatives, of hypothesis. ^hich they do not affirm that there is an essential genus, whereas others assert the existence of a third man. And, in general, the arguments concerning forms overturn the very things wh'.ch those persons who maintain the existence of theae

' I hav^ followed Didct's text, which differs in this passage some* what from Bekker. ludteiii of J/Acgyujuov, some MSS. read^ owupofio^.

OH. IV.] INCONSISTirrniES OF TBE ItlSAt HBltOtLY. 361

forms would desire to exist, in preference to the existotice of the forms themselves. For it happens that the duad is not first, but that the number is ; and prior to this is that which is relative, and that which involves an essential subsistence ia prior too; and this will be the case with all those things whatsoever which certain philosophers, in their adherence to these opinions respecting forms, have put forward in oppo* Bition to first principles.

Further, according, indeed, to that supposition ^ ^^ by which these speculators affirm the existence tency in this Of ideas, not only will there be forms of sub- J^JJ^^S^ S. stances, but of many other things besides; for forms to be there is not only the one concept^ about substances p*^*"p*°**- but also concerning those things that are not substances, and there will be systems of scientific knowledge conversant not about substance merely. But there are innumerable other consequences that ensue unto this hypothesis. In accord- ance, however, with what is necessary, and with the opinions that are prevalent concerning the Ideal Theory, on the suppo- sition that the forms are pai*ticipants, it is expedient that there should be ideas of substances merely ; for these do not participate according to what is accidental, but it is requisite that they should participate of each thing so far forth as there doth not exist a predication of it of a subject. Now I say, for example, if anything participates of the two- fold itself, this also participates of what is everlasting, but according to accident, for it is an accident for the twofold to be everlasting. Wherefore, forms will constitute substance, and these here and there ^ are in their signification equivalent to substance ; or, can we say that there is any existence of anything independent of these? take the case, for instance, of the notion of unity involved in that of plurality.

And, surely, if one establish that there is the 9. There is, or same form of the ideas as of those things that |? not, the same are participants of them, there will subsist some- idea and of the thing that is in commo© to both ; for why, may I ?"**«!«"**• ask, in the case of corruptible duads, and of duads that are many, I admit, in number, yefc everlasting — ^why, I say, in the

1 v6rifm is the word I have tranfllated " concept." ^ Didot reads, ravrd, and the Leipsic cditiou, ravra; the fiinoM Lftving a full stop after oOc %l

362 THB METAPHTSICS OF AfiTHTOTLB. [bCOK XII

case of these is the duad one and the same thing, rather than, in the case both of this and a certain particular duad ? If, however, there is not the same form of these, the result would be that entities would be homonymous, and the case would be just as if one should call both Gallias and a piece of wood a man, though at the same time unable to discern any point of communion between them.

10. lUuBtration ^^> however, we shall establish that other things from mathe- — ^qqw, I mean common reasons ^ — are capable of adaptation to the forms, as, for instance, a plain figure to the circle itself, as well as the other portions ot the definition of the circle, and if that, also, to which it oelongs will be annexed in addition — if all this be done, we ought to institute an inquiry as to whether or not this may be entirely an ineffectual proceeding ? For, also, to what, it may be asked, will the addition be made — whether to the centre, or to the sur&ce, or to all the parts? for all things that are involved in substance constitute ideas ; for instance, animal and biped. Further, it is evident that it is necessary that a thing itself should be something — ^in the same way as a surface must be some nature or other which will be inherent in all the forms — as is the case with the genus.

CHAPTER V.

I Theinsuffl- ^^ °^^®^ especially ^ might one raise the eiency of the questiou as to what at all it is that forms con- BccSuntingToir tribute either to the things that are eternal actual pheno- amongst thosc that figdl under the notice of our senses, or to things that are being generated and corrupted? for neither are these a cause to them of any motion, or of any change whatever. But, certainly, neither do these forms render any assistance towards the advauce-

^ The Latin veraion, by rendeiing this communes rationes,** does not throw much light on the meaning of these words. The com- mentators, as well as [ can undei-stand them, consider them equivalent with ** ordinary predications,"

' The student will remember how the same objectioDS are urged ii book I. chap. ix.

CH. v.] IRRELKYANOT OF THIS HYPOTHESIS. 363

xnent of the science of other things. For neither are thoso the substance of these — for, in such a case, they would he inherent in them— nor do they contribute to the exist- ence of anything at all, inasmuch as they are not, at least, inherent in those things that are participants; for if they were so they might perhaps seem to be equivalent with causes, as in the case of what is. white when it has been mixed with what is white.

But, undoubtedly, may this reason be very 2. The idealists easily overturned — a tenet, to be sure, which Anax- cannot estaWuft agoms, in the first instance, and, subsequently to anyof t?e^ ^ his age, Eudoxus,^ and certain other speculators, Jh^™a?e*put from time to time, maintained whilst labour- forward in its ing under doubts : the theory itself, however, I *^pp^^' say, is capable of refutation ; for it would be easy to collect together many antagonistic arguments as well as many impossible consequences in reference to such an opinion. But the fact is, that neither do other things subsist from the forms according to any of the modes which are accustomed to be put forward by the advocates of tlie Ideal Hypothesis.

And the assertion that ideas are models or ., ,, _

1 lit 1 1 • . . .3. Ideas are

exemplars, and that other things participate m not the models these, is to speak quite at random, and to assert ®^ ***"*«*• what is tantamount with mere poetic metaphoi*s. For what, allow me to ask, is that which operates having an eye, so to say, or looking towards the ideas ? for anything whatsoever admits of coming into existence, and of being generated ; and yet there is no consequent necessity that it should be a thing that is modelled after some form or image. So that, even though we should suppose Socrates to exist, and not to exists there yet would be generated some such thing as Socrates actually is. And in like manner is it evident that this would be the case even though Socrates were eternal.^ Also will there subsist many paradigms or models of the same thing; so that this will hold good of the forms, likewise : as, in the instance of man^ animal and biped will subsist as forms in

' This tenet of Eudoxus has been examined into, in the earlier por^ tions of the Metaphysies, as one professed by Anaxagoras, as is stated in the text.

• I have followed Didot's reading and punctuation of this sentenoOi

in prefereice to fiekker's.

S64 tnn «STAPHTBIC8 09 ARtStOTLB. [uOOfe Xlt

eonjunotion also with ideal man. Further, not onlj will the forms oonstltute the paradigms of sensibles, but also those of themselves; as genus might be regarded a paradigm ot species that are generic. Wherefore, the exemplar and the image will be the same thing.

4. How wiu Further, it would appear an impossibility that tie idealists Bubstance and that to which the substance belongs nSmtjv pf'*^^ should be separate. Wherefore, how would ideas forms f which are said to constitute the substances of things involve a separable subsistence 1 In the Phsedo, how- ever, is an assertion made to this effect — I mean, to the effect that forms are the causes both of existence and of generation. Nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence of these forms, entities, notwithstanding, are not being produced, if also there should not subsist something that is likely to be an efficient cause; and to this we may add that different other things are generated, as a house and a ring, of which they do not say that there are forms at all.

5. Aristotle's Wherefore, it is evident that those things, general objec- ajgo, of which thesc advocatcs of the Ideal Theory ideafiinK^- ^ B&j that there are ideas, may both exist and be thesis. generated on accoimt of such causes as we may eonsider the things, also, to be that have been just now men- tioned,^ but not on account of forms. But, certainly, as far as regards the subject of the Ideal Hypothesis, it is possible, both in the manner now adopted, as well as by means of argu- ments that are more logical and accurate, to collect together many similar points with those that already have been made subjects of inquiry.

CHAPTER VI.

1. The Pytha- Now, sincc WO have thus far arrived at some foric system of settlement of the controversy concerning these mimbers. upholders of the Ideal Theory, it is well once more to examine into the com>equences in respect of num-

^ This I conceive to be the literal meaning of these words; the Latin vordon is as follows : ** Propter teles causas quales eorum s*inl q^ias nunc dicta sunt."

CH. TI.] PTTHAGOBIO SYSTEM OF 5UMBXBS. 360

bers,^ that happen in the systems of those who assert that they are substances that involve a separable subsistence, anci the primary causes of entities.

It is necessary^ however, on the supposition that number oonstitutes a certain nature, and that somethLg' ^ there is not any other substance of it, but this prfm^y "»* very thing, as certain affirm-it la. I say, un- "~"'^- doubtedly necessary in this case that something belong- ing to it should be classed as what is primary, whereas that something as consequential to this be in every instance different in form. And this directly resides either in monads^ and then every monad whatsoever is incapable of comparison with any monad whatsoever, or all of these are directly in order consequent, and any whatsoever are comparable with any monads whatsoever, as scientific men afi&nn to be the case with mathematical number.

For in mathematical number there is no differ- ^ ^^^^ . ence as regards any monad one from another : or, this on its com. shall we say that, as far as the monads are con- 5!*^®?n Sathl** cemed, that some of them are capable of compari- maticai num- son with one another, whereas some are not ? just as if the first duad were to subsist after unity, and next in order the triad; and so, therefore, another number. But the monads in each number are capable of being compared one with another, as the monads contained in the first duad are with themselves, and those in the first triad with them- selves;'^ and so, therefore, is it in the case of the rest of the numbers. Those monads, however, that are contained in the duad itself are incapable of comparison with those that are contained in the triad itself; and the case is the same with the other consecutive numbers.

Wherefore, also, the mathematician reckons 4 Digferent two after the one, along with the one before, modes of nu- another one; and after the numeration of the '°®'^**°"' three, in addition to these two, he subjoins another one, and the rest in like manner. But this philosopher — I mean Plato ^ — after the one reckons two others without the first one, and the triad without the duad; and the

• This inquiry he pursues Id chaps, vi., vii., viii. pad ix.

' Bekker reads, adrris. Aristotle plaiuly is alluding to Plato

1

96^6 THB UETAFHT8ICB OF ABISIOTLB.' [2X>K XIL

case stands the same with the other number: or shall we say that one sort of numbers should subsist as that which has been mentioned first, but another, such as the mathematicians put forward, and a tliird which has been •(K>ken of as last ?

5. Numbers Further, it is evident that these numbers are ^te*o *SIe a- ®^^^®^ separable from things or are not separable, table firom but are resident in objects that fall under the fihingi. notice of our senses; yet not in these in such a manner as we have considered at the first, but as subsisting in sensibles^ through inherent numbers ; or, at any rate, one kind of these must have a subsistence thus, and another not 80, or all of them must exist thus.

6. Confirmation '^^® modcs, indeed, therefore, according to in&Tourof which it is possible that these should exist are lions to regaSd necessarily only these. In general, however, of numbers, those philosophers who affirm unity to be a first principle, and a substance and element of all things, and that number derives its existence from this and from a certain other one, almost each of them has declared his adherence to some one of these modes, with the exception of that one where all the monads are assumed as being incapable of comparison one with another. And this has happened con- sistently with rational principles, for it is not admissible that there should be further another mode of the subsistence of number beside those that have been enumerated.

Some, therefore, assert that both are num«  miiate number bcrs,* and that one of these modes which in- ^or ^d' **b- ^^^^®s what is antecedent and what is subsequent sequent— that accords with idcas, but that mathematical num^ and^Jome^wur ^^^ ^® different from ideas and sensibles, and merely mathe- that both ideas and mathematical number possess mat c num- ^ sei)arable subsistence from sensibles ; whereas others assert that mathematical number only it is that is the original of entities, and that it has been actually separated from sensibles.

8. Some con- -^^^ *^® Pythagoreans say that there exists tend for a ma- the mathematical imit, but not one which haa

^ (diTBiiroTs. Bekker reads, Hura rd ouadrird I have followed Didot. ' The thr^ opinioos set down here by Arl:totle bslong severally to PUiio, Xenocratoi, aud Pythaf^oras.

int tl.] QUESTIONS BEBFEOrnrS NTJHBERS. 367

been separated; but they affirm that sensible thematicai, and substances consist from this. For the entire PlJ^"'"'"* heaven they construct out of numbers — with the ' exception of those that are not monadic numbers — ^but they suppose that the monads invoWe magnitude; yet .as to how the first unit consists, possessed of magnitude, they seem to be involved in perplexity. A certain other philo- sopher,^ however, affirms that the first number is that one which ranks amongst forms ; and others say that mathe- matical number is this first number.

And in like manner, also, is it the case i^ 9 ^h f r^ard both of lengths and surfaces, and in going nius- : regard of solids ; for some say that those which S^og? of ma- are mathematical are different from those that thematicai • subsist after ideas. But, in the case of those who ^'*** say otherwise, some, it is time, speak of mathematical natures even mathematically — ^as many. I meail, as do not constitute the ideas as numbers, or say that the ideas exist ; but others speak of the mathematical number, yet not mathematically, however; for what they maintain is this, that neither is every magnitude divided into magnitudes, nor that any monads whatsoever can compose a duad.

All speculators, however — with the exception ^^ ^^^ of such of the Pythagorics as assert that unity opinion in constitutes, as it may be said, an element and n^terlis firet principle of entities— seek to establish the that they are dogma that numbers partake of the nature of "*°" *°' monads ; yet those, undoubtedly, speak of monads as involving magnitude,^ as has been stated previously. In what number of ways it is admissible, therefore, that statements should have been made respecting numbers, and that all such me- tliods have been enumerated, is evident from these foregoing assertions : all these assertions, however, are, to be sure^ impossible, but perhaps one more than another.

• A certain philosopher belonging to the Pythagorean seat.

' T^iis was tiie tenet of the PytbagoreaDS.

U8 THB METAPHTSIOS OF ABI8T0TL1L [BOOK XII.

CHAPTER VII.

In the first place, then, we must examine touching the whether monads are capable of mutual com- Smonads"^^ parisou, or are incapable of such comparison ; and, on the supposition of their being incapable of comparison, whether^ they are to be viewed in the manner that we have divided. For, indeed, it is possible that any taooad whatsoever should not admit of being compared^ with any whatsoever ; and it is possible that those monads that are resident in the actual duad should not be capable of a comparison with those that are in the actual triad ; and so, therefore, that those be incapable of comparison with one another which are contained in each primary number. 2. If the mo- If, therefore, all the monads are capable of nads are ^^ comparison, and devoid of any mutual diflference, ideas will not mathematical number, and one number alone, be numbers, come into being, and it is not admissible that ideas should constitute number. For what sort of a number will an ideal man be, or an ideal animal, or any other species whatsoever 1 for there is one idea of each, as one idea of man himself, and of animal itself there is another one. Numbers, however, that are similar and devoid of difference are infinite. Wherefore, in no respect will this triad constitute ideal man more than any other one whatever. 3 If the ideas ^^ ^^® Supposition, however, that the ideas are not num- are not numbers, neither is it possible that these

njrex?8?aran. ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ f^ ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ principles, may I ask, will the ideas be derived ? For number is derivable from unity and the duad, which is indefinite ; and these are said to be the first principles and the elements of number, and it is not admissible to arrange them in classes either as prior or subsequent to numbers.

• troripas or irorepov.

■ avufiKriToi and d<r{/u$\riTcu — " commensurable " and " incommen- surable ; " this is the translation in Liddell and Scott.

• This, then, would amount to a simultaneous overthrow of Platonism

ttkd Py thagoricism ; and also, as is shown in the next sentence, to th» iy^t^t|oi^ of tl^e theory of Xeaocmte^,

CH. Tn.J THE INC0MMEXSURA6ILITT OF MONADS. 3()B

If, howetsr, monads are incapable of com- ^ ifmonadt paiison^ and ;ncapable of companson after this are incom]»r mode, 80 that everything whatever is diflferent fgn®v7mSht* from everything whatever, neither is it admis- maticai Bible that this can constitute mathematical """^ '* number — for, in feet, mathematical number is derived from monads which are devoid of difiference, and things that are demonstrated thereby are found to harmonize with monads of this description — nor yet can this number belgng to forms, for the firet duad v/ill not be derived from unity and the indefinite duad. In the next place, the consecutive numbers, as it is affirmed, are duad, triad, tetmd; for at the same time are the monads produced which are contained in the first duad, whether after the same manner as the Philoso- pher was for maintaining who first made the assertion of their subsistence from unequal monads — for from things reduced to a state of equality they have been actually produced — or whether they have a subsistence in another way.

In the next place, on the supposition that 5. other argu- there will be one monad that is prior to another, ^^}^ against it will also be prior to the duad that is derived biutyofmo- from these. For in case of the subsistence of any- "*^^- thing, there is something prior, and something subsequent ; likewise will that which subsists from these be a thing that is antecedent to the one, but subsequent to the other. Fur- ther, whereas this actual unity is first, then doth there belong a certain first unit to the others, and a second after that, and again a third; there will be a second, of course, after the second, and a third after the first one : wherefore, the monads would be antecedent to the numbers of which they are composed ; as, to give an instance, in the duad there will reside a third monad antecedent to the existence of the number three, and in the triad a fourth, and in the tetrad a fifth, before the existence of these numbers.

No one, indeed, therefoiie, of these aforesaid „ ,

6 1 nconsMi*

philosophers hath asserted that the monads are tency,thereforo, incapable of comparison after this mode. But, in gL'temsIn ^"' accordance, to be sure, with the principles of those regard of speculators, it is reasonable that the case should °"*"'^®'^- be even so ; though, according to reality, such is impossible For 'Jtio that monads should be prior and subsequent il

D B

870 THB MKTJLFHTSICS OF ABISTOTLE. [BOOK xA

reasonablo enough, provided there may be in existence

both a certain first monad and first unit ; and that in like

manner, also, this should be the case in r^ard of duads^ on

the supposition that there is a first duad likewise. For after

that which is first it is rational and necessary that there

should be a something that is second, and if a something that

is second, a third, and so, therefore, of the rest in order. At

the same time, however, to assert the existence of both— even

the existence of a first monad, and of a second after unity^

and of a first duad — this is impossible. But they introduce a

monad, I admit, and a first one, but no longer do they bring

forward a second and a third ; and they introduce a first

duad, but no longer do they bring forward a second and a

third. But it is evident, also, that such is not admissible on

the supposition that all the monads are incapable of com« 

parison — I mean, that an actual duad, and a triad, and so

the other numbers, should have a subsistence. For whether

the monads be devoid of difference, and whether they are

severally different one from another, it is necessary that

number be reckoned according to addition ; as, for instance,

the duad by the addition of one to another one, and the

triad by the addition of another one to the two, and the

tetrad in like manner.

Inasmuch as these things, however, are so, it iB the^genS^ratfon iiopossible that there should be a generation o ' of number* numbers after this mode, that is, in the same man*

does not take , . , , . . i /• xn

place after a ucr as ccrtam speculators generate them from the

• • !""" ?,®^® duad and from unity. For the duad becomes a

with tneir . n t • t f i • t r t ^

generation portion of the tnad, and the triad of the tetrad ; anTfromunUy. ^^^ ^^ *^® Same manner does it happen in the case of those numbers, also, that follow next in order. But from the first duad, and from the duad that is indefinite, is formed the tetrad, being two duads in addition to the actual duad ; but, on the supposition that the actual duad is not a portion, there will exist still another single duad, and the duad will be derived from unity itself, and another one. And, if this be the case, it is not possible that also an indefinite duad should constitute the other element, for it produces one monad, but not a definite duad. Further, beside the aotaal triad, and the actual duad, how, may I aedc, will there exist Mber triads and duads^ and in what manner are they com*

Cfi. YII.] ABSUBDITIES OF THIS DOGMA. 371

pounded of prior tind subsequent monads? for all these assumptions are even fictitious, and it is impossible that there be a first duad, then an actual triad; and it would be necessary that this should be the case on ^e supposition that unity and the indefinite duad will constitute elements of numbers. If, however, consequences that are impossibilities ensue, it is likewise impossible that these should be first principles.

If, indeed, therefore, the monads are dif- g. These, then, ferent, any one whatsoever from any one what- ^ *^« results soever, these and such other results necessarily the monads^

ensue. incomparable.

But if the monads^ that are resident in another 9, Another number are difierent, and others that are inherent theory on this in the same number are alone devoid of any such ^thequ^ mutual difference, even in this case not a whit the difficulties, less do consequences ensue that are attended with difficulty. As. for instance, in the decade itself are involved ten monads, and the decade is composed both of these and of two pentads. Since, however, the decade itself is not an niustrated by ordinary number, and since ^ it is not compounded the case of the of ordinary pentads, as neither of ordinary ®^ ®* monads, it is necessary that the monads should involve a mutual difference — I mean, those that are contained in this decade. For, if they do not involve this difference, neither will the pentads be different of which the decade is composed ; yet, since they do involve this difference, the monads, likewise, will differ. And, on the supposition that they differ, whether does it follow that there will not be inherent different other pentads, but merely those two, or that there will be inherent such? and if we do not suppose this to be the case, namely, that they will be inherent, it is absurd; or, if they will be inherent, what sort will be the decade that is composed of those ? for there is not another decade resident in the decade beside itself. But, assuredly, also it is necessary a^a of the that the tetrad, at any rate, be not compounded ^trad. of the ordinary or casual duads; for the indefinite duad, as they say, receiving the definite duad, has produced two duads, for it causes the duad it has received to become two.

^ Some commentators make chapter viii to commence with these kordB.

• Bekker reads oM '^dp, I have followed the Pant edition.

bb;}

372 TH« XBTAPHTSIGB OF ARI8T0TLK. [BOOK SOL

10. othe? Ob. Further, the existence beside the two monadfl fcctions drawn of the duad as a certain nature, and of the triad tureoftheduad beside the three monads, how, may I ask, is such and the triad, admissible 1 for one will either partake of the other, as a white man beside white and man — for he partakes of these — or will do so when the one amounts to a certain differ* ence of the other, as man beside animal and biped. Further^ some things are one in contact, and others by mixture, and others by position ; not one of which is it admissible should be inherent in the monads from which the duad and the triad are compounded; but just as two men are not one certain thing beside both, so it is necessary, also, that the case should stand with the monads. And they will not be said to differ because they are indivisible, for on this account, also, are points indivisible; but, nevertheless, the duad of them will not be anything different from the two. But, imdoubtedly, neither should this escape our notice, that it happens that there will exist prior and subsequent duads; and in like manner doth the case stand with the rest of the numbers. For, indeed, even allowing the duads to rank in the tetrad cue along with another, yet these are antecedent to those in the octade: and they themselves have produced — as the duad has these — the tetrads that are contained in the octade itself; so that if, also, the first duad be an idea, these likewise will constitute certain ideas.

11. Confirmed ^^^ *^®^® ^ *^® ^™® reasoning applicable to from the case of the case of the monads also, for the monads in monads. ^j^^ ^^^ duad produce the four monads that are in the tetrad. Wherefore, all the monads become ideas, and an idea will be compounded of ideas. Wherefore, it is evident that those things of which the ideas themselves happen to be compounded will be composite natures, just as if one were to say that animals are compounded of animals ; if there are ideas of these, ideas will be compounded of animals.*

12. To make ^"^» ^^ general, to make monads to involve a monads to in- mutual difference of any kind whatspever would dlfflrence is"*^ be an absurd and fictitious supposition — now, I absurd. mean by fictitious a thing that is forcibly con- trived so as to suit a particular hypothesis. For neither

1 iK C(i(»v I9lat tffovrai, Bekker has these words, and I have foUowod bioQu The French edition omits them.

Oh. VII.] ho MONADS MUTUALLY DIFFER? 87S

according to quantity, nor according to quality, do we see a monad differing from a monad ; and it is requisite that every number ^ould be either equal or unequal : but parti- cularly that which is monadic. Wherefore, if it be neither greater nor less it will be equal. But things that are equal, and, in short, devoid of mutual difference, we consider to be the same in numbers.

And, if this be not admitted, neither will there u.showninthe be in this decade duads that are without a dif- case* of a de- ference, seeing that they are equal; for what ^ ^' cause will one be able to bring forward who makes the assertion that they are devoid of this mutual difference 1 Moreover, if every monad and another monad make two, a monad which is taken from the duad itself, andofaduad and the duad which is taken from the triad «idt"ad. itself, will be derived from monads that are different; and the question may be put as to whether this duad will be antece- dent to the triad, or subsequent to it? But there appeai-s to exist a greater necessity for its being antecedent; for the one subsists along with a triad, and the other along with a duad of monads.

And we, indeed, in general, are inclined to j^ practical adopt the supposition that one and one are two, contradiction even whether they may be equal or unequal; ^*^**'*®8™*' as, for instance, what is good and what is evil, and man and horse. They who make assertions in this way do not make these assertions of the monads however.

But, if the number belonging to the triad itself „ .- .„ be not a greater Bomber tUhat belonging to IVfi^^, the duad, it is astonishing : or, on the supposition dlfferences^'ihe of its being greater, it is evident that there is an ideas win bo equal number, also, in the duad. Wherefore, "*^ this will be without a difference from the duad itself. This, however, does not admit of taking place if there is a certain first number and a second number; neither will the ideas be numbers. For this very assertion do they correctly make who think that the monads should involve mutual differences, since they will constitute ideas, as has been previously stated;^ for the subject of both will be one form,

' Compare the beginning of chapter viL

374 THE METAFHTSICS OF ARI8T0TLB. [BOOK Xlt*

16 Theconte- But, if the monads do Dot involve this difference^

quences of both the duads and the triads will be indifferent

SdlTo*^' likewise. Wherefore, to the authors of this

devoid of mu- assertion it is necessary to say that in counting

I erence. ^^^ ^^^^ .^ ^j^.^ ^^^^ ^^ must uot, besido what

is previously existing, make any additional assumption of anything. For neither will there subsist generation from the indefinite duad, nor is it possible that an idea can exist, for there will be one idea inherent in another, and all forms will be parts of one. Wherefore, consistently, I admit, with their hypothesis do they make their assertions; yet, upon the whole, they do not make their assertions even consistentlY with thei; hy^thens. For they overturn ma»y things; sinw they are likely to say that this itself, at least, involves a certain doubt — namely, whether when we count and say one, two, three, we additionally assume anything in coimting^ or whether we carry on our reckoning according to parts 1 We do so, however, in both cases. Wherefore, it would be ridi- culous to reduce this into so great a difference of substance.

CHAPTER VII1.1

I If a number ^^ *^® ^™* plaoc, howcver, abovc all, it is well differs from a that we should comc to somo final distinctions S'*2c"?ordiS* as to what the difference is between a number to quality or and a monad, if there is any difference at alL quantity. j^qw, it is uccessary that this difference exist

either according to quantity or according to quality; yet neither of these appears to be admissible. But, so &r forth as number is concerned, the difference subsists according to quantity.

2. Can monads -^^^j therefore, if monads likewise differ in differ in quan- quantity, ouc number also would differ from another number, though it may be equal in the multitude of the monads. Further may we ask whether the first monads are greater or less, and whether thej may subse*

' Some make this chapter ix.

CiE. Yin.J KUMBEBS DO KOT EXCLUDE IDEAS. 375

quently increase,^ or the contrary? for all these statements are irrational But, undoubtedly, neither is it ad- ^^

missible that they should differ according to '" " ^' quality, for it is not possible that there should reside subse- quently in them any passive condition; for also they say that there inheres in numbers quality subsequently to quantity. Further, neither would it happen unto them that this should be derived from unity, nor from the duad; for the one is not quality, whereas the other partakes of the nature of a con- stituent of quantity, for of the existence of many entities is the actual nature of them a cause.

-But if, then, this subsists after a certain man- niBr differently, we must declare that this is the monad^differ case likewise, in the most eminent degree, with neither in a first principle; and we must come to some quaiityfwhat final distinction respecting the difference of the ?i?i7"°®/^^

'^ o . , they involve?

monad — namely, that it is especially a necessary one, and why there exists a necessity that this should be the case. If monads, however, do not differ in quantity, nor yet in quality, what difference can speculators assume as existing in themf ^ That, indeed, therefore, on the supposition that ideas are numbers, it is admissible that all the monads neither should be capable of comparison, nor should be incapable of comparison one with another in either of these ways, this point is evident.

But, assuredly,^ after the manner in which 4 attack on certain other philosophers make statements re- those who ig- specting numbers neither are such assertions JnTeond"^?' made correctly. And these are such as do not Jor**^e^\®"?v consider that there are ideas in existence, neither of mathema- fiimply considered, nor as being certain numbers, ^^^^ entities. but lay down the existence of mathematical entities, and con- tend that numbers are most original amongst entities, and that actual unity constitutes a first principle of them. For it would be absurd to go on the supposition that unity should be something primary amongst the units, as those persona assert it is ; but that a duad should not be something primary

^ hrt^i^aaiv. I have followed the Latin version, crescant;'* and find that it bears this sense in Herodotus, Euterpe, XIII., Reizii, edit Ozon, vol. I. p. 129. * Vide book IV. chap. iz.

' ' Some make chapter z to begii with these words.

S7S fflCIS liETAPHTSICS OF ABI8T0TLB. [BOOK-XIt,^^

amongst duads, nor the triad amongst triads ; for all suob- points rest on the same reasoning.

5 ifmathe- ^^f indeed, therefore, the assertions in regard

maticai number of number may be viewed after this manner, and unUyTa^pt'k i^ oue wiU Seek to establish that mathematical fi"t principle number exists solely, unity, in such a case, does o num rs. ^^^ constitute a first principle of numbers. For it is requisite that unity — such as this is —should differ from the rest of the monads ; and, if this be admitted, there will necessarily exist a certain first duad that is different from the other duads, and in like manner, also, will it be so with the rest of the numbers — I mean, such as are consecutive. If, however, unity constitute a first principle, there subsistij the greater necessity that the case should stand just as Plato used to say the points regarding number were disposed, aud that there should exist a certain first duad and triad, and that numbers should be not capable of comparison with one another. But, on the other hand, if any one, again, should maintain these assertions, it has been declared that many impossibilities ensue.

But, certainly, it is, at any rate, necessary erJr^exposld^ t^^at the casc bo either in that way or this of confound- ^ay. Whercforc, on the supposition that it Ideal and ma- be in neither way, it would not be admissible number?*^ that number should involve a separate subsist- ence. It is evident, however, from these state- ments, that the third mode ^ is expressed even in the worst manner — I mean, that one which makes out that the number which belongs to forms, as well as mathematical number, are the same ; for it is necessary that two errors at the same time should concur with one opinion. For neither is it possible that mathematical number should subsist in this manner ; but, as regards a person indulging in peculiar hypo- theses, it is necessary that he should be prolix ; and that he should enumerate the consequences also, whatsoever they are, which ensue unto those who denominate numbers aa forms, this is requisite likewise.

7. The Pytha- l^^t the plan of the Pythagorics partly, no fforean system doubt, iuvolves fcwcr difficulties than the state-

• Tha three modes, I take it, are those severally adopted by Plato^

Pytha,^oras, and Xenocratea

CH. vm.] BimcuLTna peculiar to the ptthaoobics. 37 1

^ents that have been previously niade ; but partly about numbers •t involves certain different difficulties peculiar wiShdifficuitiet to itself. For the constituting number as that that aw pecu- which possesses a subsistence not separable from ^ ^ "* °^* sensibles removes many of the impossibilities ; but the asser* tion that bodies are compounded out of numbers, and that this number is mathematical, is impossible. For neither is it correct to say that it constitutes individual magnitudes ; and, in the next place, because in the most eminent degree they are disposed after this jnode, »he monads, at any rate, do not involve magnitude : and how is it possible that magnitudes should be composed of things indivisible ? But, assuredly, mathematical ^ number, at least, in its nature is monadic ; yet those persons say that entities constitute number : at any rate, their speculations do they try and harmonize with bodies, as if numbers were derived from those. I^ therefore, it ia requisite, on the supposition of number being something essentially belonging to entities, that some one of those modes that have been mentioned should exist, but it is not admissible that any one of these should exist, it is evident, then, that there doth not subsist any such nature of numbera as those furnish who constitute number as that which pos-. Besses a separate subsistence.

Further, might the question be asked whether ^ ^^^^ ^^^ does each monad consist from the great and the each monad • small equalised; or whether is the one monad *'°"***'°^* from the little and another from the great 1 If, indeed, there- fore, the case stands thus, neither will each number consist from all the elements, nor will the monads be devoid of mutual difference ; ^ for in this monad will be inherent the great, and in that the small — ^being what is in its own nature contrary. Further, how are those resident in the triad itself? for one of them is uneven. But, perhaps, on this account they make actual unity iu what is uneven a mean. But if each of the monads arises from both the elements equalised, how will the duad constitute one certain nature compounded from the great and small) or what difference will there be in this from the monad 1 Farther, the monad

^ Perhaps the better readmg is that found in Bekker and Didot< namely, dpi6firrrtK6s.

• aSid<t>opoi is the word used by Ariftatl«.

378 THE METAPHYSICS OP ARISTOTLE. [BOOK Xll»

is antecedent to the duad ; for when it is taken away the duad is taken away. Therefore, it is necessary that this be an idea of an idea, being, at any rate, antecedent to an idea, and that it has been produced prior to such. Of what,^ then, will it be? for the indefinite duad would be formative of duality.

9. Number Further, it is necessary that, certainly, number roust be either be infinite or finite ; for speculators make finite."' * number to be that which involves a separate

subsistence, so that it is not possible that the other of these should not subsist.

10. It cannot be That, therefore, it is not possible that it should infinite. y^ infinite is evident, for neither is infinite number odd, nor is it even ; but the generation of numbers is invariably either of an odd number or of an even : when unity, in one instance, fells upon an even number, an odd number is produced; and when the duad, in another case, £alls upon the even, that which is from unity is rendered two- fold ; and when it falls, in a third way, upon the odd numbers, another even nimiber is produced. Further, if every idea belongs to some particular thing — ^but numbers are ideas — infinite number, also, will be the idea of something, either of sensibles or of something else; although neither does this admit of taking place according to position, nor according to reason ; but philosophers arrange the ideas after this manner. «« T»-^« « «« On the supposition, however, that number

11. If It is finite, . « ., , £ ' • x r x-i. j 'j,

how far does IS finite, how &r, m point of quantity, does it It extend! extend] for it is requisite that this should be declared — ^not only that the fact is so, but also why it is so. Undoubtedly, however, if number extends up to the decade, as certain say, in the first place, of course, will forms faXi quickly ; as, for instance, if the triad constitute ideal man, what number will ideal horse be? for every ideal number reaches up to the decade.^ Therefore, it is necessary that certain numbers exist of those residing in these, for these are substances and ideas ; notwithstanding, however, they will fail, for the species of animal already will be superabundant.^ At

' I have followed Didot. Bekker reads the sentence thus : trportpo* 4k rlvotrovv, *H yap dSpurros fivas, K.r.X.

• Vide book L chaps, v. and viil

' TbiB is the reading in the French edition. Bekker has fhra^ltu

OB. Vin.] 18 NUMBER FINITE OR INFINITE t 379

the same time it is, however, evident that, if the triad in this way be ideal man, the rest of the triads likewise will be 60, for similar are those that are inherent in the some numbers. Wherefore, will there exist infinite men ; if, indeed, every triad constitutes an idea, each man will be an ideal man ; but if not, yet, at any rate, men will be so.

And if the smaller ^ belong, as a portion, to the ,2. The diffi- greater — namely, that which is of the monads cuity of Axing that are capable of comparison as a portion of ®°*"y ^^ those that are in the same number — and if the tetrad itself be an idea of anything, as of a horse or of what is white, man will be a part of horse, if man constitutes a duad. But absurd, also, is the supposition of there being an idea of the decade, but not of the endecade, nor of the numbers consecutive to this. Further, however, there both exist and are gene- rated certain things of which there are not forms. Wherefore, the question comes to this, on what account are there not forms of those also ? In such a case the forms do not consti- tute causes. Moreover, it would be absurd to imagine that number, as far as the decade, should be a certain entity in a greater degree, and a form of the decade itself, although there is no generation of this, as of an unit^ but of that there is, - , Philosophers attempt, however, to alter their ^^ Theat- opinions, as if the supposition were true that tempted rel number up to the decade were a perfect one. SiSSlitJ,^*' They generate, at any rate, the things thereon fol- lowing : as, take the case of vacuity, proportion, the odd, and other things of this kind, within the decade ; for some things they ascribe to first principles, — for example, motion, restj good, evil, — but other things to numbers. Wherefore, unity amounts to what is odd ; for if it is resident in the triad, how will the pentad constitute what is odd )

Further, how far do magnitudes, and as many ,4 canthe such bodies as there are, partake of quantity ; Pythagoreans for instance, the first indivisible line, next a difficuhte* to duad, and next those numbers up to a decade? "f"J*®'^' Further, on the supposition that number in- prioruy^of ^ ▼olves a separate subsistence, one might feel "°**y' a doubt as to whether unity were antecedent, or the triad .And the duad. As far forth, therefore, as number is 00m ^ I have followed the punctuation of this passage adopted by Didot»

380 TUB UBTAPHTStOS OF ABI8T0TLB. [bOOK St

pounded unity is antecedent, but, as &r forth as what il universal and is form are prior, number involves an ante- cedent subsistence; for each of the monads constitutes a portion of number as matter, but the other as form.

15 Illustrated '^^^^ ^^ doubt, in ouc way is the right prior to in'thecaseof the acutc angle, because it has been limited by •"r^ht^Mgie. ^^ definition, and in another way is the acute prior to the right, because it is a part of it, and the right angle is divided into the acute. Undoubtedly^ indeed, as matter, the acute angle and the element and the monad are prior; and, again, as in reference to form and substance—* such as subsists according to definition — is the right angla prior, and so with the entire, which is compounded of matter and form ; for both are more proximate to form and to that which definition belongs unto, but in generation are they subsequent.

16. How, then. ^^"^y *^e°> ^^7 ^ ^^y ^ ^^^^7 «: firs* Prin- i« unity 8 first ciple ? ^ because it is not, they say, divisible, but p ncipief jg indivisible, both that which is universal, and that which is particular, and that which is an element ; but ux another manner is unity partly that which subsists accord<* ing to definition, and partly that according to duration. In what way, then, does unity constitute a first principle ? for, as has been declared, both the right angle seems to be ante^ cedent to the acute, and the acute to ^he right, and each is one. Therefore, in both ways do speculators constitute unity as a first principle.

But, further, is this impossible ; for the ond catesofthis subsists as form and substance, and the other aa

M&wish it.*** * P** ^°^ ^ matter. For in a manner each one in reality subsists in capacity, if, at least, number is one certain thing and not as an aggregate heap ; but different number subsists from different monads, as they say, and each monad does not subsist in actuality. 18 This fail "^ causc, howcver, of the error which ensues is

accounted for this, that they are accustomed at the same time inqufr™pu?-°^ ^ pursuc their investigations from the mathe- tued by the matical scienccs and from universal definitions, Pythagoreans. ■^j^i^ej.gfQre, from thosc, uo doubt, as a point, havQ

' The student will remember how this question has been asked iM book II., and how Aristotle notices the theory itself in book L

CH. IX.| DOI'BTS ARISING FROM THE FOREGOING. 381

they established unity, and the first principle ; for the monad b a point without position. As, therefore, certain others, also, have compounded entities out of what is least, so do these .persons likewise. Wherefore, the monad becomes the matter of numbers, and at the same time is prior to the duad ; and, again, is it subsequent to the duad existing as a certain whole, and as an unit, and as species. On account, however, of their being engaged in investigating that which has been predicated universally as an unit, they in this way, also, have spoken of it as a part. But it is impossible that these should reside in the same subject at the same time. But, on the supposi- tion of its being necessary that unity itself should subsist merely without position — for in no respect is there a differ^ ence, save that it constitutes a first principle, and that the duad is divisible, whereas that the monad is not so— -if this be the case, the monad would be more similar to unity itself; but, if the monad alone be without position, unity will be more similar to the monad than to the duad : so that, in either case, each monad would be prior to the duad. These specu- lators do not say so, however, at least they generate the duad^ first. Further, on the supposition that the duad itself is a certain unit, and the triad itself, both constitute a duad, from what, then, may I ask, does the duad itself consist )

CHAPTER IX.2

But one might also feel perplexed — since con- j nig^hatis tact, likewise, has not an existence in numbers, consecutive to but that which is consecutive has — in regard of Snityr^and whatsoever monads there is not to be found a other ques- medium, as those that are in the duad or the **°°'* . triad, whether what is consecutive is to be found in unity itself or not ; and whether the duad be antecedent to those things that are consecutive, or anything whatsoever to the monads )

^ Some copies read rhv hfKdda.

• These curious question* that follow in this chapter are <iuit« 

characteristic of the old Pnilosuphy. This chapter, which Bekkei reckons as ninth, some consider to be the eleventh. Vide nota^ p. 206*

382 THE METAPHTBIOS OF ARISTOTLE. [bOOK XtL

2 These diffl- "^^^ ^ ^^^^ manner, also, concerning the 8ul> .coities extend Sequent genera of number do these difficulties toe'Sfhlri^ ensue, both in the case of a line, and surface neraofnum- and bodj. Fcr some inquirers make lengtU

• • • "' from the species of the great and the small — ^for

instance, the lengths, as it were, from the long as well as from the short — but surfaces from wide and narrow, and bulks from what is profound and low ; and these are species of the great and the small In respect, however, of the principle that subsists according fo unity have different persons in different ways sought to establish their opinions upon points of this description : and in these, also, appear innumerable statements that are both impossible and fictitious, and which are contrary to all suppositions that are rational. For also it happens that they are severed in their connexion one with another, unless likewise the first principles are concomitant, so that there should exist what is broad and narrow, and long and short And if this be admitted, the surface will constitute a line, smd that which is solid a sur&ce. Further, however, angles, and figures, and such like, how will they be assigned ? and the same consequence ensues unto the points respecting numbers; for these are passive states belonging to magnitude : but magnitude is not a passive condition belonging unto these; as neither is length of straightness and what is curved, nor solids of what is smooth and rough. 8. Common Common, however, to all these assumptions is

subject of that which is allowable as a subject of perplexity doubt here . ^^ ^j^^ ^^^^^ ^^ spccies viewed in reference to

genus, when one may admit the subsistence of universals— namely, whether animal itself may reside in animal, or there be something therein that is different from animal itself) For, on the supposition that this is not separable, it will not create any doubt ; but, on the supposition of its being separ- able, as the persons who make these statements afiirm, it would not be easy to decide the question of doubt respecting unity and respecting numbers; and if such be not easy, it is necessary to say what is impossible. For when any one understands unity as involved in the notion of the duad, and, in general, in that of number, the question arises whe- ther does he pero^ve a o^rtain actual thing or something Alse?

CH. IX.] WHAT DOES NUMBER CONSIST FROlCl 383

Some, therefore, generate magnitudes from ^ Different matter of this description, but others from a modes of the point ; but a point seems to them not to be an S^Stude/^ unit, but to involve some similar quality with unity, and to belong to a diflferent matter — such as multitude belongs to, but which does not belong to multitude — respect- ing which not a whit the less it happens that one feels the same doubts. For if, in &ct, the matter is one, the same thing will be a line, and a sur&ce, and a solid, for from the same things will be derived that which is one and the same thing : but if the matters are many in number, and there will exist one matter of a line, and another of a surface, and another of a solid, assuredly, they will follow one another, or they will not ; so that the same consequences will ensue . likewise in this view of the case. For either the surface will not involve a line, or it will constitute a line.

Further, how it is admissible that number 5. Doesnum- should subsist from unity and plurality, there is ber consist of

. K 1 unity and plu-

no attempt made to show ; yet, howsoever, there- raiity, or unity fore, they happen to frame their statements, they *°*^ duautyt encounter the same difficulties as those who make number to consist from unity, and from the duad, which is indefinite. For one, indeed, generates number out of that which is pre* dicated universally, and not out of a certain multitude ; but the other from a certain multitude — ^yet from that which is primary : for they say that the duad is a certain primary multitude. Wherefore, there is no difference, so to speak, dis- coverable in all this ; but the same doubts wiil follow whether we assume it to be mixture, or position, or temperament, or generation, and whatever things of this kind there are.

But one might especially inquire — supposing ^ j^^^ ^^^ that each monad is one — from what does it does each mo- subsist? for, undoubtedly, each will not constitute °"^ *^®°'^* °^* unity itself at least : but it is necessary that it be derived from unity itself, and from plurality, or from a portion of plurality. The assertion, therefore, that the monad consti> tutes a certain multitude is impossible, since, at least, it is indivisible ; but the assertion that a monad is from a portion of multitude involves many other difficulties : for it is neces- sary, also, that each of the portions be indivisible, or that it constitute multitude^ and that the monad should be divisible^

384 THE METAPHTStCB OF ARISTOTLE. fBOClt XH

and that unity and the multitude should not be an element^ for each monad is not from multitude and an unit. Further, the person who puts forward this assertion does nothing else than make another number, for multitude is a number of indivisible things.

7. This con- Moreover, also, it is worthy of inquiry, in n'ected with tha respeot of those who make assertions in this way, number^i^ii^ whether number may be infinite or finite ? ^ for, as 0nite 01 infl. [t appears, the multitude was also finite out of

' which and imity finite monads were produced,

and multitude itself is different from infinite multitude. What sort of multitude, then, and what SGd: of an elementi is unity? And in like manner might ontt inquire, also, and as to a ret^pecting a point and the element, from which dros^ifsubTist* ^^®y make magnitudes ; for there is not merely, fr<>mr at least, one actual point. Therefore, at any rate,

one might ask the question from what each of the rest of the points will ensue ? for, undoubtedly, it is not from a certain interval, at least, and an actual point. But, assuredly, neither is it admissible that indivisible portions constitute the portions of an interval, as they do of the multitude from which the monads consist, for number is composed of . things that are indivisible ; but this is not the case with magnitudes.

8. Conclusion Now, all thesc Statements, as well as others of drawn. ^i^jg kin^^ render it evident that it is an impos- sibility for number and for magnitudes to possess a separable subsistence.

9. In the dis- Moreover, the discordancy of the original cordancyof frasncrs of this Theory respecting numbers is an these ^specula- indication that these things, not being true, are

iiiow «j"faise- fr*^^^* ^^^^ sourccs of confusion unto them. bood of their For somc of this school constituting matheraa- theories. ^.^ natures merely in addition to those that

are cognisant by the senses, when they came to perceive the difficulty and fiction attendant upon forms, have withdrawn their assent from the ideal or formal number,^ and have introduced mathematical number in its stead ; but others wishing to make forms to exist at the same time with the

' This point has been discussed in chapter vili. ^ 4nstotle qieans the Pythagoreans.

CB. IX.] DI600RD IN THB PTTHAOOBIO SCHOOLS. S65

numbers,^ but not discerning in what mannei>--on the sup- position of one's admitting tiiese as first principles — nmthe- matical number will subsist independent of that which is ideal, have constituted ideal and mathematical number as the same in definition ; since, in point of &ct, at least, mathe- matical number has been done away with in this hypothesis : for they introduce peculiar theories of their own, and such as are not consistent with mathematical science.

The philosopher, however,^ who first sought to establish the existence of both forms and num- took a true ^'^ bers, in obedience to the dictates of reason assigns jibTe^t^^^* a separate subsistence to forms and mathematical entities. Wherefore, it happens that all of this sect express themselves correctly in a certain respect, no doubt, yet not entirely with correctness. And themselves, likewise, acknow- ledge so much, as being persons who do not make the same statements at all times, but such as are contrary with one another.

And a cause of this is the following, that their j^ Theincon- suppositions and first principles are false. But sistencyorthe it would be difficult from things that are not re^uuTnh'e* properly disposed in regard of truth and false- fai«ehood of hood to frame an hypothesis with correctness, «""?""<' p««* according to Epicharmus; for in this case, as soon as the assertion is made, immediately also is apparent that which is not properly disposed in the before-mentioned respect.

Regarding numbers, however, let thus much suffice of the questions that have been started, tion concerning and of the definitions and distinctions that have n«n»b€wended. been framed. For a person who has been brought to a state of acquiescence in a theory would still the more be induced to yield assent fr*om the force of more numerous arguments; but nothing further will prevail towards inducing persuasion in the case of one who has not been prevailed upon to yield his assent already.

With respect, however,^ to first principles, and is. The theories first ca^ and elements, whatever aLrtions ^'^^

^ Suolx as SpeusippuB and Xenocrates.

' Thif is Plato, who reoognised the existence of both forms and DJmben, but coutended for their subsistence distinctively, wberetf tae Xenocratic dogma was to identify them.

' Some make chapter xii to commenoe here.

00

386 THB XVTAFHTSICB OF ARI8T0TLB. [bQOK fXt

vant to onto- those persons put forward, who are engaged ib thMe ^^the^ framing ^ their dbtinctions in regard of a B¥rt)Btaiioe supranattt. merely cognisant by the senses, some of these, indeed, have been declared in our Treatise on Physic; but the remainder of them are omitted, seeing that they do not belong unto the plan of inquiry proposed to be pursued in our present Work. But whaterer assertions are made by those who afi&rm that there exist different substanoes independent of those that fall under the notice of our senses, this is a subject for investigation consecutive to those states ments that have been already made upon this point 14. Amongst Since, therefore, certain persons affirm that naturaSsts there are such like ideas and numbers, and that some put for- the elements of these are elements and first JJid^iSTidSS, principles of entities, with respect to these we as the original' must inquire what it is they say, and how they "**' , say it. Those philosophers, then, who are for constitating as such existences numbers^ only, and such as are mathematical numbers, are to form subjects for examina- tion afterwards.

15 Two ftinda- ^^ thosc, howevcr, who affirm the existence of mental mis- the ideas, ouc should at the same time be able to idealists! Mid perceive both the manner of their existence, and the source of the matter of doubt that is prevalent regarding ^^' them ; for also do they constitute ideas as exist-

ing simultaneously with universal substances, and, again, they view them as involving a separate subsistence even from singulars. But that these statements are not possible has been previously made a matter of doubt. A cause, however, of their connecting these substances into one and the same species — I mean, with those persons who call ideas universals — is because they are not accustomed to constitute them as the same substances with sensibles.

16. The Ideal- Some singulai-s, indeed, therefore, that are iRts cannot involvcd in objects that fall under the notice of asa^u6?<rf our scnscs they considered to be in a state of their system, fly^^ ^j^^ ^q^ qj^q of them to remain in a condition

of permanence ; but that the universal subsists both beside these and is something that is different from them. But, as

' Aristotle has likewise eiamined these points in book L, and ia Physics, book L * FtWe book XUl.

OB. X.] IDEALISM NOTICED ONOE MORE. 387

we IiiEiire declared in the foregoing statements, Socrates com- munioated an i npulse, it is true, to this inquiry, by reason of definitions, jet he did not r^dly abstract them, at least, from singulars ; and, in thus not assigning them a separate subsistence, he formed his conceptions correctly.

And one could make this assertion evident j^ gocrates in from the actual occurrence of facts ; for without this theory is universals, of course, it is not possible to attain SSteM^f fact. Unto scientific knowledge : but the abstraction of them from singulars is a cause of the difi&culties that ensue in regard of ideas.

But some, as if it were necessary that if there are certain substances beside those that are cog- of tMs theory" nisant by sense and are in a state of flux, they »^"* univer- should involye a separate subsistence— some, I say, were not in possession of other natures, but brought forward those that are denominated universals; so that it happens that both universals and singulars are nearly the same natures. This, to be sure, then, would itself amount tp a certain essential difficulty in those statements that have been put forward above.

CHAPTER X.

What it is, however, that is attended with ^ ^^ ^^.^.^^ doubt, both unto those who affirm the existence or statements of ideas, and those who deny their existence, has, JS^^*^^ '^^ likewise, been observed previously,^ in the doubts enumerated at the beginning of this Treatise; let us, however at present, make a repetition of the statements made there. For if, indeed, one will not admit that substances involve a separate subsistence, and that the singulars of entities subsist in that manner as they are declared to do, such a view of things will overturn substance, as we are disposed to allow ; yet, should one assume that there are substances possessing a separate subsistence, how will he establish the elements and the first principles of them?

For, supposing them to subsist as a singular, and i. Results of Dot as an universal, entities of this kind will be ekmentt^J*^^

' Vide book II. chap, ii

388 TTHB HETAPHTSICB OV AKI8T0TL1S. [BOOK ZII.

separable sub- SB numerous OS elements, and the elements will HrtM^a^iU^ not be things capable of being made objects o| jruiar and not scientific knowledge. For let the syllables in a ^illustrated^' ^ovd be granted to be as substances, and let the to *^® «3j|i«We" elements of them be the elements of substances^

in such a case as this it is, therefore, necessary that BA be one, and that each of the syllables should be one, if not, in fact, universally and the same in species, yet each must be one in number, and this certain particiUar thing, and not equivocal ; and, further, they regard each one as the very thing itself. If syllables, however, be thus, so also will those things be of which syllables are composed There wiU not, accordingly, be more than one letter A, nor will any of the rest of the elements be more than one according to the very same mode of reasoning, in accordance with whi(£ neither is there any of the other syllables that is the same; but there is'one in one word, and another in another. But^ certainly, if this be the case, there will not exist any different entities beside the elements; but entities will constitute elements merely. And, further, neither will the elements be objects of scientific knowledge, for they are not universals ; but scientific knowledge is conversant about universals as objects of investigation.

8. Confirmed Now this is evident both from demonstrations^ S?Sinon"tr»f* ^^^ definitions ;2 for a syllogism is not completed tion and defi- bccausc this psurticular triangle has angles equal nition. ^^ ^^Q right angles, unless every triangle has

angles equal to two right angles; nor because this man is au animal, unless every man is an animal.

But, undoubtedly, if first principles are tmi- principierbe"* versal, or, also, if substances that are compounds universal, of thcsc are Universal, non-substance in such a substan^ be ' case wiU be a thing that is antecedent to sub* Jtencef*'^^ stance; for, what is universal does not consti*

tute substance: whereas the element and the first principle are universal. The element, however, and the first principle are things that are antecedent to those to which a first principle and an element belong. And, there-

^ As might be seen in the course of argument which Aristotle put fues in the Posterior Analytics. ' As is done in book YI. of this Treatise.

CH. Z.] FIRST PBINCIPLRS AS UNIYEBSALS 38V

fore, do all these consequences ensue reasonably, when both certain philosophers constitute ideas as out of elements, ami when, beside ideas and substances involving the same form, they may be of opinion that there is some one thing that has actually a separate subsistence. I^ however, there is no hindrance, but that, as in the case of the elements of speech, there should be a multitude of the letters A and the letters B, and that A itself and B itself should be nothing beside the multitude of these, on this account, at least, there will be infinite similar syllables.

But the fact that all seientifio knowledge is , ^^^^ ^^^ conversant about what is imiversal, so that it is deny their uni- necessary that both the first principles of entities Si"Sey'be°^ should be universal,and not separable substances — objecu of this feet, I say, most especially is attended with ■*'*®°^® doubtfulness above any of the assertions already mada The assertion that is made is, notwithstanding, in a manner true, and in a manner it is not true; for scientific knowledge, as also the act of scientific cognition, is twofold^ of which one subsists in capacity, but the other in energy.

Capacity, then, I mean that which subsists as 6. How it !• the matter of that which is universal and is in- ^^Jjjj^t® *' definite, belongs to what is universal and indefinite, about the uni- The energy, however, being definite, is likewise JfJ^e'rSS ^** this certain particular thing belonging to this tense it is not certain definite particular thing. But according '*'• to accident it is that the power of vision beholds universal colour, because this particular colour which it beholds is a colour; and what the grammarian speculates into as this par- ticular letter A is a letter A; since, if it be necessary that the firat principles should be imiversal, it is also necessary that those things which subsist from these should be universal : as is shown in the instance of demonstrations. And, if this be the case, there will be nothing that involves a separate subsistence, nor will thero be in existence actual substance. It is evident, however, that in a manner scientific knowledge is conversant about what is universal as an object of its in- vestigations, but that in a manner this is not the case.

BOOK xra.»

-*—^-

CHAPTER I.

. Are con- Resfeotino, indeed, then, this sobstanoe' Itl

dpietorth£gsr ^^^ much suffice to have been spoken ; bat that all constitute first principles as contraries — as we have observed in our Physics* — ^this is also the case in like manner respecting immoyable substances. Kit is not admis- sible, howeyer, that there should be anything prior to the first principle of all things, it would be impossible that the prin- ciple being anything else should be the first principle of all things ; as if one should say that a thing that is wlute was a first principle, not so £ax forth as it is something else, bat so far forth as it is white, and that this, notwithstanding, belong- ing to its subject is white, and is something different at the same time, for that will be antecedent. But, certainly, all things are generated from contraries as from a certain sub- ject; it is requisite, then, that especially this should take place in contraries. Always, therefore, will all contraries belong to a subject, and none of them will be separable. But, as also it appears, nothing is contrary to substance, and reason certifies to the truth of this statement. Not one, therefore, of contraries is strictly a first principle of all things^ bat a principle that is different from these. 2 Different Some, however, make one of the contraries as

theories on this matter; certain of them, on the one hand, consti- point. tuting the unequal as contrary to unity, that is, to

• This book, which some reckon as book XIV., is somewhat obBcnre,

It is not at all times easy to understand what particular set of opinioiis Aristotle is here setting forth : even Taylor, who is seldom baffled on such occasions, is doubtful too, and sesms to think that Aristotle is not expressing his sentiments seriously.

' That is, the Immovable and Eternal Substance which he mentions in the beginning of book XII. Some regard books XII. and XIIL AS one.

' Vide Physics, book I. chap. ir.

OH.L] CONTRARIES AS FIRST FBIKOIPLES. 391

equality, as if this were the nature of multitude ; but some, ou the other hand, making multitude or plurality contrary to unity. For niunbers are generated by some, no dcubt; from the unequal duad — I mean, the great and small ; yet a certain philosopher generates them from plurality: by both, however, this is done from the substance of unity. For the person who says that the unequal and the one constitute elements, but that the unequal, as a compound from great and small, constitutes the duad, speaks of inequality, and greatness, and smallness, as if they were one ; and he does /lot clearly determine that they are so in definition, but not in number. Yet, certainly, oven the first principles, which they call elements, they haye not correctly furnished an explanation o^ : some speculators amongst them, introducing along with unity the great and the small, affirm that these three are elements of numbers, the two first, as matter, but unity as form ; yet, according to others, the much and the few are elements, because the great and the small are naturally more peculiar properties of magnitude ; but, according to the systems of others, elements are things that are more uni- versal in the case of these— I mean, the exceeding and the exceeded.

There is not, after all, any difference, however, 3 j,^^ ^.^^^ between them, so to say, in regard of certain con- ence between sequences that ensue, unless in respect of logical SaterSS! difficulties merely, which they try to guard against, by themselves introducing logical demonstrations. Never- theless, it rests on the same mode of reasoning, at any rate — namely, the assertion of the exceeding and the exceeded being first principles, but not the great and the small, and that from the elements number is prior to the duad, for both are more universal. But now do they make an assertion of the one, but do not make an assertion of the other.

Others, however, have opposed diversity and ^ ^^^^ ^^^ difference to unity ; but some introduce, as prin- oppose diver- dples, plurality and unity. But if entities— as Sift^toSlSty. they are disposed that they should be — are generated from contraries, but to unity either nothing is con- trary, or if, then, there is likely to be anything, it is pliuality ; and if the unequal is contrary to the equal, and the diverse to the same^ and t«he different to the same— if all this be the casCi

392 THE HETAFHT8ICS OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK XIIL

most especially are those persons who oppose unity to pla«» rality in possession of a certain opinion that may be urged in their defence ; nor, howeyer, haye eyen these speculators adequately proyed their hypothesis. For imity will constitute, what is fewness ; for plurality is oppo&3d to paucity, but the much to the few.

5. Unity signi- Now, as regards unity, that it signifies a measure^ «cant of mea- is eyidcnt : and in eyery thing is there some*

• ^^' thing different that may be clasBed as a subjeo^--'-

as in harmony the diesis, and in magnitude a finger or foot, or something else of this description, but in rhythm the basis' or syllable. And in like manner, also, in weight there is a certain definite standard of measure, and according to the same manner, also, it is with all things : in qualities there is found a certain definite quality, but in quantities a certain definite quantity, and that which is indiyisible constitutes the measure ; for one sort of measure subsists according to the form, and another according to sense : so that there does !iot exist any substance that is essentially one.

6 The fore- "^^^ ^^ assumptiou rests on what is in ao-

g'oing rests on cordaucc with reason ; for unity signifies that it grounds. Constitutes a measure of a certain plurality or

multitude, and number that it is plurality mea- sured, and a multitude of measures. Wherefore, also, it may be concluded, reasonably enough, that unity is not number ; for neither is the measure a standard of measure,^ but a first principle, and the measure, and unity. It is necessary, how- eyer, always that measure should subsist as something that is the same in all things: as, for instance, if a horse is the meajsure, that such should be horses, and if a man, men ; but if man, and horse, and a god, are measures, they will perhaps be animal, and the number of them will be animals : but if man, and white, and walking be such, by no means of these will there be number, from the fact of all subsisting in one and the same subject according to number; yet, neyerthe- less, there will exist a number of the genera of these, or of some other such category.

' This Aristotle shows to be the sase in book IX., where he treats of unity.

^ fidffis literally means ** stepping," and then is transferred to meiia

• the rhythmical close in a sentence."

' I h&ve followed the reading rb lUrpov luvrptu

CH. 1.] UaiTY, INF^UALITT, AND PLURALITY. 898

But those who make the unequal as a cer- j Those who lain unity, but the indefinite duad from great snake ineqn*. and small, put forward an assertion very far ^^^^^^y* from the truth cf things that are apparent and possible; fol these are both piussious and accidents rather than subjects of numbers and magnitudes.^ For the much and few consti- tute passive states of number, and great and small of mag- nitude, just as even and odd, and smooth &nd rough, and straight and curved. Moreover, also, in addition to this error, it is necessary, likewise, that the great and the small, and all things of this kind, should be relatives; but relation, least of all the categories, constitutes a certain nature or sub* stance, and is subsequent both to quality and quantity ; and is a certain passive condition of quantity which subsists in relation to something, as has been declared, but does not con- stitute matter or anything else, and, in general, subsists in regard of what is common in relation to something, and in the parts and species of this. For there is nothing that is either great or small, or much or few, and, in short, which subsists as a relative, which is not much or few, or great or small, or a relative, at the same time that it is something else.2

That relation, however, in the smallest degree s. confirmation constitutes a certain substance, and a certain jf^gJ^lP'^^v entity, is indicated by the &.ct of there belonging nature of reia- to it alone neither generation, nor corruption,^ **®°* nor motion ; just as with respect to quantity there is increase and diminution, with respect to quality, alteration, with respect to place, motion, with respect to substance, gene- ration simply, and corruption. But this is not the case with respect to relation ; for, without being put in motion, at one time it will be greater, and at another time less or equal, so &r forth as the other is put in motion according to quantity. And it is necessary that the matter of everything ^ould be such as the thing itself in capacity : wherefore, also, will this be the case with the matter of substance; but rela*

^ In making a full stop at '^magnitudes,** and inserting the word yhp to commence the next sentence, I have followed Bekker, and differed from Taylor, who follows the same text as Didot. - ' Tl^ rendering, I conceive, explains the sense of the pasMge,

• Vide concluding chapters of book X.

894 THE METAPHTSIC8 OF ABIBIOTLa. [SOOK ZUl

tion constitutes substance neither in capacity nor in eneigja Therefore,^ it would be absurd — nay, rather, impossible — ^the constituting non-substance an element of substance, and a' thing that is antecedent to it, for all the categoiiies are what is subsequent.

9. Further rea- ^^^ further, elements are not predicated -aa son from the elements of each of the things of which they aife Si'^tf *" elements; but the much and few, both sepa- rately and simultaneously, are predicated of number, and the long and the short of a line, and a suriaoa is both broad and narrow. But i£ doubtless, also, there exists a certain midtitude of things to which always there belongs something, indeed, that is few — as, for example, the duad ; for, if this were much, unity would constitute fewness, and, if it were much absolutely, it would be much, after the same manner as the decade, and, if this be not the case, it will be more than this, nay eyen than ten thousand — how,, then, will number, on supposition of the foregoing, in this way consist of few and much, for either both ought to be predicated, or neither? but in the present instance only one of these is predicated.

CHAPTER II.

1. Can things ^^^ it is neccssary absolutely to examine an, eternal be com- to whether, then, it is admissible that things posite natures ^jj^pj^ ^^e eternal should be composed from

elements, for they will, in such a case, involve matter; for everything that is compounded of elements constitutes a composite nature. If, therefore, it is necessary that a thing be generated from that of which it consists, (both if it exists invariably, and if it were invariably generated,) but every- thing is generated from that which subsists in capacity ^ — I mean, the thing which is being generated, (for it could no* have been produced from that which is impossible, nor had it any existence before it was generated,) but that which is possible admits of subsisting in energy, and not of subsisting in this way ; — now, if this be the case, that number also, most eminently above all things, always subsists, or anytliing

^ This is established in book YIIL

CH. II.] ARE THINGS ETERNAL DISCE|IFTIBLE 1 B95

else that inyolves matter, it would admit of non-existence, just as that also which involves the space of one day, and that which possesses any amount of years whatsoever. Now, if this be so, thus much will be true of time also, when it is extended so iis to be without limit.

There would not then exist things eternal, since that is not a thing eternal which admits of i^ore the^ex- non-existence — ^as it has come in our way to treat [hingsTeternai of this subject in other portions of our philo- sophic Discourses.^ If that, however, which is now asserted be true universally, that no one substance is eternal unless it subsist in energy,^ and that the elements are the matter of sub- stance, there will not exist elements of any eternal substance from which, as inherent, this substance is composed.

But there are some persons who make an 3 Di^^ent indefinite duad the element, together with unity ; theories on this but as to the unequal, they reasonably enough ^° °** encounter difficulties, on account of coincident impossibilities, from whom so many merely of the difficulties are removed as necessarily arise — on account of the making inequality and; relation an element — to those who make assertions in this way. As many difficulties, however, as ensue independent of this opinion, these it is necessary should exist for those also both whether they constitute out of them ideal number, and whether they do so with mathematical number likewise.

Many, indeed, therefore, are the sources of the error with respect to these causes; but parti- fhe^'^noif-Jensr cularly does this remark apply to the doubt pre- this dogma valent downwards from Antiquity. For it appeared «^*"^"*«*- t9 the Philosophers of ancient days that all entities will be one — I mean, entity itself — unless one should adduce a solu- tion of the doubt, and at the same time would advance in the investigation in a line parallel with the theory of Parmenides-^

• • For tLis would you never know tc be * non-ens ; * * *

» For mstanoe, in the " De Ccelo."

• This principle Aristotle establishes in book XI., the way having

been prepared for it in book VIII. and the end of book X.

• The Leipsic edition takes these words as uttered by Aristotle him-

■elf; I have followed Didot in making them a quotation from Parmenidea.

SdG THE XETAPHTSIOS OF ABI8TOTLB. [BOOK Xllt •

but there is a necessity for showing, in regard of its existence^ that *' non-ens" has an existence; for in t£is way out of entity and something else will entities arise, supposing they are many. Although, in the first place, indeed, will tiiis be truf if entity is denominated multifariously ; for one entity sig- nifies that a thing constitutes substance, and another that it is quality, and another that it is quantity, and so of the rest of the categories, therefore. What sort of one will all the entities in such a case be, if non-entity will not have an existence — whether will they be substances, or passive oon-. ditions, and other things, truly, in like manner; or will they constitute all things, and the one will be this particular things and such like, and so much, and such other particulars as signifyone certain entity? But absurd — ^nay, rather, impossible — ^would be the assertion that one certain nature produced should be a cause, and that of this entity, and of the same entity, something should be this particular thing, and some- thing else should be endued with quality, and that this should belong to quantity, and that to the place where. In such a case, may I ask, from what sort of nonentity and entity will entities subsist? for also multi&riously is denominated nonentity, since, likewise, this is the case with entity; and non-man signifies that which is not this, and the non-straiglit the not being a thing of this description, and the being not- three cubits that which does not possess this particular quality of measure. Of what sort, therefore, of entity and nonentity are many classes of entities ? 5. The utter ^^^ ^"^ advocate of this opinion is desirous of

impossibiuty asserting what is false, and of calling this nature of is scheme. ^Q^Q^^i^jy q^^ ^f which and entity arise th<

many classes of entities that are generated. Wherefore, also, it was said that it is requisite that something that is false be supposed in the same manner as also geometricians allow, hypothetically, that a thing is pedal ^ which is not pedal. And it is impossible that these things be so; for neither dc geometricians suppose anything that is false — for that is not what is the object of the proposition in the syllogism — nor are things generated nor corrupted from that which consti- tutes nonentity after this mode. Since, however, nonentity,

^ Tida is Taylor^s traaBlaUon; the word means, what is of the niflasuro of a foot."

OB. U.] RELATION AM) PLURALnT. 397

according to its declensions,^ is styled in an equal number 01 ways with the categories, and besides this tbat is denominated nonentity which subsists as what is &'se, and that which subsists according to potentiality, from this generation takes place — fix)m that which is not-man but man in capacity is generated a man, and a thing that is white from that which is not-white in energy but white in capacity; and, in like manner, is it the case whether both one certain thing ia generated, and whether many are.

The inquiry, however, appears to be as to how g jj^,^ ^^^

• 'ens," which ispredicated according tosubstances, "ens" consti-

should constitute what is plural; for numbers, ^^'•P^^^^^y' and lengths, and bodies, are things that are being produced. Now, absurd is the inquiry as to how, indeed, entity which constitutes the nature of some particular thing is plural, and not also to inquire how it possesses either qualities or quan- tities. For, beyond all doubt, the indefinite duad is not a cause, nor yet the great and the small, that two things are white, or that there are many colours, or tastes, or figures, for these would be numbers and monads. But, really sup- posing that they attended to these inquiries, at least, they would have perceived also in them the cause; for the same thing, and that which is analogous or proportional, would constitute a cause. For the actual deviation is a cause also of the opposition that is under investigation by them, as subsisting between entity and unity, from which and from these such persons seek to generate entities, and have adopted their hypothesis in regard of relation and inequality, because there neither exists a contrary nor negation of these, but one nature of entities as both this particular thing and that particular quality.

And one ought, also, to institute this inquiry, 7. xheinqniiy namely, as to how relatives are plural, but not ^ow rei^^^es single. In the present case, however, the inquiry "* ^ is as to how there are numerous monads beside the first one ; but they do not also further inquire how there are many unequals beside the unequal. Although they employ and affirm the existence of the great, the small, the much, the few, of which numbers consist — the long, the shorty cf which

^ The Latin is casoB." Aristotle, in tke Orgazon, tues nhia word fco mean ** the mood of a syllogism."

398 THE XRTAPHTSICS O^ ABI8I0TLE. [BOOK Xm

length (Consists — the hroad, the narrow, of which the surface ii oumpobed — the deep, the low, of which the bulks ^ consist,-— and in* this way, fiirther, they without doubt afl&rm the existen3e of as many species of relatives as they may intro- duce. What, therefore, let me ask, is the cause with theso of their being plural ? It is requisite, therefore, indeed, as we have affirmed, that entity in capacity should be supposed as subsisting in each of these; but by one who makes these assertions is this also evinced — ^namely, that this particular thing constitutes an entity in capacity, and a substance, but nonentity in itself, because it constitutes a relative : just as if he should speak of something of such a quality, whidi is neither unity nor entity in capacity, nor a negation of unity nor of entity, but one certain thing which is something belong- ing to entities ; and much more will this be the case, as liM been declared, if he prosecuted the inquiry as to the manner how entities are plural, not through the investigation as to the mode those things that belong to the same predicamental line constitute many substances, or many things endued with qualities, but how they are many entities; for some things are substances, but some, passive states, and some^ relations.

I. The inquiry ^Q the casc, therefore, of the rest of the cate- ibout plurality gories, the subsistence of plurality involves the to the other matter also of some other investigation ; for, on categoric*. account of their not being separable, as the^ubject becomes, and is plural, and those things that are endued with qualities and quantities are plural likewise : although, at least, it be necessary that there should subsist a certain matter for every genus, save that it is impossible that it should involve an existence separable from substancesi. In the case, however, of those things subsisting as a certain particular thing, there is involved some reason in the inquiry how this particular thing is plural, if it will not be something particular, and this very particular thing, and a certain nature of this description. But rather does thif doubt originate from hence, how quantities are many sub- stances in energy, but not one. However, without doubt, even

^ 6fKovs. The word <^kos means either " a curve^'* and is akin tc ipfKvKot and the Latin "uncus," or'*' a bulk;** and it is then, aooordiiig to Buttmaiii to be referred to the root If7ic«, i¥fyKU¥»

ea, IH.] DIFFEJEiEVT FYTHAGOREAK theobies. 399

{hough this particular thing is not the same with ihat which is a certain quantity, it is not expressed how and why entities are plural^ but hew and why quantities are pluitil. For every number signifies a certain quantity, and the monad constitutes nothing else than a measure, because it is, according to quantity, what is indivisible. If, therefore, a quantity be different from that which subsists as a definite particular, from what it is that such definite particular results is not declared, nor how plurality subsists; but, if it is the same, the person who makes the assertion supports many contrarieties.

And one may also prosecute the inquiry, as 9. what regards number, whence are we to obtain our con- ^rSie exist-" fidence as to their existence] For in the doctrine enceof number, of ideas the Idealists furnish a certain cause for OT*mathema?* entities, since each one of the numbers con- ticau stitutes a certain idea; but the idea is the cause of exist- ence to other things, in some way or other, to be sure : for let this be assumed as a supposition of theirs. To one, how- ever, who does not think in this way, on account of discern- ing inherent difficulties independent of the doctrine of ideas, the case is different ; so that on this account, at least, he does not constitute them as numbers : but to one who introduces mathematical number, whence, may I ask, is it necessary even to have confidence in the existence of number of such a description, and in what respect will such be serviceable to other things] For neither does such a one sa^ that it is the cause of anything who affirms its existence; but such a one asserts it as being a certain nature which involves an esseu^ tial subsistence : nor does it appear that it is a cause, for all the speculations of arithmeticians, as has been stated, will likewise have an existence as conversant with objects cogni^ sant to our senses.

CHAPTER III.i

Those, therefore, that posite the existence of 1. Those who ideas, and say that these are numbers, should identify ideM • make an attempt to inform us how and why they ^ "'^ '

• Arisiotle has already taken notice of these variouB BubdivittonP of

tfte theoriw about nnmberi^ in book XII. .

400 THE METAFHTSIGS OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK XJTL

subsist; since, acoording to the expasition^ of each, every ide$ constitutes one certain thing that is different from what we regard the many as being. Doubtless, howeyer, since these things are neither necessary nor possible, neither is it to be affirmed that mathematical number exists separably, or numbers on accoimt of theso at least But the Pytha*- with things; goreaus, on accoimt of their perceiving many passive qualities of numbers as subsisting in bodies cog- nisant to the senses, made entities to be numbers, I admit, not involving, however, a separable existence ; but they regarded entities as compounded from numbers. And why sol be- cause the passive qualities of numbers subsist in Harmony, or mathema- ^^^ *^ *^® Heaven, and in many other things, ticai entities To those, however, who maintain that ma- with numbers, j^^jguj^tical number exists merely, nothing of this kind is it admissible for them to affirm — that is, if they follow their own hypothesis ; but it was asserted by them, because of these will there not exist systems of scientific knowledge. We assert, however, that the case stands^ as we affirmed formerly. And it is evident that mathematical numbers do not possess a separated subsistence ; for, if they did, the passive qualities of those that have actually been separated would not have been resident in bodies. 2. Aristotle's ^^® Pythagoreans, indeed, therefore, as regards criticism on the a point of this description, are not deserving of pythagorics. reprehension in any way; but so far, however, as they constitute physical or natural bodies out of numbers, or, in other words, from things not possessing gravity nor having lightness, tilings involving lightness and heaviness, — so faXf I say, they seem to speak respecting another heaven, and other bodies, but not of those that &11 under the notioe of our senses.

8 Those Those, howevcr, who constitute number a« 

Who assert the involving a Separable subsistence because ax- sSenc?©?^ ioms will not exist as inherent in objects cog- numbers, nisant to the senses; the assertions, likewise,

^ This is the way Taylor renders this passage. The Latin version, howeyer, would construe it as follows: — " Those who lay down that ideas exist, in their making an abstraction of every general, independent ol many singulars, in this way make an attempt to declare why, and from what caue&, each is one.** Some copies read wtp\ instead of iropd r^ roXAd ' As he has done in book XIL

OB. III.] NUMBEB8 AND M4THEMATI0AL ENTITIES. 401

of the existence of the other, that is, of the mathematical entities, will be true; and these serve to cause a soothing sensation^ in the soul: and they suppose that numbers exist and involve a separable subsistence ; and in like manner is it the dase with the magnitudes of the mathematicians. It is evident, therefore, that also the adverse argument will enun- ciate things that are contrary, and the point which just now has been declai'ed a matter of doubt must be decided by those who speak in this way — namely, as to why, on the sup- position of these things not by any means being inherent in objects cognisant to our senses, the passive quaUties of them should be in sensibles.

But there are some who, from the &ct of the ^ «^ ^ ^

. . i» 1. J • J J. 'i.' .4. What has

existence of boundaries, and extremities — vi&, led to this from a point being the boimdary of a line, Jomef ^**^ and again, a line of a sur&ce, and a sur&ce of a solid — imagine that natures of this description exist necessarily. Therefore one ought also to discover, as r^ards this reason, whether it may not in reality be very weak; for neither are extremities substances, but rather do all these constitute limits or boundaries, since both of walking, and, in general, of motion, there exists a certain limit. Is, therefor^ this limit some particular thing, and a certain substance 1 but to indulge in such a supposition is absurd. Certainly, however, ad- mitting that they have even an existence, all of them would be found amongst those objects that &11 under the notice of our senses, for the argument itself proclaims their existence in these. Why, then, will they involve a separable sub- sistence

But, further, would one who was not very 5. why prior credulous investigate respecting, therefore, of gJJ^^'J^^^j' course, every number and mathematical natures, to subsequent as to why such as these as are prior contribute ""^' nothing to those that are subsequent ; for, according to those who say that mathematical natures merely exist, though number should not have any existence, yet magnitudes will have a subsistence, and though even these were not in

^ o«/yc«~"adblandii]ntiir.*' The word literally is applied to animab in their fawning ; e,g. dogs wagging their tails. I cannot conceive what has given rise to Taylor^s tnmslating, causing perturbation;* he, in all Ukelihoody followed some different reading.

402 THB ICBIAPHYaiCB OF ARI8T0TLB. [BOOK ZIII.

exifltenoe, yet still would the soul exist, and such bodies as are cognisant to our senses.

It does not, howeyer, appear from the pheno- tion^pSSr* na®i"^ *^* Nature is devoid of a connexion with tqvLtiLy to herself, just in the way that a vicious tragedy

• • • • might be. With those, however, who are for

establishing the subsistence of ideas, this, no doubt, escapes them j for they constitute magnitudes out of matter and number — ^from the duad, indeed, lengths, and from the triad, surfisuses, perhaps, and from the tetrad, solids, or also from other numbers, for there is no difference. But whether, one may ask, will these exist, at any rate, as ideas, or what, pray, will be the manner of their subsistence, and in what way are they contributors to entities, as to their being ? for, as with mathematical entities, so do these neither contribute anything in that way. But, assuredly, neither of these doth there exist, at least, any theorem, unless one should choose to put in motion mathematical entities, and to create certain peculiar opinions of his own : but it is not difficult for those who put forward any description of hypotheses whatsoever to be able to be prolix, and to speak without ceasing.

Those, therefore, who cement together^ mathe-

itiiy

icali

tors having constituted two numbers, the one of form, and the other of a mathematical nature, by no means either have declared, or would they be able to say, the manner how this is effected, and from what mathematical number will be compounded. For they make it intermediate between formal and sensible number. For, if we suppose that it is composed of the great and small, the same will it be with that which is belonging to the ideas ; but if from some other thing that is small and great, this will not be the case, for number produces magnitudes. But if he will speak of any- thing different, he will afi&rm the existence of many elements ; and if the first principle of each thing constitutes a certain original unity, there will be in the case of these a something that is common — ^namely, unity. We must likewise investigate how, also, these many are one, and, at the same time, in

npoffyXi^X^l'*^^^' ^^ yrord ia akin to yxitrxpcs, which meant "gluey."

identi^^nathe- Hiatical entities with ideas are in this way guilty matic^ entities of error; but the earliest amongst these specula-

III.] HATHEHATIOAL ENTITIES AND IDEAS. 403

regard of the fact that it is an impdisibility that number should be produced otherwise than from either unity and an indefinite duad.

Therefore are all these consequences irrational; Jigt^c^^yJ^g"' and they are at yariance both themselves with trated. one another, and with those statements that are reasonable, and there appears to be inherent in them the " long discourse " of Simonides. For a long discourse^ is like that of the slaves, when no wholesome assertion is made. But also they appear with respect to those elements, the great and the smetU, to bawl out as if they were being dragged away with violence, for by no means are they able to generate number without doubling that which proceeds from unity.

But it is absurd — nay, rather, a certain one of 9 ^^^ ^^^ the impossibilities of this system — to introduce these systems generation in the case of entities that are eternal. I^neration't

As to the Pythagoreans, indeed, therefore, they ^^ y^ ^^ have no need to labour under doubt whether PytbagoreanA they do not introduce or do introduce genera- ^^^ Physicists, tion; for they manifestly affirm that unity has been esta- blished, and that, accordingly, what is immediately nearest to the Infinite, whether from surfaces, or from colour, or from seed, or from such things as they are at a loss to declare, is so, because it has been dragged forward, and bounded by a limit or termination. Since, however, they frame Cos- mogonies, and wish to express themselves physically, it is just that they should institute some inquiry ccnceming Nature, but as a departure from the present method of in- vestigation ; ^ for we are engaged in the investigation of the first principles belonging to things that are immovable: wherefore, also, we must examine into the generation of numbers of this kind.

^ d fuucpos \6yos. As we learn from the oommentators, the allusion hsre is to certain portions of the writings of Simonides, which he styled A^yoi "Araicroif " loose thoughts," as a modem author would style them. In these Simonides mentions ihe sort of language that it would be natural to suppose slaves would employ if questioned by their masters to give an accoimt of themselves as to certain derelictions of duty. " These . would be very tedious, and long, and verbose," says Simonides, ** but nothing to the point, no sound reasoning ; not evea would Uie apology contain a probable argument.**

' Ai Aristotle hai already shown repeatedly in this Treatiat.

dd2

404 TBI MBTAFHTSIOS OF ABISTOTLB. |2O0K XlBw

CHAPTER IV.

1. Generation Thbt do not speak of the generation of th^ In the system odd number, therefore, as if it were a thing of Pythagoras, gyi^jgjj^ ^)^q^ ^f ^^q gy^^ there 18 in existence a

generation ; but the even, in the first instance, certain specu- lators constitute from unequals — I mean, the great and small equalised. It is, then, with them necessary that in- equality should be prior to the equalisation of these. I( however, there always existed things in a state of equalisa- tion, they would not haye been unequal at a prior period; for of that always existing there is not anything prior. Wherefore, it is evident that it is not for the purpose of speculation that they make the generation of numbers. 2 The relation ^* involves, howovor, a doubt,^ and a subject- between ele- matter for reprehension, to one who acquires ™®2yoS??. **^* knowledge judiciously, how disposed, in respect

of the good and the fair are elements and first principles. The doubt I mean is as follows : namely, whether any of those is such as we are disposed to denominate the good itself and the best, or whether they are not of this sort, but are of subsequent growth ? for the difficulty appears to be acknowledged by Theologians — ^by certain amongst those of the present day — who do not actually make an assertion of this description, but who maintain that from the principle of progression found in the nature of entities, the good and the fair make their appearance on the stage of Creation. This, however, they do, cautious about falling into a real difficulty which ensues unto the systems of those who affirm, as some do, that unity constitutes a first prmciple of things, s Where th ^^* * ® difficulty to which I allude is not

difficulty lies in Started on accouut of this — ^namely, their ascribing this contro. u ^y^^ ^^^ ». ^^^ ^ first principle as a thing that ia

implanted in it — ^but firom th0 fact of their making unity a first principle, and a first principle as an element,

• Some make chapter iv. to commence with these words, bot I havl

followed Bekker mi Didot

OH. lY.] THE GOOD A PARAMOUMT FBINOIPLBi 400

and number as consisting from imitj. But the poets — ^those of the early ages^ — acted in a way similar to this, so far as they assert the dominion and the rule not of these first principles, such as Night, and Hearen, or Chaos, or even Oceanus, but of Jupiter.

Notwithstanding, to these persons does it 4. Antiquity, happen that they assert things of this description ^^^^® ^^^j on account of their changing the dominative antecedence of principles of the Universe; because those of ^^ r6 dtaesu, these speculators that, at any rate, were for adopting prin- ciples of a mingled description,^ and in respect of their not broaching their theories in a £a.bulous garb---for example, as Pherecydes ^ and certain others — ^have, in point of feet, esta- blished " the best " as the earliest principle of generation. And this is the case also with the Magi,^ and with the Sophoi or sages of a subsequent period, such as both Empedodes and Anaxagoras; one of whom constituted Harmony as an element, and the other made Mind a first principle of things. Of those Philosophers, however, who asserted the existence of immovable substances, some, I admit, affirm unity to con- stitute the actual good; they, however, in the most eminent degree regarded unity to constitute the gid>8tance of the good. The matter of doubt, of course, therefore, comes to this — as to what way scientific men ought to express themselves on this subject.

It would, however, be surprising if in that - mj^ , . which is original, and eternal, and most self- elvn^m^* '

^ The speculationB in this chapter are moat remarkable, indeed, and well worthy of the attention of the student. The meaning plainly ia Uiis, that the poets recognised in the element of good apparent in things, a paramount principle of creation.

^ This word perhaps applies to ol ipxoprts ; that is, the domlnatiye principles which were of a mingled description, were put forward by Anaxagoras and Empedocles.

^ Pherecydes was a very ancient philosopher, and a very enlightened one according to Cicero, Tusc Qusest. lib i. c. 16. Diogenes Laertiua makes him one of the ** wise men of Greece." As to his philosophy, we are given to understand that he coincided with his contemporary Anaximander in most points.

• As to the Magi, the student will do well to consult, amongst

many other sources of information. Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c viii.; Stanley's History of Chaldaic Philosophy, pu't 16; Diogenes LaertiuJk book I., Introduction ; and Hyde, De Religione Persarum.

406 THB METAFHTSIOS OP ABISTOTLB. [bOOK ZUI.

"ie^*crwSion. sufficient for its own subsistence, this rery origi* nal attribute — I mean> the self-sufficiency and the conservation of itself — should not be discovered as that which constitutes what is good. But, undoubtedly, not on account of anything else is it incorruptible or sufficient to itself, than on account of its existence or condition of sub- sistence after an excellent mode. Wherefore, indeed, the assertion of the existence of a first principle of this descrip- tion appears reasonable, as &r as its reality is concerned. 6. Doei the ^^^ *^^s» howevcr, to be unity, or, if not unity,

TO dyaBop eon- both an element and an element of numbers^ is stitute unity t impQggjjjiQ . f^j, much difficulty is coincident with

an hypothesis of this kind, and certain speculators, in their attempts to avoid this, have lost sight of the point in ques- tion, when they acknowledged unity to constitute an original first principle and an element of things, but a principle and an element of number, however— I mean, mathematical number. For, supposing this to be the case, all the monads would become a something that is good, and there would exist a certain fair supply of things which are good.

Further, if forms constitute numbers, all the sowedby^the' forms will be such as some certain thing or other Idealist. that is good. Notwithstanding, let any one

suppose the existence of ideas of any description whatsoever he feels disposed to admit ; for, allowing that they are to bo classed amongst things that are good ^ merely, ideas will not constitute substances : but if, also, they are to rank amongst substances, all animals and plants are good, and the parti- cipants of these likewise.

8. Danger of Now, both do thcsc absurdiUes concur with idX'an? fh?* *^^ hypothesis, and what is contrary constitutes rn dfa»6v toge- an element, whether we assimie it to be plurality ther. Qj. inequality ; and great and small will amount

to what is an actual eviL Wherefore, no doubt, a certain philosopher avoided the connexion of the good with unity, as if, on this hypothesis, it would be what is contrary, since generation arose from contraries, that the nature of plurality should necessarily be evil. Some, however, affirm the unequal to be of the nature of eviL

• This reminds one of the doctrines of Plato, in his yearnings after

the reai^ticQ of the various virtueii in form.

OH. V.l irO SYSTEM CAN BEST ON A DENUL OF THIS. 407

Therefore do all these entities happen to have « « „ . *v** a share m what is eyil, except unity — ^which con- way is the good stitutes actual unity — ^and we find that numbers ^ capacity, participate in a more unmixed state than magnitudes; it also follows that evil is a place of the good^ and that it shares in and desires after that which is subject to decay of itself; for one contrary is corruptive of another contrary. And if it is the case, as we have affirmed, that matter constitutes everything that subsists in capacity^ — as fire in capacity is the matter of fire in energy — evil will constitute the good itself in potentiality.

Now, all these results concur partly in con- ^^ sovaee of sequence of their constituting every first prin- the foregoing ciple as an element, and partly in consequence ®p^*°°*- of their making contraries first principles, and partly because they make unity itself a first principle of things, and partly because they regard numbers as first substances, and such as involve a separable subsistence, and because they take the flame view of the species or forms.

CHAPTER V.

If, therefore, also, the non-positing of the good j^ ^^^^ ^j. in the rank of first principles, and the positing it lows on the non-

., i n J J X i_ -L X • • classification of

in the way we have alluded to, be what is impos- the t6 dtaObv sible, it is evident that first principles are not JriSSSils^* correctly assigned, nor the primary substances. Yet one does not form his opinions correctly, either if he should assimilate the first principles of the Universe to the principle belonging to animals and plants ; because from things that are indefinite and unfinished there arise always things that are more perfect Wherefore, also, in the case of the Primary Substances, they affirm that it happens in this way, that neither does any particular entity constitute actual unity. For in objects that are here — that is, that fidl under the notice of our senses — ^are the first principles perfect from which these objects derive their original; for man begets nan, and the seed is not that which ia first. But it would be absurd, also^ the making a place along with mathematical

408 THE METAPHTSICS OF ARI8T0TLB. [bOOK Xltt

Bolids — for the place of singulars is peculiar to them ; where* fore are they topically or locally separable, mathematical «)lid8, however, are not situated in any certain locality ; and the assertion that they will be situated, indeed, somewhere^ and at the same time not to say what the place ia^ is absurd.

But it would become those who say that nilmber orip entities are compounded of elements, and that first p^Spiest li^nibers are the first of entities, that they should, by thus making a division as to how one thing derives an existence from another, express themselves in such a way as to make us acquainted after what manner number originates from certain first principles, whether this takes place by means of mixture.

s. Is it by mix- Neither, however, is everything that has tvef undergone mxiture different fix>m that which

is being produced; and nnity will not be a thing that involves a separable subsistence, nor a difierent nature: but they wish that it should be after this manner. Does orbysyn- number, however, we may ask, subsist through thesis? composition as a syllable ? But in this case it

is requisite that there shoidd be position; and he who employs his understanding thereupon will comprehend unity apart from plurality. Number, then, will constitute this, that is, a monad and plurality, or unity and inequality. And since that body which subsists from certain entities subsists partly as frx)m things that are inherent, and partly that this is not the case, in which, may I ask, will number be found ? for those things which do not subsist in this way, as frx)m those that are inherent, are no other than those of nth w which there is generation. Does it, however, a thing is txom then, subsist 88 &x)m Seed 1 But it is not pos- ^' Bible for anything to proceed forth from what is

indivisible. Shall we say, however, that it arises from a con- trary that does not involve a permanent subsistence? But whatever things subsist in this manner, are also from some- thing else that does possess a permanent subeastence. 4. Different Since, therefore, as regards unity, one Philo-

theories of Bophcr, iu &ct, positcs it as & thing that is con- duced^lfferent^ trary to plurality, and another as what is cou- lesuits. trary to inequality, employing unity as if it were

equality, number should, therefore, subsist as if it were froxa

ok T ' THB GAUSALITT OF NUHBEBS. 409

contraries. There will then be something else from whiok, aa involving a permanent subsistence, a generation of the other is brought about Further, why then, at all, are the other things of this sort subject to decay, as many as have their existence from contraries, or wherein contraries are to be found 1 — why, I say, are they subject to decay, even though they may arise from everything ) and yet that this be not the case with number. For respecting this nothing is de- clared, although a contrary, which is both inherent and not inherent, destroys that which is contrary to itself; as^ for instance, discord, mixture : and yet, at any rate, such ought not necessarily to be the case ; for the former is not contrary to the latter, at least.

There has been, however, no determination arrived at either, as to the mode in which num- J; JJ'^^^Iode bers are causative of substances, and of existence, of the eauiauty whether as limits, for example, points of magni- ®'°**™*>«"«  tides ; and according to the arrangements adopted by Eurytus, that a certain number belongs to a certain thing, as this number belongs to man, and that to horse, just as they who refer numbers to figures, the triangle and the square, thus assimilating the forms of plants to pebbles of calcidation )^ Or, shall we say that this is the case with the ratio or the symphony of numbers? And, in like manner, it is so af regards man, and everything else: but, as regards then the passive states, how, may I ask, are they numbers^ such as the white, and sweet, and hot?

That numbers, however, do not constitute sub- g Numiws do stances, and that they are not causes of form, is not constitute plain; for reason, that is, the formal principle, ***^*"®*»* constitutes substance, but number constitutes matter, as the number or substance of flesh or bone. In this way are there three of fire, and two of earth : and number, whatsoever it may be, is invariably of certain things, and constitutes either what is fiery or earthy, or of the nature of a monad. Sub- stance, however, is that which consists in being so much with relation to so much, according to mixture; but this no longer constitutes number, but a proportion or ratio of the mixture of corporeal numbers, or certain other things. Neither, therefore, does number constitute a cause in respect of pro* ^ For the alluBion contained in these words^ vide note p. 41&

410 THE METAFHTBIOB OF ABISTOTLB. [bOOK XSOk

duction, nor does it as number exist at all, nor as such num- ber as is of the nature of a monad, nor as matter, nor as the formal principle, and the form itself of things. But, undoubtedly, neither does it constitute that on accotint of which a thing subsists — I mean, of course, the final cause of things.

CHAPTER VI.

« wv.*i ♦!. One, however, might also doubt what *'tha ^^r^hltVr'^ weU*' is which originttes from numben, if mix- SlUS'Sr?"" t^re is to be found in number, either in that which is rational, or in that which is odd. For now would nothing more conducive to health arise from water and honey being thrice three times mingled ; but it would be of more service in that way supposing liiat there were to subsist no proportion in the condiments, but that it be watery, or, in number that which is an immixed ^ntitf^ Farther, the ratios — I mean those belon^g to the mixtures ^-consequent upon the addition of numbers are not foimd in numbers themselves, as the ratio between 3 and 2 is that of 3 : 2, not thrice two, however, for there ought to be the same geuus in the multiplications. Wherefore, it is necessary that both by the A should be measured the order in whid^ the ABG is to be found, and by the D, that which DEZ will assume. Wherefore, there must be the same measure in all things. Therefore, there will be of fire BEGZ, and of water the number twice three.

2. conse- But if it be necessary that all things should

raakinriSi participate of number, it is requisite, likewise^ things share in that there should be a concurrence of many things numbers. ^^^^ ^^ ^j^^ g^^j^g^ ^^^ ^.j^^^. ^^^^^^ ghoidd be the

same number for this and for another. Is this thing, there> fore, a cause, and on account of this is there anything tha* is doue,^ or is it obscure, such, for instance, as is a certait number of the revolutionary movements of the sun ; • and, again, of those of the moon ; and the life and age of each of the animal creation, at least) What obstruction, then, I may ask, is there to some of these being square, but others of them ^ TpayfM. ifl the thing done, irpd^ts the method of doing it.

CB. VI.] IS THIS tmSSORT SUPPORTED BY FACTS 1 413

cubical and equal to each other, and others twofold. For there is no hindrance to this : but it is necessary that they be intimately connected with these, if all things are wont to participate in common of number; and if it should be admis- sible that things which differ from each other should fall under the same number. Wherefore, if the same number happens to be found in certain things, those will be the same with one another, having the same form of number; as sun and moon will be the same, having the same numeric^ form. But why are these causes of things? There , „

•', :% -, . J ®ii S« The causa-

are seven vowels, no doubt, and seven chords or iity of numbers harmonies, and seven Pleiades,^ and within seven JJJnws^^ ^' years some animals cast their teeth — some, at any rate, do so, and some do not — and seven in number were those warriors that undertook the famous .expedition against Thebes.^ Is it, then, the case, because such a particular number is naturally suited for such purposes, that on this account either those chieftains amounted to seven, or that the Pleiades consist of seven stars ; or were the " Septem contra Thebas" so on account of the gates of Thebes, or through some other different cause ) If, however, we reckon in this manner, and assign twelve stars to Arcturus, at lea^t, yet others a^ree in assigning a greater number; since XYZ they affirm to constitute symphonies, and that because those are three, these also are three. But that there may be ten thousand things of this sort no one in the least feels any concern ; for G and R would be one sign. But if because each of the others is twofold, but another is not so— now the cause is, inasmuch as there being three places, one in each is added to S — on this account there subsist three only, but not because there are three symphonies, since there are, at least, more symphonies than three ; yet in the present instance there cannot any longer be more than three. Now, these philoso- phers, also, are not unlike the ancient interpreters of Homer,^ who discover minute, but fail to observe important, similitudes.

• Aristotle himself wrote a work upon astronomy, which has not come

down to us.

' This alludes to the well-known defence of Thebes against the Argives, led on by Polynices against his brother Eteocles, who chose six chieftains beside himself— just as Aristotle states— that there might be one commander posted at each of the gates.

' Possibly this sneer may have been leTelled against those phi-

413 THB MBTAPHTSI08 OF ABI8T0TLB. [BOOK THk

♦. Thecypiniont Certain speculators, however, assert that there afothen on are many such like particulars : as, for instanceb •^ •»««•• eveu as regards midia, one medium k r^ whereas another is eight, and a verse of seventeen feet is equal in number to these . Now they say that the verse ascends on the right in nine syllables, but in eight on the left, and that the distance is equal, both in letters from A to Z, and in musical instruments from the most grave sound to the most acute, the number of which constitutes an equality in the all-various melody of the Heaven. One ought not, however, to observe things of this kind (for no one would entertain a shadow of doubt as regards them) ; nor ought we to make any assertions concerning them, nor to attempt to discover them in things that are eternal ; since, also, they are to be discovered in things that are subject to corruption.

Those natures, however, in numbers that are

lity of numben the subjects of applause, and the things contrary

proved;** *^ these, and in general those that fell under our

notice in the mathematical sciences — as some^

losophers of the very early ages who sought to win assent to their theories by enlistmg in their favour the sanction of the popular Religion. Now, this many of them endeavoured to accomplish by attempting to prove their doctrines to be in harmony with certain systems of science capable of being extracted, as they alleged, from an aUegoricoL interpretation of Homer's poetry. Supposing, however, that Aristotle here directs his attack against the " Critics/' technically so termed, such censure must be received with some latitude, for we have the iiames of, at least, four of these Critics, ^e from the imputation of such extravagances in interpretation, and which, as such, have been indissolubly united with the Iliad and Odyssey, namely, Zenodotus^ Aristophanes of Byzantium, Aristarchus, and Crates. At the same time, we must allow that the complaint uttered in the text has been reiterated by those who have had occasion to examine into the critical labours of Antiquity upon the Homeric writings. Indeed, in a matter of the kind, Aristotle himself was no contemptible authority, for he

Eroduced poems from his own pen, one of which has been preserved by dogenes Laertius (p. 183, Bohn's Trans.). In the '* Poetics," too, we can see how completely he has mastered the difficulties of his subject, and we have reason to think that he wrote more at large upon it in other works — e. g. his UepX Uoiiirmv — that have unfortunately perished. In fact, there was no quarter of the regions of knowledge — the " globus iutellectualis," as Bacon would say — so far as they had been explored by mankind at that primitive period of the world's nabtory, but had been fully penetrated by the sagacity of this extraordinorj nan.

OH. VI.] ITS PRACTICAL ABBURDITT CONFIRMED. 413

in &ct, affirm them to be, and constitute them as causes of Nature— appear to persons, at least, who view the matter iii this light, to escape their notice ; for according to no one of the modes of those that are defined respecting first principles is any of them causative. And yet they do make manifest that point, namely, that ** the well " has a subsistence, and that to the co-ordination in the case of the fair belong the odd, the straight, the equal, the powers of certain numbers. For at the same time subsist seasons, and such a particular number, and other things, therefore, of this sort — such as they gather from mathematical theorems — these all involve this power or capacity. Wherefore, also, they seem like unto casual coinci- dences ; for they are accidents, no doubt, yet all are appro- priate to one another, the analogical, however, is one. For in each category of entity is there the analogical ; as the straight in length is analogous to the even in superficies, to, perhaps, the odd in number, and in colour to the white.

Further, numbers which are in the species do ^ . .

not constitute causes ^ of thmgs harmonic, and the shown in the like ; for those that are equals in the species Jumber!™*^ difier from each other, for likewise do the monads differ. Wherefore, on account of these things, at least, we must not constitute them species. As regards the conse- quences, indeed, then, that ensue, both these, and even still more than these, can be collected. They appear, however, to furnish a proof of the fact that the supporters of the Ideal Hypothesis fall into many errors respecting the generation of them, and that in no way can a connexion be traced in their systems ; inasmuch as mathematical species do not involve a subsistence separable from sensibles, as some affirm; nor do these constitute the first principles of things.

^ The causality of numbers Eurytus — its great patron — ^was in the habit of proying to its opponents by the following curious illustration : — Smearing a wall with a substance capable of being impressed with a sketch of the human figure, he would then take numerous small pebbles of various colours, and fix them within the outlines of the face, hands, and BO on, till all of them were exhausted. At other times he would do the same in the case of the picture of a plant. The amount of pebbles thus employed he would assign as the causative number of man or plant in the reality of things. This plainly is the allusion in the words (chap, y), d^ojLtoiotWat tfr^<^oif riis dil>opfids tSp <l>vT»y, ** por- traying the foims of plants by means of pebbles." This Euzytus was a Pythagorean, and a disciple of Philolaus.

QUESTIONS

on

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS,

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

Thebb has prevailed some diversity of opinion as to the import of the word Metaphysics, rd ucr& rd ijiva-iKa,

Man's natural thirst for knowledge is indicated by what fiRCt, according to Aristotle P

State the Stagyrite's object in reminding us of our natural desire of knowledge.

A graduated scale of intelligence is observable in the animal creation.

Why is this fact in Natural History brought under notice P

Amongst the senses, we award the superiority to the sense oi sight. WhyP

What distinguishes man from the other animals, in respect of his means of acquiring knowledge P

Point out the difference between Art and Experience.

Show that you understand Aristotle's object in noticing this difference.

Why does Aristotle award the superiority to Art compared with Experience, and how does this bear on the science of Ontology P

What, in fact, is the distinguishing trait in the scientific man P

How does Aristotle account for tne admiration that is bestowed upon the inventor of any art whatsoever P

Signify the difference between animate and inanimate things, in regard of the fulfilment of their proper functions.

The wonder evoked by clever discoveries is entirely independent of their utility. Show this to be the fact.

Historical proof of this.

In what part of Aristotle*s works are we to look for his distinctioi between Art and Soieni^ \

OH. III.] <)UESTIONS ON ARI8T0TLB*S METAFHTSICS. 415

As regards the experienced, why do we find them compassing their objects more successfully than the mere theorist ?

Aristotle illustrates this from the science of Medicine.

When do we award the superiority to Experience over Art ? And when do we the iame to Art over Experience ?

State Aristotle's object, that he has in yiew, in undertaking his present Treatise on Metaphysics.

CHAPTER II.

Allowing Metaphysics to be conversant with causes, as such, what inquiry presents itself next in order ?

What determines this precbe order ?

Give an analysis of Aristotle's Sophos, or " Wise Man," as well as of his Sophia, or Wisdom ?

Mr. Maurice well points out in what respect Aristotle in these Analyses departed from his predecessors.

Gould you show how these Analyses bear on the subject of meta- physeal science P

What do we term Science " par excellence P"

Knowledge after all is eligible for its own sake. Gould you prove thisP

The purely speculative character of the higher sciences is mani- fested-in the earliest systems of Philosophy.

Now, this fact bears immensely on the question of the dignity of Metaphysical Science.

What object has Aristotle in his mention of Simonides, in tliis second chapter P

Why is it not correct to ascribe Philosophy to an origin merely human P

Aristotle mentions the general sense of mankind on the nature of a cause.

Would not this determine the origin of Metaphysical Science P

Aristotle censures a certain view of the Divine nature prevalent amount the poets.

This view, however, seems supported by what is often observed actually to take place.

Begarding Metaphysics as a science of causes, determine the order of its development r

Now, does this order correspond with that assumed by the rest of the sciences P

Illustrate this from Geometry.

GHAPTER nL

Wht has Aristotle occasion to examine into how many genera fauses may be reduced P Has he made a similar redaction in any other part of his writings i

416 4)UESII01IB ON ARISTOTLlTb XETAFHTBIOa. [BOOK U

Point out from the History of Philosophy any fact that testifies to the permanence of this fourfold division of causes.

It is the nature of Metaphysics as a science that forces on Aristotle his review of the Greek Philosophy* WhyP

This review, however, will be serviceable to the Metaphysioia]^ WhvP

Now, what is the Stagyrite's general objection— stated almost &om the start — against the entire Greek Philosophy ?

He proceeds to make good this objection from the mention of particular systems.

Gould you state — as given by Aristotle— the notion of the ancient Philosophers about the nature of " an element "?

Whom does the Stagyrite specify as the author of the Materialistic Philosophy ?

Do Gicero and Aristotle agree in their view of the system of ThalesP

We can find traces according to Aristotle of the Thaletian Philo- sophy, amongst the very ancient Theologians in their Theogonies.

The Philosophy, however, of Thales does not entirely contradiel experience.

Aristotle states what he considers to be the origin in Nature of the principles put forward by Thales.

Aristotle mentions water as ui object of adjuration amongst the gods. What object has he in this P

What Philosophers does the Stagyrite bring under review next P

These ancient Philosophers unconsciously adopted correct prin- ciples.

This exemplified, in the most eminent degree, in the philosophy of Parmenides.

But, after all, what was the real difficulty that obviously presented itself to the mind of these speculators P

How, for example, did ^axagoras endeavour to get over this difficulty P

Does Aristotle consider Anaxagoras as the discoverer of the " efficient cause " P

The efficient cause, put forward by the early Philosophers, uncon- sciously to themselves, really involved the solution of two sets of phenomena.

Do Gicero and Aristotle agree in their view of the Anaxagoreaa Philosophy ?

GHAPTER IV.

How comes Aristotle to mention the system of Hesiod P The same difficulty presented itself in the way of Hesiod^ as cf the rest of the early speculators. Now, Aristotle states, that if you really compare the system of

CH. v.] QUESTIONS ON AfilSTOTLE S XSTAPHTBIOS. 417

Empedocles with the actual phenomena, this same difficulty will pre* sent itself here also.

Even granting, however, that the efficient cause wa£i recognised by Empedocles, show that his treatment of it is incomplete.

What other Philosophers does Aristotle mention in this chapter?

Does not the same objection lie against these, likewise, as thct»i? already mentioned P

Aristotle gives us a sketch of part of the Democritic Philosophy.

Cicero, for example, amongst others, notices a fundamental pnn«  ciple in the philosophy of Democritus, quite overlooked by Aristotle.

Who is the best exponent in modern times of the Democritic Philosophy P

Do all philosophers agree with Aristotle and Cicero in the ascrip- tion of the Atomic hypothesis to Leucippus and Democritus P

CHAPTER V.

How does Aristotle account for the rise of such a School as that of the Pythagoreans P

Could you state the grounds upon which the Pythagoreans them- selves rested their theory of Numbers P

What was the precise object which the Pythagoric Philosophers had in view in their introduction of a Co-ordinate Series — trvirroixia ?

What are probably the best sources for obtaining information upon the Philosophy of Pythagoras P

What Philosopher does Aristotle mention as adopting a system similar to that oi the Pythagoreans P

In what respect does Aristotle consider Pythagoras as contributing most to Metaphysical Science P

Is there no other Philosopher that can contend with Pythagoras for the credit of inventing the Philosophy of the Italic Schools P

Was Parmenides really the originator of the Philosophy of Unity — ther3?vP

Could you state the difference between the systems of Parmenides and Melissus P

In the enunciation of his theories, Parmenides was more circum- spect than others of his school.

At the end of this chapter Aristotle furnishes his readers with the conclusion suggested by the review of thus much of the Greek Philosophy.

Even in the Pythagorean treatment of the rh ri cori, there was imperfection inherent. How so P

is there any trace of the Pvthagorean Philosophy to be found dsewhere, save in the schools of Italy f

BB

418 QUESTIONS ON ABI8TOTLB*8 ]IETAPHTB108b [BOOK I.

CHAPTER VL

Weat famous system is brought under review in this ehapterf

Is there any connexion between the Platonic and the Pythagoreas Philosophies, according to AristoUe P

What part has Cratylus in the rise and progress of Platoninn P

Is there any system from which Platonism may be considered as a reaction, according to Aristotle P

To what extent are we to admit the influence of the Socratie on the Platonic Philosophy P

According to Mr. Maurice, in his Analysis of the Metaphysics, Aristotle is ungenerous towards the fame of Socrates on this Tery point.

In some respects the difference between the systems of Plato and Pythagoras was merely nominal.

C!ould you point out some particulars where the Pythagoreans agreed, and some others where they differed with the PliSonists P

To what extent does Plato go in the number of his causes P

What particuhir Science does Aristotle allow the Platonists the credit of oringing forward P

CHAPTER VIL

One point Aristotle considers as positively settled by reasmi of the foregoing review.

This is exemplified in the case of the PUtonics, and Italics, and others.

What is the chief value of Platonism in regard of the theory of Causation P

In Chapter YII. Aristotle indicates the completeness of his four- fold division of causes.

This chapter is a repetition of what has gone before, but is not, on that account, the less aeserving of attention, according to Mr. Maurice.

CHAPTER VHL

What system is noticed by Aristotle in the b^;inning of this chapter P

What may be considered as the general fault of those who put forward a material cause only P :

What systems of material causes are attacked in this chapter by i Aristotle P

The system of Anax&goras is partly true, and partly false, in the j opinion of Aristotle.

The Pythagoreans agree and differ with the Materiaista, in what respect P

now do you account for the divergence of the Pythagoreans frun the Natural Philosophers in their several systems P

OB. I.] QUBSTIONft ON ARISTOTLE*S HBTAPHTSICe. 419

The absurdities of the Pythagoric theoiy of Nomben are again exposed by Aristotle. Where P

CHAPTER IX.

This chapter opens with an attack on what famona hypothesis ?

Boes Anstoib repeat this attack in any other portion of bis writings P

Gomd you point ont the general arguments employed for the overthrow of Plato's Ideal theory P

What seems to be Aristotle's leading; objection to this hypothesis P

Why does the Ideal theory destroy its own pretensions to truth P

Show that it pro?es too much.

Can these ideas, as the Platonists contend, constitute the models of created things P

What erroneous principle laid down in the Phndo is stigmatized nere by Aristotle P

What is the greatest source of perplexity in the Ideal theory P

Had the Ideu theory an^ advocates besides Phito P

Does Aristotle confine his remarks merely to a refutation of Plato's Ideal hypothesis P

CHAPTER X.

What is this chapter chiefly engaged with P

Are we possessed of any innate^owledge of things P

After what mode is every disciplinary system attained untoP

What general method is adopted by Aristotle in his review of the

systems of the Greek Philosophers P What line of distinction may be drawn between the several systems

thus brought under review P What, then, may be stated as Aristotle's leading aim in this review

of the Greek Philosophy ? Does the Stagyrite entirely abandon the principles put forward in

the theories of his predecessors P This would contradict Aristotle's usual method in handling the

literary Uibours of others. Show why P What does Aristotle promise to investigatey as suggested by the

speculations to be found in Book L P

BOOK I. THE LESS.

CHAPTER L

Can you show that there is any connexion between Book I. tb^ fSreater, and Book I. the Less P This has been denied by some— on what grounds t

■ b9

420 QUB8TION8 ON ABISTOTLE^S MBTAFHT8I0S. [BOOK IL

What, in general, evinces the di£Biculty of attaining unto a SYsiem Uf truth P

This difficulty may arise from an unsuspected source.

Aristotle illustrates this.

How does Aristotle establish the progressiveness of Truth.

Dr. Whewell employs reasoning of the same kind.

The principles tnus established go to prove the reality of such a science as Metaphysics.

CHAPTER n.

WEA.T object has the Stagyrite in proving that there is an infinite progression of causes P

What modem Philosopher takes up the same point for the purpose of demonstrating the necessity of God's existence P

What absurdly is involved in supposing an infinite progression in the case of the ^inal Cause P

One thing may be generated from another in more senses than one.

CHAPTER in.

Show the influence of habit upon the progress of speculation.

How does Aristotle illustrate this influence P

Is the same amount of accuracy to be demanded in everything P

People run into extremes on this point.

There is an announcement made in this chapter, which has given rise to a suspicion of the entire of Book I. tne Less being out of place.

To whom has this Book been ascribed P

What, in general^ has induced commentators to question its authenticity P

BOOK II.

CHAPTER I.

What is the nature and aim of Book IL P

How does Aristotle justify the principle of doubting in PhilosophyP

What illustration does he give of this P

Could you mention some of the principal questions started for discussion P

Which of these questions is the most important in its connexion . with Metaphysical Science P

What is the difference in the mode of treating these questions in Book n.. as compared witih Book TIT. i

OH. VI.] QUESTIONS ON ABISTOTLE's UETAFHYSIC8. 421

Are all the questions discassed in the order in which they are stated F Are these questions discussed at all beyond Book 11. P

CHAPTER n.

Could you mention the questions discussed in this chapter P

Why did Aristippus inveigh against the Mathematical Sciences?

What is the origin of the Science of Geodesy P

The connexion of apodeiktic principles with the Science of Meta physics ^ives rise to a great portion of the subject-matter for dis- cussion in Books III. and X.

CHAPTER ni.

What are the questions discussed in this chapter P How many sorts of substances are there ? What view was taken by the Platonists on this point P Could you mention the parts of the Metaphysics where these several substances are severally examined into P

CHAPTER rV.

There is a most important question discussed in this chapter— what is it P

How does Aristotle show the absurdity of supposing the non- existence of a somethingthat involves a separable subsistence P

Aristotle exposes the Theology of the Hesiodic School.

Even Empedocles is guilty of inconsistency in his treatment of the question of the corruptibility of some things compared with the incorruptibility of others.

After all, what is the great difficulty that obviously presents itself in the solution of this question ?

What tenet, put forward by Plato and the Pythagoreans, is also discussed P

Were all the Philosophers agreed— according to Aristotle — con- cerning the sameness of the to ov with the t6 tv P

CHAPTERS V. AND VI.

What are the questions examined into in these two chapters P

The order in which these questions were stated at the first is now broken in upon.

How does Aristotle show the importarce of settling such a question, as to whether numbers and surfaces are substances P

Where have we a more minute discussion of the subsistence 0/ entities in energy and ca|>aoity P

■0

ISS QUESnOHB 0!r IBTmOfLEfa Mi3TAPHTRI08. (bookiil

BOOK IIL

CHAPTEKL

What is the difference between this Book and the foregoing? What is the essential difference between Metaphysics and the rest of the Sciences P What particular Science iUostrates this ?

CHAPTEEIL

Wht is not the nnity of Metaphysics, as a Science, destroyed : j the multiplicity of its subject-matter P

Ie what way does Aristotle illustrate the relation subsisting be- tween Metaphysics and the rest of the Sciences P

Aristotle mentions in this chapter a work of his that has not come down to us.

Is it not the same thing to say a science of entity as a soienoe of unity P

How does the Science of the Ontologist come to be concerned with privation and contraries P

CHAPTER m.

Is Ontologjr concerned with apodeiktic principles P •

What principle is it that we must all go upon P

What sect of philosophers sought to impugn this most evident first principle P

Anstotle establishes the unity of metaphysical science from the analogy of the science of number P

CHAPTER IV.

What seven arguments are laid down in this chapter against the assertion that contnidictions are true P

Different modes of refutation are requisite for different sorts o( sceptics.

Why does Aristotle contend for the value of Definition as an ill' strument for the refutation of Scepticism P

State the nature of the two practical arguments put forward ii Diis chapter for the overthrow of the system of the sceptic

CHAPTER V.

Staxb the origin of the hypothesis of Protagoras. This origin is exemplified in an opinion entertained amongst oertaii speculators, as to the nature of sense — aia-Bria-is, 4ristotle appeals to antiquity iv the existence of this opinion.

0H. VI.] QUESTIONS ON ▲luaTOTLB% METAFiiTSICS. 423

After all, however, there was some foandation In the nature of things for the Heraclitics to build their system u^on.

Three leading arguments put forward br Anstotle against the dogma of Proti^ras of " the truth of the Apparent."

This chapter contains another practical refutation of Scepticism.

CHAPTER VI.

The absurdity of a sjstem of Scepticism is acknowledged by the sceptics themselves.

What general absurdity is involved in the assumption of the truth of the Apparent P

There is, perhaps, a sense in which the Apparent may be regarded as true.

This sense, however, exposes the fallacy of Protagoras' dogma.

CHAPTER VIL

How does Aristotje show that there is no mean between contra- diction ?

Give the origin of Paradox.

Show the different tendencies of the assumptions of Anaxagoras compared with those of Heraciitus.

CHAPTER Vm.

A BUKMAKT of the principles espoused by different sceptics is given in this chapter.

The chief instrument the Philosopher should use in the refutation of Scepticism.

Aristotle here notices a mode of overthrowing the sceptic, which was a great favourite in the schools of modem Philosophy.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTERS L— VL

What important metaphysical terms does Aristotle classify under the denomination apxi P

Give some of the significations of the word alrutp ?

Was Aristotle the first to distinguish trroixnop from apxi ?

What was the notion of Empe(&cles as to the signification of the term <^v<ri£ P

What is remarkable in the mode of definition adopted in the case of the word dvayKtSos P

Aristotle defines, in Chapter VI., body, surface, point, and monad.

Is the term defined in this chapter examined into in any other part of the Metaphysics P

124 QUESTIONS ON ABISTOTLE*S XETAFHTSIOS. [bQOK Y« 

CHAPTERS Vn.— XIV.

ExTiTT has several significations.

Could you mention a figurative meaning of this word noticed b^ Aristotle elsewhere P

Mention some of the different sorts of opposition P

Various senses are there in which we may employ the terms '* priot '^ and " subsequent " ?

Is it with a view of forming correct notions on the subject of causation that Aristotle defines vrpdrcpov Koi ifirrtpop P Metaphoricai meaning of the word dvvaius P

CHAPTERS XV.— XX.

How does Aristotle define the word d^piaros P

Aristotle notices a metaphorical signification of the word rvXcccr.

What other term, already defined, does Aristotle consider in its meanings as equally extended with the word vipas P

T6 Mff 5 — ^ow does Mr. Maurice illustrate the meaning of this term?

Does Aristotle intend to define t^s^ in Chapter XX., in its ethical aspect P

CHAPTERS XXI.— XXX.

How could you best translate the phrase to €k tivos, defined in Chapter XXIV. P

Aristotle's mode of defining the term koKo^os bears on a question discussed by Locke.

How does Aristotle define " Genus?"

Aristotle defines the term ^€vlk>s in a way that he subsequently takes notice of.

This definition is levelled against a famous Philosopher.

What difference is there between the accidental ana the indefinite?

BOOK V. CHAPTER I.

In what aspect are causes and principles viewed bv the OntologisiP

Aristotle gives an h fortiori proof from Physics of the necessity ol the existence of such a science as Metaphysics.

Indeed, this is equally true with all the sciences.

What argument does the Stagyrite most insist upon for the reaU^ of such a science as Metaphysics P

What characteristic qualitv of metaphysical science is it that imparts so much digulti^ to it r

OH. VI.] QUXSTIONS ON ABISTOTLE'S METAFHTSIC8. 425

Coold you show any incoDsistency in Aristotle here P

The speculative sciences may be divided into three.

Whicn amongst these does Aristotle regard as the most eligible f

CHAPTER n.

Thebe are certain aspects under which the subject-matter of Metaphysics may be regarded, which are designedly omitted by Aristotle.

Plato took a correct view of the science of the Sophist.

The nature and cause of the Accident show that there cannot be a science of it.

Aristotle proves the same practically.

He confirms his assertion from the nature of Sophistical Science.

CHAPTERS ni. AND rV.

Show the absurditv of denying the existence of the Accident

What cause does the Accident fall under F

Are truth and falsehood subjective merely P

Why does Aristotle omit that view of entity and non-entity which connects them with truth and falsehood P

What, then, are the two aspects of the r6op which are passed over in the Metaphysics P

Aristotle illustrates, by an example, the absurdity of denying the existence of the Accident.

BOOK VI.

CHAPTERS L— IIL

What is the most important sense of the ro 5f»— at least, to the Ontologist P

This assertion is confirmed from usage.

What controversy amongst the old Philosophers is hereby settled, according to Mr. Mlaurice P

Are m speculators agreed on the different sorts of substances P

What was the difference between Plato and Speusippus on thid point P

How does Aristotle propose to treat the question P

Pour leading significations of the word owrla.

Could you state the order in which these are discussed P

CHAPTERS IV.— VI.

How does Aristotle come to treat of the ro ri ^v civot P Are the speculations in this Book strictly of a metaphysiov^ tendency P

426 QUESTIONS ON ARI8T0TLE*S MBTAFnTSICS. [BOOK VI.

What USA, then, does the Stagyrite make of themP Could yoa mention some of the questions broaehed in regard of definition P

CHAPTERS VIL— IX.

Things generated from Tarions causes.

What object has Aristotle in bringing the subject of generation nndcr consideration P

Is there a generation of the tUios P

What is the proper term to employ when we speak of the geaera- tion of a thing P

What is the precise nature of the €Vkn of the Peripatetics P

Why are some things, according to Aristotle, generated from art and chance, and others not so P

The nature of ovo-ta proves the non-generation of form, according to Aristotle.

CHAPTERS X.— XIL

Th£ questions discussed in remd of definition depend upon wha«  leading distinction, according to Mr. Maurice P

Apply this distinction to a controversy about definition mentioned in Cnapters X. and XL

In what portion of Aristotle's works is the subject of defini^on examined into P

Why is not the unity of definition destroyed by the muHitiide of distinctive qualities of the thing defined P

CHAPTERS xni^xvn.

As£ universals to be regarded as substances P

Forms are ingenerable.

We cannot define singulars, according to Aristotle.— Why P

Who agrees with the Stagyrite in this P

Ideas are uidefinable. — ^miy P

Aristotle brings the discussions about the tUios to bear on the Platom'c theory about ideas — ^in what way P

How far may we regard the Ideal theory as true, and where does its falsehood commence P

Aristotle notices an error in rej^ard of ** capacity," to which met are prone from imperfect observation.

What tenet of the Pythagoreans is attacked in Chapter XYIL?

OH. X.] QUESTIONS ON ABISTOTLB's METAPErSTGS. 427

BOOK VII.

CHAPTERS I.— m.

What connexion is there between Books VI. and VIL ?

There is a certain class of substances about which there is do dispute.

What is to form the subject of speculation in Book VIL ?

The rest of the questions in regard of substance are settled else- where.

What was the Democritic hypothesis as to phenomenal differences?

Has Aristotle mentioned this hypothesis anywhere else ?

Aristotle reprehends some notions of Antisthenes on the subject of definition.

CHAPTERS IV.— VL

As regards material substance we must bear in mind one particular fact — ^what is it P

What imi)ortant difficulty, as regards matter, is mentioned in Chapter V. P

Mr. Maurice, in his Analysis, expluns this difficulty most lucidly.

There is in Chapter VI. a repetition of a subject already discussed.

What is the great source for the solution of the difficulty as regards the unity of definition P

BOOK VIII. CHAPTERS I.— IV.

How is the Science of Metaphysics conversant with bvpaiut? Leading division of the different sorts of caimcitiesP Is the TO €P necessarily involved in the notion of capacity P Aristotle notices some false opinions of the Megaric School on

the subject of capacity. They were akin to the erroneous dogma of Protagoras already

refuted. What is the best way to dissipate this error P Are we to regard capacity as a necessary condition to energy P The word energy takes its origin from what source P What is the object of Aristotle, in the example by unmeaning

symbols, set down m Chapter IV. P

CHAPTERS v.— X.

What modem Philosopher has well developed the pri^oiplet broached in Chapter V. P

428 QUcsTioNs ON abistotle's metafhtsios. [book IX

What advantage does Aristotle consider as attendant upon tho consideration of tiie nature of energy P

Is energy to be distinguished from motion ?

Is capacity to be regarded as prior to energy, or subsequent to itP

An erroneous view of this question would lead to an erroneous ▼lew of the Divine nature.

Is not the subject of symbolism mentioned here P

The superiority of energy over capacity may be shown bom JIathematics.

The decision of this question, as to energy, settles, according to Aristotle, an important characteristic of evU.

What object has Aristotle in b ringing forward the illustratiooi of Passo's Hermes, in Chapter Vlll.P

Could you explain what this Fasso*s Hermes was P

Is there any relation between truth and falsehood, and between energy and capacity P

BOOK IX. CHAPTERS L— rV.

What is the subject discussed in Book IX. P

How is it that Aristotle comes to treat of this subject P

What is the most generally received notion as regards the nature

of therdh? Transferred meaning of the word " Measure " P Was this made the foundation of any famous system of Philosophy P What school of Philosophers is stigmatized by Aristotle in

Chapter 11. P '

What does Aristotle regard as the concomitants of unity and

plurality P

CHAPTERS v.— X.

How does Aristotle define the greatest difference P

Is every privation equal to contrariety P

What does Aristotle consider as the chief species of contrariety P

What is strange in the speculations found in this portion of BooklXP

Mr. Maurice, therefore, is inclined to form a certain surmise as renrds them.

In describing plurality, in Chapter YI., Aristotle takes occasioc t€ correct a false dogma oi Anaxagoras.

OH. XII.J QUESnOire ok ABISTOTLES USTAFHT8IG8. 429

BOOK X.

CHAPTERS L— IIL

Is there any repetition in the case of the subjects discussed in BookX.?

What t^ speculations, however, entered into in this Book, are to be found elsewhere in the Metaphysics P •

Mathematical entities are not the subject-matter of Metaphysical Science.

Nor are objects that fall under the notice of our senses.

Point out the absurdity — according to Aristotle— of denying the existence of something transcendentfd P

There is a point in reference to Metaphysical Science which Aris«  totle has noticed more than once in the present Treatise.

Where do the sciences of the Dialectician and the Ontologist agree, and where do they differ P

CHAPTERS rv.— vin.

What is Aristotle's object in Chapter IV. P

A subject is treated of in Chapter Y. that already has been under discussion.

What tenet of Protagoras' is brought under notice in Chapter YI.P Could you mention any fact connected with Christiauity which shows the operation of this error even tAere ?

Show the inconsistency of a follower of Heraditus putting forward any system as trtte.

One class of Sceptics, according to Aristotle, are more easily refuted than others.

Aristotle here also furnishes us with a practical refutation of Scepticism.

Point out the particular position assumed by the system of Heraclitus compared with that of Anaxagoras.

In classing Theology as one of the speculative sciences, Aristotle has f umishea his opponents with an argument in fiaTour of his Atheism.

How does Aristotle define chance P

The nature and cause of the Accident exclude the possibility of there being a science of it.

CHAPTERS IX.— XXL

What is the subiect treated of in Cha{)ter IX. ? What is motion defined in this chapter in reference toP What important term is examined into in Chapter X. P There are as many forms of entitv as of motion. What modem Philosopher coincides pretty modi with Aristotle ii his view of the nature of the Infinite i

430 QUESTIONS ON ABISTOTLBB MSIAPHTSIOS. [bOOKXI« 

Body cannot be infinite. Why? How does Aristotle define the Infinite P

This is a negative definition. TV ho agrees with Aristotle in adopt* ing this mode of definition in the case of the Infinite? In regard of which of the Categories is motion to be found existing? How does Aristotle define the word admiTos in Chapter XIL ?

BOOK XL CHAPTERS L— V.

Thebb are three sorts of substances, according to Aristotle. Three causes and first principles are enumerated in Chapter IL There is a subject, abreadr treated of, examined into in Chapter UL The point discussed in Chapter lY. is connected with the Aristo- telian demonstration of God's existence. Practically speaking, universal causes have no existence.

CHAPTERS VI.— VIIL

What does Aristotle regard as the essential quality of the Divme nature?

Why must the "Pirst Substance" be immaterial?

This is acknowledged in the systems of Theologians and Natural Philosophers.

How would you account for the Platonic dogma of the perpetuity of motion?

To what does Aristotle assimilate the mode of God*s operation ?

God's existence is a necessary existence.

The doctrine of perpetual motion virtually acknowledges the existence of God.

Give a succinct view of the attributes of God as laid down by Aristotle in Chapter VII.

What analogy does Aristotle employ to establish the perfections of the Divine nature ?

In what way does Aristotle seek to settle the question of the unity of God?

What may be regarded as Aristotle's hpoateriori proof of God's existence ?

He confirms the entire of his reasoning on this point from andeni tradition.

CHAPTERS IX. AND X.

How is it that Aristotle comes to mention questions relating to Aind? Shoyf the importance of ootrect views on the nature of sund ?

CH. Z.] QUESTIONS ON ABI8T0TLE*S XETAFHTSICS. 431

State tbe question as to the existence of £;ood.

Give Aristotle's illustration on this point.

Aristotle notices certain false theories as to tbe criffin of good.

Any system that ignores the existence of the ro SyaBdw must be false.

What old Greek poet bave we a quotation from in this chapter, and for what purpose ?

BOOK XII. CHAPTERS I.— III.

Abistotix, at the commencement of this Book, sets down various opinions respecting supra-sensual substance.

What inquiry does Aristotle propose to pursue in regard of mathematical entities F

What other inquiries are found in this Book P

What practical arj^ent does Aristotle give agauist tbe inherence of mathematical entities in sensibles P

CHAPTERS rV. AND V.

What important subject is treated of in these two chapters P

Has Aristotle already examined into this subject P

The Ideal theory Aristotle considers as a reaction against the

system of what famous Philosopher P Aristotle denies that the Idealists are justified in claiming Socrates

as a patron of their system. The arguments put forward by the Platonists are really destructive

of their own hypothesis. What are the benefits conferred by Socrates on Philosophy P What is Aristotle's general objection against the Ideal theory P

CHAPTERS VI.— X.

Aristotle, in Chapter YI., notices certain difficulties peculiar to the Pythagoric theorv of numbers.

How does Aristotle account for the failure on the part of the Pythagoreans to prove their hypothesis P

What presumptive proof have we of the fallacy of Pythagoras' system of numbers P

Could you mention any speculations broached in regc d of numbert by Aristotle P

432 QUESTIONS ON abistotlb's hetafhtsigs. [bookxiil

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTERS I.— VI.

What is the point under examination at the beginning of Chapter LP

Why is it contrary to the nature of an eternal substance to sappoa6 it a composite one P

Why was it that the Pythagoreans were induced to adopt their hypothesis about numbers r

What view does Aristotle adopt in respect of the to ayaOov as a first principle P

Does he not rest this opinion of his on the authority of antiquity?

Aristotle tests the Pvthagorio system of numbers by instances.

The TO ayaBov must be a paramount prmciple in creation.

Aristotle vindicates the value of metaphysical science, positively and negatively.

His positive defence implied in his negative.

Whymi^ht we expect to find an elaborate treatment of theological questions in Aristotle's Metaphysics P

Aristotle would probably have said that Theology was out of place in an ethical treatise.

Admitting the truth of this, it only exposes him to the charge of grosser inconsistency.

What cautions are to be observed in conducting a controversy respecting the atheism of any ancient Philosopher P

Apply this to the question of Aristotle's atheism.

What, probably, has added to the rancour of both parties on this question P

Could you state any reason to account for the coldness with whidb Aristotle mentions subjects involving a relisrious interest P

What is the best proof you can oifei of Logic and Metaphysioo being two distinct sdeuces r

INDEX.

ABSOLUTE, means of a knowledge

of the, 331, note; Ixxix. Acatalepsy, origin of, 100. Accident, defined, 155, et seq.; no science of, 160, et seq., 298, zl. et seq.; nature and cause of, 161, et seq., 299; denial of, fatalism, 163.

Action, motion in relation to, and

to passion, 312. Actuality, 302; transition of ca- pacity into, 234.

'A5id4>of)os, 122.

Muvaula, 135, 228.

iBgina, refuge in, against loss of property, 119; allusion here, ib. note.

£gypt, mathematics invented in, why, 6 ; Aiistotle^s conclusion from this, xii. et seq.

Etiology, recondite systems of, 20, note, xix. ; summary of the ancient, 36, xxiL et seq. ; errors in preceding theories of, S3, etseq.

Ayadds (metaphorice), 142.

AtSiOS Qvaia, 317.

Air, as a principle of things, 15.

AttrOiiaiSf in relation to 'Ppdimitrts, 99, XXXV. ; distinct from, ^>a»- raffia, 102.

Atriov, 112, xii. note.

'Alctnrroy tI, 102, 330, xxxvl

• Ajcpi$ts, 52, xxvii

Alcibiades, Plato's, quoted, 5, note.

Alcmseon of Crotona, 23.

AAi}0cJco^a<, 103.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 7, uota Ammonius, 92, note. ^ApoyKoioSf 119, note. Analysis, aim of the translator's, x; the value of Metaphysics explained, x.— xiiL; a view cf the Greek philosophy unfolde<l in the, xvL — xxv. ; also Aris- totle's attack on Scepticism, xxxiii. — xxxvii Ixiv. et seq.; and his refutation of Idealism, xxL xxiv. Ixxxiii. Analytics, omissions in the, sup- plied in the Metaphysics, 196 ; the posterior to be studied with the Metaphysics, xcv. Anaxigorafi, notice of, 15, note; system of, 16; recognises the. efficiency of mind, 20, xix. ; pardy right and partly wrong, 34; homoeomeria of, 93, note; the rh %v of, 318; mention of, 98, 295, 828, 405. Anaximander, the filyfta of, 31 9«  Anaximenes, notice of, 15. note, considers aii* a first principle, 15. Ancients, materialism of the, 13,

xvii. Animals, difiTerent faculties in, S.

• Ayoixoiofi(fyf), 151.

Anthropomorphism, a corrupt ten- dency in man, 61, note; cen- sured by Bacon, 291, note; found in all religions save i^hat of the Jews, and th&t of Cliiist, 833, note ; Israelites cautioned against, 339, note. Aydponros, 19, 291. 'Am04ff€is, 259.

434

iin)]BZ.

AntifltlieneB, opinion of, regarding definition, 154; on ike indefin- ability of thixigB, 218; partly right, ib. note.

jLpodeiktic principles, 85, ei seq. ; xxxiii.

• Ait6ipaffis, 97.

• Air6pMf 54, et seq.; zzriiL

• AirorrpiyowTiy, 72, note.

Apparent, truth of the, 102, et seq. ; 105, xzxt. et seq.

Aquinas, Thomas, 2, 25, 28, xir. note ; oommentaiy of, xcTi

'Apxod, questions regarding, 56, 77, et seq.

'Apxn, 111, et seq.

• Apxvy^f ^tXoo'o^tor, 18, xvii.

Arclytaa on definition, 216; notice of, 216, note.

Arcturus, an instance of numeric harmony, 411.

Aristippus, his contempt for ma- thematics, 58, 857» Ixxxiii

Arithmetic, more accurate than geometry, 8.

AfHKTTov, an example of things denying their being from time, 214 ; explanation of, ib. note.

Aristotle, on the love of the senses, 1, note; his object in the Metaphysics, 6, xc. ; his category of causes, 12, xvi ; dis- tinction of his writings, 53, note, 819; lost works of, 84, note, 337, note, 412, note ; prac- tical tendency of the mind of, 98, note ; recognition of a First Cause, 227, note, Ixxiv. et seq. ; transcendental character of the philosophy of, 282, xc. ; yindi- caites Ins system, 32, 45, 344, xxi. xxY. ; asserts the excellence of his account of the origin of eWl, 346, Ixxx. ; astronomic theory o^ 337. (See Analysis )

Army, Ulustoition from, 343.

Art, compared with experience, 5, et seq. ; xL et seq. ; a first prin- ciple, 820.

Aiciepius, his defence of Hera- eituB, 87| note; Tie^iv oC \Im

Anaxagorean philosophy, 108^ note; illustration employed by«  143, note.

'Aa^narov, 82, et seq. ; xcv.

Astronomy, cabalistic tendency of mediseyal, 63, note; ancient systems of, 836, et seq. ; in re- lation to theology, 837.

Atheism, question of Aristotle's, discussed, xc. et seq.

Atheist, Hippo, sumamed the, 15, note.

Atlas, the fable respecting, 148, note.

Augustinus mphus, 2, 10, xyi.

Ain6fMro¥, 801.

Ayerroes, opinion o^ in regard of the ItsJics, 26, note.

Axioms, do they fall under the notice of one science, or more ? 85, et seq.

B.

Bacon, Lord, 8, note; 256, note;

291, note. Bentley on the epistles of Fha*

laris, 22, Aote. Berkeley (Bishop), contrasted with

Prots^ras, 231, note. Better, a result from what is

worse, 332, note ; 404, Ixxxix. Best, the earliest principle, 405. Bkios, 119.

Body, not infinite, 308. Books to be studied with Aria*

totle*s Metaphysics, xcy. et seq. BtSfiBv^, 412. Brandis, his "Scholia in Aristo-

telem,'* xcvi. 7, note, 12, note. Bridgewater Treatises, 282, note^ BpopT^, 206.

Brown, 2, note, 341, note. Brucker, his essay on PythagoiaA^

22, note. Butler (Bishop), referred to, 120,

note, 234, note, 285, note.

C.

Calendar, the Greek, oompeied with the Roman, 315, note.

Calippus, his Astronomic Sy8tei% 336 ; notice o^ 336, note.

nmnc

435

G&lAcity, defined, 133, et aeq. ; not substance, 206; when a thing subsists in, 239.

CApacities, nature of, liil et seq. ; rational and irrational, 228, et seq.

CSategories, treatise of the, referred to, 166 ; motion in relation to, 312, et B«q.

Causality, relation of, to change, Ixxi

Cause, the ancients absorbed in the material, 13 ; the efficient, put forward by some of them, unconsciously, 17, and imper- fectly, 12 ; e.g. by Anaxagoras, 20 ; by Empedocles, ib. ; de- fined, 112, et seq.; oreatiye energies of a First, 136, note, 227, note ; Aristotle's mode of proof of a First, 833, note, Ixxv. et seq.

Causes, Aristotle's fourfold enu- meratioD of, 12, 323, zvi.; no infinite progression* of, 49, et seq.; prior to or coincident with their efi'ects, 321 ; no uniyersal, 325, Ixxiii.

Chance, why some things are pro- duced from, 185, et seq., xlv. ; definition of, 300, et seq.

Change, three genera of, 310, et seq. ; I'elation of motion to these, 311 ; every, has its sub- ject, 317, et seq.

Chalyb'dus, bis History of German Philosophy referred to, 309, note.

Chaos, Hesiod's error about, 18, note; mention of, 328, 405, Ixzxiz. •

Qhristiaus, Aristotle held in dis- repute amongst, 159, note, 207, note.

Cicero, quotation from, 1, note; superficial knowledge of, 14, note.

Clarke, Dr. Sam., referred to, 289, note; adopts the same argument with Aristotle, xxvi .

plemens, Alezuidrinus, on the

meaning of the " Metaphysics^" 1, note; referred to, 14, note.

Common sense, argument against scepticism from, 116, note, IxyL

Continuity, 122, 315.

Contradiction, no mean between, 107, xxxvii.

Contraries, defined, 130; genera- tion of, 222 ; are they principles f 390, et seq. ; theories about, in reference to the " origin of evil," Ixxx. et seq.

Contrariety defined, 262, et seq., 273 ; causation in relation to, 19, note, 390, et seq.

Coordinate series, the Pythago- reans inventors of the teufold, 23 ; Alcmaeon of a twofold, 24.

Corporeal, the principle of things viewed as, 13, 26.

Corporeity, not infinity, 808, et seq.

Corruptibles, 69, xxx.

Corruption takes place from some- thing, and into somethings 16.

Cosmogonies, 18, 403.

Cousin, referred to, 301, note.

Cratylus, an associate of PlHto, 27 ; compared with Heraclitus, 101;

little known of, 1 81 , note; rebuke

of, to Heraclitus, ib.

Creation, no limits assignable to the, 838, note ; the element of good in, 343, Ixxxix. et seq.

Cud worth, misapprehension of, 1 8, note ; referred to, 21, note, 291, note ; 'Hhe Intellectual System" of, to be studied with tiie Me- taphysics, xcvL

Custom, influence of, on opinion, 52.

D.

Dsemons, existence of, 127, note.

Deception, not the same in all things, 103.

Definition, falsity in, 154, et seq. ; questions about, 187, 196, et seq., xlvi. et seq. ; material and logical, 189, note; unity of, 198, 223, et seq.; of the Divini Nature. 245. Ixxy. et seq.

AuKifW^ 214, note

436

INDEX.

Deity, Tie wed as a caune, 11 ; na- ture of Aristotle's, 331 , et seq. ; incorporeity of the, 332, ( Vide God.)

A€Kds, 371, 394.

Democritus, sysxem of. 20, et seq. ; notice of, 21, note ; agrees with Locke, 99, note ; his dogma of simultaneous subsistence, 319; as regards definition, 359.

Demonstration, first principle of, 86, et seq. ; attack on those who deny this, 88, et seq. ; necessity of the sequence in, 120 ; ultimate foundation of r .1, 288, et seq.

AidxpiffiSf 16.

Dialectics, scien i of, 83. et seq. ; distinction of, "om Metaphysics, 84, note ; illu» (ration from, 287.

AtatpoviTcs, 248, note.

Diameter, incommensurability of the, 11, 109, note.

AidyotOf 54, 157.

Diapajson, Stmnurciv, 112, note.

AiadTiyfi, 21, 213.

^Uffis, 124, note.

Difference, 261; contrariety, a perfect, 262.

Diogenes, materialism of, 15; notice of, ib. note.

Dionysia, festival of, 149, note.

Disposition, defined, 145.

Diversity, defined, 129.

Divine Nature, examination into, Ixxiv.

Divinity, the Infinite not con- founded with the, 306, note.

AoKixaiwfS Qioiy 70.

Doubt, its relation to scientific inquiry, 54, et seq., xxviiL

Doubts, enumeration uf, intro- ductory to Ontology, 55, et seq.; discussed, 57, et seq. ; zxviiL et seq. ; bdi. et seq.

A^as, 29, 381, 391.

AvoxoiOS, 378.

AuoTvxcts, 10, note*

K

Efficiency, introduction of the oiincipl^ of, xvui. et aeq.

• Y.x*iy, 147, et seq.

ElSiyruc)! apiBn'is, 384, et seq.

• EK€lyivov, 182, 240, et b6«.
• EK\oy^ r&v ivavrittv, 84, ncte.
• EiC)ua7€tov, 29.

E\e7xoj, 242, note. 'EAryxTiKwJ dir<>5e*|a?, 88. Eleatics, philosophy of the, 25,

note. Element, defined, 115, et seci. Elemmts, are there the same, of

all things ? 322 ; this is the c<ip6

analogically, ib.; threefold, 823. •EXXijKef, 152, note. Empedocles, four elements o^ 15;

notice of, 19, note; merit of hia

system, 20 ; attack on, 34 ;

origin of the philosophy T>f,

xix. ; quoted, 70, et seq., 118 ;

liiytM of, 318; recognises the

good as a paramount principle^

405. 'EfSeXcxc^o, 301, note. 'EvfitP^Ms, 55, note. 'Ei'^f>7€(a, 215, note. Energy, in relation to potentiality,

230, liv. ; nature of, 236, Iv. ;

distinct from motion, 237;

defined, 238; prior to capacity.

241 ; superior to capacity, 247 ;

in what sense inferior to

capacity, ib. Ens, how is it plural? 397. 'EvreAexefa, 302. Entirety, defined, 150, et seq.:

generation of, 183, 203, note,

xliv. Entity, various senses of, 79, et

seq.; defined, 125, et Beq.; in

relation to truth, 164, et seq. ;

subdivisions of. 166. 'EireucTixoi KAyoi, 359. "Eitcio-oSk^St;, 847, note. Epicharmus, 101, note. Epicurus, followers of, 169, notei.

• EirarTi7iui7, 4, 389.

Epistles, the word dpxt, in St

Paul's, 112, note. Essence, inquiries about^ 171, el

seq.: 176, etseq. Eterualt the First Mover, Izsv

INDEX. 437

8S1, et seq. ; therefore energy has a prior subsistence, WL ; are things, composites f 894, et seq.

Ethics, Aristotle's, referred to, 6, note; 53, note; 114, note.

Euclid, of Megara, 230.

Eudoxus, notice of, 386, note; astronomic system of, 886; a dogma of, easily refuted, 3681

ECptats fi^aiist 59, note.

Eurytus, patron of the causality of numbers, 409; his mode of proof thereof, 413, note; notice of, ib.

Eusebius, referred to, xcvi., 14, note.

Evenus, quoted, 119.

Evil, moral and physical^ con- nected, 114, note; no inde- pendent existence of, 248; not a mere negation of good, 264, note ; origin of, 344, note, Ixzx. ; good in capacity, 407.

Ex nihilo nil fit, notice of this ancient dogma, 13, 76, note, 818, note.

"E^is, 145, et seq.

Exercise, enjoyment an induce- ment towards, 49.

Exoteric discourses, 349.

Experience, nature of, 8; takes no notice of causes, 5.

P

Fable, in relation to philosophy, . 9 ; how one became mixed up with the other, 9, note.

Fabulous Theology, 339, et seq.

Falsehood, defined, 153, et seq.; in relation to non-entity, 165, etseq.

Furrier (Prof.), his work on Meta- physics referred to, 305, note.

First cause, merit of Aristotle'g notions of a, Ixxr.

TiiHt principle, defined. 111, et seq.

First principles, are these the same of all things ? 68, et seq.

Forms, not exemplars, 40; not numuert), 41, et »vni; not separ-

able, 61; no generation of, 183; not the cause of generation, 1 84, et seq.; ingenerable, 203, 319, et seq. ; resident in compositee, 820; distinctions relating to, zliv. et seq.

a

TaK-fiyn, 216, 1.

Gener^, are they first principles ? 56, et seq., 64, et seq.

Generation, distinctions about^ 179, et seq.; pre-existence in- volyed in, 181 ; questions about, 185, xliv. et seq.

Genus, defined, 152, et seq.

Geodesy, origin of the science of^ 62, note.

Geology, some would array, against ReT^tion,lxxyiL note.

Geometry, difference of, from geodesy, 62; aigument drawn from, 356.

Geometrician, difference of, from the arithmetician, 357.

Glossary, a, of technical words, xxxviiL

Gnostics, Aristotle puts forward a principle recognised by the, 844, note.

God, nature of, according to Simonides, 10; this notion ex- amined, ib. ; an immaterial ener- gy, 327 ; mode of operation, 829. et seq.; His existence a neces-

. sary one, 830, et seq. ; moral and natural attributes of, 330, note; perfections of, 881.

T6fi4>os, 213, note.

Good, twofold aspect of, as a cause, 18, note; existence of, in the Creation, 848; illustration of the phenomenon of the, ib.; false systems about, 344; ac- counted for by Theologians, 404; by Poets, 405; by Eastern saL'es, ib. ; a paramount prin- ciple, ib. ; any system ignoring it, false, 407, et seq.

TpttfAi 4, 884.

438

INDBX*.

Greece, the games of, 131, note.

Greeks, summary of the philo- sophy of the, xxii. ; chief merit of their system, IxziL

H.

Habit, 145.

BUmilton, Sir William, referred to, 305, note; study of his writings recommended, xcvi.

Happiness essential to the Divine nature, 331, et seq.

Harmony, as a first principle, 71^ et seq. (See Empedocles.)

Heaven, Aristotle's notion about ' the, 102, note; one or many, 338, et seq.

Heracleidse, 274, note.

Heraclitics, 291.

Heraclitus, materialism of, 15; notice of, 15, note; all things the same and not the same, ac- cording to, 87; defended by Asclepius, ib. note; all things equally true according to, 108.

Hermotimus, efficient cause in- troduced by, 17.

Hesiod, on the efficient cause, 18, note ; quoted, ib ; his sect, 69, et seq. ; quoted, 148, note; censure upon, 326, note; re- ferred to, 827, note. (See Chaos.)

Hierocles, 22, note.

Hippasus, materialism of, 15.

Hippo, the Atheist, 15, note, 169, note.

Hope, Thomas, a modem sceptic, 105, note.

Hope, an exercise of, a soiuce of pleasure, 331, note.

Horoscopes, origin of, 63, note.

Homer, agrees with Parmenides, Empedocles, and others, 100; the interpreters o^ censured, 411 ; this censure examined, ib. note.

Hyperphysical, the prima philo- sophia is, 195, note; substances,

Ideal Theory, its truth and orign^ 88, et seq., 858, et seq.; partly true and partly false, 207: a reaction against the HeracUticfl, 858; relation of the Socratic Philosophy to, 859; refutatioz. of, 860, et seq. j inconsistency of the, 861; insufficiency of the, 862, et seq.; Aristotle's general objection against the, 864 ; two fundamental errors of it, 886 ; Socrates no patron of the, 886, et seq. (See Plato.)

Idealism, a confusion of substance with capacity, xlviiL ; subyersiye of itself, liii

Ideas, indefinable, 204; not the models of thin^^ 40, 863.

Identity, defined, 128. *

Idola tnbus, 256, note.

Ignorance, what it is, 88.

Iliad, quotation from, 847; this quotation explained, l^g^'

Imagination, 8, note.

Immobility, luxi et seq.

Immortals, have they the same principles as mortals? 69, et seq.

Impossible, 135, et seq.

Impotentiality, 228.

Incorruptibles, do not subsist in capacity, 245, Ivi et seq. ; cor- ruptibles, models after, 246.

Indefinite, 304

Individuality, 275.

Indivisible, 128, et seq., 252, et seq.

Induction, argument from, against numeric harmony, 411.

Infinite, definition of the, 805 ; separable, ib. ; not in sensibles, 806 ; examination into the, ixviii — ^Ixx.

Innate, is our knowledge ? 44, et seq., XXV.

Innovation, Aristotle repels ths charge of, Ixxix.

Intellect, assent of the, to truth, 251, note.

Jo^m. St., quoted, Ixxvi

Ion, 152, note.

INDSX,

439

Ionics, phibsophy of, 307, note.

Iris, 9, note.

Isthmsean, games in relation to the Olympian, 50.

Italics, character of the philo- sophy of the, 26; what does Anstotle mean by the word? 26, note.

K.

Slant, origin of the system of, 141, note ; study of, recom- mended, zcvi

Kad* 2, li4.

Karo^^voM, 94, et seq.

King, Archbp., his Treatise " De Origine Mali," 344, note.

Knowledge, dififbrent inlets of, 3 ; conditional, 309, note; what may supply our desire after, xIt.

Kopu^Mtos, 132.

Koa/junroieiv, 18, 403.

L.

Lawsp fables admitted into the, 52 ; proved in the case of those of Athens and Sparta;, 52, note.

Ac/tpavra, 340, note.

Less, Book I., the, disputes about, 47, note.

Leucippus, an obscure iBtiologist, 20. (See Democritus.)

Linus, 9.

Logic, subjects differently treated in Aristotie's, from lus Meta- physics, 55, note; illustration from, xi ; to be studied with the Metaphysics, xct.

\ayucai Hvcrx^pttif 87.

\^5, different meanings of, 4, note, 57, note, 98, note; 6 fxtucpSs, 403^ note.

Ziocke, agrees with Democritus, 99, note; referred tc^ 120, note; his use of the word substance, ' 127, note ; as to our knowledge of qualities, 191, note.

Love, due to our feUow-labourers in Science, 335; illustrated in Aristotle, as an author, ib. note; the term not emplofttd by ibs

Theogonists and Platonlgts in the same sense, xviii. ; Qod is^ IxzvL Lycophron, the Sophist, 225, note.

M.

Magi, with them good is ante* cedent to evil, 405 ; history of the, ib. note.

Man, his desire of knowledge, 1. ; this controverted, ib. note ; as a measure of things, 291, et seq., liz. et seq. ; Protagoras, dogma of, partly true, Iz. ; its pernicious operation of, on Christianity, ib.

Manichaeans might have learned a better system from Aristotle, 248, note.

Slateiialism, the ancients accused of, 13, zviL xxiU. et seq.

Mathematical entities^ opinion of Plato on, 28, et seq. ; illustra- tion from, 248, note; not in sensibles, 349, et seq. ; prac- tical argument against this, 351 ; the contrary of this true, 352 ; the separability of, mental, 356; confounded with ideas, 402, et seq. ; examination into, IxxxiL et seq.

Mathematics, favourite study of the Pythagoreans, 22; Platonists reproved for partiality to, xxiv. ; in relation to what is good, 58, 857.

Matthew, St., quoted, 309, note.

Matter, how developed, 212, note, IL ; where different, the energy thereof different, 215, 1. ; not generated, 319, et seq.

Maurice, Rev. P. D., quoted, 57, note, 277, note, ix. ; his analysis of Aristotle's Metaphyfdcs re- commended, xcvi.

Measure, different sorts of, 255, et seq.; transferred, meaning of, 256; subject of, lix.

Kedia» mathematica],62, et seq. ; in f«lation to conttAries, 270, et seq.

Megarics, attack on the^ S30;

t40

INDEX

Athilam ascribed to the, 231, note. Memory, faculty of, in brutet, 8 ; Aristotle agrees with Locke here, 8, note. MeliBsuB, idealism of, 25; notice

of, ib. note. M4pos, 149, et seq. Mcra/SoAif, 809, et seq. Metaphysics, meaning of the term, 1, note ; not of human orig^ 10; dignity of, xi. et seq.; a science most honourable, 11; order of its development, ib. ziv. ; contrary to that of the other sciences, ib. ; unity of, 80 ; subject-matter of, 84,et seq.; 226,

• ^79, xiv. et seq.; a science of

the rh tvy 156, et seq., 280; design of, 6, 848, xo. ; reality of as a science, Izvi., et seq. M/9f^f, 28. yiiKpoXoylaf 53.

Mind, as an efficient cause, 20, note; how cognisant of itself, 831'; questions in regard of, 840, et seq. ; difficulties of a kuowle<ige of, 841, note. Mineralogy, illustration from the

f^ionoe of, 248, note. Monads, the iDcommensurability of, 868, et seq. ; their mutual difference, 878, etseq. ; what do thoy consist from ? 877. Movers, 124.

Moral philosophy, an examination into iv4pyua serviceable to, 236, note. More, Henricus, his "Enchiridion Metaphysicum,** referred to, 125, note: recommended as a study, xcvi. Motion, short of energy, 287, et seq. ; yiewed as what is indefi- nite, 304; different sorts of, 814, et seq. ; Aristotelian defi- nition of, Ixviii. Moeheim, the best commentator on Cudworth, 13, note ; his dis- s^^rtation of a ** Creation out of Kothing^" SIS, note.

MuUer, a 0., his " History of tite

Dorians," 274, note. MussBus, 9. Mutilation, defined, 151, et aeq. ;

eiplanations of, bearing on ih»

question of personal idmtitj,

ib. note.

N.

Name, import of the word, 216

etseq. Natural philosophy, science of, 157, 296, et seq.; theories iii| not akin to Ontology, 886, et seq. Naturalists, superiority of the Supranaturalists over the, zxit. Nature, defined, 117; the pri- mary matter, 118 ; a potenti- ality, 241 ; the Divine, 381, et seq. (See Qod.) VUrn, 412. Necessity, defined, 119, et seq.;

ethical aspect of, ib. note. Nectar, not the cause of the ex- istence of the Gk>ds, 70. Nirrri, 182, note. Niebuhr, referred to, 114, note^

152, note. Night, as an originating principle,

826, 329. Nihilism, the result of scepticisni,

68, 95, 104. Nil generari vel cormmpi, origin of this ancient dogma^ 13; Cudworth's acoonnt of it^ ibw note. N<fi9<rts, as compared with itoliiirts,

xliv. Non-ois, multifarious predication ot 311, note ; existence of, 895 ; generation from, 896, et 8e<|. N«Os, iccU vour^, 331. Numbers, viewed as princdplco, 75; ideal and mathematical, 366; are they monadic? 367; the generation of, 370 ; do they difier from monads ? 374, et seq. ; different sorts of, not to lie oon- founded together, 375, et

INDEX.

441

finite or infinite, 878, et s<9q.t what do they coneist from ? 8b 3, et seq. ; causality of, 409, et seq.; tested, 411; illustrated, 413. (See Pythagoras.) Numeration, different modes of, 365, ot seq.

0.

Objections, Aristotle notices, 6, note, 63, 82, 182, xxxil

Objective, proper notions in re- gard of the, Iviii, Ixiv.

Oceanus, a mere negative prin- ciple in Creation, 14, 405, zvii.

Ocellus Lucanus, 22, note.

Odeion, the, at Athens, 103, note.

OiKeia, 220, note.

• Okt(£s, 372.

OAos, 150, et seq.

OKvfiirta, 50.

"Ofiota dfioiots yiyydcTKrraif 71, note.

• Ofiov vdvra x^**"'-^ ^^> note,

318.

Ontology, conversant with causes, 7; is it manifold? 55, et seq.; nature of, 7fc; concerned with contraries, 81, et seq. ; necessity of such a science as, 158 ; ques- tions in, 277; unity of, 285; this shown from the science of mathematics, 286; distinctness of, as a science, 295, et seq.; aspect of entity omitted in, 300 ; a science of substance, 816. (See Metaphysics.)

Opposition, defined, 129, et seq. ; treated of in other parts of Aristotle's works, 265, note.

Optics, analogy from, 352.

Order, what is eternal presupposed in the phenomenon of, 282.

Origen, philosophic work o^ re- ferred to, 111, note. "Opoy, 92, note.

Orpheus, 9, note.

ObpavSs, 388, et seq.

Ohrla, 127, 167, 208, et seq.

C^icu, 348, ot seq.

P.

Pantheism, scepticism a system of, 93, et seq.

Paradox, origin of, 108.

napouofri}, 132, note.

Uapturrdrfis, 132, note.

Parmenides, notice of, 16, note; his system, 16, 25, 73 ; quoted, 395.

Part, 149, et seq.

Pasicles, reputed author of Book I. the Less, 53, note.

Passo, hia image of Mercury, 243, note.

UdBost 104, note.

Pai 1, St., quoted, 142, note.

Perception, is the object of, a composite nature? 342.

Tlfpl aytiBov, Aristotle's treatise, 84, note.

Peripatetics, mathematics not so highly esteemed amongst the, as amongst the Platonists, 58, note ; verbal quibbling of, 266, et seq.; compared with the Academics, zciii.

^Kfhos, 122, note.

^avraaia, 3, note; different from oXa-Oiia'ts, 102.

^dffis, 250, note.

Pherecydes, opinion of, 405 ; notice of, 405, note.

• iKofivela, term applied to philo-

sophy by Pliny, 9, note.

Philoponus, opinion on the origin of the word "metaphysics,** 1, note.

Philosopher, meaning of the term«  9. (See a'o<l>6s,)

Philosophy, the child of wonder, 11 ; best source of information on the Platonic, in connexion with the Socratio, 28 3 earliest dawn of, 45, et seq.; differs from sophistry and dialectics, 84 ; see "Ontology," and "Me- taphysics."

^opci, 252, note.

Physics, Aristotle refers to his, 1 ^ §90.

ii2

ISDTSX.

^fuffis, 117, etseq.

Plato, notice of, 27, note ; Ideal hy potiiesis of, 27, et seq. ; on mathe* matical substances, 28, et seq.; hia Logic in relation to his Ethics, 28, note; compared with the F^hagoreans, 29; what causes recognised by, 30 ; attack on, 87, et seq.; his opinions on first principles, 43, et seq. ; the Hip- pias of, 155; inconsistency of, 328, note ; review of the system of, 858, et seq. ; the Phsedo o^ 364. (See Ideal Theory.)

rieiades, an instance of nimieric harmony, 411.

Plurality, amounts to relation, 397 ; this truth extends to the other categories, 398.

Poets, authors of fictioa, 10; Aristotle's lost work on, 412, note.

Uoinffts, 181.

UoititikSs^ 130, note.

UoioSf 138, et seq.

U6(roif, 136, et seq.

Possession, defined, 147, et seq.

Potentiality, defined, 133, et seq. ; various modes of, 226 ; differ- ence of, from energy, 241, et seq.; subject of, examined into, lii. et seq.

nptt^is, in contradistinction to wpayij.a, 357, note, 410, note.

Precision, different degi*ees of, 62, et seq.

Predication, subject of multi farious, 166, note.

Priority, 131, et seq.

Privation, defined, 146, et seq.

n/>oct(p€(rts, 132, 301, ib. note.

Procession defined, 148, et seq.

Production, twofold, 50, note.

Propensions, end of our parti cular, 243, note.

IVotagoras, habit of his, 63 ; cen sure thereupon, ib. note ; origui of the system of, 97, xxxi. attack on, 291 ; practical argu ment against, 293, et seq. (3m Scepticism.)

Tlpthai owrUu, 888, et seq.

nptirri o&o-k, 881, et seq. ; 848.

Proverbs, quoted, 10, 11, note, 47

% instance of a symbol of 8ym> phony, 411.

Ycv5o$, defined, 158, et seq.

Yf W/jVo-Oot, applied to the Bysteni of Empedocles, 19 ; a phnuse to illustrate the dawn of PhiloBo* phy, 45, et seq., xxr,; may be applied to the Prima Philoao- phia, 45, note.

Psychology, the Aristotelian theo- logy in relation to, 67» note ; see " Mind."

Pythagoras, senior to Alcmsoon, 28.

Pythagoreans, system of the, 22 ; notice of the, 22, note ; oo-ordi- nate series of the, 23 ; imitated by tjue Platonists, 27 ; their notions about imity, 257 ; errors of the, about perfection, 832 ; their hypothesis of num- bers, 864; difficulties peculiar to the, 377) et seq.; cause of their failure, 380 ; discord amongst, 384 ; natural philoHO phers, why f 408 ; their views on

feneration, 404. (See Kum- ers.)

Quality defined, 138, et seq. ; pre- supposes substance, 200.

Quantity defined, 136, et seq.

Questions, eniuneration of, preli- minary to the study of Meta- physics, 55, et seq. ^

Quiddity indefinable, 218. (See Ontology.)

R.

Reasoning, logic illustrates the process of, xL note.

Recapitulation of Aristotie'a re- view of the Greek Philosophy, 30, xxii. ; of his attack on Seep- ticism, 109, et seq. ; of the ques* tions in regard of definitioOi 195, et seq.

IKDBX.

443

Refutntion, proof by, 88.

lieid, Dr Thomas, his '* Essays on our Intellectual Powers^** 842, note.

•Pell'. 859, 886.

Religion, intellectual assent in matters of, 120, note ; element of, in Aristotle's system, zci et seq.

Best, all things in a state of, 110.

Revelation, influence of, not al- lowed for in judging of anti- quity, xciv.

Review, analytical, of the Mate- rialists, xvi et seq. ; of the Py- thagoreans, zix. et seq. ; of the Platonists, xix. et seq., IzxxiiL et seq. ; see " Analysis."

'PvarfiSs, 21, 218.

S.

Scepticism, amounts to a denial of absolute existences, 91 ; equal to Pantheism, 98, et seq. ; sub- verts the difference between a£Ebrmation and negation, 94; overthrows the distinction be- tween truth and falsehood, 95, et seq. ; practical absurdities of, 96, et seq. ; sensational origin of, 99 ; different systems of, 109; attack on, 289, et seq.

Sceptics, Aristotle's plan of attack on the, 96, note, 97, note, 107, note, xxxiiL et seq. ; Ixiv. etseq. ; different sorts of, 98 ; practical refutation of the, 108, et seq.; some more easily overthrown than others, 294.

Scholastics, elevation by the, of the sense of sight over the rest, 2, note; reversnce of the, for Aristotle's category of causes, zvi. ; one great aim of their speculations, 141, note.

Science, different . from art, 6, note ; threefold division of spe- culative, 159 ; physical and ma- thematical, 297 ; oonverauit with the universal, 889.

Sensation, real objeciol^ 212, : subjectivity of, 294.

Senses, natui'al love of^ 1 ; contro- verted, 1, note ; decisive means of the knowledge of singulars, 5 ; not Mosdom, ib. ; criteria of truth, xzxv. note ; different testimony of, 105.

Sentiments, git)wth of our moral, lis, note.

Simonides, opinion of, quoted, 10 ; his K6yoi AraKroi, 408, note.

'Xifi^Ttis, 158 ; Mr. Maurice's trans- lation of, 158, note.

SimpliciuB, referred to, 21, note.

Singulars, indefinable, 204 ; any- thing separable from, 281, etseq.

Socrates, notice of, 28, note* proximate cause of Idealism, 28, 859 ; no patron of the Ideal hypothesis, 886, et seq.

Socrates, the younger, notice of, 194, note.

'So4>(a, 7, et seq.; 8, note; see Metaphysics.

Sophists, sect of the, 63, note; science of the, 161^; quibble of the, overthrown, 242; see "Dia- lectics."

Sophocles, quoted, 119.

2o^(, opinion of the ancient, 405 : Pherecydes amongst the, ib. note.

So^, analysis of the Aiistote* Uan, 7, xiv. note.

7fiip€va-is, 351.

Species, viewed as principles, 66, et seq.; inquiries relating to, 273, et seq.

Specidation, influence of habit on, 52 ; dignity of abstract, xiii

Speculative sciences, inventors of the, subjects of admiration, 6.

Speusippus, notice of, 168, note; dogma o^ 169 ; error about per- fection, 832.

Spontaneity, 301.

Subjective, the, in relation to ob- jective, 141, note.

Substance, defined, 127, et seq.; Metaphysics a science about, 166;

Hi

ODBX.

opinions concerning, 168, et seq. ; cognisant by sense, 212.

Substances, different sorts of, 5^'; classification o^ 60, note ; ^ )t to be needlessly multiplied, 2'/6, note; three in number, 8)7; opinions about, 348.

Stars, perpetuity of their motions, 246; their divinity, ib. note; nature of the, 834.

^T^oritns, defined, 146, et seq.

2roixf7oyf 115, note.

Styx, an object of adjuration amongst the gods, 14.

X^Kpia-is, 16.

S,vfAfit^K6s, 155, et seq.

I,£fjupva-i5f 117.

HwaK.riOfi^a'Oait 298, note.

Swex^S) 815, et seq.

^ijyoKov, 56, 169, et seq. ; zliii et seq.

^{po^os, 184, note.

^upovaia ^vxvff 225.

^6p$rros oCaicif 149.

Supranaturalists, system of the, 851, et seq; opinions amongst, 886 ; see '* Plato " and " Pytha- goreans."

Symbolism, recognised by Aris- totle, 246; imperfectly so, why ? IviL

Si/oToix^a, 23.

Syiianus, 201, note, Izzzviii

T.

Ti frSij, 279.

T^ Umavda, 281, note.

Tk nadjifAdriKa, 279.

TiirptJj T«, 189, et seq.

Tavr^nis, 55, 128, et seq.

Taylor, objection to his transla- tion of the Metaphysics, ix. note.

Termination, defined, 143, et seq.

TwTpayvvl^tiv, 59, note.

Trrpdj, 402.

Tethys, 14, xviL

Thales, system of, IS, et seq.; notice of, ib. note ; origin of the theoiy of, 14, xvii. ; Aristotle differed from, 115, notei

Thargelia, (celebrated after the Dionysia, 149; origin of the, ib. note. Thesetetus, Plato's, referred to,

110, note. Thebes, the famous expedition against, 411 ; object of the allu- sion, ib. note. Themistius, 829, note, 832, note,

835, note. Theogony, error of the ancient, xvii.

Theologians, what are, according to Anstotle, 827.

Theology, a subdiyision of meta- physics, 159, 297 ; most digni- fied of the speculative sciences, ib.; in relation to Ontology, xxxix. ; defect in the ancient, Ixxiv.; Aristotle's inconsistency in this remark,xa ; in relation to astronomy, 335, note ; fabulous^ 889 ; traditional, ib.

TtK€ioSt 142, etseq.

Time, measured by motion, 809.

Timeeus, the Locrian, 22, note.

T^ &ya06v, nature of the, in the old theogonies, 18, note ; Aris- totelian view of the, examined, Ixxxix. et seq.; as a cause, 114, note, 845; Empedocles and Auaxagoras thereon, ib.; no system can ignore it, 346; tiiere- fore Idealism ialae, ib.; see "Good."

t6 %v^ 121, et seq.

T6 €«, 410.

Tb tvy the, and rh ?y, as first prin* ciples, 72 ; defined, 125, et seq. viewed along with the rh tv as primary genera, 280 ; aspect of the, omitted in Ontology, xli ; see " Ontology.**

T6 euov, 10, 159, note.

Td rl 4<m, 157.

T(J Ti ^v c7mu, 171, et seq.

Transcendental, folly of denying what is, 282.

Transcf'ndentalism, discoverable in Aristotle, 282, note, xlii xcii.

INBES.

445

Trench, his Notes on tlie Pa- rables,*' referred to, 264, note.

T/Kwnf, 21, 218.

Truth, speculation about, 47, xxTi. et seq.; progressiveness of, 48, note ; relation of doubt to, 54, et seq. ; subjectivity of, 165; in relation to energy and capacity, 249, et seq., Iviii.

U.

• Tlio9pf an object of adjuration, 14 ;

Aristotle's meaning in the men- tion of this, ib. note.

• TAij, defined, 170 ; the subject of

tlangs cognisant to sense, 212.

Understanding, relation of the will to the, 801, note.

Unit, 124.

Unity, who was the author of the system of, xz. ; interchangeable term with entity, 81 ; defined, 121, et seq. ; nature of, 252 ; as a measure, 257 ; mateiialistio or idealistic, 257, note; opposed to plurality, 259, 267; as a first principle, 880.

UniyersaLs, are they substances? 199.

Universe, inquiry about its unity, 24, irrelevant to Ontology, ib. ; want of permanence in the, 148; 246; finite or infinite, 808; principles in, of a mingled de- scription, 405 ; see Gk)od.*'

Utility, inducement from, in favour of obedience, 339 ; not the ground of seeking knowledge.

V.

Vice, a quality of actions as well as virtue, 188, et seq.

Virtue, a perfection, 142 ; remark on this, ib., note ; an excellency of the parts, 146, note.

Volition, in relation to cut pro- pensions, 248, note.

W.

Water, a first principle, 9.

Whewell, Dr., refeiTed to, 48, note ; his work on Philosophy re- commended, zcvi

Will, when not perverted, strains after what is good, Izzvi; free- dom o^ in relation to Qod's moral government, 189, note ; the, in relation to the intellect, 141, note.

Wisdom, a speculative science, 9, note. (See Ontology, and Meta- physics.)

Wonder, in relation to philosophy, xvi.

Xenophanes, system of, 25; notice

of, 25, note ; allusion to, 101. Xc9purr6y ri, 67, et seq.

Z, a symbol of symphony, 411.

Zeal, the, of the detractor of Aristotle moderated by akncnt ledge of his workn. xliz.

Zeno, the Eleatio, 71.

THE END.

See also

• Energeia or Actus et potentia
• Four causes
• Categories
• Aristotle's metaphysics (full text)

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