Moral skepticism
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| - | '''Perspectivism''' is the [[philosophy|philosophical]] view developed by [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] that all [[Ideation (idea generation)|ideation]]s take place from particular [[Perspective (cognitive)|perspective]]s. This means that there are many possible [[conceptual scheme]]s, or perspectives in which judgment of [[truth]] or value can be made. This implies that no way of seeing the world can be taken as definitively "true", but does ''not'' necessarily entail that all perspectives are equally valid. | + | "'''Moral skepticism'''" denotes a [[Class (philosophy)|class]] of [[Meta-ethics|metaethical]] theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, [[Modal logic|modal]], claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to [[moral realism]]: the view that there are knowable, mind-independent moral truths. |
| + | Defenders of some form of moral skepticism include [[J. L. Mackie]] (1977), [[Max Stirner]], [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], [[Richard Joyce (philosopher)|Richard Joyce]] (2001), [[Michael Ruse]], Joshua Greene, Richard Garner, [[Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]] (2006b), and the psychologist [[James Flynn]]. Strictly speaking, [[Gilbert Harman]] (1975) argues in favor of a kind of [[moral relativism]], not moral skepticism. However, he has influenced some contemporary moral skeptics. | ||
| - | == Related topics == | + | ==See also== |
| - | *''[[Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard#Subjectivity|Truth is Subjectivity]]'', a concept on subjectivity by [[Søren Kierkegaard]] | + | |
| *[[Amoralism]] | *[[Amoralism]] | ||
| - | *[[Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche]] | + | *[[Friedrich Nietzsche]] |
| - | *[[Conceptual framework]] | + | *[[Non-cognitivism]] |
| - | *[[Empathy]] | + | *[[Perspectivism]] |
| - | *[[Fallibilism]] | + | *[[Psychological determinism]] |
| - | *[[Anekantavada]], a fundamental doctrine of Jainism setting forth a pluralistic metaphysics | + | |
| - | *[[Rhizome (philosophy)]] | + | |
| - | *[[Value pluralism]] | + | |
| - | *[[Metaphilosophy]] | + | |
| - | *[[Moral skepticism]] | + | |
| - | *[[Multiperspectivalism]], a current in Calvinist epistemology | + | |
| - | *[[Consilience]], the unity of knowledge | + | |
| - | *[[Intersubjectivity]] | + | |
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"Moral skepticism" denotes a class of metaethical theories all members of which entail that no one has any moral knowledge. Many moral skeptics also make the stronger, modal, claim that moral knowledge is impossible. Moral skepticism is particularly opposed to moral realism: the view that there are knowable, mind-independent moral truths.
Defenders of some form of moral skepticism include J. L. Mackie (1977), Max Stirner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Richard Joyce (2001), Michael Ruse, Joshua Greene, Richard Garner, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006b), and the psychologist James Flynn. Strictly speaking, Gilbert Harman (1975) argues in favor of a kind of moral relativism, not moral skepticism. However, he has influenced some contemporary moral skeptics.
See also
