Balance of threat
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| - | The phrase "'''balance of terror'''" is usually, but not invariably, used in reference to the [[nuclear arms race]] between the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] during the [[Cold War]]. | ||
| - | It describes the tenuous peace that existed between the two countries as a result of both governments being terrified at the prospect of a world-destroying [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear war]]. The term is usually used for rhetorical purposes, and was probably coined by [[Lester Pearson]] in June 1955 at the 10th anniversary of the signing of the [[UN Charter]]: "the balance of terror has succeeded the balance of power". | + | The '''balance of threat''' ('''BoT''') theory was proposed by [[Stephen M. Walt]] first in an article titled "''Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power''" published in the journal ''[[International Security]]'' in 1985 and later further elaborated in his book ''"The Origins of Alliances"'' (1987). The balance of threat theory modified the popular [[Balance of power in international relations|balance of power]] theory in the [[Neorealism (international relations)|neorealist]] school of [[international relations]]. |
| - | Some political scientists use this phrase as a means of differentiating the world situation that followed [[World War II]] from that which preceded it. Previously, [[empire]]s had prevented war between each other by maintaining a relative balance of their ability (economic, military, and political) to wage war against each other—the phrase "[[balance of power in international relations|balance of power]]" was often used to describe this kind of tentative peace. | + | According to balance of threat theory, states' [[alliance]] behavior is determined by the [[threat]] they perceive from other states. Walt contends that states will generally [[balancing in international relations|balance]] by allying against a perceived threat, although very weak states are more likely to [[bandwagoning|bandwagon]] with the rising threat in order to protect their own [[National security|security]]. He points to the example of the alliance patterns of European states before and during [[Allies of World War I|World War I]] and [[Allies of World War II|World War II]], when nations with a significantly greater combined power allied against the recognized threat of German [[expansionism]]. |
| - | The [[atomic bomb]] created a new political reality, in which two [[superpower]]s had the ability to destroy each other and at least gravely damage all of human civilization. The obstacle to war between the [[communism|communists]] and [[capitalism|capitalists]] was no longer the fear that the other side was more powerful, but rather the realization that nuclear arsenals were now large enough and deadly enough that winning would still likely result in the destruction of one's own country and perhaps the rest of the world as well. | + | Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: its aggregate '''strength''' (size, population, and economic capabilities), its '''geographic proximity''', its '''offensive capabilities''', and its '''offensive intentions'''. Walt argues that the more other states view a [[Rising Power|rising state]] as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and balance against it. |
| - | In this counterintuitive way, the existence of the most powerful weapons ever created actually supported a kind of peace: while many wars were fought around the world during the Cold War, the superpowers never fought each other directly, nor have atomic bombs been dropped in war since the [[atomic bombing of Nagasaki]] in 1945. | + | Balance of threat theory modified [[Realism (international relations)|realism]] (as well as the [[Neorealism (international relations)|neorealism]] of [[Kenneth Waltz]]) by separating [[Power (international relations)|power]] from threat. In balance of power theory, which had previously dominated realist analyses, states balance against others whose power (i.e., military capabilities) was rising—greater power was assumed to reflect offensive intentions. Walt argues that this is not borne out by empirical evidence, and that balance of threat theory—in which states will not balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions—gives a better account of the evidence. For instance, the [[United States]] was most powerful of the two [[Superpower|superpowers]] during the [[Cold War]], but, contrary to the balance of power theory, more states (e.g., the [[NATO]] nations) allied with it than with the [[Soviet Union]] because the United States displayed much less aggressive intentions toward them than did the Soviet Union. |
| - | [[Lawrence Summers]], after the financial meltdown of 2008, adopted the term as appropriate for the situation of a 'financial balance of terror' in global markets. | + | The flaw of the balance of power theory became even more striking after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. With its power [[Polarity (international relations)|unbalanced]], Walt argued in 2004, the United States is still formally allied with NATO, [[Japan]], [[South Korea]] and several other countries, and hints that the U.S. might withdraw its forces still tend to provoke requests for a continued U.S. presence. |
| - | ==Uses== | + | [[Balancing (international relations)|Counterbalancing]] coalitions predicted by the balance of power theory hardly appeared: |
| - | *[[John F. Kennedy]] used the phrase in his 1961 [[inaugural address]], when he described the U.S. and the Soviet Union, "both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war". | + | |
| - | *[[Albert Wohlstetter]] of the [[RAND Corporation]] wrote a paper entitled "The Delicate Balance of Terror" in 1958. | + | :"Responses to U.S. primacy pale in comparison to self-defeating self-encirclement that [[German Empire|Wilhelmine Germany]] or the Soviet Union provoked, cases where most of the other major powers made formal or informal alliances to contain or defeat these powerful expansionist states … To date, at least, there is little sign of a serious effort to forge a meaningful anti-American alliance ... Instead of facing a combined coalition of major powers, united by a common desire to contain American power, the main adversaries of the United States have been the isolated and oppressive regimes… that possess little power and even less international support. With enemies like these, one might ask, who needs friends? From the traditional perspective of balance-of-power theory, this situation is surely an anomaly. Power in the international system is about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies are remarkably mild. It is possible to find them, but one has to squint pretty hard to do it ... The anomaly of states failing to balance U.S. power vanishes when we focus not on power but on threats. Although the United States is enormously powerful relative to other states, it has not been perceived as a major threat by most other powers. |
| ==See also== | ==See also== | ||
| - | *[[Balance of power (disambiguation)|Balance of power]] | + | * [[Balance of power in international relations]] |
| - | *[[Balance of power in international relations]] | + | * [[Balance of terror]] |
| - | *[[Balance of threat]] | + | * [[Balancing in international relations]] |
| - | *[[Deterrence theory]] | + | * [[Bandwagoning]] |
| - | *[[Long Peace]] | + | * [[Peace through strength]] |
| - | *[[Mutual assured destruction]] | + | |
| - | *[[Nuclear peace]] | + | |
| - | *[[Peace through strength]] | + | |
| - | *[[Reagan Doctrine]] | + | |
| {{GFDL}} | {{GFDL}} | ||
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The balance of threat (BoT) theory was proposed by Stephen M. Walt first in an article titled "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power" published in the journal International Security in 1985 and later further elaborated in his book "The Origins of Alliances" (1987). The balance of threat theory modified the popular balance of power theory in the neorealist school of international relations.
According to balance of threat theory, states' alliance behavior is determined by the threat they perceive from other states. Walt contends that states will generally balance by allying against a perceived threat, although very weak states are more likely to bandwagon with the rising threat in order to protect their own security. He points to the example of the alliance patterns of European states before and during World War I and World War II, when nations with a significantly greater combined power allied against the recognized threat of German expansionism.
Walt identifies four criteria states use to evaluate the threat posed by another state: its aggregate strength (size, population, and economic capabilities), its geographic proximity, its offensive capabilities, and its offensive intentions. Walt argues that the more other states view a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to view it as a threat and balance against it.
Balance of threat theory modified realism (as well as the neorealism of Kenneth Waltz) by separating power from threat. In balance of power theory, which had previously dominated realist analyses, states balance against others whose power (i.e., military capabilities) was rising—greater power was assumed to reflect offensive intentions. Walt argues that this is not borne out by empirical evidence, and that balance of threat theory—in which states will not balance against those who are rising in power but do not display offensive intentions—gives a better account of the evidence. For instance, the United States was most powerful of the two superpowers during the Cold War, but, contrary to the balance of power theory, more states (e.g., the NATO nations) allied with it than with the Soviet Union because the United States displayed much less aggressive intentions toward them than did the Soviet Union.
The flaw of the balance of power theory became even more striking after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. With its power unbalanced, Walt argued in 2004, the United States is still formally allied with NATO, Japan, South Korea and several other countries, and hints that the U.S. might withdraw its forces still tend to provoke requests for a continued U.S. presence.
Counterbalancing coalitions predicted by the balance of power theory hardly appeared:
- "Responses to U.S. primacy pale in comparison to self-defeating self-encirclement that Wilhelmine Germany or the Soviet Union provoked, cases where most of the other major powers made formal or informal alliances to contain or defeat these powerful expansionist states … To date, at least, there is little sign of a serious effort to forge a meaningful anti-American alliance ... Instead of facing a combined coalition of major powers, united by a common desire to contain American power, the main adversaries of the United States have been the isolated and oppressive regimes… that possess little power and even less international support. With enemies like these, one might ask, who needs friends? From the traditional perspective of balance-of-power theory, this situation is surely an anomaly. Power in the international system is about as unbalanced as it has ever been, yet balancing tendencies are remarkably mild. It is possible to find them, but one has to squint pretty hard to do it ... The anomaly of states failing to balance U.S. power vanishes when we focus not on power but on threats. Although the United States is enormously powerful relative to other states, it has not been perceived as a major threat by most other powers.
See also
- Balance of power in international relations
- Balance of terror
- Balancing in international relations
- Bandwagoning
- Peace through strength
