Concept and object
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| - | A '''concept''' is an [[abstraction|abstract]] [[idea]] or a mental symbol, typically associated with a corresponding representation in and [[language]] or [[symbology]]. It is something understood, and retained in the mind, from experience, reasoning and/or imagination; a [[generalization]] (generic, basic form), or abstraction (mental impression), of a particular set of instances or occurrences (specific, though different, recorded manifestations of the concept). | + | In the [[philosophy of language]], the distinction between '''concept and object''' is attributable to the German philosopher [[Gottlob Frege]]. |
| - | == See also == | + | |
| - | <div style="-moz-column-count:4; column-count:4;"> | + | According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists of an expression (a [[proper names|proper name]] or a general term plus the definite article) that signifies an Object together with a predicate (the [[copula (linguistics)|copula]] "is", plus a general term accompanied by the indefinite article or an adjective) that signifies (''bedeutet'') a Concept. Thus "Socrates is a philosopher" consists of "Socrates", which signifies the Object ''Socrates'', and "is a philosopher", which signifies the Concept of ''being a philosopher''. |
| - | * [[Abstraction]] | + | |
| - | * [[Categorization]] | + | This was a considerable departure from the traditional [[term logic]], in which every proposition (i.e. sentence) consisted of two [[general term]]s joined by the copula "is". |
| - | * [[Class (philosophy)]] | + | |
| - | * [[Notion (philosophy)]] | + | The distinction was of fundamental importance to the development of logic and mathematics. Frege's distinction helped to clarify the notions of a [[set theory|set]], of the membership relation between element and set, and of [[empty set|empty]] and [[infinite set]]s. However, Frege's conception of a class (in his terminology an extension of a concept) differs from the current iterative conception of a set. |
| - | * [[Concept and object]] | + | |
| - | * [[Concept car]] | + | Frege's distinction leads to the famous difficulty or "awkwardness of language" that some expressions which purport to signify a concept - Frege's example is "the concept ''horse''" - are grammatically expressions that by his criterion signify an Object. Thus "the concept ''horse'' is not a concept, whereas the city of Berlin is a city". |
| - | * [[Concept learning]] | + | |
| - | * [[Concept map]] | + | [[Anthony Kenny]] sought to justify the distinction, other philosophers such as Hartley Slater and [[Crispin Wright]] have argued that the distinguished category of ''entity'' cannot be associated with predication in the way that individual objects are associated with the use of [[singular term]]s. |
| - | * [[Concept single]] | + | |
| - | * [[Conceptual art]] | + | |
| - | * [[Conceptual blending]] | + | |
| - | * [[Conceptual clustering]] | + | |
| - | * [[Conceptual framework]] | + | |
| - | * [[Conceptual history]] (also termed: 'History of concepts' or 'Begriffsgeschichte') | + | |
| - | * [[Conveyed concept]] | + | |
| - | * [[Definitionism]] | + | |
| - | * [[Formal concept analysis]] | + | |
| - | * [[Fuzzy concept]] | + | |
| - | * [[Hypostatic abstraction]] | + | |
| - | * [[Idea]] | + | |
| - | * [[Meme]] | + | |
| - | * [[Misconception]] | + | |
| - | * [[Object (philosophy)]] | + | |
| - | * [[Philosophy]] | + | |
| - | * [[Schema (Kant)]] | + | |
| - | * [[Social construction]] | + | |
| - | * [[Symbol grounding]] problem | + | |
| - | </div> | + | |
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In the philosophy of language, the distinction between concept and object is attributable to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege.
According to Frege, any sentence that expresses a singular thought consists of an expression (a proper name or a general term plus the definite article) that signifies an Object together with a predicate (the copula "is", plus a general term accompanied by the indefinite article or an adjective) that signifies (bedeutet) a Concept. Thus "Socrates is a philosopher" consists of "Socrates", which signifies the Object Socrates, and "is a philosopher", which signifies the Concept of being a philosopher.
This was a considerable departure from the traditional term logic, in which every proposition (i.e. sentence) consisted of two general terms joined by the copula "is".
The distinction was of fundamental importance to the development of logic and mathematics. Frege's distinction helped to clarify the notions of a set, of the membership relation between element and set, and of empty and infinite sets. However, Frege's conception of a class (in his terminology an extension of a concept) differs from the current iterative conception of a set.
Frege's distinction leads to the famous difficulty or "awkwardness of language" that some expressions which purport to signify a concept - Frege's example is "the concept horse" - are grammatically expressions that by his criterion signify an Object. Thus "the concept horse is not a concept, whereas the city of Berlin is a city".
Anthony Kenny sought to justify the distinction, other philosophers such as Hartley Slater and Crispin Wright have argued that the distinguished category of entity cannot be associated with predication in the way that individual objects are associated with the use of singular terms.
