Eliminative materialism
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| + | "The term was first introduced by [[James Cornman]] in a 1968 article entitled “[[On the Elimination of ‘Sensations’ and Sensations]]” (Cornman, 1968). However, the basic idea goes back at least as far as [[C. D. Broad]]'s classic, ''[[The Mind and its Place in Nature]]'' (Broad, 1925)."[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#BriHis] | ||
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| - | '''Eliminative materialism''' (also called '''eliminativism''') is a [[materialism|materialist]] position in the [[philosophy of mind]]. Its primary claim is that people's [[common-sense]] understanding of the [[mind]] (or [[folk psychology]]) is false and that certain [[Class (philosophy)|classes]] of [[:wikt:mental state|mental state]]s that most people believe in do not [[Existence|exist]]. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent [[Neural correlate|neural basis]] will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as [[belief]] or [[Desire (emotion)|desire]], since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of [[behaviour]] and [[experience]] should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. | + | '''Eliminative materialism''' (also called '''eliminativism''') is a [[materialism|materialist]] position in the [[philosophy of mind]]. Its primary claim is that people's [[common-sense]] understanding of the [[mind]] (or [[folk psychology]]) is false and that certain [[Class (philosophy)|classes]] of [[mental state|mental state]]s that most people believe in do not [[Existence|exist]]. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent [[Neural correlate|neural basis]] will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as [[belief]] or [[Desire (emotion)|desire]], since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of [[behaviour]] and [[experience]] should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. |
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
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"The term was first introduced by James Cornman in a 1968 article entitled “On the Elimination of ‘Sensations’ and Sensations” (Cornman, 1968). However, the basic idea goes back at least as far as C. D. Broad's classic, The Mind and its Place in Nature (Broad, 1925)."[1] |
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Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Its primary claim is that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. Some eliminativists argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level.
See also
- Epiphenomenalism
- Functionalism
- Mind-body problem
- Monism
- Nihilism
- Phenomenology
- Physicalism
- Property dualism
- Reductionism
- Scientism
- Substance dualism
